Re: Intelligence is the ability to make deliberate free choices.
Hi Roger, On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:30, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal IMHO Intelligence is the ability to make deliberate free choices. One could lie if one chose to. I am OK with this. Löbian machines too. (Löbian machine = universal machine capable of knowing that they are universal). They can prove that if they never communicate a lie, they it is consistent that they can communicate a lie. That is basically Gödel's second incompleteness theorem, and it is a well known fact, already seen by Gödel in 1931 (but proved by Hilbert and Bernays rigorously later). To be sure, Gödel's statement was more general, but can be used to build a counter- example to your statement. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 05:24:48 Subject: Re: Positivism and intelligence On 11 Aug 2012, at 14:56, Roger wrote: Positivism seems to rule out native intelligence. I can't see how knowledge could be created on a blank slate without intelligence. OK. But with comp intelligence emerges from arithmetic, out of space and time. Or for that matter, how the incredibly unnatural structure of the carbon atom could have been created somehow somewhere by mere chance. Hmm... This can be explained by QM, which can be explained by comp and arithmetic. Fred Hoyle as I recall said that it was very unlikely that it was created by chance. All very unlikely things in my opinion show evidence of intelligence. In order to extract energy from disorder as life does shows that, like Maxwell's Demon, some intelligence is required to sort things out. Not sure what you mean by intelligence here. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/11/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-10, 14:05:31 Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated! On 8/10/2012 7:23 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: The modern positivist conception of free will has no scientific meaning. But all modern rephasings of old philosophy are degraded. Or appear so because they make clear the deficiencies of the old philosophy. Positivist philosophy pass everithing down to what-we-know-by- science of the physical level, That's not correct. Postivist philosophy was that we only know what we directly experience and scientific theories are just ways of predicting new experiences from old experiences. Things not directly experienced, like atoms, were merely fictions used for prediction. that is the only kind of substance that they admit. this what-we-know-by-science makes positivism a moving ground, a kind of dictatorial cartesian blindness which states the kind of questions one is permitted at a certain time to ask or not. Classical conceptions of free will were concerned with the option ot thinking and acting morally or not, that is to have the capability to deliberate about the god or bad that a certain act implies for oneself One deliberates about consequences and means, but how does one deliberate about what one wants? Do you deliberate about whether pleasure or pain is good? and for others, and to act for god or for bad with this knowledge. Roughly speaking, Men have such faculties unless in slavery. Animals do not. My dog doesn't think about what's good or bad for himself? I doubt that. The interesting parts are in the details of these statements. An yes, they are questions that can be expressed in more scientific terms. This can be seen in the evolutionary study of moral and law under multilevel selection theory: https://www.google.es/search?q=multilevel+selectionsugexp=chrome,mod=11sourceid=chromeie=UTF-8 which gives a positivistic support for moral, and a precise, materialistic notion of good and bad. And thus suddenly these three concepts must be sanctioned as legitimate objects of study by the positivistic dictators, without being burnt alive to social death, out of the peer-reviewed scientific magazines, where sacred words of Modernity resides. We are witnessing this devolution since slowly all the old philosophical and theological concepts will recover their legitimacy, and all their old problems will stand as problems here and now. For example, we will discover that what we call Mind is nothing but the old concepts of Soul and Spirit. After stripping soul of it's immortality and acausal relation to physics. Concerning the degraded positivistic notion of free will, I said before that under an extended notion of evolution it is nor possible to ascertain if either the matter evolved the mind or if the mind selected the matter. So it could be said that the degraded question is meaningless and of course, non interesting. But the question of their relationship is still interesting. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers inAIordescribing life
On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:47, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal You say, a non living computer can supported a living self- developing life form Do you mean support instead of supported ? Or what do you mean ? I mean support. Sorry. I meant that some fixed hardware computer can emulate a virtual self- modifying version of itself, so that your point is not valid. If not you introduce a notion of living matter leading to an infinite regression. It might have a solution, but it beg the question of comp/ non-comp, and you are just saying (without arguing) that machines cannot think, and that souls are substantial actual infinities. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 05:17:45 Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers inAIordescribing life On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:07, Roger wrote: Hi Russell Standish When I gave in to the AI point of view that computers can posess intelligence, I had overlooked the world of experience, which is not quantitative. Only living things can experience the world. You are right. But a non living computer can supported a living self- developing life form, unless you postulate that infinitely complex substances are at play in the mind. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ?
On 14 Aug 2012, at 17:59, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ? That we can think nothing that did not come through our senses, that is, from experience. But Turing machines cannot experience life. They can only experience 0s and 1s. See my preview answer on this, and Jason's comment. You are flattening the many possible hierarchies and loop possible for virtual universal entities. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 05:06:41 Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI ordescribing life On 11 Aug 2012, at 10:30, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following: The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent. The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research is about AI. What does intelligence means in this context that life is unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock. Where there is more intelligence? Bacteria are provably Turing complete, rocks are not. You might remind us what you mean by intelligent. I tend to oppose it to competence and learning. Intelligence is needed for making competence capable of growing and diversified, but competence has a negative feedback on intelligence. I use intelligence in a sense closer to free-will and consciousness than an ability to solve problems. IQ tests concerns always form of competence (very basic one: they have been invented to detect mental disability). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The intuitions of time and space
On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:06, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal As I recall, Kant did not use time and space as logical categories of thought because time and space are intuited before logic. And Leibniz similarly did not assign monads to them for similar reasons. Thus monadic space has no where or when. Just what. In some sense it would then be eternal, like heaven. Yes, that follows from the computationalist hypothesis. No problem here. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 05:15:39 Subject: Re: The persistence of intelligence On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:03, Roger wrote: Hi Evgenii Rudnyi IMHO Intelligence is part of mind, so is platonic and outside of spacetime. It was there before the universe was created, used to create the universe and now guides and moves everything that happens i9n the unverse. That's a Leibnizian conjecture. I agree with this, and can explain why space and time appears, even in a stable way, in the computations in arithmetic. Arithmetic contains a web of machines' dreams, and physical reality is a form of dream sharing made possible by non trivial computer science constraints (through self-reference). Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/11/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Evgenii Rudnyi Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 04:30:32 Subject: Re: Definitions of intelligence possibly useful to computers in AI ordescribing life On 10.08.2012 00:55 Russell Standish said the following: The point being that life need not be intelligent. In fact 999.9% of life (but whatever measure, numbers, biomass etc) is unintelligent. The study of artificial life by the same reason need not be a study of artitificial intelligence, although because of a biases as an intelligent species, a significantly higher fraction of alife research is about AI. What does intelligence means in this context that life is unintelligent? Let us compare for example a bacterium and a rock. Where there is more intelligence? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Apperception or self-awarewess
On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:11, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal For what it's worth, Leibniz differentiated between ordinary perception (which would include sentience or awareness) and self-awareness, which he called apperception. That difference is well approximated or quasi-explained by the difference between Universality, and what I call to be short Löbianity. Universal machine might be conscious, and Löbian machine are self-conscious. They have just one reflexive loop more, and it can be shown that you cannot add a nex reflexive loop to make them different. It is basically the difference between a simple first order specification of a universal machine, and the same + some induction axiom. It is the difference between Robinson Arithmetic (successor, addition + multiplication axioms and rules) and Peano Arithmetic (the same as Robinson + the shema of induction axioms). The induction axioms makes possible to the self to prove its own Löbianity, and to give to the machine a sort of maximal self- referential ability (well studied in mathematical logic, but not so much well known, apart from logicians). Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 04:15:11 Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated! On 11 Aug 2012, at 01:57, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 09:36:22AM -0700, meekerdb wrote: But a course of action could be 'selected', i.e. acted upon, without consciousness (in fact I often do so). I think what constitutes consciousness is making up a narrative about what is 'selected'. Absolutely! The evolutionary reason for making up this narrative is to enter it into memory so it can be explained to others and to yourself when you face a similar choice in the future. Maybe - I don't remember Dennett ever making that point. More importantly, its hard to see what the necessity of the narrative is for forming memories. Quite primitive organisms form memories, yet I'm sceptical they have any form of internal narrative. That the memory of these past decisions took the form of a narrative derives from the fact that we are a social species, as explained by Julian Jaynes. This explains why the narrative is sometimes false, and when the part of the brain creating the narrative doesn't have access to the part deciding, as in some split brain experiments, the narrative is just confabulated. I find Dennett's modular brain idea very plausible and it's consistent with the idea that consciousness is the function of a module that produces a narrative for memory. If were designing a robot which I intended to be conscious, that's how I would design it: With a module whose function was to produce a narrative of choices and their supporting reasons for a memory that would be accessed in support of future decisions. This then requires a certain coherence and consistency in robots decisions - what we call 'character' in a person. I don't think that would make the robot necessarily conscious according to Bruno's critereon. But if it had to function as a social being, it would need a concept of 'self' and the ability for self-reflective reasoning. Then it would be conscious according to Bruno. Brent IIRC, Dennett talks about feedback connecting isolated modules (as in talking to oneself) as being the progenitor of self-awareness (and perhaps even consciousness itself). Since this requires language, it would imply evolutionary late consciousness. I do think that self-awareness is a trick that enables efficient modelling of other members of the same species. Its the ability to put yourself in the other's shoes, and predict what they're about to do. I'm in two minds about whether one can be conscious without also being self-aware. I tend to think that consciousness is far more primitive than self- consciousness. I find plausible that a worm can experience pain, but it might not be self-aware or self-conscious. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Re: A possible solution to the incomputability of experience
Hi Roger, On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:14, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Penrose's noncomputability argument is based on Godel's theorem, which along these lines, In his first book, Penrose is simply invalid. In the second book, he corrected the error, but don't take into account. From Gödel (or Löb)'s theorem you can prove that IF we are machine (and correct) then we cannot know which machine we are. But you can't derive from Gödel that we are not machine, or that machine cannot think, or that we are superior to machines, etc. IMHO also makes rational thinking leaky. Well, just incomplete, and indeed you can use formally Gödel's theorem to show that machine looking inward develop an intuition which they cannot describe formally. But again, this shows that Gödel's theorem is a chance for mechanism, not a problem. It makes universal machine as ignorant and aware of their ignorance as us. Judson Webb wrote a nice book on that subject (and me too in french, but this my papers in english for concise yet complete description of the reasoning. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 05:20:56 Subject: Re: A possible solution to the incomputability of experience On 11 Aug 2012, at 13:22, Roger wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Personally I go with Roger Penrose and his conjecture that, as I personally understand it, conscious experience is noncomputable. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yFbrnFzUc0U Penrose is right, but with a wrong argument. The fact that consciousness is not computable, nor even definable, is a consequence of mechanism. It does not refute mechanism, it confirms it. Bruno Which is not to say that IMHO experience can be understood through Leibniz's metaphysics of substances (using category theory). IMHO, that's the only way. ? Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/11/2012 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:19, John Clark wrote: On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 6:30 AM, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: But he[me] agrees and even proposes a compatibilist definition [of free will] I'll let him speak to that, but its not the impression I get. All I said was that the only definition of free will that is not gibberish is the inability to always know what you will do next even in a unchanging environment, the meaning is clear and its not self contradictory. OK. We agree on that. I also said my definition was rarely used by anybody, is intellectually shallow, and has zero value; Not wen you succeed to formalize it. Then you can show, with computer science that notion like free-will, or consciousness, can have a role in the speeding of the evolution processes. This is done with all details in my long french text conscience mécanisme. but even so that makes it vastly superior to any other definition of that two word phrase. OK. Bruno John K Clark No, but it does need 1-randomness Imagine the iterated WM-duplication. Why would the resulting peoples have more free will than the same person not doing the experience? It seems to me that if a decision relies on a perfect coin, it is less free than if it relies on my partial self-indetermination, which itself is a deterministic process, although I cannot see it. Assuming the coin is operating inside the agent's body? Why would that be considered non-free? -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Imprisoned by language (code)
Hi Roger, On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:26, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal Well, I feel like Daniel must have felt when before the Giant. And I can't even find a rock to sling. Nevertheless, as I see it, computers are imprisoned by language (computer code). Like our social selves. But like Kierkegaard, I believe that ultimate truth is subjective (can, like meaning, only be experienced). Life cannot truly be expressed or experienced in code. No problem for comp here. We have discovered that machine, when looking inward tend to perceive, or experience many truth which are beyond words. There is a logic (S4Grz) which formalize at the meta- level that non-formalizable (at the ontological level) informal process of though. I wrote (and published) recently a paper on this, (the mystical machine, in french) but it is what I try to explain here since a long time. Machines have already a non formalizable (by themselves) intuition. Indeed self-referentally correct machine have a rich, neoplatonist-like, theology. On my url front page, you can download my paper on an arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus, made possible (and necessary in some sense) by computer science. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 05:13:01 Subject: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model On 11 Aug 2012, at 12:47, Roger wrote: Hi Alberto G. Corona Agreed. Computers are quantitative instruments and so cannot have a self or feelings, which are qualitative. And intution is non-computable IMHO. Computer have a notion of self. I can explain someday (I already have, and it is the base of all I am working on). Better, they can already prove that their self has a qualitative components. They can prove to herself and to us, that their qualitative self, which is the knower, is not nameable. Machines, like PA or ZF, can already prove that intuition is non-computable by themselves. You confuse the notion of machine before and after G del, I'm afraid. You might study some good book on theoretical computer science. Today we have progressed a lot in the sense that we are open to the idea that we don't know what machine are capable of, and we can prove this if we bet we are machine (comp). Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/11/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Alberto G. Corona Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 04:08:29 Subject: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ? The Dennet conception is made to avoid an agent in the first place because i so, it whould be legitimate to question what is the agent made of an thus going trough an infinite regression. The question of the agent is the vivid intuition for which there are ingenious evolutionary explanations which i may subscribe. But a robot would implement such computations and still I deeply doubt about his internal notion oof self, his quialia etc. The best response to many questions for the shake of avooiding premature dogmatic closeness is to say we don't know El 11/08/2012 07:57, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net escribi : Hi Roger, 牋 I have noticed and read your posts. Might you write some remarks about Leibniz' concept of pre-established harmony? On 8/10/2012 8:53 AM, Roger wrote: Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and neurophilosophy. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com . To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are
Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated!
On 14 Aug 2012, at 18:43, Roger wrote:
Memory may be physical, but the experience of memory is not physical.
memory is not physical. Some memories look physical in some
arithmetical situation. Keep in mind that mechanism does not allow any
notion of primitive physicalness. That's the point I proved. Some
people keep pretending seeing a flaw, but when asked, and when they
comply, they make simple error in logic, or just assert their
philosophical disbelief.
Matter is a myth. ('Matter' = primary matter).
Bruno
Roger , rclo...@verizon.net
8/14/2012
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-11, 12:00:54
Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated!
On 10 Aug 2012, at 18:18, meekerdb wrote:
On 8/10/2012 3:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
This is not obvious for me, and I have to say that it is a point
which is put in doubt by the salvia divinorum reports (including
mine). When you dissociate the brain in parts, perhaps many parts,
you realise that they might all be conscious. In fact the very
idea of non-consciousness might be a construct of consciousness,
and be realized by partial amnesia. I dunno. For the same reason I
have stopped to believe that we can be unconscious during sleep. I
think that we can only be amnesic-of-'previous-consciousness'.
I have never supposed that asleep=unconscious. When one is asleep,
one is still perceptive; just trying whispering a sleeping person's
name near them. This is quite different from being unconscious due
to a concussion.
OK.
But I think we remain conscious after concussion, except that the
first person go through amnesia or sequence of amnesia, and also
that the notion of you can momentarily change a lot, and this
followed by amnesia.
I agree that being unconscious might be a combination of loss of
all bodily control plus a loss of memory.
I am not sure. It is conceivable that we can remain conscious and
lost all memories. But I thought before that we were still obliged
to have a short term memory of the immediate conscious experience
itself, so that consciousness implies a short term memory of
elementary time events, but I am no more sure about this.
Like Brouwer I related strongly consciousness with subjective time,
but I am relinquishing that link since more recently. That's just
more doubts and foods for thought!
But that seems an unlikely coincidence. Rather it is evidence that
memory is physical
?
and that consciousness requires memory.
