Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion
2014-05-17 19:35 GMT+02:00, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Very generaly.. Very generally is not enough. A philosophical standpoint has a tradition. We the humans inherit ways of thinking, memeplexes that can not be isolated in atomic concepts, neither reduced to fancy mathematical formulas. These set of related ideas include attitudes about life, an interpretation of the history, and a set of prophets and precursors of his way of thinking. Even if he don´t know his tradition, he is a consumer of a vulgarized version of the view, which is a second rate version of the same ideas reduced to the present. That historical holistic way of working of the human mind is why modern thinkers that follow a the tradition, the one of modernity, that despises tradition, can not think at the deep level of the thinkers of the past and falsely think that the ancients were confusing. That is not the case. If anything, the modern thinkers are simple. and sterile. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: TRONNIES
On Saturday, May 17, 2014 8:27:19 PM UTC+1, John Ross wrote: John Clark, I assure you I am not a crackpot. I am a graduate Nuclear Engineer, a Patent Attorney and Vice President Intellectual Property of a respected corporation engaged in important scientific research and development. I am a good friend of many brilliant scientist. Most of them are also skeptical of my theory, but none of them has convinced me of any basic errors in my theory, other than it is inconsistent with existing accepted theories. How do you define a crackpot, out of interest? I understand a pretty constrained and precise set of characters. I think you come close John, if as you say, not in fact being a 'crackpot'? It isn't a derogatory label in my view. Most of us are crackpot at one time or another, or regarding one interest or another. I think you qualify because you don't seem to know your subject at anything approaching 'depth'. And you, don't seem to understand what is critical in a theory, and what is 'good to have'. A more elegant, asymmetric arrangement, with a simpler family of fundamental particles. This is 'good to have'it's definitely where science wants to be...but the standard of proof goes up inversely as theories get simpler and more elegant. The two go together...but far and away the critical 'must have' is the standard of what a theory says about the world. If it corrects, or supercedes, or generalizes Relativity and QM, and has a mathmatical reality and does everything they do, and more. That's a profound development, and will quickly find itself elevated to the top table and celebrated round the world. But what if it's all that, but involves a more complicated particle structure and actually increases the number of loose ends and puzzles or whatever? Would make no difference at all. If it's a better theory that replaces the best we have, then it's immaterial if it's more elegant or more complex, simpler, or messier. All that would matter would be the fact major predictions an d generalizations were opened up in a process that involved discovery things are messier and more complex than we previously thought. e John...a situation like that wousld happen all kinds of way. Most frequently, there's no change to the longer term trend toward elegance...go back 2 or 3 steps and things were far messier...but the discovery is that last step just gone saw simplifications that were not grounded in good science. The last step over simplified and wrong simplified and that's why the right theory here is a more complex and messier. John, maybe that was youmaybe the last step had a John Ross at the helm, and John Ross got it into his head simpler and more symmetrical is right for its own sakeeven if the theory doesn't do anything and doesn't replace relativity and QMand faces falsification from hard science (courtesy John C), and violates major principles in physical law, and makes no predictions, and has no unififying equations,hat' and can't calculate or solve problems. Even if all that.because it's SIMPLER and SYMMETRICAL and John Ross thinks that's the HARD challenge in science...all the other stuffis the easy part. So John Ross ignores all the problems and inadequeciesbecause he's solved the hard problem of coming up with a simpler particle idea and being symmetrical. Get real John. It's EASY to dream up a simple elegant structure, if it don't gotta do anything much. I could have ten for you by sun down. I have developed my “Theory of Everything “ through 13 years of hard work. Like all theories (like the relativity theories and the standard model) my theory may or may not be correct. It is certainly not generally accepted by the scientific community like relativity and the standard model are. The scientific community is not yet even aware of my theory. Other than my own friends and family, this chat group is the first people to be aware of it. This group has asked a lot of good questions all of which I have tried to answer quickly; however, to my knowledge no one in this group has read my book. It is available at Amazon.com. And I have offered to send copies to several of this group who have appeared to be seriously interested in my theory. I honestly believe my theory is a great improvement over the standard model and relativity theories. But I am not absolutely certain of that. Time will tell. In the meantime, Richard Feynman’s father was on the right track and Richard Feynman’s answer was not a good one. Richard was correct that the photon was not in the atom. The photons that his father was talking about are much too large to fit in an atom. However, as I have explained several times to this group the energy part of the photon is an entron. The entron is two tronnies traveling in a circle at pi/2 times the speed of light. The diameter d’
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: Hibbs, I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today) entails the MWI. OK. But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of the classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical philosopher), the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or S4Grz1, or X1*). In fact we get different physical realms (probably the physics in heaven, earth, and many intermediate realms, ...). Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is enough test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use world is the sense of a reality as real as what I can observe here and now with quasi- certainty, not in the sense of some ontology, as you know I believe only in natural numbers, and in Einstein reality definition. (*) MC = Many Computations. And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a single world. I doubt this. However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, Thanks. a rare combination. I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the more you are aware of the bigness of what you don't know. Bruno Richard On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Turing *emulation* is only meaningful in the context of emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is real. If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with nature. When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some don't. Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about what it means for something to exist. So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not falsified because it may be true somewhere else? I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless no matter what comp predicts is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, pun?) But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't. But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that we should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is that this requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things happen and some don't. Predictions that something happens somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable. But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, or destructive interference in the observations. To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp, as it needs to if comp is true. My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano Arithmetic, that concerns you. It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics. I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum propositional tautologies. Bruno So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your story of testability. So may I do a little test here. Can anyone here, other than Bruno, explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and attest to that? By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we will learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but if there is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted (well, comp + the classical theory of knowledge). How does the end part well, comp + the classical theory
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 18 May 2014, at 04:47, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Turing *emulation* is only meaningful in the context of emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is real. If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with nature. When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some don't. Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about what it means for something to exist. So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not falsified because it may be true somewhere else? I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless no matter what comp predicts is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, pun?) But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't. But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that we should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is that this requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things happen and some don't. Predictions that something happens somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable. But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, or destructive interference in the observations. To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp, as it needs to if comp is true. My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano Arithmetic, that concerns you. It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics. I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum propositional tautologies. Bruno So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your story of testability. So may I do a little test here. Can anyone here, other than Bruno, explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and attest to that? By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we will learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but if there is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted (well, comp + the classical theory of knowledge). How does the end part well, comp + the classical theory of knowledge change the commitment to falsification? Good question. I let other answer, but frankly, it is just a matter of *studying* the papers. Note that in some presentation, I take the classical theory (or definition) of knowledge granted, but in other presentation, I explain and answer your question with some detail, and it is the object of the thesis. More on this, and you can ask the question to me. The point is in focus, not the success of my pedagogy on this list. Bruno I think you're confused where your theory ends and scientific standards, conventions, definitions begin. The arguments and explanations you lay out in your theory, may certainly arrive at various conclusions for the implications comp has for the world. And I'm quite sure within that you offer your explanation for the falsifiability of comp. But you're getting ahead of yourself dramatically Bruno, if you think the details of your argument is an influential factor in settling the matter of falsifiability. What you profess within your theory is irrelevant...on this encapsulating turf. In fact from memory you've made about 4 arguments at various times. In at least one of your papers you offer this...little package of philosophical reasoning, which 5 lines and 30 seconds later concludes your work is falsifiable so scientific. I mentioned at the time the same argument can be formulated for all philosophy...and probably religion and everything else. Then you insisted your theory is falsifiable because its fundamental position
Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion
On 18 May 2014, at 09:59, Alberto G. Corona wrote: 2014-05-17 19:35 GMT+02:00, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be: Very generally.. Very generally is not enough. Quoting Very generally ... is not enough! A philosophical standpoint has a tradition. I don't do philosophy, in that sense. I study physics in the context of the computationalist frame. We the humans inherit ways of thinking, memeplexes that can not be isolated in atomic concepts, neither reduced to fancy mathematical formulas. In which theory (or meta-theory, or f-realm, frame). These set of related ideas include attitudes about life, an interpretation of the history, and a set of prophets and precursors of his way of thinking. Even if he don´t know his tradition, he is a consumer of a vulgarized version of the view, which is a second rate version of the same ideas reduced to the present. I derive conclusion from an hypothesis. That's all. That historical holistic way of working of the human mind is why modern thinkers that follow a the tradition, the one of modernity, that despises tradition, can not think at the deep level of the thinkers of the past and falsely think that the ancients were confusing. That is not the case. If anything, the modern thinkers are simple. and sterile. Here we agree. In theology, the seriousness peak has standed about 1500 years ago with neoplatonism, and we have regress since. It might be good: we might have to regress sometimes, to concentrate first on easy problem and then come back to the serious deeper and more complex question. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion
On 17 May 2014, at 21:57, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: Here's a slightly different direction for this topic. Religion purportedly answers the why, questions, and science is attributed with answering the how, questions. Regarding God, as I guess him/her/ it, would be a centralized super intelligence that created the Hubble Volume, or likely this, and other galaxies. Atheist, Michael Shermer, coined Shermer's Last Law as Any sufficiently advanced ET is indistinguishable from God. There is something similar in computer science. A machine cannot distinguish a non computable set from a set generated by a machine more complex than herself. I would not say that science = how, and religion why, although there is a bit of truth there. I distinguish science and religion only by their extension. Religion is more like the truth (that we search) and science is more the beliefs (that we share and revise). In the ideal case of the correct machine, science is a proper subset of truth, like G is a proper subset of G*. My reaction has been, So? It's not like we all have to obey the writings of St Augustine, or Thomas Aquinas, on who or what is God. They have a voice, a vote, but not a veto. So maybe God is Krezwell, the Alien? God is more non nameable than that. It is supposed to be responsible also for the Alien, and everything material and spiritual. In comp, the arithmetical truth plays the role of God, even if the Noùs (defined by qG*) is far bigger than God. In comp God is responsible of something which overwhelm him/her/it. That's the price of the comp religion: god is not omniscient nor omnipotent. It's not as if we, mere mortals, have any choice in the matter. We have the moral choice of being skeptical with any name or description of God (of both the outer-god and the inner god). We have (and must have ) the choice to say No to the shaman, priest, doctor. So, knowing this, we might be wiser in focusing on the How questions of the Universe, rather the Why? Maybe we will find the why, more profound, after we identify the how's? Yes, thats science, but we can use reason for both the how and the why. You cannot do science, without doing religion. Those saying that they do not religion, either are instrumentalist technicians, or they are not aware of their religious beliefs. Fundamental science without religion is pseudo-science and/or pseudo- religion. Bruno -Original Message- From: Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sat, May 17, 2014 1:35 pm Subject: Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion On 17 May 2014, at 10:10, Alberto G. Corona wrote: But it is worth to reflect on the mere idea of Agnosticism that comes from Kant and his approach to metaphysics. Kant did not invented it, but it is was the logical consequence of his philosophy and almost every western agnostic is kantian despite that he does not know this fact. It is very important to follow historically the development of that way of thinking to know what this philosophy mean and what more things besides God (a lot, and very important) you are living without. Very generaly, we can say that a believer M is agnostic with respect to a proposition A if M does not believe A *and* does not believe ~A. If G is for God exists, someone agnostic obeys ~[]G and ~[]~G. He does not believe in God and he does not believe in the inexistence of God. Either because he is not interested in the question, or because he waits for more information, and better precision, or he believes may be that it is in God nature than humans can't decide, whatever. Atheists, or at least strong Atheists, are believer, as they tend to believe or assert the non existence of God (instead of the I don't know of the agnostic). Many are believing, or taking for granted, in a primitive material universe, but in science, i think we should be agnostic on this too, especially in front of the debate on the meaning of QM, and the mind- body problem. I understand that agnosticism about space and time can be related to Kant, but for god , matter, energy, that seems to me less clear. Bruno 2014-05-17 0:06 GMT+02:00, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com: Dear Liz, thanks for your care to reflect upon my text and I apologize for my LATE REPLY. You ask about my opinion on Tegmark's math-realism - well, if it were REALISM indeed, he would not have had to classify it 'mathemaitcal'. I consider it a fine sub chapter to ideas about *realism* what we MAY NOT KNOW at our present level. Smart Einstein etc. may have invented 'analogue' relativity etc., it does not exclude all those other ways Nature may apply beyond our present knowledge. Our ongoing 'scientific thinking' - IS - inherently mathematical, so wherever you look you find it in the books. I did not find so far a *natural spot* self-calculating 374
Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion
On 17 May 2014, at 20:47, meekerdb wrote: On 5/17/2014 10:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Very generaly, we can say that a believer M is agnostic with respect to a proposition A if M does not believe A *and* does not believe ~A. If G is for God exists, someone agnostic obeys ~[]G and ~[]~G. He does not believe in God and he does not believe in the inexistence of God. Either because he is not interested in the question, or because he waits for more information, and better precision, or he believes may be that it is in God nature than humans can't decide, whatever. There's also the category of strong agnostic, one who denies that a question can possibly be resolved. And I suppose there is a whole range of agnosticism depending on what degree of resolution is meant. Yes, agnosticism is very large, and is not a philosophical position per se, but more a meta-position, like a statement of ignorance. You can be officially agnostic, yet harbor few doubts. I am officially agnostic on both God and Matter, but I am far more open to a fertile notion of God (like Arithmetical truth) than (primitive) Matter (which I have no clue what it is, and how it could singularize a conscious experience related to observation when we assume computationalism. I define God by anything transcendental, unnameable, and responsible (in a personal or non personal way) for our spiritual and physical existence. In comp, it cannot be Matter. The material derives from the spiritual, like explained in the UDA. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion
Hi John, I frown when I read ontology because it means something like the science (philosophy???) of the existing everything (improved definitions gladly accepted). I am not sure about such existing. Maybe we have some ideas what we THINK it may be. (in the ballpark of reality?) IF we assume computationalism, we have a pretty good idea of what needs to exist. We need anything capable of defining the partial computable functions. Then we have a lot of choice, as for the ontology we can chose any Turing universal system. It happens than elementary arithmetic is Turing complete, and so we can use just the numbers 0, s(0), s(s(0)), ... with (mainly) the addition and multiplication law. But as I said often the combinators can be used instead, or even the FORTRAN programs, the game-of-life pattern, etc. Older savants made useful application of terms we cannot really fixate. This is part of my agnosticism: to discount the 'oldies' - no matter how smart (wise?) they were. Hmm... We have to disagree on this. Some oldies might be better than us, especially when a science (theology) has been stolen by special interest, and has not yet be given back. Plotinus is more modern than us, far more. I start the time for 'oldies' at the present and count them on any backwards scale. Even include my own past oeuvre. Now THAT you may call wishful thinking. We have made progresses on the material, but we are too much dazzled by technology to understand that matter might not be what is. Progresses are double edged, and sometimes can only make a delusion bigger. That is provably the case if we assume comp, as mechanism and materialism are incompatible. I let you chose your favorite poison. Bruno John M On Sat, May 3, 2014 at 4:14 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 03 May 2014, at 16:38, John Mikes wrote: Bruno (excuse me!) - what is the difference between stable patterns of information, e.g. perception... and::(your ontological existence?, 'explained' as): the primitive objects that we agree to assume to solve or formulate some problem, and the phenomenological, or epistemological existence, Ontology is a word. Existence another. So is Information and Perception. I would say ontology is a word. But ontology is what exist, and that can be a word in some theory but could be a giraffe or a dinosaur, or a planet, or a number, in this or that other theory. The same for existence, information and perception, those are words. But I don't see why information, perception and existence would be word. (Later, in the math thread, I might denote the number 2 by s(s(0)), and denote the sequence s(s(0)) by the number 2^(code of s)*5^(code of (; , which will give a large number s(s(s(s(s(s(s(...(0)))...). This is necessary to distinguish in arithmetic a number and a code for that number.) Both definitions are based on ASSUMING.human ways of cognition/ mentality. We can work from the cognitive abilities of machines. Those abilities can be defined in elementary arithmetic, or in any computer language. Phenomenological in my vocabulary points to as we perceive something, the epistemological points to changes of the same. Within our mental capabilities. All right. None cuts into anything R E A L . You don't know that. WE CAN NOT. You cannot know that too. What we cannot do, is express that we can. But we can't express that we cannot do it either. We cannot pretend having stumble on some truth, but we might still stumble on some truth. Why not? Bruno On Thu, May 1, 2014 at 4:17 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 30 Apr 2014, at 21:06, meekerdb wrote: So what does existence mean besides stable patterns of information, e.g. perception of the Moon, landing on the Moon, tidal effects of the Moon,... I distinguish the ontological existence, which concerns the primitive objects that we agree to assume to solve or formulate some problem, and the phenomenological, or epistemological existence, which are the appearance that we derive at some higher emergent level. With comp we need to assume a simple basic Turing complete theory (like Robinson arithmetic, or the SK combinator). And we derive from them the emergence of all universal machines, their interactions and the resulting first person statistics, which should explains the origin and development (in some mathematical space) of the law of physics. I like when David Mermin said once: Einstein asked if the moon still exist when nobody look at it. Now we know that the moon, in that case, definitely not exist. Well, that was a comp prediction, with the difference that the moon doesn't exist even when we look at it. Only the relative relations between my computational states and infinitely many computations exists. Thus completely eviscerating the meaning of
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:41 AM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: Hibbs, I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a single world. However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare combination. You do? Then why participate in this tedious, repetitive carousel of personal attacks (pointing to flaws without precision, just hand waving that there is one and/or attacking Bruno on personal level) of everybody who hasn't red the original thesis, the literature they are based on, and the papers that build, clarify, or expand on the consequences; while pretending to presuppose their content and invalidating them disingenuously? Everybody here should know by now that these attacks don't lead anywhere because off topic by nature and that comp makes your head spin in disbelief at first recognizing possibilities and implications. That's not an argument and neither are personal judgements and attacks of this sort. The real time wasters. PGC Richard On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is real. If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with nature. When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some don't. Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about what it means for something to exist. So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not falsified because it may be true somewhere else? I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless no matter what comp predicts is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, pun?) But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't. But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that we should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is that this requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things happen and some don't. Predictions that something happens somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable. But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, or destructive interference in the observations. To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp, as it needs to if comp is true. My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano Arithmetic, that concerns you. It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics. I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum propositional tautologies. Bruno So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your story of testability. So may I do a little test here. Can anyone here, other than Bruno, explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and attest to that? *By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we will learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but if there is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted (well, comp + the classical theory of knowledge). * How does the end part well, comp + the classical theory of knowledge change the commitment to falsification? Good question. I let other answer, but frankly, it is just a matter of *studying* the papers. Note that in some
Re: Video of VCR
On Thursday, May 15, 2014 6:06:00 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 16 May 2014 08:22, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will be provable in the theory. Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. This means that the truth about number and machines are above what machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume computationalism. But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot truthfully assume it. I believe it's an assumption, and all we can do is bet on (or against) it. If we make that assumption, the UDA shows the consequences. I don't personally know that UDA shows the consequences, but I trust Bruno's expertise that UDA at least shows the possible consequences. The assumption is a fairly standard one for scientists working in the materialist paradigm, I believe. Unless they use continua or infinities at some point, it seems quite plausible that at some level reality could be TE. Yes, it's a popular assumption. Those don't always last forever. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: Hibbs, I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today) entails the MWI. OK. Not OK and not true. But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of the classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical philosopher), the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or S4Grz1, or X1*). In fact we get different physical realms (probably the physics in heaven, earth, and many intermediate realms, ...). Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is enough test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use world is the sense of a reality as real as what I can observe here and now with quasi-certainty, not in the sense of some ontology, as you know I believe only in natural numbers, and in Einstein reality definition. The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all select the same world. All controlled experiments select a single world. (*) MC = Many Computations. And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a single world. I doubt this. However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, Thanks. a rare combination. I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the more you are aware of the bigness of what you don't know. Bruno Richard On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is real. If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with nature. When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some don't. Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about what it means for something to exist. So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not falsified because it may be true somewhere else? I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless no matter what comp predicts is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, pun?) But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't. But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that we should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is that this requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things happen and some don't. Predictions that something happens somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable. But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, or destructive interference in the observations. To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp, as it needs to if comp is true. My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano Arithmetic, that concerns you. It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics. I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum propositional tautologies. Bruno So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your story of testability. So may I do a little test here. Can anyone here, other than Bruno, explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and attest to that? *By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
PGC, If you have not noticed I rarely post here any more. Richard On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 9:57 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:41 AM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.comwrote: Hibbs, I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a single world. However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare combination. You do? Then why participate in this tedious, repetitive carousel of personal attacks (pointing to flaws without precision, just hand waving that there is one and/or attacking Bruno on personal level) of everybody who hasn't red the original thesis, the literature they are based on, and the papers that build, clarify, or expand on the consequences; while pretending to presuppose their content and invalidating them disingenuously? Everybody here should know by now that these attacks don't lead anywhere because off topic by nature and that comp makes your head spin in disbelief at first recognizing possibilities and implications. That's not an argument and neither are personal judgements and attacks of this sort. The real time wasters. PGC Richard On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is real. If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with nature. When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some don't. Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about what it means for something to exist. So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not falsified because it may be true somewhere else? I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless no matter what comp predicts is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, pun?) But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't. But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that we should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is that this requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things happen and some don't. Predictions that something happens somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable. But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, or destructive interference in the observations. To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp, as it needs to if comp is true. My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano Arithmetic, that concerns you. It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics. I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum propositional tautologies. Bruno So it looks like it isn't just me that doesn't understand your story of testability. So may I do a little test here. Can anyone here, other than Bruno, explain this paragraph in terms of realizable falsiibility and attest to that? *By looking to our neighborhood close enough to see if the physics match well a sum on infinities of computations. If comp is true, we will learn nothing, and can't conclude that comp has been proved, but if there is a difference, then we can know that comp is refuted (well, comp + the classical theory of knowledge). * How does the end part well, comp + the classical theory of
