Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis

[Stanley N Salthe]

Mark -- What Shannon referred to as 'entropy' was 'variety'. 'Information'
per se was achieved by way of a reduction or winnowing of this variety of
possibilities, leaving 'information' to survive.

STAN

On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 10:24 PM, Burgin, Mark 
wrote:

> Dear Loet,
> Only one remark. There is no Shannon-type information but there is
> Shannon's measure of information, which is called entropy.
>
> Sincerely,
> Mark
>
>
>
> On 5/23/2018 10:44 PM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
>
> Dear Mark, Soren, and colleagues,
>
> The easiest distinction is perhaps Descartes' one between* res cogitans*
>  and* res extensa* as two different realities. Our knowledge in each case
> that things could have been different is not out there in the world as
> something seizable such as piece of wood.
>
> Similarly, uncertainty in the case of a distribution is not seizable, but
> it can be expressed in bits of information (as one measure among others).
> The grandiose step of Shannon was, in my opinion, to enable us to
> operationalize Descartes'* cogitans* and make it amenable to the
> measurement as information.
>
> Shannon-type information is dimensionless. It is provided with meaning by
> a system of reference (e.g., an observer or a discourse). Some of us prefer
> to call only thus-meaningful information real information because it is
> embedded. One can also distinguish it from Shannon-type information as
> Bateson-type information. The latter can be debated as physical.
>
> In the ideal case of an elastic collision of "billard balls", the physical
> entropy (S= kB * H) goes to zero. However, if two particles have a
> distribution of momenta of 3:7 before a head-on collision, this
> distribution will change in the ideal case into 7:3. Consequently, the
> probabilistic entropy is .7 log2 (.7/.3) + .3 log2 (.3/.7) =  .86 – .37 =
> .49 bits of information. One thus can prove that this information is not
> physical.
>
> Best,
> Loet
>
> --
>
> Loet Leydesdorff
>
> Professor emeritus, University of Amsterdam
> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
>
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
> Associate Faculty, SPRU, University of
> Sussex;
>
> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. ,
> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
> Beijing;
>
> Visiting Fellow, Birkbeck , University of London;
> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en
>
>
> -- Original Message --
> From: "Burgin, Mark" 
> To: "Søren Brier" ; "Krassimir Markov" ;
> "fis@listas.unizar.es"  
> Sent: 5/24/2018 4:23:53 AM
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis
>
> Dear Søren,
> You response perfectly supports my analysis. Indeed, for you only the
> Physical World is real. So, information has to by physical if it is real,
> or it cannot be real if it is not physical.
> Acceptance of a more advanced model of the World, which includes other
> realities, as it was demonstrated in my book “Structural Reality,” allows
> understand information as real but not physical.
>
>Sincerely,
>Mark
>
> On 5/17/2018 3:29 AM, Søren Brier wrote:
>
> Dear Mark
>
>
>
> Using ’physical’ this way it just tends to mean ’real’, but that raises
> the problem of how to define real. Is chance real? I Gödel’s theorem or
> mathematics and logic in general (the world of form)? Is subjectivity and
> self-awareness, qualia? I do believe you are a conscious subject with
> feelings, but I cannot feel it, see it, measure it. Is it physical then?? I
> only see what you write and your behavior. And are the meaning of your
> sentences physical? So here we touch phenomenology (the experiential) and
> hermeneutics (meaning and interpretation) and more generally semiotics (the
> meaning of signs in cognition and communication). We have problems
> encompassing these aspects in the natural, the quantitative and the
> technical sciences that makes up the foundation of most conceptions of
> information science.
>
>
>
>   Best
>
>   Søren
>
>
>
> *Fra:* Fis   *På
> vegne af *Krassimir Markov
> *Sendt:* 17. maj 2018 11:33
> *Til:* fis@listas.unizar.es; Burgin, Mark 
> 
> *Emne:* Re: [Fis] Is information physical? A logical analysis
>
>
>
> Dear Mark and FIS Colleagues,
>
>
>
> First of all. I support the idea of Mark to write a paper and to publish
> it in IJ ITA.
>
> It will be nice to continue our common work this way.
>
>
>
> At the second place, I want to point that till now the discussion on
>
> *Is information physical?*
>
> was more-less chaotic – we had no thesis and antithesis to discuss and to
> come to some conclusions.
>
>
>
> I think now, the Mark’s letter may be used as the needed thesis.
>
>
>
> What about the ant-thesis? Well, I will try to write something below.
>
>
>
>
>
> For me, physical, structural and mental  are one and the same.
>
>
>
> Mental m

Re: [Fis] Fw: The 'Shirasawa phenomenon' or the 'Shirasawa effect"

[Stanley N Salthe]

Sung -- regarding:

The reason epigenetics (defined here as the process of inheritance without
imlplicating any changes in the nucleotide sequences of DNA)  was not
mentioned in my previous post is because I was mainly interested in the
bottom-up (from micro to macro) mechanism of genetics, not the top-down
(from macro to micro) mechanism.  It is interesting to note that our brain
seems unable to handle both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms
simultaneously, perhaps it may have something to do with the fact that we
have two brain hemispheres (Yin and Yang) but only one vocal cord (the
Dao).

It is interesting that I early realized the difficulty many folks have with
visualizing at one time both the top-down AND bottom-up aspects of the
compositional hierarchy:
[large scale constraints -> [activity in focus <- [small
scale affordances]]]

Perhaps your suggestion is involved here as well!

STAN

On Sat, Apr 28, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Sungchul Ji 
wrote:

> Hi Arthur and  FISers,
>
> Thank you for asking an important question. The reason epigenetics
> (defined here as the process of inheritance without imlplicating any
> changes in the nucleotide sequences of DNA)  was not mentioned in my
> previous post is because I was mainly interested in the bottom-up (from
> micro to macro) mechanism of genetics, not the top-down (from macro to
> micro) mechanism.  It is interesting to note that our brain seems unable to
> handle both bottom-up and top-down mechanisms simultaneously, perhaps it
> may have something to do with the fact that we have two brain hemispheres
> (Yin and Yang) but only one vocal cord (the Dao).
>
> One way to integrate the bottom-up and top-down mechanisms underlying
> genetic phenomenon may be to invoke the principle of vibrational resonance
> -- to view both the micro-scale DNA and  the macro-scale environment of
> organisms as vibrational systems or systems of oscillators that can
> exchange information and energy through the well-known mechanisms of
> resonance (e.g., the resonance between the oscillatory motions of the swing
> and the arms of the mother; both motions must have same
> frequencies. otherwise the child will not swing).  According to the
> Fourier theorem, any oscillatory motions of DNA including very low
> frequencies can be generated by linear combinations of  very fast
> covalent bond vibrations in  DNA and  hence can be coupled to slow
> oscillatory motions of the environment, e.g., musical sounds. If this view
> is correct, music can affect, DIRECTLY (i.e., unmediated by the auditory
> system of the brain), the molecular motions of DNA in every cell in our
> body.  In other words, we can hear music not only through our ears but also
> through our whole body including blood.  Because of the patent  issue, I
> cannot reveal the experimental evidence supporting this claim, but, indue
> course, I hope to share with you the scientific evidence we obtained
> recently.
>
> In conclusion, it may be that  the yin-yang doctrine of the Daoist
> philosophy (or any other equivalent principles) applies here, since
> molecular genetics and epigenetics may constitute  the
> irreconcilable opposites:
>
> "Genetics has two complementary aspects -- molecular genetics and
> epigenetics."
>
> "Molecular genetics and epigenetics are the complementary
> aspects of genetics."
>
> "Genetic phenomena can be accounted for in two irreconcilably opposite
> manner with equal validity -- through the bottom-up (or reductionistic) or
> the top-down  (or holistic) approaches."
>
> The last statement would help avoid many wasteful debates in the field of
> genetics.
>
>  If you have any questions or corrections, please let me know.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> *From:* Arthur Wist 
> *Sent:* Friday, April 27, 2018 6:48 PM
> *To:* Sungchul Ji; FIS FIS
> *Cc:* sbur...@proteomics.rutgers.edu; Sergey Petoukhov;
> ole2001@med.cornell; dani...@shirasawa-acl.net; Sungchul Ji;
> x...@chemistry.harvard.edu; n...@princeton.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Fw: The 'Shirasawa phenomenon' or the 'Shirasawa
> effect"
>
> Hi,
>
> Just a short note to first of all say thank you, I've find this very
> helpful to know albeit I can't point to a direct application. Secondly
> however, I do wonder: Why & how come you neglected to - in either an
> inclusionary or exclusionary manner - address any potential epigenetic
> mechanisms?
>
> Kind regards,
>
>
> Arthur
>
> On 20 April 2018 at 19:32, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> >
> > I am forwarding a slightly modified version of my previous post with the
> > same title which was rejected by the FIS list due to the heavy
> attachments.
> > The most significant addition is written in green.  The removed
> attachments
> > are now replaced by their web addresses from which they can be downloaded
> > free of charge.
> >
> >
> > Best.
> >
> >
> > Sung
> >
> > 
> > From: Sungchul Ji
> > Sent: Thursday, April 19, 2018 

Re: [Fis] Music : Noise = Meaning : Data

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bruno -- That is an interesting, creative move!  But my point was simply
that the observer cannot be 'objective', but always
brings in many constraints to any observation, which might have been made
from yet another perspective, of which we cannot
imagine the number or qualities of.

STAN

On Thu, Mar 22, 2018 at 11:41 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> Dear Stan,
>
>
> On 20 Mar 2018, at 20:22, Stanley N Salthe  wrote:
>
> Bruno -- In this context I like to point out the constraints on our
> abilities of perception.  First, we are physical.
>
>
> That is a strong metaphysical assumption. See my paper for showing this is
> not compatible with the Digital Mechanist hypothesis in the cognitive
> science, which is my working hypothesis.
>
> Perception is a relative indexical relation between a (digital) machine
> (number, combinators, pattern of game of life, whatever) and other
> plausible, from its perspective, universal or not entities (infinitely many
> below the substitution level, making both matter and consciousness not
> Turing emulable (in the Mechanist perspective).
>
> There are evidences for a physical reality, but I am not sure there are
> evidence for a primary physical reality. The use of math in physics is well
> explained if the physical appears to be a mathematical reality seen from
> internal creature represented, relatively incarnated or implemented in that
> mathematical reality.
>
> I can prove, if you agree with very elementary arithmetic, the existence
> of the computations and the machine running them. I cannot prove the
> existence of a physical universe, but if Mechanism is true, the physical
> universe appearance can and must be explained by a statistics on all
> computations (seen in a first person way). That makes mechanism testable
> and indeed, thanks to Quantum Mechanics (without collapse) it fits very
> well up to now.
>
>
>
>
>
> Thus:
>
> {physical {material {biological {animal {mammal {primate {human
> {socialized {with accumulated personal history }
>
>
>
> Ok, but you will need “magical” (non Turing emulable, nor Recoverable)
> ability in your matter to select some computation.
>
> You invoke the God “Matter", but if it plays a role, I am no more sure I
> can say yes to …the doctor and survive qua computation.
>
> Mechanism and Materialism, which are often used together, can be shown
> incompatible (it is basically my PhD thesis, and it is summed up in most of
> my papers).
>
> So it is more like
>
> {arithmetical{dream-like{biological{conscious{physical{{animal {mammal
> {primate {human {socialized {with accumulated personal history }
>
>
>
>
> Hence, actuality is for us non-existent.
>
>
> ?
> Is not actuality existent *for us*, phenomenologically, and non-existent
> Ontologically, I guess you mean.  I am not sure I understand well.
>
>
> We live in a constructed reality.
>
>
> The whole physicalness is indeed the arithmetic seen from the internal
> arithmetical beings, but the person attached to them are not arithmetical
> not even analytical (not even third person describable in any way).
>
> I am aware that what I say contradicts 1500 years of (Aristotelian)
> theology, but then it was enforced by 1500 years of argument per authority,
> sometimes violent.
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
>
>
> STAN
>
> On Tue, Mar 20, 2018 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> Hi Dai, Hi Carl, Hi colleagues,
>>
>> > On 19 Mar 2018, at 16:22, Dai Griffiths 
>> wrote:
>> >
>> > On 15/03/18 10:11, Karl Javorszky wrote:
>> >
>> > >To me, it does not appear necessary to make a distinction between
>> “reality” and “data”
>> >
>> > That's a defensible position, but it does constrain 'reality' to 'that
>> which we can perceive'. Which would rule out the reality of things that we
>> cannot perceive, e.g. explanatory mechanisms, or the insides of black holes.
>>
>> If not the whole of mathematics.
>>
>> To be provocative, I would me more like thinking that the data are an
>> observer tiny distorted part of reality, especially that we can never
>> distinguishes possibly genuine data with hallucinations and dreams.
>>
>> In the computationalist theory, a data is the input to some
>> machine/number program, the execution is the arithmetical semantic of some
>> universal number getting the machine and the data has its input.
>>
>> Now a data can be anything, and can be interpreted, and handled, quite
>> differently, if at all, by different universal, or not, programs. I
>> iden

Re: [Fis] Meta-observer?

[Stanley N Salthe]

Loet wrote:

At the level of observers, indeed, a hierarchy may be involved for the
change of focus (although this is empirical  and not necessarily the case).
The communication, however, as a system different from the communicators
may contain mechanisms such as "translation" which make it possible to
redirect.

 Koichiro wrote:

At issue must be how something looking like a chain of command could happen
to emerge without presuming such a chain in the beginning. Prerequisite to
its emergence would be the well-being of each participant taken care of
locally, as a replenishable inevitable. That is an issue of the origins of
life. The impending agenda is on something general universal as an object,
and yet concrete particular enough in process.


A comment here:  there are two hierarchies possible in these phenomena: one
is the compositional hierarchy: [higher level [focus of actions [lower
level]]], or [context [action in focus [possibilities]]]. Three levels must
always be in consideration, giving: [permissive ecosystem [participant
actions [enchainment process]]].

The other is the subsumptive hierarchy:  {possibilities -> {choice ->
{refinement}}}. Here a chain might keep going into further modifications,
and the chain branches as well. The context is represented here in the
possibilities.

STAN



On Fri, Mar 2, 2018 at 12:41 AM, Koichiro Matsuno 
wrote:

> On 28 Feb 2018 at 10:34 PM, PedroClemente Marijuan Fernadez wrote:
>
> A sort of "attention" capable of fast and furious displacements of the
> focus...  helas, this means a meta-observer or an observer-in-command.
>
>Pedro, it is of course one thing to conceive of a hierarchy of
> observers for our own sake, but quite another to figure out what the
> concrete participants such as molecules are doing out there. They are doing
> what would seem appropriate for them to do without minding what we are
> observing. At issue must be how something looking like a chain of command
> could happen to emerge without presuming such a chain in the beginning.
> Prerequisite to its emergence would be the well-being of each participant
> taken care of locally, as a replenishable inevitable. That is an issue of
> the origins of life. The impending agenda is on something general universal
> as an object, and yet concrete particular enough in process. The richness
> resides within the concreteness down to the bottom.
>
>
>
>Apropos, the communications among the local participants differ from
> computation despite the seemingly concrete outlook of the latter.
> Computation upon the notion of time as the linear sequence of the now
> points is not available to the local participants because of the lack of
> the physical means for guaranteeing the sharing of the same now-point among
> themselves.
>
>
>
>Koichiro Matsuno
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>
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Re: [Fis] A Paradox

[Stanley N Salthe]

Following upon Søren:  Meaning is derived for a system by way of
Interpretation.  The transmitted information has no meaning without
interpretation.

STAN

On Mon, Feb 26, 2018 at 6:26 AM, Søren Brier  wrote:

> Dear  Xueshan
>
>
>
> The solution to the paradox is to go to a metaparadigm that can encompass
> information science as well as linguistics. C.S. Peirce’s semiotics is such
> a paradigm especially if you can integrate cybernetics and systems theory
>  with it. There is a summary of the framework of Cybersemiotics here:
>
> https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a5e7/cf50ffc5edbc110ccd08279d6d8b51
> 3bfbe2.pdf
>
>
>
> Cordially yours
>
>
>
>  Søren Brier
>
>
>
> Depart. of Management, Society and Comunication, CBS, Dalgas Have 15
> (2VO25), 2000 Frederiksberg
>
> Mobil 28494162 www.cbs.dk/en/staff/sbrmsc , cybersemiotics.com.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Fra:* Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *På vegne af *Xueshan Yan
> *Sendt:* 26. februar 2018 10:47
> *Til:* FIS Group 
> *Emne:* [Fis] A Paradox
>
>
>
> Dear colleagues,
>
> In my teaching career of Information Science, I was often puzzled by the
> following inference, I call it *Paradox of Meaning and Information* or 
> *Armenia
> Paradox*. In order not to produce unnecessary ambiguity, I state it below
> and strictly limit our discussion within the human context.
>
>
>
> Suppose an earthquake occurred in Armenia last night and all of the main
> media of the world have given the report about it. On the second day, two
> students A and B are putting forward a dialogue facing the newspaper
> headline “*Earthquake Occurred in Armenia Last Night*”:
>
> Q: What is the *MEANING* contained in this sentence?
>
> A: An earthquake occurred in Armenia last night.
>
> Q: What is the *INFORMATION* contained in this sentence?
>
> A: An earthquake occurred in Armenia last night.
>
> Thus we come to the conclusion that *MEANING is equal to INFORMATION*, or
> strictly speaking, human meaning is equal to human information. In
> Linguistics, the study of human meaning is called Human Semantics; In
> Information Science, the study of human information is called Human
> Informatics.
>
> Historically, Human Linguistics has two definitions: 1, It is the study of
> human language; 2, It, also called Anthropological Linguistics or
> Linguistic Anthropology, is the historical and cultural study of a human
> language. Without loss of generality, we only adopt the first definitions
> here, so we regard Human Linguistics and Linguistics as the same.
>
> Due to Human Semantics is one of the disciplines of Linguistics and its
> main task is to deal with the human meaning, and Human Informatics is one
> of the disciplines of Information Science and its main task is to deal with
> the human information; Due to human meaning is equal to human information,
> thus we have the following corollary:
>
> A: *Human Informatics is a subfield of Human Linguistics*.
>
> According to the definition of general linguists, language is a vehicle
> for transmitting information, therefore, Linguistics is a branch of Human
> Informatics, so we have another corollary:
>
> B: *Human Linguistics is a subfield of Human Informatics*.
>
> Apparently, A and B are contradictory or logically unacceptable. It is a
> paradox in Information Science and Linguistics. In most cases, a settlement
> about the related paradox could lead to some important discoveries in a
> subject, but how should we understand this paradox?
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Xueshan
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>
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Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based on the cateogry theory

[Stanley N Salthe]

Xueshan -- I think one can condense some of your insights hierarchically,
as:

In a system having language, information seemingly may be obtained in other
ways as well. It would be a conceptually broader category. Thus (using the
compositional hierarchy):

[information [language [signal]]]

Meaning that, when a system has language, all information will be
understood or construed by way of linguistic constructs.

(Here I am using ‘signal’ as being more specific than Peirce’s ‘sign’,
where:

[sign [information [...]]] )

Then, more dynamically (using the subsumptive hierarchy):

{language {signal {information}}}

Information in a languaged system is derived by way linguistic formations,
so that, even though it is an extremely broad category, information
(informing) only emerges by way of linguistically informed transformations.

STAN

On Sat, Feb 10, 2018 at 3:21 AM, Xueshan Yan  wrote:

> Dear Colleagues,
>
> I have read the article "The languages of bacteria" which Gordana
> recommended, and has gained a lot of inspiration from it. In combination
> with Sung's comparative linguistics exploration on cell language and human
> language, I have the following learning feelings to share with everyone:
>
> In this article, the author recognized that bacteria have evolved multiple
> languages for communicating within and between species. Intra- and
> interspecies cell-cell communication allows bacteria to coordinate various
> biological activities in order to behave like multicellular organisms. Such
> as AI-2, it is a general language that bacteria use for intergenera
> signaling.
>
> I found an interesting phenomenon in this paper: the author use the
> concept *information* 3 times but the concept *signal* (signal or
> signaling) 55 times, so we have to review the history and application of
> “information” and “signal” in biology and biochemistry, it is helpful for
> us to understand the relationship between language, signal, and information.
>
> The origin of the concept of signal (main the signal transduction) can be
> traced back to the end of the 1970s. But until 1980, biochemist and
> endocrinologist Martin Rodbell published an article titled: “The Role of
> Hormone Receptors and GTP-Regulatory Proteins in Membrane Transduction" in 
> *Nature,
> *in this paper he used the "signal transduction" first time. Since then,
> the research on signal transduction is popular in biology and biochemistry.
>
> As for any information transmission system, if we pay more attention to
> its transmission carrier instead of its transmission content, we are used
> to employing "signal transmission" instead of "signal transduction". From
> the tradition of the early use of information concept, the signal
> transduction study of cells is only equivalent to the level of
> telecommunications before 1948. Outwardly, before the advent of Shannon's
> information theory, the central issue of telecommunications is "signal"
> rather than "information". After that, the central issue of
> telecommunications is "information" rather than "signal".
>
> According to the application history of information concept, nearly all
> the essential problems behind the concepts of communication, messenger,
> signal and so on may be information problems. Just as the language problem
> what we are discussing here, our ultimate goal is to analyze the
> information.
>
>
>
> For the same reason, I recommend another two papers:
>
> 1. Do Plants Think?  (June 5, 2012, *Scientific American*)
>
> (http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/do-plants-think-
> daniel-chamovitz/#rd?sukey=fc78a68049a14bb24ce82efd8ef931
> e64057ce6142b1f2f7b919612d2b3f42c07f559f5be33be0881613ccfbf5b43c4b）
>
> 2. Plants Can Think, Feel and Learn  (December 3, 2014, *New Scientist*)
>
> (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22429980-400-root-
> intelligence-plants-can-think-feel-and-learn)
>
> From which we can judge whether or not a plants informatics can exists.
>
>
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Xueshan
>
>
>
> *From:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es]
> *On Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji
> *Sent:* Thursday, February 8, 2018 9:10 PM
> *To:* Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>; Terrence W. DEACON <
> dea...@berkeley.edu>
> *Cc:* Fis, 
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on the cateogry theory
>
>
>
> Hi Terry,  and FISers,
>
>
>
> Can it be that "language metaphor" is akin to a (theoretical) knife that,
> in the hands of a surgeon, can save lives but, in a wrong hand, can kill?
>
>
>
> All the best.
>
>
>
> Sung
> --
>
> *From:* Francesco Rizzo <13francesco.ri...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Thursday, February 8, 2018 2:56:11 AM
> *To:* Terrence W. DEACON
> *Cc:* Fis,; Sungchul Ji
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] The unification of the theories of information based
> on the cateogry theory
>
>
>
> Caro Terry estensibile a tutti,
>
> è sempre un piacere leggerTi e capirTi. La  general

Re: [Fis] New Year Lecture

[Stanley N Salthe]

Torday's work generally boils down to a concern for PREADAPTATION in
organic evolution.  This is a material necessity.  Preadaptation has been
ignored by the neoDarwinian evolutionary biologists, who have viewed their
task to concern the dynamics of natural selection (even in simple models).
So evolutionary biology has become quite abstract (mathematical), while
Torday's work is very materialistic. The information perspective can likely
better be applied to the materialist perspective than to the abstract
neoDarwinian perspective.  I think Charley D would have preferred Torday!

STAN

On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 8:39 AM, PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> head>
>
> Dear John and FIS Colleagues,
>
> Many thanks for this opening text of the NY Lecture. Indeed
> you have presented us an intricate panorama on one of the most obscure
> scientific problems of our time: the central theory of biology. As you say,
> we find with astonishment that there is literally no cell biology in
> evolution theory. And I would ad that there is no "information biology"
> either. A central theory becomes sort of a big Hall, where plenty of
> disciplinary corridors converge and later criss-cross among themselves.
> Darwinian theory is not that common hall for the really big, big science
> domain of biology. What are or where are the elements to rebuild the common
> Hall of the biological domain? I quote from your opening text:
>
> *"It is as if the unicellular state delegates its progeny to interact with
> the environment as agents, collecting data to inform the recapitulating
> unicell of ecological changes that are occurring. Through the acquisition
> and filtering of epigenetic marks via meiosis, fertilization, and
> embryogenesis, even on into adulthood, where the endocrine system dictates
> the length and depth of the stages of the life cycle, now known to be under
> epigenetic control, the unicell remains in effective synchrony with
> environmental changes."*
>
> It is really brilliant: a heads up reversal perspective. I think out of
> these ideas there are plenty of disciplinary excursions to make. One is
> "informational", another "topological". Putting together two different
> algorithmic descriptions and making them to build a torus (i.e., gastrula")
> as a universal departure for multicellularity also reminds the ideas of
> Stuart Pivart ("Omnia Ex Torus") about the primordials of multicellularity
> and the role of mechanical forces in the patterning of developmental
> processes.
>
> Echoing the ideas discussed in the Royal Society meeting (November 2016),
> there is a pretty long list of elements to take into account together with
> epigenetic inheritance (symbiogenesis, viruses and mobile elements,
> multilevel selection, niche construction, genomic evolution...). As I have
> suggested above, essential informational ideas are missing too, and this
> absence of the informational perspective in the ongoing evo discussions is
> not a good thing.
>
> i any case, it is such a great theme to ponder...
>
> Best wishes to all
>
> --Pedro
>
>
>
>   On Wed, 3 Jan 2018 07:15:43 -0800 JOHN TORDAY wrote:
> blockquote>
>
> Dear FIS Colleagues, I have attached my New Year Lecture at the invitation
> of Professor Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez. The content relates a novel
> perspective on the mechanism of evolution from a cellular-molecular
> vantage-point. I welcome any and all comments and criticisms in the spirit
> of sharing ideas openly and constructively. Best Wishes,
>
>
>
> John S. Torday PhD
>
> Professor
>
> Evolutionary Medicine
>
> UCLA
> /div>
>
>
>
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Re: [Fis] I do not understand some strange claims

[Stanley N Salthe]

Jesse, Arturo -- Science is necessarily culture-laden in being motivated
and supported by the interests of the culture affording it.  The observer
cannot escape itself nor its position in the world of possibility. The
information sought by scientific means is already implicit in the
initiation of a search, and will be, given luck and craft, narrowed down by
that search so as to serve as the stepping-off point for the next search.
In this way science progresses toward ever more refined explorations of
cultural desiderata. A nice example is quantum mechanics, as the current
furthest reach of our cultural interest in the ever more minute, which has
already 'paid off'' by an understanding of biology (as well as the building
up of massive and profitable superstructures required by science discourse).

STAN

On Thu, Nov 16, 2017 at 7:39 PM, Jesse David Dinneen <
jesse.dinn...@vuw.ac.nz> wrote:

> Dear Arturo (and greetings to everybody),
>
> Just a few more reasons to be wary of dismissing concepts and thinking
> that science is free of them:
>
> The position you are promoting constitutes a pop view (sometimes called
> the received view or naive view) of science, in which empirical items
> (e.g., measurable things) are taken to be unassailable rather than
> contingently defined and conceived of by science, implicitly or otherwise.
> To call concepts like the previously discussed triad 'useless' ignores the
> fact that they are necessary for meaningful scientific discourse (e.g., you
> cannot talk about observables without having a concept of what they are).
> Scientific discourse is inescapably value- and concept-laden (and full of
> implicit philosophical views), especially so when the terms used are
> implicitly defined or dogmatically defended; if you find these claims
> dubious, the introductory philosophers of science, like Kuhn and Popper,
> might be of interest to you. Further, the theories and observables of past
> scientific discourse have been either abandoned or refined beyond
> recognition despite relative successes in their time (e.g., phlogiston),
> and so it is reasonable to induce that the equivalent items of our time
> will someday meet similar fates -- thus it is risky to put too much faith
> in their objects being somehow more epistemologically sound or reliable
> than the objects of abstract thinking or their study free of concepts,
> philosophical thinking, etc.
>
> Your concern that discussion of information theories leads to NO-VAX
> surprises me; I am curious to know what harmful social movements you
> foresee being caused by, say, the Bar-Hillel-Carnap Paradox.
>
> Finally, it seems to me that by promoting this view of science, you are
> doing philosophy more than doing science, at least by your own view of the
> latter.
>
> Here I'm not trying to lower science, but defend concepts -- they are
> useful and necessary for scientific discourse, and seem to me very
> appropriate for this particular venue.
>
> Respectfully,
> Jesse David Dinneen
> School of Information Management, Victoria University of Wellington
>
> On Thu, Nov 9, 2017 at 10:11 AM, tozziart...@libero.it <
> tozziart...@libero.it> wrote:
>
>> Dear FISers,
>>
>> science talks about observables, i.e., quantifiable parameters.
>>
>> Therefore, describing the word "information" in terms of philosophers'
>> statements, hypothetical useless triads coming from nowhere, the ridicolous
>> Rupert Sheldrake's account, mind communication, qualitative subjective
>> issues of the mind, inconclusive phenomelogical accounts with an hint of
>> useless husserlian claims, and such kind of amenities is simply: NOT
>> scientific.
>> It could be interesting, if you are a magician or a follower of Ermetes
>> Trismegistus, but, if you are (or you think to be) a  scientist, this is
>> simply not science.
>> Such claims are dangerous, because they are the kind of claims that lead
>> to NO-VAX movements, religious stuff in theoretical physics, Heideggerian
>> metapyhsics.  Very interesting, but NOT science.
>>
>> That's all: 'nuff said.
>>
>> *Arturo Tozzi*
>>
>> AA Professor Physics, University North Texas
>>
>> Pediatrician ASL Na2Nord, Italy
>>
>> Comput Intell Lab, University Manitoba
>>
>> http://arturotozzi.webnode.it/
>>
>>
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>>
>
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Re: [Fis] some notes

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro -- Regarding:

could we say that the life cycle itself establishes the eigenvectors of
communication? It is intriguing that maintenance, persistence,
self-propagation are the essential motives of communication for whatever
life entities (from bacteria to ourselves). With the complexity increase
there appear new, more sophisticated directions, but the basic ones
probably remain intact. What could be these essential directions of
communication?

S: It is interesting on this point to note the studied avoidance of serious
discourses to include the "life cycle itself" (i.e.: immaturity
->maturity-> senescence) in any scientific study other than some areas of
biology (gerontology).  One can conclude that we have such a fear of aging
that it has blinded our discourses to this basic fact.

STAN

On Mon, Nov 13, 2017 at 8:30 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> Dear All,
>
> Herewith some notes on the exchanges of past weeks (sorry, I was away in
> bureaucratic tasks).
>
> 1. Agents & Information. There were very good insights exchanged; probably
> both terms make a fertile marriage. Actually I have been writing about
> "informational entities" or "subjects" as receivers/builders of information
> but taking into account the other disciplines around, "agents" look as the
> most natural companion of information. The only thing I don't quite like is
> that they usually appear as abstract, disembodied communicative entities
> that do not need self-producing. Their communication is free from whatever
> life maintenance...
>
> 2. Eigenvectors of communication. Taking the motif from Loet, and
> continuing with the above, could we say that the life cycle itself
> establishes the eigenvectors of communication? It is intriguing that
> maintenance, persistence, self-propagation are the essential motives of
> communication for whatever life entities (from bacteria to ourselves). With
> the complexity increase there appear new, more sophisticated directions,
> but the basic ones probably remain intact. What could be these essential
> directions of communication?
>
> 3. About logics in the pre-science, Joseph is quite right demanding that
> discussion to accompany principles or basic problems. Actually principles,
> rules, theories, etc. are interconnected or should be by a logic (or
> several logics?) in order to give validity and coherence to the different
> combinations of elements. For instance, in the biomolecular realm there is
> a fascinating interplay of activation and inhibition among the
> participating molecular partners (enzymes and proteins) as active
> elements.  I am not aware that classical ideas from Jacob (La Logique du
> vivant) have been sufficiently continued; it is not about Crick's Central
> Dogma but about the logic of pathways, circuits, modules, etc. Probably
> both Torday and Ji have their own ideas about that-- I would be curious to
> hear from them.
>
> 4. I loved Michel's response to Arturo's challenge. I think that the two
> "zeros" I mentioned days ago (the unsolved themes around the cycle and
> around the observer) imply both multidisciplinary thinking and
> philosophical speculation...
>
> Best wishes--Pedro
>
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
> Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta 0
> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 6818)
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> -
>
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[Fis] agency

[Stanley N Salthe]

10:20 AM (0 minutes ago)
to Mark
Mark -  In a physical field where many masses are interacting by way of
vectors, agency appears only
if a particular individual mass is discerned by way of discourse. A fox
picks out one chicken for dinner,
the rest scatter anonymously.

STAN
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Re: [Fis] TR: What is ³Agent²?

[Stanley N Salthe]

one domain or
> area of interest to another. It entered the English language as the noun
> associated with the verb 'to inform', i.e. to form the mind. Here is an
> excerpt from my book *What Is Information? *(available for free at
> demopublishing.com):
>
> *"Origins of the Concept of Information - *We begin our historic survey
> of the development of the concept of information with its etymology. The
> English word information according to the Oxford English Dictionary (OED)
> first appears in the written record in 1386 by Chaucer: 'Whanne Melibee
> hadde herd the grete skiles and resons of Dame Prudence, and hire wise
> informacions and techynges.' The word is derived from Latin through French
> by combining the word inform meaning giving a form to the mind with the
> ending “ation” denoting a noun of action. This earliest definition refers
> to an item of training or molding of the mind.” This is why abiotic objects
> have no information as I claimed above because they have no mind that can
> be informed.
>
> I hope that by informing you of the origin of the word information I have
> shed some light on our confusion about what is information and why we have
> so many definitions of it. It might even shed some light for that matter as
> to what is an agent. Got the ticket? If so that makes me a ticket agent. I
> hope you get the joke. all the best - Bob
>
>
>
>
> __
>
>
>
> Robert K. Logan
>
> Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto
>
> Fellow University of St. Michael's College
>
> Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD
>
> http://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertKLogan
>
> www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Logan5/publications
>
> https://www.physics.utoronto.ca/people/homepages/logan/
>
>
>
>
>
> On Oct 19, 2017, at 7:11 PM, Terrence W. DEACON 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> AUTONOMOUS AGENCY: The definition I propose for autonomous agency It is
> open to challenge. Of course, there are many ways that we use the term
> 'agent' in more general and metaphoric ways. I am, however, interested in
> the more fundamental conception that these derived uses stem from. I do not
> claim that this definition is original, but rather that it is what we
> implicitly understand by the concept. So if this is not your understanding
> I am open to suggestions for modification.
>
>
>
> I should add that it has been a recent goal of my work to describe an
> empirically testable simplest model system that satisfies this definition.
> Those of you who are familiar with my work will recognize that this is what
> I call an autogenic or teleodynamic system. In this context, however, it is
> only the adequacy of the definition that I am interested in exploring. As
> in many of the remarks of others on this topic it is characterized by
> strange-loop recursivity, self-reference, and physicality. And it may be
> worth while describing how this concept is defined by e.g. Hofstadter, von
> Foerster, Luhmann, Moreno, Kauffman, Barad, and others, to be sure that we
> have covered the critical features and haven't snuck in any "demons". In my
> definition, I have attempted to avoid any cryptic appeal to observers or
> unexamined teleological properties, because my purpose is instead to
> provide a constructive definition of what these properties entail and why
> they are essential to a full conception of information.
>
>
>
> CENTRALITY OF NORMATIVE PROPERTIES: A critical factor when discussing
> agency is that it is typically defined with respect to "satisfaction
> conditions" or "functions" or "goals" or other NORMATIVE properties.
> Normative properties are all implicitly teleological. They are irrelevant
> to chemistry and physics. The concept of an "artificial agent" may not
> require intrinsic teleology (e.g. consider thermostats or guidance systems
> - often described as teleonomic systems) but the agentive properties of
> such artifacts are then implicitly parasitic on imposed teleology provided
> by some extrinsic agency. This is of course implicit also in the concepts
> of 'signal' and 'noise' which are central to most information concepts.
> These are not intrinsic properties of information, but are extrinsically
> imposed distinctions (e.g. noise as signal to the repair person). So I
> consider the analysis of agency and its implicit normativity to be a
> fundamental issue to be resolved in our analysis of information. Though we
> can still bracket any consideration of agency from many analyses my simply
> assuming it (e.g. assumed users, interpreters, organisms and
> their functions, etc.), but this explicitly leaves a critical definin

Re: [Fis] What is “Agent”?

[Stanley N Salthe]

Here is an interesting recent treatment of autonomy.

Alvaro Moreno and Matteo Mossio: Biological Autonomy: A Philosophical

and Theoretical Enquiry (History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life
Sciences 12);

Springer, Dordrecht, 2015, xxxiv + 221 pp., $129 hbk, ISBN 978-94-017-9836-5


STAN

On Thu, Oct 19, 2017 at 11:44 AM, Terrence W. DEACON 
wrote:

> AN AUTONOMOUS AGENT IS A DYNAMICAL SYSTEM ORGANIZED TO BE CAPABLE OF
> INITIATING PHYSICAL WORK TO FURTHER PRESERVE THIS SAME CAPACITY IN THE
> CONTEXT OF  INCESSANT EXTRINSIC AND/OR INTRINSIC TENDENCIES FOR THIS SYSTEM
> CAPACITY TO DEGRADE.
>
>
> THIS ENTAILS A CAPACITY TO ORGANIZE WORK THAT IS SPECIFICALLY CONTRAGRADE
> TO THE FORM OF THIS DEGRADATIONAL INFLUENCE, AND THUS ENTAILS A CAPACITY TO
> BE INFORMED BY THE EFFECTS OF THAT INFLUENCE WITH RESPECT TO THE AGENT’S
> CRITICAL ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS.
>
> On Wed, Oct 18, 2017 at 6:00 PM, Koichiro Matsuno 
> wrote:
>
>> On 19 Oct 2017 at 6:42 AM, Alex Hankey wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> the actual subject has to be non-reducible and fundamental to our
>> universe.
>>
>>
>>
>>This view is also supported by Conway-Kochen’s free will theorem
>> (2006). If (a big IF, surely) we admit that our fellows can freely exercise
>> their free will, it must be impossible to imagine that the atoms and
>> molecules lack their share of the similar capacity. For our bodies
>> eventually consist of those atoms and molecules.
>>
>>
>>
>>Moreover, the exercise of free will on the part of the constituent
>> atoms and molecules could come to implement the centripetality of Bob
>> Ulanowicz at long last under the guise of chemical affinity unless the case
>> would have to forcibly be dismissed.
>>
>>
>>
>>This has been my second post this week.
>>
>>
>>
>>Koichiro Matsuno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *On Behalf Of *Alex
>> Hankey
>> *Sent:* Thursday, October 19, 2017 6:42 AM
>> *To:* Arthur Wist ; FIS Webinar <
>> Fis@listas.unizar.es>
>> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] What is “Agent”?
>>
>>
>>
>> David Chalmers's analysis made it clear that if agents exist, then they
>> are as fundamental to the universe as electrons or gravitational mass.
>>
>>
>>
>> Certain kinds of physiological structure support 'agents' - those
>> emphasized by complexity biology. But the actual subject has to be
>> non-reducible and fundamental to our universe.
>>
>>
>>
>> Alex
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Professor Terrence W. Deacon
> University of California, Berkeley
>
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Re: [Fis] Heretic

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bob -- Your classification of information-related concepts:

• Data are the pure and simple facts without any particular structure or
organization, the basic atoms of information,

• Information is structured data, which adds meaning to the data and gives
it context and significance,

• Knowledge is the ability to use information strategically to achieve
one's objectives, and

 • Wisdom is the capacity to choose objectives consistent with one's values
and within a larger social context

slightly reworked, can be understood as a development using a subsumptive
hierarchy:

{facts {data -->information {knowledge {understanding}

with {lower {higher}}

STAN

On Thu, Oct 5, 2017 at 12:39 PM, Bob Logan 
wrote:

> Dear Arturo - I enjoyed your expression of your opinion  because of its
> directness and honesty even though I do not quite agree with everything you
> said. I enjoyed it because it provoked the following thoughts.
>
> Yes you are right there seems to be a variety of opinions as to just what
> information is. All of them are correct and all of them are wrong including
> mine which I will share with you in a moment. They are right in that they
> describe some aspect of the notion of information and they are all wrong
> because they are attempting to be precise and that is not possible. All
> words including the word ‘information’ are metaphors and a metaphor cannot
> be right or wrong - it can only be illuminating if inspired or irrelevant
> if too narrow. I am afraid caro Arturo that there cannot be a scientific
> definition of ‘information’ because definitions cannot be falsified and as
> Karl Popper once suggested for a proposition to be scientific it has to be
> falsifiable. Of course this is Popper’s definition of science so some may
> disagree. So I am with you so far. But where I have to disagree is when you
> call the activity of trying to define information a useless activity. I
> think it is useful if only for us to see the various dimensions of this
> notion.
>
> Now as promised my thoughts re: what is information? In fact I have
> written a whole book on the subject which I invite all FISers to read free
> of charge as it is available in an open access format at
> demopublishing.com
> The availability of the book for free is part of an experiment in which I
> wanted to explore if a book could be a two-way form of communication
> between an author and his or her readers. So FISers please help yourself to
> my book and if you do please honour me with a comment or two as the Web
> site you access the book at also has provisions for you feedback. PS - The
> book is also available in hard copy from Amazon.
>
> So now for my definition of information as can be found in the book.
>
> • Data are the pure and simple facts without any particular structure or
> organization, the basic atoms of information,
>
> • Information is structured data, which adds meaning to the data and gives
> it context and significance,
>
> • Knowledge is the ability to use information strategically to achieve
> one's objectives, and
>
>  • Wisdom is the capacity to choose objectives consistent with one's
> values and within a larger social context
>
> In the book I also quote T. S. Eliot whose lines of poetry provide another
> perspective on wisdom, knowledge and information
>
> Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?
> Where is the knowledge we have lost in information? ­– TS Eliot
>
> My definition of information as well as that of TS Eliot does not
> encompass the notion of physicists who talk about information in terms of
> Wheeler’s "it from bit” idea.
> For me inanimate objects have no information because they have no choice.
> They slavishly follow the laws of physics. Only biological, living
> organisms have information because they have choice and information is that
> which allows them to make their choices. And information is that which they
> perceive through their senses from the simplest bacteria to us humans that
> ee cummings described as "fine specimen(s) of hypermagical
> ultraomnipotence”   So this is my second notion of what is ‘information’.
>
> Even a book is not a form of information. It is the record of information 
> created by its author and it is a medium that allows its readers to recreate 
> that original information of its author. From a McLuhan perspective we could
>
> also ask is information the medium or the message. McLuhan would say they are 
> the same since he said 'the medium is the message'. And he would also agree 
> that it is the reader that recreates information when the book
>
> is read since he also said “the user is the content”.
>
> Since composing this response a post from Lars-Göran Johansson appeared with 
> which I am in agreement
>
> Best wishes to all - Bob Logan
>
>
>
> __
>
> Robert K. Logan
> Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto
> Fellow University of St. Michael's College
> Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD
> http://utoronto.academia.edu

[Fis] reply to Pedro

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro wrote:

>Putting it differently, the hierarchies between scientific disciplines
were fashionable particularly in the reductionism times; but now
fortunately those decades (70s, 80s) are far away. Actually, the new views
taking shape are not far from the term "knowledge recombination" that
appears in some of the principles discussed.

