Re: Bisimulation algebra
On 8/24/2012 11:33 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/24/2012 7:05 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: ...due to the law of conjugate bisimulation identity: A ~ A = A ~ B ~ C ~ B ~ A = A ~ B ~ A this is retractable path independence: path independence only over retractable paths. I don't understand this. You write A~(B~A) which implies that B~A is a system (in this case one being simulated by A). Dear Brent, The symbol ~ represent simulate, so the symbols A~(B~A) would be read as A simulating B while it is simulating A. A and B and C and D ... are universal simulators ala David Deutsch. The can run on any physical system capable of universality. But then you write A~B~A=A~A These would read as: A simulating B simulating A, which is different from A simulating B while it is simulating A, a subtle difference. The former is simultaneous while the latter is not. and also A~B~C~A =/= A~C~B~A =/= A~A This seems inconsistent, since A~B~C~A = A~D~A where D=B~C, How do you get D=B~C from? That is inconsistent with the Woolsey identity rule . For example C could be capable of simulating B in the process of it simulating A, which is different in content from C simulating A while A is simulating B. Simulators do not commute the way numbers do. BTW, a simulation relation is not necessarily an identity like =. but then A~D~A=A~A. And A~C~B~A = A~E~A where E=C~B, and then A~E~A=A~A. But then A~B~C~A = A~C~B~A. I seem to be assuming a natural ordering on the symbols A, B, C, D, etc. and a notion of being at the same level in the ordering with the (..) symbols. I should have made this clear. My apologies! Does the comment about telescope property not make sense? You drop the parentheses, implying the relation is associative, but then you treat it as though it isn't?? Not having pointed out the ordering caused a confusion. My apologies. Thank you for pointing this out! This idea still needs a lot of work, that I do admit! Brent -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bisimulation algebra
On 8/24/2012 11:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/24/2012 11:33 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/24/2012 7:05 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: ...due to the law of conjugate bisimulation identity: A ~ A = A ~ B ~ C ~ B ~ A = A ~ B ~ A this is retractable path independence: path independence only over retractable paths. I don't understand this. You write A~(B~A) which implies that B~A is a system (in this case one being simulated by A). Dear Brent, The symbol ~ represent simulate, so the symbols A~(B~A) would be read as A simulating B while it is simulating A. A and B and C and D ... are universal simulators ala David Deutsch. The can run on any physical system capable of universality. But then you write A~B~A=A~A These would read as: A simulating B simulating A, which is different from A simulating B while it is simulating A, a subtle difference. The former is simultaneous while the latter is not. The idea of simultaneity seems out of place in simulation. A simulation simulates the event relations that define time. Your distinction implies some external time that makes an essential difference within the simulation?? and also A~B~C~A =/= A~C~B~A =/= A~A This seems inconsistent, since A~B~C~A = A~D~A where D=B~C, How do you get D=B~C from? That is inconsistent with the Woolsey identity rule . It's just defining a symbol D to denote the system B~C. For example C could be capable of simulating B in the process of it simulating A, which is different in content from C simulating A while A is simulating B. Simulators do not commute the way numbers do. I didn't assume commutation. I denoted B~C by D and C~B by E, making no assumption that D=E. BTW, a simulation relation is not necessarily an identity like =. but then A~D~A=A~A. And A~C~B~A = A~E~A where E=C~B, and then A~E~A=A~A. But then A~B~C~A = A~C~B~A. I seem to be assuming a natural ordering on the symbols A, B, C, D, etc. No I just followed the arbitrary convention of picking the next letter when I needed a new name. Put X for C and S for E if you like, they are just names of systems. Of course for real computers running simulations it is not necessarily the case that A~B~A=A~A, which would equal A, although that's the most efficient way for A to simulate B simulating A. I don't find your notion of system and simulation very clear. I suppose by system you mean a some definite set of things which are evolving by a defined process, some set of states which can be computed by an algorithm (or possibly including randomness?). Then a simulation is a different set of things evolving through states that are isomorphic to the system simulated? Brent and a notion of being at the same level in the ordering with the (..) symbols. I should have made this clear. My apologies! Does the comment about telescope property not make sense? You drop the parentheses, implying the relation is associative, but then you treat it as though it isn't?? Not having pointed out the ordering caused a confusion. My apologies. Thank you for pointing this out! This idea still needs a lot of work, that I do admit! Brent -- Onward! Stephen http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On (platonic) intuition
On 24.08.2012 21:59 John Clark said the following: On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 Evgenii Rudnyi use...@rudnyi.ru wrote: Could you please tell me what an algorithm in a self-driving car is responsible for intuition? Any algorithm based on stochastics or heuristics, in other words most of the algorithms in self-driving car software. John K Clark Then you should have a clear definition what intuition is. Could you please explain in terms of an algorithm what do you mean by intuition? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
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Re: Bisimulation Algebra
On 8/25/2012 2:41 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/24/2012 11:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/24/2012 11:33 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/24/2012 7:05 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: ...due to the law of conjugate bisimulation identity: A ~ A = A ~ B ~ C ~ B ~ A = A ~ B ~ A this is retractable path independence: path independence only over retractable paths. I don't understand this. You write A~(B~A) which implies that B~A is a system (in this case one being simulated by A). Dear Brent, The symbol ~ represent simulate, so the symbols A~(B~A) would be read as A simulating B while it is simulating A. A and B and C and D ... are universal simulators ala David Deutsch. The can run on any physical system capable of universality. But then you write A~B~A=A~A These would read as: A simulating B simulating A, which is different from A simulating B while it is simulating A, a subtle difference. The former is simultaneous while the latter is not. The idea of simultaneity seems out of place in simulation. A simulation simulates the event relations that define time. Your distinction implies some external time that makes an essential difference within the simulation?? Dear Brent, Good question! It matters at the interface - the input location vs. the output location, but not for the internals of the computation itself. You have to stop thinking of a computer as an isolated system. Bruno does this and he wonders why I complain that he does not understand implications of the body problem when it is reduced to arithmetic. We have a reality full of separate minds that needs to be explained. Explaining a single mind is easy; why we can construct beautiful Peano arithmetic and Robinson Arithmetic models of it, but a plurality of separate minds; that's hard! We have diary entries and discussions of being at Washington or Helsinki or Moscow, but that do these names mean to an isolated computation? Locating a place is not the same as locating a number. and also A~B~C~A =/= A~C~B~A =/= A~A This seems inconsistent, since A~B~C~A = A~D~A where D=B~C, How do you get D=B~C from? That is inconsistent with the Woolsey identity rule . It's just defining a symbol D to denote the system B~C. B~C is not a system, B~C is system B simulating C. If D is a system simulating B simulating C then it is its own self with its own identity D which includes the ability to simulate B simulating C. This does not make D into a system B~C. Sorry. Stop thinking off things as isolated from each other, the entire idea of interaction becomes mute when you do that! For example C could be capable of simulating B in the process of it simulating A, which is different in content from C simulating A while A is simulating B. Simulators do not commute the way numbers do. I didn't assume commutation. I denoted B~C by D and C~B by E, making no assumption that D=E. But you did assume that D was a particular computation and not a simulator capable of many simulations, not just B~C. I didn't define that possibility, so where did it come from? BTW, a simulation relation is not necessarily an identity like =. but then A~D~A=A~A. And A~C~B~A = A~E~A where E=C~B, and then A~E~A=A~A. But then A~B~C~A = A~C~B~A. I seem to be assuming a natural ordering on the symbols A, B, C, D, etc. No I just followed the arbitrary convention of picking the next letter when I needed a new name. Put X for C and S for E if you like, they are just names of systems. It helps to check to see if one's conjectures about a idea are consistent with all of the idea, not just pieces of it. Naming conventions are very tricky and lead us into all sorts of temptations. ;-) Of course for real computers running simulations it is not necessarily the case that A~B~A=A~A, which would equal A, although that's the most efficient way for A to simulate B simulating A. But there is a difference! A simulating B simulating A is the internal map of a single program, A. A simulating B while it is simulating A is a internal map (in A) of another program's (B) simulation. A slight difference. Can we untangle computations from each other such that they can have seperate identities or localizations? There is a good point to your critique here and it is that the two versions are equivalent to a separate computer that has A, B and C as subroutines such that the input and outputs are the same. But this equivalence is strictly internal to that seperate system that might be, in words like Bruno's, evaluating the difference. What I am trying to set up here is the map-territory difference and where it vanishes. When does my mental image of you and your mental image of yourself differ? When might it be the same? I don't find your notion of system and simulation very clear. Good point, I am an amateur at this and I am learning. I do appreciate your interest! :-) I
Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 5:04 AM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 1:18 PM, benjayk
benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.comwrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
Taking the universal dovetailer, it could really mean everything (or
nothing), just like the sentence You can interpret whatever you want
into
this sentence... or like the stuff that monkeys type on typewriters.
A sentence (any string of information) can be interpreted in any
possible
way, but a computation defines/creates its own meaning. If you see a
particular step in an algorithm adds two numbers, it can pretty
clearly
be
interpreted as addition, for example.
A computation can't define its own meaning, since it only manipulates
symbols (that is the definition of a computer),
I think it is a rather poor definition of a computer. Some have tried to
define the entire field of mathematics as nothing more than a game of
symbol manipulation (see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Formalism_(mathematics) ). But if
mathematics
can be viewed as nothing but symbol manipulation, and everything can be
described in terms of mathematics, then what is not symbol manipulation?
That what it is describing. Very simple. :)
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
and symbols need a meaning
outside of them to make sense.
The meaning of a symbol derives from the context of the machine which
processes it.
I agree. The context in which the machine operates matters. Yet our
definitions of computer don't include an external context.
A computer can simultaneously emulate the perceiver and the object of
perception.
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
The UD contains an entity who believes it writes a single program.
No! The UD doesn't contain entities at all. It is just a computation.
You
can only interpret entities into it.
Why do I have to? As Bruno often asks, does anyone have to watch your
brain through an MRI and interpret what it is doing for you to be
conscious?
Because there ARE no entities in the UD per its definition. It only
contains
symbols that are manipulated in a particular way.
You forgot the processes, which are interpreting those symbols.
No, that's simply not how we defined the UD. The UD is defined by
manipulation of symbols, not interpretation of symbols (how could we even
formalize that?).
It may not be explicitly defined, but it follows, just as human cognition
follows from hydrogen atoms, given a few billion years. Entities evolve
and develop within the UD who have the ability to interpret things on their
own.