Re: TRONNIES
On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 3:27 PM, John Ross jr...@trexenterprises.com wrote I am a good friend of many brilliant scientist. Most of them are also skeptical of my theory, but none of them has convinced me of any basic errors in my theory I am not one bit surprised that none of those brilliant scientist could convince you that your theory is wrong, the defining characteristic of a crackpot is the inability to make the slightest change in ones views even in the face of overwhelming logic. Many, including me, have pointed out that your model is not stable because it would radiate electromagnetic waves and so things would spiral inward, and that your model violates the conservation of mass/energy, and that your model violates the conservation of momentum, and that your model violates the law of conservation of lepton number, and that your model explains absolutely nothing that had previously been unexplained, and that your model can not be used to calculate anything that had previously been incalculable (actually I have grave doubts your model can be used to calculate ANYTHING). All these devastating criticisms have had absolutely positively zero effect on you; you don't even attempt to refute them other than to simply say no it doesn't. And then just like all good crackpots you ignore logical argument and just keep on spouting the same old tired stuff. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 4:50 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: Hibbs, I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today) entails the MWI. OK. Not OK and not true. So the majority of scientists don't believe in concept of function or mechanism (that comp aims to make precise and study the consequences of, given its step 0 assumptions)? What do they believe in then, according to you? Prove it, Richard. Yelling Not ok, is not sufficient. Same for the flaws you claim to have found. PGC But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of the classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical philosopher), the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or S4Grz1, or X1*). In fact we get different physical realms (probably the physics in heaven, earth, and many intermediate realms, ...). Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is enough test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use world is the sense of a reality as real as what I can observe here and now with quasi-certainty, not in the sense of some ontology, as you know I believe only in natural numbers, and in Einstein reality definition. The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all select the same world. All controlled experiments select a single world. (*) MC = Many Computations. And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a single world. I doubt this. However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, Thanks. a rare combination. I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the more you are aware of the bigness of what you don't know. Bruno Richard On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is real. If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with nature. When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some don't. Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about what it means for something to exist. So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not falsified because it may be true somewhere else? I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless no matter what comp predicts is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, pun?) But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't. But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that we should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is that this requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things happen and some don't. Predictions that something happens somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable. But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, or destructive interference in the observations. To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp, as it needs to if comp is true. My point is that if you say yes to the doctor, and believe in peano Arithmetic, that concerns you. It is a problem. We have to find the equivalent of Gleason theorem in arithmetic, for the arithmetical quantum logics. I submit a problem, and I provided a testable part. The quantum
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
It is easy to prove that 99.9% of scientists believe in MWI is not true. The polls taken at physics meetings indicate that less than 50% have such a belief. Gotta go. On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 11:07 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 4:50 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.comwrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: Hibbs, I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today) entails the MWI. OK. Not OK and not true. So the majority of scientists don't believe in concept of function or mechanism (that comp aims to make precise and study the consequences of, given its step 0 assumptions)? What do they believe in then, according to you? Prove it, Richard. Yelling Not ok, is not sufficient. Same for the flaws you claim to have found. PGC But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of the classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical philosopher), the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or S4Grz1, or X1*). In fact we get different physical realms (probably the physics in heaven, earth, and many intermediate realms, ...). Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is enough test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use world is the sense of a reality as real as what I can observe here and now with quasi-certainty, not in the sense of some ontology, as you know I believe only in natural numbers, and in Einstein reality definition. The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all select the same world. All controlled experiments select a single world. (*) MC = Many Computations. And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a single world. I doubt this. However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, Thanks. a rare combination. I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the more you are aware of the bigness of what you don't know. Bruno Richard On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is real. If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with nature. When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some don't. Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about what it means for something to exist. So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not falsified because it may be true somewhere else? I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless no matter what comp predicts is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, pun?) But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't. But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that we should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is that this requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things happen and some don't. Predictions that something happens somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable. But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, or destructive interference in the observations. To me, Gleason theorem somehow solve the measure problem for the quantum theory, but we have only some promise that it will be so for comp, as it needs to if comp is true. My point is
Re: Video of VCR
On Friday, May 16, 2014 3:20:24 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 May 2014, at 22:22, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 2:19:01 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 15 May 2014, at 14:40, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 6:34:55 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:45, Craig Weinberg wrote: I'm showing that authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, and that the failure of logic to detect the significance of authenticity can be empirically demonstrated, but that neither authenticity or the failure of logic to detect it can be detected within logic. At least Godel shows logic's incompleteness, but that is just the beginning. What logic doesn't know about what logic doesn't know I think dwarfs all of arithmetic truth. Gödel has shown the completeness of first order logic, and this means that what we prove in a theory written in such logic, will be true in all interpretation of the theory, and what is true in all interpretations, will be provable in the theory. Then Gödel proved the incompleteness of *all* theories about numbers and machines, with respect to a standard notion of truth. This means that the truth about number and machines are above what machines can prove, and thus what human can prove, locally, if we assume computationalism. But computationalism is a theory about numbers and machines, so we cannot truthfully assume it. no. It is a theory about your consciousness, and its relation with possible brains. But a brain is just a type of machine under comp, and the relations are just number relations. It becomes a theory about numbers, but that is the result of a non trivial reasoning, and the acceptation of the classical theory of knowledge. I can't imagine why the classical theory of knowledge should be acceptable as a way to model consciousness. Does Wiles solution to Fermat's last theorem prove that humans can use non-computational methods, in light of the negative solution to Hilbert's 10th problem? No. Why not? I doubt I'll understand your answer but I might be able to get someone else to explain why he thinks you're wrong. Well, you can invite him to make his point. I've only spoken with him a couple times, but I would if it comes up in the future. The problem is that somehow, in some sense, humans can use non computational rules, like heuristics and metaheuristic, which are non algorithm. But that is also a big chapter in AI, and machines can also use heuristic without problem, and it change nothing about the truth or falsity of comp. In fact the first person []p p is also a non algorithmic entity. So, use à-la Penrose Gödelian argument are usually confusion between []p and []p p, or []p in G and []p in G*. I think that it is nothing other than a semantic misdirection to take non-computational first person properties as being associated with computation. If non-computational properties serve an important function in consciousness, then comp is false. If our first person experience is non-computational then comp is false, since the production of non-computational effects by computation does not imply consciousness, nor does it even imply independence from consciousness to accomplish that production. Penrose thinks that it does: The inescapable conclusion seems to be: Mathematicians are not using a knowably sound calculation procedure in order to ascertain mathematical truth. We deduce that mathematical understanding – the means whereby mathematicians arrive at their conclusions with respect to mathematical truth – cannot be reduced to blind calculation! Good. That's when Penrose is correct. No machines at all can use a knowably sound procedure to ascertain a mathematical truth. By adding knowably Penrose corrected an earlier statement. But then he does not realize that now, his argument is in favor of mechanism, because it attribute to humans, what computer science already attributes to machine. If computer science attributes it to machines (and I would say that it is only some computer scientists who do so) because some are not aware of the difference between []p p and []p. I am aware that the difference is assumed in comp rather than explained by comp. You admit that at some level, basic functions of logic are taken as axioms. I reject all possibility of axioms in the absence of sense. then it cannot use a knowably sound procedure to do that, therefore it is a belief rather than a correct attribution. Yes. you even need an act of faith. I never defend the truth of comp. It is a belief like everywhere in science when we apply it to a reality. I don't think that the understanding that awareness is ontologically necessary is an act of faith, I think that it is inescapable empirically and rationally. I would not say that I have faith in that or that
Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg
Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the ‘hardware’ of our Universe I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and thought it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but I don't see any obvious problems with his general approach: http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/ Some highlights: Some Diophantine equations are easily solved automatically, for example: ∃푥, ∃푦 푥² = 푦² , 푥 푦 ∈ ℤ Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed to step through all the possible solutions will find one immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica, Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve any Diophantine equation. ... *Consequence* In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a computer. Also, he is the inventor of the LCD touchscreen, so that gives him some credibility as well. http://www.trustedreviews.com/news/i-never-expected-them-to-take-off-says-inventor-of-the-touchscreen-display -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Moneybot Singularity
On Thursday, May 15, 2014 5:18:15 PM UTC-4, Liz R wrote: On 16 May 2014 08:29, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com javascript:wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 3:55:12 PM UTC-4, JohnM wrote: Craig: beautiful reply, appreciate your understanding and explanation. H O W E V E R : if we MIX pop culture with more 'thought-of' speculation (language?) we get into trouble soon. Popular meanings are ill-defined and many times loose. I try to verify the exact meanings applies Craig, my Kraxlwerk (PC) stole the half-baked text and mailed it away. I am thankful: the rest would have been silly, anyway. John Thanks John, Yeah, I re-posted that one from by blog so it is more pop-friendly than I probably would have made it for this list. Applying 'singularity' to the growth of technology is pretty weak, I agree. I guess someone decided it needed a super-amazing name. Vernor Vinge. He called it a technological singularity because it makes the future impossible to predict even in a weak sense. This makes it more like a technological event horizon than a singularity, assuming it occurs (Max Tegmark seems to be both worried and hopeful that it will). A singularity is where something comes to an end, in this case human progress (it ends because it hits the wall of whatever is actually possible, assuming that is finite, or if not it ends because it goes to infinity). Thanks. Yeah, that makes more sense, and I have heard of Vinge, but it still seems like a term which as a meaning that is more of a metaphor than most people would assume. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:12 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: It is easy to prove that 99.9% of scientists believe in MWI is not true. The polls taken at physics meetings indicate that less than 50% have such a belief. Gotta go. Where do you see Bruno make such a statement? On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 11:07 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 4:50 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.comwrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.bewrote: On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: Hibbs, I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. He said: The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today) entails the MWI. OK. Comp entails MWI does not mean majority of scientists believe MWI. So straw man, Richard. PGC Not OK and not true. So the majority of scientists don't believe in concept of function or mechanism (that comp aims to make precise and study the consequences of, given its step 0 assumptions)? What do they believe in then, according to you? Prove it, Richard. Yelling Not ok, is not sufficient. Same for the flaws you claim to have found. PGC But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of the classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical philosopher), the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or S4Grz1, or X1*). In fact we get different physical realms (probably the physics in heaven, earth, and many intermediate realms, ...). Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is enough test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use world is the sense of a reality as real as what I can observe here and now with quasi-certainty, not in the sense of some ontology, as you know I believe only in natural numbers, and in Einstein reality definition. The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all select the same world. All controlled experiments select a single world. (*) MC = Many Computations. And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a single world. I doubt this. However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, Thanks. a rare combination. I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the more you are aware of the bigness of what you don't know. Bruno Richard On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Turing **emulation** is only meaningful in the context of emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is real. If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with nature. When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some don't. Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about what it means for something to exist. So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not falsified because it may be true somewhere else? I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless no matter what comp predicts is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, pun?) But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't. But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered that we should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view is that this requires predictions about what happens here and now, where some things happen and some don't. Predictions that something happens somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my idea of testable. But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing, or