The conscious feeling of identity requires memory, but I am not sure
that consciousness needs more memory than the minimal number of
flip-flop needed to get a universal system, to which I begin to
think has already a disconnected form of consciousness. Again, it is
not the system itself which is conscious it is the abstract person
it represents, or can represent.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Misusing Descartes' model
On 14 Aug 2012, at 19:14, Roger wrote: Hi Jason Resch You got it right. Descartes never troubled to explain how two completely different substances-- mind and body-- could interact. And Leibniz was too hard to understand. And it was also easy to follow Newton, because bodies acted as if they transferred energy or momentum. In Descartes' model, God was external to the mind/body issue, being essentially left out. Not in the meditation. God is needed, actually the goodness of God is needed to avoid the dream argument consequence. When you feel something real, it is real, because God will not lie to you, basically. I don't follow Descartes, on this, but his text In search of the truth makes me think that Descartes was himself not quite glad with this. So using the Descartes model, God (or some Cosmic Mind), who actually did these adjustments, could be left out of the universe. And mind was then treated as material. At the time of Descartes and Leibniz, there was a fork in the road, and science took the more convenient path of Newton and Descartes (materialism), which works quite well if you gloss over the unsolved mind/body problem --- until you look for a self or a God or a Cosmic Mind. Not there, as in Dennet's materialism. No wonder scientists are mostly atheists, since God doesn't fit into their model of the universe. While in Leibniz, God is necessary. for the universe In my opinion, Descartes too, but was perhaps willingly unclear to avoid problems with the authorities. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 14:53:26 Subject: Re: pre-established harmony As I understand it, the燣eibniz's爎ational for advocating the pre- established harmony idea was Newton's discovery of conservation of momentum. 燚escartes knew that energy was conserved, but not momentum. 燭his would have permitted a non-physical mind to alter the trajectories of particles in the mind so long as the speed of the particles remained unchanged. 燦ewton's revelation however was that in order for the motion of one particle to be changed, another physical particle must have an equal and opposite change in momentum. 燭his does not permit a non physical force to change the motion of particles, and hence Leibniz concluded that the mental world does not affect the physical word, or vice versa. 燫ather, they were made to agree beforehand (you might think of it as a bunch of souls watching a pre-recorded movie of the physical world, but this pre-recorded movie also agrees with the intentions of the souls watching it). In Monadology, published in 1714, Leibniz wrote 揇escartes recognized that souls cannot impart any force to bodies, because there is always the same quantity of force in matter. Nevertheless he was of opinion that the soul could change the direction of bodies. But that is because in his time it was not known that there is a law of nature which affirms also the conservation of the same total direction in matter. Had Descartes noticed this he would have come upon my system of pre-established harmony.� Jason On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 6:37 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Stephen P. King � As I understand it, Leibniz's pre-established harmony is analogous to a musical score with God, or at least some super-intelligence, as composer/conductor. � This prevents all physical particles from colliding, instead they all move harmoniously together*. The score was composed before the Big Bang-- my own explanation is like Mozart God or that intelligence could hear the whole (symphony) beforehand in his head. � I suppose that this accords with Leibniz's燽elief that God, whoc is good, constructed the燽est possible world where as a miniomum, that least physics is obeyed.� Hence Voltaire's 爁oolish criticism of Leibniz in Candide that how could� the volcanic or earthquake disaster in Lisbon be part of the most perfect world ? � Thus, because physics must be obeyed, sometimes crap happens. � * As a related and possibly explanatory爌oint, L's universe completely is nonlocal. � Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/11/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 01:56:41 Subject: Re: Where's the agent ? Who or what does stuff and is aware of stuff ? Hi Roger, 牋� I have noticed and read your posts. Might you write some remarks about Leibniz' concept of pre-established harmony? On 8/10/2012 8:53 AM, Roger wrote: Hence I follow Leibniz, even though he's difficult and some say contradictory. That agent or soul or self you have is your monad, the only (alhough indirectly) perceiving/acting/feeling agent in all of us, but currently missing in neuroscience and neurophilosophy. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this
Re: Leibniz on the unconscious
On 14 Aug 2012, at 19:16, Roger wrote: I realize that animals can think to some extent, I am glad you say that. Bruno I was just using Leibniz' simplified model. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Jason Resch Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 18:23:30 Subject: Re: Leibniz on the unconscious On Sat, Aug 11, 2012 at 5:14 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 8/11/2012 5:13 AM, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb � Leibniz seems to be the first philosopher (and one of the few)爐o discuss the unconscious, which was necessary, since like God (or some Cosmic intelligence), it is燼n integral part of his metaphysical system.� � In Leibniz's metaphysics, the lowest or bare naked monads (as in rocks)燼re unconscious bodies. Leibniz ways that they are very drowsy or asleep. They lie in darkness. � Animals can feel but not think. And your evidence for this is? Here is some disproof: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OYZnsO2ZgWo Jason � -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Positivism and intelligence
On 14 Aug 2012, at 19:46, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb You're right, random shapes do not show evidence of intelligence. But the carbon atom, being highly unlikely, does. This is amazing. Carbon is a natural product (solution of QM) by stars. All atoms are well explained and predictable by QM, itself predictable (normally, with comp) by arithmetic. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: meekerdb Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 18:20:16 Subject: Re: Positivism and intelligence On 8/11/2012 5:56 AM, Roger wrote: Positivism seems to rule out native intelligence. I can't see how knowledge could be created on a blank slate without intelligence. Or for that matter, how the incredibly unnatural structure of the carbon atom could have been created somehow somewhere by mere chance. Fred Hoyle as I recall said that it was very unlikely that it was created by chance. All very unlikely things in my opinion show evidence of intelligence. How likely is the shape of Japan? In order to extract energy from disorder as life does shows that, like Maxwell's Demon, some intelligence is required to sort things out. Life extracts energy by increasing disorder. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why AI is impossible
On 14 Aug 2012, at 20:16, William R. Buckley wrote: John: Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus universality, the Turing machine can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue of its construction. It is deeper than that. It is in virtue of the fact that the set of computable functions, unlike all other sets in math, is closed for the diagonalization, and the price for this is incompleteness. It is not trivial, and makes computational universality rather exceptional and unexpected. The discovery of the universal machine is a very big discovery, of the type: it changes everything we knew. I think. For beliefs, knowledge, proofs, definability, etc. This never happens, and the corresponding formal systems can always been extended. Bruno wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com ] On Behalf Of John Clark Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 9:39 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:09 PM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.com wrote: Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient[...] Turing's entire reason for inventing what we now call a Turing Machine was to prove that computational omniscience is NOT possible. He rigorously proved that no Turing Machine, that is to say no computer, can determine in advance if any given computer program will eventually stop. For example, it would be very easy to write a program to look for the first even number greater than 2 that is not the sum of two prime numbers and then stop. But will the machine ever stop? The Turing Machine doesn't know, I don't know, you don't know, nobody knows. Maybe it will stop in the next 5 seconds, maybe it will stop in 5 billion years, maybe it will never stop. If you want to know what the machine will do you just have to watch it and see, and even the machine doesn't know what it will do until it does it. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Leibniz on the unconscious
On 14 Aug 2012, at 20:28, meekerdb wrote: On 8/14/2012 10:42 AM, Roger wrote: Hi meekerdb Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. And I'd say why can't everything just function by itself? If God is just a placeholder word for whatever it is that makes things work it doesn't add much. No, but it is shorter. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Gödel on the Foundations of Mathematics
After browsing Leibnitz' Monadology (Roger, thanks for the link), I have checked what else is available on marxists.org. It happens that marxists have quite a nice library available. I have even found an interesting paper of Gödel. There he claims that Husserl will help us to find out what mathematics is. Evgenii Kurt Gödel (1961) The modern development of the foundations of mathematics in the light of philosophy http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/at/godel.htm In what manner, however, is it possible to extend our knowledge of these abstract concepts, i.e., to make these concepts themselves precise and to gain comprehensive and secure insight into the fundamental relations that subsist among them, i.e., into the axioms that hold for them? Obviously not, or in any case not exclusively, by trying to give explicit definitions for concepts and proofs for axioms, since for that one obviously needs other undefinable abstract concepts and axioms holding for them. Otherwise one would have nothing from which one could define or prove. The procedure must thus consist, at least to a large extent, in a clarification of meaning that does not consist in giving definitions. Now in fact, there exists today the beginning of a science which claims to possess a systematic method for such a clarification of meaning, and that is the phenomenology founded by Husserl. Here clarification of meaning consists in focusing more sharply on the concepts concerned by directing our attention in a certain way, namely, onto our own acts in the use of these concepts, onto our powers in carrying out our acts, etc. But one must keep clearly in mind that this phenomenology is not a science in the same sense as the other sciences. Rather it is or in any case should be a procedure or technique that should produce in us a new state of consciousness in which we describe in detail the basic concepts we use in our thought, or grasp other basic concepts hitherto unknown to us. I believe there is no reason at all to reject such a procedure at the outset as hopeless. Empiricists, of course, have the least reason of all to do so, for that would mean that their empiricism is, in truth, an apriorism with its sign reversed. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Reconciling Bruno's Primitives with Multisense
Hi Bruno,
I was thinking about your primitive of arithmetic truth (numbers, 0, +, and
*, right?) and then your concept of 'the dreams of numbers', interviewing
Lobian Machines, etc and came up with this.