I would like to rebut this put-down by pointing out that reduction (while
still meaningful) is no longer the sole burden of hierarchical
formulations. Rather, the major interesting point is that the disciplines
‘higher’ up in the hierarchy:

  {physics {chemistry {biology {sociology, with (lower {higher}}

provide context for the lower ones. For example, while chemical actions can
be observed to exist, putatively, outside of a biological context, that
chemistry in our universe must have been organized in such a way as to
potentially give rise to biology. That is, biology, and sociology were
operative implicitly before they existed in fact -- as attractors. Thus,
such top-down influences must have been active in OUR universe during its
inception, as contextualizations (uninfluenced universes cannot be shown to
exist!).  Anything must happen somewhere. Possibly the best evidence for
this has already emerged in the observations of QM, as an implication of
the (sometimes currently disparaged) concept of the role of the observer. I
think it unproblematic that Information can flow from a higher level to a
lower, as a constraint. Indeed the field of QM, with all of its very
expensive equipment, is a good example of this.

Yes, I appear to be arguing for a scientific role for Final Cause.  For
example, if a naturalist goes out to a forested region to study, say, birds
of paradise, where can these be found that has not already been modified by
humans (even by the camera)? Is information science intrinsically opposed
to to finality?

STAN
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[Fis] Pedro's 10 Theses

[Stanley N Salthe]

Here I indicate my understanding of Pedro's statements on information
STAN

10 PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION SCIENCE

1. Information is information, neither matter nor energy.

   S: I have information as a perceptible result of interaction,
which may be embodied in matter and/or energy


Information is comprehended into structures, patterns, messages, or flows.

   S: Agreed


3. Information can be recognized, can be measured, and can be  processed

(either computationally or non-computationally).

   S: If an interaction has an effect, that effect can be converted
to other embodiments, resulting in informing


4. Information flows are essential organizers of life's self-production

processes--anticipating, shaping, and mixing up with the accompanying

energy flows.

   S: Life, as an information-guided local process-embodiment,
transforms other forms by extracting usable energy and materials from them.


5. Communication/information exchanges among adaptive life-cycles underlie

the complexity of biological organizations at all scales.

  S: Information, as such, has no scale restriction. However,
informed processes in living systems proceed independently at many scales.


6. It is symbolic language what conveys the essential communication

exchanges of the human species--and constitutes the core of its "social

nature."

  S: Informing has been constructed as a basic tool among humans.


7. Human information may be systematically converted into efficient

knowledge, by following the "knowledge instinct" and further up by

applying rigorous methodologies.

  S: Among humans information is used to construct and effect
technologies.


8. Human cognitive limitations on knowledge accumulation are partially

overcome via the social organization of "knowledge ecologies."

  S: Humans have methods for sharing information.


9. Knowledge circulates and recombines socially, in a continuous

actualization that involves "creative destruction" of fields and

disciplines: the intellectual Ars Magna.

  S: Methods of sharing information among humans have become
developed as discourses


10. Information science proposes a new, radical vision on the information

and knowledge flows that support individual lives, with profound

consequences for scientific-philosophical practice and for social

governance.

   S: Information Science proposes to embody a special
understanding of informational transactions as an acknowledged discourse.
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Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life?

[Stanley N Salthe]

Dai --

{phenomenon 1}

{phenomenon 2}   -->  {Phenomena 1 & 2} ---> {phenomena 1.2,3}

{phenomenon 3}

The process from left to right is generalization.

‘Information’ IS a generalization.

generalities form the substance of philosophy. Info happens to a case

 of generalization which can be mathematized, which in turn allows

 it to be generalized even more.

So, what’s the problem?

STAN

On Wed, Dec 21, 2016 at 7:44 AM, Dai Griffiths 
wrote:

> >  Information is not “something out there” which “exists” otherwise than
> as our construct.
>
> I agree with this. And I wonder to what extent our problems in discussing
> information come from our desire to shoe-horn many different phenomena into
> the same construct. It would be possible to disaggregate the construct. It
> be possible to discuss the topics which we address on this list without
> using the word 'information'. We could discuss redundancy, variety,
> constraint, meaning, structural coupling, coordination, expectation,
> language, etc.
>
> In what ways would our explanations be weakened?
>
> In what ways might we gain in clarity?
>
> If we were to go down this road, we would face the danger that our
> discussions might become (even more) remote from everyday human experience.
> But many scientific discussions are remote from everyday human experience.
>
> Dai
> On 20/12/16 08:26, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
>
> Dear colleagues,
>
>
>
> A distribution contains uncertainty that can be measured in terms of bits
> of information.
>
> Alternatively: the expected information content *H *of a probability
> distribution is .
>
> *H* is further defined as probabilistic entropy using Gibb’s formulation
> of the entropy .
>
>
>
> This definition of information is an operational definition. In my
> opinion, we do not need an essentialistic definition by answering the
> question of “what is information?” As the discussion on this list
> demonstrates, one does not easily agree on an essential answer; one can
> answer the question “how is information defined?” Information is not
> “something out there” which “exists” otherwise than as our construct.
>
>
>
> Using essentialistic definitions, the discussion tends not to move
> forward. For example, Stuart Kauffman’s and Bob Logan’s (2007) definition
> of information “as natural selection assembling the very constraints on the
> release of energy that then constitutes work and the propagation of
> organization.” I asked several times what this means and how one can
> measure this information. Hitherto, I only obtained the answer that
> colleagues who disagree with me will be cited. J Another answer was that
> “counting” may lead to populism. J
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Loet
>
>
> --
>
> Loet Leydesdorff
>
> Professor, University of Amsterdam
> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
>
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; 
> http://www.leydesdorff.net/
> Associate Faculty, SPRU, University of
> Sussex;
>
> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. ,
> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
> Beijing;
>
> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck , University of
> London;
>
> 
> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en
>
>
>
> *From:* Dick Stoute [mailto:dick.sto...@gmail.com ]
>
> *Sent:* Monday, December 19, 2016 12:48 PM
> *To:* l...@leydesdorff.net
> *Cc:* James Peters; u...@umces.edu; Alex Hankey; FIS Webinar
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] What is information? and What is life?
>
>
>
> List,
>
>
>
> Please allow me to respond to Loet about the definition of information
> stated below.
>
>
>
> 1. the definition of information as uncertainty is counter-intuitive
> ("bizarre"); (p. 27)
>
>
>
> I agree.  I struggled with this definition for a long time before
> realising that Shannon was really discussing "amount of information" or the
> number of bits needed to convey a message.  He was looking for a formula
> that would provide an accurate estimate of the number of bits needed to
> convey a message and realised that the amount of information (number of
> bits) needed to convey a message was dependent on the "amount" of
> uncertainty that had to be eliminated and so he equated these.
>
>
>
> It makes sense to do this, but we must distinguish between "amount of
> information" and "information".  For example, we can measure amount of
> water in liters, but this does not tell us what water is and likewise the
> measure we use for "amount of information" does not tell us what
> information is. We can, for example equate the amount of water needed to
> fill a container with the volume of the container, but we should not think
> that water is therefore identical to an empty volume.  Similarly we should
> not think that information is identical to uncertainty.
>
>
>
> By equating the number of bits

Re: [Fis] about consciousness an Euclidean n-space

[Stanley N Salthe]

For Aturo Tozzi -- Along the lines of your examples given here you may want
to add the unpredictable trajectories of energy dissipation pathways when,
as in most natural systems, there is more than a single pathway for energy
flows.
See, or example:
 Annila, A & Salthe, SN, 2012   On intractable tracks.   *Physics Essays.*
25: 233-238.

STAN

On Wed, Dec 7, 2016 at 7:37 AM, James Peters 
wrote:

> Dear Arturo and All in this great discusssion,
> Good morning from a snowy corner of our local Manitoba neighbourhood.
>  During the
> past 24 hours, more than 30 cm of snow have fallen from the sky.   During
> most of the
> time that the snow was falling to the ground, we had fairly high wind.  In
> effect, we had
> a minor blizzard, here.  The result is an incredible display of snow
> shapes.
>
> The passage of the swirling snow flakes during our blizzard is analogous
> to what Hermann
> Weyl calls a world canal.   A system of particles moving through space
> sweep out a world
> canal (H. Weyl, Space. Time. Matter [Raum.  Zeit.  Materie], 1917, pp.
> 268-269).  In addition
> to the geometry for this spacetime structure, Weyl gives his perceptive
> description of the
> history of a system of moving particles.   His mathematics is intensive
> and his evocation of
> a perception of this spacetime structure is equally intensive.   And the
> history of swirling snowflakes
> during their passage from the overhead sky to the ground is analogous to
> Weyl's peception
> of a world canal.
>
> My suggestion for moving this discussion forward is to couple
> epistemological constructs with
> spacetime (physical) constructs.   That will help ground our discussion of
> natural phenomena
> and human perceptions.
>
> Best,
> Jim
>
> 
> James F. Peters, Professor
> Computational Intelligence Laboratory, ECE Department
> Room E2-390 EITC Complex, 75 Chancellor's Circle
> University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, MB  R3T 5V6 Canada
> Office: 204 474 9603   Fax: 204 261 4639
> email: james.pete...@ad.umanitoba.ca
> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/James_Peters/?ev=hdr_xprf
> 
> From: Fis [fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] on behalf of
> tozziart...@libero.it [tozziart...@libero.it]
> Sent: December 6, 2016 4:17 AM
> To: Jerry LR Chandler; fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: [Fis] R: Re: Who may proof that consciousness is an Euclidean
> n-space ???
>
> Dear Jerry,
> thanks a lot for your interesting comments.
> I like very much the logical approach, a topic that is generally dispised
> by scientists for its intrinsic difficulty.
> We also published something about logic and brain (currently under
> review), therefore we keep it in high consideration:
> http://biorxiv.org/content/early/2016/11/15/087874
>
> However, there is a severe problem that prevents logic in order to be
> useful in the description of scientific theories, explanans/explanandum,
> and so on.  The severe problem has been raised by three foremost
> discoveries in the last century: quantum entanglement, nonlinear dynamics
> and quantistic vacuum.
> Quantum entanglement, although experimentally proofed by countless
> scientific procedures,  is against any common sense and any possibliity of
> logical inquiry.  The concepts of locality and of cause/effect disappear in
> front of the puzzling phenomenon of quantum entanglement, which is
> intractable in terms of logic, neither using the successful and advanced
> approaches of Lesniewski- Tarski, nor Zermelo-Fraenkel's.
> The same stands for nonlinear chaotic phenomena, widespread in nature,
> from pile sands, to bird flocks and  to brain function. When biforcations
> occur in logistic plots and chaotic behaviours take place, the final
> systems' ouputs are not anymore causally predictable.
> Quantistic vacuum predicts particles or fields interactions occurring
> through breaks in CPT symmetries: this means that, illogically,  the arrow
> of the time can be reverted (!) in quantistic systems.
>
> Therefore (and I'm sorry for that), the explanatory role of logic in
> scientific theories is definitely lost.
> Here we are talking about brain: pay attention, I'm not saying that the
> brain function obeys to quantum behaviours (I do not agree with the
> accounts by, for example, Roger Penrose or Vitiello/Freeman).  I'm just
> saying that, because basic phenomena underlying our physical and biological
> environment display chaotic behaviours and quantistic mechanisms that go
> against logic, therefore the logic, in general, cannot be anymore useful in
> the description of our world.
> I'm sad about that, but that's all.
>
> P.S.: A topological approach talks instead of projections and mappings
> from one level to another, therefore it does not talk about causality or
> time and displays a more general explanatory power.   But this is another
> topic...
>
>
>
>
>
> Arturo Tozzi
>
> AA Professor Physics, University North Tex

Re: [Fis] Fwd: NEW DISCUSSION SESSION--TOPOLOGICAL BRAIN (From Karl Javorszky)

[Stanley N Salthe]

Folks -- On a source of the complexity of the neural system I think it
worthwhile to dwell for a moment anyway on the phenomenon of the 'neural
crest' in the development of vertebrate embryos. Just take peak at the
beginning of Wiki's "Neural Crest".

STAN

On Wed, Nov 30, 2016 at 3:48 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> Asunto: [Fis] NEW DISCUSSION SESSION--TOPOLOGICAL BRAIN
> Fecha: Wed, 30 Nov 2016 08:46:32 +0100
> De: Karl Javorszky  
> Responder a: karl.javors...@gmail.com
> Para: fis  
> CC: Pedro C. Marijuan 
> , tozziart...@libero.it
>
> Topology
>
> The session so far has raised the points: meta-communication,
> subject-matter, order, spaces.
>
> a.) Meta-communication
>
> Gordana’s summary explicates the need to have a system of references that
> FIS can use to discuss whatever it wishes to discuss, be it the equivalence
> between energy and information or the concept of space in the human brain.
> Whatever the personal background, interests or intellectual creations of
> the members of FIS, we each have been taught addition, multiplication,
> division and the like. We also know how to read a map and remember well
> where we had put a thing as we are going to retrieve it. When discussing
> the intricate, philosophical points which are common to all formulations of
> this session, it may be helpful to use such words and procedures that are
> well-known to each one of us, while describing what we do while we use
> topology.
>
> b.)Subject-matter
>
> Topology is managed by much older structures of the central nervous system
> than those that manage speech, counting, abstract ideas. Animals and small
> children remember their way to food and other attractions. Children
> discover and use topology far before they can count. Topology is a
> primitive ancestor to mathematics; its ideas and methods are archaic and
> may appear as lacking in refinement and intelligence.
>
> c.) Order
>
> There is no need to discuss whether Nature is well-ordered or not. Our
> brain is surely extremely well ordered, otherwise we had seizures, tics,
> disintegrative features. In discussing topology we can make use of the
> condition that everything we investigate is extremely well ordered. We may
> not be able to understand Nature, but we may get an idea about how our
> brain functions, in its capacity as an extremely well ordered system. We
> can make a half-step towards modelling artificial intelligence by
> understanding at first, how artificial instincts, and their conflicts, can
> be modelled. Animals apparently utilise a different layer of reality of the
> world while building up their orientation in it to that which humans
> perceive as important. The path of understanding how primitive instincts
> work begins with a half-step of dumbing down. It is no more interesting,
> how many they are, now we only look at where it is relative to how it
> appears, compared with the others.
>
> d.)Spaces
>
> Out of sequences, planes naturally evolve. Whether out of the planes
> spaces can be constructed, depends on the kinds of planes and of common
> axes. Now the natural numbers come in handy, as we can demonstrate to each
> other on natural numbers, how in a well-ordered collection the actual
> mechanism of place changes creates by itself two rectangular, Euclidean,
> spaces. These can be merged into one common space, but in that, there are
> four variants of every certainty coming from the position within the
> sequence. Furthermore, all these spaces are transcended by two planes. The
> discussion about an oriented entity in a space of n dimensions can be given
> a frame, placed into a context that is neutral and shared as a common
> knowledge by all members of FIS.
>
> 2016. nov. 29. 15:15 ezt írta ("Karl Javorszky"  >):
>
>> Topology
>>
>> The session so far has raised the points: meta-communication,
>> subject-matter, order, spaces.
>>
>> a.) Meta-communication
>>
>> Gordana’s summary explicates the need to have a system of references that
>> FIS can use to discuss whatever it wishes to discuss, be it the equivalence
>> between energy and information or the concept of space in the human brain.
>> Whatever the personal background, interests or intellectual creations of
>> the members of FIS, we each have been taught addition, multiplication,
>> division and the like. We also know how to read a map and remember well
>> where we had put a thing as we are going to retrieve it. When discussing
>> the intricate, philosophical points which are common to all formulations of
>> this session, it may be helpful to use such words and procedures that are
>> well-known to each one of us, while describing what we do while we use
>> topology.
>>
>> b.)Subject-matter
>>
>> Topology is managed by much older structures of the central nervous
>> system than those that manage speech, counting, abstract ideas. Animals and
>> small children remember their way to food and other attractions. Children

[Fis] Fwd: Mazur/HuffPost: A Chat with Information Scientist Pedro Marijuán

[Stanley N Salthe]

-- Forwarded message --
From: Suzan Mazur 
Date: Sun, Aug 7, 2016 at 8:32 AM
Subject: Mazur/HuffPost: A Chat with Information Scientist Pedro Marijuán
To: szn...@aol.com



My interview with Pedro Marijuán, FYI. -- *Suzan*
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/suzan-mazur/a-chat-with-inform
ation-s_b_11212594.html
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Re: [Fis] _ Reply to Annette (A Priori Modeling)

[Stanley N Salthe]

Entropy

Regarding:
> So I see it that you confirm to Shannon´s interpretation of entropy as
actually being information <
Well, in essence we may agree, but I would call this an unfortunate choice
of words. “Information," I think, has come to mean so many things to so
many people that it is *nearly* a useless term. Even though I use this term
myself, I try to minimize its use. I would say that I agree with Shannon’s
view of signal entropy as a *type* of information – and then extend that
concept using type theory, to include “meaningful” roles. Only when taken
as a whole does “information” exist, within my framing.

S: It has been shocking to me that many info-tech persons use the word
'information' when what they mean is Shannon's 'information carrying
capacity' or the word 'entropy' when they mean Shannon's 'informational
entropy', referring to variety.

STAN


On Wed, Jun 22, 2016 at 5:41 AM, Marcus Abundis <55m...@gmail.com> wrote:

> In an online exchange, Annette raises a few points and questions that I
> summarize below.
> ===
> > Please give me your basic definition of entropy <
> My short answer is that I define entropy as "material variation" of any
> type, as clarified in paper #2 and detailed starting on page 5 (actually
> named on page 6). This definition is admittedly generic/vague, for a few
> reasons:
>   a) many "types of meaning" (or entropy, if you wish) must be framed and
> then joined. I name three minimum types of meaning/entropy in paper #2.
> This multitude requires that a generic term first be named if an UTI is to
> be developed (point 1 in the introductory text).
>   b) noise is itself informational in a Darwinian role as “demise.” I
> believe this departs from most informational notions, where noise is seen
> as the opposite of information. This view also accommodates an inverse,
> where one eventually “makes sense” of nominally chaotic events.
> As such, I name an existential ground Generic Entropy, and the “tendency
> to symmetric dispersal,” within that ground, “material entropy.” And so,
> “material variation” (of any type) is meant to capture the entirety of
> those entropic roles. Lastly, I find the notion of “pure symmetry” a useful
> scientific fiction, but still a fiction in the context of true empiric
> models (point 8 in the introductory text).
>
> > So the different entropies you are using in your video point to
> different options to organize <
> > elements in a way that they generate recognizable (and therefore to a
> degree similar) <
> > information out of those elements? <
> Here, *options* and *recognizable* are the key terms. As you note, I am
> using a different (novel?) notion of “entropy,” beyond even the novel way
> in which Shannon did, and thus (hopefully) extend Shannon's view. The most
> reductive aspect here is “the element” (i.e., a “fulcrum,“ a “load,” a
> “bit,” etc. [re paper #4]). Then, inter-RELATED *element sets,* depending
> on their order (innate functioning or dis-functioning), convey a specific
> role (signal or noise). It is this RELATING of singular elements (there are
> many *options*) that conveys specific meaning/functioning/logic/order. This
> meaningful relating can equally convey *recognizable* “types of order” or
> “types disorder” (e.g., many “types of screws” exist, each with unique
> functional advantages and disadvantages, or uses and mis-uses – a machine
> screw works poorly in wood). Finally, a “recognizably deformed screw” (a
> use-less *option*) must also be accounted for within this continuum. This
> notion of related data echoes the idea already noted in the exchange with
> Antonio.
>
> > So I see it that you confirm to Shannon´s interpretation of entropy as
> actually being information <
> Well, in essence we may agree, but I would call this an unfortunate choice
> of words. “Information," I think, has come to mean so many things to so
> many people that it is *nearly* a useless term. Even though I use this term
> myself, I try to minimize its use. I would say that I agree with Shannon’s
> view of signal entropy as a *type* of information – and then extend that
> concept using type theory, to include “meaningful” roles. Only when taken
> as a whole does “information” exist, within my framing.
>
> Also, the notion of stability (as necessary for meaning) you emphasize I
> find helpful but also limiting. I tend to think of  *everything* as pro tem
> except for perhaps the Standard Model and the Periodic Table (addressed in
> paper #2; Lee Smolin may disagree?). Within type theory the central
> question becomes “At what point/level(s) does material variation
> (“entropy”) break down or fail?”, and how and why does it fail? For me,
> this is a more useful way of viewing things – using stability is too much
> like The Denial of Death (Ernest Becker). This requires us to look beyond
> thermodynamics for answers. I believe thermodynamics is historically
> stressed as it is the closest we have to a “hard science” that we might
> 

Re: [Fis] Fw: "Mechanical Information" in DNA

[Stanley N Salthe]

Regarding your last posting, I agree, and would formulate the following
subsumption hierarchy:

(thermodynamic energy flows {Shannon information theory {Peircean
semiotics}}}

STAN

On Thu, Jun 9, 2016 at 10:31 AM, Mark Johnson  wrote:

> Dear all,
>
> Is this a question about counting? I'm thinking that Ashby noted that
> Shannon information is basically counting. What do we do when we count
> something?
>
> Analogy is fundamental - how things are seen to be the same may be more
> important than how they are seen to be different.
>
> It seems that this example of DNA is a case where knowledge advances
> because what was once thought to be the same (for example, perceived
> empirical regularities in genetic analysis) is later identified to be
> different in identifiable ways.
>
> Science has tended to assume that by observing regularities, causes can be
> discursively constructed. But maybe another way of looking at it is to say
> what is discursively constructed are the countable analogies between
> events. Determining analogies constrains perception of what is countable,
> and by extension what we can say about nature; new knowledge changes that
> perception.
>
> Information theory (Shannon) demands that analogies are made explicit -
> the indices have to be agreed. What do we count? Why x? Why not y?
> otherwise the measurements make no sense. I think this is an insight that
> Ashby had and why he championed Information Theory as analogous to his Law
> of Requisite Variety (incidentally, Keynes's Treatise on Probability
> contains a similar idea about analogy and knowledge). Is there any reason
> why the "relations of production" in a mechanism shouldn't be counted?
> determining the analogies is the key thing isn't it?
>
> One further point is that determining analogies in theory is different
> from measuring them in practice. Ashby's concept of cybernetics-as-method
> was: "the cyberneticist observes what might have happened but did not".
> There is a point where idealised analogies cannot map onto experience. Then
> we learn something new.
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Mark
> --
> From: Loet Leydesdorff 
> Sent: ‎09/‎06/‎2016 12:52
> To: 'John Collier' ; 'Joseph Brenner'
> ; 'fis' 
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Fw:  "Mechanical Information" in DNA
>
> Dear colleagues,
>
>
>
> It seems to me that a definition of information should be compatible with
> the possibility to measure information in bits of information. Bits of
> information are dimensionless and “yet meaningless.” The meaning can be
> provided by the substantive system that is thus measured. For example,
> semantics can be measured using a semantic map; changes in the map can be
> measured as changes in the distributions, for example, of words. One can,
> for example, study whether change in one semantic domain is larger and/or
> faster than in another. The results (expressed in bits, dits or nits of
> information) can be provided with meaning by the substantive theorizing
> about the domain(s) under study. One may wish to call this “meaningful
> information”.
>
>
>
> I am aware that several authors have defined information as a difference
> that makes a difference (McKay, 1969; Bateson, 1973). It seems to me that
> this is “meaningful information”. Information is contained in just a series
> of differences or a distribution. Whether the differences make a difference
> seems to me a matter of statistical testing. Are the differences
> significant or not? If they are significant, they teach us about the
> (substantive!) systems under study, and can thus be provided with meaning
> in the terms of  studying these systems.
>
>
>
> Kauffman *et al*. (2008, at p. 28) define information as “natural
> selection assembling the very constraints on the release of energy that
> then constitutes work and the propagation of organization.” How can one
> measure this information? Can the difference that the differences in it
> make, be tested for their significance?
>
>
>
> Varela (1979, p. 266) argued that since the word “information” is derived
> from “in-formare,” the semantics call for the specification of a system of
> reference to be informed. The system of reference provides the information
> with meaning, but the meaning is not in the information which is “yet
> meaningless”. Otherwise, there are as many “informations” as there are
> systems of reference and the use of the word itself becomes a source of
> confusion.
>
>
>
> In summary, it seems to me that the achievement of defining information
> more abstractly as measurement in bits (*H = -* Σ *p log(p)*) and the
> availability of statistics should not be ignored. From this perspective,
> information theory can be considered as another form of statistics (entropy
> statistics). A substantive definition of information itself is no longer
> meaningful (and perhaps even obscure): the expected information content of
> a distribution or the information contained in the message that an event

[Fis] _ Re: _ Re: _ Re: _ Towards a 3φ integrative medicine

[Stanley N Salthe]

Plamen, Pedro --

It seems to me that perhaps Medicine should not look to mathematics for
support or underpinning so much as to SEMIOTICS (that is, Peircean
semiotics, being worked today as biosemiotics).  Biosemiotics is, in the
verbal conceptual realm, almost as complex and messy as medicine, and so
the two might be matched up fruitfully!

STAN

On Tue, May 17, 2016 at 9:03 AM, Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov <
plamen.l.simeo...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Daer Pedro,
>
> thank you for your entertaining way of presenting my Sisyphus theme about
> medicine in a nutshell, which was mostly enjoyable to read. Actually, you
> are right, medicine is "messy", which qualifies it more like a liberal art
> discipline rather than science, full of workshop type of hustle and bustle,
> ad hoc insights of mystic adepts followed by faithful scholars and mixed
> with cutting edge technology wherever possible (in the Western world). It
> appears that every effort to organize it in the manner we know in
> mathematics and physics is doomed to failure.  I realise that the subject's
> depth reflected in my presentation is indeed overwhelming. Yet, it was not
> my intention to put a Sisyphus rock upon this forum. Thank you for your and
> Koichiro's simplified pedestrian analysis of the theme. We can go with thes
> rephrased set of questions further.
>
>
> On Tue, May 17, 2016 at 12:51 PM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:
>
>> Dear Plamen,
>>
>> Thanks for the synthetic attempt. You have put together pretty complex
>> strands of thought that become too demanding for a general response. I will
>> concentrate in a few points.
>>
>> What is Medicine? In what extent is it amenable to "integration"? Is
>> reductionism an anathema in medicine? Can we regularly ascend from cellular
>> info flows to organs/systems, and to healthy individuals/environments?
>>
>>
> These are good general questions, but I'd rather wish to focus on one
> specific problem, e.g. the one of the metastatic melanoma that Koichiro
> addressed in his example and try to "dissect" it as in the article in his
> example. It is clear to me that I cannot focus on one single thing and
> brainstorm on it all the time. But the idea behind this concluding workshop
> was to be less philosophical and more practical in trying to investigate if
> we can reshape medicine as an extension of biology. After all, huge amounts
> of money are given for research here, more than in any other field, as far
> as I know. Are these investments justifyable in the way this "engineering
> science" is performing today? Is there anything that could make this
> discipline more predictable, at least at the curruculum level?
>
>
>> The history of Medicine shows messiness in the highest degree. To note
>> that it was not included in the Trivium/Quadrivium medieval scheme of
>> knowledge, and was only accepted within the "mechanical arts" after Hugh of
>> St. Victor compilation (XIII Century), many decades after the first
>> Faculties of Medicine were created in Italy. Why medicine is so messy? Just
>> go the wiki pages on the topic: hundreds of subspecialties are listed, and
>> under all those terms we imply all the internal and external ("natural")
>> phenomena that can derail and put out of track the advancement of a life
>> cycle. Each one of those specialties has to arrange its own world of
>> knowledge, with lots of analytical and synthetic avenues not amenable to
>> neat overall schemes and to formal approaches except in some reduced
>> pockets. Successful reductionist strategies and analytical techniques are
>> piled up with holistic views, and reams of tacit knowledge (indeed medicine
>> is a very stratified small world of "lords", "masters", "disciples",
>> "servants", and "beginners").
>>
>
> This is all true. But it is also true that medicine has been always very
> important for us human beings.
>
>
>>
>> So, like in engineering, one has to be suspicious of far reaching
>> implications for the term "integrative". Not necessarily in this case with
>> the "3φ" connotation.
>>
>
> Indeed, there coud be a "3φ", a "4φ",  or a "3φ+ 1ψ", ... etc. Greek
> alphabet built polynomial connotations encoded in this prefix. The question
> is wether we can use such kind of combination from the known natural
> science disciplines and extend them by some humanitarian fields in order to
> address key issues in an organised and diligent manner in medicine. We know
> well that there are both serios conflicts between some branches and efforts
> to reconcile them. The prefix I used was to make clear that we are asking
> for a novel kind of integration, if possible. Yet this prefix definition
> should not be considered "fixed" once for ever.
>
> But the strong reliance on criticality could be subject to scrutiny. Quite
>> many cellular / biomolecular phenomena do not especially rely on
>> criticality --perhaps the most essential ones, related to "codes", genomic
>> maintenance, protein synthesis, protei

Re: [Fis] Fw: Clarifying Posting. Speculative Realism

[Stanley N Salthe]

Joseph -- Regarding:

?As it turns out, however, Speculative Realism possesses its own set of
weaknesses which can be ascribed in a general way to its retention of
concepts embodying classical binary, truth-functional logic. These include
an ontology of 'things' rather than processes as the furniture of the
world, a logic of non-contradiction and a ground of existence that has
reason and value, but excludes the possibility of a ground of existence
which includes incoherence and contradiction.

S: Well, why cannot processes be described by subsetting? As in: {energy
dissipation {work {building a box}}}

and

{energy dissipation {finds quickest route around an obstruction {fails to
win the race}}}

STAN

On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 9:32 PM, Joseph Brenner 
wrote:

> Dear Friends and Colleagues,
>
> The last couple of postings have opened the discussion in a direction
> their authors may not have intended. Bob's felt personal plea for a
> phenomenological approach to biology, and hence to other sciences, and as
> the foundation of a philosophy, begs the question of non-phenomenological
> approaches which may be equally or more valid.
>
> We all agree the mind is capable of phenomenal experience and is not a
> machine, but the (correct) arguments being made seem to me expressions, in
> various styles, of the non-fundamentality of matter and energy. Unless I am
> wrong, this is at least a still open question. Further, Terry's (again
> correct) statements about the importance of the Liar and Goedel paradoxes
> perhaps overlooks one aspect of them: they (the paradoxes) themselves are
> only relatively simple binary cases that can be considered reduced versions
> of some more fundamental, underlying princple governing relationships in
> the real, physical world. These relationships are crucial to an
> understanding of the non-binary properties of information.
>
> A recent book by Tom Sparrow is entitled "The End of Phenomenology". It
> proposes a new science-free doctrine, Speculative Realism, to provide a
> link between phenomena and reality which in my opinion also fails, but may
> be of interest to some of you. I wrote about this doctrine:
>
> As it turns out, however, Speculative Realism possesses its own set of
> weaknesses which can be ascribed in a general way to its retention of
> concepts embodying classical binary, truth-functional logic. These include
> an ontology of 'things' rather than processes as the furniture of the
> world, a logic of non-contradiction and a ground of existence that has
> reason and value, but excludes the possibility of a ground of existence
> which includes incoherence and contradiction.
>
> All for now, for various reasons,
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Joseph
>
>
> - Original Message - From: "Robert E. Ulanowicz" 
> To: "Stanley N Salthe" 
> Cc: "fis" 
> Sent: Friday, May 06, 2016 7:36 AM
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Clarifying Posting
>
>
> Dear Pedro,
>>
>> Most of the discussion has centered about phenomenology in the sense of
>> Husserl. The topic is broader, however, and remains the foundation of the
>> engineering philosophy that has guided my career.
>>
>> I have long advocated a phenomenological approach to biology as the only
>> way forward. I have devoted years to the phenomenological study of
>> ecosystems trophic exchange networks and have shown how hypothesis
>> falsification can be possible in abstraction of eliciting causes
>> <
>> https://www.ctr4process.org/whitehead2015/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/PhilPrax.pdf
>> >.
>> I have gone so far as to propose an alternative metaphysics to
>> conventional mechanical/reductionist theory that followed from
>> phenomenological premises.
>> <http://people.clas.ufl.edu/ulan/publications/philosophy/3rdwindow/>
>>
>> So I would submit that phenomenology is alive and well as a practical and
>> even quantitative tool in science. It's just that, as an engineer, I find
>> Husserl tough going. :)
>>
>> Warm regards,
>> Bob
>>
>> ___
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>> Fis@listas.unizar.es
>> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>>
>>
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Re: [Fis] Clarifying Posting

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro -- In short, how might phenomenology relate to science?  There is one
approach - to physiology - that was taken by the British physiologist, John
B. Haldane.  He did ALL his experiments upon himself.

STAN

On Fri, May 6, 2016 at 6:12 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan  wrote:

> Dear FIS Colleagues,
>
> Some parties have doubts on how to count the two messages per week --the
> maximum allowed in this list except for the discussion chair, which
> currently is Alex. Following the international business week, the count
> starts on Monday and obviously ends on Sunday night. Not abiding by this
> rule leads to posting sanctions. The idea is to keep a reasonable traffic,
> to allow participation of more people, and to promote quiet, "reflective"
> posting beyond the merely excited and "reactive". Remember that people
> willing to check about the recent exchanges may go to:
> http://listas.unizar.es/pipermail/fis/
> https://www.mail-archive.com/fis@listas.unizar.es/
>
> As a brief note to Alex: it is fine that we are discussing all these
> curious and advanced themes here (and I do not want to interfere), but
> thinking that we are getting close to the end of this whole phenomenology
> session, and that Plamen's concluding topic will try to open some inroads
> in the applied realm, starting with some contemplation of basic
> multidisciplinary questions could be convenient, at least as a bridge. For
> instance (in my very personal interpretation):
>
> 1. What is the advantage of the phenomenological view in a basic
> information problem (relationship between "world", "object as living
> subject", "inquirer as heterogeneous communities of inquirers"). At least
> this is a real problem of mine when trying to update the scheme of cellular
> signaling relationships with the environment.
>
> 2. What is the advantage of the phenomenological view regarding the entire
> information problem (transcending the different "provincial" approaches to
> information"?
>
> 3. What is the advantage of the phenomenological view regarding the
> multidisciplinary conundrum (the accelerated expansion in the number of
> disciplines--several thousands nowadays, probably close to 10,000) and the
> more and more difficult synthesis and integration?
>
> 4. What is the advantage of closely relating phenomenology with Buddhist
> "metaphysics" (as has been done continuously in the recent discussions
> here)?
>
> Of course, these are dense points --to disregard "reactively"-- and better
> to let them resurface in coming days. Now, in order to facilitate the
> ongoing discussion on Godel's, Dr. Albert Johnstone has joined the fis list
> today (thanks are due to Maxine).
>
> Best greetings---Pedro
>
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
> Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 
> 6818)pcmarijuan.iacs@aragon.eshttp://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> -
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Fwd: Vol 25, #32, Nature of Self

[Stanley N Salthe]

Lou, Alex -- Here is another use of set theoretical brackets (the
subsumption hierarchy in evolution):  {  ? -> {physical world -> {material
world -> {biological world -> {social world }

STAN

On Sat, Apr 30, 2016 at 2:14 AM, Louis H Kauffman  wrote:

> On Pedro’s recommendation, I am forwarding this exchange to the list.
> Best,
> Lou
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> *From: *Louis H Kauffman 
> *Subject: **Re: Vol 25, #32, Nature of Self*
> *Date: *April 29, 2016 at 12:12:26 PM EDT
> *To: *Alex Hankey 
> *Cc: *"Pedro C. Marijuan" 
>
> Dear Alex,
> In set theory, the empty set can be regarded as ‘framing nothing’.
> Thus it is denoted by an empty container {  }.
> The properties of the container are not relevant, only that ‘it’ manages
> the act of containment.
> “We therefore take the form of distinction for the form.”
> From there, one generates all the multiplicities in mathematics by further
> acts of framing.
> {  }
> { { } }
> { { }, { { } } }
> ad infinitum.
> If we said this in LOF it would be essentially the same, but parsimonious
> in that the comma as an extra distinction would not be needed.
> If A is a set, then {A} is another set obtained by the act of framing. We
> see it all as ‘framing nothing’ when the sets are traced back to their
> empty origins as in
> the layers of an onion. Some layering might have to be traced back forever
> alas as in {…}. This is why set theorists are not happy to have
> sets that are members of themselves at the foundation. Nevertheless, in
> order to have language at all, self-reference is necessary. In LOF the mark
> < > is seen to be a distinction and to refer to a distinction and so refers
> to itself.
> At that point one realizes that in the form, the mark and the reader or
> writer or observer are identical. Tat tvam asi.
> Best,
> Lou
>
> On Apr 29, 2016, at 5:47 AM, Alex Hankey  wrote:
>
> RE 1 Louis Kauffman: Emptiness is form and form is emptiness. The form we
> take to exist arises from framing nothing.
>
> RE 2: The objects of our thought and perception are so laden with the
> names and symbols that have been shifted to them, that their ?original
> nature? is nearly invisible.
>
> ME 1: Many philosophers of the East, such as Nagarjuna and Adishankara
> agree that when one realizes that the real 'Self' has no form (and no
> history of change) that this frees the embodied soul from being trapped in
> forms that get reincarnated in time. It is the Ultimate Liberating
> Realization!
>
> The Maharishi International University mathematician, Michael Weinless,
> formerly an Asst Prof at Harvard, was correspondingly fond of RusselL's
> distinction between ϕ and [ϕ].
>
> Is this the same as what you are referring to, the 'framing of nothing'?
>
> ME(2): I suspect that the cognitions of a fully enlightened person is
> acutely aware of the additional nonsense that has surrounded the original
> simplicity in such cases.
>
> E.G. In the webinar, I became acutely aware of many layers of academic
> comment / prejudice etc. that surround almost every seemingly innocent
> discussion question.
>
> --
> Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
> Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
> SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
> Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
> Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
> Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789
> 
>
> 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences,
> Mathematics and Phenomenological Philosophy
> 
>
>
>
>
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>
>
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Re: [Fis] Fis 25 / 9

[Stanley N Salthe]

RE: The organization of bodies of knowledge in the sciences takes place at

another level than the integration of cognition in the body of an

individual. One cannot reduce the one level to the other, in my opinion.

