Rép : Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Thanks Hal. I add that your link provide a way to recover my old conversation with Joel Dobrzelewski on the list (28 June 2001), which presents the simplest version of the Universal Dovetelair Argument (UDA), i.e. the argument showing that the computationalist hypothesis (in the bio/psycho/theo/-logical sciences) entails that physics is ultimately a branch of machine bio/psycho/theo/-logy. In particular it shows that physics can be presented as a probability or credibility measure on the relative computational histories (which are computation as seen from some first person perspective). The argument is presented in a step by step way, and begins here: http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg01274.html You can then follow the step by clicking on the right arrow next date, and skipping the many threads we were discussing simultaneously at that time. People interested can ask questions. Note that the lobian interview does not necessitate the understanding of the UDA, but this one provides the basic motivation for some of the Theaetetical variants of the modal logic G and G*. Bruno PS I must still verify, with G*, some assertions made by Plotinus, and reciprocally I need to verify assertions made by G* with Plotinus. To be sure I have found a discrepancy between the loebian entity and Plotinus. It seems to be a point where the neoplatonist diverge the most from Aristotle, and then apparently the loebian diverges still more. To conclude I need better translations and unabridged version of Plotinus. I need a bit more time. Le 21-janv.-06, à 00:52, Hal Finney a écrit : Here is a link to an article I wrote in 2001 explaining what the Universal Dovetailer is: http://www.mail-archive.com/everything-list@eskimo.com/msg01526.html Hal Finney http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Le 19-janv.-06, à 02:45, Russell Standish a écrit : On Mon, Jan 16, 2006 at 04:32:15PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 15-janv.-06, ? 19:04, Benjamin Udell a ?crit : The dovetailer keeps sounding like a powerful idea. I do remember that it has often been mentioned here, but somehow I failed to pick up a sense of what it was really about. The Universal Dovetailer is a program which generates and executes all programs. Its existence is a non trivial consequence of Church thesis. Please recall me to explain this in detail in one or two weeks. The necessity to dovetail (that is to run successiveley on the initial segement of the execution never waiting any programs stop is due to the fact that the always defined programs cannot be generated mechanically (this can be done in the case of all programs). Actually I have already explain this on the list (in 2001) but the escribe archive seems no more working again, and the new archive seems not go enough backward in time. The first published paper where I define it, is Mechanism ans Personal Identity paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/MPI_15-MAI-91.pdf Russell Standish attributes it (wrongly) to Schmidhuber in his book. My To be precise I do not attribute it to Schmidhuber, but I can see why you came to that conclusion. I will be revising this section to make this point clear in the final version of my book. The dovetailer algorithm is certainly well known, and not apparently attributable to anyone, and at the time when I wrote that part of ToN, I was unaware that the specific application of the dovetailer to computing all possible programs is your idea. Yes, the key was to realize that church's thesis allows *universal* dovetailing, and forces the dovetailing part: i.e. there is no universal machine capable of running all programs without dovetailing. For exemple, there are no universal dovetailer for the total computable functions. See the diagonalization posts (when available). My mistake actually is using the qualified name universal dovetailer to describe a dovetailer generating all possible strings (Schmidhuber's work), when the universal dovetailer actually runs the programs too. I do not use the qualified name in Why Occam's razor. But a program generating all the strings does not need to dovetail at all. The expression dovetailing on all strings is quite confusing. I think it would be preferable to keep Schmidhuber terminology when you describe his work, which I have already described as interesting constructive physics, but not entirely relevant when searching a TOE, as the philosophical remarks ending his first everything paper illustrated, and as it has been confirmed when he dismissed the 1/3 distinction. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Le 18-janv.