One single irreducible digit ॐ which represents a self-dividing continuum
of infinite perpendicular dialectics between eidetic dream states (in which
dream~numbers escape their numerical identities as immersive qualitative
experiences) and entopic non-dream states (in which number~dreams escape
their dream nature as literal algebra-geometries).
This continuum f(ॐ), runs from infinitely solipsistic/private first person
subjectivity (calling that Aleph *ℵ*)* *to infinitely discrete/public third
person mechanism (calling that Omega *Ω*), so that at *ℵ*,any given dream
is experienced as 99.99...9% dream and 0.00...1% number and at *Ω*, any
given machine or number is presented as 99.99...9% number and 0.00...1%
dream.
The halfway point between the *ℵ *and* **Ω* axis is the perpendicular axis
f(-ॐ) which is the high and low correspondence between the literal dream
and figurative number (or figurative dream and literal number depending on
whether you are using the dream-facing epistemology or the number-facing
epistemology). This axis runs from tight equivalence (=) to broadly
elliptical potential set membership (...)
So it looks something like this:
f(ॐ) ⊇ *{ℵ** ...** ⊥** =** Ω**}*
To go further, it could be said that at *Ω*(Omega), ॐ (Om) expresses as *
10|O* (one, zero, line segment, circle referring to the quantitative
algebraic and geometric perpendicular primitives) while at *ℵ* (Aleph),
ॐ(Om) expresses as
יהוה (tetragrammaton or yod, hay, vov, hay, or in perhaps more familiar
metaphor, ♣**♠♥**♦(clubs, spades, hearts, diamonds)
where:
♣ clubs (wands) =Fire, spiritual, tactile
♠ spades (swords) = Air, mental, auditory
♥ hearts (cups) =Water, emotional, visual
♦ diamonds (pentacles/coins) = Earth, physical, olfactory-gustatory
Note that tactile and auditory modalities tune us into ourselves and each
others sensemaking (selves and minds), while the visual and
olfactory/gustatory sense modalities are about objectifying realism of the
world (egos or objectified selves/self-images and bodies). It should be
obvious that ♣ clubs (wands) and ♠ spades (swords) are stereotypically
masculine and abstracting forces, while ♥ hearts (cups) and ♦ diamonds
(pentacles/coins) are stereotypically feminine objectified fields.
Sorry for the mumbo jumbo, but it is the only way to be non-reductive when
approaching the qualitative side. We can't pretend to talk about the
eidetic, dream like perpendicular of number logic while using the purely
empirical terms of arithmetic reduction. We need symbols that can only
refer to named qualities rather than enumerated quantities.
Let the ignoring and insulting begin!
Craig
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Re: Reconciling Bruno's Primitives with Multisense
in case the special characters don't come out...
I was thinking about your primitive of arithmetic truth (numbers, 0, +, and
*, right?) and then your concept of ‘the dreams of numbers’, interviewing
Lobian Machines, etc and came up with this.
One single irreducible digit ॐ (Om) which represents a self-dividing
continuum of infinite perpendicular dialectics between eidetic dream states
(in which dream~numbers escape their numerical identities as immersive
qualitative experiences) and entopic non-dream states (in which
number~dreams escape their dream nature as literal algebra-geometries).
This continuum f (ॐ(Om)), runs from infinitely solipsistic/private first
person subjectivity (calling that Aleph *ℵ*)to infinitely discrete/public
third person mechanism (calling that Omega *Ω*), so that at *ℵ*,any given
dream is experienced as 99.99…9% dream and 0.00…1% number and at *Ω*(Omega),
any given machine or number is presented as 99.99…9% number and
0.00…1% dream.
The halfway point between the *ℵ *(Aleph) and* Ω* (Omega) axis is the
perpendicular axis f (-ॐ(Om)) which is the high and low correspondence
between the literal dream and figurative number (or figurative dream and
literal number depending on whether you are using the dream-facing
epistemology or the number-facing epistemology). This axis runs from tight
equivalence (“=” equality) to broadly elliptical potential set membership
(“…” ellipsis)
So it looks something like this:
f(ॐ) ⊇ *{ℵ** “…**” ⊥** “=**” Ω**}*
function (Om) is superset or equal to the continuum ranging from Aleph to
ellipsis perpendicular/orthogonal to the inverse range from equality to
Omega).
To go further, it could be said that at *Ω*(Omega), ॐ (Om) expresses as *
10|O* (one, zero, line segment, circle referring to the quantitative
algebraic and geometric perpendicular primitives) while at *ℵ* (Aleph), ॐ
(Om) expresses as
יהוה (tetragrammaton or yod, hay, vov, hay, or in perhaps more familiar
metaphor, ♣♠♥♦(clubs, spades, hearts, diamonds)
where:
♣ clubs (wands) =Fire, spiritual, tactile
♠ spades (swords) = Air, mental, auditory
♥ hearts (cups) =Water, emotional, visual
♦ diamonds (pentacles/coins) = Earth, physical, olfactory-gustatory
Note that tactile and auditory modalities tune us into ourselves and each
others sensemaking (selves and minds), while the visual and
olfactory/gustatory sense modalities are about objectifying realism of the
world (egos or objectified selves/self-images and bodies). It should be
obvious that ♣ clubs (wands) and ♠ spades (swords) are stereotypically
masculine and abstracting forces, while ♥ hearts (cups) and ♦ diamonds
(pentacles/coins) are stereotypically feminine objectified fields.
Sorry for the mumbo jumbo, but it is the only way to be non-reductive when
approaching the qualitative side. We can’t pretend to talk about the
eidetic, dream like perpendicular of number logic while using the purely
empirical terms of arithmetic reduction. We need symbols that can only
refer to named qualities rather than enumerated quantities.
Let the ignoring and insulting begin!