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
The definitions of the UD
or a universal turing machine or of computers in general don't contain a
reference to entities.
The definition of this universe doesn't contain a reference to human
beings
either.
Right, that's why you can't claim that all universes contain human beings.
But the set of all possible universes does contain human beings.
Similarly, the UD contains all processes, and according to
computationalism, would also contain all possible minds.
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
So you can only add that to its working in your own imagination.
I think I would still be able to experience meaning even if no one was
looking at me.
Yes, because you are what is looking - there is no one looking at you in
the
first place, because someone looking is occur in you.
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
Jason Resch-2 wrote:
The UD itself
isn't intelligent, but it contains intelligences.
I am not even saying that the UD isn't intelligent. I am just saying
that
humans are intelligent in a way that the UD is not (and actually the
opposite is true as well).
Okay, could you clarify in what ways we are more intelligent?
For example, could you show a problem that can a human solve that a
computer with unlimited memory and time could not?
Say you have a universal turing machine with the alphabet {0, 1}
The problem is: Change one of the symbols of this turing machine to 2.
Your example is defining a problem to not be solvable by a specific
entity,
not turing machines in general.
But the claim of computer scientists is that all turing machines are
interchangable,
In a certain sense. Not in the sense where they have to escape their own
level to accomplish something in a physical universe.
because they can emulate each other perfectly. Clearly
that's not true because perfect computational emulation doesn't help to
solve the problem in question, and that is precisely my point!
You seem to agree that a computer can answer any verbal problem that any
person can.
So it follows that the right program could answer the question of what a
particular person will do in a given situation. Do you agree?
Solving the body-mind problem by hiring a translator
Hi Bruno Marchal and all, Consider this analogy to the mind/body problem. Let the body or quanta speak only french and the mind or qualia speak only english. Then neither group is capable of understanding the other group, but each group is able to communicate perfectly among themselves in their own language. In order to get anything done, the french hire a translator (we'll call him Leibniz) who 1) translates each quanta (english) statement into qualia (french), 2) let's them figure out a proper response in french, using proper french grammar, 3) then translates that response into english, using proper english grammar, which he 4) then relates that translated response to the english. This is how the metaphysics of Leibniz can be used to properly treat mind/body issues. Currently the materialists ignore the language barrier and speak english to the french, who do not understand them, and the english them invent what the french must be saying, etc. This is nonsense. Instead, qualia must be discussed by qualia in qualia language, and quanta in quanta language, and communication between them done by a translator. In Leibniz's metaphysics, the translation is done by callling each part of the material world a substance, then translating the qualities and attributes of the material world into the monads of the mind world, performing actions and understanding things properly in the language and grammar of the mind, then doing the reverse translation into body language to understand the result. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/25/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-24, 12:19:25 Subject: Re: Leibniz's theodicy: a nonlocal and hopefully best mereology On 23 Aug 2012, at 03:21, Stephen P. King wrote: Bruno does not seem to ever actually address this directly. It is left as an open problem The body problem? I address this directly as I show how we have to translate the body problem in a pure problem of arithmetic, and that is why eventually we cannot postulate anything physical to solve the mind body problem without losing the quanta qualia distinction. Again this is a conclusion of a reasoning. And AUDA is the illustration of the universal machine tackles that problem, and this gives already the theology of the machine, including its propositional physics (the logic of measure one). There is really only one major disagreement between Bruno and I and it is our definitions of Universality. He defines computations and numbers are existing completely seperated from the physical and I insist that there must be at least one physical system that can actually implement a given computation. This is almost revisionism. I challenge you to find a standard book in theoretical computer science in which the physical is even just invoked to define the notion of computation. Most notion of physical implementations of computation use the mathematical notion above. Not the contrary. Deutsch' thesis is not Church's thesis. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 11:36 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote: The evidence that the universe follows fixed laws is all of science. That is plainly wrong. It is like saying what humans do is determined through a (quite accurate) description of what humans do. It is an confusion of level. The universe can't follow laws, because laws are just descriptions of what the universe does. That the universe follows laws means that the universe shows certain patterns of behaviour that, fortuitously, clever humans have been able to observe and codify. It's just a linguistic accident that we use the same term law to mean both physical law and the laws that are passed by parliament. You said you see no evidence that the universe follows laws but the evidence is, as stated, all of science. There would be no point to science if we thought that the universe behaves arbitrarily. Indeed, there is arguably no point to anything if the universe does not follow uniform laws. I assume that when I take a step that the ground is solid, which I base on its appearance and my experience of surfaces with such an appearance being solid. But if the universe did not follow laws, this assumption would be worthless; the ground may open up and swallow me, so there would be no point taking a step forward. Science does show us that many aspects of the universe can be accurately described through laws. But this is not very suprising since the laws and the language they evolved out of emerge from the order of the universe and so they will reflect it. Also, our laws are known to not be accurate (they simply break down at some points), so necessarily the universe does not behave as our laws suggest it does. And we have no reason to assume it behaves as any other law suggest it does. Why would be believe it, other than taking it as a dogma? The laws are constantly being revised, which is what science is about. If there were no laws there would be no point to science. Probabilities in quantum mechanics can be calculated with great precision. For example, radioactive decay is a truly random process, but we can calculate to an arbitrary level of certainty how much of an isotope will decay. In fact, it is much easier to calculate this than to make predictions about deterministic but chaotic phenomena such as the weather. Sure, but that is not an argument against my point. Precise probabilities are just a way of making the unprecise (relatively) precise. They still do not allow us to make precise predictions - they say nothing about what will happen, just about what could happen. If you can calculate that something will happen with 99.9% probability, I think that is saying what will happen for practical purposes. Also, statistical laws do not tell us anything about the correlation between (apparently) seperate things, so they actually inherently leave out some information that could very well be there (and most likely is there if we look at the data). They only describe probabilities of seperate events, not correlation of the outcome of seperate events. Say you have 1000 dices with 6 sides that behaves statistically totally random if analyzed seperately. Nevertheless they could be strongly correlated and this correlation is very hard to find using scientific methods and to describe - we wouldn't notice at all if we just observed the dices seperately or just a few dices (as we would usually do using scientific methods). Or you have 2 dices with 1000 sides that behaves statistically totally random if analyzed seperately, but if one shows 1 the other ALWAYS shows one as well. Using 1000 tries you will most likely notice nothing at all, and using 1 tries you will still probably notice nothing because there will be most likely other instances as well where the two numbers are the same. So it would be very difficult to detect the correlation, even though it is quite important (given that you could accurately predict what the other 1000-sided dice will be in 1/1000 of the cases). And even worse, if you have 10 dices that *together* show no correlation at all (which we found out using many many tries), this doesn't mean that the combinated result of the 10 dices is not correlated with another set of 10 dices. To put it another way: Even if you showed that a given set of macrosopic objects is not correlated, they still may not behave random at all on a bigger level because they are correlated with another set of objects! I'm not really sure of your point here. Statistical methods would not only show a correlation between the dice, but also tell you how many observations you need to make in order to be confident of a correlation to an arbitrary degree of certainty. That is the whole business of statistics. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send
Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
On 23 Aug 2012, at 19:08, John Clark wrote: On Wed, Aug 22, 2012 at 12:49 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote: 'You won't be able to determine the truth of this statement by programming a computer' If true then you won't be able to determine the truth of this statement PERIOD. Any limitation a computer has you have the exact same limitation. And there are many many times the ONLY way to determine the truth of a statement is by programming a computer, if this were not true nobody would bother building computers and it wouldn't be a trillion dollar industry. To put it another way, it shows you that it is really just obvious that you are beyond the computer, because you are the one programming it. But it's only a matter of time before computers start programing you because computers get twice as smart every 18 months and people do not. Computers do only what we instruct them to do (this is how we built them) That is certainly not true, if it were there would be no point in instructing computers about anything. Tell me this, if you instructed a computer to find the first even integer greater than 4 that is not the sum of two primes greater than 2 and then stop what will the computer do? It would take you less than 5 minutes to write such a program so tell me, will it ever stop? You might say we only do what we were instructed to do by the laws of nature, but this would be merely a metaphor, not an actual fact (the laws of nature are just our approach of describing the world, not something that is somehow actually programming us). We do things because of the laws of nature OR we do not do things because of the laws of nature, and if we do not then we are random. We might do things because the laws of arithmetic. With comp Nature is not in the ontology. You are assuming physicalism here, which is inconsistent with computationalism. Bruno Let's take your example 'Benjamin Jakubik cannot consistently assert this sentence' is true.. I can just say your sentence is meaningless. It's not my example it's your example, you said sentences like this prove that you have fundamental abilities that computers lack, and that of course is nonsense. Saying something is meaningless does not make it so, but suppose it is; well, computers can come up with meaningless gibberish as easily as people can. The computer can't do this, because he doesn't know what meaningless is I see absolutely no evidence of that. If you were competing with the computer Watson on Jeopardy and the category was meaningless stuff I'll bet Watson would kick your ass. But then he'd beat you (or me) in ANY category. Maybe that is what dinstinguishes human intelligence from computers. Computers can't recognize meaninglessness or meaning. Humans often have the same difficulty, just consider how many people on this list think free will means something. My computer doesn't generate such questions But other computers can and do. and I won't program it to. But other people will. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: What are monads ? A difficulty
