Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[John Clark]

On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 4:59 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>>In the physical world induction is just a rule of thumb that usually
>> works pretty well most of the time, but it seldom works perfectly and never
>> works continuously, eventually it always fails.
>
>

>*? You seem to confuse mathematical induction, and adductive inference.*
>

I assume you mean abductive inference, but that says you should look for
the simplest explanation and that is not induction. Induction is not about
explanations. Every animal with a nervous system employs induction, even
snails. Evolution has programmed snails to assume things usually continue,
when they don't continue, such as a sudden change in the light level or in
background noise then danger often follows so precautions need to be taken,
like withdrawing into its shell. The snail has no explanation as to why
something changed it just knows that something did and that's usually not a
good sign.

>>Turing explained exactly precisely how to build one of his machines but
>>> you have never given the slightest hint of how to build a "Löbian machine"
>>> or even clearly explained what it can compute that a Turing Machine can’t.
>>
>>
>> >*?*
>>
> !
>
> *I have given a lot of example. Peano arithmetic is a Löbian machine.
> Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory is a Löbian Machine,*
>

Machines are made of matter as is our brains,  Peano arithmetic can be run
on a machine as can Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory, but neither is a machine
because neither is made of matter.

> *Here is another definition*: [...]
>

I'm not interested, definitions are a dime a dozen, you're never going to
define your way to the truth. If you want to understand something you got
to figure out how to build it, at least in principle.

 >>Step 3? Ah yes I remember now, that's the one with wall to wall personal
>> pronouns without a single clear referent in the entire bunch.
>
>
> *No, you have agreed on each definition. *
>

John neither agrees nor disagrees because it was never made clear what the
personal pronoun "you" means in a world with "you" duplicating machines,
all Bruno will say is it's unique and the duplicating machine can't
duplicate it for some reason never specified. And thus Bruno simply stated
at the start of the "proof" the very thing Bruno was trying to prove. Both
know this is true because Bruno is totally unable to state the idea without
copious personal pronouns and continues to use those pronouns  exactly as
Bruno always has as if the existence of a personal pronoun duplicating
machine made no difference and it was all business as usual.

> >>> *The notion of Löbian machine is easy to construct,*
>>
>>
>
> >>The notion of a Perpetual Motion machine is also easy to construct as
>> is the Clark Machine that can solve the Halting Problem, but Turing did far
>> more than dream up a magical universal calculating machine, he showed
>> exactly how to make one.
>
>
> *>Yes, it did that too, but that does not change the fact that his
> recovery was in pure mathematics at first. Then later it has been shown to
> be in already pure arithmetic.*
>

Both Church and Turing independently proved the Halting Problem didn't
always have a solution but Turing's accomplishment was greater because
unlike Church he proved it has significance for the physical world. I'm not
alone in this, Gödel also felt that Turing's discovery was more profound
than Church's.

http://www.cs.umd.edu/~gasarch/BLOGPAPERS/soareturing.pdf

> *Universal machine have important logical limitation, and Löbian machine
have the same limitation, but are aware of those limitation,*

I see no reason why Turing's proof couldn't be encoded to run on a Turing
Machine and the conclusion recorded on the tape, so if you asked the
machine to prove that it was consistent it wouldn't even try just would
just tell you that was a stupid command.

> *I recall to you that by machine theology I just meant the modal logic
> G*. It is the logic of the true proposition that a machine can or cannot
> prove about itself.*
>

Just like a human a computer can prove that it s consistent if and only if
it is inconsistent. So if humans are "Löbian machines" then so is my iMac.

 John K Clark

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UCNC 2019 announcement

[Philip Thrift]

http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp/

Aim and scope
The International Conference on Unconventional Computation and Natural 
Computation (UCNC) is a meeting where scientists from many different 
backgrounds are united in their interest in novel forms of computation, 
human-designed computation inspired by nature, and computational aspects of 
natural processes. UCNC provides a forum for such scientists to meet and 
discuss their work. The 18th UCNC will be hosted by the University of 
Electro-Communications, Tokyo. 

Topics of InterestPapers and poster presentations were sought in all areas 
that relate to unconventional computation and natural computation. Both 
theoretical and experimental papers are welcome. Typical, but not 
exclusive, topics are:
   
   - Molecular (DNA) computing, quantum computing, optical computing, chaos 
   computing, physarum computing, computation in hyperbolic spaces, 
   collision-based computing;
   - Cellular automata, neural computation, evolutionary computation, swarm 
   intelligence, nature-inspired algorithms, artificial immune systems, 
   artificial life, membrane computing, amorphous computing;
   - Computational systems biology, genetic networks, protein-protein 
   networks, transport networks, synthetic biology, cellular (in vivo) 
   computing.