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
Accordingto Deutsch, MWI is falsifiable, with some actions of a quantum computer. These would be the heavy hitters of QC, and not the lab toys we have today, but we'd potentially have access to electrons in parallel cosmii. Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. -Original Message- From: Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com To: everything-list everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sat, May 17, 2014 11:41 pm Subject: Re: Is Consciousness Computable? Hibbs, I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a single world. However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare combination. Richard On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb meek...@verizon.netwrote: On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 06:29,meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, BrunoMarchal wrote: Turing *emulation* is only meaningful in the context of emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is real. If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with nature. When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some don't. Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about what it means for something to exist. So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not falsified because it may be true somewhereelse? I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless no matter what comp predicts is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, pun?) But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno derives from that assumption, or there isn't. But the question is about how to test comp. Bruno has offered thatwe should compare its predictions to observed physics. My view isthat this requires predictions about what happens here and now,where some things happen and some don't. Predictions thatsomething happens somewhere in the multiverse don't satisfy my ideaof testable. But comp do prediction right now. At first sight it predicts white noise and white rabbits, but then we listen to the machines views on this, and the simplest pass from provability to probability (the local erasing of the cul-de-sac worlds) gives a quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 proposition. A good chance that arithmetic provided some quantum erazing,
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 18 May 2014, at 16:50, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: Hibbs, I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today) entails the MWI. OK. Not OK and not true. OK. I can agree. What is a world anyway? Nevertheless, it is easy, even in Robinson arithmetic, to prove the existence *all* finite piece of computations. Then assuming computationalism, we have already our problem. My *relative* consciousness is determined by all computations in which I feel personally to survive (the global FPI on the sigma_1 complete part of the arithmetical reality). From the first person views, seen in some 3 views, that is more coherent with a many worlds *views* of reality. It is indeed an open problem if some type of computations winning the limit come to singularize a unique physical reality, defining somehow from inside a unique physical universe, but that becomes a very complex question. There are deep relation between number theory and string theory, and knot theory too. That might help to extracts more information for the lives of the relative universal numbers in Arithmetic. But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of the classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical philosopher), the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or S4Grz1, or X1*). In fact we get different physical realms (probably the physics in heaven, earth, and many intermediate realms, ...). Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is enough test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use world is the sense of a reality as real as what I can observe here and now with quasi- certainty, not in the sense of some ontology, as you know I believe only in natural numbers, and in Einstein reality definition. The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all select the same world. All controlled experiments select a single world. From the first person points of view. That is correct, and predicted by computationalism (and by Everett in QM), the observer does not feel the split, nor the stopping. QM is a relief for a classical computationalist, as it is a witness we do share a substitution level, and we do share a common universal history. QM protects comp from solipsism, and illustrates the existence of a solid first person plural. If ever god duplicate me, he duplicates you too. The quantum superposition are just very contagious. Then the meta-arithmetical theorems (Gödel, Löb, Solovay, Boolos, Goldblatt, Visser) shows that a logic of certainties, for Löbian number are given by the Theaetetus definitions, which are also the simplest common sense notion, well, applied *from* the understanding of the UDA. Incompleteness forces the machine to distinguish truth and belief, and forces the distinction between belief ([]p), knowledge ([]p p), bet ([]p t), and normally you should get the physical laws on the bet on all sigma_1 sentences. You do get indeed an arithmetical quantum logic (well, actually three, and even a graded set of quantum logics, for the []p p variants ...). In fact on sigma_1, the subtleness of incompleteness, makes possible a non trivial marriage between symmetry p - []p, and antisymmetry []([](p-[]p)-p)-p. Actually those logics (with p representing sigma_1 sentences) have both the trivial axioms (false in most modal logics) p- []p. It asserts the sigma_1 completeness of the universal machine (with [] = the box in G = Gödel's beweisbar), together with the reflection formula []p - p. They have p - []p and [] - p, but if p-[]p occurs at the G level, [] p - p is only verified at the G* level, and []p does not collapse into p. And S4Grz1 does not even lost the necessitation rule, having both [] ([]p - p) for p atomic, and [](p-p), but again []p does not collapse, and still gives a non trivial quantization of the arithmetical sigma_1 proposition. I am a constructive mystic. I am telling you that truth, including the physical truth, is in your head, and (the modern constructive part): truth is in the head of all universal numbers. The Löbian number are the one who have enough imagination (induction power) to get that point. All entities capable of believing in the Peano axioms can get that point. If patient and motivated enough, 'course. That does not mean it is true, but it means that if, by the Church- Turing comp necessity, you survive with a digital brain or body, well in that case it is true (normally, if no invalid steps, etc.). Bruno (*) MC = Many Computations. And I think MWI fails
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Sunday, May 18, 2014 2:57:02 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:41 AM, Richard Ruquist yan...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Hibbs, I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a single world. However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare combination. You do? Then why participate in this tedious, repetitive carousel of personal attacks (pointing to flaws without precision, just hand waving that there is one and/or attacking Bruno on personal level) of everybody who hasn't red the original thesis, the literature they are based on, and the papers that build, clarify, or expand on the consequences; while pretending to presuppose their content and invalidating them disingenuously? Everybody here should know by now that these attacks don't lead anywhere because off topic by nature and that comp makes your head spin in disbelief at first recognizing possibilities and implications. That's not an argument and neither are personal judgements and attacks of this sort. The real time wasters. PGC Quite a spew for someone that didn't look closely to in the first place make a say. There's no profile of maliceI've only ever had one major criticism of Bruno's theorizing, and I've tried hard to say it well enough for him that he can move past this. It is totally independent of theory - his or anyone's. It's about falsification that's all. He understands this wrongly...he conceives of it thing with many variant .,,.but this the bedrock of science, it's an hard to vary thing. I understand youyou status-sniff so twill not have read any of my descriptions. Had you of, you'd not entertain poor motivation this keenly, because endless tries to say it better, a single - just one - major criticism, is not the profile for that. Why not you have a go at my post previous to this, in which despite his allegation of vaguery, I go a few steps further than anyone else I'm aware of around here, to make more explicit the end to end structure of falsifiability as it is, in Science. I say. How about you give me that say, and suffer reading the points, and should you find disagreement, let me know. If possible also be less of a turd-sniffer PGC. There's a of formula. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 18 May 2014, at 17:12, Richard Ruquist wrote: It is easy to prove that 99.9% of scientists believe in MWI is not true. I said that 99,9 % of the scientists believe (more or less explicitly) in computationalism (in the weak sense I define by YD+CT). Of course 99,9% of the scientists ignore today that computationalism makes materialism dubious. QM already makes boolean materialism dubious, and the notion of physical reality unclear. I just extend Everett relative state vision on all computations, taking into account that the observer is a relative universal numbers, a Löbian one. The polls taken at physics meetings indicate that less than 50% have such a belief. Sure, for the quantum MWI, that oscillates a lot. But for comp, amazingly enough, the many-computations ontology is already provided by the weakest theory of arithmetic (Robinson arithmetic). 100% of the mathematicians agrees, as it is a theorem of very elementary arithmetic. Still, few meditates on this, and believes that the God Matter select their reality. With comp, God does not select reality, it makes them happening. Only you select the reality. Bruno Gotta go. On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 11:07 AM, Platonist Guitar Cowboy multiplecit...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 4:50 PM, Richard Ruquist yann...@gmail.com wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: Hibbs, I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today) entails the MWI. OK. Not OK and not true. So the majority of scientists don't believe in concept of function or mechanism (that comp aims to make precise and study the consequences of, given its step 0 assumptions)? What do they believe in then, according to you? Prove it, Richard. Yelling Not ok, is not sufficient. Same for the flaws you claim to have found. PGC But it predicts much more than the MWI. It predicts, with the use of the classical definition of knowledge (used by most analytical philosopher), the precise possible logic of observability (Z1*, or S4Grz1, or X1*). In fact we get different physical realms (probably the physics in heaven, earth, and many intermediate realms, ...). Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. I disagree. If you assume mechanism, the two-slits experience is enough test of the MW or MC(*)for me. I use world is the sense of a reality as real as what I can observe here and now with quasi- certainty, not in the sense of some ontology, as you know I believe only in natural numbers, and in Einstein reality definition. The two-slit experiment does not test MWI because the detectors all select the same world. All controlled experiments select a single world. (*) MC = Many Computations. And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a single world. I doubt this. However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, Thanks. a rare combination. I hope it is not. Comp predicts it is not. The more you know, the more you are aware of the bigness of what you don't know. Bruno Richard On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 10:47 PM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Thursday, May 15, 2014 7:48:26 AM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 22:44, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Wednesday, May 14, 2014 7:31:17 PM UTC+1, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 14 May 2014, at 03:29, meekerdb wrote: On 5/13/2014 6:11 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 11:15, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/13/2014 4:06 PM, LizR wrote: On 14 May 2014 06:29, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/12/2014 9:40 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Turing *emulation* is only meaningful in the context of emulating one part relative to another part that is not emulated, i.e. is real. If you say so. We can still listen to the machine, and compare with nature. When we compare with nature we find that some things exist and some don't. Like other worlds don't exist, or atoms don't exist ... the question about what exists hasn't been answered yet. Or indeed the question about what it means for something to exist. So is it your view that no matter what comp predicts it's not falsified because it may be true somewhere else? I find it hard to read that into what I wrote. (Unless no matter what comp predicts is a slightly awkward, but potentially rather funny, pun?) But anyway, no that isn't my view. Either comp is true or it isn't, which is to say, either consciousness is Turing emulable at some level, or it isn't. And if it is, either there is some flaw in what Bruno
Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg
On 18 May 2014, at 17:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the ‘hardware’ of our Universe I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and thought it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but I don't see any obvious problems with his general approach: http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/ Some highlights: Some Diophantine equations are easily solved automatically, for example: ∃푥, ∃푦 푥² = 푦² , 푥 푦 ∈ ℤ Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed to step through all the possible solutions will find one immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica, Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve any Diophantine equation. ... Consequence In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a computer. Also, he is the inventor of the LCD touchscreen, so that gives him some credibility as well. http://www.trustedreviews.com/news/i-never-expected-them-to-take-off-says-inventor-of-the-touchscreen-display You will not convince Andrew Wiles or anyone with argument like that. 1) it is an open question if the use of non elementary means can be eliminated from Wiles proof. Usually non elementary means are eliminated after some time in Number theory, and there are conjectures that this could be a case of general law. 2) machine can use non elementary means in searching proofs too. You did not provide evidence that they cannot do that. And you could'nt as a machine like ZF, or ZF + kappa, can prove things with quite non elementary means. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
