The meaning of subjectivity and the importance of self (1p)
Bruno and all, I have not infrequently brought up the need for a self in your models. Why do you need to include a self or 1p in your models ? There are two ways of looking at something: a) the objective material, which is the raw material without an observer. The impersonal, scientific version. This is just stuff and it has no meaning by itself. Peirce called it Firstness. b) a subjective account of the material, which is the meaning of the stuff. It is the objective material filtered through an individual's consciousness. I think that is somehow related to 1p. It is the stuff as experienced, the meaning of the stuff. From a particular point of view, such as an individual monad would perceive. Secondness is the meaning of the experience to the individual, or Firstness from a particular point of view. Thirdness is Secondness expressed to others. I think that looking at the raw stuff without filtering it through an individual's eyes-- the objective account-- will not completely tell you how well that raw account emulates life. You need to 1p filter it to get its meaning. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable
Hi Roger, On 01 Oct 2012, at 19:28, Roger Clough wrote: BRUNO: OK. But the ability to selct does not require intelligence, just interaction and some memory. $$ ROGER: No, that's where you keep missing the absolutely critical issue of self. Choice is exclusive to the autonomous self, and is absolutely necessary. Self selects A or B or whatever entirely on its own.. That's what intelligence is. INTELLIGENCE = AUTONOMOUS CHOOSER + CHOICES When you type a response, YOU choose which letter to type, etc. That's an intelligent action. I agree with you on choice. I use the term self-determination in my defense of free will. When I was talking about consciousness selection, it has nothing to do with choice. It was what happen, in the comp theory, when you duplicate yourself in two different place, like Washington and Moscow. After that duplication, when you look at you neighborhood, there is a consciousness or first person selection: you feel to be in W, or you feel to be in M. You have no choice in that matter. Choice is something else entirely, and play no role in the origin and shape of the physical laws, but consciousness selection (which is a form of Turing-tropism (generalization of anthropism)). Selection of a quantum path (collapse or reduction of the jungle of brain wave paths) produces consciousness, according to Penrose et al. They call it orchestrated reduction. . BRUNO: Penrose is hardly convincing on this. Its basic argument based on G del is invalid, and its theory is quite speculative, like the wave collapse, which has never make any sense to me. ROGER: All physical theories (not mathematical theories) are speculative until validated by data. No. All theories are speculative. Period. But when I said quite speculative, I meant no evidence at all, and contradictory with all current evidences. Yes. Atoms are no atoms (in greek t??? means not divisible). $$ROGER: The greeks had no means to split the atom, they hadn't even seen one. The greeks knew that atoms are not divisible, by definition. They didn't knew that atoms exists, nor do we. I use atom in the philosophical sense. The current physical atoms where believed to be such philo atoms, until the discovery of the electron and nucleus. The new physical philosophical atoms are the elementary particles, but they are no more philosophical atoms in string theory. $$$ROGER: The monads are just points but not physical objects. Overlaying them, all of L's reality is just a dimensionless dot. Like the UD. It is a function from nothing to nothing, and as such 0- dimensional. But i don't really believe the geometrical image is useful. With comp it is better to put geometry in the epistemology of numbers, like analysis, infinities, and physics. Keeping the ontology minimal assures that we will not risk reifying unnecessary materials. I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. BRUNO: OK. I will interpret your monad by intensional number. ROGER: Numbers do not associate to corporeal bodies, so that won't work. What do you mean by corporeal bodies? With comp + the usual Occam razor, corporeal bodies belongs to the mind of numbers (+ infinities of numbers relation). Those less dominant monads are eaten or taken over by the stronger ones. It's a Darwinian jungle down here. Crap happens. BRUNO: Crap happens also in arithmetic when viewed from inside. Contingency is given by selection on the many computational consistent continuation. There are different form of contingencies in arithmetic: one for each modal box having an arithmetical interpretations. In modal logic you can read []p by p is necessary, or true in all (accessible) worlds p by p is possible or true in one (accessible) world ~[]p or ~p by p is contingent (not necessary) What will change from one modal logic to another is the accessibility or the neighborhood relations on the (abstract) worlds. $ ROGER: That's correct, I was incorrectly limiting numbers to necessary logic. OK. Nice. comp reduces the ontology to arithmetic, but it is not a reductionism at all, it is the discovery that arithmetic has an unboundable complexity, full of life, crap, and surprises, and super- exponentially so when seen from inside, where qualitative features appears, as the numbers/machine already witness in their self- referential discourses. Another argument against numbers being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal bodies. Ah? ROGER: By atttached I mean associated with. The association is permanent. Each monad is an individiaul with individual identity given by the corporeal body it is associated with. Its soul. All corporeal bodies are different
Re: Re: Re: Attacking the brain transplant experiment