--
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Re: pre-established harmony
On 14 Aug 2012, at 20:55, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/14/2012 6:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Aug 2012, at 07:26, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/13/2012 9:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 12 Aug 2012, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote: snip Does the measure cover an infinite or finite subset of the universals? [BM] It covers the whole UD* (the entire execution of the UD, contained in a tiny constructive part of arithmetical truth). It is infinite. This follows easily from the first person indeterminacy invariance (cf step seven). Dear Bruno, Please think about what I am writing here. My words might be wrong, but please try to understand what I am saying. I am. OK, the UD* would span all of time (the partly ordered sequence of events that are 1p content) is implied by that tiny constructable part of arithmetically true statements (not truth! Truth is not an object that is accessible nor should be considered or inferred or implied to be). This makes the UD* an eternal process that can be considered to by operating the combinators (or numbers to state is crudely) over and over and over again in a concurrent fashion. The 1p indeterminacy emerges from the span of this process, the UD*. We cannot consistently argue that it is not available in its entirety for any one piece of the UD for the purpose of assigning truth valuations, unless we are going consider the medium on which the UD is running is co-existent with the UD. OK. The ontological primary medium is given by any universal system. I have chosen arithmetic to fix the thing. This is exactly why I argue that a physical world (that is a common delusion of a mutually non-contradictory collection of 1p's) is and must be considered to be on the same ontological plane as the combinators. That does not make any sense to me. Since the physical worlds cannot be considered to be ontologically primitive (since they require the UD*) then neither can the combinators, as they have no distinguishably (or availability for truth valuations), be considered to be ontologically primitive. If you don't have them, you can't build them. I will use the abbreviation 'numbers for numbers OR combinators or Fortran program or lambda terms or game of life pattern or ... What I say is that without 'numbers, youwill never have 'numbers. We cannot define 'numbers from less. Both have to be considered as existing on the same ontological level. Your proposition that we can have a consistent immaterial basis for all existence is simply inconsistent and thus wrong. You have to show the inconsistency. Does the subset have to be representable as a Boolean algebra? [BM] This is ambiguous. I would say yes if by subset you mean the initial segment of UD*. We can only make a claim that the sentence that is making that claim is true if and only if that subset can be identified in contradistinction with the rest of the UD*. This is equivalent to locating a single number within an infinite class of numbers. Given that it is a fact that the integers have a measure of zero in 2^aleph_0, There is no additive measure. If you are using a non additive measure, then it depends on the choice of the measure, there are many. Anyway, comp makes the measure problem bearing on infinite computations, some including oracles, not the numbers. then it follows that the initial segment of the UD* has a measure of zero as well. A measure simply does not exist that would select the correct segment and thus we cannot make that claim. It is only as you wrote initially, this is ambiguous. An ambiguous sentence is not the same as a true (or false!) statement. My claim is that the Boolean Representation criterion is true if and only if there exist a physical implementation of the segment of the UD*. Define physical implementation in your theory (or idea). A physical state might be one that maximally exists [BM] ... from the local first person points of view, of those dropping the apple and trying to predict what they will feel. But there is no physical state, only physical experience, which are not definable in any third person point of view. A physical state, with comp, is not an object. There is no 3p unless there is a Boolean Representation This not logically valid, although I agree, with the usual classical comp. and there cannot be a Boolean Representation without a collection of mutually non-contradictory 1p observations. Now, that is idealism. With comp that is true for the physical reality, not for the arithmetical one, which we postulate. The 1p indeterminacy must have room to put all of the copies out first and then compared to each other (solving the NP-Complete problem) I just feel compassionate for your misleading obsession on NP. and then and only then can we say that there is a true
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 01:01:10PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Aug 2012, at 12:30, Russell Standish wrote: Assuming the coin is operating inside the agent's body? Why would that be considered non-free? In what sense would the choice be mine if it is random? It is mine if the random generator is part of me. It is not mine if the generator is outside of me (eg flipping the coin). It is like letting someone else take the decision for you. I really don't see how randomness is related to with free will (the compatibilist one). Compatibilism, ISTM, is the solution to a non-problem: How to reconcile free will with a deterministic universe. It is a non-problem, because the universe is not deterministic. (The multiverse is deterministic, of course, but that's another story). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why AI is impossible
On 15 Aug 2012, at 04:22, William R. Buckley wrote: Dear Russell: When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice. See my paper planaria, amoeba and dreaming machine (in the publication part in my url). Reproduction regeneration and embryogenesis are easily solved through a theorem due to Kleene in theoretical computer science. They have all be implemented, so it is also practical computer science. As I said: the notion of self is where computer science is at its best. I can sketch the main idea, if you desire. Bruno wrb -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish Sent: Tuesday, August 14, 2012 4:11 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 11:16:47AM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote: John: Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience versus universality, the Turing machine can compute all computable computations, and this simply by virtue of its construction. wrb John is right - omniscience is a different concept to universality. For the sake of clearer conversation, it is better to keep that in mind, rather than arbitrarily redefining words Humpty Dumpty like. Of course, if there is no accepted definition for a concept, it is OK to propose another one. But please restrict it to concepts that are logically sound, and be prepared to drop your own definition if a better one comes along. Cheers -- --- - Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au --- - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why AI is impossible
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:22:21PM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote: Dear Russell: When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice. wrb I'm not entirely sure what you mean, but do Langton loops count? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langton's_loops Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On 15 Aug 2012, at 10:12, Russell Standish wrote: On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 01:01:10PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Aug 2012, at 12:30, Russell Standish wrote: Assuming the coin is operating inside the agent's body? Why would that be considered non-free? In what sense would the choice be mine if it is random? It is mine if the random generator is part of me. It is not mine if the generator is outside of me (eg flipping the coin). I don't see this. Why would the generator being part of you make it your choice? You might define me and part of me before. It is not clear if you are using the usual computer science notion of me, or not, but I would say that if the root of the choice is a random oracle, then the random oracle makes the choice for me. It does not matter if the coin is in or outside my brain, which is a local non absolute notion. It is like letting someone else take the decision for you. I really don't see how randomness is related to with free will (the compatibilist one). Compatibilism, ISTM, is the solution to a non-problem: How to reconcile free will with a deterministic universe. The very idea that we have to reconcile free-will with determinism seems to be a red herring to me. It is a non-problem, because the universe is not deterministic. (The multiverse is deterministic, of course, but that's another story). But then you have to reconcile free-will with indeterminacy, and that makes not much sense. I don't think free-will (as I defined it of course) has anything to do with determinacy or indeterminacy. The fact that someone else can predict my behavior does not make it less free. You did not reply my question: take the iterated WM-self-duplication. All the resulting people lives the experience of an random oracle. Why would they be more free than someone outside the duplication boxes? How could they use that random oracle for being more free than someone not using them, as they cannot select the outcome? It looks like you do defend the old notion of free will, which basically assume non-comp. Using first person indeterminacy can't help, imo, but if you have an idea you can elaborate. Bruno Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything- l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
the tribal self
Hi Bruno Marchal I disagree about the self not being a social contruct. It must at least be partly so, for to my mind, the self is your memory, and that includes to some extent the world. And the self includes what your think your role is. At home a policeman may just be a father, but when he puts on his uniform and stops a car for speeding, he's a different person. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 11:03:48 Subject: Re: on tribes On 14 Aug 2012, at 14:42, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think that your soul is your identity in the form of point of view. I agree. I use almost that exact definition. As we grow up we begin to define or find ourselves not out of any great insight but pragmatically, out of choosing what tribe we belong to. We define ourselves socially and culturally. We wear their indian feathers or display their tattoes and are only friendly to our own tribe or gang. So a liberal won't listen to a conservative and vice versa. It greatly simplifies thinking and speaking, and is a dispeller of doubt and tells us with some apparent certainty on who we are. OK, but that is not the root of the first person self, which can still exist even when completely amnesic. If not you make the first person I a social construct, which it is not. Bruno So Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-12, 10:47:23 Subject: Re: the unitary mind vs the modular brain On 12 Aug 2012, at 14:28, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal As before, there is the natural, undeniable dualism between brain and mind: brain objective and modular mind subjective and unitary OK. You can even say: brain/body: objective and doubtable soul/consciousness: subjective and undoubtable The brain can be discussed, the mind can only be experienced. Exactly. I would say the soul, as the mind can be discussed in theories, but the soul is much more complex. We can discuss it through strong assumption like mechanism. I believe that the only subjective and unitary item in the universe is the monad. It is the eye of the universe, although for us we can only perceive indirectly. I am open to this. The monad would be the center of the wheel, or the fixed point of the doubting consciousness. The machines already agree with you on this : ) (to prove this you need to accept the most classical axiomatic (modal) definition of belief, knowledge, etc.) See my paper here for an introduction to the theology of the ideally correct machine: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/12/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-11, 09:52:29 Subject: Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated! On 10 Aug 2012, at 14:04, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 12:10:43PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Aug 2012, at 00:23, Russell Standish wrote: It is plain to me that thoughts can be either conscious or unconscious, and the conscious component is a strict minority of the total. This is not obvious for me, and I have to say that it is a point which is put in doubt by the salvia divinorum reports (including mine). When you dissociate the brain in parts, perhaps many parts, you realise that they might all be conscious. In fact the very idea of non-consciousness might be a construct of consciousness, and be realized by partial amnesia. I dunno. For the same reason I have stopped to believe that we can be unconscious during sleep. I think that we can only be amnesic-of-'previous-consciousness'. With due respect to your salvia experiences, which I dare not follow, I'm still more presuaded by the likes of Daniel Dennett, and his pandemonia theory of the mind. In that idea, many subconscious process, working disparately, solve different aspects of the problems at hand, or provide different courses of action. The purpose of consciousness is to select from among the course of action presented by the pandemonium of subconscious processes - admittedly consciousness per se may not be necessary for this role - any unifying (aka reductive) process may be sufficient. The reason I like this, is that it echoes an essentially Darwinian process of random variation that is selected upon. Dawinian evolution is the key to any form of creative process. The brain parts I was talking about must be enough big and integrated, like an half hemisphere, or the limbic system, etc. What I said should not contradict Daniel Dennett pandemonia or Fodor modularity theory, which are very natural in a computationalist