So, a new kind of non-boolean, non-digital, computer architecture
Does this computer architecture assume not-comp? 15046Synchronized oscillators may allow for computing that works like the brain *Expand Messages* - richard ruquist May 15 2:09 PM View Source - 0 Attachment - Synchronized oscillators may allow for computing that works like the brainMay 15, 2014 [image: oscillating_switch] This is a cartoon of an oscillating switch, the basis of a new type of low-power analog computing (credit: Credit: Nikhil Shukla, Penn State) Computing is currently based on binary (Boolean) logic, but a new type of computing architecture created by electrical engineers at Penn Statehttp://www.psu.edu/ stores information in the frequencies and phases of periodic signals and could work more like the human brain. It would use a fraction of the energy necessary for today’s computers, according to the engineers. To achieve the new architecture, they used a thin film of vanadium oxide on a titanium dioxide substrate to create an oscillating switch. Vanadium dioxide is called a “wacky oxide” because it transitions from a conducting metal to an insulating semiconductor and vice versa with the addition of a small amount of heat or electrical current. *Biological synchronization for associative processing* Using a standard electrical engineering trick, Nikhil Shukla, graduate student in electrical engineering, added a series resistor to the oxide device to stabilize oscillations. When he added a second similar oscillating system, he discovered that, over time, the two devices began to oscillate in unison, or synchronize. This coupled system could provide the basis for non-Boolean computing. Shukla worked with Suman Datta, professor of electrical engineering, and co-advisor Roman Engel-Herbert, assistant professor of materials science and engineering, Penn State. They reported their results May 14 in *Scientific Reports* (open access). “It’s called a small-world network,” explained Shukla. “You see it in lots of biological systems, such as certain species of fireflies. The males will flash randomly, but then for some unknown reason the flashes synchronize over time.” The brain is also a small-world network of closely clustered nodes that evolved for more efficient information processing. “Biological synchronization is everywhere,” added Datta. “We wanted to use it for a different kind of computing called associative processing, which is an analog rather than digital way to compute.” An array of oscillators can store patterns — for instance, the color of someone’s hair, their height and skin texture. If a second area of oscillators has the same pattern, they will begin to synchronize, and the degree of match can be read out, without consuming a lot of energy and requiring a lot of transistors, as in Boolean computing. *A neuromorphic computer chip* Datta is collaborating with Vijay Narayanan, professor of computer science and engineering, Penn State, in exploring the use of these coupled oscillations to solve visual recognition problems more efficiently than existing embedded vision processors. Shukla and Datta called on the expertise of Cornell University materials scientist Darrell Schlom to make the vanadium dioxide thin film, which has extremely high quality similar to single crystal silicon. Arijit Raychowdhury, computer engineer, and Abhinav Parihar graduate student, both of Georgia Tech, mathematically simulated the nonlinear dynamics of coupled phase transitions in the vanadium dioxide devices. Parihar created a short video simulation of the transitions, which occur at a rate close to a million times per second, to show the way the oscillations synchronize. Venkatraman Gopalan, professor of materials science and engineering, Penn State, used the Advanced Photon Source at Argonne National Laboratory to visually characterize the structural changes occurring in the oxide thin film in the midst of the oscillations. Datta believes it will take seven to 10 years to scale up from their current network of two-three coupled oscillators to the 100 million or so closely packed oscillators required to make a neuromorphic computer chip. One of the benefits of the novel device is that it will use only about one percent of the energy of digital computing, allowing for new ways to design computers. Much work remains to determine if vanadium dioxide can be integrated into current silicon wafer technology. The Office of Naval Research primarily supported this work. The National Science Foundation’s Expeditions in Computing Award also supported this work. -- *Abstract of Scientific Reports paper* Strongly correlated phases exhibit collective carrier dynamics that if properly harnessed can enable
RE: TRONNIES
John Clark I plan to save your e-mails and maybe I will read some of them to the audience if and when it turns out that I am correct and am awarded the Nobel prize in Physics. By the way, none of the brilliant scientists have tried to convince me that I am wrong. They all skeptical but they have all encouraged me to make predictions that can be tested. In my book I make 101 predictions. A large number of them can be tested. My offer to send you a free copy of my book still stands. Maybe you can prove that some of my predictions are incorrect - based on observations, not existing theories. John Ross From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of John Clark Sent: Sunday, May 18, 2014 8:02 AM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: TRONNIES On Sat, May 17, 2014 at 3:27 PM, John Ross jr...@trexenterprises.com wrote I am a good friend of many brilliant scientist. Most of them are also skeptical of my theory, but none of them has convinced me of any basic errors in my theory I am not one bit surprised that none of those brilliant scientist could convince you that your theory is wrong, the defining characteristic of a crackpot is the inability to make the slightest change in ones views even in the face of overwhelming logic. Many, including me, have pointed out that your model is not stable because it would radiate electromagnetic waves and so things would spiral inward, and that your model violates the conservation of mass/energy, and that your model violates the conservation of momentum, and that your model violates the law of conservation of lepton number, and that your model explains absolutely nothing that had previously been unexplained, and that your model can not be used to calculate anything that had previously been incalculable (actually I have grave doubts your model can be used to calculate ANYTHING). All these devastating criticisms have had absolutely positively zero effect on you; you don't even attempt to refute them other than to simply say no it doesn't. And then just like all good crackpots you ignore logical argument and just keep on spouting the same old tired stuff. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg
On Sunday, May 18, 2014 1:56:48 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 18 May 2014, at 17:43, Craig Weinberg wrote: Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the ‘hardware’ of our Universe I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and thought it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but I don't see any obvious problems with his general approach: http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/ Some highlights: Some Diophantine equations are easily solved automatically, for example: ∃푥, ∃푦 푥² = 푦² , 푥 푦 ∈ ℤ Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed to step through all the possible solutions will find one immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica, Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve any Diophantine equation. ... *Consequence* In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a computer. Also, he is the inventor of the LCD touchscreen, so that gives him some credibility as well. http://www.trustedreviews.com/news/i-never-expected-them-to-take-off-says-inventor-of-the-touchscreen-display You will not convince Andrew Wiles or anyone with argument like that. 1) it is an open question if the use of non elementary means can be eliminated from Wiles proof. Usually non elementary means are eliminated after some time in Number theory, and there are conjectures that this could be a case of general law. 2) machine can use non elementary means in searching proofs too. Does computationalism necessarily include all that is done by what we consider machines, or does computationalism have to be grounded, by definition, in elementary means? You did not provide evidence that they cannot do that. His evidence was the negative answer to Hilbert's 10th problem. And you could'nt as a machine like ZF, or ZF + kappa, can prove things with quite non elementary means. What theory addresses the emergence of non elementary means? Maybe there is something about the implementation of those machines which is introducing it rather than computational factors? Craig Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: TRONNIES
I believe Albert Einstein misinterpreted the Michelson-Morley experiment. That experiment proved that the measured speed of light was always constant. It did not prove that the actual speed of light is always constant. I believe light travels in Coulomb grids and our earth has a Coulomb grid that it carries with it as it moves through the Coulomb grid of the solar system and the solar system has a Coulomb grid that moves with it as it moves our galaxy, etc. See my discussion at page 45. Do you understand how Albert Einstein explained the advance of Mercury’s perihelion? I certainly don’t. Although I have no reason to believe that My theory would not also explain the advance. I believe my theory explains gravity much better than Albert Einstein did. You are right that I have more to work with than Einstein. About 100 years of science. John R From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR Sent: Saturday, May 17, 2014 4:01 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: TRONNIES On 18 May 2014 07:38, John Ross jr...@trexenterprises.com wrote: I believe there is a need for my model because I believe it is a great improvement over existing currently accepted models. I get that, but everyone with a theory believes that. I'm interested in the specific flaws with the standard model that it fixes, and / or the reasoning that leads you to believe that it is better. (The reasoning should be the reasoning, not just a description of the end result of the reasoning!) For example, I believe special relativity addresses the problems that Maxwell's equations break down for an object moving near lightspeed, and the anomalous results of the Michelson-Morley experiment, while general relativity addresses the advance of Mercury's perihelion. They are both based on equivalence principles, SR being that no moving observers should be privileged, GR on the equivalence between aceleration and gravity (the apparently fortuitous fact that the mass values in F=ma and F=Gm/r^2, if I have those right, is the same). So you can see how Einstein used certain principles he believed to be fundamental to support his reasoning, and how the results fixed particular problems with the existing models. I would expect your theory to have similar theoretical and experimental underpinnings if it's to be taken seriously. You're probably in a better position than Einstein as far as time and resources go since he was working in the Swiss patent office at the time he developed SR, if I remember correctly. My book should be in your hands in a very few days if it is not already there. I suggest you read it a decide for yourself whether it has any merit. After you have read it, I suggest you give it to your son. If you do so, warn him that his professors probably are great supporters of the standard model and relativity. Also see my response to John Clark. They are great supporters with good reason! But of course they know those theories can't both be correct... John Ross From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR Sent: Friday, May 16, 2014 2:36 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: TRONNIES Apparently gamme rays are emitted by nuclei when they drop from an excited state to a lower energy state (much as a lower energy photon can be emitted when an electron in an atom moves from a high to a low energy state). Hence what the atom had beforehand was excess energy (in some form). I assume one of the particles making up the nucleus was in some state equivalent to an electron being in an outer electron shell, and drops into its ground state after a while. I can check with my son, who is studying nuclear physics at school at this very moment. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Isomeric_transition#Decay_processes I must say it is ominous that you are consistently failing to answer my questions about the reasoning behind all of this, but just picking on some small simple point each time and ignoring most of my posts. I'm beginning to wonder how much reasoning there actually was. I still don't know why you think there is a need for this model, what questions is answers that the original fails to, etc. On 17 May 2014 03:44, John Ross jr...@trexenterprises.com wrote: A radioactive atom that decays with a gamma ray photon has within itself before it decays something that will be released as a gamma ray photon when it decays. That something (I say that something is an entron) has a mass equivalent to the energy of the gamma ray photon. When the decay occurs the mass of the atom decreases by an amount equal to the mass of the gamma ray photon and the gamma ray photon leaves with a mass equivalent to the energy of the gamma ray photon. How can you disagree with this simple logic? In your analysis is that something
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Sunday, May 18, 2014 4:07:20 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 4:50 PM, Richard Ruquist yan...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:37 AM, Bruno Marchal mar...@ulb.ac.bejavascript: wrote: On 18 May 2014, at 05:41, Richard Ruquist wrote: Hibbs, I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. The argument says that comp (believed by 99,9% of scientists today) entails the MWI. OK. Not OK and not true. So the majority of scientists don't believe in concept of function or mechanism (that comp aims to make precise and study the consequences of, given its step 0 assumptions)? Isn't this a case of constructively building an association? I don't know if 99% of scientists concur with computationalism or not, but that would be a different question than whether scientists believe in the concept of function and mechanism. In the same way that do insurers support speculative litigation would be a different question than so insurers don't believe in rule of law? There's a lot of spectrum and a lot of scope for slide rules up and down it. I'd certainly be interested to know data on this if you have any, or should come into possession later ion, -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: TRONNIES