Which research program of these two has priority? How do they relate ?

potentially differently ? to information?


ME: My Cambridge colleague, Madan Thangavelu, holds that the structure of
knowledge in both human brains (and human organizations), and in' bodies of
knowledge' in the sciences, is fractal.


STAN: I don’t think that “fractal” answers Bob’s question. In fractal
organization there are no ‘levels’ as used by Bob.  Bob’s “levels” would
exist in a compositional hierarchy, wherein levels cannot communicate in an
interactional sense, but, rather, communicate indirectly, with the upper
level imposing boundary conditions upon a lower, while a lower provides raw
materials that might become organized by those boundary conditions.

STAN

On Wed, Apr 6, 2016 at 1:30 AM, Alex Hankey  wrote:

> RE: The organization of bodies of knowledge in the sciences takes place at
> another level than the integration of cognition in the body of an
> individual. One cannot reduce the one level to the other, in my opinion.
> Which research program of these two has priority? How do they relate ?
> potentially differently ? to information?
>
> ME: My Cambridge colleague, Madan Thangavelu, holds that the structure of
> knowledge in both human brains (and human organizations), and in' bodies of
> knowledge' in the sciences, is fractal.
>
> It is certainly true that the structure of creative ideas and new projects
> emerging from individuals and corporations has a fractal kind of
> distribution, and as a consequence, has to be assessed using a Herfyndahl
> index rather that the mean and standard deviation of a normal distribution,
> or their analogues for experimentally encountered non-normal data
> distributions. (Better the square root of the Herfyndaho index, since this
> can be additive when combining distributions.)
>
> --
> Alex Hankey M.A. (Cantab.) PhD (M.I.T.)
> Distinguished Professor of Yoga and Physical Science,
> SVYASA, Eknath Bhavan, 19 Gavipuram Circle
> Bangalore 560019, Karnataka, India
> Mobile (Intn'l): +44 7710 534195
> Mobile (India) +91 900 800 8789
> 
>
> 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences,
> Mathematics and Phenomenological Philosophy
> 
>
> ___
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[Fis] _ Re: _ Re: _ DISCUSSION SESSION: INFOBIOSEMIOTICS

[Stanley N Salthe]

All --  There is the World, and there is Nature, our model of the world.
Nature is based in (usually one kind of) logic, even though there is scant
evidence that the world operates only or mostly logically. The evidence
that there is is found in successful applications of engineering and
technology, leaving most aspects of the world (including much of human
mentality) un-modeled. Information is a logical notion. It exists in (as I
see it) three levels in a subsumptive hierarchy -- {variety {choice
{interpretation/effect}}}. So information is part of our model of the
world. Since our species has been (almost excessively) successful, we can
be assured that the world does have logical properties, to which our
mentality has become adapted. However, aspects of the world that are (one
might say) ‘illogical’ appear to be closing in upon us. These aspects
include, I think, what Søren is trying to capture in his thinking.

STAN

On Sun, Apr 3, 2016 at 4:49 AM, Mark Johnson  wrote:

> Dear Soren, Lou and Loet,
>
> I can appreciate that Bateson might have had it in for hypnotists and
> missionaries, but therapists can be really useful! Had Othello had a
> good one, Desdemona would have lived – they might have even done some
> family therapy!
>
> More deeply, Bateson’s highlighting of the difference between the way
> we think and the way nature works is important. How can a concept of
> information help us to think in tune with nature, rather than against
> it?
>
> Loet’s description of social systems as encoded systems of
> expectations within which selections are made is helpful. A concept of
> information is such a selection. But we live in a world of finite
> resources and our expectations form within what appear to be real
> limits: Othello saw only one Desdemona. Similarly, there appears to be
> scarcity of food, money, shelter, safety, education, opportunity for
> ourselves and for our children upon whose flourishing we stake our own
> happiness. These limits may be imagined or constructed, but their
> effects are real to the point that people will risk their lives
> crossing oceans, fight and kill for them. This is a result of how we
> think: it leads to hierarchy, exclusion and the production of more
> scarcity. Nature appears not to work like this.
>
> If we accept that the way we think is fundamentally different from the
> way nature works, how might a concept of information avoid
> exacerbating the pathologies of human existence? Wouldn’t it just turn
> us into information bible-bashers hawking our ideas in online forums
> (because universities are no longer interested in them!)? Would new
> metrics help? Or would that simply create new scarcity in the form of
> a technocratic elite? Or maybe we’re barking up the wrong tree. Maybe
> it’s not “information” at all (whatever that is) – or maybe it’s “not
> information”.
>
> I like “not information” as the study of the constraints within which
> our crazy thinking takes place because it continually draws us back to
> what isn't thought. Without wanting to bash any bibles, Bateson got
> this - see for example the chapter in Steps on "A Re-examination of
> Bateson's Rule". Good therapists get it too. I don't know Peirce well
> enough... Which leads me to a question: “What are the criteria for a
> good theory of information?”
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Mark
>
> On 3 April 2016 at 07:50, Loet Leydesdorff  wrote:
> > Dear Soren,
> >
> >
> >
> > In my opinion, there are two issues here (again J ):
> >
> >
> >
> > 1. the issue of non-verbal (e.g., bodily) communication;
> >
> > 2. the meta-biological or transdisciplinary integration vs. the
> > differentiation among the disciplines.
> >
> >
> >
> > Ad 1. Although I don’t agree with Luhmann on many things, his insistence
> > that everything communicated among humans is culturally coded, is fully
> > acceptable to me. “Love” is not a counter-example. Unlike animals, our
> > behavior is regulated by codes of communication. Preparing "Love” as a
> > passion, Luhmann spent months in the Bibliotheque Nationale in Paris
> reading
> > the emergence of romantic love in the literature of the early 18th
> century.
> > A similar intuition can be found in Giddens’ book “The Transformation of
> > Intimacy”. Of course, one sometimes needs bodily presence; Luhmann uses
> here
> > the concept of “symbiotic mechanisms”; but this is only relevant for the
> > variation. The selection mechanisms – which impulses are to be followed –
> > are cultural. Among human beings, this means: in terms of mutual and/or
> > shared expectations. The realm of expecting the other to entertain
> > expectations, shapes a “second contingency” which is otherwise absent in
> the
> > animal kingdom. (If you wish, you can consider it as a function of the
> > cortex as a symbiotic mechanism.)
> >
> >
> >
> > This special status of human society should make us resilient against
> using
> > biological metaphors. Socio-biology has a terrible history since it links
> > s

[Fis] _ Re: On mathematical theories and models in biology

[Stanley N Salthe]

Plamen wrote:

 I begin to believe that the transition from abiotic to biotic structures,
incl. Maturana-Varela.-Uribe’s autopoiesis may, really have some underlying
matrix/”skeleton”/”programme” which has nothing in common with the nature
of DNA, and that DNA and RNA as we know them today may have emerged as
secondary or even tertiary “memory” of something underlying deeper below
the microbiological surface. It is at least worth thinking in this
direction. I do not mean necessarily the role of the number concept and
Platonic origin of the universe, but something probably much more “physical”



S: An interesting recently published effort along these lines is:

Alvaro Moreno and Matteo Mossio: Biological Autonomy: A Philosophical and
Theoretical Enquiry (History, Philosophy and Theory of the Life Sciences
12) Springer

They seek a materialist understanding of biology as a system, attempting to
refer to the genetic system as little as possible.

I have until very recently attempted to evade/avoid mechanistic thinking in
regard to biology, but, on considering the origin of life generally while
keeping Howard Pattee's thinking in mind, I have been struck by the notion
that the origin of life (that is: WITH the genetic system) was the origin
of mechanism in the universe.  Before that coding system, everything was
mass action.  I think we still do not understand how this mechanism evolved.

STAN

On Tue, Mar 29, 2016 at 7:40 AM, Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov <
plamen.l.simeo...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> Dear Lou, Pedro and All,
>
>
>
> I am going to present a few opportunistic ideas related to what was said
> before in this session. Coming back to Pivar’s speculative
> mechano-topological model of life excluding genetics I wish to turn your
> attention to another author with a similar idea but on a sound mathematical
> base, Davide Ambrosi with his resume at
> https://www.uni-muenster.de/imperia/md/content/cim/events/cim-mathmod-workshop-2015_abstracts.pdf
> :
>
> “Davide Ambrosi:
>
> A role for mechanics in the growth, remodelling and morphogenesis of
> living systems  In the XX Century the interactions between mechanics in
> biology were much  biased by a bioengineering attitude: people were
> mainly interested in  evaluating the state of stress that bones and
> tissues undergo in order to  properly design prosthesis and devices.
> However in the last decades a new vision is emerging. "Mechano-biology" is
> changing the point of view, with respect to "Bio-mechanics", emphasizing
> the biological feedback. Cells, tissues and organs do not only deform when
> loaded: they reorganize, they duplicate, they actively produce dynamic
> patterns that apparently have multiple biological aims.
>
> In this talk I will concentrate on two paradigmatic systems where the
> interplay between mechanics and biology is, in my opinion, particularly
> challenging: the homeostatic stress as a driver for remodeling of soft
> tissue and the tension as a mechanism to transmit information about the
> size of organs during morphogenesis. In both cases it seems that mechanics
> plays a role which at least accompanies and enforces the biochemical
> signaling.”
>
>
>
>
>
> Some more details about this approach can be found here:
>
> http://rsta.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/367/1902/3335
>
> http://biomechanics.stanford.edu/paper/MFOreport.pdf
>
> In other words, for the core information theorists in FIS, the question
> is: is there really only (epi)genetic evolution communication in living
> organisms. Stan Salthe and Lou Kauffman already provided some answers. I
> begin to believe that the transition from abiotic to biotic structures,
> incl. Maturana-Varela.-Uribe’s autopoiesis may, really have some underlying
> matrix/”skeleton”/”programme” which has nothing in common with the nature
> of DNA, and that DNA and RNA as we know them today
>
> http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519314006778
>
> http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022519316001260
>
> https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2015/01/150107101405.htm
>
> may have emerged as secondary or even tertiary “memory” of something
> underlying deeper below the microbiological surface. It is at least worth
> thinking in this direction. I do not mean necessarily the role of the
> number concept and Platonic origin of the universe, but something probably
> much more “physical” or at least staying at the edge between
> physical/material and immaterial such as David Deutsch’s constructor theory
> (http://constructortheory.org/) and Brian Josephson’s
> “structural/circular theory” (
> http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1502/1502.02429.pdf;
> http://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/1506/1506.06774.pdf;
> http://arxiv.org/pdf/1108.4860.pdf) searching for the theories
> underpinning the foundations of the physical laws (and following Wheeler’s
> definition for a “Law without Law”.
>
> Some of you may say that QT and Gravitation Theory are responsible for
> such kind of stran

fis@listas.unizar.es

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro -- You are right to look dubiously at the achievement of neoDarwinism
as the sole theory of biology.  What is missing (and it was realized
already in the 1950’s with Schmalgausen and Waddington) is development. All
dissipative structures develop -- immaturity followed by a short maturity
followed by senescence -- and this was not escaped when the genetic system
was incorporated, creating living dissipative structures. Development is a
material law of nature, to be added to the underlying physical laws in the
case of dissipative structures. Evo-Devo is a currently burgeoning part of
biology discourse aimed at replacing ‘random mutation’ as the source of new
directions with material divergences occurring during ontogeny. These
reflect material tendencies that can not always be suppressed by genetic
information guidance. They might also in some way reflect choices made by a
developing system. This approach will result in bringing in a major fact of
biological evolution long ignored by neoDarwinians because their
explanatory tool kit could simply bot explain it -- convergent evolution.


STAN
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[Fis] _ Fwd: Response to Salthe

[Stanley N Salthe]

-- Forwarded message --
From: Stanley N Salthe 
Date: Wed, Feb 24, 2016 at 9:55 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Response to Salthe
To: Maxine Sheets-Johnstone 


Here I respond to Maxine:

M: Theories are based on first-person observations. Observations are
first-person real-life, real-time experiences and are duly recorded in
support of theory. Descent with modification was a theory that Darwin put
forth on the basis of his observations that had to do with morphology, but
not only with morphology. See, for example, his last book on worms and the
intelligence of worms; see also his third book devoted to emotions.

 S: Yes, nice examples. But my point here is that there can be no First
Person observation of an evolutionary origin.  Such was denied hotly in the
’80’s by phylogenetic systematicists (taxonomists) regarding observations
of fossils.   Such origins (maybe ALL origins?) are designations, not
phenomena.


M: I am unaware of Darwin’s denying a concern with origins and would
appreciate knowing more about his denial by way of a reference.

 S:  In the Origin of Species, Darwin says in a couple of place—usually
by-the-by—that he is not concerned with the origin of life.

1.  “How a nerve comes to be sensitive to light, hardly concerns us more
than how life itself fir originated” (p. 187 of first edition).

2.  “I must premise, that I have nothing to do with the origin of the
primary mental powers, any more than I have with that of life itself” (p.
207).

There is a comparable passage to the one on 207 in the manuscript that
Darwin was working on, before he condensed it into the Origin.  So in the
Stauffer edition (Darwin’s Natural Selection): “I hope that it is hardly
necessary for me to premise that here we are no more concerned with the
first origin of the senses & the various faculties of the mind, than we are
with the first origin of life.” (p. 467)



M: I know that what he did not deny was “[t]hat many and grave objections
may be advanced against the theory of descent with modification through
natural selection” (*Origin of Species, *p. 435). Clearly, “descent with
modification” has to do not just with morphology but with history. History
has to do with timelines, and in this instance with origins and extinctions.

 S: Extinctions are conceptually clean cuts, like origins. in actuality
the most recent positive find of a kind in the fossil record is held to
mark its extinction.  So evolutionary extinction is also not a phenomenon.
In the current case of human environmental destruction in might be the case
that a person could observe the last of a kind of bird flying by, but (s)he
would not actually SEE its death.



M: I would add that because “descent with modification” involves a history
and not just a  morphological comparison as in your human hand and chicken
foot example, the phrase is actually pertinent to the current discussion in
evolutionary biology as to how single-celled organisms gave rise to
multi-celled organisms. If, as is currently suggested, the way a protein
wiggles can result in a mutation so that its function in turn changes, then
“modifications” can determine origins, in this instance, the origin of
multi-celled over single-celled organisms.

 S: In the stream of changes, we pick out certain ones to mark as
‘origins’. Origin is a determination of sufficient difference to mark with
a category.  In evolutionary biology a new species is held to arise when
successful inter-reproduction fails even if no observational evidence can
be adduced as to what is manifestly different between the two.  In taxonomy
this would not be able to  mark different species. As well, there are
intermediates between single- and multi-cellulars, as in kinds of bacterial
biofilms.


M: Again, I don’t know where Darwin discredited his “origin” of species

 S: I did not mean to suggest such an outrageous thing!  See above.



M: and I would greatly appreciate knowing where, but his use of the term in
biology doesn’t necessarily mean a big bang moment. Descent with
modification means, as you say, a “change of existing forms,” and such
changes via natural selection equal in the passage of time the origin of
new species.

 S: So we can assert, even without ever being able to say exactly
where/when that was because it is technically unobservable, therefore
non-phenomenal.  But it doesn’t matter as long as we can point to
sufficient differences.


M: As to your question of how a phenomenologist could view movement in
relation to living forms that do not move, I would answer first that there
is a new science focused on plant neurobiology in which not just plant
growth but plant movement is recognized. I would also add with respect to
your mentioning that “Plants move slowly by growth” that I would definitely
align Aristotle’s thinking with phenomenology, namely, his recognition of
three primary kinetic modes: change, movement, and growth, and his highly
relevant estimation of Na

Re: [Fis] Origin?

[Stanley N Salthe]

Marcus -- You have an interesting point regarding plants and
phenomenology.  Their behavior occurs over a time scale where we
phenomenologists see nothing happening. This slow time scale was
illuminated by non-phenomenological science studies, while also inquiring
into faster-than-phenomenological time scale events. Is phenomenology to be
grounded in our animal time scale only? Or, in what way or sense can
phenomenology transcend that scale?

STAN

On Mon, Feb 22, 2016 at 12:05 AM, Marcus Abundis <55m...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear Stanley & Loet,
> Gentlemen, when you speak of "origin" I am unsure of what *exactly*
> you have in mind. Is it the "origin of the capacity for movement" that you
> think about? The origin of life, itself, along with all its causal roles?
> Or?
> > Then, many of the living do not ‘move’. . . Plants move slowly by
> growth. How could a phenomenologist view this at all?<
> I think studying *differential movement* could fall within
> phenomenology, but explaining the *origination* of autonomous movement,
> would not. Also, it seems (to me) a bit unreasonable to think such an
> origination (origin of life) narrative would be addressed in this group. Or
> do I mistake your meaning, or the group's ultimate aim? Thanks!
>
> Maxine,
> I am unclear from your extended abstract on what exactly you aim to
> accomplish in the study you present. Also, are we to read the
> "Phenomenology and Life Sciences" piece as well? I read its abstract and
> its mention of "coordinated dynamics" seemed to say "yes!" but I am unsure.
> The emphasis you seem to offer in "Phenomenology and Evolutionary
> Biology" I find interesting. Also, your mention of "static" and "genetic"
> aspects along with movement. To my mind this points to kinematics, statics,
> and dynamics in a more directly mechanical sense – but which you now wish
> to tie to evolutionary biology? Is that correct? I find that an interesting
> line of thought.
> Also, I like Pedro's notion of a connection between dance and mate
> selection. Dance then being a display behavior demonstrating an
> advantageous capacity for navigating the evolutionary landscape.
> Still, I find what you present a bit "too raw" and I am not exactly
> sure how I should view the material. For example jumping form
> dance/movement to teeth leaves me with a big gap in joining the two. I get
> the sense that you aim to close "a gap" but I am not clear on how exactly
> you do so. "Where did the notion of a tool come from?" This is an important
> question, but how is it precisely answered or addressed? Do you attribute
> the entire genesis of "six simple machines" all to teeth?
> Lastly, I too work in this area and I am just now finishing (very
> rough draft) a piece that looks at this issue. I agree that it is an
> overlooked area of study. I am happy to share what I have wth you, if you
> might find it of interest.
>
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>
>
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Re: [Fis] Maxine’s presentation

[Stanley N Salthe]

Commenting upon Maxine's presentation:

S: I think Maxine should make clear distinction between phenomena viewed
from an evolutionary perspective (e.g. comparing your hand with a chicken’s
foot, which even a child can puzzle over) and evolutionary *theory*.  It is
the former she wishes to address.

By the way, evolutionary theory does not address origins at all -- this was
even denied by Darwin despite the title of his famous book.  It deals with
change of already existent forms.

Then, many of the living do not ‘move’ in the sense that we automatically
think of (monkeys jumping). Plants move slowly by growth. How could a
phenomenologist view this at all?

STAN

On Tue, Feb 16, 2016 at 10:58 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> Dear FISers and New Colleagues,
>
> For travel reasons, Maxine could not post her presentation. On her behalf,
> I am attaching a file with the whole text and also copying below the Intro
> and the Final Section, in order to facilitate discussion. For those
> interested in further reference material, there is a folder in the FIS web
> pages, at the section "resources": http://fis.sciforum.net/fis  The
> folder can also be accessed by clicking on the announcement of this
> specific session (http://fis.sciforum.net/fis-discussion-sessions/). In
> due time, the other presenters will have similar arrangements.
>
> Responses have to be addressed to fis@listas.unizar.es. Remember please
> that only two messages per week are allowed to each participant. In case
> you have problems with spam filters (helas, very active in this host
> server), do not insist and change slightly the title of the message, far
> better than insisting. The max. message size is 300 K, and attachments
> are unwelcome, except for presenters.
>
> Reading the whole text of this presentation is strongly encouraged. It is
> a fine and rigorous essay that deals with fundamental issues not always
> within the focus of natural and computer scientists (and of many other
> tribes). It is interesting that Maxine's views in Sections 2 and 3 are not
> far from two previous discussion sessions in this list: "Informational
> Foundations of the Act" (2015), and "The Sociotype: Social Relationships
> and Beyond" (2013). Intriguingly, in Section 4 about Descriptive
> Foundations (below), is there a cryptic message for the Foundations of
> Information Science too?
>
> Best regards to all,
>
> --Pedro
> fis coordination
>
>
> -
>
> *Phenomenology and Evolutionary Biology*
>
>
> *(1): Phenomenology *As written in the Preface to the 2nd edition (1979)
> of The Phenomenology of Dance, “Certainly words carry no patented meanings,
> but the term ‘phenomenology’ does seem stretched beyond its limits when it
> is used to denote either mere reportorial renderings of perceptive
> behaviors or actions, or *any* descriptive rendering at all of
> perceptible behaviors or actions. At the least, ‘phenomenology’ should be
> recognized as a very specific mode of epistemological inquiry, a method of
> eidetic analysis invariably associated with the name Edmund Husserl, the
> founder of phenomenology; and at the most ‘phenomenology’ should be
> recognized as a philosophically-spawned terms, that is, a term having a
> rich philosophical history and significance.”
>
> A phenomenological analysis of movement given in The Phenomenology of
> Dance follows the rigorous methodology set forth by Husserl. The
> methodology is integral to understandings of phenomenology as well as to
> its practice. Husserl distinguished two modes of the methodology. One mode
> is termed “static,” the other is termed “genetic.” The aim in static
> phenomenology is to uncover the essential character of the phenomenon in
> question or under investigation. The aim in genetic phenomenology is to
> uncover the source and development of meanings and values we hold.
>
> The abbreviated phenomenological analysis of movement set forth below
> follows a static phenomenology. The abbreviated phenomenological analysis
> of the origin of tool-making follows a genetic phenomenology. The first
> analysis elucidates the inherently dynamic character of movement, and in
> ways quite contrary to the idea that movement is a force in time and in
> space and quite contrary as well to the dictionary definition of movement
> as a “change of position.” The second analysis answers questions that
> paleoanthropologists, archaeologists, and anthropologists leave unanswered.
> The analyses present basic aspects of animation that anchor the
> relationship between phenomenology and the life sciences. In particular,
> the point of departure for both phenomenology and the life sciences is
> *animate* being not just in the sense of *living* creatures, but in the
> sense of *moving* creatures, creatures who, in and through movement, are
> s

[Fis] _ Re: Fw: Five Momenta. Five Itineraries

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bruno, Joseph -- The unity of the sciences comes from the fact that one
understands sociality by way of biology, and one understands biology by way
of chemistry, and then one understands chemistry by way of physics. Thus,
the subsumptive hierarchy:

{physics {chemistry {biology {sociality

Comte, I think first showed us this.

STAN

On Fri, Feb 5, 2016 at 10:31 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Dear Loet,
>
> Sorry for bumping this old post, but I cannot resist (I tried!) to add my
> grain of salt.
>
>
> On 21 Oct 2015, at 08:37, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:
>
> Self-reference is a key principle in art and humor and it may also be a
> key component of the structured coherence in science Pedro and we are
> seeking.
>
> Dear Joseph:
>
> Do not count me in to the “we”, please. In my opinion, these “unity of
> science” principles are outdated. At issue is to specify how the sciences
> and specialties are different; in which respects and why? Obviously, the
> boundaries are fuzzy, since what may seem far distanced from one
> perspective can be nearby from another (e.g. in terms of the metrics used
> for the measurement such as in the case of biometrics and econometrics).
>
> These distinctions are not to be identified into a single “self” of the
> self-reference, but to be dissolved (differentiated) in discourse. They are
> carried by the communication in science & technology studies or more
> broadly (since including the science/society interface) in the information
> sciences. The “self” is not transcendental to these discourses, but
> reflexive insofar as one has the communicative competencies to listen and –
> if so wished -- to participate.
>
> The distinctions (such as the ones between your five schemes) may be
> useful heuristics. The puzzles have then to be specified.
>
>
>
> I think that I might agree with Pedro and Joseph. The unity of science
> should be preserved, despite this is hard to do when specialities lost
> themselves in gigantic territories.
> This eventually made the search of unity in science into a "new' science,
> or perhaps, if we assume the conceptually strong hypothesis of Mechanism
> (Descartes/Turing) into the oldest of all sciences: theology.
>
> In that case we can define a straitforward notion of self: the
> representation of the body of the machine in its brain. Descartes sought
> fort his without finding it, and Hanz Driesch, with embryology in mind,
> pretended this could not exist, due to the apparent infinite looping most
> naïve attempts seem to lead to. But von Neuman, and more conceptually
> Stephen Kleene solved that problem. John Case solved the more complex
> embryological problem. The basic idea is contained in the Dx =>T(xx) trick:
> DD will give (=>) T(DD), that is the transformation T on itself.
>
> And I agree that there is nothing transcendental in that notion of self.
>
> But that notion is third person descriptible, which is not the case for
> the first person "I", which is the one who know, notably when it has some
> headache, plain or some pleasure.
>
> To get this one, Theatetus suggested to attach the "believer" ([]p) with
> "truth" (p), and we know today that such notion of truth, and thus of
> knowledge ([]p & p) is transcendental.
>
> It is transcendental in two sense: truth (even just the arithmetical
> truth) is not exhaustible.
> - It escape *all* semi-effective (proof-checkable) theories.
> - it is not nameable or definable by the machine (as Gödel and Tarski saw).
>
> But that transcendental aspect, which is forced by logic, is available by
> the machine. So a universal machine can know that she is universal, and
> that makes her know that there is an unavoidable gap between its beliefs
> and truth, and that it can be used to explain why consciousness and
> knowledge seem so hard/impossible to define. In fact the theology of the
> machine introduces many nuance about that self: which correspond at
> different fields of research (p, the truth, []p, provability/believability,
> []p & p (knowledge, epistemology), []p & <>p (observability, as explained
> earlier or in my papers), and []p & <>t & p (sensibility, qualia).
>
> The unity here is given by a belief in Truth, the original main God of
> Plato/Parmenides/Plotinus. It is the truth we can search, and perhaps knows
> aspects on it, but never as such: doubt must remain for reason of
> self-consistency.
> With Mechanism, we can limit Truth to first order arithmetical truth, and
> all other notion (second order truth, analysis) can be put in the
> epistemology of the machine. Infinities only makes proof shorter.
>
> So, the unity of science is not a problem, if we come back to modesty in
> theology. The main formula from which all this can be derived is sometimes
> called the formula of modesty: []([]p -> p) -> []p (Löb formula), which is
> both akin to the view of the scientific attitude as essentially the
> doubting view (from Descartes to Popper) and to the religious attitude of
> staying humble in fron

Re: [Fis] A Meta(information)- scientific comment

[Stanley N Salthe]

As an erstwhile natural scientist (biology) and as a now soi-disant natural
philosopher, I agree with Joseph here:

>this seems to be turning out to be as much a psychological question as a
physical one.

Such 'objects' as quarks are created by humans within elaborate machines.
They are artifacts of engineering!  How can anyone really take them
seriously as natural things?  I would agree that anything upon which so
much time and money has been/is spent might seem on the face of it to be
'real'. I would also agree that these phenomena are potentially important
in the tech world.  But they are surely not 'natural' even if we must take
them to be real(ized).

STAN

On Fri, Jan 22, 2016 at 2:46 AM, Joseph Brenner 
wrote:

> Dear FISers,
>
> The most scientific aspect of the recent exchanges is their existence. It
> is obvious that some people feel more comfortable than others in ascribing
> properties to quantum particles that are characteristic of the
> thermodynamic world in which we exist, in particular difference (let us
> forget, if possible, Peirce's 'mind').
>
> At one point, I myself said that quantum particles are, following the
> principles of Logic in Reality, distinguishable AND indistinguishable, the
> former by virtue of a minimum difference in 'location' of two particles in
> space-time, let alone any difference in properties. Today, I am less sure;
> this description, and Bob's, begs the question of whether quarks change in
> 'time'; what 'position' means; and whether the term 'dynamic' can properly
> be used with regard to them.
>
> Pedro and others of you will note that we are returning to the questions
> left unresolved in the discussion of Conrad's
> 'fluctuons', namely, is it proper to refer to changes that occur in levels
> that we cannot access, even with extensions of our senses, and not even
> characterize as temporal or spatial, as information. As noted in the first
> paragraph above, this seems to be turning out to be as much a psychological
> question as a physical one.
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Joseph
>
> - Original Message - From: "Robert E. Ulanowicz" 
> To: "Pedro C. Marijuan" 
> Cc: 
> Sent: Friday, January 22, 2016 3:26 AM
> Subject: Re: [Fis] _ RE: _ Re: Cho 2016 The social life of quarks
>
>
> Just a few words to follow on Pedro's concerning Howard's question:
>
> From our perspective all quarks are completely indistinguishable and
> homogeneous, so the practical answer to Howard's question is "No, quarks
> cannot communicate --period!"
>
> It is possible, however, to imagine that quarks, being in large measure
> wave packets, would at any instant be different from one another. One can
> imagine multiple wave forms, dynamically changing with time. The
> particular phasing between two quarks in the quantum vacuum could take on
> any number of possibilities, and which possibility pertains at the time of
> encounter would inform what kind of boson might result. Then it becomes
> possible to speak of communication between them. It's just that we are
> unable to access that level of interaction.
>
> Cheers to all,
> Bob U.
>
> Dear FIS Colleagues,
>>
>> Thanks to Jerry and Koichiro for their insightful and deep comments.
>> Nevertheless the question from Howard was very clear and direct and I
>> wonder whether we have responded that way --as usual, the simplest
>> becomes the most difficult. I will try here.
>>
>> There is no "real" communication between quarks as they merely follow
>> physical law--the state of the system is altered by some input according
>> to boundary conditions and to the state own variables and parameters
>> that dictate the way Law(s) have to intervene. The outcome may be
>> probabilistic, but it is inexorably determined.
>>
>> There is real communication between cells, people, organizations... as
>> the input is sensed (or disregarded) and judged according to boundary
>> conditions and to the accumulated experiential information content of
>> the entity. The outcome is adaptive: aiming at the
>> self-production/self-propagation of the entity.
>>
>> In sum, the former is blind, while the second is oriented and made
>> meaning-ful by the life cycle of the entity.
>>
>> Well, if we separate communication from the phenomenon of life, from its
>> intertwining with the life cycle of the entity, then everything goes...
>> and yes, quarks communicate, as well as billiard balls, stones, cells,
>> etc. Directly we provide further anchor to the mechanistic way of
>> thinking.
>>
>> best regards--Pedro
>>
>>
>>
>> Koichiro Matsuno escribió:
>>
>>>
>>> At 2:43 AM 01/19/2016, Jerry wrote:
>>>
>>> In order for symbolic chemical communication to occur, the language
>>> must go far beyond such simplistic notions of a primary interaction
>>> among forces, such as centripetal orbits or even the four basic forces.
>>>
>>> The quark physicist is quirky in confining a set of quarks,
>>> including possibly tetra- or even penta-, within a closed bag with use
>>> of a virt

Re: [Fis] _ RE: _ Re: Cho 2016 The social life of quarks

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro -- One way to see this is to view the play of boundary conditions to
be the source of all meaningful communication. Marionettes hanging from the
laws do nothing but jiggle back and forth expressing possibilities -- until
they encounter a 'situation', when they then do their best to adjust to it
with meaningful actions.  In both cases they are maximizing their obedience
to the Second Law of thermodynamics, while in the latter case they engage,
and generate, meanings.

STAN

On Thu, Jan 21, 2016 at 9:06 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> Dear FIS Colleagues,
>
> Thanks to Jerry and Koichiro for their insightful and deep comments.
> Nevertheless the question from Howard was very clear and direct and I
> wonder whether we have responded that way --as usual, the simplest becomes
> the most difficult. I will try here.
>
> There is no "real" communication between quarks as they merely follow
> physical law--the state of the system is altered by some input according to
> boundary conditions and to the state own variables and parameters that
> dictate the way Law(s) have to intervene. The outcome may be probabilistic,
> but it is inexorably determined.
>
> There is real communication between cells, people, organizations... as the
> input is sensed (or disregarded) and judged according to boundary
> conditions and to the accumulated experiential information content of the
> entity. The outcome is adaptive: aiming at the
> self-production/self-propagation of the entity.
>
> In sum, the former is blind, while the second is oriented and made
> meaning-ful by the life cycle of the entity.
>
> Well, if we separate communication from the phenomenon of life, from its
> intertwining with the life cycle of the entity, then everything goes... and
> yes, quarks communicate, as well as billiard balls, stones, cells, etc.
> Directly we provide further anchor to the mechanistic way of thinking.
>
> best regards--Pedro
>
>
>
> Koichiro Matsuno escribió:
>
>>
>> At 2:43 AM 01/19/2016, Jerry wrote:
>>
>> In order for symbolic chemical communication to occur, the language must
>> go far beyond such simplistic notions of a primary interaction among
>> forces, such as centripetal orbits or even the four basic forces.
>>
>> The quark physicist is quirky in confining a set of quarks, including
>> possibly tetra- or even penta-, within a closed bag with use of a virtual
>> exchange of matter called gluons. This bag is methodologically
>> tightly-cohesive because of the virtuality of the things to be exchanged
>> exclusively in a closed manner. In contrast, the real exchange of matter
>> underlying the actual instantiation of cohesion, which concerns the
>> information phenomenologist facing chemistry and biology in a serious
>> manner, is about something referring to something else in the actual and is
>> thus open-ended. Jerry, you seem calling our attention to the actual
>> cohesion acting in the empirical world which the physicist has failed in
>> coping with, so far.
>>
>>Koichiro
>>
>> *From:*Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *On Behalf Of *Jerry LR
>> Chandler
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 19, 2016 2:43 AM
>> *To:* fis 
>> *Subject:* [Fis] _ Re: Cho 2016 The social life of quarks
>>
>> Koichiro, Bob U., Pedro:
>>
>> Recent posts here illustrate the fundamental discord between modes of
>> human communication.  Pedro’s last post neatly addresses the immediate
>> issue.
>>
>>  But, the basic issue goes far, far deeper.
>>
>> The challenge of communicating our meanings is not restricted to just
>> scientific meaning vs. historical meaning.  Nor, communication between the
>> general community and, say, the music (operatic and ballad) communities.
>>
>> Nor, is it merely a matter of definition of terms and re-defining terms
>> as “metaphor”in another discipline.
>>
>> Pedro’s post aims toward the deeper issues, issues that are fairly known
>> and understood in the symbolic  logic and chemical communities.  In the
>> chemical community, the understanding is at the level of intuition because
>> ordinary usage within the discipline requires an intuitive understanding of
>> the way symbolic usage manifests itself in different disciplines.
>>
>> (For a detailed description of these issues, see, The Primary Logic,
>> Instruments for a dialogue between the two Cultures. M. Malatesta,
>> Gracewings, Fowler Wright Books, 1997.)
>>
>> The Polish Logician, A. Tarski, recognized the separation of meanings and
>> definitions requires the usage of METALANGUAGES.  For example, ordinary
>> public language is necessary for expression of meaning of mathematical
>> symbolic logic.  But, from the basic mathematical language, once it
>> grounded in ordinary grammar, develops new set of symbols and new meanings
>> for relations among mathematical symbols.  Consequently, mathematicians
>> re-define a long index of terms that are have different meanings in its
>> technical language.
>>
>>  The meaning of mathematical

[Fis] Force in the information worldview

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro -- Regarding:

P: But a previous question may be in order: is "force" the most cogent term
to rationalize the upheavals of human history? Is "force" an interesting
element at all for advancing the informational worldview?

S: There is Being and there is Change.  Material Being changes but not
completely except when, or as, it disappears. Changes can be viewed as
informational. Some change is forced, some is spontaneous, but all is
mediated by the information that is embodying Being. Change is inherent in
Being-in-this-world because of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. The cause
of change can be viewed as added information. Change may be sought by, or
forced upon, Being.

So, force could be an interesting element regarding informational changes.

STAN
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Re: [Fis] Sustainability through multilevel research: The Lifel, Deep Society Build-A-Thon - 1

[Stanley N Salthe]

Nikhil --  Leaving aside details of hierarchical structure, I point out,
concerning economics:

It seems that you have in mind a global economic system in your planning.
Is that so? I think that the current global capitalist system would need to
be eschewed.

Then, this also would seem to involve a world government, placing the types
of agriculture in their optimal regions, etc.

Alternative;y, perhaps your system might function on an island like
Australia?

STAN

On Thu, Dec 17, 2015 at 3:52 AM, Nikhil Joshi 
wrote:

> Dear All,
> The research presented here is focused on gleaning insights leading to new
> solutions to the economics vs ecosystem conflict. The roots of many of
> our problems in ecological sustainability lie in the fact that our
> socio-economic systems are largely focused on fulfilling only human needs
> and the needs of human organizations. In doing so, as pointed out by Pedro,
> Bob, Francesco and others in this group our economics largely ignores the
> productive value of our ecosystems and the true costs of our development on
> our life supporting living systems.
>
> I term such a society as a “shallow society”, a society that is focused on
> the development of a single species and largely ignores the value of its
> own life-supporting living systems. With global population predicted to
> grow to 9 billion people, the next level of human development requires a
> transition of human society from being a “shallow society” that is only
> focused on only human needs to what I call a “deep society”. A deep
> society is a society that includes all living systems in its development.
>
> In this view, a deep society is not only focused on needs of human beings
> and their organizations but its development models also include development
> of the entire gamut of life-supporting living systems. Such a society
> grows not by exploiting the resources of a living planet, but also it
> possesses the capability to nurture, grow and actively manage a “living
> planet” (and perhaps seed life on other planets as well). Human
> development in the future will require the creation of new capabilities to
> develop models leading to a deep society. The question then is- can we
> develop systems that will enable a fair-value reciprocity and exchange
> between living ecosystems and economic systems?
>
>
> While, the notion that economics does not adequately value natural
> systems has been highlighted by many researchers in the field of ecological
> economics. Ideas on how natural systems can be understood, valued and
> integrated into economics have remained elusive. A multilevel view (like
> the one presented here) allows one to compare socio-economic
> organizations with natural organizations and could also provide new
> insights into how the dynamics of natural ecosystems could be synergised
> with economic systems.
>
> The model presented in the kick-off session shows two levels of
> energetically and materially coupled exchange networks in ecosystems. At
> the first level of exchange networks geochemical molecules are organized
> into different autotrophic species, and modulated by Mycorrhiza (level 1).
> Different autotrophic species then become food for the different
> heterotrophic species hence giving rise to the next higher level of
> exchange networks in ecosystems, modulated by gut bacterial networks (Level
> 2). The question then is- how does nature organize to build-in synergies
> between these two levels?
>
> At level 1, Mycorrhiza networks are known to modulate growth rates across
> different autotrophic species by providing phosphorous to different
> autotrophic species in quantitative exchange for carbohydrates. Autotrophic
> species (or groups of autotrophic species) that provide more carbohydrate
> hence get more phosphorous. Hence carbohydrates play a role in influencing
> phosphorous allocation across different autotrophic species connected to a
> Mycorrhiza network. At the next higher level in the exchange networks
> between different autotrophic species and different heterotrophic species
> gut bacteria use carbohydrates to modulate growth rates in heterotrophic
> species. Hence carbohydrates seem to play a role both in influencing
> dynamics in exchange networks at level 1, as well as in influencing
> dynamics in exchange networks at level 2.
>
> *Could such an organization where carbohydrates are a common influencing
> factor in exchanges at both levels serve to align both levels towards
> increasing overall carbohydrate production in ecosystems (hence increasing
> the overall primary production in ecosystems) by synergizing dynamics
> across both levels (and two different modulator networks)?*
>
> *Could this two-level role of carbohydrates provide new insights on
> aligning the third level of exchange networks (and our financial investment
> networks) with underling ecosystem exchange networks at level 1 and 2? *
> At this stage, these and other ideas presented here require much fu

Re: [Fis] Sustainability through multilevel research: The Lifel, Deep Society Build-A-Thon - 1

[Stanley N Salthe]

Loet -- A metabiolgy does not imply that there would not be
more-than-biological properties and processes going on.  We would not
bother to identify a higher level unless it had some of its own emergent
properties.