   IMPORTANT DATES
   - Submisson deadline 
   January 7, 2019
   - Deadline for the reviews 
   February 19, 2019
   - Notification of acceptance 
   February 26, 2019
   - Final version 
   March 11, 2019



- Philip Thrift

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Re: Busy Beaver

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Sep 2018, at 14:44, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, September 11, 2018 at 5:54:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 11 Sep 2018, at 04:44, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> Is it not computable because after some value of its argument, its mapped 
>> value is greater than anything that can be written by a computer? AG
> 
> 
> No, even a computer with infinite time and infinite memory is not able to 
> compute it. The busy beaver is a well defined total (everywhere defined) 
> function which is not computable, even in theory.
> 
> I can prove that, but have you understand that the Total-or-Partial attribute 
> of an arbitrary programs is a well defined function yet non computable? I 
> have proven this in my last post in the Church-Turing thread.
> 
> 
> Why is the busy beaver not computable. The basic reason is that it gives the 
> bound of what you can compute with the machine, and if the BB function was 
> computable, you could use it to build a more powerful BB, notably by 
> diagonalisation. 
> 
> More on this later,
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On the BBP and hypercomputing:
> 
> 
> A New Godelian Argument for Hypercomputing Minds Based on the Busy Beaver 
> Problem
> https://newdualism.org/papers/S.Bringsjord/laihyper11.pdf
> 

I read his book a long time ago, and was not much impressed, but here his 
definition of computationalism is directly inconsistent with the “indexical 
computationalism” that I study. He uses a quantifier on the notion of person 
and a quantifier on the machine and an indentity thesis between person and 
machine, which makes no sense with indexical mechanism, and it makes his 
argument into a confusion between the third person and the first person. (The 
confusion between []p and [)p & p). The universal (Löbian) machine knows 
already defeat such argument. Hofstadter understating of Gödel is better. 
I will read more, but his notion of person takes the whole of Aristotle for 
granted, where mechanism goes far more in the Plato direction. Like Penrose, he 
seems to ignore the fact that a machine does not know which machine she is, 
not-r which universal machine support her, and that below its substitution 
level, there are an infinity of such universal machine, structured by the 
mathematics of self-reference.

Bruno



> 
> - Philip Thrift
> 
> 
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Re: The codical-material universe

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/11/2018 2:45 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 11 Sep 2018, at 01:54, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 9/10/2018 9:34 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:



On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:



On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift > wrote:



On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal
wrote:



On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark 
wrote:


Bruno MarchalWrote:

/> I cannot see primary matter.In fact I am not sure
what you mean by matter, or by “mathematical-material
universe”.[...] I have proven (40 years ago) that
materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or
physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible./


If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly
don't know what "primary matter" means, so what the hell
did you prove 40 years ago?


That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a
sophisticated “sum” on all computations.

Matter = observable

Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to
which there is a primary physical universe, or a primary
sort of (non mathematical) reality from which those
observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be
shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be
reduced to some mode of arithmetical self-reference.




I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means
because any such answer has to include physics and physics
has to involve matter which you admit confuses you.


No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent
to believe that we have to assume its existence. A realm is
primary if it cannot be reduced to some other field”. May
believe that biology is not primary, because it can be
reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly,
with Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or
Turing equivalent.






And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about
"Mechanism" , the reply would only contain yet more words
you can neither define nor give examples of.


Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of
description of our body such that we can survive with a
(physical) digital brain or body, if it faithfully
represents our body’s functionality at that description level.

Bruno



I seems /possible /to me that there could be a matter
decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes *me*, decompiles
*me* into some code, transports that code, and compiles that
code into a digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of
"body". And it would be *me 2*. and "I" would exist again.

But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output
-  I don't think I would exist anymore.


How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to
distinguish (without observable clue, by personal introspection)
if it has been recompiled in a physical reality or in a
number-theoretical reality imitating my brain below my
substitution level?
It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role
in consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything
Turing-emulable, but then mechanism is false.But invoking
(primitive) Matter in this way seems arbitrary, and it
re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding
something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only
because the physical stuff emulate correctly the computations
associated to your experience, then you will survive also in
arithmetic, which emulates all computations. Indeed the notion
of “emulation” of a machine by another has been discovered in
arithmetic.

Bruno



If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code, that 
code was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a 
biocompiler - https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler - for 
example) I might be able to check if my new body was different from 
my old body by comparing medical records.


If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my 
code  had been compiled - not into my previous material reality - 
but into a numerical reality. I'm not sure how that would change my 
life. I'd probably say, "Yeah, sure" and still be a materialist.


- pt


That's a point I've made before.  It's all very well to say that you 
could be replaced by an abstract machine (e.g. arithmetic) running 
your code; but to make that work there would also have to be an 
emulation of your environment, including its physics.  So then it's 
not clear that anything is different.  It becomes a metaphysical 
just-so story.



It makes everything different. It entails that Aristotelian physics is 
wrong, that Newtonian 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/11/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Can the universal Diophantine equation emulate a hypercomputer?

Might say more on this if asked. That has been explained already in 
this list more than once. Deutsch assume a primitive physical 
reality. That is coherent with the CT part of mechanism, but not the 
YD part (the yes doctor, the first person indeterminacy). Mechanism 
is CT + YD. It leads to a constructive reduction of the mind-body 
problem to a deduction of the laws of physics from machine theology 
or machine self-reference if you prefer. And its works, the physics 
deduced until now, even if quite modest, is already enough quantum 
like to cast light on the origin of the measure on the 
computation/sigma_1 sentences.


Naah.


Please, elaborate. Once you grasp that mechanism entails we are 
emulated in infinitely many computations in arithmetic, I don’t see 
how any of this can be avoided.