On Sunday, May 18, 2014 8:27:21 PM UTC+1, John Ross wrote: John Clark I plan to save your e-mails and maybe I will read some of them to the audience if and when it turns out that I am correct and am awarded the Nobel prize in Physics. By the way, none of the brilliant scientists have *tried* to convince me that I am wrong. They all skeptical but they have all encouraged me to make predictions that can be tested. In my book I make 101 predictions. A large number of them can be tested. Another possibility is they presented with a number of apparently show stopping apparently falsification events, similar to the high value contributions of this kind for you, your betterment and benefit. You apparently are resolute in studiously ignoring all of it. You surely must see that, e.g. the 2 photons not three photons as you said, raises a major question about the veracity of your theory. That isn't going to go away..ever. You're going to have to answer it eventually because your theory will never be permitterd into the mainline, while you apparently are openly against it. What reason have you to think you would not have behaved exactly the same way with your scientist pals? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 7:22 PM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, May 18, 2014 2:57:02 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:41 AM, Richard Ruquist yan...@gmail.comwrote: Hibbs, I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a single world. However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare combination. You do? Then why participate in this tedious, repetitive carousel of personal attacks (pointing to flaws without precision, just hand waving that there is one and/or attacking Bruno on personal level) of everybody who hasn't red the original thesis, the literature they are based on, and the papers that build, clarify, or expand on the consequences; while pretending to presuppose their content and invalidating them disingenuously? Everybody here should know by now that these attacks don't lead anywhere because off topic by nature and that comp makes your head spin in disbelief at first recognizing possibilities and implications. That's not an argument and neither are personal judgements and attacks of this sort. The real time wasters. PGC Quite a spew for someone that didn't look closely to in the first place make a say. There's no profile of maliceI've only ever had one major criticism of Bruno's theorizing, and I've tried hard to say it well enough for him that he can move past this. It is totally independent of theory - his or anyone's. It's about falsification that's all. He understands this wrongly...he conceives of it thing with many variant .,,.but this the bedrock of science, it's an hard to vary thing. I understand youyou status-sniff so twill not have read any of my descriptions. Had you of, you'd not entertain poor motivation this keenly, because endless tries to say it better, a single - just one - major criticism, is not the profile for that. Why not you have a go at my post previous to this, in which despite his allegation of vaguery, I go a few steps further than anyone else I'm aware of around here, to make more explicit the end to end structure of falsifiability as it is, in Science. I say. How about you give me that say, and suffer reading the points, and should you find disagreement, let me know. If possible also be less of a turd-sniffer PGC. There's a of formula. Thank you for proving my point by making matters clear. PGC -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: TRONNIES
On 19 May 2014 08:14, John Ross jr...@trexenterprises.com wrote: I believe Albert Einstein misinterpreted the Michelson-Morley experiment. That experiment proved that the *measured *speed of light was always constant. It did not prove that the actual speed of light is always constant. I believe light travels in Coulomb grids and our earth has a Coulomb grid that it carries with it as it moves through the Coulomb grid of the solar system and the solar system has a Coulomb grid that moves with it as it moves our galaxy, etc. See my discussion at page 45. OK, this sounds vaguely similar to what is called frame dragging in general relativity. It should have measurable consequences - I would expect light that changes velocity as it enters the Earth's Coulomb grid to be defocused, for example. Do you understand how Albert Einstein explained the advance of Mercury’s perihelion? I certainly don’t. Although I have no reason to believe that My theory would not also explain the advance. I believe my theory explains gravity much better than Albert Einstein did. You are right that I have more to work with than Einstein. About 100 years of science. I don't know the maths, but I think I understand the principle. General relativity predicts that space in the vicinity of massive bodies is curved, or non-Euclidean, like the surface of a sphere or a saddle. This will effectively change the value of pi, as defined as the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter, and make the angles of a triangle sum to a value ofther than 180 degrees. You can see this on the surface of the Earth - for very large triangles, say one with corners in Kenya, Singapore at at the North Pole, the angles sum to more than 180 degrees. In the vicinity of the Sun, space is curved sufficiently that (if I remember correctly) the angles of a triangle sum to less than 180, and the value of pi is reduced slightly. Hence an ellipse - e.g. the orbit described by a planet - will be slightly distorted. Effectively there is slightly less space available for the planet to move through, so the point at which it is closest to the Sun will be slightly displaced - to where it would have been in flat space-time, I think (that would be my guess, at least, due to the conservation of momentum). This advances the perihelion, by a tiny amount for Mercury, but in a sufficiently strong gravitational field it would makes the orbit look like one drawn with a Spirograph. You can visualise this (or maybe someone has done a computer animation) for a steep gravity well with space reduced to a curved 2D surface (what's called an embedding diagram I believe) in which an object is orbitting - if the mass of the central object is adjustable, you can make the well deeper and the sides steeper, and you should see the ellipse start to rotate around the centre more and more quickly as the space containing one end of it gets more and more compressed. (I've tried googling for something like this but no one appears to have done this specific animation, which imho would show what's going on with perihelion advance rather intuitively.) For an authorised (and of course much better) explanation, I recommend this book: Misner, Thorne, Wheeler - Gravitation (Freeman, 1973) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Sunday, May 18, 2014 10:55:03 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 7:22 PM, ghi...@gmail.com javascript: wrote: On Sunday, May 18, 2014 2:57:02 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:41 AM, Richard Ruquist yan...@gmail.comwrote: Hibbs, I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a single world. However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare combination. You do? Then why participate in this tedious, repetitive carousel of personal attacks (pointing to flaws without precision, just hand waving that there is one and/or attacking Bruno on personal level) of everybody who hasn't red the original thesis, the literature they are based on, and the papers that build, clarify, or expand on the consequences; while pretending to presuppose their content and invalidating them disingenuously? Everybody here should know by now that these attacks don't lead anywhere because off topic by nature and that comp makes your head spin in disbelief at first recognizing possibilities and implications. That's not an argument and neither are personal judgements and attacks of this sort. The real time wasters. PGC Quite a spew for someone that didn't look closely to in the first place make a say. There's no profile of maliceI've only ever had one major criticism of Bruno's theorizing, and I've tried hard to say it well enough for him that he can move past this. It is totally independent of theory - his or anyone's. It's about falsification that's all. He understands this wrongly...he conceives of it thing with many variant .,,.but this the bedrock of science, it's an hard to vary thing. I understand youyou status-sniff so twill not have read any of my descriptions. Had you of, you'd not entertain poor motivation this keenly, because endless tries to say it better, a single - just one - major criticism, is not the profile for that. Why not you have a go at my post previous to this, in which despite his allegation of vaguery, I go a few steps further than anyone else I'm aware of around here, to make more explicit the end to end structure of falsifiability as it is, in Science. I say. How about you give me that say, and suffer reading the points, and should you find disagreement, let me know. If possible also be less of a turd-sniffer PGC. There's a of formula. Thank you for proving my point by making matters clear. PGC I don't think you had a distinctive point did you? You haven't read my side of things, you apparently disallow that something like prediction/falsification is as important to me as your comp envisionings are to you. Or to Bruno. You seem to visualize a sort of pecking order perhaps, in which the value of Bruno's passion or yours, for comp and infinite worlds and dreams and so on is embued with greater value, than Science as I see it, proper, has deep resonance with me. You vomited a number of allegations over me, when in fact I've made all the effort to make my case and I've never blanket dismissed Bruno the way Bruno blanket dismisses me. You're side taking PGC, in way that is totally unfair and unexplained. I've done nothing to you. I strongly disagree with elements of Bruno's theorizing, notably his claims to falsifiability which are NOT true. We both feel strongly, and we both continue to choose to engage. It's not your business. Only one person has dramatically attacked someone, and that is you your attack on me. You'd be welcome to join the argument...you'd be welcome to account for what YOU think falsification means, if you do know what it means. If you had engaged with my position and through that come to a standing on the value and/or motivation of my stance, that also would be acceptable to me. *But jumping in, discrediting me with malign motivation, accusing me failing to know or care what Bruno's ideas are. And then coming back with the pompous self-fascinated retort when I quite fairly and right call you for what you are being - a nose that sniffs around other peoples turds thinking they smell a lot worse than his own. You're an empty pair of trousers mate. * -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at
The end to end structure associated wit Falsification
I'm going to bullet point the key, hard-to-vary, components that may or may not result in falsification. In doing so, I will be stating not my personal preference, but the long standing convention. In light of this faithfulness simply to what it actually is, I feel a little aggrieved by the stream of unrelenting dismissiveness, resorts to claims of unintelligibility on my part, allegations of ill motivation, irrelevance and the rest of it. So I will bullet point it here, very briefly. And if the same individuals want to continue the way they are going, I shall suggest they put their money where their mouths are, and lay cash wager which one of us is correct, and we shall take our dispute to some of the major and esteemed leading scientists of our time. And then we shall see. Falsification. 1. A precise, non-trivial prediction must be found in a theory, with the following two key characteristics: It says something NEW about the world, that goes over and above an Explanation of that which we already know. Second, that it may be formulated with complete separation and independence from the theory from which it spawns, and stated entirely within the pre-existing realm of the incumbent hard won knowledge already in place. This is the first layer of separation. The theory from the prediction, the prediction in terms of the incumbent theory of the world. 2. Second. The theorist has no SAY, more than any other person, in how the prediction will be tested. The end to end process encapsulating all components involved in the eventual lead up to an observation event, is ENTIRELY outside the theory and the argumentations of the theorist. This is the second layer of separation,. 3. Third, an even higher level of separation must be met, between the two strands of science, on the one side being the source of the prediction and on the other the source of the observation. As such, two distinctive paradigms of science are necessary. If one is theory deriving, the other is technological. If one is human creative, the other is empirical. If one field produces the prediction, another field tests the prediction. Like Physics, and astronomy. This is the multifolding degrees of separation that set us free from our own delusions and dreams and imagings, that had dominated our condition since the dawn of our and made us prisoners in palaces of ignorance which no human had ever broken free of. It was only with this, this extreme dedication to not believing a word of our own sayings, and trusting to no-one that they could know let alone control the huge assumptions we all would be sneaking through, without even knowing it, where there not these multiple layers of separation for the first time...maybe in the whole universeset a kind free and opened an age of objective discovery. This matters. A lot. To everyone, all humans. It matters when someone misconceives this fundamemental bedrock of science. It isn't ok for people to make up their own meanings for falsification. It isn't virtuous at all to write free passes. Because we could actually this precious beautiful thing. And then all we would have is what we had before. Dreams and delusions and priests and medicine men, and nothing that ever took root and grew. So I am passion for this. I love science. I am loyal to science. I'm fine with comp and whatever else anyone wants to believe. But let's remember and allow ourselves to be reminded what is fundamental to the scientific revolution. If someone needs to relearn the nature and distinctiveness of falsification, there's no shame in that. But it isn't right to make our own versions up, and say its the same, when it's stripped of the hard-to-vary fundamental character of separation Let's lay bets if that's what it'll take. If Bruno stands by his claims to falsifiability and the definitions he has attached to falsifiability. Let's go to it..we can go all the way. Let's see what leading scientific minds of our day think it is. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Virtual Logic - Formal Arithmetic
On 17 May 2014 11:05, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/16/2014 2:41 PM, LizR wrote: On 16 May 2014 17:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/15/2014 10:04 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: So do you think there is some merit in Kauffman's conclusions? Do you think it is possible to reason about the Void? Or meaningful? Or useful? Sure, it's possible to reason about anything. Whether you can arrive at something useful is an open question - one can but try. I like the late Norm Levitt's remark, What is there? EVERYTHING! So what isn't there? NOTHING! Or one could paraphrase Russell Standish - What is there? NOTHING! - Which is EVERYTHING! I like Russell's version, which creates more of a *frisson*. Although I assume Levitt is claiming the existence of a multiverse (EVERYTHING implies that of course). I doubt that, Norm was rather a fan of Bohmian QM. I had the chance to talk to Jim Al-Kalili at the Auckland Writers Festival and I was surprised to find his favourite interpretation of QM is also the Bohm one, which hasn't been coming up much in Max Tegmark's polls of physicists recently. (I believe it's the multiverse but with one universe more real than all the others, or something similar). Obviously I didn't have much to go on with Mr Levitt, just the quote you supplied, but ISTM What is there? EVERYTHING! could be taken to mean that everything that can exist exists (i.e. Everett). An alternative reading is that he is saying he thinks the universe is infinite, which also gives us everything that can exist. I'm not sure how else one can interpret EVERYTHING especially when it's emphasised like that. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Virtual Logic - Formal Arithmetic
On Monday, May 19, 2014 12:23:58 AM UTC+1, Liz R wrote: On 17 May 2014 11:05, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net javascript: wrote: On 5/16/2014 2:41 PM, LizR wrote: On 16 May 2014 17:14, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net javascript:wrote: On 5/15/2014 10:04 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: So do you think there is some merit in Kauffman's conclusions? Do you think it is possible to reason about the Void? Or meaningful? Or useful? Sure, it's possible to reason about anything. Whether you can arrive at something useful is an open question - one can but try. I like the late Norm Levitt's remark, What is there? EVERYTHING! So what isn't there? NOTHING! Or one could paraphrase Russell Standish - What is there? NOTHING! - Which is EVERYTHING! I like Russell's version, which creates more of a *frisson*. Although I assume Levitt is claiming the existence of a multiverse (EVERYTHING implies that of course). I doubt that, Norm was rather a fan of Bohmian QM. I had the chance to talk to Jim Al-Kalili at the Auckland Writers Festival and I was surprised to find his favourite interpretation of QM is also the Bohm one, which hasn't been coming up much in Max Tegmark's polls of physicists recently. (I believe it's the multiverse but with one universe more real than all the others, or something similar). I love that guy. He is fare and way my favourite ever explainer of science...as in the documentaries he's made. He's so pure and he sort of bursts with true meant appreciation for the scientific pioneers...he can't help smiling when he speaks of some of them and their amazing exploits. He's the best, I think the smartest as well. And totally unselfpossessed. The others can't touch him. Either they barely can conceal their contempt for the scientific geniuses - like Deutsch in my view - or they are full of themselves to the point of it become a distraction for the viewer. Like what's his name, wonder's of the solar system guy. That being said, he's alright, I'm going to see him in a week or two. But Jimmy boy is a star. Obviously I didn't have much to go on with Mr Levitt, just the quote you supplied, but ISTM What is there? EVERYTHING! could be taken to mean that everything that can exist exists (i.e. Everett). An alternative reading is that he is saying he thinks the universe is infinite, which also gives us everything that can exist. I'm not sure how else one can interpret EVERYTHING especially when it's emphasised like that. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Virtual Logic - Formal Arithmetic