Homunculi
Hi Bruno Marchal The materialists don't seem to have a very specific idea of what governs us (the self) and its actual (live) governing. The self is something like a homunculus, which as Dennet correctly remarks, leads to an infinite regress in materialism. But there's no such problem with the monad, which is nonmaterial, nonphysical. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 11:01:03 Subject: Re: Peirce on subjectivity On 14 Aug 2012, at 14:00, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm way out of touch here. What is comp ? Roughly speaking comp is the idea that we can survive with a computer for a brain, like we already believe that we can survive with a pump in place of a heart. This is the position of the materialist, but comp actally contradicts the very notion of matter, or primitive ontological matter. That is not entirely obvious. I don't think you can have a symbolic theory of subjectivity, for theories are contructed in symbols, and subjectivity is awareness of the symbols and hopefully what they mean. We can use symbols to refer to existing non symbolic object. We don't confuse them. CS Peirce differentiates the triadic connections between symbol and object and awareness in his theory of categories: FIRSTNESS (perceiving an object privately) -- raw experience of an apple SECONDNESS (comparing inner and outer worlds) - looking up the proper word symbol for the image in your memory [Comparing is the basis of thinking.] THIRDNESS: (doing or expressing publicly in words) - saying That's an apple. No problem. Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-13, 11:53:51 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible Hi Jason, On 13 Aug 2012, at 17:04, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Aug 13, 2012 at 8:08 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: William, On 12 Aug 2012, at 18:01, William R. Buckley wrote: The physical universe is purely subjective. That follows from comp in a constructive way, that is, by giving the means to derive physics from a theory of subejectivity. With comp any first order logical theory of a universal system will do, and the laws of physics and the laws of mind are not dependent of the choice of the initial universal system. Bruno, Does the universal system change the measure of different programs and observers, or do programs that implement programs (such as the UDA) end up making the initial choice of system of no consequence? The choice of the initial universal system does not matter. Of course it does matter epistemologically. If you choose a quantum computing system as initial system, the derivation of the physical laws will be confusing, and you will have an hard time to convince people that you have derived the quantum from comp, as you will have seemed to introduce it at the start. So it is better to start with the less looking physical initial system, and it is preferable to start from one very well know, like number + addition and multiplication. So, let us take it to fix the thing. The theory of everything is then given by the minimal number of axioms we need to recover Turing universality. Amazingly enough the two following axioms are already enough, where the variable are quantified universally. I assume also some equality rules, but not logic! x + 0 = x x + s(y) = s(x + y) x * 0 = 0 x*s(y) = (x *y) + x This define already a realm in which all universal number exists, and all their behavior is accessible from that simple theory: it is sigma_1 complete, that is the arithmetical version of Turing-complete. Note that such a theory is very weak, it has no negation, and cannot prove that 0 ? 1, for example. Of course, it is consistent and can't prove that 0 = 1 either. yet it emulates a UD through the fact that all the numbers representing proofs can be proved to exist in that theory. Now, in that realm, due to the first person indeterminacy, you are multiplied into infinity. More precisely, your actual relative computational state appears to be proved to exist relatively to basically all universal numbers (and some non universal numbers too), and this infinitely often. So when you decide to do an experience of physics, dropping an apple, for example, the first person indeterminacy dictates that what you will feel to be experienced is given by a statistic on all computations (provably existing in the theory above) defined with respect to all universal numbers. So if comp is correct, and if some physical law is correct (like 'dropped apples fall'), it can only mean that the vast majority of computation going in your actual comp
Leibniz still lives ! Quantum monadology.
If this is a repeat, I apologize. It seems to suggest a quantum definition of self which I may not entirely be in agreement with, unless life is a quantum phenomenon. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12648850 Biosystems. 2003 Apr;69(1):27-38. Quantum monadology: a consistent world model for consciousness and physics. Nakagomi T. Source Department of Information Science, Kochi University, Kochi 780-8520, Japan. nakag...@is.kochi-u.ac.jp Abstract The NL world model presented in the previous paper is embodied by use of relativistic quantum mechanics, which reveals the significance of the reduction of quantum states and the relativity principle, and locates consciousness and the concept of flowing time consistently in physics. This model provides a consistent framework to solve apparent incompatibilities between consciousness (as our interior experience) and matter (as described by quantum mechanics and relativity theory). Does matter have an inside? What is the flowing time now? Does physics allow the indeterminism by volition? The problem of quantum measurement is also resolved in this model. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Why AI is impossible
Hi Bruno Marchal This is hard to put into words. No offense, and I may be wrong, but you seem to speak of the world and mind as objects. But like a coin, I believe they have a flip side, the world and mind as we live them, not as objects but as subjects. Entirely different worlds. It is as if you talk about swimming in the water without actually diving in. Or treating a meal as that which is on the menu, but not actually eating it. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 05:38:31 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible Hi William, On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote: Bruno: From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe seems rather obvious. I don't think anything is obvious here. What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are dreaming? What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind? Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with omniscience, even restricted to number relations. Computational universality entails the impossibility of omniscience. solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why, Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable computations. ? Somehow, where information is concerned, context is king. I agree with this. I would say that information is really context selection. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Dasein
Bruno, Heidegger tried to express the point I tried to make below by using the word dasein. Being there . Not merely describing a topic or item, but seeing the world from its point of view. Being inside it. Being there. Hi Bruno Marchal This is hard to put into words. No offense, and I may be wrong, but you seem to speak of the world and mind as objects. But like a coin, I believe they have a flip side, the world and mind as we live them, not as objects but as subjects. Entirely different worlds. It is as if you talk about swimming in the water without actually diving in. Or treating a meal as that which is on the menu, but not actually eating it. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-14, 05:38:31 Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible Hi William, On 14 Aug 2012, at 02:09, William R. Buckley wrote: Bruno: From the perspective of semiotic theory, a subjective universe seems rather obvious. I don't think anything is obvious here. What do you mean by a subjective universe? Do you mean that we are dreaming? What is your theory of dream? What is your theory of mind? Consider that the Turing machine is computational omniscient I guess you mean universal. But universality is incompatible with omniscience, even restricted to number relations. Computational universality entails the impossibility of omniscience. solely as a consequence of its construction, and yet, it can hardly be said that the engineer who designed the Turing machine (why, Turing, himself!) intentioned to put into that machine as computable computations. ? Somehow, where information is concerned, context is king. I agree with this. I would say that information is really context selection. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
equivalence between math and computations
