Re: Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license
I did get a response from him when I suggested making Amoeba's Secret open access. According to Kim Jones, who visited him 2022, he is well and taking a break from the Everything List. Cheers On Mon, Apr 29, 2024 at 03:09:22PM +1200, LizR wrote: > Hi Russell, > > Do you have any news of Bruno? I see his last contribution here was a > couple of years ago. > > Best wishes, > Liz > > On Sat, 12 Aug 2023 at 22:15, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > Hi guys, > > > > I finally got around to doing something I meant to do years ago - I > > have released the English translation of "Amoeba's Secret" as a freely > > downloadable PDF under the Creative Commons CC-BY license at > > https://www.hpcoders.com.au/docs/amoebassecret.pdf . > > > > Bruno Marchal was a long time contributer to this list, and this > > semi-autobiography is also one of the clearest explanations of his > > ideas. > > > > Enjoy, > > > > -- > > > > > > Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > > http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > To view this discussion on the web visit > > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20230812101516.GF17399%40zen. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/CAKzbsNfSjoRtyM4gFtUz8_7DAxbdJYor7_ZbXsB9q3kH4htLaA%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240429050401.GO4152%40zen.
Re: LLAMA3
> On Sunday, April 21, 2024 at 03:19:37 PM EDT, Brent Meeker > wrote: > > > So far some human has to provide motivation in the form of prompts. Has > anymore tried a feedback loop in which AI's responses are returned at prompts? > > Brent > Yes - I believe that experiment was done, and it works quite well. Maybe several times. Possibly with a different AI doing the prompt evolution, Red Queen style. Sorry - I can point you at a report, it was amongst the flurry of articles about AI that have come out in the last 12 months. Cheers -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2024040359.GH10432%40zen.
Re: [Extropolis] NYTimes.com: Did One Guy Just Stop a Huge Cyberattack?
I'd be surprised if it hadn't been done so already. This story has been in the mainstream media news for the past weekend at least. I agree its an amazing story - we collectively dodged a bullet, but worryingly have little to prevent its reoccurrence. On Fri, Apr 05, 2024 at 08:51:32AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 10:59 PM Keith Henson wrote: > > > "That's one of the most amazing stories I have ever heard." > > > Anyone should feel free to forward it to the Extropy List. I can't. > > John K Clark > > > > > > On Thu, Apr 4, 2024 at 5:15 AM John Clark wrote: > > > > Explore this gift article from The New York Times. You can read it for > free without a subscription. > > > > Did One Guy Just Stop a Huge Cyberattack? > > > > A Microsoft engineer noticed something was off on a piece of software he > worked on. He soon discovered someone was probably trying to gain access > to > computers all over the world. > > > > https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/03/technology/ > prevent-cyberattack-linux.html?unlocked_article_code= > 1.h00.SM26.A41shONSS_wE=em-share > > > > > Open-source software is normally secure, but not against this kind of > attack. Whoever did it spent years working their way into a position > of trust. > > Keith > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "extropolis" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to extropolis+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > extropolis/ > CAPiwVB5q4VKROcv5htznJA_irhe1xRN%2BPLGBWFGRqv%2B9V44K0A%40mail.gmail.com. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv2sEjAiNdS_teRxV%2Bk%3Dp2A9UWrUaSKVHyEbFn1oPLw4zA%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240408060739.GA28200%40zen.
Re: Environmentalists are not serious people
On Sun, Mar 31, 2024 at 12:09:25PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Sun, Mar 31, 2024 at 10:05 AM William Flynn Wallace > wrote: > > > > John, you are judging all environmentalists by a tiny group of > extremists. > > > > Tiny? I didn't see a larger group of environmentalists lobbying in favor of > SCoPEx or The Thirty Meter Telescope! I am judging environmentalists by those > who manage to get things done, or rather those who are successful in making > sure that nothing ever gets done. They'd rather cry about global warming than > do anything to try to fix the problem, unless of course the solution > involves > a vast amount of suffering, then fixing it would be OK. Otherwise they'd > prefer > the problem remain unsolved. > "Environmentalists" are not one united group of people. Probably one of the biggest movements is Avaaz, which takes on environmental concerns as well as humanitarian ones. I'm subscribed to that group, but SCoPEx didn't rate a mention. So this most likely was a small group opposing it, and nobody else knew about it. But... The most compelling argument to opposing geoengineering is that it is a distraction from the real task, which is to reduce CO2 emissions. Some people (I don't think anyone in this company would be that stupid) seem to think it is OK to continue burning fossil fuels if the effects can be mitagated by climate geoengineering, or carbon capture sequestration. Some in the environmental movement are suspicious that fossil fuel companies will hold out mitigations methods as a "get out of gaol free" card, to allow business as usual. This is all entirely political, and as far as I'm concerned total bullshit. We need all and every possible means to counteract climate change. That means decarbonise the economy as soon as possible, it also means geoengineering to mitigate the worst effects, and it also means adapting to the changing climate by, for example developing drought resistent crops. It was already too late for just doing massively decarbonisation when I first became aware of the issue in the 1980s, let alone getting started now some 30+ years later with more than a decade of ostrich-like behaviour by the conservative mob (that's in Australia, to say nothing of the rest of the world). Nothing should be off the table, at least as far as researching different options to figure out what interventions work and how cost efective they will be. Humanity is already locked in for a very bumpy century - there will be mass migration, plagues, famine, infrastructure - what we need to focus on is what we need to do to save civilisation. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240331214408.GA13053%40zen.
Re: Coming Singularity
On Fri, Mar 29, 2024 at 09:55:28AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Thu, Mar 28, 2024 at 9:27 PM Russell Standish > wrote: > > > >"So to compare apples with apples - the human brain contains around 700 > trillion (7E14) synapses" > > > I believe 700 trillion is a more than generous estimate of the number of > synapses in the human brain, but I'll let it go. > > > > >"which would roughly correpond to an AI's parameter count > > > > NO! Comparing the human brain's synapses to the number of parameters that an > AI > program like GPT-4 has is NOT comparing apples to apples, it's comparing > apples > to oranges because the brain is hardware but GPT-4 is software. So let's > compare the brain hardware that human intelligence is running on with the > brain > hardware that GPT-4 is running on, that is to say let's compare synapses to > transistors. I'll use your very generous estimate and say the human brain has > 7*10^14 synapses, but the largest supercomputer in the world, the Frontier > Computer at Oakridge, has about 2.5*10^15 transistors, over three times as > many. And we know from experiments that a typical synapse in the human brain > "fires" between 5 and 50 times per second, but a typical transistor in a > computer "fires" about 4 billion times a second (4*10^9). That's why the > Frontier Computer can perform 1.1 *10^18 floating point calculations per > second > and why the human brain can not. There is a big difference between the way transistors are wired in a CPU and the way neurons are wired up in a brain. The brain is not optimised at all to do floating point calculations, which is why even the most competent "computer" (in the old fashioned sense) can only manage sub 1 flops. Conversely, using floating point operations to perform neural network computations is not exactly efficient either. We're using GPUs today, because they can perform these very fast, and its a massively parallel operation, and GPUs are cheap, for what they are. In the future, I would expect we'd have dedicate neural processing units, based on memristors, or whatever. Indeed Intel is now flogging chips with "NPU"s, but how much of that is real and how much is marketing spin I can't say. The comparing synapses with ANN parameters is only relevant for the statement "we can simulate a human brain sized ANN by X date". Kurzweil didn't say that (for some reason I thought he did), he said human intelligence parity (which I supose could be taken to be avergae intelligence, or an IQ of 100). In a human brain, a lot of neurons are handling body operations - controlling muscles, interoception, proprioception, endocrine control etc, so the actual figure related to language processing is likely to be far smaller than the figure given. But only by an order of magnitude, I would say. > > I should add that although there have been significant improvements in the > field of AI in recent years, the most important being the "Attention Is All > You > Need" paper, I believe that even if transformers had never been discovered the > AI explosion that we are currently observing would only have been delayed by a > few years because the most important thing driving it forward is the brute > force enormous increase in raw computing speed. > > > > "He [Ray Kurzweil] was predicting 2029 to be the time when AI will > attain human level intelligence." > > > It now looks like Ray was being too conservative and 2024 or 2025 would be > closer to the Mark, and 2029 would be the time when an AI is smarter than the > entire human race combined. > 2025 should see the release of GPT5. It is still at least two orders of magnitude short of the mark IMHO. It is faster though - training GPT5 will have taken about 2 years, whereas it takes nearly 20 years to train a human. > > > > "I would still say that creativity (which is an essential prerequisite) > is still mysterious" > > > It doesn't matter if humans find creativity to be mysterious because we have > an > existence proof that a lack of understanding of creativity does not prevent > humans from making a machine that is creative. That may be the case, but understanding something does accelerate process dramatically over blind "trial and error". It is the main reason for the explosion in technical prowess over the last 400 years. > Back in 2016 when a computer > beat Lee Sedol, the top human champion at the game of GO, the thing that > everybody was talking about was move 37 of the second game of the five game > tournament. When the computer made that move the live expert commentators were > shocked and described it as "prac
Coming Singularity
Been thinking about the timing of the singularity a bit, given progress in generative AI recently, partly as a result of attending NVidia's annual GTC conference. I first heard about GPT3 two years ago, which impressed me with their 150 billion parameter neural net, because I compared that against the human brain's 100 billion neuron count (that is an incorrect comparison, though, which I'll mention below). As you are well aware, GPT3 exploded into public awareness a year ago with the launch of ChatGPT. For some reason I had in my mind that Ray Kurzweil was predicting human brain level simulation by 2020. Turns out that was not quite correct - he was predicting human-like AI assistants by 2019, which I would say arrived a little late last year in 2023. He was predicting 2029 to be the time when AI will attain human level intelligence. So to compare apples with apples - the human brain contains around 700 trillion (7E14) synapses, which would roughly correpond to an AI's parameter count. GPT5 (due to be released sometime next year) will have around 2E12 parameters, still 2-3 orders of magnitude to go. Assuming continuation of current rates of AI improvement GPT3->GPT5 (4 years) is one order of magnitude increase in parameter count, it will take to 2033 for AI to achieve human parity. So I would say Kurzweil's singularity is a little delayed, to perhaps 2050, provided ecological collapse doesn't happen sooner. I would still say that creativity (which is an essential prerequisite) is still mysterious, in spite of glimmering of creativity shown by Gen AI. But singularity requires that machines design themselves - this means that semiconductor companies need to be run by AI, fabs need to be 3D printed, as well as the chips as well. It'll be a while before the cost of fabs comes down to the point where hyperexponential technological will happen. We will see these prerequisite technological changes years before the singularity really kicks off. Anyway my 2c - I know John is keen to promote the idea of singularity this decade - but I don't see it myself. Cheers -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240329012651.GE2357%40zen.
Re: On The Origin Of Time
I'd never heard of that called the Poincare effect either. Nor it seems does Wikipedia nor Google. IIUC, it is the phenomenon that after working fruitless on some problem for a while, taking a break, sleeping on it, etc might suddenly produce the solution. As I've often said - the 10 minutes walk from my desk to the cafe to get my cup of coffee is often the most productive time of my day. Cheers On Fri, Feb 02, 2024 at 03:17:59PM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote: > I'm surprised. All mathematicians have experienced it, but it's named after > Poincare' because of this essay. It's well worth reading all of it, but the > relevant part is pp 326-329. > > https://archive.org/details/jstor-27900262/page/n9/mode/2up > > Brent > > On 2/2/2024 11:47 AM, John Clark wrote: > > On Fri, Feb 2, 2024 at 2:34 PM Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > You must know about the Poincaire' effect > > > Nope, never heard of it. Do you mean the Poincaré conjecture? Or the > Poincaré recurrence? Or do you mean something else entirely, the man did a > lot of stuff. > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > mpl > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv2kdHN7iXg7Pr_Pr9tu%3DYEw2ONhoF95MC%2BFY0vFuYBwRg%40mail.gmail.com. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/e3868a6b-c499-4dc7-b075-38119a465606%40gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20240205221251.GA4342%40zen.
Amoeba's Secret openly available under CC-BY license
Hi guys, I finally got around to doing something I meant to do years ago - I have released the English translation of "Amoeba's Secret" as a freely downloadable PDF under the Creative Commons CC-BY license at https://www.hpcoders.com.au/docs/amoebassecret.pdf . Bruno Marchal was a long time contributer to this list, and this semi-autobiography is also one of the clearest explanations of his ideas. Enjoy, -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20230812101516.GF17399%40zen.
Re: DeepMind AI Discovers Better Algorithms for Foundational Computing
I haven't read the original article, but given the timing, I believe this was the application of AI in a competitive environment to optimise sorting algorithms of short sequences (<8 items, IIUC). Which reminds of work done by Danny Hillis (of Thinking Machines fame) in the late 1980s who set up a coevolutionary genetic algorithm to evolve sorting algorithms that beat classic sorting algorithms. ISTM - they've just rediscovered his work. Danny has a paper in the ALifeII proceedings describing that work. On Sun, Jun 11, 2023 at 02:52:01PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > The next level will be when an AI makes itself smarter. > > Brent > > On 6/11/2023 7:34 AM, John Clark wrote: > > If this is not an example of an AI helping to develop a smarter AI then I > don't know what is. People are gonna be having a very hard time trying to > convince themselves this is just a glorified autocomplete program. > > AlphaDev - DeepMind AI Discovers Better Algorithms for Foundational > Computing > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > pui > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv3Tn98n4yZL61z0Ry__BNvf9WJ25VZOXrrtLAn_fYt0FQ%40mail.gmail.com. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/46449833-251f-cdee-5129-84a7e83f17c5%40gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20230611231447.GA15947%40zen.
Re: It's too late to stop GPT4 now
On Sat, Apr 08, 2023 at 03:11:47PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Sat, Apr 8, 2023 at 8:19 AM Russell Standish wrote: > > > > Don't forget it requires a society of hundreds of millions of human > level intelligences to make a GPT-4. And it take a human level > intelligence > some 20 years in order to make > meaningful contributions to something like GPT-4. > Progress will therefore continue to be be exponential for some time to > come. Only when super human intelligence is able to design itself will > hyperbolic progress begin. > > > Although certainly extremely helpful most areas of science require more than > just a brilliant theoretician, they need experimental evidence, and so new > knowledge in those fields will not grow at the same explosive rate as computer > intelligence does; however there are two fields that do not require experiment > evidence and so should grow as rapidly as intelligence does, mathematics and > software development, including smart software they can write even smarter > software. And there are mountains of data on physics and biology that already > exist and they're almost certainly unknown gems hiding in there that nobody > has > spotted, but with new mathematical techniques and better software they could > be > found. > Sure - I was trying to proffer some suggestions as to why Ray Kurzweil suggested 25 years between attaining human level computational ability and the singularity. I haven't read his book, just summaries - maybe someone who has could enlightent us. BTW - I still think we haven't cracked the problem of open-ended creativity, which is essential for something like the singularity to occur, but recent developments have lead me to believe it might be achieved sooner rather than later. Ten years ago, I'd have said the singularity wouldn't appear before 2070 (probably did say, though not publicly). Now, I've brought that forward to 2050s > > > It will also need to better the energy efficiency of human brains, and > it > is still orders of magnitude away from that. > > > Take a look at this video, it talks about Nvidia's new chip, with a data > center > using it an AI system that had required 35 MW to run will only need 5 MW to do > the same thing. > > Nvidia's HUGE AI Breakthrough is Bigger Than ChatGPT That is a seven fold improvement, not quite one order of magnitude. My understanding is that about 4-5 orders of magnitude are required before machines can really take over the world. It will happen, but on present exponential progress (classic Moore's law) that will take 2-3 decades. Current AI systems like GPT-4 require the resources of a small town of several thousand people for training. GPT-4 is about 800 billion parameters IIUC. A human brain has over a trillion synapses, so its certainly getting close. > > By the way, I think mathematicians and software developers will be the first > to > lose their jobs, perhaps they could be retrained as coal miners. > I don't think they'll be the first :). ATM, GPT systems seem to have an enormous propensity to make shit up, but less skill in making shit up that is correct. ISTM the creative arts might be the area to lose their jobs first. > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > 8fi > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv15B0KuA4vUUid4YGex_H9uqwTnbKT9EU_64mqjNioXcw%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20230409000824.GB1379%40zen.