STAN

On Fri, Dec 11, 2015 at 5:35 AM, Loet Leydesdorff 
wrote:

> Dear colleagues,
>
>
>
> I don’t consider it as fruitful to recycle the argument that society were
> to be modeled as a meta-biology. The biological explanation can perhaps
> explain behavior of individuals and institutions; but social coordination
> more generally involves also the dynamics of expectations. These are much
> more abstract although conditioned by the historical layer. For example,
> one cannot expect to explain the *trias politica* or the rule of law
> biologically. These cultural constructs regulate our behavior from above,
> whereas the biological supports existence and living from below. The
> historical follows the axis of time, whereas the codification (albeit
> historical in the instantiations) also restructures and potentially
> intervenes and reorganizes social relations from the perspective of
> hindsight.
>
>
>
> In analogy to codifications such as the juridical ones, scientific
> knowledge provides the code for technological intervention. This type of
> knowledge is human-specific; perhaps, we are also able to build machines
> that mimick it. This technological evolution is going on for centuries. If
> I look up from my screen, I look into the gardens which have a typical
> Dutch polder vegetation. The polder was made in the 17th century and
> replaced the natural ecology of marsh land and lakes. The order of the
> explanation was thus inverted: the constructed structures (instead of the
> constructing agencies) increasingly carry the system. The constructs don’t
> have to be material; see my example of the rule of law. It is not a
> religion, but a dynamics of expectations. Replacing it with a biology
> misses the point.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Loet
>
>
> --
>
> Loet Leydesdorff
>
> Professor, University of Amsterdam
> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
>
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
> Honorary Professor, SPRU, University of
> Sussex;
>
> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. ,
> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
> Beijing;
>
> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck , University of
> London;
>
> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en
>
>
>
> *From:* Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *On Behalf Of *Nikhil
> Joshi
> *Sent:* Friday, December 11, 2015 9:47 AM
> *To:* FIS Group
> *Cc:* Nikhil Joshi
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Sustainability through multilevel research: The
> Lifel, Deep Society Build-A-Thon - 1
>
>
>
> Dear Guy and FIS colleagues,
>
> Thank you for your comments and the copy of your article. Your views on
> the roots of biological systems and their evolution in dissipate systems
> are very interesting. Your paper reminds me of a paper by Virgo and Froese
> on how simple dissipative structures can demonstrate many of the
> characteristics associated with living systems, and the work of Jeremy
> England at MIT.
>
>
>
> Given your research focus and expertise in looking at living systems as
> dissipative systems, I would appreciate your views and assistance in
> understanding the energetics involved in the common multilevel
> organisational pattern (CMOP) (presented in the paper II of the kick-off
> mail).
>
>
>
> At first glance, it appears that different levels in self-organization in
> living systems  a core dynamic in living systems is comprised of a cycle
> between a class of more-stable species (coupled-composite species) and a
> class of less-stable species (decoupled-composite species), see paper II in
> the kick-off mail.
>
> hence:
>
> Level 1: Molecular self-organization, involves a cycle between oxidised
> molecules (more stable) and reduced molecules (less stable) in molecular
> self-organization in  photosynthesis and cellular metabolism [Morowitz and
> smith].
>
>
>
> Level 2: Cellular self-orgnaization, involves a cycle between autotrophic
> species (more stable) and heterotrophic species (less stable) in ecosystems
> [Stability of species types as defined by- Yodzis and Innes Yodzis, P.;
> Innes, S. Body Size and Consumer-Resource Dynamics. *Am. Nat.* 1992, *139*,
> 1151].
>
>
>
> Level 3: Social self-self-organization, involves a cycle between
> kinship-based social groups (more stable) and non-kinship-based social
> groups (less stable) [Stability of species types as suggested in Paper II,
> based on an extension of work of Robin Dunbar and others].
>
>
>
> At level 1 (molecular self-organiztion)- solar energy is stored in the
>  high-energy reduced molecules. Do you see a possibility that
> living systems could store energy in cycles involving less stable species
> at the two 

Re: [Fis] Sustainability through multilevel research: The Lifel, Deep Society Build-A-Thon - 1

[Stanley N Salthe]

Nikhil --

In your search for a multilevel model of complex systems you claim to find
a “common multilevel organizational pattern” (CMOP) in different levels. In
this connection you claim that mycorrhiza networks, gut bacteria, and
investment networks are functional equivalents at three different levels.

The first question is do you really have plausibly different levels in a
compositional hierarchy.  It is not clear to me that your levels 1 and 2
are actually separated by scale of activity.  If not, then you do not
actually have a compositional hierarchy.  Then you need to define just what
kind of hierarchy you have constructed (it is also not a subsumptive
hierarchy -- see my 2012 paper).

If your scheme was a compositional hierarchy, then what you are looking for
here generally are isomorphisms at different levels. In the 1970’s this was
an active research plan, but it never got very far and has not to my
knowledge been pursued since then until here in your work.

STAN

On Fri, Nov 20, 2015 at 5:23 AM, Nikhil Joshi 
wrote:

> *(This email post has also been archived in the drop box. In case you are
> unable to read this entire post, please download from this link
> )*
>
>
>
> *Sustainability through multilevel research: The Lifel, Deep Society
> Build-A-Thon*
>
> Dear FIS Colleagues,
>
> Over the last fifty years or so, we have made significant progress in
> enhancing our theoretical understanding of self-organizing complex systems.
> When it comes to self-organization in complex *living systems*, along
> with advances in theoretical research, advances in disciplines like
> prebiotic evolution, molecular biology, complexity, linguistics,
> information systems, ecology, bacteriology, soil microbiology, sociology,
> and economics have all contributed to provide deeper insights into the
> processes and organization in living systems at multiple different levels.
>
> Having reached here we can ask the questions- can this new science help us
> develop a unified view of our socio-economic and natural systems?  Can
> such a view reveal new systemic ways to align economics and ecosystems?
>
> This series of articles [1-3] are a part of the “Lifel Deep Society
> Build-A-Thon” initiative. A research Build-A-Thon that aims to bring
> together domain level researchers, philosophers and theoretical
> researchers, and other problem solvers to build a multilevel model that can
> prove to be useful in enhancing our understanding of the combined
> ecosystem-economics system. This initiative provides exciting new
> opportunities for researchers to both further their own research, while
> also contributing towards addressing the larger problem of
> ecosystem-economics alignment.
>
> The first article [1] reveals an important common multilevel
> organizational pattern in self-organization of living systems that proposes
> that socio-economic organizations could be an extension of a larger
> multilevel organizational pattern in natural self-organization. In this
> paper, two new classes of systems have been defined to capture important
> characteristics of internal organization in living systems across multiple
> levels. An examination of multilevel living systems through the lens of
> these definitions reveals a common multilevel level organizational pattern
> (CMOP) that extends across levels from molecular, to ecological and to
> social self-organization. The outcomes of the common multilevel
> organizational pattern are discussed, with important implications and areas
> for further research.
>
> The second article [2] examines the possibility of organizational and role
> similarities between banks and financial investment networks in social
> self-organization, and networks of subsoil Mycorrhiza and gut-bacterial
> networks in ecosystems. The multilevel model of self-organizing living
> systems developed previously, has been used to pose questions and make
> multilevel organizational comparisons to glean new insights into the roots
> of our banking and financial investment networks in self-organizing living
> systems. Research findings point to the possibility that banks and
> financial investment networks play a role in social self-organization that
> could be in some ways similar to that played by Mycorrhiza and gut
> bacterial networks in the self-organization of ecosystems. A multilevel
> understanding of these systems could help us not only understand the roots
> of financial investment systems in self-organizing systems but also help
> better align financial systems and economics with natural ecosystems, and
> further the agenda of ecological sustainability. Some implications,
> questions and avenues for further research have been discussed.
>
> The third article is an extended abstract and presents an overview of this
> initiative [3].
>
> Taken together the two articles [1,2] present a cascading organization
> where autotrophic species aris

Re: [Fis] Locality & Five Momenta . . .

[Stanley N Salthe]

Marcus wrote:

– I find myself thinking Five Momenta must represent five types of
localities. I ask if that “smells right” to you. If so, I would think that
“localizing hierarchies” would also be needed. For example, I see: 1)
passive descriptions of Nature (aka natural philosophy, general science) as
a different locality than, 2) anthropogenic or anthropocentric deeds (human
semiotics+acts). One might even then add 3) biological processes mediating
between 1 & 2.  All represent essentially different systems of meaning, no?
But then, the Five (suggested) Momenta would be subordinate to 1, 2, and 3
in different ways, as I read things. Evaluation (cataloguing) of different
localized traits seems to me as a possible useful path. Thoughts?

Marcus -- The momenta as given my Pedro:philosophy, biomolecular,
multicellular, sociality, information do not make up a logical hierarchy,
either subsumptive nor compositional. One possible, idealistic, reading is
in subsumption:

{mind {microbiology {macrobiology {sociality {conceptualization}

STAN

On Fri, Oct 30, 2015 at 2:49 AM, Marcus Abundis <55m...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Loet, thanks for your note (Sat Oct 24) . . . an interesting twist on
> things I had not been considering.
>
> John, re (Tue Oct 27) “rigorous connections using the entropy concept . .
> . most people don't understand entropy . . . So I haven't published”
> – This interests me, as my own work heads in a general “entropic”
> direction.
>
> Pedro, Steve & Stan – re various notes on Locality, Five Momenta and
> Hierarchy.
> – I find myself thinking Five Momenta must represent five types of
> localities. I ask if that “smells right” to you. If so, I would think that
> “localizing hierarchies” would also be needed. For example, I see: 1)
> passive descriptions of Nature (aka natural philosophy, general science) as
> a different locality than, 2) anthropogenic or anthropocentric deeds (human
> semiotics+acts). One might even then add 3) biological processes mediating
> between 1 & 2.  All represent essentially different systems of meaning, no?
> But then, the Five (suggested) Momenta would be subordinate to 1, 2, and 3
> in different ways, as I read things. Evaluation (cataloguing) of different
> localized traits seems to me as a possible useful path. Thoughts?
>
> Re Chatin – an interesting article, to be sure, but for the reasons Joesph
> points out (and more) I agree with his posted thoughts.
>
> Finally, in following the posted notes, I find this “discussion about
> discussion“ instructive.
>
>
>
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>
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[Fis] hierarchy

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro wrote:

I see but five different and interrelated "momenta" that should be aligned
for the hypothetical advancement of the common info field.  The first one
corresponds to philosophy, as the critical playground where dissatisfaction
with the existing views should conduce to attempting more congenial new
ways of thinking. Unsolved problems of the sciences, when they are general
and affect several disciplines, easily generate philosophical debate--which
can be helpful to suggest new inroads. Saying clearly "nope" to some
philosophical and para-philosophical schools is quite valuable although it
easily generates irritation and obfuscation in the concerned parties (that
ingredient of "piquancy" also enlivens the debates).The second momentum
would correspond to the biomolecular (primordials of life and cellular
organization). The third momentum would wrap around the organismic and the
neuronal (the evolutionary outcomes of multicellular life up to advanced
nervous systems). I think they are so obvious that do not deserve further
comment.The fourth momentum involves the roots of human sociality, up to
the historical development of social complexity. And the fifth momentum
belongs to the contemporary revolution around communication, information,
etc.

Pedro -- What you have here is a rough subsumptive hierarchy.  That is,
each concept to the immediate left of another concept here subsumes that
concept.  So, e.g., sociality subsumes information, while information
constrains sociality.

{philosophy  {biomolecular  {organismic & neuronal  {sociality
{information}


STAN
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[Fis] life cycles

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro wrote:


Unfortunately, the neglect of the life cycle is almost universal. Neither
neuroscientists nor psychologists nor social scientists are sufficiently
aware of this invisible "water" that permeates all living stuff. Echoing
some old evolutionary statement, everything should made sense in relation
with the advancement of the corresponding life cycle. Just the superficial
observation of human exchanges in our societies, or in whatever historical
epoch, the conversational small-talk topics, the way people greet each
other, the gossip media... the condensates of the individuals' info cycles
are everywhere. A new conceptualization of information as accompanying the
development of human action for the sake of life cycles and subtending the
cooperation structures of economic life could have wide multidisciplinary
interest--I think. (Unfortunately, these adventures are discouraged: Mark
is terribly right about the sorrow state of our collective brain
reservoirs--poor universities! kingdoms of conventionalism and tunnel
vision).


Stan: One aspect of the life cycle is the rate of energy flow through a
system, which is well known in living systems, and appears to be similar in
all dissipative structures.  This is shown in this figure:


[image: Inline image 1]

Then we need to consider which life cycle we are going to investigate.  One
conversation? The duration of conference?, etc.


STAN
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Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: Information is a linguistic description of structures]--T...

[Stanley N Salthe]

Loet wrote:

 I suggest to distinguish between three levels (following Weaver): A.
(Shannon-type) information processing ; B. meaning sharing using languages;
C. translations among coded communications.

So, here we have a subsumptive hierarchy"

{reduction of possibilities {interpretation {generalization}}}

STAN

On Thu, Oct 1, 2015 at 2:14 AM, Loet Leydesdorff 
wrote:

> in other words, it's time we confess in science just how little we know
> about language, that we explore language's mysteries, and that we use our
> discoveries as a crowbar to pry open the secrets of this highly contextual,
> deeply relational, profoundly communicational cosmos.
>
>
>
> Dear colleagues,
>
>
>
> The vernacular is not sufficiently codified to contain the complexity of
> the sciences. One needs specialized languages (jargons) that are based on
> symbolic codification. The codes can be unpacked in elaborate language; but
> they remain under re-construction. The further differentiation of codes of
> communication drives the complexity and therefore the advancement of the
> sciences as discursive constructs.
>
>
>
> This cultural evolution remains rooted in and generated by the underlying
> levels. For example, individuals provide variety by making new knowledge
> claims. Since the selection is at the level of communication, however, this
> level tends to take over control. But not as an agent; it further
> differentiates into different forms of communication such as scientific
> discourse, political discourse, etc. Sociologists (Parsons, Luhmann) have
> proposed “symbolically generalized media of communication” which span
> horizons of meaning. “Energy”, for example, has a meaning in science very
> different from its meaning in political discourse. Translations remain of
> course possible; local organizations and agents have to integrate different
> meanings in action (variation; reproduction).
>
>
>
> In my recent paper on the Self-organization of meaning (at
> http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.05251 ), I suggest to distinguish between three
> levels (following Weaver): A. (Shannon-type) information processing ; B.
> meaning sharing using languages; C. translations among coded
> communications. The horizontal and vertical feedback and feedforward
> mechanisms (entropy generation vs. redundancy generation in terms of
> increasing the number of options) are further to be specified.
>
>
>
> Hopefully, this contributes to our discussion.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Loet
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Loet Leydesdorff
>
> *Professor Emeritus,* University of Amsterdam
> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
>
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
> Honorary Professor, SPRU, University of
> Sussex;
>
> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. ,
> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
> Beijing;
>
> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck , University of
> London;
>
> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en
>
>
>
>
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Information and Locality Introduction

[Stanley N Salthe]

Reacting to my:

S: Well, I have generalized the Shannon concept of information carrying
capacity under 'variety'...  {variety {information carrying capacity}}.
This allows the concept to operate quite generally in evolutionary and
ecological discourses.  Information, then, if you like, is what is left
after a reduction in variety, or after some system choice. Consider dance:
we have all the possible conformations of the human body, out of which a
few are selected to provide information about the meaning of a dance.

Jerry responded:

Stan's post is a superb example of how anyone change the semantic meaning
of words and talk about personal philosophy in context that ignores the
syntactical meaning of the same word such that the exact sciences
are generated.  Of course, this personal philosophy remains a private
conversation.

S: I really need a translation of this statement.

STAN

On Fri, Sep 11, 2015 at 11:31 AM, Jerry LR Chandler <
jerry_lr_chand...@me.com> wrote:

> Dear Steven, Pedro and List:
>
> Two excellent posts!
>
> Steven:  I look forward to your ratiocinations and there connectivity with
> symbolic logic.
>
> It is my view that one of the foundational stumbling blocks to
> communication about syntactical information theory (and its exactness!) is
> the multi-meanings that emerge from the multiple symbol systems used by the
> natural sciences.
>
> Stan's post is a superb example of how anyone change the semantic meaning
> of words and talk about personal philosophy in context that ignores the
> syntactical meaning of the same word such that the exact sciences
> are generated.  Of course, this personal philosophy remains a private
> conversation.
>
>  Steven and Pedro (and I), by way of contrast, are seeking a discussion of
> public information and the exactness of public information theory.
>
> Cheers
>
> Jerry
>
>
> Words to live by:
>
> *"The union of units unifies the unity of the universe"*
>
>
>
>
> On Sep 11, 2015, at 7:22 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:
>
> Dear Steven and FIS colleagues,
>
> Many thanks for this opening text. What you are proposing about a pretty
> structured discussion looks a good idea, although it will have to
> confront the usually anarchic discussion style of FIS list! Two aspects
> of your initial text have caught my attention (apart from those videos
> you recommend that I will watch along the weekend).
>
> First about the concerns of a generation earlier (Shannon, Turing...)
> situating information in the intersection between physical science and
> engineering. The towering influence of this line of thought, both with
> positive and negative overtones, cannot be overestimated. Most attempts
> to enlarge informational thought and to extend it to life, economies,
> societies, etc. continue to be but a reformulation of the former ideas
> with little added value. See one of the last creatures: "Why Information
> Grows: The Evolution of Order, from Atoms to Economies" (2015), by Cesar
> Hidalgo (prof. at MIT).
>
> In my opinion, the extension of those classic ideas to life are very
> fertile from the technological point of view, from the "theory of
> molecular machines" for DNA-RNA-protein matching to genomic-proteomic
> and other omics'  "big data". But all that technobrilliance does not
> open per se new avenues in order to produce innovative thought about the
> information stuff of human societies. Alternatively we may think that
> the accelerated digitalization of our world and the cyborg-symbiosis of
> human information and computer information do not demand much brain
> teasing, as it is a matter that social evolution is superseding by itself.
>
> The point I have ocasionally raised in this list is whether all the new
> molecular knowledge about life might teach us about a fundamental
> difference in the "way of being in the world" between life and inert
> matter (& mechanism & computation)---or not. In the recent compilation
> by Plamen and colleagues from the former INBIOSA initiative,  I have
> argued about that fundamental difference in the intertwining of
> communication/self-production, how signaling is strictly caught in the
> advancement of a life cycle  (see paper "How the living is in the
> world"). Life is based on an inusitate informational formula unknown in
> inert matter. And the very organization of life provides an original
> starting point to think anew about information --of course, not the only
> one.
>
> So, to conclude this "tangent", I find quite exciting the discussion we
> are starting now, say from the classical info positions onwards, in
> particularly to be compared in some future with another session (in
> preparation) with similar ambition but starting from say the
> phenomenology of the living. Struggling for a
> convergence/complementarity of outcomes would be a cavalier effort.
>
> All the best--Pedro
>
>
>
> Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
>
> ...The subject is one that has concerned me ever since I completed my PhD
> in 1992. I cam

Re: [Fis] Information and Locality Introduction

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro wrote"

>Most attempts to enlarge informational thought and to extend it to life,
economies, societies, etc. continue to be but a reformulation of the former
ideas with little added value.

S: Well, I have generalized the Shannon concept of information carrying
capacity under 'variety'...  {variety {information carrying capacity}}.
This allows the concept to operate quite generally in evolutionary and
ecological discourses.  Information, then, if you like, is what is left
after a reduction in variety, or after some system choice.  Consider dance:
we have all the possible conformations of the human body, out of which a
few are selected to provide information about the meaning of a dance.

STAN

STAN

On Fri, Sep 11, 2015 at 8:22 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> Dear Steven and FIS colleagues,
>
> Many thanks for this opening text. What you are proposing about a pretty
> structured discussion looks a good idea, although it will have to
> confront the usually anarchic discussion style of FIS list! Two aspects
> of your initial text have caught my attention (apart from those videos
> you recommend that I will watch along the weekend).
>
> First about the concerns of a generation earlier (Shannon, Turing...)
> situating information in the intersection between physical science and
> engineering. The towering influence of this line of thought, both with
> positive and negative overtones, cannot be overestimated. Most attempts
> to enlarge informational thought and to extend it to life, economies,
> societies, etc. continue to be but a reformulation of the former ideas
> with little added value. See one of the last creatures: "Why Information
> Grows: The Evolution of Order, from Atoms to Economies" (2015), by Cesar
> Hidalgo (prof. at MIT).
>
> In my opinion, the extension of those classic ideas to life are very
> fertile from the technological point of view, from the "theory of
> molecular machines" for DNA-RNA-protein matching to genomic-proteomic
> and other omics'  "big data". But all that technobrilliance does not
> open per se new avenues in order to produce innovative thought about the
> information stuff of human societies. Alternatively we may think that
> the accelerated digitalization of our world and the cyborg-symbiosis of
> human information and computer information do not demand much brain
> teasing, as it is a matter that social evolution is superseding by itself.
>
> The point I have ocasionally raised in this list is whether all the new
> molecular knowledge about life might teach us about a fundamental
> difference in the "way of being in the world" between life and inert
> matter (& mechanism & computation)---or not. In the recent compilation
> by Plamen and colleagues from the former INBIOSA initiative,  I have
> argued about that fundamental difference in the intertwining of
> communication/self-production, how signaling is strictly caught in the
> advancement of a life cycle  (see paper "How the living is in the
> world"). Life is based on an inusitate informational formula unknown in
> inert matter. And the very organization of life provides an original
> starting point to think anew about information --of course, not the only
> one.
>
> So, to conclude this "tangent", I find quite exciting the discussion we
> are starting now, say from the classical info positions onwards, in
> particularly to be compared in some future with another session (in
> preparation) with similar ambition but starting from say the
> phenomenology of the living. Struggling for a
> convergence/complementarity of outcomes would be a cavalier effort.
>
> All the best--Pedro
>
>
>
> Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
>
>> ...The subject is one that has concerned me ever since I completed my PhD
>> in 1992. I came away from defending my thesis, essentially on large scale
>> parallel computation, with the strong intuition that I had disclosed much
>> more concerning the little that we know, than I had offered either a
>> theoretical or engineering solution.
>> For the curious, a digital copy of this thesis can be found among the
>> reports of CRI, MINES ParisTech, formerly ENSMP,
>> http://www.cri.ensmp.fr/classement/doc/A-232.pdf, it is also available
>> as a paper copy on Amazon.
>>
>> Like many that have been involved in microprocessor and instruction
>> set/language design, using mathematical methods, we share the physical
>> concerns of a generation earlier, people like John Von Neumann, Alan
>> Turing, and Claude Shannon. In other words, a close intersection between
>> physical science and machine engineering.
>>
>> ...I will then discuss some historical issues in particular referencing
>> Benjamin Peirce, Albert Einstein and Alan Turing. And finally discuss the
>> contemporary issues, as I see them, in biophysics, biology, and associated
>> disciplines, reaching into human and other social constructions, perhaps
>> touching on cosmology and the extended role of information theory in
>

Re: [Fis] Fw: It-from-Bit and information interpretation of QM

[Stanley N Salthe]

Terry, list --

Terry wrote:

We should not expect such a quip to be a sufficient explanation of
information in all its complexity. It is merely a useful mnemonic (coined
also by MacKay as a "distinction that makes a difference") that captures
both Shannon's logic and Bateson's cybernetic implications. But this is not
all. If one wants to try to force this phrase to carry more of the weight
of completely characterizing information it should be further interpreted.
Notice that it is also an appropriate quip to describe the concept of
physical work— a gradient (or difference of potential) that is reduced in a
constrained way so that it generates an increase in a gradient or
difference in potential or pushes a system further from equilibrium.

 S: We might also note that it stands for the existence of any material
objects, in that they are energy gradients temporarily differentiated from
the condition of equilibrium implied by the universal tendency to even out
all such gradients. These ‘make a difference’ from that ultimate condition.
The particular forms of such gradients are where the information is located
when any observer interacts with one.

STAN

On Mon, Jun 29, 2015 at 4:48 PM, Terrence W. DEACON 
wrote:

> On Bateson's "difference that makes a difference."
>
> We should not expect such a quip to be a sufficient explanation of
> information in all its complexity. It is merely a useful mnemonic (coined
> also by MacKay as a "distinction that makes a difference") that captures
> both Shannon's logic and Bateson's cybernetic implications. But this is not
> all. If one wants to try to force this phrase to carry more of the weight
> of completely characterizing information it should be further interpreted.
> Notice that it is also an appropriate quip to describe the concept of
> physical work— a gradient (or difference of potential) that is reduced in a
> constrained way so that it generates an increase in a gradient or
> difference in potntial or pushes a system further from equilibrium.
>
> This double applicability is not merely a terminological coincidence,
> though I don't think that Gregory realized this, since he used this quip to
> argue for an energy/information dichotomy. I have instead argued (most
> recently in my January FIS essay) that both the referential and normative
> properties of information are intimately entangled with the concept of
> physical work.
>
> Also, in English parlance the phrase to "make a difference" is an idiom
> that means "to matter" or to be significant or of value. I believe that
> this double entendre was intended in order to implicate the normative and
> goal directed aspects of information. Explicating either the aboutness or
> the normative consequence in terms of "bits" therefore inevitably results
> in reductionistic oversimplication. Bits are a relevant measure of
> intrinsic logical properties of the communication medium, but of minimal
> value in assessing the extrinsic relational properties that are implicated
> in the larger concept of information. I think that measuring work (though
> in ways that are more complex than mere physical work) can lead to a more
> useful incorporation of the referential and normative properties that are
> implied by "information."
>
> Another problem is introduced by the use of the concept of "meaning" in
> these discussions. The term ambiguously connotes both reference and
> significance, and while it is applicable to symbolic and linguistic
> information, it only metaphorically applies to iconic and indexical forms
> of communication. Thus we discern that a sneeze indicates (provides
> potential information about) an allergic response, but doesn't "mean"
> allergy or nasal irritation. Seeing the imprint of a person's face on a
> coin doesn't "mean" that person. I would not want to exclude these semiotic
> forms of conveying information from our consideration of the concept.
>
> Clearly, we need to carefully distinguish the intrinsic logical properties
> of a signal medium (Shannon's usage) from information "about" something not
> intrinsic to that medium, from the "informative value" or normative /
> significant / useful consequence that is the point of interpreting
> something to be about something else.
>
> To fail to make these distinctions and instead flatten our discussions to
> the Shannonian usage is to loose track of the challenge. Let me conclude by
> noting that this troublesome flattening of the meaning of "information" was
> recognized by Shannon and many others, in the formative years of the field.
> In the words of a major figure in the field:
>
> *“I didn’t like the term Information Theory. Claude didn’t like it either.
> You see, the term ‘information theory’ suggests that it is a theory about
> information – but it’s not. It’s the transmission of information, not
> information. Lots of people just didn’t understand this... I coined the
> term ‘mutual information’ to avoid such nonsense: making the point

Re: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!

[Stanley N Salthe]

Loet -- Well, so you favor the definition of information as an invention of
Western technology related to communication.  Others prefer to define
information in such a way that it emerges into the world with biology -- in
the genetic system.  Still others define information in such a way that it
can be viewed as a physical quantity, perhaps a measure of the importance
of context in any physical interaction.  As a generalizer, I prefer the
latter, giving us the subsumptive hierarchy:

 Information ~ {context {material code {uncertainty}}}

STAN

On Sun, Jun 14, 2015 at 1:46 PM, Loet Leydesdorff 
wrote:

> I would add another possibility -- information does not appear in the
> universe until it is manipulated by modern human society as a commodity.
>
>
>
> Yes, Stan, this makes sense to me: information (in bits) can be considered
> as a measurement of the expected uncertainty. It is *yet* meaning-free,
> but it can be provided with meaning in a system of reference – such as a
> discourse.
>
>
>
> For example, {50%,50%} contains 1 bit of information. Thus, if we mix 50
> euro coins with 50 coins of a dollar or we group 50 black cats with 50
> white ones, the uncertainty is one bit of information. This does not tell
> us anything about the cats themselves as in a biology.
>
>
>
> During the recent conference in Vienna, I was amazed how many of our
> colleagues wish to ground information in physics. However, the
> information-theoretical evaluation seems mathematical to me. The
> mathematical notion of entropy is different from the physical one. The
> physical one is only valid for the physico-chemical system of momenta and
> energy.
>
>
>
> When I exchange the 50 dollars into 50 euros, the expected information
> content of the distribution of coins goes from one to zero bits, but this
> is not thermodynamic entropy. The physics of the exchange process are
> external to the informational-theoretical evaluation.
>
>
>
> I know that you wish to express this with hierarchies. Information can be
> measured at each level or as mutual information between them. But what the
> information means, depends on the specific systems of reference.
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Loet
>
>
> --
>
> Loet Leydesdorff
>
> *Emeritus* University of Amsterdam
> Amsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR)
>
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/
> Honorary Professor, SPRU, <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/>University of
> Sussex;
>
> Guest Professor Zhejiang Univ. <http://www.zju.edu.cn/english/>,
> Hangzhou; Visiting Professor, ISTIC,
> <http://www.istic.ac.cn/Eng/brief_en.html>Beijing;
>
> Visiting Professor, Birkbeck <http://www.bbk.ac.uk/>, University of
> London;
>
> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en
>
>
>
> *From:* Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *On Behalf Of *Stanley
> N Salthe
> *Sent:* Sunday, June 14, 2015 3:14 PM
>
> *To:* fis
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!
>
>
>
> Krassimir -- Thanks. Now I see what your objection is.  You do not agree
> with the Wheeler concept that information was he basis upon which
> everything else was founded. Rather, you see it as appearing along with
> matter. Or you might consider that it appeared 'along with form', in which
> case information doesn't appear in the universe until life makes it
> appearance.  I would add another possibility -- information does not appear
> in the universe until it is manipulated by modern human society as a
> commodity.
>
>
>
> STAN
>
>
>
> On Sat, Jun 13, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Krassimir Markov 
> wrote:
>
> Dear John and Stan,
>
> What is cause, and what is result? This is the question.
>
> If we not assume information and informational processes as secondary
> effect from activity of living mater,  it is not possible to proof anything
> and we have to believe that proposed models maybe are truth. We have to
> trust to Author but not to experiments.
>
> Information has to be included not in the beginning of the hierarchy – at
> least in the middle where living mater appear.
>
> Sorry that my post was apprehended as careless!
>
> Friendly regards
>
> Krassimir
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *From:* Stanley N Salthe 
>
> *Sent:* Saturday, June 13, 2015 3:30 PM
>
> *To:* Krassimir Markov 
>
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!
>
>
>
> Krassimir -- ???  I fail to understand your assertion.  This (and any
> hierarchy) is a logical formulation, allowing us to allocate influences
> f

Re: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!

[Stanley N Salthe]

Krassimir -- Thanks. Now I see what your objection is.  You do not agree
with the Wheeler concept that information was he basis upon which
everything else was founded. Rather, you see it as appearing along with
matter. Or you might consider that it appeared 'along with form', in which
case information doesn't appear in the universe until life makes it
appearance.  I would add another possibility -- information does not appear
in the universe until it is manipulated by modern human society as a
commodity.

STAN

On Sat, Jun 13, 2015 at 3:49 PM, Krassimir Markov  wrote:

>   Dear John and Stan,
> What is cause, and what is result? This is the question.
>  If we not assume information and informational processes as secondary
> effect from activity of living mater,  it is not possible to proof anything
> and we have to believe that proposed models maybe are truth. We have to
> trust to Author but not to experiments.
> Information has to be included not in the beginning of the hierarchy – at
> least in the middle where living mater appear.
> Sorry that my post was apprehended as careless!
> Friendly regards
> Krassimir
>
>
>
>
>
>  *From:* Stanley N Salthe 
> *Sent:* Saturday, June 13, 2015 3:30 PM
> *To:* Krassimir Markov 
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!
>
>  Krassimir -- ???  I fail to understand your assertion.  This (and any
> hierarchy) is a logical formulation, allowing us to allocate influences
> from various aspects of nature in an orderly manner.
>
> So, please explain further your careless assertion!
>
> STAN
>
> On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 5:18 PM, Krassimir Markov 
> wrote:
>
>>   Dear John and Stan,
>> Your both hierarchies are good only if you believe in God.
>> But this is believe, not science.
>> Sorry, nothing personal!
>> Friendly regards
>> Krassimir
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  *From:* John Collier 
>> *Sent:* Friday, June 12, 2015 5:02 PM
>> *To:* Stanley N Salthe  ; fis
>> 
>> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!
>>
>>
>> Not quite the same hierarchy, but similar:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> It from bit is just information, which is fundamental, on Seth Lloyd’s
>> computational view of nature. Paul Davies and some other physicists agree
>> with this.
>>
>> Chemical information is negentropic, and hierarchical in most
>> physiological systems.
>>
>>
>>
>> John
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Fis [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *On Behalf Of *Stanley
>> N Salthe
>> *Sent:* Friday, June 12, 2015 3:40 PM
>> *To:* fis
>> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!
>>
>>
>>
>> Pedro -- Your list:
>>
>>
>>
>> physical, biological, social, and Informational
>>
>>
>>
>> is implicitly a hierarchy -- in fact, a subsumptive hierarchy, with the
>> physical subsuming the biological and the biological subsuming the social.
>> But where should information appear?  Following Wheeler, we should have:
>>
>>
>>
>> {informational {physicochemical {biological {social
>>
>>
>>
>> STAN
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 5:34 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
>> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:
>>
>> Thanks, Ken. I think your previous message and this one are drawing sort
>> of the border-lines of the discussion. Achieving a comprehensive view on
>> the interrelationship between computation and information is an essential
>> matter. In my opinion, and following the Vienna discussions, whenever life
>> cycles are involved and meaningfully "touched", there is info; while the
>> mere info circulation according to fixed rules and not impinging on any
>> life-cycle relevant aspect, may be taken as computation. The distinction
>> between both may help to consider more clearly the relationship between the
>> four great domains of sceince: physical, biological, social, and
>> Informational. If we adopt a pan-computationalist stance, the information
>> turn of societies, of bioinformation, neuroinformation, etc. merely reduces
>> to applying computer technologies. I think this would be a painful error,
>> repeating the big mistake of 60s-70s, when people band-wagon to developed
>> the sciences of the artificial and reduced the nascent info science to
>> library science. People like Alex Pentland (his "social physics" 2014) are
>> again taking the wrong way... Anyhow, it was nicer talking face to face as
>> we

Re: [Fis] Philosophy, Computing, and Information - apologies!

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro -- Your list:

 physical, biological, social, and Informational

is implicitly a hierarchy -- in fact, a subsumptive hierarchy, with the
physical subsuming the biological and the biological subsuming the social.
But where should information appear?  Following Wheeler, we should have:

{informational {physicochemical {biological {social

STAN

On Fri, Jun 12, 2015 at 5:34 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> Thanks, Ken. I think your previous message and this one are drawing sort
> of the border-lines of the discussion. Achieving a comprehensive view on
> the interrelationship between computation and information is an essential
> matter. In my opinion, and following the Vienna discussions, whenever life
> cycles are involved and meaningfully "touched", there is info; while the
> mere info circulation according to fixed rules and not impinging on any
> life-cycle relevant aspect, may be taken as computation. The distinction
> between both may help to consider more clearly the relationship between the
> four great domains of sceince: physical, biological, social, and
> Informational. If we adopt a pan-computationalist stance, the information
> turn of societies, of bioinformation, neuroinformation, etc. merely reduces
> to applying computer technologies. I think this would be a painful error,
> repeating the big mistake of 60s-70s, when people band-wagon to developed
> the sciences of the artificial and reduced the nascent info science to
> library science. People like Alex Pentland (his "social physics" 2014) are
> again taking the wrong way... Anyhow, it was nicer talking face to face as
> we did in the past conference!
>
> best ---Pedro
>
> Ken Herold wrote:
>
>> FIS:
>>
>> Sorry to have been too disruptive in my restarting discussion post--I did
>> not intend to substitute for the Information Science thread an alternative
>> way of philosophy or computing.  The references I listed are indicative of
>> some bad thinking as well as good ideas to reflect upon.  Our focus is
>> information and I would like to hear how you might believe the formal
>> relational scheme of Rosenbloom could be helpful?
>>
>> Ken
>>
>> --
>> Ken Herold
>> Director, Library Information Systems
>> Hamilton College
>> 198 College Hill Road
>> Clinton, NY 13323
>> 315-859-4487
>> kher...@hamilton.edu 
>>
>
>
> --
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
> Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 6818)
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> -
>
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
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Re: [Fis] THE FOURTH GREAT DOMAIN OF SCIENCE: INFORMATIONAL? - What is a discipline?

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bob-- As one who has strayed from the Darwinian discipline of evolutionary
biology (my erstwhile field), I can say that I have 'paid the price'. But I
have had a wonderful time exploring wherever my thinking has gone.  I think
the discipline has in a sense guided me anyway, as turning away from it was
part of my motivation.  That is the disciplines continue to exert their
effect in the reactions to them.