I ´m seduced and intrigued by the Bruno´s final conclussións of the COMP hypothesis. But I had a certain disconfort with the idea of a simulation of the reality by means of an algorithm for reasons I will describe later. I found that either if the nature of our perception of reality) can be of the thesis of a simulation at a certain level of substitution of a phisical or mathematical reality, this simulation is, and only is, a discrete manifold, with discreteness defined by the substitution level, which is a subset of a continuous manifold that is the equation M of superstring theory of wathever mathematical structure that describe the universe. The equivalence may be shown as follows: A imperative computation is equivalent to a mathematical structure thanks to the work on denotational semantics http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Denotational_semanticsand the application of category theory to it https://www.google.es/search?q=denotational+semantics+imperative+monadssugexp=chrome,mod=11sourceid=chromeie=UTF-8#hl=ensugexp=efrshgs_nf=1tok=VMyaXoMGarRPPBvFsyx1Cgpq=denotational%20semantics%20imperative%20monadscp=49gs_id=1qxhr=tq=denotational+semantics+imperative+category+theorypf=psafe=offsclient=psy-aboq=denotational+semantics+imperative+category+theorygs_l=pbx=1bav=on.2,or.r_gc.r_pw.r_cp.r_qf.fp=4beb944d59246923biw=1092bih=514 . Suppose that we know the M theory equation. A particular simulation can be obtained in a straighfordward way by means of an algorithm that compute a sequence of positions and the respective values in the M equation (which must specify wether there is a particle, its nature and state at this point or more precisely the value of the wave equation at this N-position or wathever are the relevant parameters at this level of substitution), perhaps the sucession of points can be let´s say in a progression of concentric n-dimensional circles around the singularity. this algoritm is equivalent to the ordered set obtained by the combination of two kind of functions (1) for obtaining sucessive N-dimensional positions and (2) the function M(pos) itself for that particular point. The simulation then is a mathematical structure composed by the ordered set of these points, which is a subset of the manifold described by the M equation. (When a computation is pure, like this, the arrows between categories are functions). Suppose that we do not know the equation fo the M theory, and maybe it does not exist, but COMP holds and we start with the dovetailer algoritm at a fortunate substitution level. Then we are sure that a complete mathematical description of reality exist (perhaps not the more concrete for our local universe), since the imperative algoritm can be (tanks to denotational semantics) described in terms of category theory. In any case, I believe, similar conclussion holds. Although in the consequence of machine psychology in the case of COMP, the mind imposes a fortunate and robust algoritm as description of our local universe, and in the case of a mathematical universe this requirement is substituted by a fortunate and coherent mathematical structure. Anyhow, both are equivalent since one implies the other. Both of them reject phisicalism and the mind stablish requirement for the nature of what we call Physics. Perhaps one may be more general, and the other may bring more details A question open is the nature of time and the progression of the simulation of the points. Theoretically, for obtaining a subset of the points of a mathematical structure, the simulation can proceed in any direction, independent on the gradient of entropy. It can proceed backwards or laterally, since the value of a ndimensional point does not depend on any other point, if we have the M equation. Moreover, time is local, there is no meaning of absolute time for the universe, so the simulation can not progress with a uniform notion of time. A local portion of the universe does make sense to have an uniform time, but the level of substitution necessary may force the locality of time to be very small. At the limit, the simulation may be forced to be massively parallel with as many local times as particles, and the model becomes the one of a self computing universe. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: the tribal self
Social construction of the self is incompatible with natural selection. 2012/8/15 Roger rclo...@verizon.net Hi Bruno Marchal I disagree about the self not being a social contruct. It must at least be partly so, for to my mind, the self is your memory, and that includes to some extent the world. And the self includes what your think your role is. At home a policeman may just be a father, but when he puts on his uniform and stops a car for speeding, he's a different person. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/15/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - *From:* Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-14, 11:03:48 *Subject:* Re: on tribes On 14 Aug 2012, at 14:42, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I think that your soul is your identity in the form of point of view. I agree. I use almost that exact definition. As we grow up we begin to define or find ourselves not out of any great insight but pragmatically, out of choosing what tribe we belong to. We define ourselves socially and culturally. We wear their indian feathers or display their tattoes and are only friendly to our own tribe or gang. So a liberal won't listen to a conservative and vice versa. It greatly simplifies thinking and speaking, and is a dispeller of doubt and tells us with some apparent certainty on who we are. OK, but that is not the root of the first person self, which can still exist even when completely amnesic. If not you make the first person I a social construct, which it is not. Bruno So Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/14/2012 - Receiving the following content - *From:* Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-12, 10:47:23 *Subject:* Re: the unitary mind vs the modular brain On 12 Aug 2012, at 14:28, Roger wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal As before, there is the natural, undeniable dualism between brain and mind: brain objective and modular mind subjective and unitary OK. You can even say: brain/body: objective and doubtable soul/consciousness: subjective and undoubtable The brain can be discussed, the mind can only be experienced. Exactly. I would say the soul, as the mind can be discussed in theories, but the soul is much more complex. We can discuss it through strong assumption like mechanism. I believe that the only subjective and unitary item in the universe is the monad. It is the eye of the universe, although for us we can only perceive indirectly. I am open to this. The monad would be the center of the wheel, or the fixed point of the doubting consciousness. The machines already agree with you on this : ) (to prove this you need to accept the most classical axiomatic (modal) definition of belief, knowledge, etc.) See my paper here for an introduction to the theology of the ideally correct machine: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Bruno Roger , rclo...@verizon.net 8/12/2012 - Receiving the following content - *From:* Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be *Receiver:* everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com *Time:* 2012-08-11, 09:52:29 *Subject:* Re: Libet's experimental result re-evaluated! On 10 Aug 2012, at 14:04, Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Aug 10, 2012 at 12:10:43PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Aug 2012, at 00:23, Russell Standish wrote: It is plain to me that thoughts can be either conscious or unconscious, and the conscious component is a strict minority of the total. This is not obvious for me, and I have to say that it is a point which is put in doubt by the salvia divinorum reports (including mine). When you dissociate the brain in parts, perhaps many parts, you realise that they might all be conscious. In fact the very idea of non-consciousness might be a construct of consciousness, and be realized by partial amnesia. I dunno. For the same reason I have stopped to believe that we can be unconscious during sleep. I think that we can only be amnesic-of-'previous-consciousness'. With due respect to your salvia experiences, which I dare not follow, I'm still more presuaded by the likes of Daniel Dennett, and his pandemonia theory of the mind. In that idea, many subconscious process, working disparately, solve different aspects of the problems at hand, or provide different courses of action. The purpose of consciousness is to select from among the course of action presented by the pandemonium of subconscious processes - admittedly consciousness per se may not be necessary for this role - any unifying (aka reductive) process may be sufficient. The reason I like this, is that it echoes an essentially Darwinian process of random variation that
RE: Why AI is impossible
No, Langton's loops do not count. Nor do any published cellular automaton. Read these papers: Computational Ontogeny, already published in Biological Theory and Constructor Ontogeny, accepted for full presentation at ECTA-2012. Send your email address and I will forward these papers. wrb -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 3:09 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:22:21PM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote: Dear Russell: When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice. wrb I'm not entirely sure what you mean, but do Langton loops count? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langton's_loops Cheers -- --- - Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au --- - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why AI is impossible
On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 8:24 AM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.comwrote: No, Langton's loops do not count. Nor do any published cellular automaton. William, Do these count: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann_universal_constructor ? Read these papers: Computational Ontogeny, already published in Biological Theory and Constructor Ontogeny, accepted for full presentation at ECTA-2012. Send your email address and I will forward these papers. I am interested in seeing these papers. If you don't use e-mail to interact with this list, you can go to the google group's page to get any poster's e-mail address. It has some anti-spam protection which is slightly safer than posting one's e-mail address directly to this list. Jason wrb -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 3:09 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:22:21PM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote: Dear Russell: When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice. wrb I'm not entirely sure what you mean, but do Langton loops count? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langton's_loops Cheers -- --- - Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au --- - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why AI is impossible
These are quite interesting: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2YPYYvZOGlU http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=09Q5l47jTy8 http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=fvwpv=PBXO_6Jn1fs Are these not forms of life? Jason On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 9:50 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 8:24 AM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.com wrote: No, Langton's loops do not count. Nor do any published cellular automaton. William, Do these count: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann_universal_constructor ? Read these papers: Computational Ontogeny, already published in Biological Theory and Constructor Ontogeny, accepted for full presentation at ECTA-2012. Send your email address and I will forward these papers. I am interested in seeing these papers. If you don't use e-mail to interact with this list, you can go to the google group's page to get any poster's e-mail address. It has some anti-spam protection which is slightly safer than posting one's e-mail address directly to this list. Jason wrb -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 3:09 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:22:21PM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote: Dear Russell: When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice. wrb I'm not entirely sure what you mean, but do Langton loops count? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langton's_loops Cheers -- --- - Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au --- - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Why AI is impossible
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 2:16 PM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.comwrote: Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience I don't dislike the term, in fact I think I'd rather enjoy being omniscient but unfortunately I'm not. the Turing machine can compute all computable computations, Yes, and thus Turing proved that in general determining if a computer program will ever stop is not computable; all you can do is watch it and see what it does. If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if its still going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop and maybe it will not, you need to keep watching and you might need to keep watching forever. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Stephen Hawking: Philosophy is Dead
On 8/15/2012 3:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: It is mine if the random generator is part of me. It is not mine if the generator is outside of me (eg flipping the coin). I don't see this. Why would the generator being part of you make it your choice? You might define me and part of me before. It is not clear if you are using the usual computer science notion of me, or not, but I would say that if the root of the choice is a random oracle, then the random oracle makes the choice for me. It does not matter if the coin is in or outside my brain, which is a local non absolute notion. I'd say the crucial difference is whether you chose to use the random oracle (i.e. flip a coin) or you make a random decision (due to a K40 decay) without knowing it. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Is the Turing machine like a tabla rasa ?