Understanding something isn't the same as believing it.  I understand 
that Sherlock Holmes lived on Baker Street.


If you believe that there is something like a physical universe, or a 
any god or ontology, capable of selecting a computation in arithmetic, 
you need to explain what it is, and how it does that trick.


I don't believe there are computations in arithmetic, because I don't 
believe arithmetic exists.


Brent

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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Sep 2018, at 12:43, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, September 11, 2018 at 4:18:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 10 Sep 2018, at 18:34, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark > wrote:
 
 
 Bruno Marchal Wrote:
 
 > I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by 
 > matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 
 > years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or 
 > physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible.
 
 If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what 
 "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago? 
>>> 
>>> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated 
>>> “sum” on all computations. 
>>> 
>>> Matter = observable
>>> 
>>> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is a 
>>> primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) reality 
>>> from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be 
>>> shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced to some 
>>> mode of arithmetical self-reference.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any 
 such answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which 
 you admit confuses you. 
>>> 
>>> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe that 
>>> we have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced 
>>> to some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, because it 
>>> can be reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, with 
>>> Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the reply 
 would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give examples 
 of.
>>> 
>>> Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of description of 
>>> our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or body, 
>>> if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that description 
>>> level.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I seems possible to me that there could be a matter 
>>> decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes me, decompiles me into some 
>>> code, transports that code, and compiles that code into a 
>>> digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be me 
>>> 2. and "I" would exist again.
>>> 
>>> But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output -  I don't  
>>> think I would exist anymore.
>> 
>> How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to distinguish 
>> (without observable clue, by personal introspection) if it has been 
>> recompiled in a physical reality or in a number-theoretical reality 
>> imitating my brain below my substitution level?
>> It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role in 
>> consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything Turing-emulable, but 
>> then mechanism is false.But invoking (primitive) Matter in this way seems 
>> arbitrary, and it re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding 
>> something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the 
>> physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to your 
>> experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which emulates all 
>> computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a machine by another has 
>> been discovered in arithmetic.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>>  
>>  
>> If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code,
> 
> What do you mean by decompiling a material body? I cannot make sense of this 
> expression. 
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> "Decompiling" just means reverse engineering, as the synthetic biologists do 
> for simple life now.
> 
>  An actual , simple biomolecular form (like DNA) is reversed engineered into 
> some software code (a chemical language, like an XML for chemistry), That 
> might be modified. and then a molecular assembler makes an actual new life 
> form.
> 
> This is extrapolated to more complicated life forms.

That is basically how I discovered the notion of computation by studying the 
molecular genetics of bacteria and virus. But then I found Gödel’s theorem, and 
saw that the recursion tricks illustrated by the bacterial genome is done ad 
infinitum already in arithmetic. I will still take some time to digest the 
discovery of the universal machine and why it makes all this possible. I took 
time to really understand the Church-Turing thesis: it is a miracle, Gödel is 

Re: Busy Beaver

[John Clark]

On Mon, Sep 10, 2018 at 10:44 PM  wrote:

*>Is it not computable because after some value of its argument, its mapped
> value is greater than anything that can be written by a computer? AG*
>

No that's not the fundamental problem. It is entirely possible that the 5th
Busy Beaver number is  47,176,870 because a 5 state Turing Machine has been
found that halts after 47,176,870 operations; computers have no trouble
with numbers that small,  the problem is there are still 5 different 5
state turing machines that are well past 47,176,870 and they have not
halted. If none of those 5 machines ever halts then 47,176,870 really and
truly is the 5th Busy Beaver number, but if that is the case we will never
know that is the case because we'll never know that none of those 5
machines ever halts.

John K Clark

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Re: Busy Beaver

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, September 11, 2018 at 5:54:06 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Sep 2018, at 04:44, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> Is it not computable because after some value of its argument, its mapped 
> value is greater than anything that can be written by a computer? AG
>
>
>
> No, even a computer with infinite time and infinite memory is not able to 
> compute it. The busy beaver is a well defined total (everywhere defined) 
> function which is not computable, even in theory.
>
> I can prove that, but have you understand that the Total-or-Partial 
> attribute of an arbitrary programs is a well defined function yet non 
> computable? I have proven this in my last post in the Church-Turing thread.
>
>
> Why is the busy beaver not computable. The basic reason is that it gives 
> the bound of what you can compute with the machine, and if the BB function 
> was computable, you could use it to build a more powerful BB, notably by 
> diagonalisation. 
>
> More on this later,
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
On the BBP and hypercomputing:


*A New Godelian Argument for Hypercomputing Minds Based on the Busy Beaver 
Problem*
https://newdualism.org/papers/S.Bringsjord/laihyper11.pdf


- Philip Thrift

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Re: Busy Beaver

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Sep 2018, at 04:44, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> Is it not computable because after some value of its argument, its mapped 
> value is greater than anything that can be written by a computer? AG


No, even a computer with infinite time and infinite memory is not able to 
compute it. The busy beaver is a well defined total (everywhere defined) 
function which is not computable, even in theory.

I can prove that, but have you understand that the Total-or-Partial attribute 
of an arbitrary programs is a well defined function yet non computable? I have 
proven this in my last post in the Church-Turing thread.