STAN

On Sat, May 23, 2015 at 9:24 AM, Bob Logan 
wrote:

> Dear Colleagues - I have been reading the posts in this thread and
> enjoying the conversation. I started playing with the notion of discipline
> and came up with these undisciplined playful thoughts which I believe
> provide an interesting or at least an alternative perspective on the notion
> of a discipline. A discipline is a tool, a way of organizing ideas that
> result from scientific inquiry or any other form of scholarly activity and
> even artistic activity. Now every tool provides both service and
> disservice.  All of the posts so far have dealt with the service of
> discipline. Here are some thoughts about the possible disservice of
> discipline. Please take the following with a grain of salt. I believe the
> notion of a  discipline is anti-thetical to scientific inquiry in the sense
> that  it confines ones thinking to the confines of a discipline. One should
> not be disciplined by a discipline but be free to go beyond the boundaries
> of that discipline. Note that the root of the word discipline is disciple.
> If one is to be free to explore new ideas and new phenomena one should not
> be a disciple of the scientists or thinkers that created a discipline. Now
> I am not saying that learning a discipline is a bad thing as it provides a
> solid training and an understanding of how a set of principles describes
> certain phenomena. It is a model of how a scientific, scholarly or artistic
> practice can be carried out. As long as one does not become a disciple of
> one's discipline or disciplines they can be very useful for creating a new
> discipline or going beyond ones discipline. Perhaps the notion of
> trans-disciplinary is not such a bad notion if one thinks of trans as
> beyond.
>
> As to the notion that there are these four super categories of disciplines
> or great domains of science: Physics, biology, social and the 4th domain
> which is computing or infomation depending on how one likes to classify
> thing here are some thoughts. I find these classification schemes and their
> inter-relations fascinating and useful. But I believe another challenge
> worthy of consideration is to consider the interaction of the great domains
> of science with the great domains of the humanities, ethics, the arts. How
> does we connect the knowledge of the sciences with the wisdom of how to
> best use that knowledge to benefit humankind. Here are some thoughts I
> developed before this thread began that might be pertinent to our current
> discussion. Science can be thought of as organized knowledge given that the
> etymologically the word science derives from the Latin to know:
> en.wiktionary.org/wiki/*science*
> ‎
> [edit]. From Old French *science*, from Latin scientia (“knowledge”),
> from sciens, the present participle stem of scire (“know”).
>
> *Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom: *The relationship of data,
> information, knowledge and wisdom
>
> “Where is the wisdom we have lost in knowledge?
>
> Where is the knowledge we have lost in information?” ­– TS Eliot
>
> “Where is the meaning we have lost in information?” ­– RK Logan
>
> “• Data are the pure and simple facts without any particular structure or
> organization, the
>
>   basic atoms of information,
>
> • Information is structured data, which adds meaning to the data and gives
> it context and
>
>   significance,
>
> • Knowledge is the ability to use information strategically to achieve
> one's objectives, and
>
> • Wisdom is the capacity to choose objectives consistent with one's values
> and within a larger social context (Logan 2014).”
> While checking out the etymology of science I encountered the following on
> http://www.luminousgroup.net/2013/05/on-etymology-of-science.html
>
> "“This might be a good time to examine the etymology of the word *science*,
> It comes from the Latin *scientia*, from *sciens*, which means *having
> knowledge*, from the present participle of *scire*, meaning *to know*,
> probably—and here's where it gets exciting—akin to the Sanskrit *Chyati*,
> meaning* he cuts off*, and Latin *scindere*, *to split, cleave*."
>
> Science operates by cutting off questions of value. And this is why I
> advocate consideration of the four great domains of science with the great
> domain of the humanities, the arts and ethics. The greatest challenges
> facing humanity is not just increasing our store of knowledge through
> science but also how we choose to deploy our scientific knowledge in the
> best interest of human kind.
>
> So ends my challenge to Moises Nisen

[Fis] Intelligence Science

[Stanley N Salthe]

Stanley N Salthe wrote:

Pedro -- Here are my reactions :
>
> Intelligence Science is a new science. It is the scientific spirit applied
> to thought and mental processes and phenomena; it is an emergent
> multidisciplinary direction of research. At the same time, it represents a
> long-standing tradition in oriental thought. After the success of science
> in grasping the rules of the natural world, and despite many false starts,
> science has finally begun to focus on intelligence. Hence East and West
> should meet here, Science and Art should meet here, and it is from here
> that the new scientific paradigm and a new paradigm for civilization should
> evolve.
> In ancient times, human beings faced the challenges of existence. After a
> long period of evolution, it is the time to go from a survival mode - how
> to live better - and now face what A. Feln said: to think better is the
> challenge to our integrity. “Know yourself” was the inscription in the
> temple of Apollo. It can and should be taken to heart now more than in any
> other age. Intelligence Science has been born at the right moment.
>
>
> S: The “right moment” may be too late for our current cultures, which have
> virtually destroyed the natural environment with its 'ecosystem services'!
>
>
> Despite all their problems, all sciences are becoming richer and more
> successful, above all technological disciplines. The Internet is the ‘roof’
> over the Global Village in which this has taken place. Workers in the
> sciences and the humanities are already exchanging information about their
> work and also their feelings about their work. Intelligence Science emerges
> naturally.
>
> We need to continuously try to face and answer honestly the question: how
> can the human factor be recognized and integrated naturally into science?
> Science needs rethinking, humanity needs rethinking, the West and the East
> need rethinking, so that we can benefit from the richness of human nature
> and  bear the complexity of human thought. Integration is not easy, but we
> must do it. If all civilizations develop, reach their limits and then fade,
> contending among themselves, finally they must fail and destroy each other.
> Alternatively, the Eastern and Western civilizations of today could
> interact more dynamically observing, understanding and checking each other
> to form a ‘new’ civilization that could go farther. Which alternative will
> we choose? Intelligence Science burdens itself with this mission.
>
> S: Civilization is mediated by language.  It seems that English has taken
> precedence over all others as the current ‘lingua franca’.
>
>
> From Artificial Intelligence (AI) to Intelligence Science (IS) is a
> strategic transformation, a major contribution to science. Led by the
> Chinese Association for Artificial Intelligence ( CAAI), Intelligence
> Science was born in October, 2003. Since the first one created in Peking
> University, in just the last decade, 27 universities have set up a
> Department of Intelligence Science and Technology, and the number should
> increase. We can say that IS has now created a new frontier of knowledge,
> going from theory to practice and to education. But our task, the task of
> this book, is to describe and participate in the research and development
> of this still-forming frontier.
>
>
> S: So it seems that Intelligence science’ will have a mechanistic basis.
> That seems unnecessarily limiting!
>
>
>  Poincaré said: “if we can occasionally enjoy relative tranquility, it is
> because of the tenacious struggle of our ancestors. If our vigor, our
> vigilance relax a moment, we will lose the fruits that our ancestors gained
> for us.
> There is a poem of Master Hong Yi that can describe this new science: “I
> come for the plant/ I leave the flower that has not bloomed yet,/it does
> not mean this is not a fine scene,/waiting for later generations.” Due to
> the interactive changes involving East and West I mentioned above, our
> civilization has achieved a high degree of maturity in what is now a
> precious wealthy and peaceful age.
>
> S: I fail to see this as a “peaceful age”.


STAN
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[Fis] Fwd: Beginnings and ends---Steps to a theory of reference & significance

[Stanley N Salthe]

-- Forwarded message --
From: Pedro C. Marijuan 
Date: Mon, Jan 19, 2015 at 11:02 AM
Subject: Re: [Fis] Beginnings and ends---Steps to a theory of reference &
significance
To: Stanley N Salthe 


Good comment! But not only to me, it has general interest, you should put
it into the list too... ---Pedro

Stanley N Salthe wrote:

>
> Pedro --  The Four Domains of Science diagram is reminiscent of the
> hierarchy of scientific disciplines outlined by Comte, Spencer and Peirce.
> Thus (using the subsumptive hierarchy):
>
>
>  {informational realm {physicochemical realm {Biological realm {social
> realm
>
>
> Information is here viewed as preceding any of the other realms.  It is
> not clear how to understand this.  Peirce had in this position ‘Universal
> Mind’, which I think could be viewed as informational. Comte had
> mathematics here, reifying what many would take to be an emergent human, or
> animal, capability.
>
> Many today would likely not give information a separate realm, but would
> take it to emerge with the physical world (?Wheeler?).  I think this
> coincides with my own view.
>
>
> STAN
>
>
> On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 5:25 AM, pedro marijuan  <mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>> wrote:
>
> Thanks Stan (next Monday I will resend the figure). By the way, it
> would be great if you can contribute to warm up the session!
> Best--Pedro
> BlackBerry de movistar, allí donde estés está tu oficin@
> ----
> 
> *From: * Stanley N Salthe  <mailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu>>
> *Date: *Fri, 16 Jan 2015 09:39:40 -0500
> *To: *Pedro C. Marijuan <mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>>
> *Subject: *Re: [Fis] Beginnings and ends---Steps to a theory of
> reference & significance
>
> Oedro -- The figure does not show in this message.
>
> STAN
>
> On Fri, Jan 16, 2015 at 6:43 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan
> mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es>> wrote:
>
> Dear Terry and FIS colleagues---and pirates,
>
> Just a brief reflection on the below.
>
> (From Terry's last message)...
> So my goal in this case is quite modest, and yet perhaps also a bit
> foolhardy. I want to suggest a simplest possible model system to
> use
> as the basis for formalizing the link between physical processes
> and
> semiotic processes. Perhaps someday after considerably elaborating
> this analysis it could contribute to issues of the psychology of
> human
> interactions. I hope to recruit some interest into pursuing this
> goal.
>
> In my view, any research endeavor is also accompanied by some
> "ultimate" goals or ends that go beyond the quite explicit
> disciplinary ones. In this case, say, about the destiny of the
> constructs that would surround the information concept (or the
> possibility of framing an informational perspective, or a
> renewed information science, or whatever), wouldn't it be
> interesting discussing in extenso what could that ultimate
> vision?
>
> I mean, most of us may agree in quite many points related to
> the microphysical (& thermodynamic) underpinning of
> information, as it transpires in the exchanges we are
> having--but where do we want to arrive finally with the
> construction activity? I tend to disagree with localist aims,
> even though at the time being they may look more prudent and
> parsimonious. Putting it in brief, too briefly!, and borrowing
> from Rosenbloom (P.S. 2013. On Computing: The Fourth Great
> Scientific Domain) the idea is that information science,
> properly developed and linked with computer science and
> mathematics, should constitute one of the Great Domains of
> contemporary science. The informational would go together with
> the physical, the biological, and the social: constituting the
> four great domains of science. See Figure below. Rather than
> attempting the construction of another average or standard
> discipline, information science is about the making out of one
> of the “great scientific domains” of contemporary knowledge.
>
> More cogent arguments could be elaborated on how to cover
> sceintifically the whole "information world" (human societies,
> behaving individuals, brain organization, cellular processes,
> biomolecules) and the problem of interlocking--crisscrossing a
> myri

Re: [Fis] Fis Digest, Vol 10, Issue 11

[Stanley N Salthe]

Jeremy -- It is no longer so easy to declare that the physicochemical realm
has no end-rirectednes.  There is a burgeoning viewpoint -- the maximizing
entropy production principle (MEPP) -- that proposes an end for all actions
and activities whatever.

In my version, it is the constitutively poor energy efficiency of any work
that gives us the hint that all actions serve first to further the
thermodynamic equilibration of the Universe.

Finalisms can be parsed, using a subsumptive hierarchy, as follows:

 {entropy production {free energy utilization {work {projects

on the template:

   {physical realm (chemical realm (biological realm (social realm

The Second Law of thermodynamics establishes the finality here, carried
molecularly by the least action principle.  At the levels of biology and
society these are weak forces compared to the need to survive and the
urgency of social projects. But these latter come and go, while the urge to
do anything-at-all is always pulling, even at rest (where in biology
healing takes place as well as brain reorganization).

I send references to you at your e-mail address.

STAN

On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 9:41 PM, Jeremy Sherman <
mindreadersdiction...@gmail.com> wrote:

> It would be satisfying perhaps to think of our collective work as at the
> forefront of the development of what will become A Grand Domain of Science,
> but I would say the better trend in current science is toward careful
> integration between domains rather than toward established grand divisions,
> which seems a more a classical approach. Doesn't information play out in
> the biological and the social domains? Isn't our most ambitious goal here
> to explain scientifically the relationship between information and the
> physical domain?
>
> Whether modest or foolhardy as Terry suggests or of some other stature,
> Terry's approach addresses the source of the great schism in all academic
> and intellectual circles: Physical scientists are appropriately barred from
> explaining behavior in terms of the value of information for some
> end-directed self about, or representative of anything. But biological and
> social scientists can't help but explain behavior in those terms. Focusing,
> precisely on possible transitions from the physical domain to the living
> and social domains is exactly what a scientific approach demands.
>
> Lacking an explanation for the transition from mechanism to end-directed
> behavior (which is inescapably teleological down to its roots in function
> or adaptation--behaviors of value to a self about its environment), science
> is stuck, siloed into isolated domains without a rationale.
>
> To my mind, this makes the implications of meticulous work at the very
> border between mechanism and end-directed behavior anything but modest in
> its possible implications. In this I agree with Pedro. With what we now
> know about self-organization-- how it is footing on the physical side for a
> bridge from mechanism to end-directed behavior but does not itself provide
> the bridge,  we are perfectly poised to build the bridge itself, through an
> integrated science that explains the ontology of epistemology, providing
> solid scientific ground over the absolutely huge gaping hole in the middle
> of the broadest reaches of scientific and philosophical  endeavor.
>
> Whether Terry's work or someone else's work bridges that gap, I predict
> that, at long last, the gap can and will be finally filled, probably within
> the next decade. As ambitious researchers this would be a lousy time for
> any of us, Terry included, to stick to our guns in the face of substantial
> critique revealing how a theory we embrace merely provides a new, more
> clever way way to hide or smear over the gap pretending it isn't there,
> which is why I would love to see this discussion refocus on the article's
> detailed content. Though the implications of this research at the
> borderline may be grand, the research, in the doing, is as Terry implies as
> modest any careful scientific work.
>
> Jeremy Sherman
>
> On Sat, Jan 17, 2015 at 5:06 AM, Moisés André Nisenbaum <
> moises.nisenb...@ifrj.edu.br> wrote:
>
>> Hi, Pedro.
>> I didnt receive th image (Figure 1. The Four Great Domains of Science)
>> Would you please send it again?
>>
>> Thank you.
>>
>> Moises
>>
>> 2015-01-17 9:00 GMT-02:00 :
>>
>>> Send Fis mailing list submissions to
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>>>
>>>1. Re: Beginnings and ends---Steps to a theory of reference &
>>>   sig

Re: [Fis] MEPP

[Stanley N Salthe]

Terry -- Replying


T: Stan: Abiotic dissipative structures will degrade their gradients as
fast as possible given the bearing constraints. They are unconditional
maximizers. Life that has survived has been able to apply conditions upon
its entropy production, but that does not mean that it has enacted energy
conservation or energy efficiency policies.  Its mode is still maximizing,
but within limits.


Your phrases "given the bearing constraints" and "within limits" are the
critical issues to be focused on in my opinion [as I noted in my response
to Guy].


S: Yes.


T: But I do indeed argue that living processes can and do enact entropy
rate regulating mechanisms. This is of course an empirical question, and


S: Do you know the multiple papers by Adrian Bejan?  He has shown that in
all systems (he has tackled LARGE numbers of them, including the living),
the system organizes so as to maximize access to the energy gradient it is
using.  I think that this is exactly what MEPP would predict.


T: I have seen studies suggesting both results. My point is only that
autogenesis (which I use as a proxy for the simplest life-like dynamic)


S: Do you know these papers on autogenesis?  They were dissatisfied with
autopoiesis because it did not admit evolutionary change.


Csányi, V. and G. Kampis (1989).  Autogenesis: the evolution of replicative
systems. Journal of Theoretical Biology 114: 303-321.


Kampis, G., 1991. Self-modifying Systems in Biology and Cognitive Science:
A New  Framework for Dynamics, Information and Evolution. London: Pergamon
Press.


T: is a dissipative system that regulates the boundary constraints on its
rate of dissipation, and that this non-linearity is a critical
game-changer.


S: Regulates downward from physical maxima, but does not go below the
fastest non-damaging rates, therefore is ‘maximizing given constraints’,


T: In particular, for this discussion, I argue that this
constraint-ratcheting effect—where a distinctive dynamical configuration
can change the boundary constraints on its own constraint dissipation
tendency—

S: This is not clear.  Constraints are usually not thought of as
dissipatable.  Perhaps an example?


T: is what makes reference and significance possible. The resulting higher
order synergy constraint is neither a physical nor chemical constraint, but
a formal constraint.


S: By “formal” I Take it you mean organizational or structural.


T: Because of this it is thereby


S: ‘Could thereby be’ ?


 substrate transferrable so that reference and significance are
maintainable despite complete replacement of physical substrates, i.e. via
reproduction.


S: Would an example be the use of yolk in embryos?


 Without this property biological evolution is not possible.


S: Is the property in question the “formal” organization?


STAN

On Sat, Jan 10, 2015 at 3:42 AM, Terrence W. DEACON 
wrote:

> Hi Stan,
>
> Stan: Abiotic dissipative structures will degrade their gradients as fast
> as possible given the bearing constraints. They are unconditional
> maximizers. Life that has survived has been able to apply conditions upon
> its entropy production, but that does not mean that it has enacted energy
> conservation or energy efficiency policies.  Its mode is still maximizing,
> but within limits.
>
> Terry:  Your phrases "given the bearing constraints" and "within limits"
> are the critical issues to be focused on in my opinion [as I noted in my
> response to Guy]. But I do indeed argue that living processes can and do
> enact entropy rate regulating mechanisms. This is of course an empirical
> question, and I have seen studies suggesting both results. My point is only
> that autogenesis (which I use as a proxy for the simplest life-like
> dynamic) is a dissipative system that regulates the boundary constraints on
> its rate of dissipation, and that this non-linearity is a critical
> game-changer.
>
> In particular, for this discussion, I argue that this
> constraint-ratcheting effect—where a distinctive dynamical configuration
> can change the boundary constraints on its own constraint dissipation
> tendency—is what makes reference and significance possible. The resulting
> higher order synergy constraint is neither a physical nor chemical
> constraint, but a formal constraint. Because of this it is thereby
> substrate transferrable so that reference and significance are maintainable
> despite complete replacement of physical substrates, i.e. via reproduction.
> Without this property biological evolution is not possible.
>
> — Terry
>
> ___
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>
>
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[Fis] MEPP

[Stanley N Salthe]

TD: Autogenesis is also not a Maximum Entropy Production process because it
halts dissipation before its essential self-preserving constraints are
degraded and therefore does not exhaust the gradient(s) on which its
persistence depends.


S: Abiotic dissipative structures will degrade their gradients as fast as
possible given the bearing constraints. They are unconditional maximizers.
Life that has survived has been able to apply conditions upon its entropy
production, but that does not mean that it has enacted energy conservation
or energy efficiency policies.  Its mode is still maximizing, but within
limits.


GH: I think of [MEPP] as a thermodynamic version of natural selection in
which some alternative states are thermodynamically favored over others,
but this does not guarantee that dissipation will proceed to completion or
that the particular alternative that absolutely generates the most
efficient or effective dissipation will always be the manifested outcome
(if there are a number of similarly optimal paths available).  Contingency
on idiosyncratic configurations within and in the neighborhood of a system
might lead the system to follow a variety of alternative paths.


S: I think that the keyword here is ‘striving’  Living things are mostly
always striving, so they reach for the maximum until it ‘hurts’.


GH: Would you argue that autogenesis is not an MEP process from this
somewhat fuzzy perspective?


TD:  This offers a challenge to a theory (MEPP) that has recently been
heralded as a key to explaining life. But it does not violate the basic
logic of far-from-equilibrium thermodynamics. It is  rather a further
development, that now includes a non-linear factor: dissipative processes
that collectively produce and modify their own boundary conditions. But as
with the introduction of an such nonlinearity this can produce some quite
unexpected emergent consequences. This is what makes the dynamic that we
call life so radically different in what it can do compared to non-living
dissipative dynamics.


This -snip- does suggest that we may need to modify claims that life is
"merely" an entropy maximizing process.


S: I think no one has argued that living systems are ‘merely’ entropy
production maximizers. That might be the view of the Universe, if it could
have a view. But finalities can be parsed as {entropy production {free
energy dissipation {work}}} on the template {physical process {chemical
actions {living activity}}}.  At each level we have finalities {Second Law
{Maupertuis’ least energy {goal seeking}}}. The outermost class is locally
the weakest impulse, but it acts continuously and ‘fills in’ immediately
there is any hesitation, while the innermost subclass is the most
immediately effective, but its enthusiasms come and go, and do not last.


STAN
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[Fis] "The Travelers"

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro wrote:

PM: Regarding the theme of physical information raised by Igor and Joseph,
the main problematic aspect of information (meaning) is missing there. One
can imagine that as two physical systems interact, each one may be
metaphorically attributed with meaning respect the changes experimented.
But it is an empty attribution that does not bring any further interesting
aspect.

SS: I have advanced (  On the origin of semiosis. * Cybernetics and Human
Knowing* 19 (3): 53-66. 2012 ) the idea that whenever context influences
importantly any reaction which, even in the physical realm, might be viewed
as an informational exchange, there is the forerunner of the interpretation
of an interaction, Such a simple 'interpretation' (proto-interpretation)
would then be the forerunner of meaning generation.  When context
importantly influences the outcome of a physical interaction, this brings a
"further interesting aspect" beyond the purely physical.

STAN
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Re: [Fis] Physical Informatics… (J.Brenner)

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bob -- I think the viewpoint on information being expressed by Gerhard is
that which sees information to be embodied in configuration/conformation.
If a configured entity is in the world it necessarily will encounter other
configurations/conformations which will result in an 'interpretation' by
both parties.

STAN

On Mon, Oct 20, 2014 at 2:53 PM, Bob Logan 
wrote:

> Dear all - my take on this post is that the question of whether physical
> processes are information is like the question: Is there a sound if a tree
> falls in the forest and no one is there to listen? This is like the Zen
> koan: "what is the sound of one hand clapping" If no one is in the forest
> are the trees information? Well for sure they are trees but as to whether
> or not they are information that is strictly dependent on the point of view
> of the respondent. For me they are just trees and here is why I think so.
> For me information is about a process. The noun information relates to the
> verb inform. If no one is being informed there is no information. In the
> same way that if no one or thing is there being loved (verb) their is no
> love (noun). If no one is engaged in the activity of loving (a verb) there
> is no love (a noun). If there is no one being informed (a verb) then there
> is no information (a noun). Now one can talk about an object or a
> phenomenon having the possibility of informing someone which to my mind is
> potential information which is what I would call the physical processes
> that take place in our universe. A book written in Urdu is potential
> information because an Urdu reader can be informed by it. For me as a
> non-Urdu speaker there is very little information other than someone went
> to the trouble of writing out a text with Urdu letters and hence there is
> probably information there for an Urdu speaker reasoning why would any one
> make the effort to create such an object unless that person wanted to
> inform Urdu speakers. Just as one person's food is another person's poison
> so it is that one person's information is just for another persons merely a
> physical phenomenon such as processes in nature, ink on paper, sounds or EM
> signals. Shannon developed a theory of signals in which some of those
> signals have the ability to inform some recipients. I hope this collection
> of words has informed you other than giving you the knowledge of my view as
> to what constitutes information. Thanks to Joseph, Pedro, and Igor for the
> opportunity to reflect on the nature of information. If you enjoyed my post
> and would like to learn more about my views on information please send me
> an email off line and I will send you an email version of my book *What
> is Information?  Propagating Organization in the Biosphere, the
> Symbolosphere, the Technosphere and the Econosphere * for free. And now
> you know what an infomercial is. This was an infomercial because of my
> offer to share my book with you erudite scholars of FIS whose posts I
> always enjoy. With kind regards - Bob
> __
>
> Robert K. Logan
> Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto
> Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD
> http://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertKLogan
> www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan
> www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Logan5/publications
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On 2014-10-20, at 1:57 PM, PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ wrote:
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Joseph Brenner 
> *To:* Igor Gurevich  ; Pedro C. Marijuan
>  ; fis 
> *Sent:* Monday, October 20, 2014 8:40 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Physical Informatics contains fundamental results
> which impossible to get only by physical methods
>
> Dear Igor, Dear Gerhard and Colleagues,
>
> In Igor's summary of his recent work, I read the following absoutely
> critical statement:
> " It is shown that the expansion of the Universe is the source of
> information formation, wherein a variety of physical processes in an
> expanding Universe provide information formation." I take this as meaning
> that the expansion of the Universe as such does not produce information.
>
> Gerhard's formulation is slightly different (my paraphrase):
> "The first assymetry in energy distribution, following the singularity, is
> the source of information formation".
>
> My question is, therefore, how best to combine these insights. For
> example, we may say that the variety of physical processes are all the
> consequence of, and subsequently reflect, a first assymetry.
>
> It is also interesting to note that the approaches of both Igor and
> Gerhard imply the emergence of information through the interactional impact
> (informational interactions) of fundamental forces on particles, extended
> by Gerhard to somewhat higher levels of organization (life) than Igor.
>
> I look forward to further discussion of these fundamental issues.
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Joseph
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Igor Gurevich 
> *To:* Pedro C. Marijuan  ; fis
> 
> *Sent:* Wednesday, Octo

Re: [Fis] Fw: Krassimir's Information Quadruple and GIT. Quintuples?

[Stanley N Salthe]

John wrote:


Catching up after a myriad of distracting problems.


At 03:51 PM 2014-08-25, Stanley N Salthe wrote:

Bob wrote:


Recall that some thermodynamic variables, especially work functions like

Helmholz & Gibbs free energies and exergy all are tightly related to

information measures. In statistical mechanical analogs, for example, the

exergy becomes RT times the mutual information among the molecules


S: So, the more organized, the more potential available energy.


JC: I think not, Stan. Organization requires a middling degree of
complexity. Exergy is maximized when the mutual information is 1, like in a
crystal. Crystals are not highly organized. See Collier and Hooker Complexly
Organised Dynamical Systems <http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/Cods.pdf>
(1999) for discussion.


SS: An excellent paper, that I have used in my thinking.  I was assuming
complex, not simple systems.


RU: I happen to be a radical who feels that the term "energy" is a construct

with little ontological depth.


S: I believe it has instead ontological breadth!


RU: It is a bookkeeping device (a nice one, of course, but bookkeeping
nonetheless). It was devised to maintain the Platonic worldview. Messrs.
Meyer & Joule simply gave us the conversion factors to make it look like
energy is constant.


S: It IS constant in the adiabatic boxes used to measure it.


 RU: *Real* energy is always in decline -- witness what happens to the work
functions I just mentioned.


S: In decline in the actual material world that we inhabit.  That is, the
local world -- the world of input and dissipation.  I think the information
problem may be advanced if we try to explain why the energy efficiency of
any work is so poor, and gets worse the harder we work. This is the key
local phenomenon that needs to be understood.


JC: Information can be used to improve efficiency.


SS: That is not same question.  Which is: Why is any work constitutively
poor in energy efficiency?  I wrote a little essay ( Entropy: what does it
really mean?  *General Systems Bulletin*  32:5-12.) suggesting that it
results from a lack of fittingness between energy gradient and the system
attempting to utilize it -- that is, that it is an information problem.


STAN


John


On Thu, Sep 4, 2014 at 9:16 AM, John Collier  wrote:

>  Catching up after a myriad of distracting problems.
>
> At 03:51 PM 2014-08-25, Stanley N Salthe wrote:
>
> Bob wrote:
>
> Recall that some thermodynamic variables, especially work functions like
> Helmholz & Gibbs free energies and exergy all are tightly related to
> information measures. In statistical mechanical analogs, for example, the
> exergy becomes RT times the mutual information among the molecules
>
> S: So, the more organized, the more potential available energy.
>
>
> I think not, Stan. Organization requires a middling degree of complexity.
> Exergy is maximized when the mutual information is 1, like in a crystal.
> Crystals are not highly organized. See Collier and Hooker Complexly
> Organised Dynamical Systems <http://web.ncf.ca/collier/papers/Cods.pdf>
> (1999) for discussion.
>
> I happen to be a radical who feels that the term "energy" is a construct
> with little ontological depth.
>
> S: I believe it has instead ontological breadth!
>
> It is a bookkeeping device (a nice one, of course, but bookkeeping
> nonetheless).
> It was devised to maintain the Platonic worldview. Messrs. Meyer & Joule
> simply
> gave us the conversion factors to make it look like energy is constant.
>
> S: It IS constant in the adiabatic boxes used to measure it.
>
>  *Real* energy is always in decline -- witness what happens to the work
> functions I
> just mentioned.
>
> S: In decline in the actual material world that we inhabit.  That is, the
> local world -- the world of input and dissipation.  I think the information
> problem may be advanced if we try to explain why the energy efficiency of
> any work is so poor, and gets worse the harder we work. This is the key
> local phenomenon that needs to be understood.
>
>
> Information can be used to improve efficiency.
>
> John
>
>
>  --
> Professor John Collier
> colli...@ukzn.ac.za
> Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South
> Africa
> T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292   F: +27 (31) 260 3031
>  Http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>  <http://web.ncf.ca/collier>
>
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Re: [Fis] Fw: Krassimir's Information Quadruple and GIT. Quintuples?

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bob wrote:

Recall that some thermodynamic variables, especially work functions like
Helmholz & Gibbs free energies and exergy all are tightly related to
information measures. In statistical mechanical analogs, for example, the
exergy becomes RT times the mutual information among the molecules

S: So, the more organized, the more potential available energy.

I happen to be a radical who feels that the term "energy" is a construct
with little ontological depth.

S: I believe it has instead ontological breadth!

It is a bookkeeping device (a nice one, of course, but bookkeeping
nonetheless).
It was devised to maintain the Platonic worldview. Messrs. Meyer & Joule
simply
gave us the conversion factors to make it look like energy is constant.

S: It IS constant in the adiabatic boxes used to measure it.

 *Real* energy is always in decline -- witness what happens to the work
functions I
just mentioned.

S: In decline in the actual material world that we inhabit.  That is, the
local world -- the world of input and dissipation.  I think the information
problem may be advanced if we try to explain why the energy efficiency of
any work is so poor, and gets worse the harder we work. This is the key
local phenomenon that needs to be understood.

STAN


On Mon, Aug 25, 2014 at 4:40 AM, John Collier  wrote:

> Nice post, Bob. I agree pretty much. Brooks and Wiley got slammed by
> Morowitz for using the *Real* energy in their book, which being about
> biology is the only sensible notion of energy.
>
> There is still a need for a clear dimensional analysis of the relation(s)
> between information and energy. I work on that periodically, but only
> minimal progress so far. Perhaps I can focus on it better now that I am
> retired.
>
> John
>
> At 02:11 AM 2014-08-22, Robert E. Ulanowicz wrote:
>
>> Dear Joseph,
>>
>> Recall that some thermodynamic variables, especially work functions like
>> Helmholz & Gibbs free energies and exergy all are tightly related to
>> information measures. In statistical mechanical analogs, for example, the
>> exergy becomes RT times the mutual information among the molecules.
>>
>> I happen to be a radical who feels that the term "energy" is a construct
>> with little ontological depth. It is a bookkeeping device (a nice one, of
>> course, but bookkeeping nonetheless). It was devised to maintain the
>> Platonic worldview. Messrs. Meyer & Joule simply gave us the conversion
>> factors to make it look like energy is constant. *Real* energy is always
>> in decline -- witness what happens to the work functions I just mentioned.
>>
>> Well, enough heresy for one night!
>>
>> Cheers,
>> Bob U.
>>
>> > Dear Mark and All,
>> >
>> > I return belatedly to this short but key note of Mark's in which he
>> > repeats his view, with which I agree, that  Energy is a kind of
>> > information and information is a kind of energy.
>> >
>> > My suggestion is that it may be useful to expand this statement by
>> looking
>> > at both Information and Energy (mass-energy) as emergent properties of
>> the
>> > universe. Since we agree they are not identical, we may then look at how
>> > the properties differ. Perhaps we can say that Energy is an extensive
>> > property, measured primarily by quantity, and Information is an
>> intensive
>> > property. The difficulty is that both Energy and Information themselves
>> > appear to have both intensive and extensive properties, measured by
>> vector
>> > and scalar quantities respectively. I am encouraged to say that this
>> > approach might yield results that are compatible with advanced theories
>> > based on the sophisticated mathematics to which Mark refers.
>> >
>> > I would say then that in our world it is not the question of which is
>> more
>> > fundamental that is essential, but that Energy and Information share
>> > properties which are linked dynamically. In this dialectical
>> > interpretation, the need for a 'demon' that accomplishes some function,
>> as
>> > in the paper referred to in John's note, is a formal exercise.
>> >
>> > Thank you and best wishes,
>> >
>> > Joseph
>> >
>> >
>> > - Original Message -
>> > From: Burgin, Mark
>> > To: Joseph Brenner
>> > Sent: Friday, August 01, 2014 9:19 PM
>> > Subject: Re: [Fis] Krassimir's Information Quadruple and GIT.
>> Quintuples?
>> >
>> >
>> > Dear Joseph and Colleagues,
>> > An answer to "the perhaps badly posed question of whether information or
>> > energy is more fundamental" is given in the book M.Burgin, Theory of
>> > information. The answer is a little bit unexpected:
>> > Energy is a kind of information and information is a kind of energy.
>> > It's a pity that very few researchers read books with advanced theories
>> > based on sophisticated mathematics.
>> >
>> >  Sincerely,
>> > Mark Burgin
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > On 7/31/2014 2:40 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:
>> >
>> >   Dear Krassimir and Colleagues,
>> >
>> >   I have followed this discussion with interest but not total agreement.
>> > As I ha

Re: [Fis] information.energy

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bob -- Note that I was pointing out "a sense" in which information implies
something different from energy -- especially in the context of dialectics,
which is the basis of Joseph's approach. There can be no 'precipitated'
energy (matter) without some kind of form, realizing one or some
constraints, but the concept of information (its history) tends to imply
interaction.

STAN


On Sun, Aug 3, 2014 at 11:13 PM, Robert E. Ulanowicz  wrote:

> > Stanley N Salthe 
> > 9:32 AM (0 minutes ago)
> > to Joseph
> > Joseph -- Commenting on:
> > ...
> > Is there not also a sense that information implies more than one entity
> > (sender-receiver, object-interpreter)? That too would tend to align with
> > the idea of energy being primary.
>
>
> But Stan, you were one of the first to recognize the broader nature of
> information as constraint. It is also inherent in structure (Collier's
> "enformation"). Hence, wherever inhomogeneities exist, so does information
> -- an argument for a common origin. Bob
>
>
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[Fis] information.energy

[Stanley N Salthe]

Stanley N Salthe 
9:32 AM (0 minutes ago)
to Joseph
Joseph -- Commenting on:

 We may agree that, if they are not identical, energy and information
always accompany one another and may have emerged together from some as yet
incompletely defined substrate. However, they may not be, do not have to be
and for me are not at the same ontological level, and energy is primary
being less abstract.

Is there not also a sense that information implies more than one entity
(sender-receiver, object-interpreter)? That too would tend to align with
the idea of energy being primary.

STAN
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Re: [Fis] [Fwd: closing the session] John Prpic

[Stanley N Salthe]

With hierarchy theory serving as a dressmaker's dummy, these statements:

>From Guy:
"*I think of collective intelligence as synonymous with collective
information processing*. I would not test for its existence by asking if
group-level action is smart or adaptive, nor do I think it is relevant to
ask whether collective intelligence informed or misinformed individuals.  I
would say that in the classic example of eusocial insect colonies (like
honey bees, for example) *there is no reasonable doubt that information is
processed at the level of the full colony, which can be detected by the
coordination of individual activities into coherent colony-level
behavior*. *Synchronization
and complementarity of individual actions reflect the top-down influences
of colony-level information processing.* It is the existential question
that I think is key here, and I hope our conversation includes objective
ways to detect the existence or absence of instances where a collective
intelligence has manifested as a way to keep this concept more tangible and
less metaphorical".


>From John Collier:
"Guy, This looks fruitful, but it might be argued that the exchanges
of information
in a colony can be reduced to individual exchanges and interactions, and
thus there is not really any activity that is holistic. This is what Steven
is doing with his example of pyramid building. *On the other hand, with
ants, for example, it has been shown by de Neuberg and others that in ant
colonies the interactions cannot be reduced, but produce complex
organization that only makes sense at a higher level of **behaviour.* Examples
are nest building and bridge building, among others. I assume the same is
true for humans. For example, in the pyramid case, why is it being built,
why are people so motivated to cooperate on such a ridiculous project?
Contrary to widespread opinion the workers were not slaves, but they were
individual people.* I doubt this can be explained at the individual level.
If ants have complexly** organized behaviour, then surely humans do as well
-- we are far more complex, and our social interactions are far more
complex"*.

seem to be the most interesting garment designs!

STAN


On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 4:19 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

>
>  Original Message   Subject: Re: closing the session  Date:
> Sun, 27 Apr 2014 16:30:44 -0700  From: John Prpic 
>   To:
> Pedro C. Marijuan  
>
> Dear FIS'ers,
>
> In an effort to put the latest session formally to bed, please allow me to
> highlight some of the excellent food for thought that was put forward by
> the group in respect to "Collective Intelligence". I'll attempt to roughly
> follow the chronological order in which the discussion was received, and
> within this, I'll highlight passages that I thought were especially
> interesting, salient, insightful or provocative.
>
>
> From Pedro:
> "*Along the biggest social transformations, the "new information orders"
> have been generated precisely by new ways to circulate
> knowledge/information across social agents*--often kept away from the
> previous informational order established. But there is a difference, in my
> opinion, in the topic addressed by John P., it is *the intriguing, more
> direct involvement of software beyond the rather passive, underground role
> it generally plays*.  "Organizational processes frozen into the
> artifact--though not fossilized". Information Technologies are producing an
> amazing mix of new practices and new networkings that generate growing
> impacts in economic activities, and in the capability to create new
> solutions and innovations...Brave New World? Not yet, but who knows..."
>
> >From Bob Logan:
> "*What is a culture after all but a form of collective intelligence.*Eric 
> Havelock called myths the tribal encyclopedia. With writing the
> collectivity of intelligence grew wider as evidenced by the scholars of
> Ancient Greeks who created a collective intelligence through their writing.
> The printing press was the next ramping up of collective intelligence as
> the circle of intelligences contributing to a particular project
> dramatically increased. The ability to have a reliable way of storing and
> sharing experimental data contributed in no small way to the scientific
> revolution. Other fields of study thrived as a result of print IT such as
> philosophy, literature, history, economics etc etc. The printing press also
> contributed to the emergence of modern democracy. *With the coming of
> electricity and electrically configured IT the collectivity of intelligence
> passed through another phase transition*. Marshall McLuhan reflecting on
> this development well before the emergence of digital IT wrote:"
>
>  "The university and school of the future must be a means of total
> community participation, not in the consumption of available knowledge, but
> in the creation of completely unavailable insights. The overwhelming
> obstacle to suc

[Fis] replies to Loet & Joseph

[Stanley N Salthe]

Replying to Loet and Joseph:


Loet:  I am not sure that you mean this with "actuality". (which seems an
Aristotelian notion to me).


S: I have been using 'Actuality' (and 'Reality') as proposed by:


Roth G, Schwegler H (1990) Self-organization, emergent properties and the
study of the world.  In Krohn W, Kuppers G, Nowontny H (eds)
Self-Organization: Portrait of a Scientific Revolution. Kluwer.



Joseph: The first thing I would like, Stan, is that in your talking about
MY notion of actuality, it is brought out that it is no longer the original
concept elaborated by Aristotle, but that the (partial) actuality of the
elements involved in a dynamic process is linked dynamically to their
(partial) potentiality and *vice versa*.


S: I include potentiality as part of Actuality. Actuality exists at many
scales, and what is potential at, say, a large scale may be accompanied by
actions already actualized at a smaller scales. Thus, if it takes one
minute to complete an action at one scale (as viewed by an outside
observer), and simultaneously an action is being made at a smaller scale
that takes one second to complete, when that action is seen to be completed
at the smaller scale, the larger scale action (as viewed by the outside
observer) would still be happening/unfinished. Of course, there are no
outside observers, but actions at all levels will depend in various upon
what is happening at other levels.



Then Stan, I hope you could reconsider your formulations, with none of
which I can agree:



1. You set up a *distinguo* between reality and actuality, while failing to
see that both Loet and I are indeed concerned with both. Speaking for
myself, you should already see that I cannot have ignored the difference
between actuality and reality since I say that reality is composed of
actuality and potentiality. It is not a model of anything.



S: I'm sorry to disagree. Your dialectical system is a logical social
construct, and therefore a part of Realty (as per my take on Roth &
Schwegler). Your system indeed* refers to* what I call 'Actuality' as an
element in the theory (this Actuality is again a social construct).


LIR is a part of reality, as is any logical, scientific theory but then
what is the purpose of saying "It is a socially constructed tool for
negotiating actuality". Is your work a 'socially constructed tool'?


S: Yes indeed, it is.  Our thinking is located within Western discourse,
which is currently located within our capitalist system, and reflects
concepts that are possible/feasible within that system -- even if the
concepts are critical of it. You may contact some aspects of actuality with
your tongue or foot, but not with a theory (as such).  (These contacts
would be biological constructs, by the way, and no more privileged than
social constructs!).