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: What is it that Locke and Hume claimed ? Who cares? Today a bright high school physics or biology student understands far more about the inter workings of the universe than either Locke or Hume. Turing machines cannot experience life. They can only experience 0s and 1s. And you can only experience the firings of the neurons in your brain and Shakespeare only produced a sequence of ASCII characters. Do you fine anything a bit simplistic in this worldview? John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Misusing Descartes' model
On 8/15/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 Aug 2012, at 19:14, Roger wrote: Hi Jason Resch You got it right. Descartes never troubled to explain how two completely different substances-- mind and body-- could interact. And Leibniz was too hard to understand. And it was also easy to follow Newton, because bodies acted as if they transferred energy or momentum. In Descartes' model, God was external to the mind/body issue, being essentially left out. Not in the meditation. God is needed, actually the goodness of God is needed to avoid the dream argument consequence. When you feel something real, it is real, because God will not lie to you, basically. I don't follow Descartes, on this, but his text In search of the truth makes me think that Descartes was himself not quite glad with this. Dear Bruno and Roger, We can avoid the intentionally not a liar question by noticing that a physical world requires incontrovertibly (no contradictions) so that there could be persistent objects. My conjecture is that this obtain automatically if all interactions require a floor or level where all statements that might be communicated are representable by a Boolean algebra. I suspect that the substitution level of COMP is a version of this idea. So using the Descartes model, God (or some Cosmic Mind), who actually did these adjustments, could be left out of the universe. And mind was then treated as material. At the time of Descartes and Leibniz, there was a fork in the road, and science took the more convenient path of Newton and Descartes (materialism), which works quite well if you gloss over the unsolved mind/body problem --- until you look for a self or a God or a Cosmic Mind. Not there, as in Dennet's materialism. No wonder scientists are mostly atheists, since God doesn't fit into their model of the universe. While in Leibniz, God is necessary. for the universe In my opinion, Descartes too, but was perhaps willingly unclear to avoid problems with the authorities. Many writers in that epoch had to moderate their words, especially given the example that was made of Giordano Bruno http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Giordano_Bruno. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 10:29 AM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: 1) I can experiencre redness (a qualitative property) while computers cannot, Computers can distinguish between red and blue just like you can. And I know that I can but I have no direct evidence that either you or a computer can experience anything at all. all they can know are 0s and 1s. And your post was just a sequence of 0s and 1s sent to my computer, and the only relationship your parents gave you involved a rather long (about 3.2 billion) sequence of nucleotides. But one cannot tell other than by tasting it if a wine is truly a good vintage or not. Early chemists analyzes substances by tasting them, later they found safer more accurate ways of doing the same thing. A computer can't do that. Sure it can. And any creative act comes out of the blue if it is truly creative People don't fully understand how their mind works and computer's don't know if the program they're running will ever stop. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
RE: Why AI is impossible
Again, not any published cellular automaton. wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Jason Resch Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 7:51 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Wed, Aug 15, 2012 at 8:24 AM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.com wrote: No, Langton's loops do not count. Nor do any published cellular automaton. William, Do these count: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Von_Neumann_universal_constructor ? Read these papers: Computational Ontogeny, already published in Biological Theory and Constructor Ontogeny, accepted for full presentation at ECTA-2012. Send your email address and I will forward these papers. I am interested in seeing these papers. If you don't use e-mail to interact with this list, you can go to the google group's page to get any poster's e-mail address. It has some anti-spam protection which is slightly safer than posting one's e-mail address directly to this list. Jason wrb -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything- l...@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Russell Standish Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 3:09 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 07:22:21PM -0700, William R. Buckley wrote: Dear Russell: When you can design and build a machine that builds itself, not its replicant but itself, then I will heed better your advice. wrb I'm not entirely sure what you mean, but do Langton loops count? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Langton's_loops Cheers -- --- - Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au --- - -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything- list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
RE: Why AI is impossible
Let's not ignore the most important point. The machine has Turing closure solely due to the details of its construction. wrb From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Quentin Anciaux Sent: Wednesday, August 15, 2012 11:25 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Why AI is impossible 2012/8/15 John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 2:16 PM, William R. Buckley bill.buck...@gmail.com wrote: Regardless of your dislike for the term omniscience I don't dislike the term, in fact I think I'd rather enjoy being omniscient but unfortunately I'm not. the Turing machine can compute all computable computations, Yes, and thus Turing proved that in general determining if a computer program will ever stop is not computable; all you can do is watch it and see what it does. No, all you can know is that no *general* algorithm (as you pointed out) can solve that. And I have to say it again, it doesn't mean that a particular one cannot solve the halting problem for a particular algorithm. And unless you prove that that particular algorithm is undecidable, then it is still possible to find another algorithm that could decide on the halting of that algorithm. If you see it stop then obviously you know that it stopped but if its still going then you know nothing, maybe it will eventually stop and maybe it will not, you need to keep watching and you might need to keep watching forever. It's obviously not true for *a lot* of algorithm Quentin John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Severe limitations of a computer as a brain model
On Tue, Aug 14, 2012 at 4:29 PM, Roger rclo...@verizon.net wrote: And any creative act comes out of the blue if it is truly creative (new). Improved jazs would be a good example of that. I believe that John Coltrane's solos came out of the Platonic world. Roger , rclo...@verizon.net Hi Roger, Jazz players do not, with possible exception of free Jazz (and even here it is debatable), play completely out of the blue. Sure, players value the risky creative spark of playing out of the blue, but in Mike Stern's words: If you play too much like that (getting from point A to B in a song on pure intuition, purposefully disregarding some set of the Song's fixed frame of parameters; the melody, tempo, harmony, rhythm, accents, phrasing etc.), you'll sound like you don't know what you're doing. Check out the demo version of the program band in a box. Here you can set tempo, style and harmony, and the program will generate you a Bill Evans, Miles Davis, Coltrane, Herbie Hancock solo in midi commands. Of course this sounds pretty artificial as the notes are spit out as raw midi through a mediocre synthesizer in the program. But if you take those midi commands and use them as input for a rich digital sampler, programmed with thousands of notes, different articulation, phrases, and phrasing for different tempos... I think you'd be surprised at the quality. Tenor Sax is difficult to render convincingly, due to phrasing/articulation issues, and we still need a few more years and more powerful machines to do so. But Piano is much more tractable problem in this sense. Sure, I cannot convince somebody who knows Keith Jaretts improvisation of Body and Soul that our Computers improvise with such nuance yet (disregard the imagery of the video, if you want to hear the song: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fY5rzzZENsE). But Keith is standing on a few hundred years of piano tradition and improvisation, while we have been coding our computers to improvise only for the last 20 years: still, in most of computer generated sample-based music today in TV, advertising, movies etc., I'd bet the majority of casual listeners already cannot tell that the pianist or orchestra is a PC somewhere with a human operator. Not many composers are open to the public about this, but composers versed in programming low-level languages, such as MAX for example, have programmed musical environments so rich, that most of what they do, after the programming, is wait for the environment to spit out something rich/interesting to them, just tweaking this value or parameter somewhere in the environment or changing just a single input, to huge effect. Most people think a big mixing desk with a hundred channels is amazing. With enough computing power, you can chain dozens of these monsters, route them through the strangest effect algorithms, and create a sonically compelling thunderstorm out of a single kick drum sample. Old famous example, how to turn a bass drum into a thunderstorm with a few virtual mixers' sends routed into each other: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WL4MMJMXEFk So, we'll never turn the computer into Keith Jarett or John Coltrane. But its getting closer everyday. Even thunderstorms :) your computer can get pretty close to. There is so much interesting music out there being made today, even if its not publicly visible for commercial reasons. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