Why is the busy beaver not computable. The basic reason is that it gives the 
bound of what you can compute with the machine, and if the BB function was 
computable, you could use it to build a more powerful BB, notably by 
diagonalisation. 

More on this later,

Bruno




> 
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Re: The codical-material universe

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, September 11, 2018 at 4:18:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 10 Sep 2018, at 18:34, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> Bruno Marchal Wrote:
>>>
>>> *> I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by 
 matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 
 years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or 
 physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible.*
>>>
>>>
>>> If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what 
>>> "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago?  
>>>
>>>
>>> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated 
>>> “sum” on all computations. 
>>>
>>> Matter = observable
>>>
>>> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is 
>>> a primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) 
>>> reality from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it 
>>> can be shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced 
>>> to some mode of arithmetical self-reference.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any 
>>> such answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which 
>>> you admit confuses you. 
>>>
>>>
>>> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe 
>>> that we have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be 
>>> reduced to some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, 
>>> because it can be reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, 
>>> with Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the 
>>> reply would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give 
>>> examples of.
>>>
>>>
>>> Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of description 
>>> of our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or 
>>> body, if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that 
>>> description level.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> I seems *possible *to me that there could be a matter 
>> decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes *me*, decompiles *me* into 
>> some code, transports that code, and compiles that code into a 
>> digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be *me 
>> 2*. and "I" would exist again.
>>
>> But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output -  I 
>> don't  think I would exist anymore.
>>
>>
>> How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to distinguish 
>> (without observable clue, by personal introspection) if it has been 
>> recompiled in a physical reality or in a number-theoretical reality 
>> imitating my brain below my substitution level?
>> It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role in 
>> consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything Turing-emulable, but 
>> then mechanism is false.But invoking (primitive) Matter in this way seems 
>> arbitrary, and it re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding 
>> something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the 
>> physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to your 
>> experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which emulates all 
>> computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a machine by another has 
>> been discovered in arithmetic.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>  
>  
> If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code,
>
>
> What do you mean by decompiling a material body? I cannot make sense of 
> this expression. 
>
>
>
 

"Decompiling" just means* reverse engineering*, as the synthetic biologists 
do for simple life now.

 An actual , simple biomolecular form (like DNA) is reversed engineered 
into some software code (a chemical language, like an XML for chemistry), 
That might be modified. and then a molecular assembler makes an actual new 
life form.

This is extrapolated to more complicated life forms.

 
- Philip Thrift

that code was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a 
> biocompiler - https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler - for example) I 
> might be able to check if my new body was different from my old body by 
> comparing medical records.
>
> If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my code  
> had been compiled - not into my previous material reality - but into a 
> numerical reality. I'm not sure how that would change my life. I'd probably 
> say, "Yeah, sure" and still be a materialist.
>
>
> Yes, the whole point is that it will 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, September 11, 2018 at 4:06:33 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 11 Sep 2018, at 03:11, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 4:11:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> I can argue that the Church-Turing thesis entails the falsity of the 
>> physical Church-Turing thesis, even without postulating Mechanism.
>> If we are machine, then we can exploit the computations which supports us 
>> below our substitution level to mimic in real time processes which are not 
>> rulable in real time by any classical computer.
>> Might say more on this if asked. That has been explained already in this 
>> list more than once. Deutsch assume a primitive physical reality. That is 
>> coherent with the CT part of mechanism, but not the YD part (the yes 
>> doctor, the first person indeterminacy). Mechanism is CT + YD. It leads to 
>> a constructive reduction of the mind-body problem to a deduction of the 
>> laws of physics from machine theology or machine self-reference if you 
>> prefer. And its works, the physics deduced until now, even if quite modest, 
>> is already enough quantum like to cast light on the origin of the measure 
>> on the computation/sigma_1 sentences. Not yet that much as to be able to 
>> derive Gleason theorem, though, but that is just complicated. To refute 
>> mechanism, we should have a proof that such measure does not exist.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>  
>
> I still think we just don't know what *computation* completely means in 
> the material world (what I have called synthetic pancomputationalism [1]). 
> In particular, possibly the brain (neural material) is not a digital or an 
> analog or a hyper computer, but a novel kind of computer (cf. references in 
> [2]).
>
>
> The notion of computability is the most successful epistemological notion 
> ever defined in mathematics, thanks to the Church thesis. I might take a 
> look on your link, but usually I am not convinced by any non standard 
> notion of computations, which show very often that the authors have not 
> grasped Church’s thesis.
> Then, in the mind-body problem studies, I think it is better to be neutral 
> on the ontology. I do not postulate a physical universe. It is part of what 
> I am interested in explaining. 
>
> Bruno
>
>
> [1]  
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/04/07/synthetic-pancomputationalism/
> [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gualtiero_Piccinini
>
> - Philip Thrift
>
>
>
I don't know whether the "unconventionalists"  (e.g. at the UCNC 
conferences [ http://www.ucnc2019.uec.ac.jp ]) are misunderstanding the CT, 
but it is a thesis "reformulated" by some (at least in terms of questioning 
what computation means).

One of the references in [2] above:


“Computation without Representation,” Philosophical Studies, 137.2 (2008), 
pp. 205–241.
[ http://www.umsl.edu/~piccininig/Computation_without_Representation.pdf ]

- pt


 

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Re: Combinator 3 (a bit of Logic)

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 10 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
> 
> Thanks Bruno!