On 23 Aug 2012, at 19:35, Richard Ruquist wrote: The waveform is subjective as it represents a particular quantum state. In COMP terms it is 3p. But comp people may not think of it as subjective since every quantum state is realized and therefore all quanta are objective. With comp quanta are still first person. Hopefully first person plural, as the duplication is extended on machines populations. The only real 3p notions arises in the ontology, and can be taken from any specification of a universal system (in Post-Church-Turing Turing sense). Bruno On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 1:28 PM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: Hi Stephen P. King hmmm. Quanta and monads are singular entities. QM has the dualism particle/wave Monadology has extended/inextended. These might be construed as similar. But QM doesn't to my knowledge have the dualism objective/subjective unless the waveform is subjective. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/23/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-23, 13:03:04 Subject: Re: What are monads ? A difficulty Hi Roger, I like the idea that pure QM systems are the best example of a monad. On 8/23/2012 11:14 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Right. The world is filled with monadswas just a way of saying things, just a rhetorical phrase. All physical things in the world are substances rather than monads. If you can measure it, it's not a monad. If you can think of it, in some cases (see below) it is a monad. Monads are simply mental points in ideal space, which have a potential driving force, such as the driving force of life (called entelechy). A desire to realize its own potential. So monads can be said to be alive. Monads have to be uniform substances that one could use as the subject of a sentence. As as thought of, as intended, with no parts. Personally I would correct that to say no parts at the level of image magnification intended. This is one of the main difficulties in understanding Leibniz. If you think of Socrates as a whole, not separately of organs, etc., that Socrates would be a monad. A monad has to be, as they say, the whole enchilada. I would say thus that I am a monad, as are you. Monads and snd the substances they refer to are infinite in variety. Space and time are excluded from this as space and time separately are not in spacetime. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/23/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-23, 08:28:33 Subject: Re: Leibniz's theodicy: a nonlocal and hopefully best mereology Hi Roger, I agree in spirit with you but cringe at the use of the word filled. Do you have any ideas as to the mereological relation between monads? On 8/23/2012 8:08 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Richard, There are an infinite number of different monads, since the world is filled with them and each is a different perspective on the whole of the rest. Not only that, but they keep changing, as all life does. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/23/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The hypocracy of materialism
On 23 Aug 2012, at 22:01, John Clark wrote: On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 9:48 AM, Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net wrote: If you are a materialist, rejecting God is a perfectly sensible thing to do. Correct. But materialism is bad philosophy, since it ignores the ontological firewall between mind and matter. I make changes in the matter of your brain and your mind changes. When your mind changes, such as when you figure the coffee cup should be at your lips and not on the table the position of the matter in the coffee cup changes. That's sounds like a pretty BAD firewall, even Microsoft can make a better firewall than that! Naturally, it cannot solve the mind/body problem The hardest part of the mind/body problem is figuring out exactly what the mind/body problem is and what solving it is supposed to mean. A popular subproblem consists in explaining how a grey brain can generate the subjective color perception. With comp a precise subproblem consists in explaining how the appearance of the physical reality emerges from relative statistics on the computations (defined and existing as a consequence of any Turing universal laws, like + and *). Most religious belief, like the belief in the existence of primary matter, or of mind, or God, etc, can be seen as attempt to clarify, or hide, the mind-body problem. Another subproblem is the relation of the soul with the body, and the question of the immortality of the souls, etc. The christian follows Plato, for the soul, and Aristotle for matter, and this leads to difficulties with respect to computer science and computationalism. Bruno and has no clue what mind or God is, God is dog spelled backward. but demands proof of any religious statement or concept. Science has explained a lot of things, it's true it hasn't explained everything but it's explained a lot, so I don't understand why embracing religion is supposed to help when RELIGION CAN'T EXPLAIN ANYTHING. Science can't explain everything so you want to switch to something that can't explain anything. It's nuts. Is that hypocracy or what ? Its not hypocrisy so it must be what. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Male Proof and female acceptance of proof
On 23 Aug 2012, at 22:26, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/23/2012 2:17 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: You recently allude to a disagreement between us, but I (meta)disagree with such an idea: I use the scientific method, which means that you cannot disagree with me without showing a precise flaw at some step in the reasoning. You seem to follow the seven first steps, so that in particular you grasp apparently that COMP + ROBUST-UNIVERSE entails the reversal physics/arithmetic, and the explanation why qualia and quanta separate. Are you sure you got this? Step 8 just eliminates the ROBUST-UNIVERSE assumption in step 7. Dear Bruno, I claim that step 8 is invalidated by the fact that you must use the physical medium to interact (communicate) the abstract concept. If we take step 8 literally, this would not occur and thus obtain a contradiction. You seem to not realize the price that you must pay for immaterialism. To invalidate a step in a proof, you must mention what is not valid in the derivation. Here you just introduce a statement without proof, nor definition (your statement that we have to use a primary physical medium to interact), and you avoid the reasoning. This is not a valid use of philosophy in science. You might refute the theory of evolution by saying that it is quite well, and that it explains well how birds and plants evolves, but that it fails miserably to explain how God made the world in six days. The work shows that immaterialism is the price for computationalism. The price of immaterialism itself is the object of the whole reasoning: to extract the appearance of a physical medium without assuming a physical medium. At first it looks simple, as Tegmark and Schmidhuber proposal might suggest, given that physical realities, with interacting bodies are easy to show to exist in arithmetic (take for example the program emulating the SWE of the galaxy). But it is part of the work to show that such explanation omit the first person indeterminacy, and so can't work, as we have to justify the relative stability, from the first person point of view, with respect to the comp multiplication of computations, a priori different from QM. But the logic of self- reference gives the constraints which are needed, and the rest is math and physics, to test the comp hypothesis. Bruno -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
On 23 Aug 2012, at 22:36, John Clark wrote: I don't know either, nobody knows, even the computer doesn't know if it will stop until it finds itself stopping; If a computer stops, it will never know that. If it executes a stopping program, then it can. To stop has no first person meaning. Nobody will ever write in its personal diary that he just died, unless metaphorically, or approximately perhaps, like with NDE, or some dreams. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Partial sentence test
This is a partial sentence test, please ig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Male Proof and female acceptance of proof
On 23 Aug 2012, at 22:39, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/23/2012 2:17 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Then AUDA translates everything in UDA in terms of numbers and sequences of numbers, making the body problem into a problem of arithmetic. It is literally an infinite interview with the universal machine, made finite thanks to the modal logic above, and thanks to the Solovay arithmetical completeness theorem. You cannot both claim that there is a flaw, and at the same time invoke your dyslexia to justify you don't do the technical work to present it. Dear Bruno, It is the body problem that is your problem. No. It is the problem of all computationalists. That is the result of the work. Then I show how to translate that problem in arithmetic. There is no solution for it in strict immaterialism. Proof? Immaterials cannot interact, Proofs? (btw, this is not needed, we need only dreams of interaction, but then immaterial can interact, as it is obvious with comp: in the arithmetical simulations (thus truncated digitally) of the galaxies, they interact through gravitation, or you are coming up with metaphysical primary sort of material interaction which nobody has ever proved the existence. they have nothing with which to touch each other. All they can do is imagine the possibility in the sense of a representation of the logical operation of imagining the possibility of X (a string of recursively enumerable coding the computational simulation of X). This would be fine and you do a wonderful job of dressing this up in your work, but the body problem is just another name for the concurrency problem. It is much vaster. We have to justify appearance of space, time, force, physical constant, the quantum, etc. Concurrrency is easy to explain, compared to gravitation. But it remains hard to justify the stability if any of this. The only way to do that is in justifying some phase randomization from only the self-reference logic. Here the p- BDp is a sort of arithemtical miracle, because it explains already the less trivial part. It is the scarcity of physical resources that forces solutions to be found and this is exactly what Pratt shows us how to work out. Mutual consistency restrictions is the dual to resource availability! My dyslexia prevents me from writing long strings of symbolic logical codes, but I can write English (and some Spanish) well enough to communicate with you and I can read and comprehend complex texts very well. ;-) This contradicts what you say about UDA. By the way, I only asked from a verbal - written English version of your symbols strings, not a condensed explanation of it. I do appreciate what you wrote, but it was not what I was asking for. G is [](p - q) - ([]p - []q) []p - [][]p []([]p - p) - []p with the rules A, A-B / B and A / []A S4Grz is [](p - q) - ([]p - []q) []p - [][]p []([](p - []p) - p) - p with the rules A, A-B / B and A / []A These symbols have verbal words associated with them, no? If you where to read of these sentences aloud. What English sounds would come out of your mouth? ? It is logic. Whatever english sentence you give will be for the intended meaning, or the intended meaning of some mathematical intepretations of it. I gavce them just to illustrates a machinery. you must read [](p-q)-([]p - []q) in the follwing literal way: box left parenthesis p implies q right parenthesis ... It is like giving a picture of DNA molecules ATTCAGTTAAACTCCGTA ... . In logic we don't interpret the formula. You must look at [](p-q)- ([]p - []q) at a non interpreted finite molecule. And then you can look at an ference rule like A, A-B/B as an enzyme which will take two molecules, like [](p-q) and [](p-q)-([]p - []q), and catlyse a reaction leading to ([]p - []q). Could those words be transcribed here for the readers of the Everything List? What word corresponds, for instance, to - ? Implies? It might, and it is, depending what you mean by implies, it can be birds and frogs in other interpretation, and it does not matter, because the machinery is build so that the reasoning will not depend from the interpretation. That is the whole what logic is about. Interpretation is defined mathematically, and provides another chapter in logic. Then in applied logic, another layer of interpretation is given, and this one can be rendered in english, but to give it before can only be confusing. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:04, benjayk wrote: But this avoides my point that we can't imagine that levels, context and ambiguity don't exist, and this is why computational emulation does not mean that the emulation can substitute the original. But here you do a confusion level as I think Jason tries pointing on. A similar one to the one made by Searle in the Chinese Room. As emulator (computing machine) Robinson Arithmetic can simulate exactly Peano Arithmetic, even as a prover. So for example Robinson arithmetic can prove that Peano arithmetic proves the consistency of Robinson Arithmetic. But you cannot conclude from that that Robinson Arithmetic can prove its own consistency. That would contradict Gödel II. When PA uses the induction axiom, RA might just say huh, and apply it for the sake of the emulation without any inner conviction. I agree, so I don't see how I confused the levels. It seems to me you have just stated that Robinson indeed can not substitue Peano Arithmetic, because RAs emulation of PA makes only sense with respect to PA (in cases were PA does a proof that RA can't do). That is, it *needs* PA to make sense, and so we can't ultimately substitute one with the other (just in some relative way, if we are using the result in the right way). It is like the word apple cannot really substitute a picture of an apple in general (still less an actual apple), even though in many context we can indeed use the word apple instead of using a picture of an apple because we don't want to by shown how it looks, but just know that we talk about apples - but we still need an actual apple or at least a picture to make sense of it. Bruno Marchal wrote: With Church thesis computing is an absolute notion, and all universal machine computes the same functions, and can compute them in the same manner as all other machines so that the notion of emulation (of processes) is also absolute. OK, but Chruch turing thesis is not proven and I don't consider it true, necessarily. I don't consider it false either, I believe it is just a question of what level we think about computation. Also, computation is just absolute relative to other computations, not with respect to other levels and not even with respect to instantion of computations through other computations. Because here instantiation and description of the computation matter - I+II=III and 9+2=11 describe the same computation, yet they are different for practical purposes (because of a different instantiation) and are not even the same computation if we take a sufficiently long computation to describe what is actually going on (so the computations take instantiation into account in their emulation). Bruno Marchal wrote: It is not a big deal, it just mean that my ability to emulate einstein (cf Hofstadter) does not make me into Einstein. It only makes me able to converse with Einstein. Apart from the question of whether brains can be emulated at all (due to possible entaglement with their own emulation, I think I will write a post about this later), that is still not necessarily the case. It is only the case if you know how to make sense of the emulation. And I don't see that we can assume that this takes less than being einstein. benjayk -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34347848.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Internal matters