-06, à 20:35, danny mayes a écrit : I doubt the beliefs of fundementalist Christianity will ever be absolutely proven or disproven, and as a faith belief I reserve the right to discard it at my choosing! And what if you make the personal experience of God afterlife or before, or to take a less hot example, what if you wake up in the morning with the belief that you exist, as a first person (with private subjective life and all that). In both case you get something that science will never been able to prove or disperove. But does it need an act of faith? One problem is that the word faith has already (like theology) big social connotations, but many reasonable things, especially in science, needs some amount of faith in the sense belief beyond proof.. What I mean is that those questions are difficult, and there is no clear-cut frontier between many sort of beliefs. I have given reasons (often in this list) that the belief in a primitive material universe/realm is already a sort of religious belief. Actually the belief in any application of a theory is beyond provability. But as I said, also the belief in a personal pain, like headache, is beyond proof, although we don't need a proof to understand we have headache. In any case I am not sure it is a question of choice, although that, concerning religious belief, perhaps some form of open-minded education could help young people to be less influenced by the their parent's beliefs (which are not chosen by the children of course). But then that choice question could lead us to the will or free-will question which is not simple too. I am not sure I am clear: to sum up I think we have many beliefs on things with no proofs nor disproofs, but I would'n say it is a matter of choice. We always need evidences of some kind, I think, but for some just a lovely sunshine could be taken as an evidence for God or Gods, and for others just the existence of Nazis will be taken of evidence for Evil, Evils, if not devil(s). That leads to the question of what is an evidence and how does evidences add up (and here many interesting models and theory are developped in Artifical Intelligence (and alike), and the evidences add up toward the idea that that stuff is not obvious at all. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Danny Mayes writes: I haven't participated in the list in a while, but I try to keep up with the discussion here and there as time permits. I personally was raised a fundamentalist Baptist, but lost most of my interest in that religion when I was taught at 9 years old that all the little kids in Africa that are never told about Jesus Christ go to Hell. Even at 9, I knew that wasn't something I was going to be buying. Who wants to believe in a God that cruel? Even without the problematic cruel creator, I have always been to oriented toward logic and proof to just accept stuff on faith. I sympathise with the conclusions of the young Danny, but there is a philosophical non sequitur here. The fact that I would like something to be true, or not to be true, has no bearing on whether it is in fact true. I don't like what happened in Germany under the Nazis, but that doesn't mean I should believe the Nazis did not exist, so why should my revulsion at the thought of infidels burning in Hell lead me to believe that God and Hell do not exist? It might make me reluctant to worship such a God, but that is not the same as believing he does not exist. Religion means believing something in the absence of sufficient evidence. Stathis Papaioannou _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/ My belief is that in matters of faith, you can choose to believe or not believe based on whether it suits your personal preferences. Your example of the Nazis would not apply because there is overwhelming evidence that the Nazis existed. Perhaps it can be argued that there is meaningful evidence that the God described in Sunday school class exists as well, however I don't think anyone would argue that the evidence for that God is nearly as strong as evidence of the Nazis. As you say, religion, by necessity, is based on faith and therefore little to no objective evidence. I guess your point was that if you already have the faith in something without evidence, the fact that you are then taught as part of the belief system that there are some aspects not very appealing should not have any bearing on whether you still have your faith? I would disagree with that in that you can have faith in something because the concept is attractive to you, but then lose your faith when the concept is shown to be less attractive. (this was not really my situation as a child- I was never really presented the opportunity to examine the faith until presented with the teachings described in the original post). This is not entirely unrelated to the sciences. Science has pushed into many areas into realms that can only tangentially, at best, be proven with objective evidence. The MWI is a good example. I believe in it, because I think it provides the most explanatory power over competing ideas. However, it would be difficult to fault someone for demanding more in the way of direct evidence. In a sense, there is an element of faith in such theories. String theory is another example. I'm not saying these things are not science, just that they are theories beyond our reach to prove or disprove at the present time. Many scientists are quoted as endorsing string theory in part due to the elegance of the theory. This goes with what I was saying above about accepting something on faith as long as it appears to be the most attractive idea, even if it is not supported by much objective evidence. I doubt the beliefs of fundementalist Christianity will ever be absolutely proven or disproven, and as a faith belief I reserve the right to discard it at my choosing! Danny