Thanks *you*.

> Following so far with not problems.

Good!

I hope the others understand too. It is simple conceptually, compared to the 
amount of math you need to do to understand Quantum Mechanics. 
For the combinators, everything is reduced to simple substitution rules, then 
the rest follows quickly, if we take the time to get familiar with the notation.

Unfortunately, some people do not understand that kind of mathematics ONLY 
because they imagine it is difficult, and this only because they never read the 
definitions with the minimal attention needed. 

Now, of course, if there is a problem in Combinator 4 (Recursion) that I posted 
yesterday, just ask, but I guess you will grasp it without any problem. It is 
slightly more complex, because it is not at all obvious that it even make sense 
of all recursive equation having a solution. It can be related to the Gödel 
“miracle”: the closure of the partial computable functions for diagonalization.

Soon, the Numbers.

All the best,

Bruno



> 
> On 5 September 2018 at 19:41, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> Hi Jason, Telmo, Brent, others,
>> 
>> Some of you might say “OK, combinators combine, and now we know that the
>> combination of S and K, that is, the combinators, can do all combination”.
>> The last post did prove the so-called combinatorial completeness.
>> 
>> But that might still seem far from Turing universality.
>> 
>> The post of today will make a simple step in that direction.
>> 
>> I propose to implement elementary logic with the combinators. I expose a
>> solution due to Barendrecht, which is extraordinarily elegant. It is also
>> the one used by Smullyan in “To Mock a Mocking Bird”.
>> 
>> I will first implement the control structure:
>> 
>>   if A then B else C
>> 
>> As you can guess this is a pretty important step toward Turing Universality.
>> A is supposed to be some “propositional combinators”, being true or false,
>> on some argument(s) or not, and we want that if A is true, then the
>> combinators B is trigged, and if A is false, then the combinator C should be
>> trigged.
>> 
>> For this we need some representation of the constant Boolean TRUE and FALSE.
>> 
>> Barendrecht defined the constant TRUE by K. And he defined the constant
>> false by KI. (I is of course the identity combinator, i.e. SKK). I will use
>> t and f as usual for those boolean constants.
>> 
>> So we define:
>> 
>> t = K
>> 
>> and
>> 
>> f = KI
>> 
>> Now, the implementation of
>> 
>>   if A then B else C
>> 
>> Is simply
>> 
>>  ABC
>> 
>> Indeed, if A is true, A = t = K, and KBC = B, and if A is false, A = f = KI,
>> then ABC = fBC = KIBC = C.
>> 
>> (KIxy = (KIx)y = Iy = y)
>> 
>> OK?
>> 
>> Bold Summary: By choosing t = K, and f = KI, “if A then B else C” becomes
>> ABC.
>> 
>> This will be exploited later for programming, but right now, we can use this
>> to implement elementary propositional logic.
>> 
>> I will use minuscule for those logical combinators
>> 
>> 1) conjunction: c("x and y” is written cxy)
>> 
>> We want a combinator c such that cxy = t if both x and y are equal to t, and
>> false in all other situations.
>> 
>> But cxy, the conjunction of x and y, is really the same as "If x then y else
>> f".
>> 
>> Indeed, if x is false, “x & y” is false, and if x is true, “x & y” is given
>> by the truth value of y.
>> 
>> So:  cxy = 'if x then y else f' = xyf (cf the bold summary above), and c =
>> [x][y] xyf, but that is Rfxy where R is the Robin (one of the combinator
>> which does a circular permutation, that we have seen previously):
>> Rxyz = yzx. Conclusion c = Rf.
>> 
>> <> To be sure we have seen that R = CC and that
>> C = S(BBS)(KK),  (note the difference between c and C)
>> 
>> R = CC =  S(BBS)(KK)(S(BBS)(KK)) but there are still B there, which we
>> replace by its SK-implementation S(KS)K:
>> 
>> R = S(S(KS)K(S(KS)K)S)(KK)(S(S(KS)K(S(KS)K)S)(KK))
>> 
>> So the combinator c is Rf which is R(KI), and that gives, with I = SKK,
>> 
>> c =  S(S(KS)K(S(KS)K)S)(KK)(S(S(KS)K(S(KS)K)S)(KK))(K(SKK))
>> 
>> But I will write it simply c = Vf. I just wanted you to remember that c is
>> truly a combinator, i.e.. a combination of K and S.>>
>> 
>> Does it work? It should. No need to verify this with the long expression, as
>> we have already verified that Vxyz = zxy, etc. We can test directly the
>> truth table:
>> 
>> ctt = Rftt = ttf = Ktf = t
>> ctf = Rftf = tff = Kff = f
>> cft = Rfft = ftf = KItf = f
>> cff = Rfff = fff = KIff = f
>> 
>> It works!
>> 
>> 2) Disjunction:  d
>> 
>> dxy = if x then t else y  (OK?)
>> 
>> So dxy = xty. So d = [x][y]xty = Tty (with Txy = yx): Ttxy = xty indeed.
>> 
>> So d = Tt
>> 
>> Does it work? Let us verify:
>> 
>> dtt = Tttt = ttt = Ktt = t
>> dtf = Tttf = ttf = Ktf = t
>> dft = Ttft = ftt = (KI)tt = t
>> dff = Ttff = ftf = (KI)tf = f
>> 
>> It works!
>> 
>> 3) implication: i
>> 
>> ixy should be false only if x is t and y is 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Sep 2018, at 01:54, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/10/2018 9:34 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift > 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> 
 On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark > wrote:
 
 
 Bruno Marchal Wrote:
 
 > I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by 
 > matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 
 > years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or 
 > physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible.
 