How can his cubic hash frown? How does metahype purge? Should the insufficient fear roll? Can the ignored upstairs call Bruno? Bruno sticks a razor above a beard. Why won't this mill thank metahype? The pulp strikes against his freezing drift. Women discriminates an abstract. Quantum dynamics obstructs women underneath the biography. The biggest sophisticate recognizes an overlooked pedantry. Quantum dynamics fumes throughout women. Quantum dynamics strains against women. The Everything list begs the developer in the pedestrian. How can apprehension walk throughout every continental? Its creator furthers apprehension with the registered composite. Should the nun recover from your curry? The courier parts a marriage. An individual lover kisses apprehension. The Everything list reverts next to the discharge. Should the Everything list stop under meekerdb? The downstairs exits over the packet. A convict breach orbits the Everything list past the problem. -Sam Spencer -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: On the need for synthetic logic
On 24 Aug 2012, at 11:57, Roger Clough wrote: Does the comp project use any synthetic logic ? IMHO synlog is the basis of worldly intelligence. . Analytic logic can tell us nothing new, so cannot be a basis alone for intelligence. Machines have already both. As the classical definition of the knower works for machine by incompleteness, making such a knower an intuitionist thinker unable to have a name. Gödel's incompleteness prevents all easy reductionist conception of machine. The problem is that we define machines by their bodies, and bodies don't think, only persons think. They are only locally incarnated through bodies. This follows logically from the mechanist assumption. Bruno http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/HUME.HTM Analytic and Synthetic Analytic statements are a special class of a priori statements. In analytic statements, the predicate concept adds nothing to the subject concept, e.g., “Bachelors are unmarried,” or “The red house is red.” Synthetic statements are a special class of a posteriori statements. In synthetic statements, the predicate concept adds something to the subject concept (the two concepts are synthesized), e.g., “The red house is owned by a dentist.” Hume’s Fork According to Hume, legitimate reasoning has just two possible kinds of subject matter: 1. Relations of Ideas (e.g., math, logic) or 2. Matters of Fact (e.g., empirical matters). Reasoning about relations of ideas is analytic and a priori. Reasoning about matters of facts is synthetic and a posteriori. For Hume, any legitimate statement is either analytic a priori or synthetic a posteriori. According to Hume, analytic a priori statements – the kind we use when we reason about relations of ideas – tell us nothing about the world; they tell us only about how we think and use language. Thus, according to Hume, the only statements than can tell us anything about the world are synthetic a posteriori. And according to Hume, if a statement is synthetic a posteriori, it must be grounded in impressions (sense data or passion). If no impressions support a synthetic statement, the statement is bogus superstition, and should be rejected. In other words, Hume’s fork has two tines. Legitimate statements are either analytic a priori — like statements of math, which tell us nothing about the external world; or synthetic a posteriori — like statements about the world of the senses, supportable by impressions (sense data or passions). Thus, statements are either analytic a priori (in which case they tell us nothing about the world), OR they are synthetic a posteriori (in which case they must be supported by impressions). For Hume, there are no other legitimate possibilities. Hume’s fork means that statements about matters of fact always require empirical support; we can never “just know” them. This is why Hume criticizes the Ontological Argument, which attempts to prove that the claim “God exists” is true a priori. For Hume, no claim about existence can be a priori, since whether or not something exists is a matter of fact, and thus must be known a posteriori. Hume’s Fork does not necessarily plunge us into skepticism about morality, since for Hume, morality is a matter of the passions, and passions are one of the sources of impressions. So to say “Stealing is wrong” simply means “I feel stealing is wrong”; but what if everybody feels the same way? Then morality is a set of objective facts about human feeling based on common human nature. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/24/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Jesse Mazer Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-23, 20:19:50 Subject: Re: A remark on Richard's paper A quibble with the beginning of Richard's paper. On the first page it says: 'It is beyond the scope of this paper and admittedly beyond my understanding to delve into G鰀elian logic, which seems to be self- referential proof by contradiction, except to mention that Penrose in Shadows of the Mind(1994), as confirmed by David Chalmers(1995), arrived at a seemingly valid 7 step proof that human 搑easoning powers cannot be captured by any formal system�.' If you actually read Chalmers' paper at�http://web.archive.org/web/20090204164739/http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-09-chalmers.ht ml he definitely does *not* confirm Penrose's argument! He says in the paper that Penrose has two basic arguments for his conclusions about consciousness, and at the end of the section titled the first argument he concludes that the first one fails: 2.16 It is section 3.3 that carries the burden of this strand of Penrose's argument, but unfortunately it seems to be one of the least convincing sections in the book. By his assumption that the
Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote: On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 11:36 PM, benjayk benjamin.jaku...@googlemail.com wrote: The evidence that the universe follows fixed laws is all of science. That is plainly wrong. It is like saying what humans do is determined through a (quite accurate) description of what humans do. It is an confusion of level. The universe can't follow laws, because laws are just descriptions of what the universe does. That the universe follows laws means that the universe shows certain patterns of behaviour that, fortuitously, clever humans have been able to observe and codify. OK, so it is a metaphor, since the laws itself are just what we codified about the behaviour of the universe (so the universe can't follow laws because the laws follow the universe). Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote: You said you see no evidence that the universe follows laws but the evidence is, as stated, all of science. Science just requires that the universes behaviour is *approximated* by laws. Stathis Papaioannou-2 wrote: Science does show us that many aspects of the universe can be accurately described through laws. But this is not very suprising since the laws and the language they evolved out of emerge from the order of the universe and so they will reflect it. Also, our laws are known to not be accurate (they simply break down at some points), so necessarily the universe does not behave as our laws suggest it does. And we have no reason to assume it behaves as any other law suggest it does. Why would be believe it, other than taking it as a dogma? The laws are constantly being revised, which is what science is about. If there were no laws there would be no point to science. Right, but this doesn't mean that the laws have to be accurate or even can be accurate. They just need to be accurate enough to be useful to us. -- View this message in context: http://old.nabble.com/Simple-proof-that-our-intelligence-transcends-that-of-computers-tp34330236p34347886.html Sent from the Everything List mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Male Proof and female acceptance of proof
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:15, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Could you explain a little about Bp p duality ? Are they both
analytic, or does one of them us synthetic logic ?
I void using synthetic and analytic. Bp is a modal formula and its
interpretation here is provable('p') where provable is Gödel
provability predicate, entirely defined in arithmetic,, and 'p' is
for the arithmetical description of some sentence of arithmetic, but
'p' is for the arithmetical proposition itself, which cannot be
described as such. Bp p means that the machine can prove that she
can prove p, and that it is the case that p, or, if you prefer that p
is true for the machine (believed by the machine).
By incompleteness, the machine cannot prove Bf - f (provable 0=1
implies that 0 = 1). That is equivalent with ~provable (false), which
is equivalent with I am consistent, with a third person description
of I.
So, if the machine is sound, we do have Bf - f, but the machine
cannot know that. Yet, Bf f typically implies false (as p q
implies p). So, although Bp p is equivalent with Bp (both proves the
same proposition of arithmetic) they obeys very different logic. Bp
obeys to the modal logic G, and Bp p obeys to the modal logic of
knowledge S4.
You cannot define Bp p in arithmetic, by a general arithmetical
predicate, and this makes the machine first person I quite non
analytical, as no third person description can ever be used for it,
from the machine perspective.
This explains why the mind-body problem befuddled the machines until
they realized their own universality and the incompleteness which
follows. That is quickly the case for universal machine believing in
the induction axiom, (having them as pre-wired axioms) which provides
them very deep cognitive abilities.
So you can see Bp as analytical, having third person description, like
in arithmetic, and you can see Bp p as synthetic, as it cannot be
defined in term of the ontological element of the theory, nor any
third person construction made on them.
Bruno
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/24/2012
Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function.
- Receiving the following content -
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-23, 14:17:50
Subject: Re: Male Proof and female acceptance of proof
On 21 Aug 2012, at 21:42, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 8/21/2012 2:28 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Aug 2012, at 12:12, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno and Stephen,
This is the bicameral mind again. Right brain must accept left
brain decisions for human safety.
Ought must rule over is (or else we'd all be nazis, Hume, for the
safety of humanity)
Passion must rule over reason (or else we'd all be nazis, Hume,
for the safety of humanity)
Acceptace of proof dominates proof (common sense psychology)
Thus you can objectively, mathematically prove that 2+2=4, but
you still have to subjectively accept that psychologically.
Woman always gets the last word.
No problem here. That fits nicely with the Bp versus Bp p
duality, which is just the difference between rational belief
and rational knowledge (true rational belief).
It took time to realize that when we define the rational belief by
formal proof, which makes sense in the ideal correct machine case,
although knowledge and belief have the same content (the same
arithmetical p are believed), still, they obey to different
logics. This is a consequence of incompleteness. Rational beliefs
obey to a modal logic known as G (or GL, Prl, K4W, etc.) and true
rational belief obeys to a logic of knowledge (S4), indeed known
as S4Grz.
G is
[](p - q) - ([]p - []q)
[]p - [][]p
[]([]p - p) - []p
with the rules A, A-B / B and A / []A
S4Grz is
[](p - q) - ([]p - []q)
[]p - [][]p
[]([](p - []p) - p) - p
with the rules A, A-B / B and A / []A
Bruno
Dear Bruno,
It might help us immensely if you could tell us how to read
these symbolic representations. Not all of us speak that language!
There are English words for all of these symbols!
???
The only differences with elementary propositional logic are that we
have one symbol more, the box [], and one more inference rule.
It is a unary operator symbol, so if X is a formula, []X is a
formula, like ~X.
The inference rule is that you can derive []p from p. Careful, this
does not make p - []p true in most modal logic.
I wrote often the box [] by using the letter B.