Re: It's too late to stop GPT4 now
Don't forget it requires a society of hundreds of millions of human level intelligences to make a GPT-4. And it take a human level intelligence some 20 years in order to make meaningful contributions to something like GPT-4. Progress will therefore continue to be be exponential for some time to come. Only when super human intelligence is able to design itself will hyperbolic progress begin. It will also need to better the energy efficiency of human brains, and it is still orders of magnitude away from that. In saying 25 years to singularity, I was simply taking Kurzweil's timeline, and adding the 5 years he was out by. On Sat, Apr 08, 2023 at 07:46:05AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > On Sat, Apr 8, 2023 at 7:31 AM Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > Why such a long gap between gaining human level intelligence and the > singularity? > > > That is a very good question but I don't have a very good answer so I don't > think there will be a long gap. Fasten your seatbelts, we're in for a bumpy > ride. > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > > jwx > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv1BhQQ4visgvVPTZTH9ZqiMJYcabARAnY_g37c-dUOUkA%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20230408121750.GA1379%40zen.
Re: It's too late to stop GPT4 now
What struck me when watching this video is the uncanny similarity of this mechanism to the Steven Pinker's proposed "mind's big bang", which took place in human minds about 40,000 years ago. It all came down to using language for the disparate modules of the human brain to talk to each other, likened to individual chapels uniting to form a cathedral. I would predict that human level intelligence may be matched in 2025 with GPT-5, only 5 years later than Ray Kurzweil's prediction, which might mean the singularity is on course for some time in the 2050s... Cheers On Sun, Apr 02, 2023 at 03:35:03PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > This video is a summary of several technical papers that have come out in the > last 72 hours, apparently GPT4 can now improve itself without human help by > self-reflecting on its errors and can even design better hardware for itself. > > GPT 4 Can Improve Itself by self reflection > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > 3zi > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv1Zdxw4fhV7Vq%3DWHDL5SOUNbnyCNgFmjuEo8%3DqOAC%2Busg%40mail.gmail.com. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20230408063942.GA6671%40zen.
Re: Why Does the Universe Exist? Some Perspectives from Our Physics Project—Stephen Wolfram Writings
On Sun, Aug 21, 2022 at 03:14:50PM +0200, Telmo Menezes wrote: > > I guess we need some sort of everything list Alife hacakthon :) Russell is > very > quiet, but I know that he also likes this stuff. Indeed. But I need to retire first to be able to have the time to do some real work! I tried last year, but got sucked back into my old contract due to labour shortages. Hopefully next year. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220831042237.GA13394%40zen.
Re: The collapse of bitcoin
On Sun, Jul 31, 2022 at 07:22:28AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > That won't help because the energy cost involved in making a bitcoin is also > increasing and it's increasing exponentially; there will never be more than 21 > million bitcoins in the world because if there are 21 million of them the > energy needed to make another one is infinite. Bitcoin is inherently energy > inefficient and its inefficiency can only increase. > > Other than it's inventor Satoshi Nakamoto the very first person to ever mint a > bitcoin was Hal Finney in 2009, back then a typical home computer could make a > bitcoin in just a few minutes, I remember he said on the Extropian mailing > list > I was on at the time that on a whim he once left his computer on overnight > minting bitcoins. He claims that after that he forgot all about it but soon > after he was faced with huge medical bills because he was diagnosed with ALS, > the same disease Stephen Hawkings had, and about the same time he started > reading about the huge increase in the price of Bitcoins. Finney no longer > used > that old obsolete computer but he still had it at the back of his closet, and > the Bitcoins were still on the hard drive, they were more than enough to pay > for his medical expenses. > > Finney died in 2014 and to this day some people think he actually was Satoshi > Nakamoto. It may be a coincidence that Nakamoto stopped posting and > disappeared > about the same time Finney got sick, or it may not be, but it would explain > why > although he owns billions of dollars worth of bitcoins not a single one has > ever been spent by somebody who controls the Bitcoin account of "Satoshi > Nakamoto". Even after this recent price collapse Nakamoto is still one of the > richest men in the world, and yet he doesn't seem to have ever spent a single > nickel of his vast fortune. It's weird. > Interesting. I did not know that. Of course, some of us old-timers remember that Hal was a member of this list. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220805020856.GA4834%40zen.
Re: The Nature of Contingency: Quantum Physics as Modal Realism
On Wed, Apr 27, 2022 at 05:14:41PM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote: > > If there are probabilities attached to the branches, then Gleason's theorem > shows that the probabilities must satisfy the Born rule. So I don't seen any > inconsistency in simply saying they are probabilities of measurement results, > that's Copenhagen. But if they are probabilities of results that implies that > some things happen and others don't...other wise what does "probability" mean > and what use is it as an empirical concept? That brings back the original > problem of CI, where and how is this happening defined? > Doesn't this just hinge on what I call in my book the semantic-syntactic distinction, aka the 1-3 distinction (long debates between Bruno and JC on this), or the subjective-objective distinction, or even discrete-continuous distinction. Without this cut, the very concept of information makes no sense, and without information, Darwinian evolution doesn't happen. ISTM, no-collapse QM is a continuous theory, it lacks this cut, which must be added in as an extra axiom. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220507024952.GA2667%40zen.
Re: Is Artificial Life Conscious?
On Mon, May 02, 2022 at 08:03:21AM -0400, Jason Resch wrote: > Hi Russell, > > Thanks for sharing. I had read this argument before, I believe in your book, > and reread it again just now. It is compelling and a quite novel approach to > the question. > > However, I do not see it as bullet proof. For example: > > The reasoning could be applied equally as an argument that we are living in a > computer simulation where simulating minds of higher level organisms is more > common than simulating simpler creatures, and so common as to outclass simpler > minds. Why would this be? The Solomonoff-Levin theorem would indicate simpler programs would be exponentially more common than more complex ones, so the same scaling would apply to minds. > > It could be used as an argument for Unificationism (the idea that > instantiating > same mind more than once does not ascribe more measure to the experience). > Then > the power law would reflect unique possible conscious states across reality, > and human and higher level minds would dominate in that there are more ways > for > a human brain to create unique conscious states. > Interesting line of attack, but I think it fails due to the expectation that you should be maximally complex (and probably maximally old). There's no reason to think that human beings are the most complex consciousnesses possible in the multiverse. > It could also be that simple conscious states can jump or shift to equivalent > conscious states until they stabilize on an experience that is less likely to > stabilize. For instance, the question is sometimes asked "What is it like to > be > a thermostat?" One answer could be that it is like a person waking up in the > morning. (Where the conscious state of a waking person intersects the state of > a thermostat, and a thermostat's mind is equivalent to a wide class of many > minds, it is not really like anything to be a thermostat). I don't know that > insect consciousness is simple enough for this argument to apply though. > > Then there's the question of whether it is correct to divide minds, or whether > something like universalism is true, which states there is only one mind, and > all experiences belong to it. Then any experience is one I am 100% likely to > experience. > > I am not sure what to think, but "why are we not ants?" is indeed a mystery > that calls for an explanation. > Indeed. Of course, you are right that the argument is not bullet proof. But as is typical of doomsday arguments, peoples reactions are "WTF?", and there's no engagement. On Google Scholar, there is precisely 1 citation to that paper, and admittedly I haven't read it, but based on the abstract, I think the citation was just of similar example of anthropic reasoning, rather than engaging with the argument itself. Arguments against this argument have to date been unconvincing, just like the ones against the DA. Personally, I think it is interesting that we can provide some hard numbers around the nature of the "hard question", contra John Clark's assertion that nothing can be said about consciousness. Cheers -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220502233956.GQ2399%40zen.
Re: Is Artificial Life Conscious?
Hi John, always a pleasure to cross swords with your brain :). However, your quibbles below are easy to address - see below. On Mon, May 02, 2022 at 06:03:47AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Mon, May 2, 2022 at 5:30 AM Russell Standish wrote: > > > > Most insects can't be consious (see my paper "Ants are not conscious"). > > > I just read the abstract, and its very first sentence is: > > "Anthropic reasoning is a form of statistical reasoning based upon finding > oneself a member of a particular reference class of conscious beings." > > My question to you is, how do you know for a fact you are a member of a "class > of conscious beings"? How do you even know that rocks aren't conscious? I DO > know for a fact that I'm conscious, but I don't know for a fact that you are. > The second sentence is: > I know that I am conscious. Therefore I must be a member of the set of consious entities. It is true I don't know what else is in the set. I do assume that all humans are conscious (at least at some point in their lives), but if you assume the opposite, then the argument is even stronger. > "By considering empirical distribution functions defined over animal life on > Earth, we can deduce that the vast bulk of animal life is unlikely to be > conscious." > > This is a classic example of assuming what you're trying to prove. > No - it is a deduction. You're reading the abstract. It is usual to state the conclusion in the abstract so you know whether it is worth digging into the paper body to see to proof. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220502230637.GP2399%40zen.
Re: Is Artificial Life Conscious?
On Fri, Apr 22, 2022 at 09:38:40PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: > Artificial Life such as these organisms: > https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLq_mdJjNRPT11IF4NFyLcIWJ1C0Z3hTAX > ( https://github.com/jasonkresch/bots ) > > Have neural networks that evolved through natural selection, can adapt to a > changing environment, and can learn to distinguish between "food" and "poison" > in their environment. > > If simple creatures like worms or insects are conscious, (because they have > brains, and evolved), then wouldn't these artificial life forms be conscious > for the same reasons? > > Why or why not? Most insects can't be consious (see my paper "Ants are not conscious"). Most ALife forms created to date are simpler than insects, and probably even worms, so are unlikely to be consious either. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220502093004.GA16990%40zen.
Re: A gravitational wave rocket
On Sat, Jan 22, 2022 at 07:08:29AM -0500, John Clark wrote: > On Sat, Jan 22, 2022 at 3:07 AM Russell Standish > wrote: > > > >> even with your frugal ways solar cells aren't enough to make you > energ independent, you still have to hook up with the power company. > > > > > Of course. We'd need a battery as well. But that's not the point. > > > I think it is the point because it illustrates one of the 2 most important > shortcomings of solar energy, it's unreliable. It is not the point, because the aim is not energy self-sufficiency. The aims are to produce the energy needed at the most economical cost, and also to do so in a carbon neutral fashion. Rooftop solar is a massive low-hanging fruit in that regard. Batteries, not quite so much, but they're getting there. Some of our friends have invested in batteries, perhaps because they value carbon-neutrality higher than we do. > The other is that it takes up > too much area because it's too dilute; even Dyson spheres have that problem, > they produce a huge amount of power but they need a gargantuan area to do so. > > > > You have warm mild bits too, like Florida, or southern California. > > > I know from personal experience that if it wasn't for Willis Carrier's > invention of the air conditioner there is no way Florida would be the third > most populous of the 50 states, even in mid winter it's not unusual for the > temperature to be in the upper 80s (fahrenheit) with very high humidity. > Everybody has air conditioners, the state should be renamed "Carrier". As for > Southern California, it's not unusual for the temperature to get into the > triple digits. By triple digits, I think you mean over 36 degrees. It's not unusual for it to be that here too. But only for a few days in the warmest month of the year. I have visited SoCal and NoCal many times - the temperature range is pretty similar to here actually. We're lucky that we live by the see: close the doors and blinds during the day when it is hot, open them in the evening when there is a cool sea breeze. Yes - in the western parts of our city, aircons are more essential. but again, only for a few days a years. And without Carrier I don't think Texas would be the second most > populous state, and Arizona wouldn't be the fastest growing. Perhaps so - but running the aircons when solar generation is at its peak, and temperature are at their peak works well. Solar makes a lot of sense for those states. > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > wca > > eex > > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv2deya%3DE_kRwtcbsHi9ie_yrUTGSpH-uKmmz8YAW9Cu9Q%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/2022010133.GA5474%40zen.
Re: A gravitational wave rocket
On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 07:29:55AM -0500, John Clark wrote: > On Fri, Jan 21, 2022 at 4:26 AM Russell Standish > wrote: > > > > We have solar panels on half our roof (the difficult half, because of > aesthetics, we didn't want to cover the western half that faces the > street). So about 16kW of installed capacity. Average production year > round > is about 1kW. > > > Average production is only 1/16 of installed capacity? That's even worse > than > I thought. Sorry my mistake - we have 16 panels, each of which have peak output 330W = 5.28 kW. > > > > Our usage is about half that, > > > Wow only 500 watts, you must live frugally. Not especially - we do turn out lights when not in use, of course. > I take it you have a gas stove or > do most of your cooking with a microwave. Gas stove, and use the microwave a lot, but the electric oven only sometimes (there is a distinct bump of about 200W average in consumption at 6pm). Our biggest consumption is a spa (or jacuzzi as they say in the US). This consumes about 2.5kW, but is only on for 2 hours in the day, and we turn it off over the winter season (too bloody cold getting out of the spa midwinter). Then come fridges. When we got "smart meters", we did end up turning off one of the fridges, and just not buying quite as much frozen goods. Smart meters make a huge difference by making it clear just how much power each device uses. The come computers and internet. Recent upgrades have dropped typical desktop computer consumption from 100W to around 25W (eg Intel NUC), and computers do get turned off when not in use, After that - not much else of significance. > I also assume if you have an electric > car you don't charge it up at home. Yeah - no electric car. Australia has such backward policies on electric cars that I expect we'll be the dumping ground of petrol guzzling CO2 belchers for some years. > > > > so we end up selling quite a bit of electricity to the grid (at about a > third of the cost to buy it). Its > a 4 bedroom house, but just the two of us live here now. > > > But even with your frugal ways solar cells aren't enough to make you energy > independent, you still have to hook up with the power company. > Of course. We'd need a battery as well. But that's not the point. > > > We're lucky, we don't need air conditioning, and rarely even use a > heater. > > > You are lucky, most people don't live in a climate that is as mild as yours. > Sure. But 10kW 24x7 still seems very extreme for an average house, even in the US. You have warm mild bits too, like Florida, or southern California. > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > epr > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv2W%2BkYAY3S3BEbBKavTgBtTQnhdtcCmeMJgni5uwxEaxg%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220122080646.GA12863%40zen.
Re: Tonga Volcano Explodes, Detected by Himawari Satellite
Closest I saw on the day (I live on a beach on the east coast of Australia) was the water level going from roughly the mid-tide mark (full beach exposed) to the full tide mark and back again over about a 10 second interval. Otherwise, things seemed very gentle. On Sun, Jan 16, 2022 at 08:12:24PM +, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: > Indeed! The wave effect close up. > https://twitter.com/i/status/1482218429121802240 > > In Monterrey Bay in Cal. > https://twitter.com/i/status/1482671587518148612 > > > > > -Original Message- > From: Brent Meeker > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > Sent: Sun, Jan 16, 2022 2:17 pm > Subject: Re: Tonga Volcano Explodes, Detected by Himawari Satellite > > My son-in-law, an avid surfer, went down to the beach to see the surge. It > was > noticeable, but not impressive...until you reflected on how far it came. > > Brent > > On 1/15/2022 8:52 PM, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: > > There are some very clear phone videos of the insurging tide that's coming in > around Tonga and also there is a title surgeon California not nearly as bad > caused by the eruption. It's easy to find on Twitter, if you do a search on > any > search engine and it will take you directly there with better photos so to > speak vids, then you will usually see on the news. > > > ━━━ > On Saturday, January 15, 2022 John Clark > wrote: > > This happened just a few hours ago: > > Tonga Volcano Explodes, Detected by Himawari Satellite > > John K ClarkSee what's on my new list at Extropolis > tev > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv1O73VXNJqnax21-KFJ%2BqaKUHBk%3DzPokeDbFgCbi7hHNw%40mail.gmail.com. > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/90757051.310925.1642308741772%40mail.yahoo.com. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/64d530d2-a634-af1f-bf02-a60b3c6af39f%40gmail.com. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/408450385.442640.1642363944962%40mail.yahoo.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220121092832.GE16768%40zen.