 If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what 
 "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago? 
>>> 
>>> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated 
>>> “sum” on all computations. 
>>> 
>>> Matter = observable
>>> 
>>> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is a 
>>> primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) reality 
>>> from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be 
>>> shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced to some 
>>> mode of arithmetical self-reference.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any 
 such answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which 
 you admit confuses you. 
>>> 
>>> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe that 
>>> we have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced 
>>> to some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, because it 
>>> can be reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, with 
>>> Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
 And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the reply 
 would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give examples 
 of.
>>> 
>>> Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of description of 
>>> our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or body, 
>>> if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that description 
>>> level.
>>> 
>>> Bruno
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I seems possible to me that there could be a matter 
>>> decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes me, decompiles me into some 
>>> code, transports that code, and compiles that code into a 
>>> digital-technology-based "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be me 
>>> 2. and "I" would exist again.
>>> 
>>> But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output -  I don't  
>>> think I would exist anymore.
>> 
>> How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to distinguish 
>> (without observable clue, by personal introspection) if it has been 
>> recompiled in a physical reality or in a number-theoretical reality 
>> imitating my brain below my substitution level?
>> It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role in 
>> consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything Turing-emulable, but 
>> then mechanism is false.But invoking (primitive) Matter in this way seems 
>> arbitrary, and it re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding 
>> something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the 
>> physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to your 
>> experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which emulates all 
>> computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a machine by another has 
>> been discovered in arithmetic.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>>  
>>  
>> If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code, that code 
>> was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a biocompiler 
>> -https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler 
>>  - for example) I might be able 
>> to check if my new body was different from my old body by comparing medical 
>> records.
>> 
>> If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my code  
>> had been compiled - not into my previous material reality - but into a 
>> numerical reality. I'm not sure how that would change my life. I'd probably 
>> say, "Yeah, sure" and still be a materialist.
>> 
>> - pt
> 
> That's a point I've made before.  It's all very well to say that you could be 
> replaced by an abstract machine (e.g. arithmetic) running your code; but to 
> make that work there would also have to be an emulation of your environment, 
> including its physics.  So then it's not clear that anything is different.  
> It becomes a metaphysical just-so story.


It makes everything different. It entails that Aristotelian physics is wrong, 
that Newtonian physics is 

Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 10 Sep 2018, at 20:54, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 6:28 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > Matter = observable
> 
> Speed is observable, is speed matter?


Yes, and it belong to the realm of the quanta. It is observable and sharable.



> The qualia red is observable, is red matter?

Yes, but it is not sharable. It is “physical”, but not in physics. The length 
wave might belong to sharable physics, but the qualia itself is private and non 
sharable. It will be in Z1* minus Z1, if you have read the papers I mentioned. 




>  
> > Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle
> 
> If I never hear another word about Aristotle I will not in any way feel 
> deprived. 

That might explain why you seem unable to conceive reality in a different way 
than Aristotle. 

Plato: what we see might not be real.
Aristotle; real is defined by what we see.




>  
> >A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced to some other field”.
> 
> OK
> 
> >May believe that biology is not primary, because it can be reduced 
> >(apparently) to chemistry and physics.
> 
> Yes
>  
> > with Mechanism, physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent.
> 
> No. You can't have a Turing Machine without a machine


That contradicts all papers on Turing machine. A Turing machine is finite set 
of quadruplets, as I have recalled more or less recently.



> and you can't have a number theory, or a theory of any sort, without a brain 
> made of matter.


Gödel greatest contribution is the arithmetization of arithmetical theories 
(and others). Even Robison arithmetic can prove the existence of richer 
theories like PA and ZF. 

You commit an ontological commitment to defeat a theory. That is how the 
creationist criticise the theory of evolution. 

There is no evidence that a brain, or an amoeba, is made of primary matter. 
Quantum mechanics shows, at the least, that the notion of matter is unclear, 
but all serious philosopher of mind knew this since Plato.




> 
> > Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of description of 
> > our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or body, 
> > if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that description 
> > level.
> 
> Digits are numbers

Not really, but OK.



> so I guess you believe in Digital Mechanism,

It is my working hypothesis.



> unless you believe there is something special about the atoms that happen to 
> occupy your body right


There is no atoms, once we postulate Mechanism. That is the result of the 
informal UDA, and that is what all machine understand soon or later in 
arithmetic, or in any of its consistent extensions. To have *ontological* 
atoms, you need a non computational theory of mind. That is not obvious, 
especially if you are stuck at the easiest step (step 3).




> now so that they "cannot be reduced to some other field", that is to say 
> unless you believe the matter in your body is primary.