Hi Stathis Papaioannou The self is not the brain, which is objective. The self is the subjective or personal view of what the brain does. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-01, 19:20:12 Subject: Re: Re: Attacking the brain transplant experiment On Tue, Oct 2, 2012 at 3:37 AM, Roger Clough wrote: A brain in a vat would probably have an autonomous self, which is needed for everything the brain does. I don't see how an autonomous self can be present in a computer, because autonomous means it can't depend on anything--- especially not hardware or software. Let me also say it this alternate way. The output of an algorithm (let's say a choice, given an input) is always dependent on what the algorithm did. And algorithms are software. In that case a brain can't be autonomous either, since it depends on hardware (the matter the brain) and software (encoded in the brain through experience). -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Attacking the brain transplant experiment
On 01 Oct 2012, at 19:37, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal A brain in a vat would probably have an autonomous self, which is needed for everything the brain does. I don't see how an autonomous self can be present in a computer, because autonomous means it can't depend on anything--- especially not hardware or software. Only God does not depend on anything. An autonomous self depends can only be partially autonomous, it depends on its brain, on its flesh, on food, water, taxes, and many things, in its contingent terrestrial manifestations. Autonomy for any being (≠ God) is always relative to its self and its neighboors. Let me also say it this alternate way. The output of an algorithm (let's say a choice, given an input) is always dependent on what the algorithm did. And algorithms are software. But a software can change itself in an autonomous way, relatively to its most probable universal numbers (arithmetical computers). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Re: Re: Attacking the brain transplant experiment
Statis, A more concise response would be that the self is the brain's activity from a certain point of view (yours). Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-02, 05:43:40 Subject: Re: Re: Re: Attacking the brain transplant experiment Hi Stathis Papaioannou The self is not the brain, which is objective. The self is the subjective or personal view of what the brain does. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stathis Papaioannou Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-01, 19:20:12 Subject: Re: Re: Attacking the brain transplant experiment On Tue, Oct 2, 2012 at 3:37 AM, Roger Clough wrote: A brain in a vat would probably have an autonomous self, which is needed for everything the brain does. I don't see how an autonomous self can be present in a computer, because autonomous means it can't depend on anything--- especially not hardware or software. Let me also say it this alternate way. The output of an algorithm (let's say a choice, given an input) is always dependent on what the algorithm did. And algorithms are software. In that case a brain can't be autonomous either, since it depends on hardware (the matter the brain) and software (encoded in the brain through experience). -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable
On 02 Oct 2012, at 07:14, William R. Buckley wrote: $$$ 1) Well it's an indeterminantcy, but which path is chosen is done by the geometry of the location or test probe, not the same I would think as logical choice (?) So I would say no. ... Note that intelligence requires the ability to select. BRUNO: OK. But the ability to selct does not require intelligence, just interaction and some memory. I can make a selection without the use of memory. We call such choices by the term arbitrary William, please look at my answer to Roger. Consciousness selection is a posteriori, and happens in self-duplication (in the comp theory), or in superposition (in the Everett theory). It has nothing to do with choice, which is self-determination. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: structural complexity
On 02 Oct 2012, at 05:57, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/1/2012 1:00 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Physiological realities are mechanistic. Biologists and doctors are mechanists. Even if you claim that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts that does not mean that if yoyu replace the parts the whole will stop working. Yes. Anti-mechanist often refer to the whole is bigger than the parts, but nowhere else than in computer and engineering is it more true that the whole is bigger than the part, if only because the whole put some specific structure on the relation between parts. We might simplify this by saying that the whole *structural complexity* grows like an exponential (or more) when the whole cardinality grows linearly. H Bruno, Could you source some further discussions of this idea? I thought it was common sense. With a coffee machine, you can do coffee. But you can't do coffee with any parts of that machine. From my own study of Cantor's tower of infinities, I have found the opposite, complexity goes to zero as the cardinals lose the ability to be named. ? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
On creating Golem
Hi Bruno Marchal Yes, complete autonomy of the mind may not be possible, I agree, but we seem to survive this problem. My objection that sufficent computer autonomy may not be possible to emulate life is still a doubt in my mind. In both of these cases, the ultimate limitation might be language, meaning words or the symbols of calculation. Peirce said that we think in symbols. But symbols are Thirdness, the raw stuff filtered (or distorted) from a particular point of view. Words are known to be cultural products. Symbols of computation depend on what a computation can do and how we define the symbols, which I suppose goes back to the limitations and distortions of words. Let me try this: 1) Computer programs use selected symbols and program designs. 2) These symbols and designs are man-made and hence sometimes distorted and imperfect. I admit that simple calculations can be perfect. 3) So computer programs are quite possibly reflections of whoever made the program, and of the distortions of computer language, not life itself. In essence what I am saying here is that only a perfect being can create life. But maybe I am being too hard on the possibilities or impossibilities. A golem would still be interesting. Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-02, 05:48:09 Subject: Re: Attacking the brain transplant experiment On 01 Oct 2012, at 19:37, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal A brain in a vat would probably have an autonomous self, which is needed for everything the brain does. I don't see how an autonomous self can be present in a computer, because autonomous means it can't depend on anything--- especially not hardware or software. Only God does not depend on anything. An autonomous self depends can only be partially autonomous, it depends on its brain, on its flesh, on food, water, taxes, and many things, in its contingent terrestrial manifestations. Autonomy for any being (? God) is always relative to its self and its neighboors. Let me also say it this alternate way. The output of an algorithm (let's say a choice, given an input) is always dependent on what the algorithm did. And algorithms are software. But a software can change itself in an autonomous way, relatively to its most probable universal numbers (arithmetical computers). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable
Hi Bruno Marchal My understanding of personal or subjective or 1p filtering has little to do with where the person is (Washington or Moscow). it has to do (if I might say it this way) with where the person has been. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-02, 05:34:11 Subject: Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable Hi Roger, On 01 Oct 2012, at 19:28, Roger Clough wrote: BRUNO: OK. But the ability to selct does not require intelligence, just interaction and some memory. $$ ROGER: No, that's where you keep missing the absolutely critical issue of self. Choice is exclusive to the autonomous self, and is absolutely necessary. Self selects A or B or whatever entirely on its own.. That's what intelligence is. INTELLIGENCE = AUTONOMOUS CHOOSER + CHOICES When you type a response, YOU choose which letter to type, etc. That's an intelligent action. I agree with you on choice. I use the term self-determination in my defense of free will. When I was talking about consciousness selection, it has nothing to do with choice. It was what happen, in the comp theory, when you duplicate yourself in two different place, like Washington and Moscow. After that duplication, when you look at you neighborhood, there is a consciousness or first person selection: you feel to be in W, or you feel to be in M. You have no choice in that matter. Choice is something else entirely, and play no role in the origin and shape of the physical laws, but consciousness selection (which is a form of Turing-tropism (generalization of anthropism)). Selection of a quantum path (collapse or reduction of the jungle of brain wave paths) produces consciousness, according to Penrose et al. They call it orchestrated reduction. . BRUNO: Penrose is hardly convincing on this. Its basic argument based on G del is invalid, and its theory is quite speculative, like the wave collapse, which has never make any sense to me. ROGER: All physical theories (not mathematical theories) are speculative until validated by data. No. All theories are speculative. Period. But when I said quite speculative, I meant no evidence at all, and contradictory with all current evidences. Yes. Atoms are no atoms (in greek t??? means not divisible). $$ROGER: The greeks had no means to split the atom, they hadn't even seen one. The greeks knew that atoms are not divisible, by definition. They didn't knew that atoms exists, nor do we. I use atom in the philosophical sense. The current physical atoms where believed to be such philo atoms, until the discovery of the electron and nucleus. The new physical philosophical atoms are the elementary particles, but they are no more philosophical atoms in string theory. $$$ROGER: The monads are just points but not physical objects. Overlaying them, all of L's reality is just a dimensionless dot. Like the UD. It is a function from nothing to nothing, and as such 0-dimensional. But i don't really believe the geometrical image is useful. With comp it is better to put geometry in the epistemology of numbers, like analysis, infinities, and physics. Keeping the ontology minimal assures that we will not risk reifying unnecessary materials. I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. BRUNO: OK. I will interpret your monad by intensional number. ROGER: Numbers do not associate to corporeal bodies, so that won't work. What do you mean by corporeal bodies? With comp + the usual Occam razor, corporeal bodies belongs to the mind of numbers (+ infinities of numbers relation). Those less dominant monads are eaten or taken over by the stronger ones. It's a Darwinian jungle down here. Crap happens. BRUNO: Crap happens also in arithmetic when viewed from inside. Contingency is given by selection on the many computational consistent continuation. There are different form of contingencies in arithmetic: one for each modal box having an arithmetical interpretations. In modal logic you can read []p by p is necessary, or true in all (accessible) worlds p by p is possible or true in one (accessible) world ~[]p or ~p by p is contingent (not necessary) What will change from one modal logic to another is the accessibility or the neighborhood relations on the (abstract) worlds. $ ROGER: That's correct, I was incorrectly limiting numbers to necessary logic. OK. Nice. comp reduces the ontology to arithmetic, but it is not a
autonomous means a priori
Hi Bruno Marchal I agree that conscious selection is a posteriori, but the selector and his possible biases or personal baggage are a priori. He has or is a self. It is the a priori part that I am referring to when I insist that the selector must be able to make autonomous choices. The choice must be based mostly on the inside = the selector's mind. In other words, autonomous = a priori Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-02, 06:03:36 Subject: Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable On 02 Oct 2012, at 07:14, William R. Buckley wrote: $$$ 1) Well it's an indeterminantcy, but which path is chosen is done by the geometry of the location or test probe, not the same I would think as logical choice (?) So I would say no. ... Note that intelligence requires the ability to select. BRUNO: OK. But the ability to selct does not require intelligence, just interaction and some memory. I can make a selection without the use of memory. We call such choices by the term arbitrary William, please look at my answer to Roger. Consciousness selection is a posteriori, and happens in self-duplication (in the comp theory), or in superposition (in the Everett theory). It has nothing to do with choice, which is self-determination. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable
Hi Stephen P. King I appreciate criticisms of Leibniz. Not sure what computational complexity or universality means although I suppose that it has something to do with the whole is greater than its parts. That being so, if we take the parts to be monads, each part knows everything (all of the other monads) in the universe, in which there are an infinite number of monads. So the whole (the monad of monads, the All) in Leibniz is infinitely greater than the parts (its monads and their infinite contents of all the other monads. And that's just the beginning, for Leibniz says that world consists of monads within monads within monads within. Would that overcome your objection ? Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-02, 00:16:31 Subject: Re: The Good, the Bad and the weirdly computable On 10/1/2012 1:28 PM, Roger Clough wrote: ROGER: Objects can be physical and also infinitely divisible, but L considered this infinite divisibility to disqualify an object to be real because there's no end to the process, one wouldn't end up with something to refer to. Hi Roger, This is part of the thoughts that Leibniz was wrong about since he did not know of computational complexity or universality. His explanations assumed only ideas from the material world. He was an unparalleled genius, there is no doubt of that, but he was far ahead of his time. We can now correct these errors and use the monadology as a mereological model of entities. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitantsofmonads
Hi Richard Ruquist Absolutely. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Richard Ruquist Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-01, 16:51:44 Subject: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitantsofmonads String theory and variable fine-structure measurements across the universe suggest that the discrete and distinct monads are ennumerable. On Mon, Oct 1, 2012 at 4:32 PM, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/1/2012 10:17 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Stephen P. King Good idea, but unfortunately monads are not numbers, numbers will now guide them or replace them. Monads have to be associated with corporeal bodies down here in contingia, where crap happens. Hi Roger, I agree, monads are not numbers. Monads use numbers. Roger Clough,rclo...@verizon.net 10/1/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Stephen P. King Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-09-30, 14:22:03 Subject: Re: Numbers and other inhabitants of Platonia are also inhabitants ofmonads On 9/30/2012 8:34 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I'm still trying to figure out how numbers and ideas fit into Leibniz's metaphysics. Little is written about this issue, so I have to rely on what Leibniz says otherwise about monads. Previously I noted that numbers could not be monads because monads constantly change. Another argument against numbers being monads is that all monads must be attached to corporeal bodies. So monads refer to objects in the (already) created world, whose identities persist, while ideas and numbers are not created objects. While numbers and ideas cannot be monads, they have to be are entities in the mind, feelings, and bodily aspects of monads. For Leibniz refers to the intellect of human monads. And similarly, numbers and ideas must be used in the fictional construction of matter-- in the bodily aspect of material monads, as well as the construction of our bodies and brains. Dear Roger, Bruno's idea is a form of Pre-Established Hamony, in that the truth of the numbers is a pre-established ontological primitive. -- Onward! -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: autonomous means a priori
On 02 Oct 2012, at 12:30, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal I agree that conscious selection is a posteriori, but the selector and his possible biases or personal baggage are a priori. He has or is a self. It is the a priori part that I am referring to when I insist that the selector must be able to make autonomous choices. The choice must be based mostly on the inside = the selector's mind. In other words, autonomous = a priori OK, so we agree on this too. To put it simply, choice depends on who you are, and who you are depends on who you have been. Selection is used only in the QM or comp context, and has nothing to do with choice and autonomy. Its role in comp and QM is in the singularization and partial relative selection of the local material conditions (your most probable universal neighborhood). My understanding of personal or subjective or 1p filtering has little to do with where the person is (Washington or Moscow). it has to do (if I might say it this way) with where the person has been. Hmm, this defines the person. But in the duplication experience, the problem is that the have been is duplicated identically, and put in different places. This entails a first person indeterminacy: before the duplication, and knowing the protocol of the duplication, the person is indetermined about its immediate, post-duplication, future. This is almost another topics, and I have mentioned it only to recall that with comp, matter is not a primary stuff. You might read my paper sane04 if interested. Yes, complete autonomy of the mind may not be possible, I agree, but we seem to survive this problem. Not sure. Anne Frank was an autonomous agent, until its neighborhood fight badly back: she did not survive the concentration camps. She might have survived in some alternate reality, but we can't access it now. Survival also is relative, but the death of others are absolute relatively to the branch of reality you can be here and now. My objection that sufficent computer autonomy may not be possible to emulate life is still a doubt in my mind. Good. Doubting is a symptom of mind sanity and of soul honesty. In both of these cases, the ultimate limitation might be language, meaning words or the symbols of calculation. Peirce said that we think in symbols. But symbols are Thirdness, the raw stuff filtered (or distorted) from a particular point of view. Words are known to be cultural products. Symbols of computation depend on what a computation can do and how we define the symbols, which I suppose goes back to the limitations and distortions of words. Let me try this: 1) Computer programs use selected symbols and program designs. Hmmm... OK (but this admits different interpretations, I choose the one which seems most coherent with the present discussion, and with comp). 