Re: A gravitational wave rocket
ell-being above its own. > > > > Mr. Robot might simply like enough electricity. > > > If Mr. Robot likes electricity then Mr. Robot has emotions and Mr. Robot will > be unhappy if you try to take electricity away from him and take appropriate > actions to prevent that unhappy event from occurring. Mr. Human may not be > pleased with those actions but Mr. Human will no longer be the one calling the > shots. > > John K Clark See what's on my new list at Extropolis > mrh > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv2kMC-QsWQSZ5Xv4RuLNqoJR%2B72_57ypWNrK4T73EDLBw%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20220121092615.GD16768%40zen.
Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder
On Sun, Dec 26, 2021 at 02:57:51PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > If the measure function (normalisable to probability) is a bilinear > function (which you almost get from the axioms of probability), then > the state space must be a hilbert space, and the probability of A->B > is given by the Born rule. But for the MWI, you already > start with a Hibert space, so even this linearity issue isn't a > difficulty. > > > > I don't understand what you are talking about. If a trial has two possible > outcomes, and every outcome is realized in every trial, then after N trials > there are 2^N possible sequences of outcomes. These cover all possible binary > strings of length N, independent of the probabilities for individual outcomes > on any single trial. The binomial theorem (or the law of large numbers) then > implies that as N becomes large, in the large majority of sequences you will > have approximately equal numbers of each result. If these sequences are used > to > estimate the probabilities, then most sequences will give p = 0.5 for each > result. This is a well-known result. Consider a fair dice, and the two outcomes: a six, and the numbers 1-5. According to your argument, the probability of each outcome is 1/2. Clearly something has gone wrong. What I'm saying is that the probability must depend on both the anterior and posterior states. In this thought experiment, the anterior state is one of maximum ignorance, but the posterior states have uneven weights. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20211226073828.GB7780%40zen.
Re: Superdeterminism And Sabine Hossenfelder
On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 09:07:30AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Sat, Dec 25, 2021 at 7:53 AM Dirk Van Niekerk wrote: > > > > Imagine one physicist starts a series of quantum experiments. Each > experiment has two outcomes with predicted probabilities of A=p1 and > B=p2. > In MWI, after doing an arbitrarily large number of these experiments the > end observer in each branch now tabulates their observations and find that > they have measured outcome A p1 times and outcome B p2 times. Each > observer therefore must have followed a branching path that lead to this > outcome. What in the MWI and the Schroedinger equation determined that > each observer would find those probabilities (other than arbitrarily > invoking the Born rule). What in MWI prevents that a large number of > observers will report a probability for either A or B as 100%. > > > The characteristic of MWI is that every outcome occurs in its own branch for > every trial. If there are just two outcomes, A and B in your case, then after > N > trials there will be 2^N copies of the observer -- each with an individual > sequence of A B results, covering all possible 2^N sequences for N trials. > According to the binomial theorem, for large N the relative proportions of A > and B in these sequences will peak around 50/50. In other words, the majority > of the copies at the end of this experiment will find data suggesting a > probability of 0.5 for A, and 0.5 for B. There will, of course, be a number of > outliers with discrepant statistics, such as sequences dominated by As or by > Bs. But these form a vanishing proportion in the limit of large N. > > The obvious trouble with this is that the majority find a 50/50 ratio, > regardless of the actual specified probabilities of A=p1 and B=p2. There is, > in > fact, no way in which unmodified MWI can get data that reflects the actual > probabilities when these differ significantly from p1=p2=0.5. This is one of > main main objections to MWI -- direct confrontation with the data clearly > falsifies the theory. > > Of course, people have come up with various fixes to MWI to overcome this. One > popular way is to simply add additional branches on each trial so that the > proportions reflect the required probabilities. Zurek and Carroll have > varieties of this approach. The trouble here is that this is completely ad > hoc. > and it also turns out to be circular, because the only way in which one can > know how many additional branches to add to each outcome is to look to the > Born > probabilities -- probabilities that are not available in the raw Schrodinger > equation. > > Other possible fixes have been tried, but none can actually overcome the basic > problem that MWI is inconsistent with real-world data. > The probability of an observer seeing state B given they're in state A must depend on both A and B. So what you say about a split into B and ¬B giving rise to probabilities of 1/2 cannot be the case in general, as there would be no dependence on either A or B. If the measure function (normalisable to probability) is a bilinear function (which you almost get from the axioms of probability), then the state space must be a hilbert space, and the probability of A->B is given by the Born rule. But for the MWI, you already start with a Hibert space, so even this linearity issue isn't a difficulty. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20211226032909.GA7780%40zen.
Re: Why Does Anything Exist?
On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 09:00:38AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Wed, Mar 10, 2021 at 6:00 AM Jason Resch wrote: > > On Tue, Mar 9, 2021 at 9:41 AM Lawrence Crowell < > goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Nothingness is a paradoxical thing. Does nothingness exist? If so, > then > by having existential properties it is not pure nothingness. If > nothingness does not exist then there must exist something. In a sense > God is the antithesis of nothingness and in a sense shares the same > paradoxical issue. > > > There is a strange and paradoxical sort of identity between nothing and > everything, particularly as it relates to information theory. Insofar as > the total set of all possibilities has zero information content. > > > > A random message string can contain zero information, but still exist -- > written on a piece of paper, for example. To be fair, I usually talk of descriptions that are sets of infinite strings equivalent under some observer's notion of classification. Strings sharing a suitable common prefix are usually equivalent. Information is a property of these descriptions. I never claimed that a random description has zero information, just that it is low information. From my point of view, a string consisting of the works of Willam Shakespeare, followed by an arbitrarily long sequence of random bits is not a random string, even though it would be considered as such by AIT. By excluding such sequences as non random, actual random string will still have non-zero information. > This idea that zero information > equates to 'nothing' is just an elementary confusion of categories. > I think I said that nothing and everything are duals, in the same way the empty set and the full set are duals. I never said zero information equates to nothing. The full set of strings, corresponding to the zero length description has zero information. This is what I'm identifying as the Everything. How is this a confusion of categories? > > This is the main subject of Russell Standish's book: Theory of Nothing: > https://www.hpcoders.com.au/nothing.html > > > > That is why Russell got so many things wrong in this book. > You need to engage with the work rather than making sweeping statements like this. Perhaps it is you who got so many things wrong in the book. > Bruce > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAFxXSLTXSHt%3DASkdBiA%2Bh_-4d3FCAHMX7puXWq9_1tG%3DnjbXSg%40mail.gmail.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/YEnRLHDvM6KEHngZ%40zen.
Re: For the love of God can someone please unsubscribe me from this gobshite list?
Just follow the instructions below. On Mon, Nov 16, 2020 at 06:08:28AM +, chris peck wrote: > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > AM6PR07MB499300ED9D5D848106569F1EDEE30%40AM6PR07MB4993.eurprd07.prod.outlook.com > . -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20201116072246.GF9860%40zen.
Re: This is the man who says he found Hunter Biden's laptop
On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 03:13:39PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > > On 10/23/2020 10:49 AM, John Clark wrote: > > > Odd that there is nothing on that list about discussion about what is > allowed on the list. It seems that the EVERYTHING list is misnamed. The rationale for the list can be found at http://www.weidai.com/everything.html -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20201024032804.GA12316%40zen.
Re: Stenger on Initial Low Entropy
On Fri, Oct 16, 2020 at 04:49:35PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Fri, Oct 16, 2020 at 3:38 PM Russell Standish > wrote: > > On Fri, Oct 16, 2020 at 10:07:32AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > > It is refuted by the idea of unitary evolution in QM. Unitary evolution > means > > that everything is reversible, If new microstates are created as the > universe > > expands, then this expansion cannot be reversed: the creation of such > > microstates gives an absolute arrow of time. This is generally rejected, > > because physicists tend to believe in unitary dynamics. If dynamics are > not > > unitary, then the universe is not governed by the Schrodinger equation, > and > > arguments for the multiverse collapse. > > I'm not sure the last point follows, perhaps you can expand on it. But > it is an interesting argument that the Layzer style "increase in > microstates" > should be enough to prevent a Hawking style "wavefunction of the > universe". > > > I was talking about the Everett-style quantum many worlds. Other types of > multiverse (such as the existence of other cosmological Hubble volumes) are > not > necessarily affected. Hawking's "wave function of the universe" is a definite > casualty if unitary evolution is denied. > > > > Could the ideas be made compatible by have the number of accessible > microstates increasing over time, due to the expansion of the > universe, but that the total number remains constant, or is even > infinite? Or does that place us right back at the original problem of > having a low entropy initial state. > > > I don't really understand this. An infinite number of microstates makes little > sense in standard thermodynamics. > Quite true. It would have to involve some sort of limiting process, which would definitely be non-standard thermodynamics. But that's never stopped anyone before :). I was more speculating along the lines of the usual way of reconciling irreversible processes with a reversible multiverse. Where the interesting stuff happens in a finite dimensional subspace of an infinite dimensional Hilbert space, but that dimensionality grows in time due to "splitting", or "decoherence" or what have you. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20201016060333.GH6315%40zen.
Re: Stenger on Initial Low Entropy
On Fri, Oct 16, 2020 at 10:07:32AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > It is refuted by the idea of unitary evolution in QM. Unitary evolution means > that everything is reversible, If new microstates are created as the universe > expands, then this expansion cannot be reversed: the creation of such > microstates gives an absolute arrow of time. This is generally rejected, > because physicists tend to believe in unitary dynamics. If dynamics are not > unitary, then the universe is not governed by the Schrodinger equation, and > arguments for the multiverse collapse. I'm not sure the last point follows, perhaps you can expand on it. But it is an interesting argument that the Layzer style "increase in microstates" should be enough to prevent a Hawking style "wavefunction of the universe". Could the ideas be made compatible by have the number of accessible microstates increasing over time, due to the expansion of the universe, but that the total number remains constant, or is even infinite? Or does that place us right back at the original problem of having a low entropy initial state. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20201016043814.GA4042%40zen.
Re: The Handmaid's Tale
On Thu, Oct 01, 2020 at 07:06:44AM +1000, Kim Jones wrote: > How come nobody talks about ToEs anymore on this list? The genre of > conversation and exchanges I daily read here now are no different to Facebook. > A once-great science discussion list - now a pathetic shadow of its former > self. You must all be a bunch of sad and lonely types. Well, at least be > HONEST > : change the name to the "Anything List" > > Kim Jones B.Mus GDTL > 'Twas ever thus - a madness descends on these lists every four years for around 6 months or so. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20201001031805.GA11872%40zen.
Re: Ex Machina, the film, about the Turing Test
Alas not available on Netflix Australia. It'll have to wait until if/when I subscribe to Amazon Prime briefly. I'm also not really prepared to purchase a VPN just to watch other countries' Netflix connections, for much the same reason as I only subscribe to one streamer - so it might have to wait until if/when I do live in a country that has it in the Netflix catalogue. The tangled web of movie copyright arrangements... Bah! On Sat, Aug 15, 2020 at 02:23:52PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: > If you haven't viewed it, please do so. It's about the Turing Test, science > fiction, but the "special effects" aren't primarily photographic bells and > whistles, but the dialogue. the text, the logic of the script. Recently, we > have argued about consciousness, what it is, and how we can test for it in the > context of AI. I claimed that we could do some superficial surgery to > determine > whether the subject of the test was a robot or a conscious entity. But this is > completely mistaken. All that that would reveal is whether the subject was > artificial, not whether it was "conscious". The subject could have been a > black > box, and still showing signs of what we can't really define; consciousness. I > think Ex Machina provides an answer of what we need to look for. Please view > it > and report back. But do NOT read the plot, say in Wiki. It's a spoiler. AG > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/6c3c8eba-542c-45a6-a79f-ca54202fdcc8o%40googlegroups.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200816012618.GA5850%40zen.
Re: Trump suggests delaying the election
On Sun, Aug 02, 2020 at 11:16:00AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > I think we started congratulating ourselves too early. As you know, things are > not so great in Victoria. Indeed, we're not out of the woods yet. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200802032710.GP3461%40zen.
Re: Trump suggests delaying the election
On Fri, Jul 31, 2020 at 07:42:28PM +, spudboy100 via Everything List wrote: > Yeah, I am sure the competent hand of Joe Biden will solve everything... You > haven't cited what Germany and Australia are doing differently than the US > either. Can you please list what these lands are doing so well? I think in Australia's case, our "Trump mini-me" government finally grew a brain and listened to the health experts, after their total mishandling of the bushfire debacle over summer. It also helps that we're a little more likely accept restrictions for the sake of the common good than our American friends. Not as much as some Asian cultures, though. And finally, being an "island continent" makes it easier to shut our borders and control who comes into the country. Cheers -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200731231632.GA17238%40zen.
Re: The size of the universe
On Sun, May 24, 2020 at 01:21:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 24 May 2020, at 01:37, Russell Standish wrote: > > > > However, I would think that ultrafinitism would change COMP's > > predictions, and in a sense be incompatibe with it. Some programs will > > not exist, because one would need to wait too long > > “Too long” is still finite. > > The biggest natural number is of course “infinite”, but the ultrafinitist > cannot know that. > > That is why a “real ultrafinitiste” will never say that he is ultrafinitist. > He has no means to explains why ultra-finitism means. Only a finitists can > prove that ultra-finitsime is consistent (indeed PA can prove that RA is > consistent). > > > > > for them to be > > executed by the UD. In fact, the choice of reference universal machine > > would be significant in ultrafinitism, IIUC. > > Why? As long as the theory is Turing complete, all programs are run (in all > interpretation of the theory), including all finite segment of the executions > of all non terminating programs, and this with the usual redundancy. > For an ultrafinitist, there is a biggest number (perhaps unknowable), and consequently computer programs that don't get run (because they take more steps than that biggest number. The CT thesis is strictly false in such a case, but could possibly apply in an approximate sense. > Bruno > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > > > Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) > > Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au > > http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > > To view this discussion on the web visit > > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200523233705.GC27696%40zen. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/596AD8C2-0628-4F05-926E-0BDEF0767A46%40ulb.ac.be. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200531075033.GB25940%40zen.
Re: The size of the universe
On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 12:05:08PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > > On 5/23/2020 4:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > Well, those are theorem provable in very weak theories. It is more a > > question of grasping the proof than subscribing to a philosophical idea. > > That arithmetic executes all programs is a theorem similar to Euclid’s > > theorem that there is no biggest prima numbers. It is more a fact, than > > an idea which could be debated. I insist on this as I realise this is > > less known by the general scientists than 20 years ago. We knew this > > implicitly since Gödel 1931, and explicitly since Church, Turing and > > Kleene 1936. > > Recently you have said that your theory is consistent with finitism, even > ultrafinitism. But the idea that arithemtic exectues all programs certainly > requires infinities. Only potential infinities, not actual infinities. For the UD (a finite object) to execute any given program, one only needs to wait a finite amount of time. However, I would think that ultrafinitism would change COMP's predictions, and in a sense be incompatibe with it. Some programs will not exist, because one would need to wait too long for them to be executed by the UD. In fact, the choice of reference universal machine would be significant in ultrafinitism, IIUC. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200523233705.GC27696%40zen.
Re: The size of the universe
On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 08:33:03PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Is it correct to say that almost surely any sequence can be found? > > > Hmm… “almost” has already a technical meaning in computer science. It means > for > all but a finite number exceptions. It existential dual is “there is > infinitely many …”. > > Then, I don’t want to look like pick nicking, but “almost” and “sure” seems a > bit antinomic. Not to pick nits, but it actually means the exceptions are of measure zero. There may well still be an infinite number of them. After all, the set of rational numbers (which is infinite) is of measure zero. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200523230215.GB27696%40zen.