In arithmetic, my conscious experience cannot be associate with any particular 
computational state, but with an infinity of them, making matter into a 
statistics on computations (a term which I use always in the sense of Turing, 
Church, Post, Kleene: that is in the mathematical sense).

Bruno






> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
> 
> 
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Re: The codical-material universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 10 Sep 2018, at 18:34, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 3:25:53 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Sep 2018, at 13:06, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 5:28:25 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 8 Sep 2018, at 23:53, John Clark > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Bruno Marchal Wrote:
>>> 
>>> > I cannot see primary matter. In fact I am not sure what you mean by 
>>> > matter, or by “mathematical-material universe”. [...] I have proven (40 
>>> > years ago) that materialism (the belief in some primary matter, or 
>>> > physicalism) and Mechanism are incompatible.
>>> 
>>> If you don't know what "matter" means then you certainly don't know what 
>>> "primary matter" means, so what the hell did you prove 40 years ago? 
>> 
>> That if mechanism is true, the observable has to rely on a sophisticated 
>> “sum” on all computations. 
>> 
>> Matter = observable
>> 
>> Primary matter is the doctrine by Aristotle according to which there is a 
>> primary physical universe, or a primary sort of (non mathematical) reality 
>> from which those observable would have emerge. With mechanism, it can be 
>> shown that the laws pertaining on the observable have to be reduced to some 
>> mode of arithmetical self-reference.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> I'm not even going to ask what you think physicalism means because any such 
>>> answer has to include physics and physics has to involve matter which you 
>>> admit confuses you. 
>> 
>> No, it does not confuse me. It is just shown inconsistent to believe that we 
>> have to assume its existence. A realm is primary if it cannot be reduced to 
>> some other field”. May believe that biology is not primary, because it can 
>> be reduced (apparently) to chemistry and physics. Similarly, with Mechanism, 
>> physics is reducible to number theory or Turing equivalent.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> And for the same reason I'm not going to ask about "Mechanism" , the reply 
>>> would only contain yet more words you can neither define nor give examples 
>>> of.
>> 
>> Digital Mechanism  is the doctrine that there is a level of description of 
>> our body such that we can survive with a (physical) digital brain or body, 
>> if it faithfully represents our body’s functionality at that description 
>> level.
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I seems possible to me that there could be a matter 
>> decompiler/transporter/compiler that takes me, decompiles me into some code, 
>> transports that code, and compiles that code into a digital-technology-based 
>> "brain" in some sort of "body". And it would be me 2. and "I" would exist 
>> again.
>> 
>> But if it never recompiled me into any kind of material output -  I don't  
>> think I would exist anymore.
> 
> How would you, or how would any universal machine, be able to distinguish 
> (without observable clue, by personal introspection) if it has been 
> recompiled in a physical reality or in a number-theoretical reality imitating 
> my brain below my substitution level?
> It seems to me that you need to give to matter some special role in 
> consciousness which cannot be recovered by anything Turing-emulable, but then 
> mechanism is false.But invoking (primitive) Matter in this way seems 
> arbitrary, and it re-introduce the mind-body problem. It seems like adding 
> something difficult to avoid a consequence. If you survive only because the 
> physical stuff emulate correctly the computations associated to your 
> experience, then you will survive also in arithmetic, which emulates all 
> computations. Indeed the notion of “emulation” of a machine by another has 
> been discovered in arithmetic.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
>  
>  
> If my (material) body was decompiled into some compressed code,

What do you mean by decompiling a material body? I cannot make sense of this 
expression. 



> that code was stored, and then later that code was compiled (with a 
> biocompiler - https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/biocompiler - for example) I 
> might be able to check if my new body was different from my old body by 
> comparing medical records.
> 
> If the person who compiled my code into my new body told me that my code  had 
> been compiled - not into my previous material reality - but into a numerical 
> reality. I'm not sure how that would change my life. I'd probably say, "Yeah, 
> sure" and still be a materialist.

Yes, the whole point is that it will not change your life, but now you need to 
explain the appearance of the physical reality without any ontological 
commitment, except for some numerical reality (but that is already done when 
hypothesising Mechanism (with or without matter at the start).