Finally, as we all struggle to understand one another, what, Stan, is the
purport of the word 'negotiating' actuality? Negotiating for me means
seeking advantage of some kind, more or less (usually less) fairly. There
is a vicious ad for a financial broker you may have heard, which I cannot
stand: "Life is a competition; negotiate well".


S: 'Negotiating', as I use it here, refers to trying to do one's best to
survive or succeed, involving also the use of versions of reality in order
to do so. The import is that actuality is a challenging experience.

(Your quote is indeed crass, and reflects the high status of Darwinian
notions in our culture.  I have a Critique of the Concept of Natural
Selection in my web pages at http://www.nbi.dk/~natphil/salthe/index.html )


STAN
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Re: [Fis] Fw: Fw: [Feedforward II and Anticipation] Joseph Brenner

[Stanley N Salthe]

Joseph, Loet --

I like to distinguish The (supposed ontological) World, which I refer to as
'actuality', from 'reality', our logical/scientific model of actuality.

As I see it, Loet would be concerned with a version of reality, but ignores
the possibility of actuality, while Joseph ignores the difference between
actuality and reality.  LIR is a part of reality. It is a socially
constructed tool for negotiating actuality.

STAN


On Tue, Feb 18, 2014 at 5:27 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:

>  Dear Loet and Colleagues,
>
> In this most interesting comment by Loet, there is a fascinating inversion
> of roles! Laplace told Louis XV that "I don't need the hypothesis of God",
> something, let us say, rather abstract compared to the solar system. Loet
> is telling us, however, that what he does not need is the hypothesis of an
> external reality of energy, since he can explain 'everything' with a set of
> discursive perspectives, which I consider far too abstract.
>
> My position is that I do not need the hypothesis of abstract,
> epistemological perspectives that are not grounded in reality. I do not
> know exactly what this is, nor everything about it, but I know some things
> and understand some real dynamics of their evolution. If a system (such as
> Loet's) excludes all of these as ungrounded beliefs, something may be
> missed in the understanding of complex processes, e.g., information.
>
> Loet is, perhaps, closer to Newton in his attitude to his own
> (Loet's) system: "Hypotheses non fingo". I'll go with Laplace.
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Joseph
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Loet Leydesdorff 
> *To:* Joseph Brenner 
> *Cc:* fis 
> *Sent:* Monday, February 17, 2014 9:32 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Fw: [Feedforward II and Anticipation] Joseph Brenner
>
>   Dear Joseph,
>
> The "energetic" terms are external referents to the communication
> (scholarly discourse). These external referents can differently be
> codified; for example, in terms of thermodynamics or various forms of
> physics (e.g., in terms of classical physics). The dynamic properties can
> only be studied from one discursive perspective.or another.
>
> The ontological status that these dynamics are nevertheless attributed in
> your "logic in reality" requires an act of belief in an external reality
> that is assumed to be given (so that can enter into the dialectics of
> "logic in reality".)
> "Je n'ai pas besoin de cette hypothese-la."
>
> Best wishes,
> Loet
>
>
>  On Sun, Feb 16, 2014 at 11:51 AM, Joseph Brenner 
> wrote:
>
>>  Dear Loet,
>>
>>  I am still hoping that there will be more comments on both my original
>> note
>>  and your significant emendation of it, for which many thanks. Here is my
>>  response to you now. I have, more than before, the feeling that you have
>>  agreed that LIR can add something to the sufficiency of the overall
>> picture.
>>  Three things might make this even clearer:
>>
>>  1. You wrote:
>>  > From this perspective, the "reality" in "Logic in Reality" (LIR) is res
>>  > cogitans:  an inter-human construct about which we remain uncertain.
>>
>>  JEB: But LIR applies also INTRA-human constructs, that is how human
>> agents
>>  change one another, including their expectations. Thus,
>>
>> 2.  > The codes in the reflexive communications can be considered as the
>>  > (hypothesized!) eigenvectors of the networks of relations among
>> expectations (carried
>>  > by human minds).
>>
>>  JEB: Same comment as above. The logical values of actuality and
>> potentiality
>>  of real process elements, which include communications, have the
>> dimensions
>>  of vectors.
>>
>>  3.  > However, this reality has the epistemological status of a
>> hypothesis,
>>  > whereas you seem to reify it and identify it with "nature" (energy?)
>> as a
>> given. From my
>>  > perspective, this presumes a reduction of the complexity using the
>> communicative codes of
>> > physics and biology. There is nothing against this coding, but it can be
>> > considered as one among an alphabet of possible ones.
>>
>>  JEB: This is an interesting expression of our different points of view.
>> You
>>  see my approach as reducing complexity and reifying 'this reality' and I
>>  think it is your approach that reduces and reifies it!! Perhaps we are
>> both
>> right!!
>>  Logic in Reality does not deal with a /certain/ complexity, which can be
>>  associated with complicated epistemological entities or states. Your
>> theory
>>  seems to me to abstract away qualitative, energetic highly complex
>>  relational/cognitive states that are outside the hypothesis.
>>
>>  > The specific reduction to the perspective of a "sociology" of
>> expectations
>>  > enables us to study the dynamics among differently coded expectations
>> in
>> other domains.
>>
>>  JEB: If one includes, in the zoo of expectations, their dynamics in
>>  energetic terms, one does not have to see the 'zoology' of expectations
>> as
>> a
>>  reduction. It is already and remains open sin

Re: [Fis] Social constructivism

[Stanley N Salthe]

In my last posting for the week, I Reply to Hans --


QBism does not change any of the impressive successes of quantum mechanics.
 It simply says that quantum mechanics is a very complex, abstract encoding
of the experiences of generations of scientists interacting with atomic
systems.


S: These generations of “scientists” are a subsystem of society as a
whole.  They influence each other via language and other social
constructions, including theories and machines.  Through them, it is
society that observes the micro activities occurring with the experimental
machinery.  ‘Proof’? -- each individual could be replaced by another using
the same social tools (including education).


It disenfranchises a physicist from knowing what an electron spin, for
example, REALLY is, while celebrating her ability to predict correctly,
albeit probabilistically, what to expect in the next experiment. She and
her predecessors have created an abstract model, and validated it by appeal
to experiments, without appeal to any of the other considerations listed
above


S: So QM, via QBism, is meaningless!  Is this an achievement? -- to render
meaningless the activities within the socially-constructed machinery guided
by the socially-constructed theories?



In conversation with Joseph Brenner and others I have used the rainbow as a
metaphor. The rainbow is a phenomenon that everyone experiences slightly
differently, but that we all agree on.


S: I would say that it is a biologically-constructed epiphenomenon.


The scientific model that "explains" it is very complicated and highly
abstract.  Is the rainbow "real"?  It certainly does not exist when nobody
is looking.  It is, in the end, a personal experience.  For me the
experience is enhanced considerably by my understanding of the scientific
model of it, because it allows me to look for and discover details I had
never noticed, but I would not presume to say I know what YOUR experience
of it is.  Maybe you are thinking of Iris or Noah, and feeling awe or
curiosity, and remarking on its (apparently) immense size and variable
brightness.


S: But it’s physical interpretation, from the QBist perspective, is of no
interest as such.



QBism suggests that we look at the world as consisting of rainbows -- an
ensemble of complex phenomena about which we know some things, but whose
essences we cannot capture.  The QBist says: I don't know what the world
is.  All I know is what I experience in my interactions with the world, as
they are illuminated and modified by what I have learned from other people,

past and present, who have had similar experiences and encoded them in the
succinct language of mathematics.


S: That is, our experiences are socially conditioned biological
constructs.  In this view physics becomes the theoretical basis for
constructing the QM machinery, which will display an epiphenomenon.


STAN



Hans


On Tue, Jan 7, 2014 at 6:52 PM, Hans von Baeyer wrote:

> Stan asks: Would we be justified in viewing QBism the latest venture of
> [social] constructivism?
>
> WOW, I sure hope not!  While it is true that there are fads in science,
> and that the direction of research is influenced to some degree by the
> society that funds it and consumes its fruits, I think that the underlying
> methodology distinguishes socially constructed models of reality from
> scientific ones.  Social constructions use arguments that play no role in
> any account of the scientific method as it applies to the Natural Sciences
> (as opposed to the Social Sciences).
>
> Some examples: Deutsche Physik referred to the ethnicity of scientists,
> Lysenkoism adduced ideological goals; Creationism appeals to scripture;
> Feminist Science Studies consider the gender of scientists.
>
> QBism does not change any of the impressive successes of quantum
> mechanics.  It simply says that quantum mechanics is a very complex,
> abstract encoding of the experiences of generations of scientists
> interacting with atomic systems. It disenfranchises a physicist from
> knowing what an electron spin, for example, REALLY is, while celebrating
> her ability to predict correctly, albeit probabilistically, what to expect
> in the next experiment. She and her predecessors have created an abstract
> model, and validated it by appeal to experiments, without appeal to any of
> the other considerations listed above.
>
> In conversation with Joseph Brenner and others I have used the rainbow as
> a metaphor. The rainbow is a phenomenon that everyone experiences slightly
> differently, but that we all agree on. The scientific model that "explains"
> it is very complicated and highly abstract.  Is the rainbow "real"?  It
> certainly does not exist when nobody is looking.  It is, in the end, a
> personal experience.  For me the experience is enhanced considerably by my
> understanding of the scientific model of it, because it allows me to look
> for and discover details I had never noticed, but I would not presume to
> say I kno

[Fis] QBism

[Stanley N Salthe]

Here I advance a viewpoint for Hans.  There has been an ongoing critique of
the very scientific viewpoint that you eschew -- namely the notion that
there is an objective world out there that we might discover.  This attack
on science as it has been is known as social constructivism, and it is
sorely hated by most scientists, (Social constructivism has other meanings
in other fields, like architecture, but I refer only to its meaning
bis-a-vis science.) It proposes that observations are taken from local
perspectives -- as you do -- but it focuses ,not upon individual
researchers, as you do -- but rather upon the society from within which the
observations are made. Thus, modern science is taken to be an aspect, or
arm, of the Global Capitalist Growth Economy, which pays for the scientific
tools and work.  Hence, scientists are not viewed as discovering things,
but as constructing them, using the tools provided by society.  So, how do
you relate QBism to social constructivism?  Would we be justified in
viewing QBism the latest venture of constructivism?


STAN
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Re: [Fis] reply to Loet

[Stanley N Salthe]

Joseph said:

>Of course it is persons, and not "systems", in their complexity, that are
communicating and not communicating and wondering whether to continue to
communicate or not, or are sorry they communicated. Any attempt at a more
complete understanding of communication should be able to take such
complexification of the notion of system into account, in my opinion.

S: Here, in my thinking, you are broaching the internalist / externalist
dichotomy.   Hierarchy, as I have just outlined it in a recent posting, is
a global systems model -- an externalist construction such as is used in
the natural sciences.  When you refer to a human person, you are referring
to an entirely different order of entity.  Persons peer out at the universe
from their local positions -- from inside themselves. They have no place --
as unique persons -- in systems diagrams or models like the hierarchy
models.

Bruno said:

>This thread reminds me George Bush when he said that that corporations are
persons.

S: It was the Supreme Court -- many appointed by Butch -- that said that.
 In any case, you can see from my comments above that this statement is
sheer nonsense.  Corporations are subsystems of a Corporative State (phrase
coined by Mussolini).  They are unable to vote, as such, but they can
deploy costly messages aimed at defeating politicians who are not striving
to increase their corporate power.


STAN


On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 12:40 PM, Joseph Brenner wrote:

>  Dear Gordana and Loet,
>
> I think that you here and Loet, with his idea of local inversion of the
> hierarchy, have an intuition of something I consider potentially very
> important. In reality, it is the processes in the "hierarchy" that
> have been moving and continue to move partly in a non-univocal manner,
> countercurrently if you like. My logic gives a framework for such
> movement in a spiral, not circular manner by alternating actualization and
> potentialization.
>
> Of course it is persons, and not "systems", in their complexity, that are
> communicating and not communicating and wondering whether to continue to
> communicate or not, or are sorry they communicated. Any attempt at a more
> complete understanding of communication should be able to take such
> complexification of the notion of system into account, in my opinion.
>
> Best,
>
> Joseph
>
> ----- Original Message -
> *From:* Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic 
> *To:* Loet Leydesdorff  ; 'Stanley N 
> Salthe';
> 'fis' 
> *Cc:* Инга 
> *Sent:* Saturday, November 02, 2013 9:51 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] reply to Loet
>
>
>  Could it possibly be imagined as a circular motion (bottom-up--top-down—
> and-back-again)?
>
> Just a thought.
>
>
> All the best,
>
> Gordana
>
>
> http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/
>
>
> From: Loet Leydesdorff 
> Date: Saturday, November 2, 2013 8:21 AM
> To: 'Stanley N Salthe' , 'fis' <
> fis@listas.unizar.es>
> Cc: Инга 
>
> Subject: Re: [Fis] reply to Loet
>
>S: (Nothing can go against the 'entropy law'.)  A nice example for you
> might be communication over distances by flashing lights using the Morse
> code.  The actual local operations here may not be the best framework to
> view this (including in thermodynamic terms). Again, I could subsume this
> example into my above argument -- that is, it is the social system that is
> communicating, not individual persons.  It takes two positions for this
> communication to occur, and this makes the system a large scale one, and so
> its speed of communication is understandable in terms of natural hierarchy
> principles.
>
>  I don’t follow the argument completely: the larger social system would
> then be subsumed under the individual system (because of its larger size
> and speed), but it is a social construction on top of the individuals,
> isn’t it? Is there room for a local inversion of the hierarchy (and thus of
> the second law?) such as the generation of redundancy?
>
>  Best,
>
> Loet
>
>   ・Inga Ivanova and Loet
> Leydesdorff, Redundancy Generation in University-Industry-Government
> Relations: The Triple Helix Modeled, Measured, and 
> Simulated.<http://arxiv.org/abs/1308.3836>
>
>  ・Loet Leydesdorff and
> Inga Ivanova, Mutual Redundancies in Inter-human Communication Systems:
> Steps Towards a Calculus of Processing 
> Meaning<http://arxiv.org/abs/1301.6849>,
> *Journal of the American Society for Information Science and Technology *(in
> press).
>
> --
>
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>
>
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Re: [Fis] reply to Loet

[Stanley N Salthe]

As my last posting for the week ...

Loet, Gordana --

 Loet Leydesdorff
3:21 AM (6 hours ago)
to *Инга*, me, fis

S: (Nothing can go against the 'entropy law'.)  A nice example for you
might be communication over distances by flashing lights using the Morse
code.  The actual local operations here may not be the best framework to
view this (including in thermodynamic terms). Again, I could subsume this
example into my above argument -- that is, it is the social system that is
communicating, not individual persons.  It takes two positions for this
communication to occur, and this makes the system a large scale one, and so
its speed of communication is understandable in terms of natural hierarchy
principles.



L: I don't follow the argument completely: the larger social system would
then be subsumed under the individual system (because of its larger size
and speed), but it is a social construction on top of the individuals,
isn't it? Is there room for a local inversion of the hierarchy (and thus of
the second law?) such as the generation of redundancy?



SS: Ah, we have here opened a difficult and intriguing question.  First, a
non-social animal -- say, a leopard -- is an individual utilizing its
species' genetic potenialities.  These are contained within it, and its
acts as its species' representative -- but it acts alone, as a single
organism.


But a social animal is not alone, cannot act naturally alone.  It is a
portion of a larger group.  It is not an individual organism except when it
dies. Then we transit to a human social individual within his/her
socially-constructed frameworks. Even calling to another person in the
street is a group action (via language and expectations).  More clearly, if
the individual (as we think of ourselves) sends an e-mail message --  this
action is NOT an individual, personal action. It is the social system
acting through one of its parts.   The message itself is socially
constructed, as is the thought behind it.

 Hierarchically (the compositional hierarchy is relevant here), the social
system is of much larger scale than its organismic parts.  One of these
cannot call by voice beyond the distance of two streets.  But the social
system can send messages at comparatively great speed (more power), and so
to greater distances.  As a social being, I can void waste alone, but I can
do hardly anything else by myself.  Even my language is an aspect of the
society, and so also any possible message I might make using it (otherwise
I would be judged insane!).



So -- no, the social system is not "subsumed within the individual", but,
instead,  as the larger scale entity, occupies the individual, guiding
his/her actions. Even terrorists act within systemic guidelines, utilizing
a system's powerful products, guided by allowable alternative entrainment.


 Thus, Gordana, bottom-up, yes.  Also top-down!  Bottom-up supplies and
generates possibilities, top-down regulates the deployment of these in
various constructions.


 Concerning the Second Law of thermodynamics (a social construct!), it can
be viewed as imposing a finality upon our actions. Along with other
finalities -- (utilizin the subsumptive hierarchy) on the template of:


 {physical world {material world {biological world {socioeconomic world


 We have:


 {entropy production {free energy dispersion {work {projects


 The requirement for entropy production is weak compared to entrainment by
social projects, but it acts continually, in anything anyone does, by way
of the constitutively poor energy efficiency of any and all effective work.
 Consequently, as we build, we serve the expanding universe even more!


 STAN





On Sat, Nov 2, 2013 at 3:21 AM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

> S: (Nothing can go against the 'entropy law'.)  A nice example for you
> might be communication over distances by flashing lights using the Morse
> code.  The actual local operations here may not be the best framework to
> view this (including in thermodynamic terms). Again, I could subsume this
> example into my above argument -- that is, it is the social system that is
> communicating, not individual persons.  It takes two positions for this
> communication to occur, and this makes the system a large scale one, and so
> its speed of communication is understandable in terms of natural hierarchy
> principles.
>
>
>
> I don't follow the argument completely: the larger social system would
> then be subsumed under the individual system (because of its larger size
> and speed), but it is a social construction on top of the individuals,
> isn't it? Is there room for a local inversion of the hierarchy (and thus of
> the second law?) such as the generation of redundancy?
>
>
>
> Best,
>
> Loet
>
>
>
>
>
> ·Inga Ivanova and Loet Leydesdorff, Redundancy Generation in
> University-Industry-Government Relations: The Triple Helix Modeled,
> Measured, and Simulated. 
>
>
>
> ·Loet Leydesdorff and Inga

Re: [Fis] reply to Loet

[Stanley N Salthe]

Loet -- You wrote:

This is the case for natural systems and engineered systems (Herbert
Simon). However, above the individual the hierarchy is inverted because
collectively the communication is faster than the individual can
reflexively follow.

S: In general, while smaller scale systems can accelerate more quickly than
large scale ones, large scale ones are capable of greater absolute rates of
speed. Now, I gather that you are here speaking of non-natural systems --
i.e., human mechanical arrangements and social constructions.  It is a
complex question, but I will venture the possibility that what is happening
here is NOT acceleration, but absolute speeds, which in larger scale
systems can be faster. As a possible example, consider a firearm. The
bullet seems to be of small scale, and this might match its initial
acceleration, but its continued speed would be the speed of the large scale
social system that constructed it.

 The complexity and speed of communication can be enhanced by codification.
The cultural system operates in terms of expectations (from the perspective
of hindsight) and therefore against the entropy law.

S: (Nothing can go against the 'entropy law'.)  A nice example for you
might be communication over distances by flashing lights using the Morse
code.  The actual local operations here may not be the best framework to
view this (including in thermodynamic terms). Again, I could subsume this
example into my above argument -- that is, it is the social system that is
communicating, not individual persons.  It takes two positions for this
communication to occur, and this makes the system a large scale one, and so
its speed of communication is understandable in terms of natural hierarchy
principles.

Then... Krassimir wrote:

The concept “window” not exactly correspond to reality.
Building the “hierarchy”, the Nature uses “structuring” of low levels to
build upper ones.

S: This building from 'bottom-up' is only part of the system. Everything
exists somewhere, and so, your "bottom" was somewhere too before it started
building upwards. This somewhere was its physical context, which will have
imposed various boundary and initial conditions upon the building process.
 This is sometimes called 'downward causation'. So the new level built
would be a level in between the original upper (constraining) and lower
(building) levels.

What we call “window” is the set of elements which are “used” to create the
new level entities with “emergent” features.

S: And what that window 'saw' was the various initial and boundary
conditions that would be imposed upon the building.

STAN

In other words, “channels” do not exist but chains of “structuring” and
“restructuring” processes.


On Fri, Nov 1, 2013 at 8:20 AM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

> S: Yes. These 'windows' are the channels for constraint imposition from
> level to level -- transactions, not direct interactions -- between them.
>  The lower, faster acting, level provides 'data' constructed as ensemble
> data by the higher level, while the higher level imposes relatively
> continuous constraints upon the lower level.
>
>  
>
> In short, there IS need for hierarchy, properly understood.
>
> ** **
>
> Dear Stan, 
>
> ** **
>
> This is the case for natural systems and engineered systems (Herbert
> Simon). However, above the individual the hierarchy is inverted because
> collectively the communication is faster than the individual can
> reflexively follow. The complexity and speed of communication can be
> enhanced by codification. The cultural system operates in terms of
> expectations (from the perspective of hindsight) and therefore against the
> entropy law. 
>
> ** **
>
> Thanks otherwise!
>
> ** **
>
> Best,
>
> Loet
>
> ** **
>
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[Fis] reply to Loet

[Stanley N Salthe]

Commenting upon Loet's statement:



>No need for reductionism or hierarchy!



S: Hierarchy does not (therefore should not) imply reduction.  Levels in a
compositional hierarchy operate dynamically independently, as you say:



>The dynamics operate in parallel

 with windows on each other. One can try to specify the mechanisms of these

windows.



S: Yes. These 'windows' are the channels for constraint imposition from
level to level -- transactions, not direct interactions -- between them.
 The lower, faster acting, level provides 'data' constructed as ensemble
data by the higher level, while the higher level imposes relatively
continuous constraints upon the lower level.



In short, there IS need for hierarchy, properly understood.



STAN



 On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 6:11 AM, Loet Leydesdorff 
wrote:

> Ok, but in order to understand the emerging macro-variables of the social
structure, one must always take into account the whole cognitive
capabilities of the individual.

Dear Raquel and colleagues,

It seems to me that this misses the point that the non-linear dynamics of
the macro-system do not require that specific individuals participate at
all levels, in all dimensions, and at all times concurrently. One can only
access this system of expectations (horizons of meaning) insofar as has
developed cognitive competencies in relevant dimensions.

For example, one cannot be an expert in all sciences at the same
timebecause of the different literatures. Thus, the social has a dimension
ofits own (as cogitatum) which is reflexively accessible to cogitantes (us).
There is no need for reductionism. Luhmann, for example, used the concept
of "interpenetration" for this interfacing between meanings available at
the supra-individual and individual levels. I would take from him that
theinterface can be considered as an operational coupling (in language and
symbols) that adds to the structural coupling between the social
andpsychological.

No need for reductionism or hierarchy! The dynamics operate in parallel
with windows on each other. One can try to specify the mechanisms of these
windows.

Best,
Loet



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Re: [Fis] Praxotype

[Stanley N Salthe]

Kark, all -- I have question about this numbers <--> words concept.  For
users of a given language much an be communicated by connotation as well as
denotation.  It seems to me that the matching of numbers to words would not
encompass this -- would it?  As well, what about synonyms with slightly
diifferent meanings?

STAN


On Tue, Oct 15, 2013 at 8:32 AM, Karl Javorszky wrote:

> Cointinuing Bob's discourse on language and words, the next step was done
> by Wittgenstein, who said that as tokens, words can be represented by
> numbers. This is a resurrecting of Pythagoras' statement, that Nature is
> representable by natural numbers and their harmonies.
> It is important to keep in mind that numbers have as many
> interrelationships among each other as words - if not more. And, by the use
> of computers, we can make their harmonies among each other visible to the
> human. The inner poetry of words that is behind the words themselves, can
> be found in the relations among the natural numbers.
> Karl
>
>
> 2013/10/15 Bob Logan 
>
>> Thanks John for alerting us to the terms praxotype and cognotyppe. I have
>> a simpler formula which I made use of in my book the Extended Mind: The
>> Emergence of Language, the Human Mind and Culture. Words are simply
>> concepts and hence thinking tools. Before verbal language hominids
>> communicated by mimesis, i.e. hand signals, facial gestures, body language
>> and prosody (non-verbal vocalization) like grunts. As the complexity of
>> hominid existence increased mimesis did not have the requisite variety for
>> everyday life. Conceptualization was needed. Verbal language emerged in
>> which our words were our first concepts. The word water, for example, was a
>> concept that united all our percepts of the water we drank, washed with,
>> cooked with, fell as rain, or was found in rivers, lakes or the sea. With
>> language the brain which before was a percept engine bifurcated into the
>> human mind capable of conceptualization and hence planning and large scale
>> coordination. Verbal language allowed us to deal with matters not
>> immediately available in space and time. I claim that the emergence of
>> verbal language represented three simultaneous bifurcations: from mimetic
>> communication to verbal langauge; from the brain as a percept engine to the
>> mind capable of conceptualization and from hominids to fully human Homo
>> Sapiens.
>>
>> for more details visit
>>
>> http://www.academia.edu/783502/The_extended_mind_understanding_language_and_thought_in_terms_of_complexity_and_chaos_theory
>>
>> or
>>
>>
>> http://www.academia.edu/783504/The_extended_mind_The_emergence_of_language_the_human_mind_and_culture
>>
>> cheers - Bob Logan
>>
>> On 2013-10-15, at 2:54 AM, John Collier wrote:
>>
>> This term might be useful in the context of the present discussion,
>> especially in the contest of coordinated practice(s). Cognotype might also
>> be useful. I think these might lead to a more fine-grained analysis of the
>> more integrative sociotype.
>> ** **
>>
>> http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/2013/09/27/words-are-thinking-tools-praxotype/
>> 
>> ** **
>> ___
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>> fis@listas.unizar.es
>> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>>
>>
>>  __
>>
>> Robert K. Logan
>> Chief Scientist - sLab at OCAD
>> Prof. Emeritus - Physics - U. of Toronto
>> http://utoronto.academia.edu/RobertKLogan
>> www.physics.utoronto.ca/Members/logan
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
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>>
>>
>
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Re: [Fis] THE SOCIOTYPE: From R. Zimmerman

[Stanley N Salthe]

Joseph, Rainer -- On the subject of levels (here I think we are dealing
with a compositional hierarchy), I found Rainer's quick description to be
correct as far as it goes. Then Joseph said..

-snip-
>First, the reference to levels is important, but in my opinion more attention
needs to be paid to the applicable interactive relationships and movement
between levels.

S: We need to be careful with this "interaction' locution.  If there truly
are different levels, then their dynamical rates must be different enough
so that there could not be direct 'interaction' -- rather indirect
'transactions' between them.

>Rainer writes: " . . . because evolution on the one level does not
necessarily entail the same evolution on the other, . . ." To me, this
leaves totally
open the case that evolution on the two levels may be the same or share
important characteristics.

S: Evolution at one level may have effects upon the other level, but in
specific ways.  From the social level down to the individual, we would have
altered signals. From the individual up to the social, only an ensemble
signal from many individuals would be received at the social level. No
direct upward communication between levels.

>Further in the same paragraph we read: "...social groups consist of
individuals which are to the social field generated by that group a
singularity which is one source of this field at the same time. Hence, the
agglomeration of individuals in groups cannot be described by the
same language that is applied to describe the individuals. One is the
macro-level (sociology), the other is the micro-level (psychology).The first
is emergent with respect to the latter."

>This, to me again, is another 'argument by separation', which assumes a
singularity that is limited to the psychologically trivial separate physical
existence of the individual, while eliminating /a priori/ the possibility of
psychologically significant individual - group mutual interaction. It seems
thus to ignore the entire literature on /group/ psychology.

S: But this statement ignores the strictures on communication between
levels. It cannot be direct mutual INTERaction.  Consensus or voting must
occur among individuals in order to affect the collective. Separation is
the essence of hierarchy.  It is possible that a system might be set up so
that one individual -- the Chief -- is given special access to the social
level, but he/she must be the conduit to report the consensus.

STAN




On Fri, Oct 11, 2013 at 10:14 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:

> Dear Raquel, Dear Colleagues,
>
> I have been following the development of this topic with an interest that
> is
> not unmixed with concern. In particular, since we are supposed to deal with
> 'foundations', with some of the assumptions made by Rainer in his note.
>
> First, the reference to levels is important, but in my opinion more
> attention needs to
> be paid to the applicable interactive relationships and movement between
> levels.
>
> Rainer writes: " . . . because evolution on the one level does not
> necessarily entail the same evolution on the other, . . ." To me, this
> leaves totally
> open the case that evolution on the two levels may be the same or share
> important characteristics.
>
> Further in the same paragraph we read: "...social groups consist of
> individuals which are to the social field generated by that group a
> singularity which is one source of this field at the same time. Hence, the
> agglomeration of individuals in groups cannot be described by the
> same language that is applied to describe the individuals. One is the
> macro-level (sociology), the other is the micro-level (psychology).The
> first
> is emergent with respect to the latter."
>
> This, to me again, is another 'argument by separation', which assumes a
> singularity that is limited to the psychologically trivial separate
> physical
> existence of the individual, while eliminating /a priori/ the possibility
> of
> psychologically significant individual - group mutual interaction. It seems
> thus to ignore the entire literature on /group/ psychology.
>
> The 'agglomeration' of individually into groups is not a random matter, (if
> in fact random has any meaning in the real world) but follows a dynamics
> involving the potential individual-group relations to which I referred
> above.
>
> My concern, then, is that the implied model may negatively influence the
> methodology of your study, Raquel, with whose objectives I am certainly in
> agreement. Thus, I was not encouraged by the statistical format implied
> by your most recent note, with its emphasis on quantitative measures that
> may miss key properties of the sociotype.
>
> I hope you will take these comments in the spirit of inquiry in which they
> are intended.
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Joseph
>
>
> Dear Raquel,
>
> may I just point out that your conception which I find quite promising,
> should be modified somewhat as to the symmetry between micro- and
> macrolevels(a point tha

Re: [Fis] THE SOCIOTYPE: SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND BEYOND

[Stanley N Salthe]

Krassimir -- you said:

Social organization is a separate level of living matter hierarchy with
specific “emerged” [Ashby] features.

There is no direct “smooth” transition from one level of living matter to
another.

What is common for all levels of living matter organization are the
“information phenomena and processes” which (of course!) are specific for
different levels.

I understand your  hierarchy to be a subsumptive one -- thus:

{physical realm {material realm {biological realm {socioeconomic realm.
 Your statements are correct in this context.

STAN


On Tue, Oct 8, 2013 at 1:21 PM, Krassimir Markov  wrote:

>   Dear Raquel, Loet and FIS Colleagues,
>
> Yes, “global brain” is mystification.
>
> One may find similarity between organization of society and human brain.
>
> But this is the same kind of similarity as to mechanism, computer, clock,
> etc. .
>
> Such similarities may be used to generate some new ideas or to break down
> old paradigms.
>
> Social organization is a separate level of living matter hierarchy with
> specific “emerged” [Ashby] features.
>
> There is no direct “smooth” transition from one level of living matter to
> another.
>
> What is common for all levels of living matter organization are the
> “information phenomena and processes” which (of course!) are specific for
> different levels.
>
> Because the information is a kind of reflection and the reflection is
> attribute of the matter.
>
> If one ask me what is the “emerged” feature of human society, my answer
> will be “the natural languages” and information interaction based on
> linguistic constructions.
>
>  Friendly regards
> Krassimir
>
>
>
>
>
>  *From:* Loet Leydesdorff 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 08, 2013 5:11 PM
> *To:* 'Raquel del Moral'  ; fis@listas.unizar.es
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] THE SOCIOTYPE: SOCIAL RELATIONSHIPS AND BEYOND
>
>
> Loet, your criticism is very accurate, thanks. But I really think, as said
> Jorge, that our sociality has to have a fairly stable structure, that is
> to say, lower and upper limits that "feed" our mental wellbeing. It's not 
> fixed,
> of course, but individuals become integral embodiments of emotions, and
> most of the active components of these emotions reside in our social
> environment. Evolutionarily we have developed this social dependence, and
> therefore the absence of such bonds, or the feeling of not having them, is
> devastating to our health --both physical and mental, as emphasized by 
> numerous
> studies.
>
> Dear Raquel: 
>
> Expectations of social structure are extremely stable without
> materialization. For example, the expectation of the rule of law. These are
> anchored/reflected in codes of communications. One does not have to appeal
> to a “global brain”. It seems a mystification to me. 
>
> Of course, the social expectations when codified leave footprints behind
> in the form of institutions. For example, courts and parliaments as places
> where one enacts the rule of law.
>
> Best,
>
> Loet
>
> 
>
> --
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Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Fw: [bisc-group] The Curse of Efficiency]

[Stanley N Salthe]

Professor Zadeh's meaning of 'efficiency increase' is cost-cutting.  It is
interesting to note that in one area this would be impossible -- the
construction of infrastructure like bridges, tunnels, etc.  This is one
area where efficiency increases would largely be impossible, and so that
function needs to be performed by pubic funds levied by taxes.  The major
opposition to that is military expenditure, which consumes most of an
'important' society's funds. The military does not reckon efficiency
increases as a benefit either.  Its function is claimed to have priority if
there is to be a society in the first place. It might be said that the
major reason for the existence of any state is military activity. So,
infrastructure upkeep is squeezed between cost-cutting by firms that would
be needed to support it, and by tax fund devouring by the military.


STAN


On Mon, Jul 8, 2013 at 10:34 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> I think this might be of interest for FISers too. ---P.
>
>  Original Message 
> Subject:Fw: [bisc-group] The Curse of Efficiency
> Date:   Wed, 3 Jul 2013 09:45:41 +0800
> From:   赵川 
> To: Pedro C. Marijuan , Joseph Brenner <
> joe.bren...@bluewin.ch>, Mihir-work 
>
>
>
> lets share this reflection idea of Zadeh.  Zhao Chuan
>
>
> -原始邮件-
> *发件人:* "Lotfi A. Zadeh" 
> *发送时间:* 2013-06-28 06:53:42
> *收件人:* 
> bisc-gr...@lists.eecs.**berkeley.edu
> *抄送:*
> *主题:* [bisc-group] The Curse of Efficiency
>
> Dear members of the BISC Group:
>
>Sometime ago, January 1, 1998, I wrote a piece on efficiency. On
> reading this piece, it occurred to me that what I said at that time is
> still valid. Following is what I wrote. Comments are welcome.
>
>Regards to all,
>
>Sincerely,
>
>Lotfi
>
>
> *The Curse of Efficiency*
>
>
>
> Recently, I had a brush with efficiency. My experience added a notch to an
> accumulating level of anger and frustration over what is becoming an
> all-too-common experience in our efficiency-driven society.
>
> A friend locked himself out of his car in front of my house. He asked me
> to call Emergency Road Service for assistance. I dialed the number and, as
> usual, was greeted with a recorded message: “Your call will be answered by
> the next available representative. Thank you for waiting. Our call center
> is presently experiencing a high volume of calls and all service
> representatives are busy servicing other member calls. Please accept our
> apology.”
>
> For the next several minutes, I heard the same message repeated over and
> over again, with recorded music in between. As I was holding the handset,
> my blood pressure was rising. I asked myself: What would I do if I had to
> place the call not from the comfort of my home but from an outdoor phone in
> freezing weather? In a state of frustration, I felt an irrational urge to
> smash the handset down. In a related way, the exasperating experience of
> dealing with menu-driven voice-mail systems make many of us nostalgic for
> the days when such labor-saving systems did not exist.
>
> The issues which underlie experiences like mine are well-understood. By
> downsizing its workforce, a company lowers operating costs, increases
> profits, improves its competitive position, increases stock price, wins
> applause from Wall Street and, not coincidentally, increases the value of
> stock options of its executives. The losers are the laid-off workers and
> the company’s clientele. For a company, the advantages of downsizing are
> clear-cut. The pain and inconvenience inflicted on others carry much less
> weight. However, as in the case of price wars, unilateral moves to improve
> efficiency may result in a situation in which everybody is worse off.
>
> Beyond the obvious issues there are two that stand out in importance.
> First, the benefits of efficiency are usually measurable and immediate,
> while the costs are diffuse, hard to quantify and many lie in the future.
> An example is the addition of lead to gasoline, which had greatly improved
> the efficiency of gasoline engines. It took decades to realize that the use
> of lead additives is a serious health hazard, particularly in the case of
> children. Once the consequences were understood, the use of lead additives,
> at least in the United States, was phased out.
>
> Another example is the use of antibiotics in animal feed. In this case,
> improvement in efficiency has led to the development of drug-resistant
> bacteria and a growing number of allergic reactions in the general
> population. A more recent example is the unfreezing of land rents in
> Egypt―aimed at improving the efficiency of land utilization―which may
> pauperize hundreds of thousands of tenant farmers and lead to serious
> social unrest.
>
> Second, a move to improve efficiency generally leads to a small gain for
> many and a large loss for few. A classic example is a reduction in tariffs
> on importa. In this case,

Re: [Fis] About FIS 2005

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bob -- Your outline here compares closely with a recent one by Howard
Pattee.  I think maybe we can call this the 'standard view ' from science.

I am not satisfied with this view, largely on evolutionary (and
materialist) grounds.  Where did information come from?

Well, I think it must have originated in the abiotic world somehow.  Here
is an example of a generalization of information:

Y = aX^b

Here, a and b are constant parameters which represent the nonholonomic
(possibly also holonomic/lawful) constraints on the relationship between X
and Y.  In nature they would represent an interpretation of the environment
of these relations.  They carry INFORMATION about that environment
influencing the relationship. Why are the values of these constraints not
'information', since they do inform the situation between X and Y?

STAN



On Mon, Apr 15, 2013 at 8:43 AM, Bob Logan wrote:

> Dear Xueshan - re Nalewajski's conjecture that molecular systems have
> information I am skeptical. The word information originated with the idea
> of forming the mind according to the OED. Information as far as I am
> concerned requires a sentient being to receive and understand it. Molecules
> and atoms react to forces not information. They have no idea of the forces
> acting on them. They are not informed as they have no sentience that can be
> informed. Information requires an interpretant for which the signal has
> meaning. Shannon's  information theory is merely signal theory as all he is
> concerned with is how well a set of symbols or a signal are transmitted
> from the sender to the receiver. The ability of the receiver to decipher
> the signal or interpret the signal  has no bearing on the reception of
> Shannon information. Shannon information has nothing to do with meaning. A
> set of random numbers has the maximum amount of Shannon information and yet
> has no meaning. If my set of symbols have meaning for you, whether or not
> you agree with the premise they represent, then they are information. As
> for a molecule or even a flower or a penguin they are not information. In
> other words information has to inform as a grammatical analysis of the word
> information implies. A representation represents, a contradiction
> contradicts, a saturation saturates and in general an "X"tion "X"es and
> therefore information informs or at least has the capability of informing.
> So while a text in the Basque or Albanian languages might not inform me
> because of my inability with these languages they are capable of informing
> those familiar with the Basque and Albanian languages respectively and are
> therefore informaton. A random set of letters cannot inform anyone yet they
> have maximum Shannon information. Information is a tricky thing.
>
> This line of thought raises the question of whether or not DNA is
> information. DNA does not inform a sentient being yet it does catalyze and
> hence instructs how RNA is produced which in turn catalyzes and instructs
> how proteins are created which in turn gives rise to bodily functions.
> Therefore we suggested that DNA represents a different form of information
> from Shannon information which we called biotic or instructional
> information. The argument can be found in the paper  Propagating of
> Organization: An Inquiry by Stuart Kauffman, Robert K. Logan, Robert Este,
> Randy Goebel, David Hobill and Ilya Smulevich. published in 2007 in
> Biology and Philosophy 23: 27-45. I am happy to share this paper with
> anyone requesting it.
>
> Bob Logan
>
> On 2013-04-14, at 9:59 PM, Xueshan Yan wrote:
>
>
> Dear Michel,
>
> Thank you!
>
> I am very familiar with your FIS 2005 website long before.
>
> Have you read the Polish chemist Nalewajski's book:
> Information theory of molecular systems (Elsevier, 2006), I
> really want to know if there are INFORMATON that play a role
> between two atoms, or two molecules, or two supramolecules
> as Jean-Marie Lehn said.
>
> As to FIS 2005, I need every review about all four FIS
> conferences held in Madrid, Vienna, Paris, and Beijing, but
> only a general review about FIS 2005 not be given by people
> so far.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Xueshan
> 9:59, April 15, 2013  Peking University
>
>
> -Original Message-
>
> From: Michel Petitjean [mailto:petitjean.chi...@gmail.com]
>
>
> Sent: Sunday, April 14, 2013 6:19 PM
>
> To: Yan Xueshan
>
> Subject: Re: About FIS 2005
>
>
> Dear Xueshan,
>
> As far as I know, there is no longer report, but I am at
>
> your
>
> disposal if you wish to get more: please feel free to ask
>
> me.
>
> Also you may have a look at the programme, the
>
> proceedings,
>
> and all what is available from the main welcome page:
>
> http://www.mdpi.org/fis2005/ Best, Michel.
>
>
>
> 2013/4/14 Xueshan Yan :
>
>
> Dear Michel,
>
>
> May I ask you a favor?
>
>
> Do you have any more detailed review about FIS 2005,
>
> except
>
> your FIS
>
> 2005 brief conference report published in
>
> http://www.mdpi.org/entropy/htm/e7030188

Re: [Fis] [Fwd: SV: Science, Philosophy and Information. An Alternative Relation] S.Brier

[Stanley N Salthe]

Søren -- Your "science without philosophy" is what we have mostly been
having since the industrial revolution.  In this period sciences has mostly
been the handmaid of engineering and technology, following Francis Bacon's
recommendation.  Now that our culture has captured and partly destroyed
much of the world, it is time to regain a philosophical grip on the
'sorcerer's apprentice'! One tool for this is to reinstate final cause and
Aristotle's four causes analysis.