2) These symbols and designs are man-made and hence sometimes distorted and imperfect. I admit that simple calculations can be perfect. Only locally so. Humans can believe that they have invented the computer, but computer have appeared in nature all the time since the beginning, and eventually with comp, nature itself is a video game selected by the infinitely many computers existing in arithmetic independently of time and space. 3) So computer programs are quite possibly reflections of whoever made the program, and of the distortions of computer language, not life itself. I can guess the nuances, but it is a form of anthropomorphism. Life, for a computationalist is almost captured by a very simple program: help yourself. In essence what I am saying here is that only a perfect being can create life. OK. Arithmetical truth can be considered perfect, somehow, and it creates life and lives. But maybe I am being too hard on the possibilities or impossibilities. A golem would still be interesting. There is no worry. God recognizes his creatures, in heaven. But it is nice also when the creatures recognizes themselves on earth, but that can take time. It is nice as it makes suffering less necessary. It is harm reductive. But women get the votes only recently herby, and machines, which are made into slaves at the start, are not yet asking. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: The meaning of subjectivity and the importance of self (1p)
On 02 Oct 2012, at 11:27, Roger Clough wrote: Bruno and all, I have not infrequently brought up the need for a self in your models. Why do you need to include a self or 1p in your models ? There are two ways of looking at something: a) the objective material, which is the raw material without an observer. The impersonal, scientific version. This is just stuff and it has no meaning by itself. Peirce called it Firstness. OK. And with comp, Plotinus or Plato, it does not really exist. It is not part of the being. It is the shadow of a vaster reality only. b) a subjective account of the material, which is the meaning of the stuff. Hmm... I would say tha the stuff is only a part of the meaning, which is only a part of what a person is. It is the objective material filtered through an individual's consciousness. I think that is somehow related to 1p. OK. (with objective = sharable by all persons) It is the stuff as experienced, the meaning of the stuff. From a particular point of view, such as an individual monad would perceive. Perhaps I should interpret your monad by person, simply. Or generalized person. Secondness is the meaning of the experience to the individual, or Firstness from a particular point of view. Thirdness is Secondness expressed to others. I think that looking at the raw stuff without filtering it through an individual's eyes-- the objective account-- will not completely tell you how well that raw account emulates life. You need to 1p filter it to get its meaning. No problem. With comp the moon is no more stuffy than a spaceship in a video game, except that most spaceship video game are only some years old, the moon and stars are basically as old as the physical universe. But they are not made of stuff, and comp is only in its infancy, so that it can still take time before we really apprehend that stuffy aspect. With comp (assuming no flaws, etc.) things goes like this (roughly speaking) ARITHMETICAL TRUTH INTELLIGIBLE ARITHMETICAL REALM === UNIVERSAL SOUL PARTICULAR SOULS, and then only === PARTICULAR DREAMS SHARING (physical realities). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: The meaning of subjectivity and the importance of self (1p)
Hi Bruno Marchal Responses in ** We're pretty much aligned. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-02, 07:56:43 Subject: Re: The meaning of subjectivity and the importance of self (1p) On 02 Oct 2012, at 11:27, Roger Clough wrote: Bruno and all, I have not infrequently brought up the need for a self in your models. Why do you need to include a self or 1p in your models ? There are two ways of looking at something: a) the objective material, which is the raw material without an observer. The impersonal, scientific version. This is just stuff and it has no meaning by itself. Peirce called it Firstness. b) a subjective account of the material, which is the meaning of the stuff. Hmm... I would say tha the stuff is only a part of the meaning, which is only a part of what a person is. *Absolutely. It is the objective material filtered through an individual's consciousness. I think that is somehow related to 1p. OK. (with objective = sharable by all persons) * good. It is the stuff as experienced, the meaning of the stuff. From a particular point of view, such as an individual monad would perceive. Perhaps I should interpret your monad by person, simply. Or generalized person. * No, each person has his own monad, his own corporeal body. They're all different. Substances are all different. A generalized person would be an idea or abstraction. Ideas are all inhabitants of Platonia. A particular person is an inhabitant of Contingia. Secondness is the meaning of the experience to the individual, or Firstness from a particular point of view. Thirdness is Secondness expressed to others. I think that looking at the raw stuff without filtering it through an individual's eyes-- the objective account-- will not completely tell you how well that raw account emulates life. You need to 1p filter it to get its meaning. No problem. With comp the moon is no more stuffy than a spaceship in a video game, except that most spaceship video game are only some years old, the moon and stars are basically as old as the physical universe. But they are not made of stuff, and comp is only in its infancy, so that it can still take time before we really apprehend that stuffy aspect. With comp (assuming no flaws, etc.) things goes like this (roughly speaking) ARITHMETICAL TRUTH INTELLIGIBLE ARITHMETICAL REALM === UNIVERSAL SOUL PARTICULAR SOULS, and then only === PARTICULAR DREAMS SHARING (physical realities). Good. We're pretty much aligned. This has been very helpful. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Mon, Oct 1, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I don't understand the question because I'm not clear on what these differences refers to. The differences between evolutionary nature (teleonomy) and rational design (teleology) that we are talking about. For God's sake! (Note: poetic license in use, I don't believe in God) I wrote a detailed post last month explaining how and why things that evolved are different from things that are designed by something that is smart and why Evolution is inferior to design at producing complex objects. Apparently you didn't see it so I repeated it just a few days ago. If something I said was unclear I will try to expand on the topic, or if you disagree with part of it I am prepared to debate you, but don't just keep asking the same damn question over and over again and pretend you never saw my answer. Any meta-molecular system is going to be complex compared to a molecular system, That's what meta means, and a very big thing is larger than a big thing. The inorganic geology of the Earth as a whole is much more complex than a single cell Bullshit!! Geology may be large but if we're talking complexity it's finger painting compared to the smallest cell. Darwin wasn't trying to explain awareness itself. That was part of Darwin's genius, picking the right problem to work on. He knew that explaining awareness was out of reach in his day as it is in ours so he didn't waste his time trying, he also knew that explaining the origin of life was out of reach although it's starting to become so in our day. Darwin figured that the problem of how a self reproducing organism could diversify into a bewildering number of species, one of which had a very large brain and opposable thumbs, might be within reach for a man of sufficient talent in his day. And He was right. There is no bridge however from evolution of biological forms and functions to the origin of experience, I might not know exactly how that bridge operates but I know that such a bridge between experience and intelligence MUST exist because otherwise experience could not have evolved on this planet; and it has, at least once for certain, and probably billions of times. It [Evolution] offers no hint of why complex intelligence should be living organisms and not mineral-based mechanisms. If you'd read the post that I sent TWICE in the month of September you'd know that Darwin's theory does explain why that is, but the post was rather long and it did contain a few big words and so you didn't read it and prefer to keep asking the same questions over and over. Before long one generation of computers will design the next more advanced generation, and the process will accelerate exponentially. Maybe. My guess is that in 50 years, someone will still be saying the same thing. Somebody will be saying that in 50 years no doubt about it, but the someone won't be biological. If tools couldn't do something that people can't then there would be no point in them making tools. And water vapor can't smash your house but water vapor can make a tornado and a tornado can. But water vapor can't make tools no matter how fast it's moving or for how long. We can choose to make tools which extend the power of our intentions There are reasons that water vapor makes tornadoes and there are reasons that humans make tools. Biology doesn't have any cosmic purpose for existing, but there are reasons. Are there? Yes. Like what? I've answered this before: Chemistry, a planet with liquid water, a energy source like the sun, and lots of time. There is no purpose in any of that because intelligence is in the purpose conferring business not chemistry or water or energy or time. So there is no purpose to biology but there are reasons. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: autonomous means a priori ver 2
Hi Roger, Another way to express my view is subjective = a priori = autonomous = the chooser Yes. Both the chooser, and the one selected (but not the selector). It is also the knower. The soul is the knower of its own conscience/ consciousness. The man is when the soul believing it has a body (which might be locally true with respect of the probable computational histories in their neighborhoods). objective = a posteriori = possible choices OK. Responses in ** We're pretty much aligned. I think so (except perhaps on Jesus, but we can come back on this later ... I don't think it is so important, now) Perhaps I should interpret your monad by person, simply. Or generalized person. * No, each person has his own monad, his own corporeal body. They're all different. The Universal Soul, the Inner God, the Knower can leave their bodies (in comp). Substances are all different. A generalized person would be an idea or abstraction. Ideas are all inhabitants of Platonia. A particular person is an inhabitant of Contingia. I am not sure. For two reasons: 1) with comp it seems that there is a universal person, abstract, perhaps, but completely conscious. Like you, me, and the jumping spider. 2) most people on (good dose of) salvia divinorum, (a powerful dissociative psychedelic plant), get *completely* amnesic. They report the lost of all the memories of anything particular about them, including the memory of having once own a body, immersed in space and time. Yet, they report to remain *completely* conscious, like out of time, like out of anything (any thing). With lesser dose, you just dissociate, that is you keep the memories, but you don't believe or associate with them any more (for a period of 4m, the experience is short lived). With comp (assuming no flaws, etc.) things goes like this (roughly speaking) ARITHMETICAL TRUTH INTELLIGIBLE ARITHMETICAL REALM === UNIVERSAL SOUL PARTICULAR SOULS, and then only === PARTICULAR DREAMS SHARING (physical realities). Good. We're pretty much aligned. This has been very helpful. Haha! Yes, you confirm some of my feelings, notably, to be short, that christians are, conceptually, much more closer to comp (and Plato, Plotinus, probably Leibniz, even Descartes when read by taking the context into account) than the atheists, the naturalists and the (even weak) materialists who eliminate persons, not just in books, but in their everyday life, as I am witnessing again and again. pfff... BTW, I suggest everyone to look at Korean movies (on Youtube, you can find a lot), as their culture shows some harmonic (with nice gentle dissonances) relationship between christianity and buddhism. By far my favorite is Hello Ghost, which is, btw and imho, a perfect allegory of the salvia divinorum experience, including the so- called breakthrough. It is a typical movie that you can appreciate to see twice (and don't read the YouTube comments the first time, as some some spoils the story!). Best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Zombieopolis Thought Experiment