Re: EinsteinPy
On Tue, May 05, 2020 at 10:47:15AM +0200, smitra wrote: > Isn't Python too slow for such simulation work? The heavy lifting is done in C++, with full HPC support (OpenMP and MPI). EcoLab naturally embeds an interpreter, which is currently TCL, enabling rapid setting up of different experiements. Thinki of it like Tensorflow, not "everything done in Python". -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200506022534.GA26429%40zen.
Re: EinsteinPy
Yes - Python is the duck's nuts right now. I want to switch TCL out for Python in my EcoLab platform, which I use for ALife research. It'll probably have a to wait a few years until I "retire", though, and I hope that the scientific community hasn't jumped on another bandwagon by that time :). On Mon, May 04, 2020 at 05:02:23PM -0700, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > Latest release: > > https://twitter.com/EinsteinPy/status/1257452756413165568 > > @philipthrift > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/e97522ce-5c96-4459-af0c-fb790517e4d6%40googlegroups.com. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200505012527.GB7959%40zen.
Universe as a simulated strange loop
Not sure if this paper has been mentioned here, but it seems quite apt to our discussions. It appears concordant with my ideas in "Theory of Nothing", also Bruno's AUDA and Brent's virtuous circles. https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/22/2/247/htm I haven't yet read the article in full - just the summary writeup here: https://bigthink.com/surprising-science/new-hypothesis-argues-the-universe-simulates-itself-into-existence?rebelltitem=6#rebelltitem6 Cheers -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200503030239.GB29442%40zen.
Re: John Conway is dead
Trubutes: https://xkcd.com/2293/ There was another tribute of similar ilk, but I can't find it now. On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 05:29:06PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > John Conway, the inventor of the Game Of Life and one of the greatest > mathematicians in the world has died of COVID-19. > > John Conway Solved Mathematical Problems With His Bare Hands > > John K Clark > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/ > CAJPayv1Yhf_jyCu3kywvg2cnTd1%3DL4UWRODv7ODP7hZQu0Ms_g%40mail.gmail.com. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200420221929.GA5993%40zen.
Re: Does time flow?
Thanks for this. I've downloaded this, and will get to it soon. It sounds like an interesting approach. On Thu, Apr 09, 2020 at 02:43:41AM +, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List wrote: > Read a thought provoking hypothesis proposed by Swiss physicist Nicolas Gisin > in four papers he authored that questions the widely accepted block universe > model of Relativity on a mathematical basis, centered on the proposition that > infinitely precise real numbers do not exist in nature. > > Mathematics assumes the existence of infinitely precise real numbers as a > given; Nicolas Gisin questions that assumption. Instead Grisin argues that a > hundred year old branch of mathematics called Intuitionust Mathematics that > rejects the existence of numbers with infinite digitsvof precision is used to > describe the evolution of physical systems, it becomes clear that time really > passes and that new information is being created. > > The block universe model of spacetime argues for a static -- pre-ordained -- > universe in which past, present and future are illusions and all that is > always > has been. > > Modern information theory however shows that information is physical, it > requires both energy and space. He questions how a block universe hypothesis > could contain -- essentially infinite -- all the information encoded in the > block universe in the initial state at the moment of the big bang. > > Intuitionist mathematics accepts the reality of irrational values such as say > pi that have an infinite series of digits of precision because a formula > exists > that can in theory calculate its value to any degree of precision. > > But say we have an arbitrary value x that is initially measured to some point > of precision of x=0.4 (the example given) and that this value unfurls to > greater and greater degrees of precision. Perhaps the series of 9s continues > forever and thus x is exactly equal to 1/2, but if at any point a digit of > lower value is encountered this quantity will forever be less than 1/2. > Before > that happens we cannot know what x is equal to, our knowledge depends on this > unfolding sequence. > > "But before that happens, when all we know is 0.4999, “we don’t know whether > or > not a digit other than 9 will ever show up,” explained Carl Posy, a > philosopher > of mathematics at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a leading expert on > intuitionist math. “At the time we consider this x, we cannot say that x is > less than ½, nor can we say that x equals ½.” The proposition “x is equal to > ½” > is not true, and neither is its negation. The law of the excluded middle > doesn’t hold." > > "In other words, the world is indeterministic; the future is open. Time, Gisin > said, “is not unfolding like a movie in the cinema. It is really a creative > unfolding. The new digits really get created as time passes.”" > > Here is the link to the article, for those interested: https:// > www.quantamagazine.org/ > does-time-really-flow-new-clues-come-from-a-century-old-approach-to-math-20200407 > / > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/1883724681.2957102.1586400221647%40mail.yahoo.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200413091932.GA3306%40zen.
Re: Pauli's Exclusion Principle
I thought the principle came from antisymmetry of fermionic pairwise wavefunctions. If two fermions occupied the same state, then antisymmetry is impossible. Bosons have symmetric pairwise wavefunctions (you can swap two bosons, and nothing changes), hence it is possible to have more than one boson in the same state. I'd have to go back to my class notes of QM to check this of course, just speaking from 35+ years ago when I last studied this. On Fri, Apr 03, 2020 at 08:16:51AM -0700, Lawrence Crowell wrote: > It is reasonable to state the Pauli exclusion principle is a postulate on its > own. There are though other possibilities. With supersymmetry, parafermions, > bosonization and now fermionization of bosons the role of the PEP is not > entirely certain. > > LC > > On Thursday, April 2, 2020 at 8:09:23 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote: > > Does the Pauli's Exclusion Principle have a similar status in QM as Born's > rule; namely, an empirical fact not derivable from the postulates of QM? > TIA, AG > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/3996ad4e-cd70-474f-94d6-8e6b7bf310ce%40googlegroups.com. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200404083558.GA2556%40zen.
Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Mon, Mar 09, 2020 at 08:41:01PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wro> > It may seem counter intuitive, but as the sample length goes up the > probability of each possible proportion goes down, including that of the > true value. It goes down because there are more possible exact values. > > Brent > Yes, but that is not really related either. When talking about all proportions that lie within (say) 1% of 50/50, the number of such distinct proportions grows faster than the probability of each possible proportion. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200311053037.GA30360%40zen.
Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Sun, Mar 08, 2020 at 10:10:23PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > > In order to infer a probability of p = 0.5, your branch data must > have > > > approximately equal numbers of zeros and ones. The number of > branches > > with > > > equal numbers of zeros and ones is given by the binomial > coefficient. For > > large > > > even N = 2M trials, this coefficient is N!/M!*M!. Using the > Stirling > > > approximation to the factorial for large N, this goes as 2^N/sqrt > (N) > > (within > > > factors of order one). Since there are 2^N sequences, the > proportion with > > n_0 = > > > n_1 vanishes as 1/sqrt(N) for N large. > > > > This is the nub of the proof you wanted. No - it is simply irrelevant. The statement I made was about the proportion of strings whose bit ratio lies within certain percentage of the expected value. After all when making a measurement, you are are interested in the value and its error bounds, eg 10mm +/- 0.1%, or 10mm +/- 0.01mm. We can never know its exact value. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200309215348.GH2903%40zen.
Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Sun, Mar 08, 2020 at 07:08:25PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Sun, Mar 8, 2020 at 6:14 PM Russell Standish wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 09:45:38PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 5:26 PM Russell Standish > wrote: > > > > But a very large proportion of them (→1 as N→∞) will report being > > within ε (called a confidence interval) of 50% for any given ε>0 > > chosen at the outset of the experiment. This is simply the law of > > large numbers theorem. You can't focus on the vanishingly small > > population that lie outside the confidence interval. > > > > > > This is wrong. > > Them's fighting words. Prove it! > > > I have, in other posts and below. You didn't do it below, that's why I said prove it. What you wrote below had little bearing on what I wrote. > > > > In the binary situation where both outcomes occur for every > > trial, there are 2^N binary sequences for N repetitions of the > experiment. This > > set of binary sequences exhausts the possibilities, so the same sequence > is > > obtained for any two-component initial state -- regardless of the > amplitudes. > > > You appear to assume that the natural probability in this situation is p > = 0.5 > > and, what is more, your appeal to the law of large numbers applies only > for > > single-world probabilities, in which there is only one outcome on each > trial. > > I didn't mention proability once in the above paragraph, not even > implicitly. I used the term "proportion". That the proportion will be > equal to the probability in a single universe case is a frequentist > assumption, and should be uncontroversial, but goes beyond what I > stated above. > > > Sure. But the proportion of the 2^N sequences that exhibit any particular p > value (proportion of 1's) decreases with N. > So what? > > > In order to infer a probability of p = 0.5, your branch data must have > > approximately equal numbers of zeros and ones. The number of branches > with > > equal numbers of zeros and ones is given by the binomial coefficient. > For > large > > even N = 2M trials, this coefficient is N!/M!*M!. Using the Stirling > > approximation to the factorial for large N, this goes as 2^N/sqrt(N) > (within > > factors of order one). Since there are 2^N sequences, the proportion > with > n_0 = > > n_1 vanishes as 1/sqrt(N) for N large. > > I wasn't talking about that. I was talking about the proportion of > sequences whose ratio of 0 bits to 1 bits lie within ε of 0.5, rather > than the proportion of sequences that have exactly equal 0 or 1 > bits. That proportion grows as sqrt N. > > > > No, it falls as 1/sqrt(N). Remember, the confidence interval depends on the > standard deviation, and that falls as 1/sqrt(n). Consequently deviations from > equal numbers of zeros and ones for p to be within the CI of 0.5 must decline > as n becomes large > The value ε defined above is fixed at the outset. It is independent of N. Maybe I incorrectly called it a confidence interval, although it is surely related. The number of bitstrings having a ratio of 0 to 1 within ε of 0.5 grows as √N. IIRC, a confidence interval is the interval of a fixed proportion, ie we can be 95% confident that strings will have a ratio between 49.5% and 51.5%. That interval (49.5% and 51.5%) will decrease as √N for fixed confidence level (95%). > > > > Now sequences with small departures from equal numbers will still give > > probabilities within the confidence interval of p = 0.5. But this > confidence > > interval also shrinks as 1/sqrt(N) as N increases, so these additional > > sequences do not contribute a growing number of cases giving p ~ 0.5 as > N > > increases. > > The confidence interval ε is fixed. > > > No, it is not. The width of, say the 95% CI, decreases with N since the > standard deviation falls as 1/sqrt(N). Which only demonstrates my point. An increasing number of strings will lie in the fixed interval ε. I apologise if I used the term "confidence interval" in a nonstandard way. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200308085904.GE2903%40zen.
Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Sun, Mar 08, 2020 at 06:50:52PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On Sun, Mar 8, 2020 at 5:32 PM Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Fri, Mar 06, 2020 at 10:44:37AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> > That is, in fact, false. It does not generate the same strings as
> flipping a
> > coin in single world. Sure, each of the strings in Everett could have
> been
> > obtained from coin flips -- but then the probability of a sequence of
> 10,000
> > heads is very low, whereas in many-worlds you are guaranteed that one
> observer
> > will obtain this sequence. There is a profound difference between the
> two
> > cases.
>
> You have made this statement multiple times, and it appears to be at
> the heart of our disagreement. I don't see what the profound
> difference is.
>
> If I select a subset from the set of all strings of length N, for example
> all strings with exactly N/3 1s, then I get a quite specific value for the
> proportion of the whole that match it:
>
> / N \
> | | 2^{-N} = p.
> \N/3/
>
> Now this number p will also equal the probability of seeing exactly
> N/3 coins land head up when N coins are tossed.
>
> What is the profound difference?
>
>
>
> Take a more extreme case. The probability of getting 1000 heads on 1000 coin
> tosses is 1/2^1000.
> If you measure the spin components of an ensemble of identical spin-half
> particles, there will certainly be one observer who sees 1000 spin-up results.
> That is the difference -- the difference between probability of 1/2^1000 and a
> probability of one.
>
> In fact in a recent podcast by Sean Carroll (that has been discussed on the
> list previously), he makes the statement that this rare event (with
> probability
> p = 1/2^1000) certainly occurs. In other words, he is claiming that the
> probability is both 1/2^1000 and one. That this is a flat contradiction
> appears
> to escape him. The difference in probabilities between coin tosses and
> Everettian measurements couldn't be more stark.
That is because you're talking about different things. The rare event
that 1 in 2^1000 observers see certainly occurs. In this case
certainty does not refer to probability 1, as no probabilities are
applicable in that 3p picture. Probabilities in the MWI sense refers
to what an observer will see next, it is a 1p concept.
And that 1p context, I do not see any difference in how probabilities
are interpreted, nor in their numerical values.
Perhaps Caroll is being sloppy. If so, I would think that could be forgiven.
--
Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 09:45:38PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 5:26 PM Russell Standish wrote: > > > But a very large proportion of them (→1 as N→∞) will report being > within ε (called a confidence interval) of 50% for any given ε>0 > chosen at the outset of the experiment. This is simply the law of > large numbers theorem. You can't focus on the vanishingly small > population that lie outside the confidence interval. > > > This is wrong. Them's fighting words. Prove it! > In the binary situation where both outcomes occur for every > trial, there are 2^N binary sequences for N repetitions of the experiment. > This > set of binary sequences exhausts the possibilities, so the same sequence is > obtained for any two-component initial state -- regardless of the amplitudes. > You appear to assume that the natural probability in this situation is p = 0.5 > and, what is more, your appeal to the law of large numbers applies only for > single-world probabilities, in which there is only one outcome on each trial. I didn't mention proability once in the above paragraph, not even implicitly. I used the term "proportion". That the proportion will be equal to the probability in a single universe case is a frequentist assumption, and should be uncontroversial, but goes beyond what I stated above. > > In order to infer a probability of p = 0.5, your branch data must have > approximately equal numbers of zeros and ones. The number of branches with > equal numbers of zeros and ones is given by the binomial coefficient. For > large > even N = 2M trials, this coefficient is N!/M!*M!. Using the Stirling > approximation to the factorial for large N, this goes as 2^N/sqrt(N) (within > factors of order one). Since there are 2^N sequences, the proportion with n_0 > = > n_1 vanishes as 1/sqrt(N) for N large. I wasn't talking about that. I was talking about the proportion of sequences whose ratio of 0 bits to 1 bits lie within ε of 0.5, rather than the proportion of sequences that have exactly equal 0 or 1 bits. That proportion grows as sqrt N. > > Now sequences with small departures from equal numbers will still give > probabilities within the confidence interval of p = 0.5. But this confidence > interval also shrinks as 1/sqrt(N) as N increases, so these additional > sequences do not contribute a growing number of cases giving p ~ 0.5 as N > increases. The confidence interval ε is fixed. So, again within factors of order unity, the proportion of sequences > consistent with p = 0.5 decreases without limit as N increases. So it is not > the case that a very large proportion of the binary strings will report p = > 0.5. The proportion lying outside the confidence interval of p = 0.5 is not > vanishingly small -- it grows with N. > > > > > The crux of the matter is that all branches are equivalent when both > outcomes > > occur on every trial, so all observers will infer that their observed > relative > > frequencies reflect the actual probabilities. Since there are observers > for all > > possibilities for p in the range [0,1], and not all can be correct, no > sensible > > probability value can be assigned to such duplication experiments. > > I don't see why not. Faced with a coin flip toss, I would assume a > 50/50 chance of seeing heads or tails. Faced with a history of 100 > heads, I might start to investigate the coin for bias, and perhaps by > Bayesian arguments give the biased coin theory greater weight than the > theory that I've just experience a 1 in 2^100 event, but in any case > it is just statistics, and it is the same whether all oputcomes have > been realised or not. > > > The trouble with this analogy is that coin tosses are single-world events -- > there is only one outcome for each toss. Consequently, any intuitions about > probabilities based on such comparisons are not relevant to the Everettian > case > in which every outcome occurs for every toss. Your intuition that it is the > same whether all outcomes are realised or not is simply mistaken. > > > > The problem is even worse in quantum mechanics, where you measure a > state > such > > as > > > > |psi> = a|0> + b|1>. > > > > When both outcomes occur on every trial, the result of a sequence of N > trials > > is all possible binary strings of length N, (all 2^N of them). You then > notice > > that this set of all possible strings is obtained whatever non-zero > values of a > > and b you assume. The assignment of some propbability relation to the > > c
Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Fri, Mar 06, 2020 at 10:44:37AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
>
> That is, in fact, false. It does not generate the same strings as flipping a
> coin in single world. Sure, each of the strings in Everett could have been
> obtained from coin flips -- but then the probability of a sequence of 10,000
> heads is very low, whereas in many-worlds you are guaranteed that one observer
> will obtain this sequence. There is a profound difference between the two
> cases.