STAN

On Mon, Feb 11, 2013 at 10:28 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

>  Original Message 
> Subject:SV: [Fis] Science, Philosophy and Information. An
> Alternative
> Relation
> Date:   Thu, 07 Feb 2013 20:32:04 +0100
> From:   Søren Brier 
> To: joe.bren...@bluewin.ch , Pedro Clemente
> Marijuan Fernandez , fis@listas.unizar.es
> , John Collier 
> References: <6043399.89641360255002322.javamail.webm...@bluewin.ch>
>
>
>
> Dear Joseph
>
>
>
> I go for each of the three nominally independent disciplines are not
> independent, but that each provides a dynamic ontological and
> epistemological link to the other two, more or less strong or "actual"
> depending on the extent to which one wishes to emphasize certain aspects
> of knowledge. Science without philosophy is stupid but philosophy
> without science is blind. I am for a synergetic interaction.
>
>
>
>
>
> Best wishes
>
>
>
>   Søren Brier
>
>
>
> Professor in the semiotics of information, cognition and commmunication
> science,
>
> department of International Business Communication, Copenhagen Business
> School,
>
> Dalgas Have 15, 2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark,
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Fra:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es
> [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es] *På vegne af *joe.bren...@bluewin.ch
> *Sendt:* 7. februar 2013 17:37
> *Til:* Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez; fis@listas.unizar.es; John
> Collier
> *Emne:* [Fis] Science, Philosophy and Information. An Alternative Relation
>
>
>
> Dear FIS Colleagues,
>
> The formation of the the Society for the Philosophy of Information at
> the University of Hertfordshire is announced in the link in John's note.
> It includes the announcement and Call for Papers of the International
> Conference on the Philosophy of Information to be held in Xi'An, China
> in October, 2013, sponsored by both the above Society, led by Professor
> Luciano Floridi and the Institute for the Philosophy of Information in
> Xi'An under the direction of Professor Wu Kun.
>
> This increased activity in the area of the philosophy of information
> (another major Workshop is planned this Spring) raises the issue of the
> relation between the science and philosophy of information as well as of
> the philosophy of science. I am aware of and agree with the position
> expressed by Pedro that information science in the FIS framework should
> emphasize scientific research in the sense of knowledge that is
> quantifiable and/or provable. However, I do not believe that either he
> or others of you intend to exclude rigorous qualitative knowledge,
> especially as it concerns the dual nature of information.
>
> The ubiquitous presence of information in all disciplines, as emphasized
> by Wu, suggests an alternative relation linking philosophy, science and
> information that is NOT one of simple hierarchical inclusion or
> possession ("of"). One possibility is to say that it is information that
> links philosophy and science, but this formulation perhaps fails to
> recognize the general properties of the latter two.
>
> Another possibility is to say that each of the three nominally
> independent disciplines are not independent, but that each provides a
> dynamic ontological and epistemological link to the other two, more or
> less strong or "actual" depending on the extent to which one wishes to
> emphasize certain aspects of knowledge.
>
> I look forward to your comments regarding the pros and cons of such a
> conception. Thank you.
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Joseph
>
> Ursprüngliche Nachricht
> Von: colli...@ukzn.ac.za 
> Datum: 04.02.2013 18:57
> An: "fis"mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>>
> Betreff: [Fis] Society for the Philosophy of Information
>
> http://www.socphilinfo.org/
>
>
> --
> Professor John Collier
> colli...@ukzn.ac.za 
> Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South
> Africa
> T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292   F: +27 (31) 260 3031
> http://web.ncf >.ca/collier
> 
>
> ___
> fis mailing list
> fis@listas.unizar.es 
> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
>
>
>
> --
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Grou

[Fis] Fwd: It's (Almost) Alive! Scientists Create a Near-Living Crystal | Wired Science | Wired.com

[Stanley N Salthe]

-- Forwarded message --
From: Malcolm Dean 
Date: Sun, Feb 3, 2013 at 11:14 PM
Subject: Fwd: It's (Almost) Alive! Scientists Create a Near-Living Crystal
| Wired Science | Wired.com
To: "Stanley N. Salthe" 


-- Forwarded message --
From: "Malcolm Dean" 
Date: Feb 3, 2013 2:25 PM
Subject: It's (Almost) Alive! Scientists Create a Near-Living Crystal |
Wired Science | Wired.com
To: "Malcolm Dean" 
Cc:

http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2013/01/living-crystal/
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Re: [Fis] dark matter

[Stanley N Salthe]

John -- You said:


There is no other evidence for a change in G, though it has been postulated.


What is the compelling evidence for stable G?  I would think that if
galaxies at known distances would be resolved without dark matter using
different values of G, that this would itself be the evidence for change
that would be required.  But we would not be likely to discover this if we
hold G constant by fiat, or simply because it simplifies calculations.


The dynamics to be explained apply to both near and far galaxies,
apparently in much the same way.


The near galaxies would have G much closer to our own value in the case of
evolving G.


Perhaps most important, they apply to our local group of galaxies.


These would be brought into the calculations as well, of course.  Overall
we would expect that the most distant galaxies would require the greatest G
in order to explain their configuration, with G getting smaller and smaller
as we approach the present time.  If so, this would provide another
evidence for the Big Bang.


I note that the evidence for "dark energy" is much weaker.


I have felt this as well.  I have been wondering why our recent discovery
of current accelerating expansion could not simply be interpreted as a
remnant continuing expansion.


STAN


John Collier

On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 3:49 PM, John Collier  wrote:

>  Stan,  there are several reasons that a change in gravity will not
> explain the effects of supposed dark matter. I list them below.
>
>
>
> *From:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es]
> *On Behalf Of *Stanley N Salthe
> *Sent:* 29 December 2012 04:52 PM
> *To:* fis
> *Subject:* [Fis] dark matter
>
>
>
> Gordana has said:
>
>
>
>
> Information and Energy/Matter
>
>   What can we hope for from studies of information related to
> energy/matter (as it appears for us in space/time)? Information is a
> concept known for its ambiguity in both common, everyday use and in its
> specific technical applications throughout different fields of research and
> technology. However, most people are unaware that matter/energy today is
> also a concept surrounded by a disquieting uncertainty. What for Democritus
> were building blocks of the whole universe appear today to constitute only
> 4% of its observed content. (NASA 2012) [1] The rest is labeled “dark
> matter” (conjectured to explain gravitational effects otherwise unaccounted
> for) and “dark energy” (introduced to account for the expansion of the
> universe). We do not know what “dark matter” and “dark energy” actually
> are. This indicates that our present understanding of the structure of the
> physical world needs re-examination. [...]
>
>
> Information and Energy/Matter
> Gordana Dodig Crnkovic
>
> Information 2012, 3(4), 751-755;
> http://unam.us4.list-manage2.com/track/click?u=0eb0ac9b4e8565f2967a8304b&id=ae24f18d1e&e=d38efa683e
>
>
> Special Issue "Information and Energy/Matter"
>
>
> http://unam.us4.list-manage.com/track/click?u=0eb0ac9b4e8565f2967a8304b&id=ea193b9747&e=d38efa683e
>
> See it on Scoop.it (
> http://unam.us4.list-manage.com/track/click?u=0eb0ac9b4e8565f2967a8304b&id=cdfa764e97&e=d38efa683e)
> , via Papers (
> http://unam.us4.list-manage.com/track/click?u=0eb0ac9b4e8565f2967a8304b&id=e23b9e2cd9&e=d38efa683e
> )
>
>
> I would like to inquire whether any fis'rs might react to the following
> notion:
>
>
>
> Dark matter is postulated because the amount of matter detectable in
> galaxies would be insufficient alone to explain how they hold together
> given the value of the gravitational constant.
>
>
>
> However, the information we glean from galaxies represents their condition
> as it was a very long time ago, in an earlier universe.
>
>
>
> Is it not possible to resolve this puzzle less radically than by inventing
> dark matter by supposing that the gravitational constant has not been
> constant but has instead been changing, and was much stronger in the past,
> which is when we detect these distant clusters of matter?  Perhaps G as
> been scaled to the rate of expansion of space?  Perhaps the rate of
> expansion was greater then than now, even with current acceleration?
>
>
>
>
>
> My response:
>
>
>
> 1. There is no other evidence for a change in G, though it has been
> postulated.
>
>
>
> 2. The dynamics to be explained apply to both near and far galaxies,
> apparently in much the same way.
>
>
>
> 3. Perhaps most important, they apply to our local group of galaxies.
>
>
>
> I note that the evidence for "dark energy" is much weaker.
>
>
>
> John
>  === Please find our Email Disclaimer here-->:
> http://www.ukzn.ac.za/disclaimer ===
>
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[Fis] dark matter

[Stanley N Salthe]

Gordana has said:


Information and Energy/Matter

  What can we hope for from studies of information related to energy/matter
(as it appears for us in space/time)? Information is a concept known for
its ambiguity in both common, everyday use and in its specific technical
applications throughout different fields of research and technology.
However, most people are unaware that matter/energy today is also a concept
surrounded by a disquieting uncertainty. What for Democritus were building
blocks of the whole universe appear today to constitute only 4% of its
observed content. (NASA 2012) [1] The rest is labeled “dark matter”
(conjectured to explain gravitational effects otherwise unaccounted for)
and “dark energy” (introduced to account for the expansion of the
universe). We do not know what “dark matter” and “dark energy” actually
are. This indicates that our present understanding of the structure of the
physical world needs re-examination. [...]


Information and Energy/Matter
Gordana Dodig Crnkovic

Information 2012, 3(4), 751-755;
http://unam.us4.list-manage2.com/track/click?u=0eb0ac9b4e8565f2967a8304b&id=ae24f18d1e&e=d38efa683e


Special Issue "Information and Energy/Matter"

http://unam.us4.list-manage.com/track/click?u=0eb0ac9b4e8565f2967a8304b&id=ea193b9747&e=d38efa683e

See it on Scoop.it (
http://unam.us4.list-manage.com/track/click?u=0eb0ac9b4e8565f2967a8304b&id=cdfa764e97&e=d38efa683e)
, via Papers (
http://unam.us4.list-manage.com/track/click?u=0eb0ac9b4e8565f2967a8304b&id=e23b9e2cd9&e=d38efa683e
)


I would like to inquire whether any fis'rs might react to the following
notion:

Dark matter is postulated because the amount of matter detectable in
galaxies would be insufficient alone to explain how they hold together
given the value of the gravitational constant.

However, the information we glean from galaxies represents their condition
as it was a very long time ago, in an earlier universe.

Is it not possible to resolve this puzzle less radically than by inventing
dark matter by supposing that the gravitational constant has not been
constant but has instead been changing, and was much stronger in the past,
which is when we detect these distant clusters of matter?  Perhaps G as
been scaled to the rate of expansion of space?  Perhaps the rate of
expansion was greater then than now, even with current acceleration?

STAN
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Re: [Fis] The Information Flow

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bruno said --
> but this does not mean that Mechanism is
a good *explanation* of anything. On the contrary, I prefer to look at
it as a tool, perhaps a simplifying tool, to *formulate* the problems
(notably the mind-body problem), to explain it is not yet solved, even
in that simplifying frame, etc.

Quite right.  Logic is a linguistic mechanism, and a ll of our
philosophical and scientific efforts are mediated by it.  We (except poets)
are all mechanists!

STAN


On Tue, Nov 13, 2012 at 8:50 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Dear Robert and FIS colleagues,
>
>
> On 12 Nov 2012, at 16:35, Robert Ulanowicz wrote:
>
> > Dear Pedro,
> >
> > Roman & Littlefield is coming out with a volume along those lines
> > entitled "Beyond Mechanism"
> > <
> http://www.academia.edu/1141907/Beyond_Mechanism_Putting_Life_Back_Into_Biology
> > >
> >
> > As for our Chinese colleagues, I find them more open to non-mechanical
> > scenarios than are anglophones.
>
> The problem is that few people defending mechanism are aware that
> mechanism is incompatible with weak materialism (the primary existence
> of a physical universe, that is more or less the current dogma/
> paradigm). Most proponents of Mechanism have still the 19th century
> conception of Mechanism, which is refuted by theoretical computer
> science/mathematical logic.
>
> Mechanical entities are intrinsically related to non mechanical
> scenario. You cannot genuinely be open to mechanism without being open
> to the non-mechanical. Most predicate applying to machine are
> undecidable, non mechanical, etc. Machines, notably when they are self-
> observing, are confronted to the non mechanical, and *can* overcome it
> by relying on non mechanically generable informations.
>
> I am not defending Mechanism, but as a logician I do invalidate
> widespread misconception on machines, and notably I try to explain
> that Digital Mechanism (computationalism) is quite the opposite of
> reductionism. I would even say that it might be used as a vaccine
> against reductionism in the exact and human science.
>
> Mechanism, in the weak sense I am using, is quite plausible, as there
> are no evidences against it, but this does not mean that Mechanism is
> a good *explanation* of anything. On the contrary, I prefer to look at
> it as a tool, perhaps a simplifying tool, to *formulate* the problems
> (notably the mind-body problem), to explain it is not yet solved, even
> in that simplifying frame, etc. We are very ignorant of what are
> machines, and probably so, in case we assume we are ourself Turing
> emulable (with or without oracles).
>
>
> > All three of my books are being
> > translated into Chinese. The first one, "Growth and Development:
> > Ecosystems Phenomenology" has already been published.
>
> Congratulation !
>
> Best,
>
> Bruno
>
> > Quoting PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ :
> >
> >> Dear colleagues,
> >>
> >> Yes, the foundations are trembling... as usual during quite long a
> >> time. Maybe too many aspects have to be put into line in order to
> >> have new, more consistent foundations for human knowledge. Until now
> >> the different crisis of Mechanics, the dominant scientific culture,
> >> have been "solved" at the small price of leaving conceptual
> >> inconsistencies until the rug of brand new fields or subdisciplines
> >> while at the same time fictive claims of unity of sceince,
> >> reductionism, etc. were upheld. Good for mechanics, as probably
> >> there were few competing options around --if any. Bad for the whole
> >> human knowledge, as multidisciplinary "schizophrenia" has been
> >> assumed as the natural state of mental health.
> >>
> >> My opinion is that information science should carefully examine the
> >> problematic claims at the core of mechanical ways of explanation, as
> >> some (many?) of them refer to the information stuff: unlimited
> >> communication (even between physical elements), arbitrary partitions
> >> and boundary conditions, ideal status of the acting laws of nature,
> >> ominiscient observer, idealized nature of human knowledge  (no
> >> "neurodynamics of knowledge"), disciplinary hierarchies versus
> >> heterarchical interrelationships, logical versus social construction
> >> and knowledge recombination, idealized social information, etc.etc.
> >> Probably I have misconceived and wrongly expressed some of those
> >> problems, but in any case it is unfortunate that there is a dense
> >> feedback among them and a strong entrenchment with many others, so
> >> the revision task becomes Herculean even if partially addressed.
> >>
> >> The big problem some of us see, and I tried to argument about that
> >> in the last Beijing FIS meeting, is that without an entrance of some
> >> partial aspect in the "professional science" system, none of the
> >> those challenges has the slightest possibility of being developed in
> >> the amateur mode/marginal science our studies are caught into.
> >> Therefore a common challenge for FIS, the new ISIS soc

Re: [Fis] The Information Flow

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro -- The Aristotelian causal categories are conceptual tools, providing
language for distinguishing aspects of a scene.  Without them we are liable
to miss certain aspects of nature. For example, Francis Bacon eliminated
final cause from science discourse, explicitly stating that finality can
only apply to human needs. This eliminated much in nature -- in fact those
aspects not useful for the construction of machines.  Note that
experimental science -- most of physics -- embodies formal and final causes
in the construction of an experimental setup, eliminating these categories
from the observation of what happens when an observed system is stimulated
by an efficient cause (to be noted only afterward in 'materials and
methods').  Thus, formal and final causes tend to become invisible.  This
is valid in physics, or any experimental science which seeks to discover
the possibilities of observed systems, and not to explain actual phenomena
(which are mostly influenced by historically determined nonholonomic
constraints and context (formal causes).

The fact that 'what, how and where' may be transported along one route in a
natural system cannot eliminate them as conceptual tools.

STAN


On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 4:32 PM, PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> Dear FISers,
>
> Is it interesting the discussion on wether those informational entities
> contain realizations of the Aristotelian scheme of causality or not?
>
> The cell, in my view, conspicuously fails --it would be too artifactual an
> scheme. Some parts of the sensory paths of advanced nervous systems seem to
> separate some of those causes --but only in a few parts or patches of the
> concerned pathway. For instance, in visual processing the "what" and the
> "how/where" seem to be travelling together undifferentiated along the optic
> nerve and are separated --more or less-- after the visual superior
> colliculus in the midbrain before discharging onto the visual cortex. The
> really big flow of spikes arriving each instant (many millions every few
> milisec) are mixed and correlated with themselves and with other top-down
> and bottom-up preexisting flows in multiple neural mappings... and further,
> when those flows mix with the association areas under the influence of
> languaje, then, and only then, all those logic and conceptual
> categorizations of human thought are enacted in the ephemeral synaptic
> networks.
>
> I am optimistic that  a new "Heraclitean" way of thinking boils down in
> network science, neuroinformatics, systems biology, bioinformation etc.
> Neither the "Parmenidean" eliminative fixism of classical reductionists,
> nor the Aristotelian organicism of systemicists. Say that this is a
> caricature. However "you cannot bathe twice in the same river" not just
> because we all are caught into the universal physical flow of photons and
> forces, but for the "Heraclitean flux" of our own neurons and brains, for
> the inner torrents of the aggregated information flows. The same for
> whatever cells, societies, etc. and their physical structures for info
> transportation.
>
> Either we produce an interesting new vision of the world, finally making
> sense of those perennial metaphors among the different (informational)
> realms, or information science will continue to be that small portion of
> incoherent patches more or less close to information theory or to
> artificial intelligence. In spite of decades of bla-bla- about information
> revolution and information society and tons of ad hoc literature, the
> educated thought of our contemporary society continues to be deeply
> mechanistic!
>
> Why?
>
> best wishes
>
> ---Pedro
>
>
> >
> > -snip-
> >
> > I think it of some interest that I have
> > previously ( 2006  On
> > Aristotle’s conception of causality.
> > General Systems Bulletin 35:
> > 11.) proposed that the Aristotelian 'formal
> > cause' determines both
> > 'what happens' and 'how it happens', and that
> > the combination of
> > this with material cause ('what it happens
> > to') delivers 'where' it
> > happens.
> >
> > (For completeness sake I add that efficient
> > cause determines only
> > 'when it happens', while final cause points
> > to 'why it happens'.  It
> > would be quite exciting to find that these
> > informations were also
> > carried on separate tracts.)
> >
> >
> > It would be exciting, as that would seem to refute the
> > Aristotelean idea
> > of the four causes as four aspects of all causation. However an
> > information channel can carry some part of the information from
> > its
> > source, which would be a sort of filter or abstraction of the
> > source.
> > So, for example, a channel might be sensitive only to the "how",
> > but not
> > the "what", and vice versa. A channel is fundamentally a mapping
> > of
> > classes from a source to a sink that through instances that
> > retain the
> > mapping (see Barwsie and Seligman, I

Re: [Fis] The Information Flow

[Stanley N Salthe]

Pedro -- it is of interest to me that

On Sun, Oct 21, 2012 at 3:38 PM, PEDRO CLEMENTE MARIJUAN FERNANDEZ <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> Dear FISers,
>
> Continuing with the comments on the "how" versus the "what", it is an
> important topic in mammalian (&vertebrate) nervous systems. They are
> subtended by mostly separate neural tracts (though partially
> interconnected), it is the dorsal stream, specialized in the how & where,
> and the ventral stream stream about the what.

-snip-

I think it of some interest that I have previously ( 2006  On Aristotle’s
conception of causality.  General Systems Bulletin 35: 11.) proposed that
the Aristotelian 'formal cause' determines both 'what happens' and 'how it
happens', and that the combination of this with material cause ('what it
happens to') delivers 'where' it happens.

(For completeness sake I add that efficient cause determines only 'when it
happens', while final cause points to 'why it happens'.  It would be quite
exciting to find that these informations were also carried on separate
tracts.)

STAN


>
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>
>
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Re: [Fis] The Information Flow

[Stanley N Salthe]

On that "curious definition of knowledge", it looks like 'knowing how'
rather than 'knowing that'.

STAN

On Mon, Oct 15, 2012 at 11:56 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

> Dear FIS Colleagues,
>
> Thanks to Zhao Chuan for the Computer Poem/Song. It is a soft way to
> retake our discussions. These weeks there have been a couple of
> important achievements in the bio-information field. On the one side,
> the first 'complete' model of a prokaryotic cell ("A Whole-Cell
> Computational Model Predicts Phenotype from Genotype", by Karr et al.,
> Cell, 150, 389-401, 2012). On the other, there was the report of another
> 'complete' scheme, that of the C. elegans nervous system, now at the
> level of individual synaptic contacts, which was able to explain the
> mating behavior of the worm ("The Connectome of a Decision-Making Neural
> Network", by Jarrell et al., Science, 337, 437-444, 2012). It contained
> several references to the "information flow" through interneurons and
> sensorimotor circuits, and a very curious definition of knowledge (as
> "the set of activity weights in an adjacency matrix of a neural network,
> upon which the network's input-output function in part depends...").
>
> Both papers are very interesting, relatively consistent with each other,
> and I think both represent symbolic milestones in the bio-information
> field. The point on information flows left me thinking on the larger
> perspective beyond single information items that we rarely focus on.
> Actually the first Shannonian information metaphor was about "sources"
> and "channels" --wasn't it? Particularly thinking on social information
> matters, how many aspects of contemporary life relate to the maintenance
> of the information flows intertwining and directing the economic flows.
> No doubt that the "forces of communication" have definitely won the
> upper hand upon the "forces of production ".
>
> Somehow, Zhao Chuan's poem is but a celebration of the central role that
> computers have come to play in the gigantic information flows of our time.
>
> best wishes
>
> --Pedro
>
> --
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
> Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 6818)
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> -
>
> ___
> fis mailing list
> fis@listas.unizar.es
> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
___
fis mailing list
fis@listas.unizar.es
https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

Re: [Fis] POSTS ON TERRY' S BOOK

[Stanley N Salthe]

Not only among fis. I can tell you that it is very well written.  As far as
I have read (1/3), it goes over what (I suppose) we all (me anyhow) know
already, but with a spin of great rhetoric.  Perhaps it acts as a focus.

STAN

On Fri, Apr 27, 2012 at 4:39 PM, Hector Zenil  wrote:

> Could someone summarize why Terrence Deacon's book is such a presumed
> breakthrough judging by the buzz it has generated among FIS
> enthusiasts?
>
> Thanks.
>
>
> On Fri, Apr 27, 2012 at 11:09 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan
>  wrote:
> > Dear colleagues,
> >
> > Krassimir Markov's suggestion is excellent. Next year we could have a
> > FIS conference in his place, centered in the exploration of the new info
> > avenue drafted by Terrence Deacon's book, and started by Stuart Kauffman
> > and others. Previously my suggestion is that we have a regular
> > discussion session (like the many ones had in this list). A couple of
> > voluntary chairs, and an opening text would be needed. Sure Bob Logan
> > could handle this (perhaps off list) and we would have a fresh
> > discussion session for the coming months.
> >
> > Technical Note: the current messages are not entering in the list; the
> > filter is rejecting them as there are too many addresses together.
> > Please, send the fis address single, and all the others separated or as
> > as Cc. Otherwise I will have to enter them one by one.
> >
> > best
> >
> > ---Pedro
> > (fis list coordination)
> >
> > -
> > Pedro C. Marijuán
> > Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> > Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> > Avda. Gómez Laguna, 25, Pl. 11ª
> > 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> > Telf: 34 976 71 3526 (& 6818) Fax: 34 976 71 5554
> > pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> > http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> > -
> >
> >
> > ___
> > fis mailing list
> > fis@listas.unizar.es
> > https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
> ___
> fis mailing list
> fis@listas.unizar.es
> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>
___
fis mailing list
fis@listas.unizar.es
https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bob -- I seem to have missed your statement here, and id not answer, so I
do so now.

Dear Stanley - how can there be information in the abiotic world?
Information is the noun associated with the verb to inform or informing. A
rock can not be informed. An abiotic entity can not be informed.
Information begins with life. A bacterium can be informed but not an
abiotic entity. When we look at stars or the moon or a fossil, they are not
information. Our interpretation of the things in nature we observe, biotic
or abiotic is the information. Perhaps I am missing something but that is
how I see things from my naive point of view. The star, the moon or the
fossil are not signs unless you believe that God exists and he or she made
these signs for us to interpret. What do you mean that semiosis is a
universal phenomenon?

The short answer is that any condition or context that persists
significantly beyond the time required for some process or event to occur
is a nonholonomic constraint on that process, and 'informs' it.  This is
represented by the values of constants in a physical equation.

STAN




On Sun, Apr 8, 2012 at 5:54 AM, Søren Brier  wrote:

> Dear Bill and Bob
>
> Thanks. I hope to see you both here if you pass through Copenhagen. We are
> having a PhD. course on cybersemiotics based on the book the 22-26. of
> August here. We hope for a lovely discussion.
>
> Venlig hilsen/best wishes
>
> Søren Brier
>
> Professor of semiotics of Information , Cognition and Communication, at
> Department of International Studies of Culture and Communication, research
> group on Language, Cognition and Communication (LaCoMe), CBS.
>  uk.cbs.dk/staff/soeren_brier
> Dalgas Have 15, DK-2000 Frederiksberg. Room DH2Ø042. Tel. (+ 45) 38153132
> Ed. Cybernetics & Human Knowing http://www.imprint.co.uk/C&HK/ ,
> Subscription $ 104
> Book: Cybersemiotics: Why Information Is Not Enough, Toronto University
> Press, 2008, sec. ed. 2010. Google book.
> ENTROPI, Special Issue "Cybersemiotics—Integration of the informational
> and semiotic paradigms of cognition and communication"
> http://www.mdpi.com/journal/entropy/special_issues/cybersemiotics-paradigms/
> 
> From: Bob Logan [lo...@physics.utoronto.ca]
> Sent: Saturday, April 07, 2012 2:48 PM
> To: Bill Seaman
> Cc: Loet Leydesdorff; Stanley N Salthe; fis; Søren Brier
> Subject: Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.
>
> Dear Bill - thanks for alerting me to Soren's book. When I was last in
> Copenhagen two years ago I had a very enjoyable meeting with Soren. I look
> forward to reading his book. - Bob
>
> Hi Soren - congrats on what looks to be a fascinating book. Hope all is
> well in Copenhagen - Bob
>
>
> On 2012-03-30, at 2:09 PM, Bill Seaman wrote:
>
> I came across this book which is quite interesting and related to the
> topic:
>
>
> Cybersemiotics: Why Information Is Not Enough (Toronto Studies in
> Semiotics and Communication) [Hardcover]
> Soren Brier<
> http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=ntt_athr_dp_sr_1?_encoding=UTF8&sort=relevancerank&search-alias=books&ie=UTF8&field-author=Soren%20Brier>
> (Author)
>
>
> http://www.amazon.com/Cybersemiotics-Information-Toronto-Semiotics-Communication/dp/0802092209
>
> Book description:
> A growing field of inquiry, biosemiotics is a theory of cognition and
> communication that unites the living and the cultural world. What is
> missing from this theory, however, is the unification of the information
> and computational realms of the non-living natural and technical world.
> Cybersemiotics provides such a framework.
>
> By integrating cybernetic information theory into the unique semiotic
> framework of C.S. Peirce, Søren Brier attempts to find a unified conceptual
> framework that encompasses the complex area of information, cognition, and
> communication science. This integration is performed through Niklas
> Luhmann's autopoietic systems theory of social communication. The link
> between cybernetics and semiotics is, further, an ethological and
> evolutionary theory of embodiment combined with Lakoff and Johnson's
> 'philosophy in the flesh.' This demands the development of a
> transdisciplinary philosophy of knowledge as much common sense as it is
> cultured in the humanities and the sciences. Such an epistemological and
> ontological framework is also developed in this volume.
>
> Cybersemiotics not only builds a bridge between science and culture, it
> provides a framework that encompasses them both. The cybersemiotic
> framework offers a platform for a new level of global dialogue between
> knowledge systems, including a view of science that does not compete with
> religion but o

Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.

[Stanley N Salthe]

As my first posting for this week:

Bob, Loet -- I respond by clarifying that my meaning in this little
equation is that (following Sebeok) semiosis is a universal phenomenon.
 The system of interpretance in my effort here is the LOCALE.  It is such
locales that have evolved into organisms and social systems.  In organisms
and other distinct systems of interpretance, the sign is the context for
interpretation.  So, in the little equation, I am GENERALIZING semiosis
into abiotic Nature.

STAN


On Sun, Mar 18, 2012 at 2:57 AM, Loet Leydesdorff wrote:

> Dear Bob, 
>
> ** **
>
> Yes, I agree: the difference that makes a difference is operationally
> generated by a receiving system; information itself is nothing but a series
> of differences (contained in a probability distribution). The selection
> mechanisms in the receiving systems that position the incoming uncertainty
> have to be specified (as hypotheses). Meaningful information emerges from
> selecting the signal from the noise.
>
> ** **
>
> The meaningful information (the differences that make a difference) can
> again be communicated as information (for example, in and among biological
> systems). Thus, the operation is recursive and the communication /
> autopoiesis continues. Meaning can only be communicated by systems which
> are able to entertain a symbolic order reflexively such as human beings and
> in interhuman discourses.
>
> ** **
>
> I’ll read the book by Reading.
>
> Best,
>
> Loet
>
> ** **
> --
>
> **Loet** **Leydesdorff** 
>
> Professor, University of Amsterdam
> **Amsterdam** **School** of Communications Research (ASCoR),
> Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1012 CX Amsterdam.
> Tel.: +31-20- 525 6598; fax: +31-842239111
> l...@leydesdorff.net ; http://www.leydesdorff.net/ ;
> http://scholar.google.com/citations?user=ych9gNYJ&hl=en 
>
> ** **
>
> *From:* fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es [mailto:fis-boun...@listas.unizar.es]
> *On Behalf Of *Bob Logan
> *Sent:* Saturday, March 17, 2012 10:55 PM
> *To:* Stanley N Salthe
> *Cc:* fis
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] FW: [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.
>
> ** **
>
> Stan - great formula but as I learned from Anthony Reading who wrote a
> lovely book on information Meaningful Information - it is the recipient
> that brings the meaning to the information. 
>
> ** **
>
> PS My book What is Information was been translated into Portuguese and
> published in Brazil where I am doing a 4 city, 5 university speaking tour.
> The book has not yet appeared in English but it is scheduled to be
> published soon by Demo press.
>
> ** **
>
> Regards from Brazil - Bob
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> On 2012-03-17, at 11:17 AM, Stanley N Salthe wrote:
>
>
>
> 
>
> Concerning the meaning (or effect) of information (or constraint) in
> general, I have proposed that context is crucial in modulating the effect
> -- in all cases.  Thus: it would be like the logical example:
>
> ** **
>
>  Effect = context a   x   Constraint ^context b
>
> ** **
>
> STAN
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> ** **
>
> On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 2:18 PM, Christophe Menant <
> christophe.men...@hotmail.fr> wrote:
>
> *Dear FISers, *
> *Indeed information can be considered downwards (physical & meaningless)
> and upwards (biological & meaningful). The difference being about
> interpretation or not. *
> *It also introduces an evolutionary approach to information processing
> and meaning generation.*
> *There is a chapter on that subject in a recent book** **(**
> http://www.amazon.co.uk/Information-Computation-Philosophical-Understanding-Foundations/dp/toc/9814295477
> ).** *
> *“Computation on Information, Meaning and Representations.An Evolutionary
> Approach”*
> *Content of the chapter:*
> *1. Information and Meaning. Meaning Generation**
> **1.1. Information.Meaning of information and quantity of information**
> **1.2. Meaningful information and constraint satisfaction. A systemic
> approach**
> **2. Information, Meaning and Representations. An Evolutionary Approach **
> **2.1. Stay alive constraint and meaning generation for organisms**
> 2.2. The Meaning Generator System (MGS). A systemic and evolutionary
> approach
> 2.3. Meaning transmission
> 2.4. Individual and species constraints. Group life constraints. Networks
> of meanings
> 2.5. From meaningful information to meaningful representations
> **3. Meaningful Information and Representations in Humans**
> 4. Meaningful Information and Representations in Artificial Systems
> **4.1. Meaningful informa

Re: [Fis] Physics of computing

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bruno -- As an idealist, I think you have it all backward!  I would argue
that cardinal numbers are the most 'crisp' entities that we know, and this
disqualifies them or being primeval.  That is, I think it makes sense to
see all developments as beginning relatively vaguely and then becoming more
definite over time.  So, then, it will have taken these numbers a very long
period of evolution (passing through the 'real' stage) to have become as
definite as they are now. Or, even if cardinal numbers became quite crisp
at the time, say, of the origin of chemistry, that too will have been a
long way from primeval.

STAN

On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 4:38 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 16 Mar 2012, at 18:43, Guy A Hoelzer wrote:
>
> Greetings All,
>
> While I like to think that I am not limited to reductionistic thinking, I
> find it difficult to understand any perspective on information that is not
> limited to physical manifestation. I would appreciate further justification
> for a non-physicalist perspective on information.  How can something exist
> in the absence of physical manifestation?
>
>
> If you are realist about elementary arithmetic, that is if you agree that
> elementary arithmetical proposition like "17 is prime" are true
> independently of you, then, by arithmetic's Turing universality, you can
> show that the numbers exchange information relatively to universal numbers,
> which are playing the role of relative interpreters.
>
>
>
>
>  I am not interested in a metaphysical perspective here, which might have
> heuristic value even if it is not 'real'.  The issue of 'content' and
> 'meaning' strikes me as entirely physical, so mentioning those issues
> doesn't help me understand what non-physical information might be.  I would
> say that if information is physically manifested by contrasts (gradients,
> negentropy, …), then content or meaning refers to the internal dynamics of
> complex systems induced by interaction between the system and the
> physically manifested information.  If there is no affect on internal
> dynamics, then the system did not 'perceive' the information.  If the
> information merely causes a transient fluctuation of the internal dynamics,
> then the perceived information was not meaningful to the system.  At least
> this is a sketch of my view that I hope illustrates why the notions of
> 'content' and 'meaning' does not depart the physical realm for me.
>
>
> I can prove that if we are machine at some description level, then the
> physical is both ontologically and epistemologically emerging from numbers
> relation. The hypothesis of mechanism can be shown logically incompatible
> with very weak form of materialism. Physics can not be fundamental, it
> emerges from mathematics, indeed from what has been called the sharable
> part of mathematics (sharable between classical logicians and intuitionist
> logicians, it is basically arithmetic or something recursively equivalent).
> We can already derive propositional quantum logic from classical number
> self-reference. Arithmetic is full of life at the start, and matter appears
> to be arithmetical truth as seen from "inside".
>
> Poetically, to be short, numbers dreams, and physical realities are dream
> sharing. The quantum emerges, if mechanism is correct, from a statistics on
> all computations. This makes both matter and consciousness NON Turing
> emulable. In particular digital physics can be shown self-contradictory.
> Those (actually old) results are not well known but have been verified by
> many people. I don't think there is a flaw, but we never can be sure, of
> course.
>
> Bruno Marchal
>
> PS see below for a concise version of the proof:
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html
>
>
>
>
> Regards,
>
> Guy
>
> From: Pedro Clemente Marijuan Fernandez  mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es >>
> Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 04:19:31 -0700
> To: Foundations of Information Science Information Science <
> fis@listas.unizar.es>
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Physics of computing
>
> Dear discussants,
>
> I tend to disagree with the motto "information is physical" if taken too
> strictly. Obviously if we look "downwards" it is OK, but in the "upward"
> direction it is different. Info is not only physical then, and the
> dimension of self-construction along the realization of life cycle has to
> be entered. Then the signal, the info, has "content" and "meaning".
> Otherwise if we insist only in the physical downward dimension we have just
> conventional computing/ info processing. My opinion is that the notion of
> absence is crucial for advancing in the upward, but useless in the downward.
> By the way, I already wrote about info and the absence theme in a 1994 or
> 1995 paper in BioSystems...
>
> best
>
> ---Pedro
>
>
>
> walter.riof...@terra.com.pe
> escribió:
>
> Thanks John and Kevin to update issues in information, computation, energy
> and rea

Re: [Fis] FW: [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.