Bruno

> 
> - pt
> 
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Sep 2018, at 01:10, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/10/2018 2:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 9 Sep 2018, at 21:51, Philip Thrift >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Sunday, September 9, 2018 at 10:04:20 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>>> On Sun, Sep 9, 2018 at 6:44 AM Bruno Marchal >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> >>Nobody on this planet uses the term "Löbian machine" except you.
>>>  
>>> >It is just a more precise version of what popular books described by 
>>> >“sufficiently rich theory”.
>>> 
>>> There is nothing precise about homemade slang used by nobody but you.
>>> 
>>> > There are many definition, but they are all equivalent.
>>> 
>>> And there is nothing profound about a definition, it's easy to define a 
>>> perpetual motion machine but that doesn't mean they exist, I can define a 
>>> Clark Machine as a machine that can solve the halting problem but that 
>>> doesn't mean I have the any idea how to make one or can even show that such 
>>> a thing could in principle exist.
>>>  
>>> >Any Turing complete theory of any universal machine, with sufficiently 
>>> >strong induction axiom (like sigma_1 induction)  constitute a Löbian 
>>> >machine.
>>> 
>>> In the physical world induction is just a rule of thumb that usually works 
>>> pretty well most of the time, but it seldom works perfectly and never works 
>>> continuously, eventually it always fails.
>>> 
>>> >>Turing explained exactly precisely how to build one of his machines but 
>>> >>you have never given the slightest hint of how to build a "Löbian 
>>> >>machine" or even clearly explained what it can compute that a Turing 
>>> >>Machine can’t.
>>> 
>>> >?
>>> ! 
>>> 
>>> >That means just that you need to go being step 3 in my thesis,
>>> 
>>> Step 3? Ah yes I remember now, that's the one with wall to wall personal 
>>> pronouns without a single clear referent in the entire bunch.
>>>  
>>> > The notion of Löbian machine is easy to construct,
>>> 
>>> The notion of a Perpetual Motion machine is also easy to construct as is 
>>> the Clark Machine that can solve the Halting Problem, but Turing did far 
>>> more than dream up a magical universal calculating machine, he showed 
>>> exactly how to make one. But we're not as smart as Turing, I can't do that 
>>> with my Clark Machine and you can't do that with your Löbian machine.
>>>  
>>> > and the mathematical reality is full of example of Löbian machine, and 
>>> > Löbian god
>>> 
>>> Löbian machine,  Löbian god, the propositional part of the theology  
>>> tell me, have you ever wondered why so many people fail to take you 
>>> seriously?
>>>  
>>> >A Lpobian machine is just a universal machine capable of proving its own 
>>> >universality.
>>> 
>>> I have no trouble believing a universal machine is universal, but no Turing 
>>> Machine can in general prove it will halt and but no machine of any sort, 
>>> or anything else for that matter, can prove its own consistency unless it 
>>> is inconsistent. 
>>> 
>>> > Why do you want it to be able to do what a god can do?
>>> 
>>> Odd question, who wouldn't want to do what a God can do? But if God can 
>>> solve the Halting Problem then He can also make a rock so heavy He can't 
>>> lift it.
>>> 
>>> >>How would things be different if "the propositional part of the theology" 
>>> >>were not decidable? 
>>> 
>>> >Solovay theorem would be false, and the subject of machine theology would 
>>> >be far more complex. 
>>> 
>>> I don't know if that's true or not because "machine theology" is more of 
>>> your homemade gibberish, just like "the propositional part of the theology".
>>> 
>>> > Note that the theology of machine has highly undecidable at the first 
>>> > order level.
>>> 
>>> And I don't know if that is true or not either because "the theology of 
>>> machine" is yet more of your patented homemade baby talk. 
>>> 
>>> John K Clark
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> The only relevant "physical" theory I know about and is discussed widely is 
>>> in terms of relativistic computers (which probably most think are forever 
>>> merely fictional).
>>> 
>>> Relativistic computers and the Turing barrier
>>> 
>>> 
>>> https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0096300305008398 
>>> 
>>> http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.150.783=rep1=pdf
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> We examine the current status of the physical version of the Church-Turing 
>>> Thesis (PhCT for short) in view of latest developments in spacetime theory. 
>>> This also amounts to investigating the status of hypercomputation in view 
>>> of latest results on spacetime. We agree with [D. Deutsch, A. Ekert, R. 
>>> Lupacchini, Machines, logic and quantum physics, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 
>>> 6 (3) (2000) 265–283] that PhCT is not only a conjecture of mathematics but 
>>> rather a conjecture of a 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Sep 2018, at 03:11, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, September 10, 2018 at 4:11:46 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> I can argue that the Church-Turing thesis entails the falsity of the physical 
> Church-Turing thesis, even without postulating Mechanism.
> If we are machine, then we can exploit the computations which supports us 
> below our substitution level to mimic in real time processes which are not 
> rulable in real time by any classical computer.
> Might say more on this if asked. That has been explained already in this list 
> more than once. Deutsch assume a primitive physical reality. That is coherent 
> with the CT part of mechanism, but not the YD part (the yes doctor, the first 
> person indeterminacy). Mechanism is CT + YD. It leads to a constructive 
> reduction of the mind-body problem to a deduction of the laws of physics from 
> machine theology or machine self-reference if you prefer. And its works, the 
> physics deduced until now, even if quite modest, is already enough quantum 
> like to cast light on the origin of the measure on the computation/sigma_1 
> sentences. Not yet that much as to be able to derive Gleason theorem, though, 
> but that is just complicated. To refute mechanism, we should have a proof 
> that such measure does not exist.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
>  
> 
> I still think we just don't know what computation completely means in the 
> material world (what I have called synthetic pancomputationalism [1]). In 
> particular, possibly the brain (neural material) is not a digital or an 
> analog or a hyper computer, but a novel kind of computer (cf. references in 
> [2]).

The notion of computability is the most successful epistemological notion ever 
defined in mathematics, thanks to the Church thesis. I might take a look on 
your link, but usually I am not convinced by any non standard notion of 
computations, which show very often that the authors have not grasped Church’s 
thesis.
Then, in the mind-body problem studies, I think it is better to be neutral on 
the ontology. I do not postulate a physical universe. It is part of what I am 
interested in explaining. 

Bruno


> 
> 
> 
> [1]  
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/04/07/synthetic-pancomputationalism/
> [2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gualtiero_Piccinini
> 
> - Philip Thrift
> 
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