Jon, Edwina, Clark, List, Perhaps this back and forth--especially the tone and tendency towards repetition--has gotten "tiresome" for some readers as well as the most active participants.
I had hoped my suggestion a while back of a Platonic cosmos *pre*-the Big Bang (note: of course I completely agree with Clark that one shouldn't really bring such very much later notions into the picture, which is why I used the modifier "loosely" when I last referred to it--but what language *do* we have to distinguish the early cosmos Peirce describes in the last lecture of the 1898 *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* from *this, our,* existential one?) *contra* a more Aristotelian cosmos once there *exists* a, shall we say, *particular* three category semiosic universe might be helpful in moving this discussion forward. So, my question: Are these two different? If so, how so? If not, why not? One thing I would be very interested in is what Edwina, Clark, and others make of the final 1898 lecture, esp. the blackboard metaphor. Here, as I interpret it, Peirce seems not at all to be considering the semiosic universe we inhabit, but *the conditions* *for any, perhaps many, possible universe(s) to arise*. Unlike the Neglected Argument essay, there is no explicit mention of God here, and Peirce seems to be making a purely scientific hypothesis. So, perhaps, dropping the God-talk for a moment, what is Peirce attempting in RLT? Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 8:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Edwina, List: > > Lest we get bogged down any further in yet another tiresome exegetical > battle, I will simply say that I find almost nothing in your last post to > be consistent with my understanding of Peirce's own thought. I once again > leave it to the List community to decide which of us--if either of us--has > demonstrated the more accurate interpretation. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 6:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> > wrote: > >> Jon - as Clark has been trying to point out, you and I are locked in >> terminological difficulties. Your insistence that YOUR use is identical >> with that of Peirce's use - is simply your own opinion. >> >> My reading of Peirce is that all three categorical modes only function >> within Relations. Firstness is NOT 'real' in the sense of it being a >> generality [ie., the reality of the laws of Thirdness] and it does >> *exist* as a *state* of 'existentiality; i.e., as a quality, a feeling, >> an openness, BUT, this state *is itself an experience, entire in itself*, >> and as such, it *exists* within that experience of its fullness. There >> is no such thing as an unembodied Firstness! Since it is a *state of >> experience*, then, it must be embodied. It is simply 'complete', so to >> speak and not open to the Otherness of analysis or reaction. >> >> You confine 'existence' to Secondness - which is, I feel, too narrow an >> understanding of the three categories and of the term 'existence'. >> >> I disagree that 'pure nothing' is Firstness and Secondness in the absence >> of Thirdness. I agree that without Thirdness - it would be chaos, but i >> don't see this as PURE nothing. After all, 'the original chaos, therefore, >> where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, >> in which nothing existed or really happened". 1. 411. My reading of that, >> is that there was no matter in a mode of Firstness or Secondness in this >> 'original chaos' - no 'existences' and no 'feelings'. Nothing. >> >> Now - of course, and as usual, you can disagree with me. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 7:25 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >> Cosmology) >> >> Edwina, List: >> >> Once again, I find your use of terminology inconsistent with Peirce's. >> Firstness is real, but does not exist. It has no Relations, because any >> Relation requires Secondness. "Pure nothing" is the chaos of Firstness and >> Secondness in the absence of Thirdness. Accepting any matter of fact--such >> as the origin of our existing universe--as inexplicable is unacceptable, >> because it blocks the way of inquiry. Nothing new here, so I will leave it >> at that. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> >> wrote: >> >>> I think that 'actualization' and 'cause' are two entirely different >>> actions. >>> >>> With regard to Firstness, I see it, as a spontaneous *state* *of >>> existence* which *might* then act upon/be reacted to.., in the >>> 'fullness of this state'. The point of all the categories is that they >>> operate within Relations; they are not isolate in themselves. Firstness, as >>> that *spontaneous state of existence* [which might dissipate in a >>> nanosecond if it doesn't *bond/relate* to another entity]...can provide >>> a novel form of existence. >>> >>> For example, a spontaneous mutation of a cell *might* be accepted by >>> other cells and might become part of the organism's nature. Or, *might >>> not* be accepted and its energy-content would dissipate. >>> >>> Or, a novel mode of transportation [*Uber*] might suddenly develop and >>> might spread to other domains. Or, like many a new invention - it might >>> disappear in a month. >>> >>> The causality of Firstness is the Relations that the novelty ir >>> provides has on other organisms/entities. It can actually cause/effect >>> changes in the larger system. >>> >>> Yes, I see the universe as self-emergent and self-organizing - and refer >>> to 1.412 for the Peircean outline of these actions. But I don't see this as >>> a transition from Firstness to Secondness, for I don't consider that the >>> pre-universe was in any categorical mode [ie, not in a mode of Firstness, >>> Secondness or Thirdness. It was simply nothing]. >>> >>> Certainly, the 'somehow', i.e., the bridge between 'nothing' and >>> 'something' is not explained beyond a 'chance flash'. But because there is >>> no explanation, does not mean that I can or even should come up with one - >>> certainly, science hasn't been able to do so, and since I'm an atheist, >>> then, I'm not going to offer a self-organized belief in god as having been >>> First Cause. I simply don't know. >>> >>> Edwina >>> >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>> *To:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> >>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu> >>> *Sent:* Thursday, November 03, 2016 5:59 PM >>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's >>> Cosmology) >>> >>> Clark, List: >>> >>> Your points, as usual, are well-taken. Is it helpful at all to refer to >>> "actualization," rather than "cause"? Edwina's position, as I understand >>> it, is that our existing universe is not only self-*organizing *but >>> also self-*generating *or self-*originating*; as Houser put it in his >>> introduction to EP 1, "Somehow, the possibility or potentiality of the >>> chaos is self-actualizing." This is the crucial transition from Firstness >>> (possibility) to Secondness (actuality), and the word "somehow" reflects >>> the fact that Houser's attempt to summarize Peirce's cosmology effectively >>> leaves this step unexplained. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Thu, Nov 3, 2016 at 4:29 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote: >>> >>>> On Nov 3, 2016, at 1:50 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >>>> wrote: >>>> >>>> ET: Of course I didn't mean an individual [human or god] force by the >>>> term of 'chance'!. I find that Jon jumps to disagree with me as a matter of >>>> habit. Either that, or his tendency to read in a literal manner leads him >>>> to such conclusions. I meant 'chance or Firstness or spontaneity as a >>>> causal force - and there's plenty of comments in Peirce on just this state. >>>> >>>> No, I understood exactly what you meant. My disagreement is that I >>>> take "chance" (in Peirce's usage) to be freedom or spontaneity, rather than >>>> randomness or inexplicability; and it is certainly not something that could >>>> ever be "a causal force." I even quoted Peirce to support this view, but >>>> you refer to my "tendency to read in a literal manner" as if it were a bad >>>> thing! >>>> >>>> Again I think we’re all talking past one an other by equivocating over >>>> the term ‘cause.’ In a certain cause pure freedom or spontaneity isn’t >>>> causal and in an other sense it must be. Effectively each firstness is its >>>> own unmoved mover. The problem is that making sense of causality at all >>>> when little is necessary and most things are underdetermined is >>>> problematic. >>>> >>>> I think causality is problematic for a variety of other reasons too. >>>> For instance in terms of physics we could oppose the classic Newtonian >>>> formulation of mechanics in terms of forces and masses to the Hamiltonian >>>> or Lagrangian forms. They’re mathematically equivalent yet metaphysically >>>> quite conceptually different. The Hamiltonian is the evolution of the wave >>>> function (what in quantum mechanics becomes the Dirac or Schrodinger >>>> equation) and it’s hard to make sense of causality in terms of it. >>>> >>>> Likewise again turning to Duns Scotus we have classic arguments against >>>> causality being continuous. (Basically part of the same extended argument I >>>> linked to earlier for a first cause) For Peirce where any sign can be >>>> divided it’s worth asking if we have causality at all. >>>> >>>> Despite these problems of causality we all use the term causality. >>>> >>>> He referenced the same series of articles in what was probably his very >>>> first draft of "A Neglected Argument" (1908), and made a few other comments >>>> about it that are relevant to this discussion. >>>> >>>> CSP: I there contended that the laws of nature, and, indeed, all >>>> experiential laws, have been results of evolution, being (such was my >>>> original hypothesis,) developments out of utterly causeless determinations >>>> of single events, under a certain universal tendency toward habit-forming >>>> ... But during the long years which have elapsed since the hypothesis first >>>> suggested itself to me, it may naturally be supposed that faulty features >>>> of the original hypothesis have been brought [to] my attention by others >>>> and have struck me in my own meditations. Dr. Edward Montgomery remarked >>>> that my theory was not so much evolutionary as it was emanational; and >>>> Professor Ogden Rood pointed out that there must have been some original >>>> tendency to take habits which did not arise according to my hypothesis; >>>> while I myself was most struck by the difficulty of so explaining the law >>>> of sequence in time, if I proposed to make all laws develope from single >>>> events; since an event already supposes Time. (R 842, emphasis added) >>>> >>>> I think this might be better read as there being no cause *for* firstness >>>> not that firstness can’t be seen a not causal. Again I suspect we’re >>>> talking past one an other again but the mere fact firstness can be an >>>> element in a triadic sign more or less entails a certain sense of >>>> causation. (Although I prefer Peirce’s term determination although that too >>>> has the genealogy in problematic metaphysical understanding) >>>> >>>> I should add that this problem of language for this foundational event >>>> isn’t new. You see similar debates in late antiquity over whether the >>>> platonic One is one or ought to be considered two emanation steps. While >>>> I’ll confess to finding such matters idle talk there’s usually a logical >>>> reason for the analaysis. (Much like the whole disparaged “how many angels >>>> could dance on a pin” makes sense in the context of the debates over kinds >>>> in medieval scholasticism) >>>> >>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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