[Stanley N Salthe]

Concerning the meaning (or effect) of information (or constraint) in
general, I have proposed that context is crucial in modulating the effect
-- in all cases.  Thus: it would be like the logical example:

 Effect = context a   x   Constraint ^context b

STAN




On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 2:18 PM, Christophe Menant <
christophe.men...@hotmail.fr> wrote:

>  *Dear FISers,
> Indeed information can be considered downwards (physical & meaningless)
> and upwards (biological & meaningful). The difference being about
> interpretation or not.
> It also introduces an evolutionary approach to information processing and
> meaning generation.
> There is a chapter on that subject in a recent book (
> http://www.amazon.co.uk/Information-Computation-Philosophical-Understanding-Foundations/dp/toc/9814295477
> ).
> “Computation on Information, Meaning and Representations.An Evolutionary
> Approach”
> Content of the chapter:
> 1. Information and Meaning. Meaning Generation
> 1.1. Information.Meaning of information and quantity of information
> 1.2. Meaningful information and constraint satisfaction. A systemic
> approach
> 2. Information, Meaning and Representations. An Evolutionary Approach
> 2.1. Stay alive constraint and meaning generation for organisms
> 2.2. The Meaning Generator System (MGS). A systemic and evolutionary
> approach
> 2.3. Meaning transmission
> 2.4. Individual and species constraints. Group life constraints. Networks
> of meanings
> 2.5. From meaningful information to meaningful representations
> 3. Meaningful Information and Representations in Humans
> 4. Meaningful Information and Representations in Artificial Systems
> 4.1. Meaningful information and representations from traditional AI to
> Nouvelle AI. Embodied-situated AI
> 4.2. Meaningful representations versus the guidance theory of
> representation
> 4.3. Meaningful information and representations versus the enactive
> approach
> 5. Conclusion and Continuation
> 5.1. Conclusion
> 5.2. Continuation
> A version close to the final text can be reached at
> http://crmenant.free.fr/2009BookChapter/C.Menant.211009.pdf
>
> As Plamen says, we may be at the beginning of a new scientific revolution.
> But I’m afraid that an understanding of the meaning of information needs
> clear enough an understanding of the constraint at the source of the
> meaning generation process. And even for basic organic meanings coming from
> a “stay alive” constraint, we have to face the still mysterious nature of
> life. And for human meanings, the even more mysterious nature of human mind.
> This is not to discourage our efforts in investigating these questions.
> Just to put a stick in the ground showing where we stand.
> Best,
> Christophe
> *
> --
> Date: Fri, 16 Mar 2012 13:47:28 +0100
> From: pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> To: fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: [Fis] [Fwd: Re: Physics of computing]--Plamen S.
>
>  Mensaje original   Asunto: Re: [Fis] Physics of computing  
> Fecha:
> Fri, 16 Mar 2012 13:24:38 +0100  De: Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov
>Para: Pedro
> C. Marijuan
> Referencias:
> <20120316041607.66ffc68000...@1w8.tpn.terra.com><20120316041607.66ffc68000...@1w8.tpn.terra.com>
> <4f6321c3.5000...@aragon.es> <4f6321c3.5000...@aragon.es>
>
>
> +++
>
> Dear All,
>
> I could not agree more with Pedro's opinion. The referred article is
> interesting indeed. but, information is only physical in the narrow sense
> taken by conventional physicalistic-mechanistic-computational approaches.
> Such a statement defends the reductionist view at nature: sorry. But
> information is more than bits and Shanno's law and biology has far more to
> offer. I think we are at the beginning of a new scientific revolution. So,
> we may need to take our (Maxwell) "daemons" and (Turing) "oracles" closer
> under the lens. In fact, David Ball, the author of the Nature paper
> approached me after my talk in Brussels in 2010 on the Integral Biomathics
> approach and told me he thinks it were a step in the right direction:
> biology driven mathematics and computation.
>
> By the way, our book of ideas on IB will be released next month by
> Springer:
> http://www.springer.com/engineering/computational+intelligence+and+complexity/book/978-3-642-28110-5
> If you wish to obtain it at a lower price (65 EUR incl. worldwide
> delivery) please send me your names, mailing addresses and phone numbers
> via email to: pla...@simeio.org. There must be at least 9 orders to keep
> that discount price..
>
> Best,
>
> Plamen
>
>
>
> On Fri, Mar 16, 2012 at 12:19 PM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:
>
>  Dear discussants,
>
> I tend to disagree with the motto "information is physical" if taken too
> strictly. Obviously if we look "downwards" it is OK, but in the "upward"
> direction it is different. Info is not only physical then, and the
> dimension of self-construction along the realization of life cycle has to
> be entered. Then the signal

Re: [Fis] THEORY AND SCIENCE From QTQ

[Stanley N Salthe]

Bob -- Agreed. The way I see it is that there are two orientations in
science, and these depend upon personality.  One is the strategy of
confirmation (of a favored theory), the other is the strategy of testing
(of other's theories).  The gist of confirmation is to conjure, and then
firm up, a concept with increasing examples (this fits my own, basically
artistic, temperament).  The gist of testing, as Popper persuaded us, is to
try to destroy any theory, with the notion that all of them would
eventually get overturned. This fits with pessimistic personalities. This
view seems inconsistent with the now-getting-popular idea from C.S. Peirce,
that we will discover 'truth' in the long run.  Of course, from semiotics
we also have the view (originally from von Uexküll) that each species is
locked into its own sensorium (and so each culture into its own linguistic
and conceptual biases as well), meaning that this truth could only be one
possible version of the world.  (Note that technological effectiveness
cannot suggest that a theory is 'true', even though many scientists believe
this.)

STAN

On Wed, Jan 11, 2012 at 9:49 AM, Bob Logan wrote:

> Caro Colleagues - Etymology is always a useful exercise - theory and
> theatre come from the same root 'to see' and science from the root 'to
> know'. "The word *theoria* θεωρία, meant 'a looking at, viewing,
> beholding', and referring to contemplation or speculation (wikipedia
> article on theory)." Now most often we say to see is to believe or know.
> This translate into the idea that  theory helps us to believe or to know or
> to do science. But Marshall McLuhan said I did not see it until I believed
> it. In other words to believe or know is a necessary condition to be able
> to see which translates into the idea that we need science to make a
> theory. Science is a way of organizing theories and theories are a way of
> organizing science. The relation of science and theory is a chicken and egg
> problem. It is a question of emergence. The relation of science and theory
> is one of non-linear dynamics. One needs science to make a theory and a
> theory or theories to make science. As is the case with emergent phenomena
> one cannot predict what theories will emerge from science or what science
> will emerge from theories. This is my theory of science and my science of
> theories.
>
> I hope you enjoyed my playful take on the relation of science and theory
> which I offer as a serious resolution to the challenges raised in this
> thread. I also hope you will comment.
>
> with kind regards - Bob Logan
>
>
> On 2012-01-11, at 2:42 AM, Krassimir Markov wrote:
>
>  Dear QTQ and FIS Colleagues,
>
> I am afraid we had not define the terms ‘theory” and “science” but start
> discussion.
> Let firstly clear what they means and after that to make conclusions.
>
> It is clear the theories are part of the science but the science is
> something more.
>
> In our area - the Information Science is quite more than any theory for
> information.
>
> Of course,  “What is information?” is the basic question, but after it
> follow the questions “How it is used by live organisms?” and “Why it is
> needed for social structures?”, “Why one and the same reflection is
> information for one but not for another subject?” and “Can the information
> be totally destroyed or not, i.e. is the information depended with physical
> (material) world or not?”, etc.
>
> ---
>
> About the journals:
>
> I have more than 35 year experience in editing and publishing scientific
> collections and journals.
> My personal position is: “The Variety and Independence cause Development!”
>
>
> Every journal has its own politic and there is no sense to discus its
> rules.
> My personal position is presented in the name of my firs Int. Journal:
> “Information Theories and Applications”.
> Yes – Theories.
>
> Some scientists prefer to be protected from “spam” papers by the
> reviewers, but this has simple decision – “Do not read papers at all !”
>
> The science needs new ideas.
> Sometimes the proper way is not in the fat books but in the thin papers.
> We have long history of development but are we sure that all in it
> (especially for information) is absolutely correct ant may be accepted
> without doubt?
>
> ---
>
> Happy New 2012 Year!
> Friendly regards
>
> Krassimir
>
>
>
>
>  *From:* Pedro C. Marijuan 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, January 10, 2012 5:48 PM
> *To:* fis@listas.unizar.es
> *Subject:* [Fis] [Fwd: THEORY AND SCIENCE] From QTQ
>
>
>
>  Mensaje original   Asunto: THEORY AND SCIENCE Fecha: Tue,
> 10 Jan 2012 10:49:58 +0800 De: whhbs...@sina.com Responder a:
> whhbs...@sina.com Para: Pedro C. Marijuan 
> mailto:pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es,
> mjs mailto:m...@aiu.ac.jp , Joseph Brenner
> mailto:joe.bren...@bluewin.ch , fislist
> mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es 
>
> Dear Pedro, Dear Marcin, Dear Joseph, Dear FIS Colleagues, 
> Theory is important and necessary, but theory is different from science,
> theor

Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Stanley N Salthe]

And it could feature in 'Science for Non-Majors' courses as well.

STAN

On Mon, Dec 5, 2011 at 12:44 PM, Guy A Hoelzer  wrote:

> Hi All,
>
> I agree with those who are suggesting that Information Science makes sense
> as a widely useful way to think about different scientific disciplines
> even if we don't have a strong consensus on how to define 'information'.
> I think there is enough coherence among views of 'information' to underpin
> the unity and universality of the approach.  Perhaps Information Science
> is less a discipline of its own and more of a common approach to
> understanding that can be applied across disciplines.  While I can imagine
> good courses focusing on Information Science, it might be most productive
> to include a common framework for information-based models/viewpoints
> across the curriculum.
>
> Guy Hoelzer
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Discussion of Information Science Education

[Stanley N Salthe]

Regarding:

>Information Science is a perfect tool for integration of curriculum,
especially in the context of Liberal Arts education. >Which other concept,
if not information, can be applied in all possible contexts of education?

I would point out that there have been two previous disciplines that have
attempted this reasonable goal -- systems science and semiotics.  Neither
one ever became a major program except in one or two universities where
major players worked.  Our culture rewards specializations much more than
general applications.

STAN



On Sat, Dec 3, 2011 at 7:23 AM,  wrote:

> Dear Colleagues:
> There are some questions which periodically return to FIS
> discussions without conclusive answers. For instance: "What is
> information?" However, the lack of consensus regarding central
> concept is not an obstacle in the development of Information
> Science. There is no commonly accepted answer to the question
> "What is life?" But, this does not threaten the identity of
> Biology.
>
> Information Science has not yet achieved a status of a
> commonly recognized discipline. It is frequently confused with
> Computer Science, because of the term Informatics which in
> Europe denotes what in the US is called Computing, or with
> Library
> Science and sometimes even with Philosophy of Information,
> as visible from the Handbook on the Philosophy of Information
> http://www.illc.uva.nl/HPI/ where philosophy and science
> interleave
> on many levels.
>
> Information Science will never receive recognition without an
> organized effort of research community to introduce its
> philosophy,
> goals, methods, and achievements to the general audience.
>
> Books and articles popularizing the theme of information as
> a subject of independent study do not have big enough
> circulation to be sufficient in establishing an identity of
> the discipline. The only effective way is to introduce
> Information Science as a subject of education at the college
> level for students who do not necessarily want to specialize
> in this direction.
>
> Certainly, introduction of a new subject to curriculum is not
> easy, but it is possible. After all, Information Science is a
> perfect tool for integration of curriculum, especially in the
> context of Liberal Arts education. Which other concept, if not
> information, can be applied in all possible contexts of
> education?
>
> Now, the question is whether we are ready to come out with a
> syllabus for such a course acceptable for all of us, those who
> are involved in the subject, and those who aren't, but
> participate in the development of curricula. Can we overcome
> differences between our views on the definition of
> information, on the relationship of information understood in
> a general way to its particular manifestations in other
> disciplines?
>
> Since the course (or courses) should present an identity of
> the discipline of Information Science, it is very important
> that we are convinced about the authentic existence of a large
> enough common ground. Can we develop a map of this territory?
> Can we pool resources to establish foundations for a standard,
> Information Science curriculum?
>
> Marcin and Gordana
>
> Marcin J. Schroeder, Ph.D.
> Professor and Dean of Academic Affairs
> Akita International University
> Akita, Japan
> m...@aiu.ac.jp
>
>
> Gordana Dodig Crnkovic,
> Associate Professor
> Head of the Computer Science and Networks Department
> School of Innovation, Design and Engineering
> Mälardalen University
> Sweden
> http://www.mrtc.mdh.se/~gdc/
>
> Organizer of the Symposium on Natural/Unconventional
> Computing,
> the Turing Centenary  World Congress of AISB/IACAP
> https://sites.google.com/site/naturalcomputingaisbiacap2012
>
>
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Re: [Fis] Category Theory and Information. Back to Basics

[Stanley N Salthe]

Joseph --

On Fri, Oct 28, 2011 at 3:37 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:

> **
> Dear Stan,
>
> To return to your question, I think that there is a disjunction between our
> usual logics and the actual, changing world but that it is fatal only in 
> *those
> *logics. Logic in Reality reduces to standard logic for simple process
> phenomena involving minimal interactive aspects - those which
> science handles easily. But LIR  applies to more complex phenomena whose
> evolution I would not consider outside science. Could we say that LIR is a
> way of bringing change better within science?
>
> Thus my answer to your question is yes. LIR, to use your phrase,
> encompasses change as it happens. It describes logical characteristics
> of the evolution of processes in a multi-dimensional configuration space.
> The elements of the logic are changing values of the actuality and
> potentiality of the elements in interaction (e.g., system and environment). 
> The
> disjunction thus becomes, itself, a process describable by LIR.
>

So, just to get a clearer statement -- we can have a differential equation
describing some kind of change. But here the constants are fixed, and so the
change is predetermined, and used to describe only average, standard or
characteristic changes.  So, you seem to be saying that in LIR format one
can describe changes where the constraints are not fixed.

If so, would the changes of the constants be in some way predetermined?  Or
could that be open as well?

>
> I do not expect that people who wish to retain the characteristics of
> standard category theory can accept the above any more than those who
> require that logic refer only to propositions and their truth-values. I
> have said that a conceptual mathematical theory applicable to my Logic in
> Reality is both possible in principle and desirable. I only insist that none
> such yet exists, since what does exist is eliminative with respect to the
> interactive realities LIR attempts to discuss, among them information.
>

Does the above comment give some hint of what would be required, or
accomplished by this math?

STAN

>
> Cheers,
>
> Joseph
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Stanley N Salthe 
> *To:* joe.bren...@bluewin.ch ; fis@listas.unizar.es
> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 18, 2011 11:16 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [Fis] Category Theory and Information. Back to Basics
>
> Joseph --
>  SS: Your objection seems to me to imply a fatal disjunction between our
> usual logics -- the basis of science -- and the actual (changing) world.
>  For example, in biological ontogeny we begin at one scale, and GRADUALLy
> assemble a larger scale.  During this transition the system is ambiguous as
> to scale.  It is CHANGE which faults our thinking here, not the idea that a
> developing embryo can be modeled as existing at more than one scale.  I
> suppose you can then tell us that your system of logic (LIR) takes care of
> this, by encompassing change as it happens.  Yes?
>
> STAN
>
>>
>> For complex process phenomena such as information, involving
>> complementarity, overlap or physical interactions between elements, these
>> doctrines fail. The "mathematical conceptualization" they provide does not
>> capture the non-Markovian aspects of the processes involved for which no
>> algorithm can be written. If any algebra is possible, it must be a
>> non-Boolean one, something like that used in quantum mechanics extended to
>> the macroscopic level.
>>
>> I have proposed a new categorial ontology in which the key categorial
>> feature is NON-separability. This concept would seem to apply to some of the
>> approaches to information which have been proposed recently, e.g. those of
>> Deacon and Ulanowicz. I would greatly welcome the opportunity to see if my
>> approach and its logic stand up to further scrutiny.
>>
>> As Loet suggests, we must avoid confounding such a (more qualitative)
>> discourse with the standard one and translate meaningfully between them.
>> However this means, as a minimum, accepting the existence and validity of
>> both, as well as the possibility in principle of some areas of overlap,
>> without conflation.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Joseph
>>
>>
>> - Original Message -
>> *From:* Gavin Ritz
>> *To:* 'Joseph Brenner'
>> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 18, 2011 10:45 AM
>> *Subject:* RE: [Fis] Chemo-informatics as the source of morphogenesis -
>> bothpractical and logical.
>>
>>  Hi there Joseph
>>
>> This takes us
>>
>> back to the question of the primacy of quantitative over qualitative
>>
>> properties, or, better, over qualitative

Re: [Fis] Category Theory and Information. Back to Basics

[Stanley N Salthe]

Joseph --

On Tue, Oct 18, 2011 at 11:14 AM, Joseph Brenner wrote:

> **
>  Dear Gavin, Loet and Colleagues,
>
> Gavin raises a fair question as to the reasons for my objection to the use
> of category theory
> with respect to information. My answer is that it suffers from the same
> limitations as standard truth-functional logic, set theory and mereology:
>
> Logic: absolute separation of premisses and conclusion
> Set Theory: absolute separation of set and elements of the set
> Mereology: absolute separation of part and who
>
Category Theory: exhaustivity and absolute separation of elements of
> different categories. (The logics of topoi are Boolean logics).
>

SS: Your objection seems to me to imply a fatal disjunction between our
usual logics -- the basis of science -- and the actual (changing) world.
 For example, in biological ontogeny we begin at one scale, and GRADUALLy
assemble a larger scale.  During this transition the system is ambiguous as
to scale.  It is CHANGE which faults our thinking here, not the idea that a
developing embryo can be modeled as existing at more than one scale.  I
suppose you can then tell us that your system of logic (LIR) takes care of
this, by encompassing change as it happens.  Yes?

STAN

>
> For complex process phenomena such as information, involving
> complementarity, overlap or physical interactions between elements, these
> doctrines fail. The "mathematical conceptualization" they provide does not
> capture the non-Markovian aspects of the processes involved for which no
> algorithm can be written. If any algebra is possible, it must be a
> non-Boolean one, something like that used in quantum mechanics extended to
> the macroscopic level.
>
> I have proposed a new categorial ontology in which the key categorial
> feature is NON-separability. This concept would seem to apply to some of the
> approaches to information which have been proposed recently, e.g. those of
> Deacon and Ulanowicz. I would greatly welcome the opportunity to see if my
> approach and its logic stand up to further scrutiny.
>
> As Loet suggests, we must avoid confounding such a (more qualitative)
> discourse with the standard one and translate meaningfully between them.
> However this means, as a minimum, accepting the existence and validity of
> both, as well as the possibility in principle of some areas of overlap,
> without conflation.
>
> Best,
>
> Joseph
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gavin Ritz
> *To:* 'Joseph Brenner'
> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 18, 2011 10:45 AM
> *Subject:* RE: [Fis] Chemo-informatics as the source of morphogenesis -
> bothpractical and logical.
>
>  Hi there Joseph
>
>
>
> This takes us
>
> back to the question of the primacy of quantitative over qualitative
>
> properties, or, better, over qualitative + quantitative properties.
>
>
>
> Is this not a good reason to use category theory and a Topos (part of an
> object), does not the axiom of “limits” and the axiom of “exponentiation-
> map objects” deal philosophically with “quantity and limit” and “quality and
> variety” concepts respectively.
>
>
>
> Is this not the goal of category theory to explain the concepts in a
> conceptual mathematical way.
>
>
>
> Regards
>
> Gavin
>
>
>
> This for
>
> me is the real area for discussion, and points to the need for both lines
>
> being pursued, without excluding either.
>
>
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Gavin Ritz 
> *To:* 'Joseph Brenner' 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, October 18, 2011 10:45 AM
> *Subject:* RE: [Fis] Chemo-informatics as the source of morphogenesis -
> bothpractical and logical.
>
>  Hi there Joseph
>
>
>
> This takes us
>
> back to the question of the primacy of quantitative over qualitative
>
> properties, or, better, over qualitative + quantitative properties.
>
>
>
>
>
> Is this not a good reason to use category theory and a Topos (part of an
> object), does not the axiom of “limits” and the axiom of “exponentiation-
> map objects” deal philosophically with “quantity and limit” and “quality and
> variety” concepts respectively.
>
>
>
> Is this not the goal of category theory to explain the concepts in a
> conceptual mathematical way.
>
>
>
> Regards
>
> Gavin
>
>
>
> This for
>
> me is the real area for discussion, and points to the need for both lines
>
> being pursued, without excluding either.
>
>
>
>
>
>
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[Fis] Fwd: Chemical information: a field of fuzzy contours ?

[Stanley N Salthe]

Michel -- Regarding:

Now, I ask you the following: please can you provide an extremely
simple example (the most simple you could imagine) of situation in
which you can say: << in this situation, information is ... >>.
Chemical information is welcome, but an example from physics would be
great, too. However, please, no biology example, that will be dicussed
at the occasion of a future session.


Would it not be the case that chemical information would relate to
catalysts?  That is, chemical scale configurations which have the property
of forming enabling constraints for some chemical bond alterations.  Then,
of course, at the physical level we have the fermion / boson transactions
that actually make up the basis of a chemical reaction.

STAN


On Fri, Sep 23, 2011 at 7:07 AM, Michel Petitjean <
petitjean.chi...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear FISers,
>
> Pedro raises several points.
> Among them:
>
> 1. "Chemoinformatics" or "Cheminformatics" ?
> Both terms are encountered. I would say that unless some authority
> takes a decision, both terms will continue to be used.
>
> 2. Despite I gave an example of what could be cheminformation in a
> concrete case, I did not tell what was exactly cheminformation in this
> concrete case. I just asked the question of what it could be.
> Now, I ask you the following: please can you provide an extremely
> simple example (the most simple you could imagine) of situation in
> which you can say: << in this situation, information is ... >>.
> Chemical information is welcome, but an example from physics would be
> great, too. However, please, no biology example, that will be dicussed
> at the occasion of a future session.
> These examples are expected to help us to define information in more
> general situations.
>
> 3. The comparison Pedro did with symmetry is of interest: can anyone
> define symmetry ?
> During a long time, symmetry had in common with information that many
> people attempted to define it in its own field, giving raise to many
> particular definitions, but not to a common and widely accepted one.
> Some years ago, although I needed to mention a definition of symmetry
> in one of my papers, I was surprised that I could not find an unifying
> one (symmetry is known since millenaries!!). Even in the book of Weyl
> I did not find the expected one.
> So, I decided to build my own one (Symmetry: Culture and Science,
> 2007, 18[2-3], 99-119; free reprint at
> http://petitjeanmichel.free.fr/itoweb.paper.SCS.2007). See also:
> http://petitjeanmichel.free.fr/itoweb.petitjean.html
> In fact, the group structure which is generally a priori imposed, is a
> consequence of several properties that the definition should satisfy
> to be in agreement with some obvious intuitive requirements (and so,
> five different groups appear naturally, none of them being imposed a
> priori). Of course, the proposed unifying definition applies to a
> broad spectrum of situations, not only the geometric one: matrices,
> functions, distributions, graphs, etc.
> But that was possible because I already had knowledge of the many
> definitions in particular domains or situations.
>
> Thus I expect that that you will post several examples of information
> in very simples cases.
> From the analysis of these situations we should move forward.
>
> E.g., for symmetry, one of the simple examples I gave was the set of
> three points of the real line: if one point is the mid of the two
> other, there is symmetry (in fact, it is a case of achirality, i.e.
> indirect symmetry, because here we deal with reflections rather than
> with rotations).
> It would be great to have so simple situations for information in
> chemistry or physics.
>
> Thanks by advance,
> ll my best,
>
> Michel.
>
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Re: [Fis] Chemical information: a field of fuzzy contours ?

[Stanley N Salthe]

Michel -- Organic chemistry was known to be the most difficult course in
Columbia University.  But I got interested in it, worked very hard
constantly, and I achieved an  'A'.  But what you say here indicates several
orders of magnitude more difficulty than what I played with in university.
 For me this raises a question about the 'realms of nature', as in the
subsumptive hierarchy: {physical realm {chemical realm {biological realm}}.
 Do you think one should place an 'organic realm' between chemical and
biological?  Or, otherwise, do you think it possible that there might be
organic realms out in the universe not entrained into biology?

STAN

On Sat, Sep 17, 2011 at 1:53 PM, Michel Petitjean <
petitjean.chi...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Dear Joe, dear FISErs,
>
> An organic chemist is able to predict a number of properties from the
> structural formula, including much about reactivity of the compound.
> But as you know, doing that properly is extremely difficult in a
> number of cases, because the rules governing reactivity are much more
> complicated that the ones which are taught at Universities, and the
> number of rules expands rapidly each year. In fact, an experienced
> Organic Chemist has in his head a so extraordinary rich collection of
> rules and a so enormous knowledge that even many chemists which are
> not Organicians cannot imagine the extent of this knowledge.
> It is clear that the "doing chemistry" process derives from these
> rules (these rules are chemical information), not only from the
> formulas.
> Since the 70's, some cheminformaticians tried to store that in
> databases: reactions databases plus databases of reactivity rules for
> computer sssisted synthesis or retrosynthesis, etc., then built
> programmes intended to output proposals supposed to help the chemist.
> As far as I know, the brain of the Organician is still by far much
> more efficient than the best softwares which were produced.
> So, I may tell that the information available in the brain of the
> Organician is extremely difficult to store on computer, and it is even
> very difficult to teach it, apart the very beginning.
> There are examples other than reactivity. A huge of QSAR studies were
> done in order to predict various physico-chemical properties of simple
> chemical compounds, e.g., predicting from the structural formulas the
> boiling temperatures of monofunctional compounds such as alcohols,
> cetones, etc. at 20 C under 1 atm. But even in these apparently simple
> cases, the chemical information we need to do that with an acceptable
> accuracy is difficult to extract: the conclusions of such QSAR studies
> cannot be applied to any alcohol or cetone (still assumed to be
> monofunctional compounds), and it is even difficult to know the extent
> of validity of the published empirical rules, concretely often
> summarized by some regression coefficients.
> The example of spectroscopic databases is also of interest. How
> simulate spectras (infrared, NMR, mass spectras, etc.) of chemical
> compounds ? Starting from the structural formula, it is really hard to
> simulate, e.g. a low resolution mass spectra. Most time, it was
> attempted to extract rules from spectroscopic databases, then try to
> predict the spectra of a compound absent from the database, or
> conversely, retrieving the structural formula of a compound from its
> spectra(s). Many such softwares were developped since the 70's (one of
> the oldest ones is STIRS), but really the chemical information needed
> to do that properly is very difficult to extract.
> To conclude, I retain your example of crystallization: for sure when
> we will able to retrieve from the structural formula H-O-H that water
> under 1 atm should crystallize at 0 C, then for sure we will be ready
> to predict more about crystallization of chemicals.
>
> Best regards,
>
> Michel.
>
> 2011/9/17 joe.bren...@bluewin.ch :
> > Dear Michel and FIS Colleagues,
> >
> > This will be an interesting discussion, since the core nature and role of
> > information will be involved. Here is just one first point: to me, as a
> > chemist, chemical information is only secondarily an "object" capable of
> > being formalized, archived, etc. A formula has meaning for me in terms
> > of the potential reactions the molecule to which it refers can undergo,
> what
> > it looked like when crystallized for the first time and so on.
> >
> > Cheminformatics seems not to deal with such aspects of chemical
> information
> > as part of a process of "doing chemistry". Can this be captured by
> another system?
> >
> > Best wishes,
> >
> > Joseph
> >
>
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[Fis] testing

[Stanley N Salthe]

I am having problems communicating with lists, So I am trying to see if this
gets through.

STAN
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[Fis] replies to several

[Stanley N Salthe]

Replying to Raphael, Joseph, and Loet -

**

*Rafael Capurro* to Robert, fis

show details 10:13 AM (4 hours ago)


well... not exactly. This is the way Hegel (and others) looked at it,

discarding the 'singulars' or including them into the particulars and so

creating a dialectics of the universal and the particular. Kierkegaard

was not at all happy with this. What I am trying to say (quoting Octavio

Paz) is nothing mystical or singular in the sense that might be part of

the process of questioning ("falsifying") theories and the like. It is

surely not against scientific method (fallibilistic or not) and it is

not mystical (a word used by Wittgenstein as you know). Trees are trees,

not signs. As simple as this. Best. Rafael


Trees vary according species and cultures, each of which has evolved signs
to negotiate with them.  ‘Trees as trees’ are a ‘scientific’ fiction insofar
as they are supposed to be so without any connection to observation and
interpretation.  In fact here we have a good example for consideration of
nominalism.  ‘Trees’ is a  universal, and depends upon
observation/interpretation regarding particular ones in order to be
instantiated at places and times.  Science believes it can transcend this
by, for example, observing different species interacting with a particular
kind of tree.  The worm, the moth and squirrel are observed interacting with
a kind of tree, under the idea that the more kinds of interactions we
observe the more actual is this kind of tree.  But the whole scene is a
social construct; placing a universal into an increasingly inclusive
observer-constructed context does not make it increasingly ‘real’ as a
universal. Recording our observations and combining them with those of
others merely increases the ‘scale’ of the observation.  A library full of
treatises on oaks does not make ‘oak’ a real universal -- unless your
philosophy deems it to be so.  Things-as-such are linguistic constructions.

--


Then to Joseph --


Joseph --


On Thu, May 5, 2011 at 2:59 PM, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch <
joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> wrote:

Dear John,


The reference you cited looks like essential reading and I have ordered it.
Thank you for calling it to our attention.


I believe, also, that the conventional view of meaning leads to its erasure,
and this exactly why a Derridean view of writing (and speech) is required in
which erasure does not mean the total loss of meaning.


As far as signs go, the area of debate is clear. A theory of signs (or
sign-relations) is essential to the understanding of information and
questions of reality and illusion. You believe that Peirce delivers this and
I do not. The reason is that the critical fallibility, I think, is not in
our representations, about which there should be no debate, but in taking
signs (Peirce's icon and index) as representations in the first place. Doing
this leads straight to the illusions we as realists wanted to avoid.


Without this there can be no discourse about the origin of semiosis, which
requires the concept of indexical signs.

--



Then replying to Loet --


On Sat, May 7, 2011 at 9:12 AM, Loet Leydesdorff 
wrote:

Dear Koichiro and colleagues,



-snip-



 Meaning is provided to the events from the perspective of hindsight, and
with reference to other possible meanings (at t +1). Thus, acting against
the arrow of time, the communication of meaning increases the redundancy (as
different from the increasing entropy to which it is coupled as a feedback
mechanism).


>From a semiotic perspective, a system will already have its meanings
embodied in signs.  This involves foresight, even searching, as well.




-snip-



Your point of replacing the “why” with “by what” seems not necessary to me.
The communication is carried by those units which have communicative
competencies. This closes the domains operationally. You and I cannot
communicate in terms of atoms, whereas molecules can. The why-question is
utmost important because it involves evolutionary theorizing about the
systems under study; for example, chemical versus biological evolution.


I agree with this.  In semiotics the 'why' is embodied in the pragmatic
aspects of semiosis, resulting, in biological systems, from adaptation.  The
'why' is involved up front in the seeking for information. Totally
unrelated, uncalled-for, information will simply be missed (possibly at
peril!).


STAN


 Best wishes,

Loet
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[Fis] replies to Quiao, Pedro, Krassimir & Loet

[Stanley N Salthe]

(1) Replying Quiao --


On Mon, Apr 25, 2011 at 7:15 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan <
pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es> wrote:

Message from Qiao Tian-qing


--


 Dear FISers

There is another general theory of information (GTIA).

I consider,

The customarily named information is the collection of three kinds of
things´ attributes: things themselves (including cause or effect formed
through their interaction), the attributes of things that someone thinks and
simulates, and the attributes of tools someone or something uses when
considers, expresses, or simulates something. The first kind of attributes
of things is based on facts, for example, the three states of water, someone
is swimming. This are physical, chemical, biological, social or any other
properties of things, irrefutable and objective, which have nothing to do
with any expressive way related to the thing (such spoken and written
languages, music or pictures).


This relates to the semiotic work of  Jacob von Uexküll ('Biological
Theory', 1925), who suggested that each species has its own sensory
equipment, and finds/ lives in a different world from other species.  It
could be said that this was an early postmodern text.   It is now in the
standard (Peircean) background of semiotics.


The second kind is related with the inner thoughts, or expressions through
talk, or sentence, namely, some attributes of things that someone can find;
or the attributes of things that could be simulate according to science and
technology.


 Here we find Bidgman's 'operationalism' in his 1927 'The Logic of Modern
Physics'.


The third kind is the attributes of tools used by someone (or something)
when he himself thinks, or expresses, or simulates something, i.e. the state
of brain neurons when he thinks, the line trend of words when writes, the
vibration frequency and intensity of sound when speaks, the bit of circuit
devices in a computer, or the models of devices used in an experiment, etc.


This again relates to the above.

---



(2) Then to Pedro, Krassimir and Loet:


Pedro Says:


But a new framework (way of thinking) is needed where we somehow
de-anthropogenize the field, getting it partially free of the above
circularity: "because I am philososphically or disciplinarily configured
that way, info is this and that for me". My usual argument in this list has
been that a few "informational entities" have to be taken as model systems,
and then a comparative study undertaken. Now what I would ad is that a
previous new "theory of mind" has to be advanced, a little bit at least.


And Krassimir says:


What we may do is to invite everybody to present from his/her point of view
one or more (own or not) information theories. The texts we will organize in
a book for free access from all over the world.


Loet says:


The need for a general theory of information can therefore be understood
psychologically, but this is itself a special subject of possible
theorizing. J The inference to a general theory is not warranted by this
(empirical) philosophy of science.


I have just completed an attempt to sketch of a very general theory of
information written for a special issue of the new journal "Information"
based on the FIS 2010 Beijing conference.  In this paper I suggest that
semiotics is subsumed by information theory and that this in turn is
subsumed by thermodynamics.  Thus -- {thermodynamics {information theory
{semiotics}}}


This is based on my generalization of the Shannon definition of information,
as:

information is a reduction in uncertainty = choosing;


Bateson: information is a difference that makes a difference (to an
interpreting system)


Thermodynamic: information is any constraint on entropy production


STAN
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Re: [Fis] Discussion session on information theory (Igor's thread)

[Stanley N Salthe]

Igor said --



IG: I suggested this definition (Gurevich, 1989). “Information is
heterogeneity, stable for some definite time”. Regardless of the nature of
heterogeneity, would be it letters, words, phrases or - elementary
particles, atoms, molecules, or - people, groups, societies, etc.



Gurevich I.M. (1989). Law of informatics - a basis of researches and
designing of complex communication and management systems. (In Russian).
«Ecos». Moscow 60 p.


SS: I would point out that this is, rather, information carrying capacity.
 Information results from its reduction.


STAN

On Sat, Apr 23, 2011 at 1:34 AM, joe.bren...@bluewin.ch <
joe.bren...@bluewin.ch> wrote:

> Dear Igor, Dear Pedro and Colleagues,
>
>
>
> When someone has spent as much time and effort as Igor has on developing
> and presenting a concept of information, the least one can do is study and
> comment on it carefully. Now, I happen to disagree with Igor on some pretty
> fundamental issues, but I believe my critique, and the response from him I
> hope we will all see, may suggest new ways of approaching our favorite
> topic. I take as references both his long note of 20 December 2010, to which
> Pedro referred, and his summary of it 19 April 2011.
>
>
>
> 1. General Remark
>
> The key ontological property for Igor is identity: he thinks
> that a “Science of Information” must use a single, unified unique definition
> of information. On the other hand “information is a continuous evolving
> process” that exists in both simple and complex forms. It is not clear why,
> except from a kind of habit, one needs to have a single, static definition
> for an evolving process. But, you and he will say, he states that
> information is heterogeneity! Yes, but it is heterogeneity to the exclusion
> of homogeneity, which for anything real is an abstraction. It is the
> identity of exclusion (please see next point).
>
>
>
> 2. The Definitions of Homogeneity and Heterogeneity
>
> Igor’s definitions are a restatement of the principle of
> exclusivity in standard set theory and the standard concept of similarity
> and difference. This makes his definitions of homo- and heterogeneity fully
> equivalent to elements of classical bivalent propositional logic. In my
> opinion, it is impossible for such a logic and such definitions to apply to
> information as a process, moving as it does between partially homogeneous
> and heterogeneous elements.
>
>
>
> 3. Information-as-Heterogeneity
>
> Igor states that his definition of
> information-as-heterogeneity, stable for a finite time, “can describe
> information (heterogeneity) of any nature”. This statement perhaps
> anticipates the subsequent discussion, but it is not clear as it stands. In
> the complete note it is stated that “the measure of the degree of
> heterogeneity or information is Shannon’s information entropy *and other
> information characteristics (information divergence, joint entropy,
> communication information)*”. However, these “other information
> characteristics”, which in my view may be the most significant ones for
> further discussion, are not indicated, nor is if and how they function in
> measurement.
>
>
>
> 4. Information and Observers
>
> Igor is of course correct when he observes (sorry) that the
> advent of Observers results in new levels of complexity (or hierarchies) of
> information, limited by the informational characteristics of the “lowest
> level”, that is the physics and chemistry of our world. I also agree that it
> is most useful to see information as a universal property or process
> component of the world.
>
> However, I would like to call attention to the most
> interesting citation Igor makes in his April, 2011 note from the work of A.
> D. Ursul to the effect that “information is a variety which one object
> contains about the other (in the process of their interaction (which can
> also be self-referential))”.
>
> This for me is an essential point: we do not need to make
> absolute separations between observer and observed, Observer 1 and Observer
> 2 (both “objects” and “subjects”) and the information, in slightly different
> words, that is a product of their interaction, the interactive process. I am
> not convinced, then, that the standards and definitions of each Observer
> will be totally disjoint. Rather (with some good will), some partially if
> not completely compatible interpretations of information will be possible.
>
>
>
> 5. Perception and Thinking
>
> As a final point, I note Igor’s statement that “the concept of
> information reflects … also the *property* of perception and thinking, as
> well as the “objectively real property of inanimate and animate objects of
> nature and society”. I would argue that the use of “objectively” here
> diminishes the value of the qualitative features of information that the
> simple definition of it as heterogeneity cannot provide, but that we s

[Fis] reply to Gavin

[Stanley N Salthe]

s my last or the week:

Replying to Gavin -- I think you make the 'error of misplaced concreteness'.
 Information theory -- and all theories and laws are modeling tools, not
actual phenomena.  So, it is also true that when an apple falls it is not
being pulled by gravitation  Gravitation is our way of understanding the
falling.  We all know these things, so there is no need to point this out.


STAN


On Sat, Apr 9, 2011 at 11:45 PM, Gavin Ritz  wrote:

Ted



Thank you Mark. This promises to be interesting.


My view may best be introduced by stating that I believe we are in the

business of creating a new science that will depend on new abstractions.

These abstractions will extend from the notion of "information" as a first

class citizen, as opposed to our default, the "particle." The latter has

qualities that can be measured and in fact the very idea of metrics is bound

to this notion of thingness.


GR: I just can't see the evidence that information has anything to do with

living organisms.




Much of the dialog here works with the problem of naming what that it is.


GR: They look more like logical operators, such as Imperative logic,

declarative logic and interrogative logic.




Having said that...


> 1.Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict

distinction between information as a phenomenon and information measures as

quantitative or qualitative characteristics of information?




Thank you Mark. This promises to be interesting.


My view may best be introduced by stating that I believe we are in the
business of creating a new science that will depend on new abstractions.
These abstractions will extend from the notion of "information" as a first
class citizen, as opposed to our default, the "particle." The latter has
qualities that can be measured and in fact the very idea of metrics is bound
to this notion of thingness.


Because we will not leave existing theoretical tools behind, we need a
bridge between the abstractions of "effect" in the particle model (fields
and forces) and the corresponding "effect" in the information model. I am
fine with extending the metaphor far enough to say that we need something
like parametrics in our new science of information. But I really balk at
using the notion from one system in another without some sort of morphism.


Much of the dialog here works with the problem of naming what that it is.
Unfortunately, the abstractions of fields and forces are a very poor formal
model, because they are defined not by their essence but by their metrics.


Having said that...


> 1.Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a strict
distinction between information as a phenomenon and information measures as
quantitative or qualitative characteristics of information?


I am rather certain that there is a very real distinction, because of how we
define the problem. After all, we are not asking how do information and
information metrics fit within the confines of rather limited abstractions.
At least I am not. But the distinction does not allow for full orthogonality
from set theory (the formalism of things), because we want to be able to
model and engineer observable phenomenon in a cleaner way. This should be
the test of any serious proposal, in my view.


This requirement is why discussion on these matters often moves into
category theory, after the fashion of Barwise and others. A spanning
morphism can extend the notion of parameters to information space, but only
when considered in the situation of that origin (meaning measurable space in
the traditional sense).


> 2.Are there types or kinds of information that are not
encompassed by the general theory of information (GTI)?


I believe so. Some types clearly have laws that affect the world, which is
how you scope the types covered by GTI. But just as particle physics finds
it handy to have virtual particles and transcendent symmetries over them, so
will we have information types that do not touch the world in an observable
way; these will be required to support clean laws of behavior, yet to be
convincingly proposed.


> 3.Is it necessary/useful/reasonable to make a distinction
between information and an information carrier?


I suppose you will get universal agreement on this, at least here. But...


I was just at NIH at a rather introspective conference on structural
biology, which assumes that the form of the carriers collectively forms the
code of the system. They have dropped billions (quite literally) into
metrics associated with these laws of information form but are ready to
abandon the concept as a key technique. Clearly there is a system-level
conveyance of information that "carries" an organizational imperative. If
these can be said to be supported with the metaphoric virtual particle with
the local interaction governed by the form of the carrier, then the answer
is both yes and no.


I am intrigued by the notion introduced here r