On 5/18/2014 4:23 PM, LizR wrote: On 17 May 2014 11:05, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/16/2014 2:41 PM, LizR wrote: On 16 May 2014 17:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/15/2014 10:04 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: So do you think there is some merit in Kauffman's conclusions? Do you think it is possible to reason about the Void? Or meaningful? Or useful? Sure, it's possible to reason about anything. Whether you can arrive at something useful is an open question - one can but try. I like the late Norm Levitt's remark, What is there? EVERYTHING! So what isn't there? NOTHING! Or one could paraphrase Russell Standish - What is there? NOTHING! - Which is EVERYTHING! I like Russell's version, which creates more of a /frisson/. Although I assume Levitt is claiming the existence of a multiverse (EVERYTHING implies that of course). I doubt that, Norm was rather a fan of Bohmian QM. I had the chance to talk to Jim Al-Kalili at the Auckland Writers Festival and I was surprised to find his favourite interpretation of QM is also the Bohm one, which hasn't been coming up much in Max Tegmark's polls of physicists recently. (I believe it's the multiverse but with one universe more real than all the others, or something similar). Obviously I didn't have much to go on with Mr Levitt, just the quote you supplied, but ISTM What is there? EVERYTHING! could be taken to mean that everything that can exist exists (i.e. Everett). An alternative reading is that he is saying he thinks the universe is infinite, which also gives us everything that can exist. I'm not sure how else one can interpret EVERYTHING especially when it's emphasised like that. You're reading to much into it. Norm wasn't involved the everythingism of Tegmark and Marchal. He was making a tongue-in-cheek paraphrase of W. V. O. Quine's, Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not? Norm was interested in defending the existence of a Platonic realm of mathematics, but one that existed in a different way than the material world. Brent The duty of abstract mathematics, as I see it, is precisely to expand our capacity for hypothesizing possible ontologies. --- Norm Levitt -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion
On 17 May 2014 10:06, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote: Dear Liz, thanks for your care to reflect upon my text and I apologize for my LATE REPLY. You ask about my opinion on Tegmark's math-realism - well, if it were REALISM indeed, he would not have had to classify it 'mathemaitcal'. I consider it a fine sub chapter to ideas about *realism* what we MAY NOT KNOW at our present level. Smart Einstein etc. may have invented 'analogue' relativity etc., it does not exclude all those other ways Nature may apply beyond our present knowledge. Our ongoing 'scientific thinking' - IS - inherently mathematical, so wherever you look you find it in the books. I assume the implication of what you're saying here is that the reason physics appears mathematical is because that's the way we think. I suspect most physicists would say the opposite - that we think that way because that's how nature works (or at least that's how it appears to work so far). If one is going to take the position that maths is a human invention, then one has the hard problem of explaining why maths is so unreasonably effective in physics while no other system of thought comes close. I did not find so far a *natural spot* self-calculating 374 pieces of something. and draw conclusions of it NOT being 383. Nature was quite well before humans invented the decimal system, or the zero. And please, do not call it a 'discovery'. Nowhere in Nature are groupings of decimally arranged units presented for processing/registration. I'm not sure what you mean here. (I *think* you may be confusing the fact that 1+1=2 with the statement 1+1=2) Regardless of the notation we happen to use, there are numbers in nature - pi, the ratios of the strengths of various fundamental forces and masses, etc. Also, various mathematical theorems have been discovered by different people using different approaches, yet they reach the same result. And there are lots of open questions in maths, some with a $1 million prize attached - it's obviously hard for people to make discoveries in maths, or those prizes would have been claimed long ago. All of which implies that maths is something that is discovered, and indeed could be discovered independently in different cultures, times, places - and on different planets or in different universes. Unless you 'discover' within the human mind. Well, yes, just like you will discover any concept within a mind, by definition. (Or I guess within textbooks, in a codified form). The evidence seems fairly strong that you will discover the same mathematical concepts within ANY mind which looks into the subject, and has sufficient ingenuity to work out the answers to various questions, because mathematical truths appear to be universal (e.g. Pythagoras' theorem didn't only work for the Ancient Greeks, 17 will always be prime, the square root of 2 will always be irrational, etc). Only minds can appreciate these facts, just as only minds can discover the law of universal gravitation. Your closing phrase doesn't mean that it isn't inherently mathematical is true as to the content it states. It also does not mean that it may not be anything else beyond. Of course, there may always be something else beyond, even given a TOE we can't be sure this isn't the case. (There is however no evidence whatsoever to suggest that 1+1 will ever not equal 2.) It was a pleasure to follow your argumentation. Likewise, although I'm not sure I followed all of it. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Virtual Logic - Formal Arithmetic
On 19 May 2014 12:13, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/18/2014 4:23 PM, LizR wrote: On 17 May 2014 11:05, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/16/2014 2:41 PM, LizR wrote: On 16 May 2014 17:14, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 5/15/2014 10:04 PM, freqflyer07281972 wrote: So do you think there is some merit in Kauffman's conclusions? Do you think it is possible to reason about the Void? Or meaningful? Or useful? Sure, it's possible to reason about anything. Whether you can arrive at something useful is an open question - one can but try. I like the late Norm Levitt's remark, What is there? EVERYTHING! So what isn't there? NOTHING! Or one could paraphrase Russell Standish - What is there? NOTHING! - Which is EVERYTHING! I like Russell's version, which creates more of a *frisson*. Although I assume Levitt is claiming the existence of a multiverse (EVERYTHING implies that of course). I doubt that, Norm was rather a fan of Bohmian QM. I had the chance to talk to Jim Al-Kalili at the Auckland Writers Festival and I was surprised to find his favourite interpretation of QM is also the Bohm one, which hasn't been coming up much in Max Tegmark's polls of physicists recently. (I believe it's the multiverse but with one universe more real than all the others, or something similar). Obviously I didn't have much to go on with Mr Levitt, just the quote you supplied, but ISTM What is there? EVERYTHING! could be taken to mean that everything that can exist exists (i.e. Everett). An alternative reading is that he is saying he thinks the universe is infinite, which also gives us everything that can exist. I'm not sure how else one can interpret EVERYTHING especially when it's emphasised like that. You're reading to much into it. Norm wasn't involved the everythingism of Tegmark and Marchal. He was making a tongue-in-cheek paraphrase of W. V. O. Quine's, Nonbeing must in some sense be, otherwise what is it that there is not? Norm was interested in defending the existence of a Platonic realm of mathematics, but one that existed in a different way than the material world. Like I said, you didn't provide much to go on. Brent The duty of abstract mathematics, as I see it, is precisely to expand our capacity for hypothesizing possible ontologies. --- Norm Levitt Max T has definitely adhere to that. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: TRONNIES
On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 10:02:25AM +1200, LizR wrote: I don't know the maths, but I think I understand the principle. General relativity predicts that space in the vicinity of massive bodies is curved, or non-Euclidean, like the surface of a sphere or a saddle. This will effectively change the value of pi, as defined as the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter, and make the angles of a triangle sum to a value ofther than 180 degrees. You can see this on the surface of the Earth Yes, except that conventionally pi is a constant, so you should be saying that the ratio of tyhe circumference to diameter becomes less than pi. Just a small nit picked. Just about all of modern maths goes out the window if pi changes value, as nearly happened in Indiana (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indiana_Pi_Bill) Actually, that is a rather instructive example of crackpottery! Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: So, a new kind of non-boolean, non-digital, computer architecture
On 19 May 2014 07:16, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: Does this computer architecture assume not-comp? I don't know, but I would think not, because comp allows reality to be digitised at any level (e.g. sub atomic) which wouldn't contradict the use of oscillators. This sounds a bit like what someone once told me about early computer storage being done as sound waves that kept bouncing back and forth inside some medium. (A large spring, I think.) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: The Evolutionary Tree of Religion
On 5/18/2014 5:40 PM, LizR wrote: On 17 May 2014 10:06, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com mailto:jami...@gmail.com wrote: Dear Liz, thanks for your care to reflect upon my text and I apologize for my LATE REPLY. You ask about my opinion on Tegmark's math-realism - well, if it were REALISM indeed, he would not have had to classify it 'mathemaitcal'. I consider it a fine sub chapter to ideas about *realism* what we MAY NOT KNOW at our present level. Smart Einstein etc. may have invented 'analogue' relativity etc., it does not exclude all those other ways Nature may apply beyond our present knowledge. Our ongoing 'scientific thinking' - IS - inherently mathematical, so wherever you look you find it in the books. I assume the implication of what you're saying here is that the reason physics appears mathematical is because that's the way we think. I suspect most physicists would say the opposite - that we think that way because that's how nature works (or at least that's how it appears to work so far). If one is going to take the position that maths is a human invention, then one has the hard problem of explaining why maths is so unreasonably effective in physics while no other system of thought comes close. Not at all. A lot of math was invented to describe theories of physics. If you have some idea of how the world is, e.g. it consists of persistent identifiable objects, or all matter pulls on other matter; And you want to work out the consequences of the idea and make it precise with no inconsistencies - you've invented some math (unless you can apply some that's already invented - see Norm Levitt's quip). I did not find so far a /natural spot/ self-calculating 374 pieces of something. and draw conclusions of it NOT being 383. Nature was quite well before humans invented the decimal system, or the zero. And human invented the */decimal/* system long before they invented the binary system because... And please, do not call it a 'discovery'. Nowhere in Nature are groupings of decimally arranged units presented for processing/registration. I think I have one here ready to hand. I'm not sure what you mean here. (I /think/ you may be confusing the fact that 1+1=2 with the statement 1+1=2) Regardless of the notation we happen to use, there are numbers in nature - pi, the ratios of the strengths of various fundamental forces and masses, etc. Also, various mathematical theorems have been discovered by different people using different approaches, yet they reach the same result. And there are lots of open questions in maths, some with a $1 million prize attached - it's obviously hard for people to make discoveries in maths, or those prizes would have been claimed long ago. All of which implies that maths is something that is discovered, and indeed could be discovered independently in different cultures, times, places - and on different planets or in different universes. I think it only implies that some parts of math are discovered like counting (which was discovered by evolution) and when people invented language and logically inference and concepts like successor and ... they discovered there was a lot more math they could infer. Unless you 'discover' within the human mind. Well, yes, just like you will discover any concept within a mind, by definition. (Or I guess within textbooks, in a codified form). The evidence seems fairly strong that you will discover the same mathematical concepts within ANY mind which looks into the subject, and has sufficient ingenuity to work out the answers to various questions, because mathematical truths appear to be universal (e.g. Pythagoras' theorem didn't only work for the Ancient Greeks, 17 will always be prime, the square root of 2 will always be irrational, etc). Only minds can appreciate these facts, just as only minds can discover the law of universal gravitation. Which is a strange thing to say since it turned out there was no such thing as the law of universal gravitation; it was just an approximation to another theory, general relativity, which we're pretty sure is wrong but we just haven't been able to invent a better one. So how is a non-existent law discovered? Brent Your closing phrase doesn't mean that it isn't inherently mathematical is true as to the content it states. It also does not mean that it may not be anything else beyond. Of course, there may always be something else beyond, even given a TOE we can't be sure this isn't the case. (There is however no evidence whatsoever to suggest that 1+1 will ever not equal 2.) It was a pleasure to follow your argumentation. Likewise, although I'm not sure I followed all of it. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: The end to end structure associated wit Falsification