You have made this statement multiple times, and it appears to be at
the heart of our disagreement. I don't see what the profound
difference is.
If I select a subset from the set of all strings of length N, for example all
strings with exactly N/3 1s, then I get a quite specific value for the
proportion of the whole that match it:
/ N \
|| 2^{-N} = p.
\N/3/
Now this number p will also equal the probability of seeing exactly
N/3 coins land head up when N coins are tossed.
What is the profound difference?
--
----
Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
http://www.hpcoders.com.au
--
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Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 11:34:55AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 10:39 AM Russell Standish > wrote: > > On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 09:46:34AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > The greater problem is that any idea of probability founders when all > outcomes > > occur for any measurement. Or have you not followed the arguments I have > been > > making that shows this to be the case? > > > > I must admit I haven't followed the arguments either - admittedly, I > haven't read your cited material. > > ISTM - probability is all about what an observer observes. Since the > observer cannot see all outcomes, an objection based on all outcomes > occurring seems moot to me. > > > The fact that the observer cannot see all outcomes is actually central to the > argument. If, in the person-duplication scenario, the participant naively > assumes a probability p = 0.5 for each outcome, such an intuition can only be > tested by repeating the duplication a number of times and inferring a > probability value from the observed outcomes. Since each observer can see only > the outcomes along his or her particular branch (and, ipso facto, is unaware > of > the outcomes on other branches), as the number of trials N becomes very large, > only a vanishingly small proportion of observers will confirm their 50/50 > prediction . This is a trivial calculation involving only the binomial > coefficient -- Brent and I discussed this a while ago, and Brent could not > fault the maths. But a very large proportion of them (→1 as N→∞) will report being within ε (called a confidence interval) of 50% for any given ε>0 chosen at the outset of the experiment. This is simply the law of large numbers theorem. You can't focus on the vanishingly small population that lie outside the confidence interval. > > The crux of the matter is that all branches are equivalent when both outcomes > occur on every trial, so all observers will infer that their observed relative > frequencies reflect the actual probabilities. Since there are observers for > all > possibilities for p in the range [0,1], and not all can be correct, no > sensible > probability value can be assigned to such duplication experiments. I don't see why not. Faced with a coin flip toss, I would assume a 50/50 chance of seeing heads or tails. Faced with a history of 100 heads, I might start to investigate the coin for bias, and perhaps by Bayesian arguments give the biased coin theory greater weight than the theory that I've just experience a 1 in 2^100 event, but in any case it is just statistics, and it is the same whether all oputcomes have been realised or not. > > The problem is even worse in quantum mechanics, where you measure a state such > as > > |psi> = a|0> + b|1>. > > When both outcomes occur on every trial, the result of a sequence of N trials > is all possible binary strings of length N, (all 2^N of them). You then notice > that this set of all possible strings is obtained whatever non-zero values of > a > and b you assume. The assignment of some propbability relation to the > coefficients is thus seen to be meaningless -- all probabilities occur equal > for any non-zero choices of a and b. > For the outcome of any particular binary string, sure. But if we classify the outcome strings - say ones with a recognisable pattern, or when replayed through a CD player reproduce the sounds of Beethoven's ninth, we find that the overwhelming majority are simply gobbledegook, random data. And the overwhelming majority of those will have a roughly equal number of 0s and 1s. For each of these categories, there will be a definite probability value, and not all will be 2^-N. For instance, with Beethoven's ninth, that the tenor has a cold in the 4th movement doesn't render the music not the ninth. So there will be set of bitstrings that are recognisably the ninth symphony, and a quite definite probability value. > > > > You may counter that the assumption that an observer cannot see all > outcomes is an extra thing "put in by hand", and you would be right, > of course. It is not part of the Schroedinger equation. But I would > strongly suspect that this assumption will be a natural outcome of a > proper theory of consciousness, if/when we have one. Indeed, I > highlight it in my book with the name "PROJECTION postulate". > > This is, of course, at the heart of the 1p/3p distinction - and of > course the classic taunts and misunderstandings between BM and JC > (1p-3p confusion). > > > I know that it is a factor of the 1p/3p distinction. My complaint has > frequently been that advocates of the "p =
Re: Postulate: Everything that CAN happen, MUST happen.
On Thu, Mar 05, 2020 at 09:46:34AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > The greater problem is that any idea of probability founders when all outcomes > occur for any measurement. Or have you not followed the arguments I have been > making that shows this to be the case? > I must admit I haven't followed the arguments either - admittedly, I haven't read your cited material. ISTM - probability is all about what an observer observes. Since the observer cannot see all outcomes, an objection based on all outcomes occurring seems moot to me. You may counter that the assumption that an observer cannot see all outcomes is an extra thing "put in by hand", and you would be right, of course. It is not part of the Schroedinger equation. But I would strongly suspect that this assumption will be a natural outcome of a proper theory of consciousness, if/when we have one. Indeed, I highlight it in my book with the name "PROJECTION postulate". This is, of course, at the heart of the 1p/3p distinction - and of course the classic taunts and misunderstandings between BM and JC (1p-3p confusion). Incidently, I've started reading Colin Hales's "Revolution of Scientific Structure", a fellow Melburnian and member of this list. The interesting proposition about this is Colin is proposing we're on the verge of a Kuhnian paradigm shift in relation to the role of the observer in science, and the that this sort of misunderstanding is a classic symptom of such a shift. Cheers -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200304233927.GE7315%40zen.
Re: Connectional physics
On Sat, Feb 08, 2020 at 06:44:16AM -0800, Philip Thrift wrote: > > Connectional physics > > Some have written on how the connectional (neural network) approach will not > rival the traditional equational ( https://inews.co.uk/news/science/ > this-is-the-equation-stephen-hawking-wanted-on-his-tombstone-323699 ) > approach, > but then why should nature necessarily be expressed in simple language. Both equations and connectionist models rely on finding and expoiting patterns in nature. Why these patterns exist is really Wigner's hoary old question of the "unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics". To which, I would answer because of the Solomonoff-Levin theorem, sometimes called the Occams Razor theorem. The equation approach is remarkably effective for some situations (eg celestial mechanics), and before we had decent computers, we focussed on domains where these models were effective. Now we find that some models (think weather models, for example), where the computational cost of the equation approach exceeds the computational cost of throwing a neural network at it, allowing considerable speedup of computing the model using a connectionist shortcut. I think it is interesting from a having another tool in the toolbox, but probably not interesting philosophically. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200209003648.GO31496%40zen.
Re: Inept leadership
The answer is yes. The enormity of the situation can be brought home by noting that more than half of Australia's population is affected by these fires, including myself; about five times the area of the recent California fires have been burnt in the last three months and about 2/3rds of Australia's annual CO2 emissions have just gone up in smoke. This same "no policies" PM - "she'll be right, no worries" actively refused to meet with the fire chiefs back in April of this year to discuss what to do about the impending fire season (yes - it was known back then things were going to be bad). That for me is the height of ineptitude - probably worse than Bush Jr's handling of Katrina. A lot of us Aussies feel the same way right about now. Pity they didn't when they elected him earlier this year. Cheers On Fri, Jan 03, 2020 at 02:16:34PM -0800, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > On Friday, January 3, 2020 at 2:30:08 PM UTC-7, Bruce wrote: > > The bush fires in Australia have shown up a serious deficit of > leadership in Australia's Prime Minister -- who holidays in Hawaii while > Australia burns > > People are asking for NZ to take over.. > > https://www.rt.com/news/477394-aussies-plead-nz-pm-takeover/ > > Bruce > > > Is your residence near any fires? What city? AG > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/ > everything-list/e6b759e5-148e-4cc0-81ef-b60a9b91cddf%40googlegroups.com. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20200103232002.GE16240%40zen.
Re: There is no mind-body problem
On Sat, Oct 26, 2019 at 05:25:39PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > > On 10/26/2019 5:05 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Sat, Oct 26, 2019 at 12:50:10PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything > > List wrote: > > > I'm glad you recognize there's a difference between "potential" and > > > "real"; > > > a distinction this list is founded to obfuscate. > > > > > > Brent > > I don't know about that. The everything is "all finite things" is a > > perfectly rational starting point for an ensemble theory. > > > > Even though Max's original "all mathematical objects" theory is > > ambivalent on the point, I've always interpreted that as "all finite > > axiomatic systems", even in my first paper on the subject: "Why Occams > > Razor". > > Peano arithmetic is not a finite axiomatic system. It has infinitely many > axioms of the form (s...(s(s(s)))...). > So I'm not sure what your refer to. I doubt that "all finite things" is > well defined. Is the set of all finite things finite? > It was a way of characterising a type of theory, such as "all finite axiomatic systems", or "all turing machines". Peano arithmetic is a finite axiomatic system. However, the integers is not - as shown by Goedel's incompleteness theorem. Cheers -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20191027003338.GI12720%40zen.
Re: There is no mind-body problem
On Sat, Oct 26, 2019 at 12:50:10PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > I'm glad you recognize there's a difference between "potential" and "real"; > a distinction this list is founded to obfuscate. > > Brent I don't know about that. The everything is "all finite things" is a perfectly rational starting point for an ensemble theory. Even though Max's original "all mathematical objects" theory is ambivalent on the point, I've always interpreted that as "all finite axiomatic systems", even in my first paper on the subject: "Why Occams Razor". Cheers -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20191027000238.GG12720%40zen.
Re: Sean Carroll: Universe a 'tiny sliver' of all there is
On Sat, Oct 05, 2019 at 09:05:49PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Sat, Oct 5, 2019 at 7:15 PM Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 5 Oct 2019, at 07:14, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > On Sat, Oct 5, 2019 at 1:10 AM Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > According to the above non-separable wave function, that means that > Bob > gets only the ket |->, > > > That is vague. It means that Alice will access to the Bobs who get that > state, and never access to the Bobs who did not got it. > > > Exactly. And this is what you are required to explain. Just stating it as a > fact is not an explanation. ISTM that this follows from the Born rule - the probability of both Alice and Bob seeing the same spin is strictly zero. I understand that there are problems in deriving the Born rule from the MWI, and that derivations that purport to do so (such as mine) are contentious (to put it politely :)). So it doesn't exactly solve the problem, but maybe directs us toward where the solution lies. What I do get is Bruno's point that a single world assumption turns a nonlocal state into FTL "influence", the mechanism of which is quite unimaginable as you point out. An argument by incredulity, as it were, for the MWI. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20191006005045.GX14811%40zen.
Re: Sean Carroll: Universe a 'tiny sliver' of all there is
On Sun, Sep 29, 2019 at 03:27:51PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > > On 9/29/2019 3:15 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Fri, Sep 27, 2019 at 06:27:16PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything > List wrote: > > When I wrote "lowest" I was assuming the context of MWI...not a single > universe. The Bekenstein bound implies that the Hubble volume has an > upper > bound for information capacity of it's surface area in Planck units. > This > number is around 2.4e106. So as I read Zurek, he thinks this > provides a kind > of probability cutoff and branches less probable than 0.4e-106 have > zero > probability. And, more to the point, in the limit of large N, where > N is the > number of degrees of freedom in the environment the off diagonal > terms of the > reduced density matrix go to zero; but this cutoff makes them exactly > zero for > N>2.41e106. I haven't figured out many branchings it would take to > reach this > number, but with some 1e98 particles it wouldn't take very many. > > Brent > > Its an interesting idea, and a plausible mechanism for denying the > "no cul-de-sac conjecture" and quantum immortality. > > However, I do have to wonder the significance of a 2.4x10^106 planck > distance quare hubble volume. This surely is a geographical factoid > rather than of fundamental significance. > > > It's not just geographical. The Bekenstein bound on the information that can > be contained within a the Hubble sphere depends on how big the sphere is which > in turn depends on the expansion rate of the universe. The expansion rate of > the universe might be a fundamental constant. > > Brent > Wouldn't it also depend on when you are observing the universe? -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190930011334.GD31717%40zen.
Re: Sean Carroll: Universe a 'tiny sliver' of all there is
On Fri, Sep 27, 2019 at 06:27:16PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > When I wrote "lowest" I was assuming the context of MWI...not a single > universe. The Bekenstein bound implies that the Hubble volume has an upper > bound for information capacity of it's surface area in Planck units. This > number is around 2.4e106. So as I read Zurek, he thinks this provides a kind > of probability cutoff and branches less probable than 0.4e-106 have zero > probability. And, more to the point, in the limit of large N, where N is the > number of degrees of freedom in the environment the off diagonal terms of the > reduced density matrix go to zero; but this cutoff makes them exactly zero for > N>2.41e106. I haven't figured out many branchings it would take to reach this > number, but with some 1e98 particles it wouldn't take very many. > > Brent Its an interesting idea, and a plausible mechanism for denying the "no cul-de-sac conjecture" and quantum immortality. However, I do have to wonder the significance of a 2.4x10^106 planck distance quare hubble volume. This surely is a geographical factoid rather than of fundamental significance. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190929221524.GC31717%40zen.
Re: Quantum Supremacy
On Sat, Sep 21, 2019 at 08:22:40AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > There is a rumor that a team of researchers at Google led by John Martinis > have > performed a calculation on a Quantum Computer in three minutes and 20 seconds > that would have taken Summit, the most powerful conventional supercomputer in > the world, 10,000 years to perform. The rumor started when a paper stating > that > was posted by the Google team, apparently accidentally, on a NASA website and > then quickly taken down. It's not clear exactly what the calculation was > about, > they just said it “marks the first computation that can only be performed on a > quantum processor". My guess is it was probably a weird function of some sort > that would not be of much use to a scientist or engineer, but even so if true > it would be a first proof of concept and be earthsharing. I suppose they want > to check and recheck their work before they make a official announcement this > important and that's why they took the article down. > > John K Clark > It is rather easy to say that one's optimised algorithm using special purpose hardware performs better than some naive implementation running on a conventional computer. It is not so easy to show that it beats the pants off all possible algorithm running on the conventional computer. For example, it is often the case that some simple algorithm can be parallelised, and run many times faster on a parallel computer, however that there is also a more complicated algorithm that is inherently serial, but actually runs faster than the paralellised one. I have a feeling that may have happened here. But I look forward to a proper demonstration of quantum supremacy. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190921213209.GA3498%40zen.
Re: Quantum immortality
On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 10:01:42PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 4:57 PM Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > The argument of the measure is based on ASSA and that's why it is flawed, > moments are not random sampled from all possible moments, with this > argument and without QI, you should have never find yourself young... But > somewhere just before your death. > > > ASSA is not a law of physics. I am not assuming random sampling from anything. > It is just that you spend more time old than young given quantum immortality. > That is not to say that you are never young -- of course you have to pass > through all the years since your birth, one year at a time. It is just that > there are more years after any given age than before that age. Yes, and I'm still passing through those younger moments. That is the RSSA position. If you want to say you are randomly sampled from all your life's observer moments (ASSA), you have to take account the nonuniform measure as a function of age over observer moments. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190918050814.GE2417%40zen.
Re: Quantum immortality
On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 12:00:04PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Wed, Sep 11, 2019 at 10:18 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List < > everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > On 9/10/2019 4:30 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > Another argument that has been given here before is that if quantum > > immortality is true, then we should expect to see a number of people > > who are considerably older than the normal life expectancy -- and we > > do not see people who are two or three hundred years old. Even if the > > probabilities are very low, there have been an awful lot of people > > born within the last 500 or so years -- some must have survived on our > > branch if this scenario is true. > > My argument was that each of us should find ourselves to be much older > than even the oldest people we know. > > > That is probably the best single argument against quantum immortality: if QI > is > true, then the measure of our lifetime after one reaches a normal lifetime is > infinitely greater than the measure before age , say, 120 yr. So if one finds > oneself younger than 120 years, QI is false, and if MWI is still considered to > be true, there must be another argument why MWI does not imply QI. > Once I tried to use this argument against the ASSA in a debate with Jacques Mallah. I lost. This line of argument fails. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190918050411.GD2417%40zen.