In the axiom above, it is better to not interpret the box, as this
can confuse with the representation theorem which associate
meaning mathematically.
I have often talked about Bp and Bp p, with Bp having the
arithmetical provability meaning (G鰀el 1931).
G above is the logic of G鰀el's beweisbar predicate. For example the
second incompleteness theorem is given by Dt - ~BDt, or t -
~[]t, or consistent('t') - NOT
Re: The bicameral mind
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:20, Alberto G. Corona wrote: I´m also very heterodox with respect to physics. Although I have a degree in Physics, or just because that, I understand that physics has exerted a reductionist fascination that has ruined every social and human science, including philosophy. Now it has been substituted by information theory, computer science and biology, which are more appropriate to the understanding of ultimate existential questions, but the danger still exist. there are still too much physics envy in human sicences and the biologist-computationalist reductions may or may be not equally dangerous. Almost all the human sciences are nothing more that religious sects that try to explain every human aspect as a result of a single entity that creates meaning: the notion of culture formerly class or race before Hitler for example. This is noting but crap. Philosophy has followed this nonsense until it annihilated itself. I agree. But computer science is saved from reductionism by incompleteness and incompleteness-like phenomenon. We have just to be aware of the gigantic gap between ideally true computer science (God, if you want), and computer's computer science. Bruno 2012/8/23 Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net Dear Alberto, I agree with you 100%. I have trouble classifying myself. I am not conservative with regard to the current orthodoxy in physics and yet am conservative when it comes to philosophical ideas in the sense of rejecting relativism and deconstructivism. Post-modern progressives seem to be anti-progressive in their actions and so I think of them as just naive or worse. On 8/23/2012 1:47 PM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: Roger, I tend to believe what you say. But, in an effort to be objective, I belive that emotionality is the trait that apeear in a culture when it is dominant and mostly unchallenged. Now the progressive culture is dominant, so the lazy-thinking people go to the progressive culture, but this neither is the root nor defines the progressive culture. At least I don´t think that people Mill or Rawls are emotional. They may be very coold. However there is something demagogic and self-indulgent in every progressive ideology, this makes more lazy.thinking people in its side. Both groups have two different ideas of what reality is, and two different ideas of human nature. Progressives may be or may not be very rational, but they start with different beliefs, so that even with equal goals, the consequences for action are completely different than in the case of conservatives. I´m conservative, this is evident, this is a disclaimer, but if I as conservative and more or less rational were persuaded that the social reality is not a consequence of human nature, but the result of an external ideological repression which make very difficult a possible unlimited human and material progress , if I were persuaded that all men have not inside the seeds for evil, so that the evil could be eradicated by political measures, then i would be progressive with the same rationality, and with the same goals of doing the best for the whole society. For this reason, it is necessary to gain a scientific knowledge of human nature, I believe that evolutionary theory brings so. the gofod news for me is that the picture that emerges from it is conservative. The bad news is that the progressives feels themselves challenged in their beliefs and they will not accept it easily. 2012/8/21 Roger Clough rclo...@verizon.net Hi Alberto G. Corona I suppose I opened a can of worms; I really don't want to get into a political argument, because never the twain shall meet. They speak completely different languages. Two completely different views, two different tribes always at war with one another. Because of the bicameral mind metaphor (Jaynes and others): Left brain metaphor (top or intellectual portion of monad humunculus) Conscious, thinking, discreteness, sequential, control, logic, yang, male, ego, insistent, sun Right brain metaphor (feeling or middle portyion of monad humunculus) Subconscious, Feeling, global, nonlinear thinking, submission, aesthetics, yin, female, noninsistent, moon Two different tribes, the ought or moral coming from the right hand brain metaphor, the is coming from the left hand brain metaphor. The bicameral mind Let me just state my basis for the assignments. I think Lakoff wrote a book not long ago on the subject of words and politics. Liberal (ought) arguments are usually morally based (we can't let the poor starve so we need to tax the greedy rich) while conservatives try to reply using the is weapons of facts and logic (we can't afford that stuff, we're going bankrupt). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/21/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. --
Re: Emergence
On 24 Aug 2012, at 12:39, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King H. I guess I should have know this, but if there are unproveable statements, couldn't that also mean that the axioms needed to prove them have simply been overlooked in inventorying (or constructing) the a priori ? If so, then couldn't these missing axioms be suggested by simply asking what additional axioms are needed to prove the supposedly unproveable propositions? You can add the new statement, but then you get a transformed machine, and it will have new unprovable statement, or become inconsistent. Tkae the machine/theory having the beliefs:axioms: 1) 2) Suppose the machine is consistent. Then the following below is a new consistent machine, much richer in probability abilities: 1) 2) 3) 1) + 2) is consistent. But the one below: 1) 2) 3) 1) + 2) + 3) is consistent. which can be defined (the circularity can be eliminated by use of some trick) will be inconsistent, as no machine can ever prove consistently his own consistency. Bruno Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/24/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-23, 13:28:00 Subject: Re: Emergence Hi Richard, You mean provable statements not truths per se... I guess. OK, I haven't given that trope much thought I try to keep Godel's theorems reserved for special occasions. It has my experience that they can be very easily misapplied. On 8/23/2012 1:24 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Stephan, Strong emergence follows from Godel's incompleteness because in any consistent system there are truths that cannot be derived from the axioms of the system. That is what is meant by incompleteness. Sounds like what you just said. No? Richard On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 1:20 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Richard, Ah! http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strong_emergence Strong emergence is a type of emergence in which the emergent property is irreducible to its individual constituents. OK, but irreducibility would have almost the same meaning as implying the non-existence of relations between the constituents and the emergent. It makes a mathematical description of the pair impossible... I don't think that I agree that it is derivable from Godel Incompleteness; I will be agnostic on this for now. Could you explain how it might? On 8/23/2012 1:10 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: It is said that strong emergence comes from Godel incompleteness. Weak emergence is like your grains of sand. On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 12:48 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net wrote: Hi Richard, Pratt's theory does not address this. Could emergence be the result of inter-communications between monads and not an objective process at all? It is useful to think about how to solve the Sorites paradox to see what I mean here. A heap is said to emerge from a collection of grains, but is there a number or discrete or smooth process that generates the heap? No! The heap is just an abstract category that we assign. It is a name. On 8/23/2012 9:44 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: Now if only someone could explain how emergence works. Can Pratt theory do that? -- Onward! Stephen Nature, to be commanded, must be obeyed. ~ Francis Bacon -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Male Proof and female acceptance of proof
On 24 Aug 2012, at 14:31, Stephen P. King wrote: Dear Roger, I only see one glaring gap in your explanation here: the chain of non-interaction leads all the way up to the supremum where God is essentially and effectively (not)interacting with itself. Is this not the very definition of Solipsism? How is the problem of solipsism not even infinitely more acute for God? God has no peers, so it naturally implies that the ordinary problem of solipsism - what does one human solipsist say to another? - is a mute point, but somewhere and somehow the appearance of plurality of entities must appear in order for us to explain appearences. This is the very same question that I keep asking Bruno and he seems to not understand the question: How does a plurality of minds emerge from the One such that they have an appearance of interactions without falling into the morass of allowing for everythign and thus, ultimately, explaining nothing? And this is what I explain with all details since years on this list, refering to peer reviewed papers, using standard terms of the theories in use. But either you philosophize on it without addressing what I say, or you justify by contingencies why you don't address it. Your question has an easy part, and a difficult part. - The easy part is the explanation of why interactions exist. This is easy, because all theories of interactions, and their models, are emulated by arithmetic, like with the example of the simulation of the galaxy: it occurs in the UD. - The difficult part is that such theories admits a continuum of consistent extension, including those which will lead to aberrant interactions, and we have to justify why they seem rare (relatively rare) in our extension, and that is the measure problem, which we cannot avoid with comp. Then comp explains easily the quanta and qualia separation, has lived by each machine. Bruno It seems to me that Leibniz was working out the Everything vs. Nothing problem of existence from a different point of view with the monadology. On 8/24/2012 7:55 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King True, materials don't actually interact in Idealism, but the Supreme intelligence insures that the same result happens. In other words, you can't tell the difference. So at least in one place Leibniz says, True, they don't actually interact, because ideas as substances cannot interact, but there's no harm in saying that they do. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 8/24/2012 Leibniz would say, If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function. - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-08-23, 16:39:18 Subject: Re: Male Proof and female acceptance of proof On 8/23/2012 2:17 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Then AUDA translates everything in UDA in terms of numbers and sequences of numbers, making the body problem into a problem of arithmetic. It is literally an infinite interview with the universal machine, made finite thanks to the modal logic above, and thanks to the Solovay arithmetical completeness theorem. You cannot both claim that there is a flaw, and at the same time invoke your dyslexia to justify you don't do the technical work to present it. Dear Bruno, It is the body problem that is your problem. There is no solution for it in strict immaterialism. Immaterials cannot interact, they have nothing with which to touch each other. All they can do is imagine the possibility in the sense of a representation of the logical operation of imagining the possibility of X (a string of recursively enumerable coding the computational simulation of X). This would be fine and you do a wonderful job of dressing this up in your work, but the body problem is just another name for the concurrency problem. It is the scarcity of physical resources that forces solutions to be found and this is exactly what Pratt shows us how to work out. Mutual consistency restrictions is the dual to resource availability! My dyslexia prevents me from writing long strings of symbolic logical codes, but I can write English (and some Spanish) well enough to communicate with you and I can read and comprehend complex texts very well. ;-) By the way, I only asked from a verbal - written English version of your symbols strings, not a condensed explanation of it. I do appreciate what you wrote, but it was not what I was asking for. G is [](p - q) - ([]p - []q) []p - [][]p []([]p - p) - []p with the rules A, A-B / B and A / []A S4Grz is [](p - q) - ([]p - []q) []p - [][]p []([](p - []p) - p) - p with the rules A, A-B / B and A / []A These symbols have verbal words associated with them, no? If you where to read of these sentences aloud. What English sounds would come out of your mouth? Could those words be transcribed here for the readers of the
Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:19, meekerdb wrote: On 8/24/2012 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: But normally the holographic principle should be extracted from comp before this can be used as an argument here. Normally?? The holographic principle was extracted from general relativity and the Bekenstein bound. I don't know in what sense it should be extracted from something else, but if you can do so, please do. It would certainly impress me. UDA explains why it should be. That such an extraction might take 10001000 centuries is not relevant. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:23, meekerdb wrote: On 8/24/2012 9:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And those theorem are non constructive, meaning that in the world of inference inductive machine, a machine capable of being wrong is already non computably more powerful than an error prone machine. There's something wrong with that sentence. An error prone machine one that is capable of being wrong, and hence non-computably more powerful than itself? Yes. It makes sense because the identification criteria for the inductive inference has been weakened. A machine allowed to do one error (that is synthesizing a program giving a wrong output) will recognize a non computably vaster class of phenomena, even if wrong on some input. See the paper of Case and Smith reference in my url, or the book by Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
I am getting a bit tired of our discussion, so I will just adress the main points: Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: But let's say we mean except for memory and unlimited accuracy. This would mean that we are computers, but not that we are ONLY computers. Is this like saying our brains are atoms, but we are more than atoms? I can agree with that, our minds transcend the simple description of interacting particles. But if atoms can serve as a platform for minds and consciousness, is there a reason that computers cannot? Not absolutely. Indeed, I believe mind is all there is, so necessarily computers are an aspect of mind and are even conscious in a sense already. Do you have a meta-theory which could explain why we have the conscious experiences that we do? Saying that mind is all there is, while possibly valid, does not explain very much (without some meta-theory). No, I don't even take it to be a theory. In this sense you might say it doesn't explain anything on a theoretical level, but this is just because reality doesn't work based on any theoretical concepts (though it obviously is described and incorporates them). Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: Short of adopting some kind of dualism (such as http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_naturalism , or the idea that God has to put a soul into a computer to make it alive/conscious), I don't see how atoms can serve as this platform but computers could not, since computers seem capable of emulating everything atoms do. OK. We have a problem of level here. On some level, computers can emulate everything atoms can do computationally, I'll admit that. But that's simply the wrong level, since it is not about what something can do in the sense of transforming input/output. It is about what something IS (or is like). Within the simulation, isn't a simulated atom like a real atom (in our reality)? There is no unambiguous answer to this question IMO. But it only matters that the simulated atom is not like the real atom with respect to our reality - the former can't substitute the latter with respect to reality. Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: since this is all that is required for my argument. I (if I take myself to be human) can't be contained in that definition because a human is not a computer according to the everyday definition. A human may be something a computer can perfectly emulate, therefore a human could exist with the definition of a computer. Computers are very powerful and flexible in what they can do. That is an assumption that I don't buy into at all. Have you ever done any computer programming? If you have, you might realize that the possibilities for programs goes beyond your imagination. Yes, I studied computer science for one semester, so I have programmed a fair amount. Again, you are misinterpreting me. Of course programs go beyond our imagination. Can you imagine the mandel brot set without computing it on a computer? It is very hard. I never said that they can't. I just said that they lack some capability that we have. For example they can't fundamentally decide which programs to use and which not and which axioms to use (they can do this relatively, though). There is no computational way of determining that. There are experimental ways, which is how we determined which axioms to use. Nope, since for the computer no experimental ways exists if we haven't determined a program first. You said computers fundamentally cannot choose which programs or axioms to use. We could program a computer with a neural simulation of a human mathematician, and then the computer could have this capability. That just would strengthen my point (note the words we program meaning we choose the program). Jason Resch-2 wrote: Jason Resch-2 wrote: If the computer program had a concept for desiring novelty/surprises, it would surely find some axiomatic systems more interesting than others. Sure. But he could be programmed to not to have such a concept, and there is no way of determining whether to use it or not if we haven't already programmed an algorithm for that (which again had the same problem). In effect you get an infinite regress: How determine which program to use? -use a program to determine it But which? -use a program to determine it But which? -use a program to determine it Guess and check, with random variation, it worked for evolution. But which guessing and checking program to use? -use a more general guessing and checking program to determine it But which? -use an even more more general guessing and checking program to determine it etc You still never arrive at a program, in fact your problem just becomes more difficult each time you
Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
On 24 Aug 2012, at 19:46, meekerdb wrote: On 8/24/2012 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Aug 2012, at 15:12, benjayk wrote: Quantum mechanics includes true subjective randomness already, so by your own standards nothing that physically exists can be emulated. That's QM+collapse, but the collapse is not well defined, It is well defined in epistemic interpretations. But those rely on an implicit dualism. That is what I thought after reading von Neumann, and London--Bauer, but then reading Shimony I realized that such a dualism does not make sense, and that it leads to solipisism. and many incompatible theories are proposed for it, and Everett showed we don't need it, But then we need to derive the classical world from the quantum. We need to derive the appearance of the classical world. This is well explained by Everett+decoherence. With comp we start from classical arithmetic, and we derive the appearance of the quantum, and then we ca use decoherence to explain the re-appearance of the classical physical worlds. It is really: classical === quantum === classical if we assume comp or weaker. Feynman called the collapse, a collective hallucination, but then with comp so is the wave. It is misleading to use a non understood controversal idea in a domain (the wave collapse in physics) to apply it on complex non solved problem in another domain (the mind body problem). There are no known phenomena capable of collapsing the wave, Decoherence theory provides a mechanism, although the basis problem is open. It is of a piece with the problem of deriving the classical from the quantum. I have never understood the basis problem. It is quite similar to comp. You have to fix a base to do the math, and then you can show that all appearances, from the first person perspective are independent of the choice of the basis. then we can understand empirically why some bases will seem more important, as natiure did a choice of measuring apparatus for us a long time ago, but all this can be described in any basis. My feeling is that Everett got this right at the start. nor any known evidences that the wave does collapse. Collapse appears all the time, LOL. Show me one. and a good theory must save appearances. Everett showed that the appearances are saved, in the memory of the observers. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A remark on Richard's paper
On 24 Aug 2012, at 21:07, Jesse Mazer wrote: On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 at 1:33 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: Chalmers followed my talk on the UD Argument at ASSC 4 and leaved the room at step 3, saying that there is no indeterminacy as he will feel to be at both places. Do you have a link to the discussion, or was it not on a public discussion forum? It was live. I wonder if Chalmers might have just meant that he would *define* both copies as himself and thus say that he would be at both places, while at the same time agreeing with you that each copy at a different location would have its own distinct subjective experience (qualia) and that neither would have any conscious awareness of what the other copy was experiencing. No. That was what I told him. But he left the place, simply, without further comment, and quite disrespectfully. Many people were shocked by this behavior, but said nothing. I think Chalmers is in part responsible for the spreading of defamation I am living across the ocean, and why nobody dares to mention the first person indeterminacy, or my name. I am afraid he has just been brainwashed by the main victims of a manipulative form of moral harrasment., as I described in the book ordered by Grasset in 1998 (but never published). He is quite plausibly a member of the same sect which put fraternity above facts. It is a form of hidden corporatism. I'm afraid Chalmers might be just an opportunist. He is clearly not a serious scientist, but seems to be an expert in self-marketing. His fading qualia paper is not so bad, but is hardly original, and lacks many references. The hard problem of consciousness is know by all philosophers of mind since a long time as the mind-body problem, and his formulation is physicalist and not general, also. Bruno This made perhaps some sense in his dualist interpretation of Everett, (if *that* makes sense), but makes no sense at all in comp. I guess that like John Clark he confused the 1-view of the 1-view, with some 3-view on the 1-view. I know only two people stopping at step 3. But if you know others, let me know. (I don't count the person who stop at step 3 because they have something else to do). Bruno On 24 Aug 2012, at 02:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: Jesse, This is what Chalmers says in the 95 paper you link about the second Penrose argument, the one in my paper: 3.5 As far as I can determine, this argument is free of the obvious flaws that plague other Gödelian arguments, such as Lucas's argument and Penrose's earlier arguments. If it is flawed, the flaws lie deeper. It is true that the argument has a feeling of achieving its conclusion as if by magic. One is tempted to say: why couldn't F itself engage in just the same reasoning?. But although there are various directions in which one might try to attack the argument, no knockdown refutation immediately presents itself. For this reason, the argument is quite challenging. Compared to previous versions, this argument is much more worthy of attention from supporters of AI. Chalmers finally concludes that the flaw for Godel, which Penrose also assumed, is the assumption that we can know we are sound. So the other way around, if Godel is correct, so is the Penrose second argument, which Chalmers confirmed. However, Chalmers seems to be saying the Godel is incorrect, hardly a basis for my paper. Personally, when I am sound, I know I am sound. When I am unsound I usually know that I am unsound. However, psychosis runs in my family, and many times I have watched a relative lapse into psychosis without him realizing it. Besides I sent the paper to Chalmers and he had no problem with. But he did wish me luck getting it published. He knew something I had not yet learned. Richard On Thu, Aug 23, 2012 at 8:19 PM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@gmail.com wrote: A quibble with the beginning of Richard's paper. On the first page it says: 'It is beyond the scope of this paper and admittedly beyond my understanding to delve into Gödelian logic, which seems to be self- referential proof by contradiction, except to mention that Penrose in Shadows of the Mind(1994), as confirmed by David Chalmers(1995), arrived at a seemingly valid 7 step proof that human “reasoning powers cannot be captured by any formal system”.' If you actually read Chalmers' paper at http://web.archive.org/web/20090204164739/http://psyche.cs.monash.edu.au/v2/psyche-2-09-chalmers.html he definitely does *not* confirm Penrose's argument! He says in the paper that Penrose has two basic arguments for his conclusions about consciousness, and at the end of the section titled the first argument he concludes that the first one fails: 2.16 It is section 3.3 that carries the burden of this strand of Penrose's argument, but unfortunately it seems to be one of the least convincing sections in the
Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 at 7:31 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: We might do things because the laws of arithmetic. If so then we in particular and everything in general is as deterministic as a cuckoo clock because when you add 2 numbers together you always get the same answer. I might add that everything is most probably not deterministic. To stop has no first person meaning. After the instant in time called stop there will be no more entries in my diary, the meaning of that is pretty clear to me. Or to put it another way, death means having a last thought. Nobody will ever write in its personal diary that he just died, But they have written this will be my last entry; I believe the Antarctic explorer Robert Scott wrote something like that in his diary that was found months later next to his frozen body. You are assuming physicalism here, The only thing I'm assuming is that X is Y or X is not Y. which is inconsistent with computationalism. You're creating a straw man opponent, nobody believes that what a thing is and what a thing does is the same. Mind, a abstract concept, is what the brain, a physical object, does. And going fast, a abstract concept, is what a jet, a physical object, does. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Bisimulation Algebra