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 04:10:24PM -0700, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: I'm going to bullet point the key, hard-to-vary, components that may or may not result in falsification. In doing so, I will be stating not my personal preference, but the long standing convention. In light of this faithfulness simply to what it actually is, I feel a little aggrieved by the stream of unrelenting dismissiveness, resorts to claims of unintelligibility on my part, allegations of ill motivation, irrelevance and the rest of it. So I will bullet point it here, very briefly. And if the same individuals want to continue the way they are going, I shall suggest they put their money where their mouths are, and lay cash wager which one of us is correct, and we shall take our dispute to some of the major and esteemed leading scientists of our time. And then we shall see. Falsification. 1. A precise, non-trivial prediction must be found in a theory, with the following two key characteristics: It says something NEW about the world, that goes over and above an Explanation of that which we already know. This is probably too big a bar, although clearly a theory that jumps this hurdle will be more interesting. Given the new theory and an incumbant with with equal predictive power (ie no new testable predictions on which the theories differ), we can still discriminate on based on Occam's razor. Initially, heliocentrism actually performed less well than Ptolemy's epicycle theory, but did much better on Occam. Clearly, COMP has not yet jumped that bar. Potentially it may do so, once all the consequences of the X_1 modal logic is worked out. So I wouldn't crack the champagne, but it is reasonable to pursue working out the consequence of X_1. It's just not going to be me - I'm too far behind the 8 ball on that one :). Second, that it may be formulated with complete separation and independence from the theory from which it spawns, and stated entirely within the pre-existing realm of the incumbent hard won knowledge already in place. This is the first layer of separation. The theory from the prediction, the prediction in terms of the incumbent theory of the world. Yes - this makes sense. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in the scientific sense. No one calls you on this.here.but then again.let's face it no one answered my question either. But other thereall you'll accomplish with this hubris is to be ignored and written off. Which you probably are, by and large. And...I wanted to add value for youfor my part I would actually question the way your friends write you a pass about this, because this is one tiny goldfish bowl dude. I don't think Bruno claims to have a testable scientific theory. He claims to have a logical argument applied to the assumption made by most scientists who believe in primary materialism - that consciousness is computable. Given this assumption and a couple of others, he argues to a certain conclusion, which is that primary materialism fails. Hence surely he is in the position of someone testing a scientific theory, rather than claiming to have one? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 08:43:23AM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote: Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the ‘hardware’ of our Universe I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and thought it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but I don't see any obvious problems with his general approach: http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/ Some highlights: Some Diophantine equations are easily solved automatically, for example: ∃푥, ∃푦 푥² = 푦² , 푥 푦 ∈ ℤ Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed to step through all the possible solutions will find one immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica, Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve any Diophantine equation. ... *Consequence* In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a computer. This doesn't follow. An evolutionary algorithm with a real random source, can potentially stumble upon any solution, not just ones for which no algorithm can find. There even remains some doubt that real randomness is required, so long as the entropy of the random source is sufficiently high. In COMP, the universal dovetailer provides plenty of real randomness from the subjective point of view, that can be harnessed. Perhaps that's exactly what Andrew Wiles did. (In fact, I really rather think he did - my proofs, which are not so grand as Andrew's, usually involve some divine spark of inspiration, which is just another term for rolling a random number generator). Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg
On 19 May 2014 07:37, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: You did not provide evidence that they cannot do that. His evidence was the negative answer to Hilbert's 10th problem. To be exact, it's claimed to be *how he arrived at* that answer. The extract says that he arrived at a proof that no algorithm could have found. How did he find it? The paper is far too high powered for my little brain, so I am hoping for an answer for dummies. Did he decide that the answer might have some particular form using intuition, say, tried it, and found it worked? How did he (or anyone) then show there was no algorithm for finding it? (This is reminiscent of The Emperor's New Mind, which IIRC attempts to prove that some gifted mathematicians are not machines!) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 12:15 AM, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, May 18, 2014 10:55:03 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 7:22 PM, ghi...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, May 18, 2014 2:57:02 PM UTC+1, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 5:41 AM, Richard Ruquist yan...@gmail.comwrote: Hibbs, I do not often share your opinion, but in this instance I do. It seems to me that Bruno's principal argument for comp is that it predicts MWI. Yet MWI itself is not falsifiable or testable. And I think MWI fails the measure problem despite the Gleason Theorem. I think it is a mistake for Bruno to connect comp to MWI. Comp like string theory is so rich in results that I suggest that it could as well predict a single world. However, I do appreciate Bruno's intellect and humility, a rare combination. You do? Then why participate in this tedious, repetitive carousel of personal attacks (pointing to flaws without precision, just hand waving that there is one and/or attacking Bruno on personal level) of everybody who hasn't red the original thesis, the literature they are based on, and the papers that build, clarify, or expand on the consequences; while pretending to presuppose their content and invalidating them disingenuously? Everybody here should know by now that these attacks don't lead anywhere because off topic by nature and that comp makes your head spin in disbelief at first recognizing possibilities and implications. That's not an argument and neither are personal judgements and attacks of this sort. The real time wasters. PGC Quite a spew for someone that didn't look closely to in the first place make a say. There's no profile of maliceI've only ever had one major criticism of Bruno's theorizing, and I've tried hard to say it well enough for him that he can move past this. It is totally independent of theory - his or anyone's. It's about falsification that's all. He understands this wrongly...he conceives of it thing with many variant .,,.but this the bedrock of science, it's an hard to vary thing. I understand youyou status-sniff so twill not have read any of my descriptions. Had you of, you'd not entertain poor motivation this keenly, because endless tries to say it better, a single - just one - major criticism, is not the profile for that. Why not you have a go at my post previous to this, in which despite his allegation of vaguery, I go a few steps further than anyone else I'm aware of around here, to make more explicit the end to end structure of falsifiability as it is, in Science. I say. How about you give me that say, and suffer reading the points, and should you find disagreement, let me know. If possible also be less of a turd-sniffer PGC. There's a of formula. Thank you for proving my point by making matters clear. PGC I don't think you had a distinctive point did you? I thought I did: that an absolutist truth assignment to comp, or any complete notion of reality for that matter, principally escapes my understanding when it takes on these rhetorical forms with vague, if any, association to some frame of reference. Especially when its complex imbrication in form of personal attacks etc. obscures apparently a point or set of points you want to make. I know Richard is working from particular Calabi Yau manifolds on String level. But neither this nor comp (or any other foray into discourse on ultimates) has some complete verification, or states some ultimate final approach in the depths of prediction, falsifiability and their funky relationship to explanatory force. You like Deutsch; I think he's cool with this, even advocating explanation over prediction, in one of the opening chapters of FOR, if I am not mistaken. Thus, you or Richard declaring false in the ways that I could parse in this thread, didn't convince me trivially for lack of reference. It's not clear what theory, theology, frame you are even arguing from; so how could one assess your statements, apparently comp related, when this or your position to Step 0 isn't clear? Screaming false + complex personal attacks is hardly convincing. PGC You haven't read my side of things, you apparently disallow that something like prediction/falsification is as important to me as your comp envisionings are to you. Or to Bruno. You seem to visualize a sort of pecking order perhaps, in which the value of Bruno's passion or yours, for comp and infinite worlds and dreams and so on is embued with greater value, than Science as I see it, proper, has deep resonance with me. You vomited a number of allegations over me, when in fact I've made all the effort to make my case and I've never blanket dismissed Bruno the way Bruno blanket dismisses me. You're side taking PGC, in way that is totally unfair and unexplained. I've done nothing to you. I strongly disagree with elements of Bruno's theorizing, notably his
Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg
On Sunday, May 18, 2014 9:34:40 PM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 08:43:23AM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote: Free Will Universe Model: Non-computability and its relationship to the ‘hardware’ of our Universe I saw his poster presentation at the TSC conference in Tucson and thought it was pretty impressive. I'm not qualified to comment on the math, but I don't see any obvious problems with his general approach: http://jamestagg.com/2014/04/26/free-will-universe-paper-text-pdf/ Some highlights: Some Diophantine equations are easily solved automatically, for example: ∃푥, ∃푦 푥² = 푦² , 푥 푦 ∈ ℤ Any pair of integers will do, and a computer programmed to step through all the possible solutions will find one immediately at ‘1,1’. An analytical tool such as Mathematica, Mathcad or Maple would also immediately give symbolic solutions to this problem therefore these can be solved mechanically. But, Hilbert did not ask if ‘some’ equations could be solved, he asked if there was a general way to solve any Diophantine equation. ... *Consequence* In 1995 Andrew Wiles – who had been secretly working on Fermat’s ‘arbitrary equation’ since age eight – announced he had found a proof. We now had the answers to both of our questions: Fermat’s last theorem is provable (therefore obviously decidable) and no algorithm could have found this proof. This leads to a question; If no algorithm can have found the proof what thought process did Wiles use to answer the question: Put another way, Andrew Wiles can not be a computer. This doesn't follow. An evolutionary algorithm with a real random source, can potentially stumble upon any solution, not just ones for which no algorithm can find. There even remains some doubt that real randomness is required, so long as the entropy of the random source is sufficiently high. The Wiles proof didn't have a random source though, it was developed intentionally. In COMP, the universal dovetailer provides plenty of real randomness from the subjective point of view, that can be harnessed. Perhaps that's exactly what Andrew Wiles did. (In fact, I really rather think he did - my proofs, which are not so grand as Andrew's, usually involve some divine spark of inspiration, which is just another term for rolling a random number generator). You're still the one intentionally doing the rolling. Thanks Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpc...@hpcoders.com.aujavascript: University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: TRONNIES
On 19 May 2014 13:05, Russell Standish li...@hpcoders.com.au wrote: On Mon, May 19, 2014 at 10:02:25AM +1200, LizR wrote: I don't know the maths, but I think I understand the principle. General relativity predicts that space in the vicinity of massive bodies is curved, or non-Euclidean, like the surface of a sphere or a saddle. This will effectively change the value of pi, as defined as the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter, and make the angles of a triangle sum to a value ofther than 180 degrees. You can see this on the surface of the Earth Yes, except that conventionally pi is a constant, so you should be saying that the ratio of tyhe circumference to diameter becomes less than pi. Just a small nit picked. Sure. That's why I added as defined by... But yes, come to think of it, I probably shouldn't have mentioned pi, which is of course a mathematical CONSTANT. Oops. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Free Will Universe Model - James Tagg
On Sun, May 18, 2014 at 07:01:01PM -0700, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, May 18, 2014 9:34:40 PM UTC-4, Russell Standish wrote: This doesn't follow. An evolutionary algorithm with a real random source, can potentially stumble upon any solution, not just ones for which no algorithm can find. There even remains some doubt that real randomness is required, so long as the entropy of the random source is sufficiently high. The Wiles proof didn't have a random source though, it was developed intentionally. The proof doesn't but Wiles probably did (in his brain, presumably, although he could have used a coin or something else). In COMP, the universal dovetailer provides plenty of real randomness from the subjective point of view, that can be harnessed. Perhaps that's exactly what Andrew Wiles did. (In fact, I really rather think he did - my proofs, which are not so grand as Andrew's, usually involve some divine spark of inspiration, which is just another term for rolling a random number generator). You're still the one intentionally doing the rolling. That makes no sense. Rolling an RNG is a mechanical process, if ever there was one. Intention to solve Fermat's last theorem is outside the scope of the claim. -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au Latest project: The Amoeba's Secret (http://www.hpcoders.com.au/AmoebasSecret.html) -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Is Consciousness Computable?
On 5/18/2014 6:26 PM, LizR wrote: On 19 May 2014 05:12, spudboy100 via Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com wrote: So you do not have a testable, falsifiable, theory Bruno. Not in the scientific sense. No one calls you on this.here.but then again.let's face it no one answered my question either. But other thereall you'll accomplish with this hubris is to be ignored and written off. Which you probably are, by and large. And...I wanted to add value for youfor my part I would actually question the way your friends write you a pass about this, because this is one tiny goldfish bowl dude. I don't think Bruno claims to have a testable scientific theory. He claims to have a logical argument applied to the assumption made by most scientists who believe in primary materialism - that consciousness is computable. Given this assumption and a couple of others, he argues to a certain conclusion, which is that primary materialism fails. Not that it fails, but that it's dispensable; that matter may be necessary for our existence (when I've argued for that point I think he has agreed) but if so it is derivable from the computations of the UD, so it's not primary. I'm not sure he's wrong, but I'm not convinced by his MGA or Maudlin's Olympia argument. I think that for them to go through, to show that consciousness can be instantiated with no physical action, depends on anticipating all possible counterfactuals, i.e. simulating a world which the consciousness is relative to. I think that to simulate consciousness within a simulated world removes the distinction of simulated and the argument becomes vacuous. Simulated physics is happening in that simulated world and the simulated consciousness depends on it. Now if Bruno can predict some new testable physics from comp, that would be great - but that's a high bar indeed. His main interest is the mind-body problem; and my interest in that problem is more from an engineering viewpoint. What does it take to make a conscious machine and what are the advantages or disadvantages of doing so. Bruno says a machine that can learn and do induction is conscious, which might be testable - but I think it would fail. I think that might be necessary for consciousness, but for a machine to appear conscious it must be intelligent and it must be able to act so as to convince us that it's intelligent. Brent Hence surely he is in the position of someone testing a scientific theory, rather than claiming to have one? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: Is Consciousness Computable?
Hi Folk, A little more you may find interesting. RE: The much-discussed arXiv paper Maguire, Phil, Moser Philippe, Maguire, Rebecca and Griffith, Virgil 2014 'Is Consciousness Computable? Quantifying Integrated Information Using Algorithmic Information Theory'. http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.0126v1) Now there’s an article in New Scientist http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg9692.800-sentient-robots-not-possible-if-you-do-the-maths.html#.U3liRihGO5L *‘Sentient robots? Not possible if you do the maths’* The headline should read: *‘Sentient robots? Not possible if you use computers’* Breathtaking blindspot revealed yet again: The presupposition that real AGI involves formal computing. Here I am building a robot brain that does not use computing, and New Scientist guy doesn’t even realise the possibility. This presupposition is so completely trained-in it’s its.. sigh I have been watching this for 10 years now. I expect COMP to circle the toilet for a little while yet and then the penny will drop. I guess.. 1-2 years? Don’t despair: Brilliant (AGI) robots will happen! They just won’t use computing as their main cognitive architecture. Why anyone should be upset about this change of fortune beats me. Cheers -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