Re: Quantum immortality
On Tue, Sep 10, 2019 at 05:18:51PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > > On 9/10/2019 4:30 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > Another argument that has been given here before is that if quantum > > immortality is true, then we should expect to see a number of people who > > are considerably older than the normal life expectancy -- and we do not > > see people who are two or three hundred years old. Even if the > > probabilities are very low, there have been an awful lot of people born > > within the last 500 or so years -- some must have survived on our branch > > if this scenario is true. > > My argument was that each of us should find ourselves to be much older than > even the oldest people we know. Only if the ASSA is true, not the RSSA. But even if the ASSA is true, the total measure of very old observer moments may well be insignificant compared with those of moderate age, so no, your argument fails. The latter was my mistake in an argument I had with Jacques Mallah once. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190918050120.GC2417%40zen.
Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)
On Mon, Sep 16, 2019 at 07:42:18PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > On Monday, September 16, 2019 at 7:20:57 PM UTC-6, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 08:25:06PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > > Whether they're boring or not is irrelevant. As I previously posted, an > > uncountable infinity of universes is possible without any repeats. AG > > > > Incorrect. Each world has a finite amount of information that defines > it, and consequently nonzero measure. If these worlds are drawn from > an uncountable infinite set, then there must be an uncountable number > of copies of each world. > > > This argument breaks down if worlds are infinite. To prove any of this, > we need to do some real mathematics. So far I see it as conjectural. AG > I just don't see how it could be possible for a world to contain an infinite amount of information. But as people have noted here, the word "world" is ambiguous. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190917051323.GF5030%40zen.
Re: Another physicist in mental decline (Sean Carroll)
On Fri, Sep 13, 2019 at 08:25:06PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: > > Whether they're boring or not is irrelevant. As I previously posted, an > uncountable infinity of universes is possible without any repeats. AG > Incorrect. Each world has a finite amount of information that defines it, and consequently nonzero measure. If these worlds are drawn from an uncountable infinite set, then there must be an uncountable number of copies of each world. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190917010724.GD5030%40zen.
Re: Entropy of early universe
On Sat, Sep 14, 2019 at 10:13:27PM -0700, Alan Grayson wrote: > > > On Saturday, September 14, 2019 at 7:12:34 AM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote: > > If the early universe, say before the emergence of the CMBR, consisted of > a > random collection of electrons and photons, wouldn't this correspond to a > high, not low entropy? Wouldn't it be analogous to gas with many possible > states? Yet cosmologists seem hard pressed to explain an initial or early > state assuming the entropy is low. AG > > > When I was an undergraduate I took a course in Classical Thermodynamics and > recall being satisfied that entropy was well-defined. I never took a course in > Classical Statistical Mechanics, but I've seen Boltzmann's equation for S and > wonder how N, the number of possible states is defined. If we have a gas > enclosed in a container, we can divide it into occupation cells of fixed > volume > to calcuate S. But why can't we double the number of cells by reducing their > volume by half? How then is S well defined in the case of Classical > Statistical > Mechanics? TIA, AG It actually isn't. The point bothered me too. The number of states is basically V/h, where V is the volume of phase space occupied by the system, and h a cell size. Therefore, entropy is klog V - klog h For a large range of values of h, the second term is just a negligible constant offset to the total entropy. However, as h→0, entropy blows up. And that what classical statistical mechanics tells you. Enter quantum mechanics. Heisenberg's uncertainty relation tells us that ΔxΔp ≥ ℏ, so in the above entropy formula, h is constrained to be larger than ℏ³. Quantum mechanics saves classical statistical physics' bacon. Nothing blows up. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190916072249.GC5030%40zen.
Re: The Neuroscience of Reality
On Mon, Sep 02, 2019 at 01:56:48AM -0700, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > Reality is constructed by the brain, and no two brains are exactly alike > > By Anil K. Seth (@anilkseth) | Scientific American September 2019 Issue > > https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-neuroscience-of-reality/ > Interesting article. I might just forward this onto another correspondent of mine :) -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190903061221.GS2402%40zen.
Re: Observation versus assumption
On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 05:08:42AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 12:14 AM Russell Standish > wrote: > > > > This is all different from John Clark's argument that something must > exist to breathe fire into all the computations. He calls that > something "matter", and strongly disavows the ability of arithmetic to > do this. Bruno Marchal claims the opposite - that arithmetic, or in > fact any abstract system capable of universal computation, is > sufficient for the job. To be quite frank, I'm a fence sitter in this > debate, as I've yet to see any physically realisable experiment that > can settle the matter. > > > I have. Add 2 +2 on your computer. Observe the output. Hit your computer as > hard as you can with the hammer. Add 2 +2 on your computer again. Observe if > the output has changed. Note that a hammer can change physical things but > can't > change arithmetic. You could be observing a simulation of a hammer breaking a simulated computer, which if faithful, should prevent the computation from taking place. It does not demonstrate ontological existence of the computer. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190826000419.GJ2402%40zen.
Re: Models of arithmetic
On Fri, Aug 23, 2019 at 10:24:47PM -0700, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > On Friday, August 23, 2019 at 5:54:17 PM UTC-5, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Wed, Aug 21, 2019 at 10:28:39AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 20 Aug 2019, at 19:38, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > > > > > The reason to suspect that arithmetic comes from matter (M→A) vs. > matter > > comes from arithmetic (A→M) is that with A→M there many Ms. > > > > > > On the contrary: Arithmetic (A) explains why there is many geographies > and > > history, but only one physics, the same fr all universal machine. That > is > due > > to the fact that Physics (Matter, M) emerges from the first person > > indeterminacy on *all* computations. > > So A explains why there is only one M possible, and why the physical > reality is > > the same for all universal machine/number. > > With A, the physical laws are justified being laws, and we get some > criteria > > (lacking in physics+physicalism) to distinguish physics and geography. > > This answer is a bit glib IMHO. In some ways it echos the statements I > give in section 9.3 of my book "Theory of Nothing", but which I freely > admitted I felt were provisional and too hand-wavy. However, I believe > that Markus Mueller has since provided an answer in the form of a > theorem (Thm 2.3 "Emergence of an Objective Reality") in his paper > arXiv: 1712.01816. > > That paper to me is probably the most significant result in this area > since I published my book. > > Cheers > > -- > > > > Dr Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Principal, High Performance Coders > Visiting Senior Research Fellow hpc...@hpcoders.com.au > Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au > > > > So how does one get from (simple) > > https://arxiv.org/pdf/1712.01816v1.pdf > > to (complex) > > > https://www.sciencealert.com/images/Screen_Shot_2016-08-03_at_3.20.12_pm.png > (the Lagrangian Standard Model equation) > > ? > > @philipthrift > A partial answer is explored in Stenger's "Comprehensible Cosmos". In brief, its a combination of symmetries and symmetry breaking. But, as they say, the devil is in the details. Cheers -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190825042635.GG2402%40zen.
Re: Observation versus assumption
On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 01:15:38PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 1:01 PM Russell Standish > wrote: > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 07:34:26PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything > List wrote: > > > > > > On 8/24/2019 6:31 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 10:06:38AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 9:45 AM Russell Standish < > li...@hpcoders.com.au> wrote: > > > > > > > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 05:18:47PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > > > > > > > > > >> OK so 0=1, that's fine. > > > > > > > > > > > No, that is not fine. If 0=1, pigs have wings. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes but that's OK too, if nothing physical exists then pigs > and wings > > > > can't > > > > > cause problems because they don't exist. And there are no > minds that > > > > might be > > > > > upset by paradoxes. > > > > > > > > > > > > > That's kind of the point, though. Minds are nonphysical things, > and > > > > there is no apriori reason why physical things need to exist > for > minds > > > > to exist. > > > > > > > > > > > > You have evidence for disembodied minds? > > > That's not an apriori reason. Assuming you're in principle OK with the > > > concept of a brain in a vat (which is a disembodied mind), then the > > > you too do not have an apriori reason for the existence of physical > > > things. > > > > > > > > > > I don't see that a brain in a vat counts as a disembodied mind. Do you > mean > > a brain that has no environment to perceive or act on? I would deny > that > > such an isolated brain instantiates a mind. On the other hand, if the > brain > > has sensors and actuators operating, say a Mars Rover, then it isn't > > disembodied. > > > > Brent > > > > Yes - I know your argument. In the BIV scenario, the environment could > be simulated. Basically Descartes' evil daemon (malin genie) > scenario. Nothing about the observed physics (bodies and whatnot) > exists in any fundamental sense. > > > Presumably the vat is a physical object that provides nutrients, power, etc to > the BIV. That does not count as disembodied in my book. > Neither the brain, nor the vat is a body. The body is actually simulated by the evil daemon, and doesn't exist ontologically. Hence disembodied. Now Brent makes good arguments (and I echo simular arguments in my book) that a body must exist phenomenally (ie exist as an experience of the mind), but nowhere does there appear to be a requirement for the body to exist ontologically (in the same reality as the brain and the vat in this example). This is all different from John Clark's argument that something must exist to breathe fire into all the computations. He calls that something "matter", and strongly disavows the ability of arithmetic to do this. Bruno Marchal claims the opposite - that arithmetic, or in fact any abstract system capable of universal computation, is sufficient for the job. To be quite frank, I'm a fence sitter in this debate, as I've yet to see any physically realisable experiment that can settle the matter. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190825041431.GF2402%40zen.
Re: Observation versus assumption
On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 07:34:26PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > > On 8/24/2019 6:31 PM, Russell Standish wrote: > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 10:06:38AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 9:45 AM Russell Standish > > > wrote: > > > > > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 05:18:47PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > > > > > > > >> OK so 0=1, that's fine. > > > > > > > > > No, that is not fine. If 0=1, pigs have wings. > > > > > > > > > > > > Yes but that's OK too, if nothing physical exists then pigs and > > > wings > > > can't > > > > cause problems because they don't exist. And there are no minds > > > that > > > might be > > > > upset by paradoxes. > > > > > > > > > > That's kind of the point, though. Minds are nonphysical things, and > > > there is no apriori reason why physical things need to exist for > > > minds > > > to exist. > > > > > > > > > You have evidence for disembodied minds? > > That's not an apriori reason. Assuming you're in principle OK with the > > concept of a brain in a vat (which is a disembodied mind), then the > > you too do not have an apriori reason for the existence of physical > > things. > > > > > > I don't see that a brain in a vat counts as a disembodied mind. Do you mean > a brain that has no environment to perceive or act on? I would deny that > such an isolated brain instantiates a mind. On the other hand, if the brain > has sensors and actuators operating, say a Mars Rover, then it isn't > disembodied. > > Brent > Yes - I know your argument. In the BIV scenario, the environment could be simulated. Basically Descartes' evil daemon (malin genie) scenario. Nothing about the observed physics (bodies and whatnot) exists in any fundamental sense. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190825030137.GE2402%40zen.
Re: Observation versus assumption
On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 10:06:38AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Sun, Aug 25, 2019 at 9:45 AM Russell Standish > wrote: > > On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 05:18:47PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > > > >> OK so 0=1, that's fine. > > > > > No, that is not fine. If 0=1, pigs have wings. > > > > > > Yes but that's OK too, if nothing physical exists then pigs and wings > can't > > cause problems because they don't exist. And there are no minds that > might be > > upset by paradoxes. > > > > That's kind of the point, though. Minds are nonphysical things, and > there is no apriori reason why physical things need to exist for minds > to exist. > > > You have evidence for disembodied minds? That's not an apriori reason. Assuming you're in principle OK with the concept of a brain in a vat (which is a disembodied mind), then the you too do not have an apriori reason for the existence of physical things. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190825013144.GD2402%40zen.
Re: Observation versus assumption
On Sat, Aug 24, 2019 at 05:18:47PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > >> OK so 0=1, that's fine. > > > No, that is not fine. If 0=1, pigs have wings. > > > Yes but that's OK too, if nothing physical exists then pigs and wings can't > cause problems because they don't exist. And there are no minds that might be > upset by paradoxes. > That's kind of the point, though. Minds are nonphysical things, and there is no apriori reason why physical things need to exist for minds to exist. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190824234532.GB2402%40zen.
Re: Models of arithmetic
On Wed, Aug 21, 2019 at 10:28:39AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 20 Aug 2019, at 19:38, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > > The reason to suspect that arithmetic comes from matter (M→A) vs. matter > comes from arithmetic (A→M) is that with A→M there many Ms. > > > On the contrary: Arithmetic (A) explains why there is many geographies and > history, but only one physics, the same fr all universal machine. That is due > to the fact that Physics (Matter, M) emerges from the first person > indeterminacy on *all* computations. > So A explains why there is only one M possible, and why the physical reality > is > the same for all universal machine/number. > With A, the physical laws are justified being laws, and we get some criteria > (lacking in physics+physicalism) to distinguish physics and geography. This answer is a bit glib IMHO. In some ways it echos the statements I give in section 9.3 of my book "Theory of Nothing", but which I freely admitted I felt were provisional and too hand-wavy. However, I believe that Markus Mueller has since provided an answer in the form of a theorem (Thm 2.3 "Emergence of an Objective Reality") in his paper arXiv: 1712.01816. That paper to me is probably the most significant result in this area since I published my book. Cheers -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190823225404.GE2271%40zen.
Re: Are proofs equivalent to dovetailing computations?
On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 12:17:38PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > You cannot identify a computation and a representation of that computation. So > the answer is no: the blockhead or the infinite look-up table does not process > a computation. That is incorrect. Lookup tables _are_ computations, and the algorithms go by the name "memoisation", and are a form of optimisation where space and time are traded. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190819012547.GD20075%40zen.
Re: Are proofs equivalent to dovetailing computations?
On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 12:06:32PM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: > > Thanks for the background and explanation. Is it the case then that any > undecidable (creative?) set is a compact description of universal > dovetailing? > Would Chaitin's constant also qualify as a compact description of the > universal > dovetailing (though being a single real number, rather than a set of rational > complex points)? > Related to this, on page 218 of Li and Vitanyi's "Introduction to Kolmogorov Complexity and it Applications", right under corollary 3.6.2 is the statement: "Moreover, for all axiomatic mathematical theories that can be extressed compactly enough to be conceivably interesting to human beings, say in fewer than 10,000 bits, [the first 10,000 bits of the Chatin probability Ω] can be used to decide for every statement in the theory whether it is the true, false or independent. ... Thus Ω is truly the number of Wisdom, and 'can be known of, but not known, through human reason' [C.H Bennett and M. Gardner, Sci Am. 241:11(1979),20-34]". Cheers -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190816233116.GX20075%40zen.
Re: Are proofs equivalent to dovetailing computations?
On Tue, Aug 13, 2019 at 02:41:09AM -0700, Philip Thrift wrote: > > If only there were a dovetailer to multiplex all one's duties. :) They made a movie about that, starring Tom Hanks IIRC. Can't tremeber the title, though... -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190814021139.GM20075%40zen.
