Edwina, List: Lest we get bogged down any further in yet another tiresome exegetical battle, I will simply say that I find almost nothing in your last post to be consistent with my understanding of Peirce's own thought. I once again leave it to the List community to decide which of us--if either of us--has demonstrated the more accurate interpretation.
Regards, Jon On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are locked in > terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is identical > with that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion. > > My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only function > within Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the sense of it being a > generality [ie., the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it does *exist* > as a *state* of 'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a feeling, an > openness, BUT, this state *is itself an experience, entire in itself*, > and as such, it *exists* within that experience of its fullness. There is > no such thing as an unembodied Firstness! Since it is a *state of > experience*, then, it must be embodied. It is simply 'complete', so to > speak and not open to the Otherness of analysis or reaction. > > You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, too narrow an > understanding of the three categories and of the term 'existence'. > > I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness in the absence > of Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be chaos, but i > don't see this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos, therefore, > where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, > in which nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411. My reading of that, > is that there was no matter in a mode of Firstness or Secondness in this > 'original chaos' - no 'existences' and no 'feelings'. Nothing. > > Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology) > > Edwina, List: > > Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with Peirce's. > Firstness is real, but does not exist. It has no Relations, because any > Relation requires Secondness. "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and > Secondness in the absence of Thirdness. Accepting any matter of fact--such > as the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable, > because it blocks the way of inquiry. Nothing new here, so I will leave it > at that. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different >> actions. >> >> With regard to Firstness, I see it, as a spontaneous *state* *of >> existence* which *might* then act upon/be reacted to.., in the 'fullness >> of this state'. The point of all the categories is that they operate within >> Relations; they are not isolate in themselves. Firstness, as that >> *spontaneous >> state of existence* [which might dissipate in a nanosecond if it doesn't >> *bond/relate* to another entity]...can provide a novel form of existence. >> >> For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell *might* be accepted by >> other cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, *might >> not* be accepted and its energy-content would dissipate. >> >> Or, a novel mode of transportation [*Uber*] might suddenly develop and >> might spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it might >> disappear in a month. >> >> The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir >> provides has on other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect >> changes in the larger system. >> >> Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and refer >> to 1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see this as >> a transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider that the >> pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of Firstness, >> Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing]. >> >> Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and >> 'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is >> no explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with one - >> certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist, >> then, I'm not going to offer a self-organized belief in god as having been >> First Cause. I simply don't know. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> >> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >> Cosmology) >> >> Clark, List: >> >> Your points, as usual, are well-taken. Is it helpful at all to refer to >> "actualization," rather than "cause"? Edwina's position, as I understand >> it, is that our existing universe is not only self-*organizing *but also >> self-*generating *or self-*originating*; as Houser put it in his >> introduction to EP 1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the >> chaos is self-actualizing." This is the crucial transition from Firstness >> (possibility) to Secondness (actuality), and the word "somehow" reflects >> the fact that Houser's attempt to summarize Peirce's cosmology effectively >> leaves this step unexplained. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: >> >>> On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>> wrote: >>> >>> ET: Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the >>> term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of >>> habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him >>> to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a >>> causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state. >>> >>> No, I understood exactly what you meant. My disagreement is that I take >>> "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather than >>> randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that could >>> ever be "a causal force." I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but >>> you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad >>> thing! >>> >>> Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by equivocating over >>> the term ‘cause.’ In a certain cause pure freedom or spontaneity isn’t >>> causal and in an other sense it must be. Effectively each firstness is its >>> own unmoved mover. The problem is that making sense of causality at all >>> when little is necessary and most things are underdetermined is >>> problematic. >>> >>> I think causality is problematic for a variety of other reasons too. For >>> instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic Newtonian >>> formulation of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the Hamiltonian >>> or Lagrangian forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet metaphysically >>> quite conceptually different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution of the wave >>> function (what in quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or Schrodinger >>> equation) and it’s hard to make sense of causality in terms of it. >>> >>> Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have classic arguments against >>> causality being continuous. (Basically part of the same extended argument I >>> linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where any sign can be >>> divided it’s worth asking if we have causality at all. >>> >>> Despite these problems of causality we all use the term causality. >>> >>> He referenced the same series of articles in what was probably his very >>> first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few other comments >>> about it that are relevant to this discussion. >>> >>> CSP: I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all >>> experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my >>> original hypothesis,) developments out of utterly causeless determinations >>> of single events, under a certain universal tendency toward habit-forming >>> ... But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis first >>> suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty features >>> of the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others >>> and have struck me in my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked >>> that my theory was not so much evolutionary as it was emanational; and >>> Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some original >>> tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis; >>> while I myself was most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the law >>> of sequence in time, if I proposed to make all laws develope from single >>> events; since an event already supposes Time. (R 842, emphasis added) >>> >>> I think this might be better read as there being no cause *for* firstness >>> not that firstness can’t be seen a not causal. Again I suspect we’re >>> talking past one an other again but the mere fact firstness can be an >>> element in a triadic sign more or less entails a certain sense of >>> causation. (Although I prefer Peirce’s term determination although that too >>> has the genealogy in problematic metaphysical understanding) >>> >>> I should add that this problem of language for this foundational event >>> isn’t new. You see similar debates in late antiquity over whether the >>> platonic One is one or ought to be considered two emanation steps. While >>> I’ll confess to finding such matters idle talk there’s usually a logical >>> reason for the analaysis. (Much like the whole disparaged “how many angels >>> could dance on a pin” makes sense in the context of the debates over kinds >>> in medieval scholasticism) >>> >>
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