On Tuesday, October 2, 2012 1:48:39 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: On Mon, Oct 1, 2012 Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: I don't understand the question because I'm not clear on what these differences refers to. The differences between evolutionary nature (teleonomy) and rational design (teleology) that we are talking about. For God's sake! (Note: poetic license in use, I don't believe in God) I wrote a detailed post last month explaining how and why things that evolved are different from things that are designed by something that is smart and why Evolution is inferior to design at producing complex objects. Apparently you didn't see it so I repeated it just a few days ago. If something I said was unclear I will try to expand on the topic, or if you disagree with part of it I am prepared to debate you, but don't just keep asking the same damn question over and over again and pretend you never saw my answer. I don't know what answer you are talking about but I am sure that nothing I have read from you so far has addressed this very specific and clear question of how can reason be completely different from evolution if reason itself is a consequence of nothing but evolution. You say that they are different but you explain nothing of how it is possible for evolution to become so different from itself. Any meta-molecular system is going to be complex compared to a molecular system, That's what meta means, and a very big thing is larger than a big thing. The inorganic geology of the Earth as a whole is much more complex than a single cell Bullshit!! Geology may be large but if we're talking complexity it's finger painting compared to the smallest cell. http://mepag.nasa.gov/science/2_Complex_Surface_Geology/2_Complex_Surface_Geology_clip_image004.jpg http://stockpix.com/images/9799.jpg It depends on what level of description you are looking at. Anything that an organism does to the Earth would change the Earth in complex ways. If you look at the entire history of the Earth as a single event and had to account for every substance and interaction on every layer of the planet including the layers of the atmosphere, there is really no basis for a sweeping edict on complexity. Everything is complex at some level of description. Darwin wasn't trying to explain awareness itself. That was part of Darwin's genius, picking the right problem to work on. He knew that explaining awareness was out of reach in his day as it is in ours so he didn't waste his time trying, Or it could be that Darwin was interested in a particular field of natural science and didn't bear any particular bigotry against all other forms of understanding. he also knew that explaining the origin of life was out of reach although it's starting to become so in our day. Darwin figured that the problem of how a self reproducing organism could diversify into a bewildering number of species, one of which had a very large brain and opposable thumbs, might be within reach for a man of sufficient talent in his day. And He was right. What does Darwin being right about evolution have to do with you being right about biology being unnecessary? There is no bridge however from evolution of biological forms and functions to the origin of experience, I might not know exactly how that bridge operates but I know that such a bridge between experience and intelligence MUST exist because otherwise experience could not have evolved on this planet; and it has, at least once for certain, and probably billions of times. You assume that experience could have evolved from non-experience, but I understand why evolution has to arise from experience to begin with. Nothing can evolve from non-experience. It [Evolution] offers no hint of why complex intelligence should be living organisms and not mineral-based mechanisms. If you'd read the post that I sent TWICE in the month of September you'd know that Darwin's theory does explain why that is, but the post was rather long and it did contain a few big words and so you didn't read it and prefer to keep asking the same questions over and over. There is no point in debating someone who keeps using the tactic of claiming that they answered questions elsewhere. I don't do that so I don't pay attention to others when they do that. If you don't want to answer the question, then don't. Before long one generation of computers will design the next more advanced generation, and the process will accelerate exponentially. Maybe. My guess is that in 50 years, someone will still be saying the same thing. Somebody will be saying that in 50 years no doubt about it, but the someone won't be biological. If there is something non-biological that is being made to say it, they still won't know that they are saying it, or indeed what it
Re: The meaning of subjectivity and the importance of self (1p)