Re: STEP 3
On Sat, Aug 10, 2019 at 08:53:39AM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Sat, Aug 10, 2019 at 3:22 AM Jason Resch wrote: > > On Friday, August 9, 2019, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On Fri, Aug 9, 2019 at 8:59 PM Jason Resch > wrote: > > > What role do you see decoherence playing in consciousness? In > other words, could you explain why shedding IR photons into an > external environment necessary for the mind to be conscious? > > > Consciousness is a classical phenomenon since the brain is a classical > object (not in a state of quantum coherence). So decoherence, and the > emergence of the classical from the quantum, is essential for > consciousness. Just as to be conscious is to be conscious of > something, > such as the external world. > > > > You appear to be extrapolating a causation from the appearance of a > correlation: > "The brain is classical, and the brain is conscious, therefore all > consciousness must be classical." > > The conclusion doesn't follow from the premise. > > > Show me consciousness that does not involve decohered classical matter, such > as > in a brain. > > > Also, is a brain really conscious of the external world, or is it > conscious > of it's internal states? The redness of a red apple does not exist > physically. Redness is an invention of the brain, which cannot be found in > the external world of colorless particles. > > > But the physical world does contain photons of various wavelengths -- which > correspond to different colours. Correlation does not necessarily indicate > causation, but scientific study does reveal the underlying relations between > things. > > Bruce > Riffing further on this theme, conscious must be intimately tied up with a process for deriving meaning from data. Given a continuous ontology (eg ontic-ψ), this must involve a discretisation process - decoherence pretty much fits the bill here, and so Brent's often posed-insight that consciousness must involve an interaction between an observer system, and an environment that is traced over makes a lot of sense. Going the other way, computationalism entails via the UDA that the physical world has this continuous character. So computationalism must ultimately address Brent's insight. This comes to the fore with the MGA - the argument breaks down when an environment is included that adds essential stocasticity to subsequent runs of the machine (ie only the original run of Klara is conscious, the recording reruns of Olympia are not, nor might any accidental recordings either). -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190810012533.GB2223%40zen.
Re: STEP 3
On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 11:44:23AM -0500, Jason Resch wrote: > > Closest continuer theory is the "Copenhagen Interpretation" of personal > identity theory. A stop gap to preserve common sense notions in light of > paradoxes that imply the old way if thinking is untenable. > > As with quantum mechanics, common sense personal identity theories are forced > to either abandon any connection linking observer moments (like the zero > universe interpretation) or to a universalism that links all observers to a > single person (like many worlds). > I never accepted that argument. Why couldn't there be islands in the space of observer moments separated by states of unconsiousness? In the classic thought experiment by Parfitt, what's to say that consciousness doesn't blink out after a certain number of neurons have been swapped for Napoleon's, and doesn't blink back into existence once Napoleon's brain is nearly complete? -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190726060732.GA17287%40zen.
Re: We Are Legion We Are Bob Bobiverse Book 1
On Thu, Jul 25, 2019 at 10:47:46PM -0400, John Clark wrote: > > The only other novel I can think of that treats the subject of uploading with > equal intelligence is "The Silicon Man". > > The Silicon Man by Charles Platt > There's a movie "Abre los oyos" (Open your eyes) that deals with this subject that I thought was quite good. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190726044526.GB8230%40zen.
Re: Observation versus assumption
On Wed, Jul 24, 2019 at 03:57:14AM -0700, Philip Thrift wrote: > > > On Wednesday, July 24, 2019 at 5:34:38 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > The concept of “Matter” is never used in any paper in physics, only in > materialist philosophy. > > > > https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02062-0 > > Strange topological materials are popping up everywhere physicists look > > ‘Fragile topology’ is the latest addition to a group of quantum phenomena that > give materials exotic — and exciting — properties. > > "The mathematics hidden in materials keeps getting more exotic. Topological > states of matter — which derive exotic properties from their electrons’ > ‘knotty’ quantum states — have shot from rare curiosity to one of the hottest > fields in physics. Now, theorists are finding that topology is ubiquitous — > and > recognizing it as one of the most significant ways in which solid matter can > behave." > > @philipthrift > I suspect that all of matter (eg the zoo of elementary particles) might be related to the topology of the underlying spacetime. Sadly, my mathematical chops are not strong enough to make headway on this insight... -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190725012412.GC1964%40zen.
Re: Eternal return
On Fri, Jun 21, 2019 at 09:27:49AM -0700, Eva wrote: > Given that time is irreversible, and global entropy always increase: > > 1. In principle, sooner or later, every living system such as human being, or > humanity will be annihilated? > > 2. In principle, if system is annihilated then it is irreversible - a system > with the same internal structure may be created, but it will not be the very > same system, it may be (at most) perfectly isomorphic, but it will not share > the same identity? > > So, for example, if I die, and hypothetically, in the distant future, an > exact copy of my body will be made than it will be an exact copy of my body > and consciousness, but not my current identity, so my consciousness will not > reappear after my death like from deep sleep. > > > I would like to ask you - in your opinion, my two above conclusions are > correct? > If functionalism were true (a popular position here, and implied by computationalism), then the exact copy (even near enough copy) will be identical to you, and your conclusion would be incorrect. If this new copy follows a slightly different path (perhaps because of a sightly different environment, or just instrinsic randomness), then your life continues. Of course this means an eternal return. But it is nothing to fear - you will not experience your life over again - each time you will experience you life as having been lived once, albeit most likely immortally. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190623135218.GA24600%40zen.
Re: Aeon: "AIs should have the same ethical protections as animals"
On Wed, May 22, 2019 at 03:14:43PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > 2147 Breaking News: > Alfred has used a very cheap teleportation device to go on Mars. He seemed OK > and claimed he has not changed, but his wife believes he lost his sense of > humour. > An inquest revealed that the the substitution level chose by the candidate > were indeed not always used, and very often the society used a much higher > level. This makes more sense if the French word "société" is translated as "company" rather than "society". One the many faux frères - pairs of similar words with distinctly different meanings in French and English. > Many users lost some psychological trait, like sense of humour, or some > memories, or even the ability to have REM sleep. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190522231425.GS5592%40zen.
Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon
On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 09:05:27PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > That is an assumption. There are proposed cosmologies that allow for > an infinite number of computational steps to occur - IIRC, the "big > rip" is one such. > > > I don't think so -- the "big rip" would simple tear the physical computer to > pieces. Yes, but give it enough energy to execute an inifnite number of computational steps before its demise. Or so I was told :). There are cosmologies where that doesn't happen too - the "big crunch" being one IIRC. That was famously where Tipler came unstuck. > > > Once multiverses get into the picture, there is > almost assuredly sufficient computational resources to go around. > > > No so fast. The multiverse is an assemblage of disjoint universes -- what > happens in one universe does not affect any other universe. So that doesn't > get > you any more computing power. > > I don't need to execute all programs here, they just need to be executed somewhere. So the Multiverse definitely does fit the bill, so long as there's enough of them. The string landscape probably doesn't have enough :) > Nevertheless, it is an interesting question as to whether insufficient > resources to support the full reality of the integers makes any damn > difference at all to mathematics or even observable reality. Norm > Wildberger is one of the few people championing this sort of work. > > > If the dovetailer has only limited resources, does it actually get you > anything > at all? > Norm thinks so. But its early days in that program, and I don't think they have many results. I just point it out that it is really the logical conclusion from the position you're arguing. > > > > > I think that the CT thesis requires that all possible programs can > be > > run in order for a machine to be considered truly > > universal. > > > > > > That might be the case, in which case the argument works only on the > realist > > assumption. Since there is no necessity to make such an assumption, we > can > > safely ignore the whole shebang > > > > There's a lot of plausible arguments in favour of a multiversal > reality - indeed it tends to be the prevalent background assumption of > this mailing list. > > > This list is a very small sample of the scientific community, much less of > humanity as a whole. Do you want it otherwise? > Multiverse ideas are around, but unless seriously > constrained, they are definitely suspect. > Maybe so - but let's not try to give up critical thinking about them. > > My gut feeling is that if there really is an ultrafinitist limit to > the amount of computation available in the universe, then there ought > to be some measureable consequence of this in our observable universe. > > > Why? That might be the case if the computationalist/arithmetical realist > thesis > has some basis. But there is no evidence for that. Physicalism is still safer > bet.. > Everything theories have definite advantages over theories that say "it just is - some things exist, others don't, for no apparent reason". So its worth trying to pin down what constraints that assumption puts on out observed reality. Of course, it may be that "it just is" wins out at the end, but that would be like: OK science stops here. BTW - computationalism already has a "some things exist, others don't" moment. The CT thesis implicitly assumes that hypercomputers do not exist. If they did, then there would be some computations that are impossible for a Turing machine to perform. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190520001900.GG14791%40zen.
Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon
On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 05:11:20PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 4:45 PM Russell Standish > wrote: > > On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 04:12:00PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 10:27 AM Russell Standish > > > wrote: > > > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:47:36PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:14 PM Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > > > > > On 16 May 2019, at 03:27, Bruce Kellett > > > wrote: > > > > > > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:59 AM Bruno Marchal < > marc...@ulb.ac.be > > > > > > wrote: > > > > > > The first order theory of the real numbers does not > require > > > arithmetical realism, but the same theory + the > > trigonometrical > > > functions reintroduce the need of being realist on the > > integers. > > > Sin(2Pix) = 0 defines the integers in that theory. > > > > > > If you reject arithmetical realism, you need to tell > us > which > > > axioms you reject among, > > > > > > 1) 0 ≠ s(x) > > > 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y) > > > 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) > > > 4) x+0 = x > > > 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y) > > > 6) x*0=0 > > > 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x > > > > > > > > > You say that "realism" is just acceptance of the axioms of > arithmetic > > above. > > > But then you say that arithmetical statements are true in the > model > of > > > arithmetic given by the natural integers. There is a problem here: > are > > the > > > integers the model of your axioms above, or is it only the axioms > that > > are > > > "real". If the integers are the model, then they must exist > independently > > of > > > the axioms -- they are separately existing entities that satisfy > the > > axioms, > > > and their existence cannot then be a consequence of the axioms, on > pain > > of > > > vicious circularity. > > > > > > Axioms 1-3 define the successor operator s(x). It is enough to > > generate the set of whole numbers by repeated application on the > > element 0. As a shorthand, we can use traditional decimal notation > (eg > > 5) to refer to the element s(s(s(s(s(0). 4&5 define addition, > and > > 6&7 define multiplication on these objects. > > > > > > That is where the problem lies. If these axioms generate the set of > whole > > numbers, then that is a constructvist or nominalist account of > arithmetic. If, > > however, the integers exist independently and are thus just a model for > these > > axioms (a domain in which the axioms are true), then you have arithmetic > > realism. You can't have it both ways. > > It is clear that application of the successor function is sufficient to > generate all whole numbers (given sufficient resources, of > course). The definitions of addition and multiplication give a > contructive way of computing these operations. > > I can't see why one can't also suppose that those entities exist > independently of whether I bother to run a program that generates them > or not - so one can have it both ways AFAICS. Realism vs nominalism is > a choice. > > > That was the point I was trying to make: Realism is an assumption that has to > be added to the axioms. > > > > > Goedel's incompleteness theorem demonstrates there are true > statements > > of these objects that cannot be proven from those axioms alone. > > > > In that sense, the whole numbers are a consequence of those axioms, > > whilst also being separately existing entities (having a life of > their > > own). > > > > > > That is an independent assumption, not implied by the axioms above, as I > have > > pointed out. > > > >
Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon
On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 04:12:00PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Sun, May 19, 2019 at 10:27 AM Russell Standish > wrote: > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:47:36PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:14 PM Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > > > On 16 May 2019, at 03:27, Bruce Kellett > wrote: > > > > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:59 AM Bruno Marchal > > > > wrote: > > > > The first order theory of the real numbers does not require > > arithmetical realism, but the same theory + the > trigonometrical > > functions reintroduce the need of being realist on the > integers. > > Sin(2Pix) = 0 defines the integers in that theory. > > > > If you reject arithmetical realism, you need to tell us > which > > axioms you reject among, > > > > 1) 0 ≠ s(x) > > 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y) > > 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) > > 4) x+0 = x > > 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y) > > 6) x*0=0 > > 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x > > > > > > You say that "realism" is just acceptance of the axioms of arithmetic > above. > > But then you say that arithmetical statements are true in the model of > > arithmetic given by the natural integers. There is a problem here: are > the > > integers the model of your axioms above, or is it only the axioms that > are > > "real". If the integers are the model, then they must exist > independently > of > > the axioms -- they are separately existing entities that satisfy the > axioms, > > and their existence cannot then be a consequence of the axioms, on pain > of > > vicious circularity. > > > Axioms 1-3 define the successor operator s(x). It is enough to > generate the set of whole numbers by repeated application on the > element 0. As a shorthand, we can use traditional decimal notation (eg > 5) to refer to the element s(s(s(s(s(0). 4&5 define addition, and > 6&7 define multiplication on these objects. > > > That is where the problem lies. If these axioms generate the set of whole > numbers, then that is a constructvist or nominalist account of arithmetic. If, > however, the integers exist independently and are thus just a model for these > axioms (a domain in which the axioms are true), then you have arithmetic > realism. You can't have it both ways. It is clear that application of the successor function is sufficient to generate all whole numbers (given sufficient resources, of course). The definitions of addition and multiplication give a contructive way of computing these operations. I can't see why one can't also suppose that those entities exist independently of whether I bother to run a program that generates them or not - so one can have it both ways AFAICS. Realism vs nominalism is a choice. > > > Goedel's incompleteness theorem demonstrates there are true statements > of these objects that cannot be proven from those axioms alone. > > In that sense, the whole numbers are a consequence of those axioms, > whilst also being separately existing entities (having a life of their > own). > > > That is an independent assumption, not implied by the axioms above, as I have > pointed out. > No I was parroting another argument that Goedelian incompleteness entails an independent existence - that some things are true (exist) even if you cannot generate that thing algorithmically. I'm a little ambivalent on this argument - it forms the core of the argument a friend of mine is writing a book about, but he's only shown me the first chapter (which I've critiqued), so I haven't got to the meat of it. > > There are also nonstandard airthmetics, that involve adding additional > elements (infinite ones) that cannot be created by successive > application of s. > > Given these 7 axioms can also be viewed as an algorithm for generating > the whole numbers, acceptance of the Church-Turing thesis (ie the > existence of a universal Turing machine) is sufficient to reify the > whole numbers. > > > That remains to be proved. Church-Turing is about calculable numbers, not > about > reification. It also works in a purely nominalist account. > Hmm - possibly I went too fast here. The existence of a running universal dovetailer is sufficient for the whole numbers to be reified, as the abovementio
Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon
On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:47:36PM +1000, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Fri, May 17, 2019 at 10:14 PM Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 16 May 2019, at 03:27, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > On Thu, May 16, 2019 at 12:59 AM Bruno Marchal > wrote: > > The first order theory of the real numbers does not require > arithmetical realism, but the same theory + the trigonometrical > functions reintroduce the need of being realist on the integers. > Sin(2Pix) = 0 defines the integers in that theory. > > If you reject arithmetical realism, you need to tell us which > axioms you reject among, > > 1) 0 ≠ s(x) > 2) x ≠ y -> s(x) ≠ s(y) > 3) x ≠ 0 -> Ey(x = s(y)) > 4) x+0 = x > 5) x+s(y) = s(x+y) > 6) x*0=0 > 7) x*s(y)=(x*y)+x > > > You say that "realism" is just acceptance of the axioms of arithmetic above. > But then you say that arithmetical statements are true in the model of > arithmetic given by the natural integers. There is a problem here: are the > integers the model of your axioms above, or is it only the axioms that are > "real". If the integers are the model, then they must exist independently of > the axioms -- they are separately existing entities that satisfy the axioms, > and their existence cannot then be a consequence of the axioms, on pain of > vicious circularity. Axioms 1-3 define the successor operator s(x). It is enough to generate the set of whole numbers by repeated application on the element 0. As a shorthand, we can use traditional decimal notation (eg 5) to refer to the element s(s(s(s(s(0). 4&5 define addition, and 6&7 define multiplication on these objects. Goedel's incompleteness theorem demonstrates there are true statements of these objects that cannot be proven from those axioms alone. In that sense, the whole numbers are a consequence of those axioms, whilst also being separately existing entities (having a life of their own). There are also nonstandard airthmetics, that involve adding additional elements (infinite ones) that cannot be created by successive application of s. Given these 7 axioms can also be viewed as an algorithm for generating the whole numbers, acceptance of the Church-Turing thesis (ie the existence of a universal Turing machine) is sufficient to reify the whole numbers. Conversely, this arithmetic is sufficient to generate all possible Turing machine (IIRC, the proof involves Diophantine equations, but wiser heads then me may confirm or deny). A converse position (held by a small minority of mathematicians) is that perhaps not all whole numbers exist - that there is some (unspecified) maximum integer x for which s(x) is not meaningful, and in particular, for which axiom 3 is false. In such an environment, the CT thesis must be false, there can be no universal machine capable of emulating all other others - there must be at least one such machine whose emulation program is too long to fit on the obviously finite length tape. Bruno's work does not address this ultrafinitist case, as the CT thesis is an explicit assumption. Except that the Movie Graph Argument is supposedly about that case. Cheers -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190519002736.GK5592%40zen.
Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon
On Fri, May 10, 2019 at 12:24:56PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Wittgenstein is sum up with his “what we cannot talk about should not be > talked > about”, but that is self-defeating (What are you talking about Mr > Wittgenstein?). > Only if he couldn't talk about what he is talking about. But it seems like he could, so perhaps therefore he thought he should? -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/everything-list/20190510223048.GA3946%40zen. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A short and straight to the point speech of Donald Haffman that the brain does not exist
On Wed, May 01, 2019 at 09:42:44AM -0400, John Clark wrote: > On Wed, May 1, 2019 at 2:24 AM via Everything List < > everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote: > > > > You certainly demonstrated that you are acting like a disrespectful > frustrated teenager > > > You made my day by confusing me with a teenager! And I solemnly promise I will > continue to give you all the respect you deserve. > > > > My conversation with you ends here > > > Somehow I doubt it. > > John K Clark That's good! You had me choking on my cornflakes :) -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Everything List Conference
On Sat, Apr 27, 2019 at 05:14:21AM -0700, PGC wrote: > > > On Friday, April 26, 2019 at 2:02:05 AM UTC+2, Jason wrote: > > This list has been active for over 20 years (since 1998), but to my > knowledge there has never been an organized event for for members of this > list to meet and discuss topics in person. > > > The small European side has always tried to reach out to each other. No > success > record but a few discussions were had in person. I have personally met Bruno Marchal, Youness Ayaita and frequently had a beer with Kim Jones, as I only live about 3km from the latter. I did try connecting up with Juegen Schmidhuber on one of my trips, although all I've managed so far is to meet Marcus Hutter, who as far as I know doesn't even lurk on the everything-list. We have had some fun, long-ranging conversations, but I don't think ever solved any extant problem :). I've tried reaching out to the Melbourne crowd on my odd trip down there, but for one reason or other never quite managed to meet up. As a shout out, I will be visiting Melbourne over the weekend of the 25th May, so that might be a possibility to meet up. > > > > Is this something any participants of this list be interested in, > attending > and perhaps presenting at, should such an event were to be organized? > > I think in-person panels/presentations/discussions it could do a lot to > overcome some long-standing debates on this list. > > If you are interested, I have created an anonymous survey form: > https://forms.gle/AKHxJpeYUgv35g2J7 > > I welcome others to share thoughts, comments, concerns, on whether this > idea does or does not make sense. > > > Any positive initiative towards meeting folks in person, outside the anomie > kind of void of staring into screens through impersonal screen names, is a > responsible use of personal freedom. > > Go see things and people for yourself. Not to swallow everything we read on a > screen. Of course it can turn out to be a disappointment. That's why it > matters > though. Being there for ourselves and others beyond predictable typed > responses. > > The prevalent attitude and certainty at least from some European folk on this > list... to never even try, to shoot anybody with "ambition" to explore and > open > ourselves to others beyond the keyboard, as if it were a crime... I've never > understood that. PGC > "Have an open mind, but not so open your brains fall out". I mostly think we get the balance right on the everything-list, otherwise I would have abandoned it years ago, like I did with the FOR list. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Questions about the Equivalence Principle (EP) and GR
On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 09:13:34PM -0700, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 9:20:36 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 8:08:58 PM UTC-6, agrays...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, April 18, 2019 at 6:53:33 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
> Sorry, I don't remember what, if anything, I intended to text.
>
> I'm not expert on how Einstein arrived at his famous field
> equations. I know that he insisted on them being tensor equations
> so that they would have the same form in all coordinate systems.
> That may sound like a mathematical technicality, but it is really
> to ensure that the things in the equation, the tensors, could have
> a physical interpretation. He also limited himself to second
> order
> differentials, probably as a matter of simplicity. And he
> excluded
> torsion, but I don't know why. And of course he knew it had to
> reproduce Newtonian gravity in the weak/slow limit.
>
> Brent
>
>
> Here's a link which might help;
>
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1608.05752.pdf
>
> AG
>
>
> I'm coming to the view that what I have been seeking these many years -
> namely, a mathematical derivation of Einstein's field equations, somewhat
> like a mathematical theorem -- doesn't exist. It's more a case of a set of
> highly subtle physical intuitions about how the universe functions, which,
> when cobbled together, result in the field equations. For this reason,
> most
> alleged explanations of GR involve, at some point, essentially pulling the
> field equations out of the proverbial hat. As with the Principle of
> Relativity and the Least Action Principle, the latter say applied to
> asserting geodesic motion for freely falling bodies, they're not provable
> as "true", but assuming them "false" would be a dead-end for physics and
> would, as well, make our lives miserable. AG
>
>
> One possible exception to the above is the Einstein-Hilbert Principle of Least
> Action, from which, it is alleges, Einstein's field equations can be derived.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Einstein%E2%80%93Hilbert_action
>
> But what it is, and how it would work, is above my pay grade. Maybe someone
> here can shed some light on this topic.
>
> AG
Roy Frieden has a derivation of Einstein's field equations from his
Fisher information principle - sorry its above my pay grade too, so
don't ask me to explain, but it could be related to you Hilbert action
derivation.
@Book{Frieden98,
author = {B. Roy Frieden},
title ={Physics from Fisher Information: a unification},
publisher ={Cambridge UP},
year = 1998,
address = {Cambridge}
}
--
Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon
On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 03:17:59AM -0700, 'Cosmin Visan' via Everything List wrote: > What does "self model" even mean ? Notice that any material attempt to > implement "self model" leads to infinite regress. Because let's say that a > machine has the parts A B C. To have a "self model" would mean to have another > part (A B C) which would contain the "self model". But this would be an extra > part of the "self" which would be needed to be included in the "self model" in > order to actually have a "self model", so you would need another part (A B C > (A > B C)). But then again you would need to include this part as well in the "self > model". So you will get to infinite regress. Therefore, you need a special > kind > of entity to obtained the desired effect without getting into infinite > regress. > And that's precisely why the self-reference that I'm talking about in the book > is unformalizable. And as you say, being unformalizable, allows for > bootstrapping consciousness into existence. You cannot simulate self-reference > just by playing around with atoms. Self-reference just is. It just is the > source of the entire existence. Is not up to anyone to simulate the source of > existence. You can never obtain the properties of consciousness (meaning, > purpose, free will, memory, intelligence, learning, acting, etc.) just by > playing around with a bunch of atoms. All these properties of consciousness > are > having their source in the unformalizable self-reference. > The same argument was made in favour of vitalism - before the structure and mechanics of DNA was discovered. Self-reference is formalisable. See Löb's theorem. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon
On Thu, Apr 18, 2019 at 10:34:26AM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > > On 4/18/2019 2:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > For > instance, without an observer to interpret a certain pile of atoms as > a machine, it is just a pile of atoms. > > Are you saying that Mars Rover cannot interpret some of its data on Mars, > when nobody observed it, or are you saying that Mars Rover has enough > observation abilities? > > > What makes the Mars Rover a machine is that it can act and react to its > environment. If it's an AI Rover it can learn and plan and reflect. To > invoke > an "observer" is just push the problem away to "What is an observer?" To not recognise the observer is simply to put the problem under a rug. Without an interpretation that voltages in excess of 3V represent 1, and voltages less than 2V represent 0, the logic circuits are just analogue electrical circuits. Without such an interpretation (and ipso facto an observer), the rover is not processing data at all! Note an observer need be nothing more than a mapping of physical space to semantic space. One possibility is to bootstrap the observer by self-reflection. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Universal numbers and Game of Thrones
er not to be drowned out. It shocked me that I constantly had to repeat myself, as things that I had realised decades ago are still widely misunderstood. One might ask what developments have occurred since Bruno submitted his thesis (I recall there's been one or two, but not many). The most fertile period of a scientist's life tends to be eir 20s and 30s, and none of us are spring chickens any more, which might explain it... -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon
On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 06:22:35PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote: > > But how complete must the self-model be. That is the 64 million dollar question. > As Bruno has pointed out, it can't > be complete. Current Mars Rovers have some "house keeping"self-knowledge, > like battery charge, temperature, power draw, next task, location, time,... I don't think that's enough. I think it must have the ability to recognise other (perhaps similar) robots/machines as being like itself. > Of course current rovers don't have AI which would entail them learning and > planning, which would require that they be able to run a simulation which > included some representation of themself; but that representation might be > very simple. When you plan to travel to the next city your plan includes a > representation of yourself, but probably only as a location. > Hod Lipson's starfish's representation of itself is no doubt rather simple and crude, but it does pose the question of whether it might have some sort of consciousness. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: My book "I Am" published on amazon
On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 06:25:19PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Rover is conscious, but still dissociated from ‘rover”. But that is just > because it has no strong induction axiom, and no way to build approximation of > models of itself. It lack a re-entring neural system rich enough to manage > the > gap between its first person apprehension, and the third person apparent > reality around it. > > > > > > > The entity "Telmo" exists in your mind and mine, and I happen to be an > entity "Telmo" in whose mind the entity "Telmo" also exists. This is real > self-reference. > > > I agree. It is unclear for me if Mars Rover has it, or not, as I have not seen > the code, and even seeing it, it could ba a Helle of a difficulty to prove it > has not that ability. I doubt it has it, because Naza does not want a free > exploratory on Mars, but a docile slave. I do think self-reference has something to do with it, as without an observer to give meaning to something, it has no meaning. For instance, without an observer to interpret a certain pile of atoms as a machine, it is just a pile of atoms. Unless you propose a la Bishop Berkley some sort of devine mind from which all meaning radiates, the only other possibility is that each consciousness bootstraps its own meaning from self-reference. Unless the mars rover has a self model in its code (and I don't think it was constructed that way), then I would extremely doubt it has any sort of consciousness. A more interesting possibility is Hod Lipson's "starfish" robot, which has self-reference baked in. Cheers -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?
On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 02:22:05PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 2:03 PM Russell Standish wrote: > > On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 12:06:00PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > > > My problem with your idea that the function: "(n-1)+1" is a valid > computational > > algorithm for n is that it makes all real numbers also computable, but > the > > notion of Turing computability applies only to the integers. We do not > want a > > definition of 'computable', that makes all reals computable. > > You cannot represent n as a finite string for an arbitrary real number > n. But you can for an arbitrary integer n. > > > Sure. But that was not part of your definition of a 'computation'. The > algorithm f(x): (r-1)+1 works for all reals r as well as for finite strings n. > > Bruce I don't think it's 'my definition'. The usual meaning of computable integer is that there exists a program that outputs it. For real numbers, this is changed to a program exists that outputs a sequence of numbers that converges to the real number in question. One could also consider "spigot" programs for this purpose too - a program that outputs the decimal (or binary say) expansion of the real number. It is clear that this more relaxed definition is equivalent to the former in the integer case. It is clear that all integers are computable according to the above, and that nearly all real numbers aren't (by virtue of there only being a countable number of programs). Cheers -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?
On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 12:06:00PM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > > My problem with your idea that the function: "(n-1)+1" is a valid > computational > algorithm for n is that it makes all real numbers also computable, but the > notion of Turing computability applies only to the integers. We do not want a > definition of 'computable', that makes all reals computable. You cannot represent n as a finite string for an arbitrary real number n. But you can for an arbitrary integer n. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?
On Tue, Mar 05, 2019 at 10:42:00AM +1100, Bruce Kellett wrote: > On Tue, Mar 5, 2019 at 10:25 AM Russell Standish > wrote: > > On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 05:31:00PM -0500, John Clark wrote: > > On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 11:04 AM Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > > >> I don't follow you. If the 8000th BB number is unknowable > then > it is > > certainly uncomputable > > > > > > > That is not true. All natural number n are computable. The program > is > > “output n”. > > > > > > I think you're being silly. You're saying if you already know that the > answer > > to a problem is n then you can write a program that will "compute" the > answer > > with just a "print n" command. But that's not computing that's just > printing. > > OK, so what about the program "print X+1", where X is the expansion of > the number BB(8000)-1? > > If that's not computing something, then I'm sure I can cook up > something more complicated to compute. > > > I think the trouble with that, or with variations of that idea, is that they > render the notion of 'computability' vacuous. In order to write such a > program, > or concoct such an algorithm, you need to know the answer in advance. That is > fine, if you just want a program to compute the number 'n', 'n' being given in > advance. But that is no help in computing a number that can be defined, but is > not known in advance. > > So what people are really looking for here is a constructive notion of > computability -- anything else has a tendency to render the notion of > 'computability' trivial. > Not really, as it makes a distinction with respect to real numbers. All integers are computable, but no real numbers are except for a set of measure zero. And then there are well defined numbers that aren't computable, such as Chaitin's Omega. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?
On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 06:48:19PM -0500, John Clark wrote: > > On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 6:25 PM Russell Standish wrote: > > > > OK, so what about the program "print X+1", where X is the expansion of > the number BB(8000)-1? > > > Well what about it? If you don't know what BB(8000) is, and you don't and > neither does God, then neither of you will ever know what BB(8000)-1 is. > > John K Clark That is why I said the number is unknowable, rather than uncomputable. -- -------- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?
On Mon, Mar 04, 2019 at 05:31:00PM -0500, John Clark wrote: > On Mon, Mar 4, 2019 at 11:04 AM Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > >> I don't follow you. If the 8000th BB number is unknowable then it > is > certainly uncomputable > > > > That is not true. All natural number n are computable. The program is > “output n”. > > > I think you're being silly. You're saying if you already know that the answer > to a problem is n then you can write a program that will "compute" the answer > with just a "print n" command. But that's not computing that's just printing. OK, so what about the program "print X+1", where X is the expansion of the number BB(8000)-1? If that's not computing something, then I'm sure I can cook up something more complicated to compute. -- ---- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: Are there real numbers that cannot be defined?
ISTM that the 8000th BB number is unknowable, rather than uncomputable. As Bruno said, there is a program that outputs the 8000th BB number, but we can never know that this program is the correct one. Cheers On Sun, Mar 03, 2019 at 12:28:54PM -0500, John Clark wrote: > > > On Sun, Mar 3, 2019 at 9:26 AM Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > >> The 8000th Busy Beaver Number can be named but not calculated > even theoretically, > > > The busy beaver function is not computable, but on each individual n, it > is computable theoretically, > > > No it is not, not if n= 7918, to compute that the program would have to solve > the Halting Problem. The first 4 Busy beaver numbers have been computed and > Scott Aaronson proved that the 7918th Busy Beaver Number is not computable, > most people think n=5 is not computable either but that has not been proved. > > The 7918th Busy Beaver Number > > > > The 8000h BB number is well defined, > > > Yes. > > > > so it is a (finite) number, > > > Yes, > > > > and so you there exist a finite program computing it > > > No. The 8000th Busy Beaver Number is the largest number of FINITE operations a > 8000 state Turing Machine will make before it halts. Some programs we can > observe halting and with others it's easy to prove will never halt, that's why > we know the first 4 Busy Beaver Numbers, but Turing Proved you can't do that > in > general and Aaronson proved you can't do that for the 7918th; and you > probably > can't even do it for the 5th. > > It is entirely possible that the 5th Busy Beaver number is 47,176,870 because > a 5 state Turing Machine has been found that halts after 47,176,870 > operations, the problem is there are still 5 different 5 state turing > machines that are well past 47,176,870 and they have not halted. If none of > those 5 machines ever halts then 47,176,870 really and truly is the 5th Busy > Beaver Number, but if that is the case we will never know that is the case > because we'll never know that none of those 5 machines ever halts. > > John K Clark > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email > to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at https://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