On 8/25/2012 1:53 AM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/25/2012 2:41 AM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/24/2012 11:19 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/24/2012 11:33 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 8/24/2012 7:05 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: ...due to the law of conjugate bisimulation identity: A ~ A = A ~ B ~ C ~ B ~ A = A ~ B ~ A this is retractable path independence: path independence only over retractable paths. I don't understand this. You write A~(B~A) which implies that B~A is a system (in this case one being simulated by A). Dear Brent, The symbol ~ represent simulate, so the symbols A~(B~A) would be read as A simulating B while it is simulating A. A and B and C and D ... are universal simulators ala David Deutsch. But then A~B is a relation between simulators, not simulations of a system on two different simulators. The can run on any physical system capable of universality. But then you write A~B~A=A~A These would read as: A simulating B simulating A, which is different from A simulating B while it is simulating A, a subtle difference. So subtle I fail to grasp it. What does A while add? Is A~B~A = A~(B~A)? You didn't answer my question about why you dropped the parentheses, even though you treat ~ as non-associative. Brent The former is simultaneous while the latter is not. The idea of simultaneity seems out of place in simulation. A simulation simulates the event relations that define time. Your distinction implies some external time that makes an essential difference within the simulation?? Dear Brent, Good question! It matters at the interface - the input location vs. the output location, but not for the internals of the computation itself. You have to stop thinking of a computer as an isolated system. Bruno does this and he wonders why I complain that he does not understand implications of the body problem when it is reduced to arithmetic. We have a reality full of separate minds that needs to be explained. Explaining a single mind is easy; why we can construct beautiful Peano arithmetic and Robinson Arithmetic models of it, but a plurality of separate minds; that's hard! We have diary entries and discussions of being at Washington or Helsinki or Moscow, but that do these names mean to an isolated computation? Locating a place is not the same as locating a number. and also A~B~C~A =/= A~C~B~A =/= A~A This seems inconsistent, since A~B~C~A = A~D~A where D=B~C, How do you get D=B~C from? That is inconsistent with the Woolsey identity rule . It's just defining a symbol D to denote the system B~C. B~C is not a system, B~C is system B simulating C. If D is a system simulating B simulating C then it is its own self with its own identity D which includes the ability to simulate B simulating C. This does not make D into a system B~C. Sorry. Stop thinking off things as isolated from each other, the entire idea of interaction becomes mute when you do that! For example C could be capable of simulating B in the process of it simulating A, which is different in content from C simulating A while A is simulating B. Simulators do not commute the way numbers do. I didn't assume commutation. I denoted B~C by D and C~B by E, making no assumption that D=E. But you did assume that D was a particular computation and not a simulator capable of many simulations, not just B~C. I didn't define that possibility, so where did it come from? BTW, a simulation relation is not necessarily an identity like =. but then A~D~A=A~A. And A~C~B~A = A~E~A where E=C~B, and then A~E~A=A~A. But then A~B~C~A = A~C~B~A. I seem to be assuming a natural ordering on the symbols A, B, C, D, etc. No I just followed the arbitrary convention of picking the next letter when I needed a new name. Put X for C and S for E if you like, they are just names of systems. It helps to check to see if one's conjectures about a idea are consistent with all of the idea, not just pieces of it. Naming conventions are very tricky and lead us into all sorts of temptations. ;-) Of course for real computers running simulations it is not necessarily the case that A~B~A=A~A, which would equal A, although that's the most efficient way for A to simulate B simulating A. But there is a difference! A simulating B simulating A is the internal map of a single program, A. A simulating B while it is simulating A is a internal map (in A) of another program's (B) simulation. A slight difference. Can we untangle computations from each other such that they can have seperate identities or localizations? There is a good point to your critique here and it is that the two versions are equivalent to a separate computer that has A, B and C as subroutines such that the input and outputs are the same. But this equivalence is strictly internal to that seperate system that might be, in words like Bruno's, evaluating the difference. What I am trying to set up here is the
Re: The hypocracy of materialism
On Sat, Aug 25, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: A popular subproblem consists in explaining how a grey brain can generate the subjective color perception. I don't ask that you give a explanation but I do want to know what the general shape a successful explanation would be. If I said X causes Y and Y causes Z and Z causes consciousness I have the feeling you would just say but Z is not consciousness; and you'd be right because otherwise you'd just be saying consciousness causes consciousness which is no help at all. So if you don't like that tell me what the general outline of what a solution to the mind body problem would look like, assuming there really is a problem that needs a solution. Most religious belief, like the belief in the existence of primary matter, or of mind, or God, etc, can be seen as attempt to clarify, or hide, the mind-body problem. If consciousness is truly fundamental, as I strongly suspect it is, then after saying consciousness is what happens when physical systems starts behaving intelligently then there is simply nothing more to be said on the subject of consciousness. However if I'm wrong and it's not fundamental then there really is a mind-body problem that needs solving, but the God theory does not even come close to solving it; saying God did it without saying how He did it is no more help than saying the dog did it. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
On Friday, August 24, 2012 3:50:32 PM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote: On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: I did it for many reasons And a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons. None of them are the reasons of a clock. If you must manufacture reasons, then they can only be the reasons of human clockmakers and human consumers of clocks. It could be said that there are reasons from the molecular layer as well - of tension, density, and mass. There are no cuckoo clock reasons though. some of them my own. In other words you have not divulged to others some of the reasons you acted as you did, and no doubt some of the reasons you don't know yourself. No matter, they're still reasons. No, privacy is not the difference. My motives are not only the motives of cells or species, they are specific to me as well. The cuckoo clock can't do that. It can't intentionally try something new and justify it with a reason later. Anything that can be imagined as occuring before something else can be called a reason - a butterfly wing flapping can be a reason for a typhoon. There are countless reasons which can influence me, but I can choose in many cases to what extent I identify with that influence, or I can defy all of the influences with a creative approach which is not random nor predetermined by any particular reason outside of my own. Your argument is that grey must be either black or white. No, grey is a state of being every bit as logical as black or white, and because it is logical we know that everything is either grey or not grey. And free will is every bit as logical as grey. We know that everything is either voluntary or involuntary. I wouldn't say that, but you would have to agree to that if you are to remain consistent in your position. It's interesting that you bring up Lewis Carroll (as you have before) as an insult, when actually the Alice books are brilliant explorations on consciousness and sense-making. And he was a brilliant satirist on how illogical many of our most strongly held beliefs are. Charles Lutwidge Dodgson would laugh at your ideas. And Richard Phillips Feynman would laugh at your lack of ideas. What does your opinion of my ideas have to do with anything? If you can't refute them, just concede. Why claim the dead as your allies against me? Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? In either case, would there be any point in anyone else paying attention to them Point? It sounds like you're asking for a reason, well such a reason either exists or it does not. What do your assumptions about my motives have to do with anything? That's a stupid question; if you had motives, regardless of what they are, then your actions are deterministic. That's a stupid answer. My question was very specific: Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? You are trying to create a diversion to cover up that your approach fails the test of its own limited criteria. If your opinions are robotic or random, then they don't matter and they aren't opinions. This has nothing to do with me or my motives. What is useful about saying that something 'either exists or it does not'? That's an even stupider question, true statements always have uses. An even stupider non-answer. Just because a statement is true doesn't mean it is a useful statement. Even if it were true, you are still admitting that your edicts of binary mutual exclusivity are no more relevant than saying anything at all. Everything exists in some sense. Nothing exists in every sense. And with that you abandon any pretense that you want to figure out how the world works and make it clear that what you really want to do is convince yourself that what you already want to believe is in fact true. And its going to work too because if you take the above as a working axiom in your system of beliefs then you can prove or disprove anything you want, you can even prove and disprove the same thing at the same time. Not at all. I am asserting positively that this is actually the nature of the world. All forms of proof are relative to the context in which they are proved. According to your views, you don't have any views, and neither do any possible readers of your views. That is ridiculous. I agree, nevertheless it is the inescapable reductio ad absurdum of your stated worldview. All of it is either robotic or random. What does that have to do with the price of eggs? What does that have to do with not having views?? Because if your views are robotic or random then they are not views, they are noise. Since you mention the price of eggs, lets go with that. The market for eggs is not automatic, nor is it random. Despite attempts to beat financial markets
Re: Leibniz's theodicy: a nonlocal and hopefully best mereology
On 25 Aug 2012, at 07:53, Stephen P. King wrote: On 8/24/2012 12:19 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 23 Aug 2012, at 03:21, Stephen P. King wrote: Bruno does not seem to ever actually address this directly. It is left as an open problem The body problem? I address this directly as I show how we have to translate the body problem in a pure problem of arithmetic, and that is why eventually we cannot postulate anything physical to solve the mind body problem without losing the quanta qualia distinction. Again this is a conclusion of a reasoning. Dear Bruno, OK! But just take this one small step further. Losing the quanta / qualia distinction is the same thing as loosing the ability to define one's self. I am not talking of someone losing that distinction, but on losing the ability to use the distinction between G and G*, and between Z1 and Z1*, and also the ability to use S4Grz1 in that context. The interest of using the machine theory of self reference is that we can distinguish between what the machine can say, and what is true wabout what the machine can say, through what I called already the Solovay split. It is the vanishing of identity. This is exactly why I am claiming that step 8 goes too far! AUDA comes after UDA, and is in some sense independent. But anyway, I was not alluding to an experience, but to a theory of mind and matter. The idea that we can remove the necessity of a robust physical universe and yet retain all of its properties is the assumption of primitive substance but just turned inside-out. Look at the substance article here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Substance_theory Substance theory, or substance attribute theory, is an ontological theory about objecthood, positing that a substance is distinct from its properties. A thing-in-itself is a property-bearer that must be distinguished from the properties it bears. What purpose does substance serve here? By Occam it is unnecessary and thus need not be postulated or imagined to exist. Primitive matter would be this notion of substance and as you point out, it is irrelevant. But the bundle of properties that define for us the appearance of physical stuff cannot be waved away. They are not. Reduction to bare arithmetic as you propose eliminates access to the very properties required for interaction and this includes the means to distinguish self from not self. Here you are technically false. If you don't want to the math, read any conclsuoion of papers aroung Gödel 1931. The notion of universal computations, and implementation can be defined in arithmetic, like interaction, etc. The herad things is to derive the interaction as they are described by physics, but that is the result. Then AUDA shapes the general solution. And AUDA is the illustration of the universal machine tackles that problem, and this gives already the theology of the machine, including its propositional physics (the logic of measure one). But this is ignoring the non-constructable aspects that make out finite naming schemes have a relative measure zero. What is the measure of the Integers in the Reals? Which real? An additive measure? What is this question for, as the measure are on the continuum of the infinite histories? You keep seeing problems where there are none, and not seeing problem where I point on them. There is really only one major disagreement between Bruno and I and it is our definitions of Universality. He defines computations and numbers are existing completely seperated from the physical and I insist that there must be at least one physical system that can actually implement a given computation. This is almost revisionism. I challenge you to find a standard book in theoretical computer science in which the physical is even just invoked to define the notion of computation. How about Turing's own papers? http://www.turingarchive.org/viewer/?id=459title=1 Without the possibility of physical implementation (not attachment to any particular physical system which is contra universality) there is no possibility of any input or output control. Peter Wegner et al make some some powerful arguments in terms of interactive computation... It is interesting but it does not concerns us a priori. If if helps you to find a solution please do. Most notion of physical implementations of computation use the mathematical notion above. Not the contrary. Deutsch' thesis is not Church's thesis. Sure, but Deutsch is not trying to make computation float free of the physical world Unlike you in your last post, Deustch does postulate a form of physicalism, through his thesis, but it can be shown inconsistent with comp. Indeed that's an easy consequence of UDA. The quantum many- worlds extend it comp many dreams, and both the collapse and the wave are appearances. and thus
Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
Point, Set, Match: Craig Weinberg! On 8/25/2012 1:44 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, August 24, 2012 3:50:32 PM UTC-4, John K Clark wrote: On Fri, Aug 24, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: I did it for many reasons And a cuckoo clock operates the way it does for many reasons. None of them are the reasons of a clock. If you must manufacture reasons, then they can only be the reasons of human clockmakers and human consumers of clocks. It could be said that there are reasons from the molecular layer as well - of tension, density, and mass. There are no cuckoo clock reasons though. some of them my own. In other words you have not divulged to others some of the reasons you acted as you did, and no doubt some of the reasons you don't know yourself. No matter, they're still reasons. No, privacy is not the difference. My motives are not only the motives of cells or species, they are specific to me as well. The cuckoo clock can't do that. It can't intentionally try something new and justify it with a reason later. Anything that can be imagined as occuring before something else can be called a reason - a butterfly wing flapping can be a reason for a typhoon. There are countless reasons which can influence me, but I can choose in many cases to what extent I identify with that influence, or I can defy all of the influences with a creative approach which is not random nor predetermined by any particular reason outside of my own. Your argument is that grey must be either black or white. No, grey is a state of being every bit as logical as black or white, and because it is logical we know that everything is either grey or not grey. And free will is every bit as logical as grey. We know that everything is either voluntary or involuntary. I wouldn't say that, but you would have to agree to that if you are to remain consistent in your position. It's interesting that you bring up Lewis Carroll (as you have before) as an insult, when actually the Alice books are brilliant explorations on consciousness and sense-making. And he was a brilliant satirist on how illogical many of our most strongly held beliefs are. Charles Lutwidge Dodgson would laugh at your ideas. And Richard Phillips Feynman would laugh at your lack of ideas. What does your opinion of my ideas have to do with anything? If you can't refute them, just concede. Why claim the dead as your allies against me? Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? In either case, would there be any point in anyone else paying attention to them Point? It sounds like you're asking for a reason, well such a reason either exists or it does not. What do your assumptions about my motives have to do with anything? That's a stupid question; if you had motives, regardless of what they are, then your actions are deterministic. That's a stupid answer. My question was very specific: Are your opinions on free will robotic or random? You are trying to create a diversion to cover up that your approach fails the test of its own limited criteria. If your opinions are robotic or random, then they don't matter and they aren't opinions. This has nothing to do with me or my motives. What is useful about saying that something 'either exists or it does not'? That's an even stupider question, true statements always have uses. An even stupider non-answer. Just because a statement is true doesn't mean it is a useful statement. Even if it were true, you are still admitting that your edicts of binary mutual exclusivity are no more relevant than saying anything at all. Everything exists in some sense. Nothing exists in every sense. And with that you abandon any pretense that you want to figure out how the world works and make it clear that what you really want to do is convince yourself that what you already want to believe is in fact true. And its going to work too because if you take the above as a working axiom in your system of beliefs then you can prove or disprove anything you want, you can even prove and disprove the same thing at the same time. Not at all. I am asserting positively that this is actually the nature of the world. All forms of proof are relative to the context in which they are proved. According to your views, you don't have any views, and neither do any possible readers of your views. That is ridiculous. I agree, nevertheless it is the inescapable reductio ad absurdum of your stated worldview. All of it is either robotic or random. What does that have to do with the price of eggs? What does that have to do with not having views?? Because if your views are robotic or random then they are not views, they are noise. Since you mention
Re: The hypocracy of materialism
On 8/23/2012 1:04 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: The hardest part of the mind/body problem is figuring out exactly what the mind/body problem is An explanation on how consciousness arises in the body. and what solving it is supposed to mean. Know how consciousness works and how it is related to the physical body. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_problem It's useful to think of what kind of explanation we might find satisfactory. In other fields, once we have an explanation that fits in with other theories and which allows use to manipulate or predict things we call it an explanation. When Newton came up with his theory of gravity he was asked how gravity exerted a force at a distance. He replied Hypothesi non fingo. Yet gravity was considered a good explanation of planetary motion, ballistics, and other phenomena. Eventually, Einstein found a better explanation - one that agreed with a few more observations and which answered the force-at-a-distance problem. But it still leaves the question; how does matter warp spacetime? And Einstein might have given the same answer as Newton. That's why I think that when consciousness is 'explained' it will just be that we will have solved the engineering problems of AI and robotics to such a degree that everyone will agree that we can make conscious robots and that we can make them with different personalities and we can manipulated and interconnect brains in ways that people describe as changing their consciousness, etc. And we will just stop thinking of consciousness as the hard problem because it will be seen as an ancillary question - like, how does gravity act at a distance. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Simple proof that our intelligence transcends that of computers
On 8/25/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: We do things because of the laws of nature OR we do not do things because of the laws of nature, and if we do not then we are random. We might do things because the laws of arithmetic. With comp Nature is not in the ontology. You are assuming physicalism here, which is inconsistent with computationalism. I don't see that John is assuming that physics is fundamental. If computationalism=conscious thought arises from some kinds of computation. it may still require that those kinds of computation, the ones giving rise to conscious thought, must also give rise to some form of physics; that there cannot be conscious thought without physics. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The hypocracy of materialism
On 8/25/2012 2:26 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 25.08.2012 22:25 meekerdb said the following: On 8/23/2012 1:04 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: The hardest part of the mind/body problem is figuring out exactly what the mind/body problem is An explanation on how consciousness arises in the body. and what solving it is supposed to mean. Know how consciousness works and how it is related to the physical body. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_problem It's useful to think of what kind of explanation we might find satisfactory. In other fields, once we have an explanation that fits in with other theories and which allows use to manipulate or predict things we call it an explanation. When Newton came up with his theory of gravity he was asked how gravity exerted a force at a distance. He replied Hypothesi non fingo. Yet gravity was considered a good explanation of planetary motion, ballistics, and other phenomena. Eventually, Einstein found a better explanation - one that agreed with a few more observations and which answered the force-at-a-distance problem. But it still leaves the question; how does matter warp spacetime? And Einstein might have given the same answer as Newton. That's why I think that when consciousness is 'explained' it will just be that we will have solved the engineering problems of AI and robotics to such a degree that everyone will agree that we can make conscious robots and that we can make them with different personalities and we can manipulated and interconnect brains in ways that people describe as changing their consciousness, etc. And we will just stop thinking of consciousness as the hard problem because it will be seen as an ancillary question - like, how does gravity act at a distance. Brent Do you mean that when the evolution according to the M-theory proceeds further, then such a question will not be instantiated anymore in the brain of scientists? Evolution of what? What question? Could you please apply the compatibilist viewpoint to engineers? How would you describe what a creativity of engineers is according to compatibilism? Why should I? I didn't use the word compatibilism. What's your definition of compatibilism? of creativity? Brent Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The hypocracy of materialism
On 25.08.2012 23:32 meekerdb said the following: On 8/25/2012 2:26 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 25.08.2012 22:25 meekerdb said the following: On 8/23/2012 1:04 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: The hardest part of the mind/body problem is figuring out exactly what the mind/body problem is An explanation on how consciousness arises in the body. and what solving it is supposed to mean. Know how consciousness works and how it is related to the physical body. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind%E2%80%93body_problem It's useful to think of what kind of explanation we might find satisfactory. In other fields, once we have an explanation that fits in with other theories and which allows use to manipulate or predict things we call it an explanation. When Newton came up with his theory of gravity he was asked how gravity exerted a force at a distance. He replied Hypothesi non fingo. Yet gravity was considered a good explanation of planetary motion, ballistics, and other phenomena. Eventually, Einstein found a better explanation - one that agreed with a few more observations and which answered the force-at-a-distance problem. But it still leaves the question; how does matter warp spacetime? And Einstein might have given the same answer as Newton. That's why I think that when consciousness is 'explained' it will just be that we will have solved the engineering problems of AI and robotics to such a degree that everyone will agree that we can make conscious robots and that we can make them with different personalities and we can manipulated and interconnect brains in ways that people describe as changing their consciousness, etc. And we will just stop thinking of consciousness as the hard problem because it will be seen as an ancillary question - like, how does gravity act at a distance. Brent Do you mean that when the evolution according to the M-theory proceeds further, then such a question will not be instantiated anymore in the brain of scientists? Evolution of what? What question? I believe that you accept the viewpoint that the physical laws are causally closed and that there are physical laws that describe the transient development of our universe including human beings. Is this correct? If yes, then my question was related to the fact that now in brains of some people the physical laws instantiate a question what is consciousness. Hence I have guessed that in the future such a question will not be instantiated anymore. Could you please apply the compatibilist viewpoint to engineers? How would you describe what a creativity of engineers is according to compatibilism? Why should I? I didn't use the word compatibilism. What's your definition of compatibilism? of creativity? If we speak about creativity of engineers, I would say that we are back to a question of free will. Hence was my question about compatibilism. Or do you think we could separate creativity of engineers from free will problem? Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