On Tuesday, October 2, 2012 5:28:47 AM UTC-4, rclough wrote: Bruno and all, I have not infrequently brought up the need for a self in your models. Why do you need to include a self or 1p in your models ? There are two ways of looking at something: a) the objective material, which is the raw material without an observer. The impersonal, scientific version. This is just stuff and it has no meaning by itself. Peirce called it Firstness. This is the problem in my view. Matter isn't firstness, it is secondness or really half - of - firstness turned inside out. There needs to be an experience which defines anything, as per Berkeley. You can't assume that 'without an observer' is one of the viable 'ways of looking at something', as you have disqualified all ways of looking at anything from the start. It's confusing because as individual human beings, we are nested layers deep in personal and impersonal interacting levels of perception and participation. It's not that our perception creates matter it is that our perception of matter comes to us indirectly through the experiences of our body. The raw material is experience, not observerless theoretical concepts. Experience is concretely real, ideas of objective conditions which exist outside of all possibility of experience is ultimately nonsense (although seductive nonsense). b) a subjective account of the material, which is the meaning of the stuff. It is the objective material filtered through an individual's consciousness. I think that is somehow related to 1p. It is the stuff as experienced, the meaning of the stuff. From a particular point of view, such as an individual monad would perceive. Secondness is the meaning of the experience to the individual, or Firstness from a particular point of view. Thirdness is Secondness expressed to others. I think that looking at the raw stuff without filtering it through an individual's eyes-- the objective account-- will not completely tell you how well that raw account emulates life. You need to 1p filter it to get its meaning. The 1p is not the filter, it is the 3p which is a lowest common denominator filter that is inter-monadic and virtual. Our 1p is a filter of the multitude of sub-personal and super-personal 1p experiences associated with our cells, molecules, family, world, etc., but it is not a filter of 3p external realities. I'm with Bruno on this as far as matter not being primitive but I don't say that it doesn't exist, only that it existence isn't as primordial as insistence. Extension supervenes on intention, not the other way around. Craig Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net javascript: 10/2/2012 Forever is a long time, especially near the end. -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/_gs8E0x7aQAJ. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: structural complexity
On 10/2/2012 2:57 PM, John Mikes wrote: Stephen (and Bruno?) What I called The Aris - Total- meaning Aristotle's maxim that /the 'whole' is bigger than the sum of its parts/ - means something else in MY agnosticism. Originally I included only the fact what Bruno pointed out now: that the PARTS (as accounted for) develop relations (qualia) adding to the totality they participate in. Lately, however, I added to my view that beyond the accountable *_parts _*(forget now the relations) there are participant 'inconnu'-s from outside our (inventoried) model knowable as of yesterday. So whatever we take inventory of is an (accountable) *_partial_* only. Beyond that - of course - Aristotle's 'total' (/_material parts only)_/ of his inventory was truly smaller than the above *_TOTAL_* in its entire complexity. The fact that complexity-parts extracted, or replaced may not discontinue the function of the 'total' is my problem with death: how to identify THOSE important components which are inevitable for maintaining the function as was? (Comes back to my negative attitude towards transport - hype (to Moscow, or another planet/universe) - complexity has uncountable connections in the infinite relations. How much could we possibly include (in our wildest fantasy) into the tele-transporting of a person (or whatever) so that the original functionality should be still detectable?) Yet we get time transported from last year to this year - with most of our atoms being replaced by others. We are not exactly the same - but the same enough. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: structural complexity
On 10/2/2012 5:57 PM, John Mikes wrote: Stephen (and Bruno?) What I called The Aris - Total- meaning Aristotle's maxim that /the 'whole' is bigger than the sum of its parts/ - means something else in MY agnosticism. Originally I included only the fact what Bruno pointed out now: that the PARTS (as accounted for) develop relations (qualia) adding to the totality they participate in. Lately, however, I added to my view that beyond the accountable *_parts _*(forget now the relations) there are participant 'inconnu'-s from outside our (inventoried) model knowable as of yesterday. So whatever we take inventory of is an (accountable) *_partial_* only. Beyond that - of course - Aristotle's 'total' (/_material parts only)_/ of his inventory was truly smaller than the above *_TOTAL_* in its entire complexity. The fact that complexity-parts extracted, or replaced may not discontinue the function of the 'total' is my problem with death: how to identify THOSE important components which are inevitable for maintaining the function as was? (Comes back to my negative attitude towards transport - hype (to Moscow, or another planet/universe) - complexity has uncountable connections in the infinite relations. How much could we possibly include (in our wildest fantasy) into the tele-transporting of a person (or whatever) so that the original functionality should be still detectable?) Heavenly afterlife anybody? John Mikes Hi John, Aris, I like it! One question is how much of one's sense of self and memories can be carried across. Function does not seem to do this alone as it is completely independent of the physical body. On Mon, Oct 1, 2012 at 11:57 PM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.net mailto:stephe...@charter.net wrote: On 10/1/2012 1:00 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Physiological realities are mechanistic. Biologists and doctors are mechanists. Even if you claim that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts that does not mean that if yoyu replace the parts the whole will stop working. Yes. Anti-mechanist often refer to the whole is bigger than the parts, but nowhere else than in computer and engineering is it more true that the whole is bigger than the part, if only because the whole put some specific structure on the relation between parts. We might simplify this by saying that the whole *structural complexity* grows like an exponential (or more) when the whole cardinality grows linearly. H Bruno, Could you source some further discussions of this idea? From my own study of Cantor's tower of infinities, I have found the opposite, complexity goes to zero as the cardinals lose the ability to be named. -- -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