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
On Mon, Jan 16, 2006 at 04:32:15PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 15-janv.-06, ? 19:04, Benjamin Udell a ?crit : The dovetailer keeps sounding like a powerful idea. I do remember that it has often been mentioned here, but somehow I failed to pick up a sense of what it was really about. The Universal Dovetailer is a program which generates and executes all programs. Its existence is a non trivial consequence of Church thesis. Please recall me to explain this in detail in one or two weeks. The necessity to dovetail (that is to run successiveley on the initial segement of the execution never waiting any programs stop is due to the fact that the always defined programs cannot be generated mechanically (this can be done in the case of all programs). Actually I have already explain this on the list (in 2001) but the escribe archive seems no more working again, and the new archive seems not go enough backward in time. The first published paper where I define it, is Mechanism ans Personal Identity paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/MPI_15-MAI-91.pdf Russell Standish attributes it (wrongly) to Schmidhuber in his book. My To be precise I do not attribute it to Schmidhuber, but I can see why you came to that conclusion. I will be revising this section to make this point clear in the final version of my book. The dovetailer algorithm is certainly well known, and not apparently attributable to anyone, and at the time when I wrote that part of ToN, I was unaware that the specific application of the dovetailer to computing all possible programs is your idea. My mistake actually is using the qualified name universal dovetailer to describe a dovetailer generating all possible strings (Schmidhuber's work), when the universal dovetailer actually runs the programs too. I do not use the qualified name in Why Occam's razor. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpEhD1zAmId6.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Russell, list, [Ben] The dovetailer keeps sounding like a powerful idea. I do remember that it has often been mentioned here, but somehow I failed to pick up a sense of what it was really about. Was there a message to the Everything-List in which it was explained so that non-experts can understand it? I'm not asking you to track that message (or series of messages) down, but if you or somebody remembers around which month it was, that should be enough for me to find it. Or is there a link to a Webpage with such an exposition? [Russell] Do a Google search, or a search on the everything list archives eg Google everything list dovetailer. I know that the phrase has been used in very many posts, I thought it might take me a long time. Anyway, Bruno has narrowed it down. [Ben] Level III varies across quantum branchings. Level II varies across times and places along a single quantum branch in such a way that its features come out the same as Level III's features. [Russell] This is not my reading. Level II universes vary their fundamental physical constants, eg G, alpha and so on. [Russell] Level I universes merely vary in time and space, but sufficiently separated as to be causally independent. That's exactly what I meant. I think the terminology has gotten me into trouble here. G, alpha, etc. vary across Level II, across its various inflationary bubbles. Level II's features are the same as Level III's features. Level III embodies a variation-across-quantum-branchings of constants, initial conditions, etc., variations which Level II has across the various Level I universes or Level I multiverses (I did think that my using the word universe instead would get me into trouble!) which Level II contains along a single quantum branch. Or maybe talking about different Level I multiverses still implies that I'm speaking only of Level I variation, not Level II variation. Anyway, I mean variation of constants, etc. With regard to quantum branching, this kind of variation is quite like the kind of variation exhibited by hits in a repeated experiment within a single Level I multiverse, with one big difference: the pattern of a sufficiently repeated experiment's hits is s! ufficient to tell us the probability distribution for the particle in that experiment in that Level I multiverse, but is not an adequate sample of variation across a Level II multiverse, since it does not reflect variation of fundamental constants, initial conditions insofar as these might affect the constants, etc. A pattern of hits representing only Level II variation is just the pattern which we can't observe -- it's the pattern made across various inflationary bubbles -- they are such hits. Anyway, given a mathematical structure distinguishable topologically or perhaps infinite-graph-theoretically, there are still variations of constants, initial conditions insofar as these might affect the constants, etc., which are reflected in variations of probability distribution for a given experiment's result across a Level III multiverse's quantum branchings of the genesis of an inflationary bubble and across a Level II multiverse's various inflationary bubbles along a sing! le quantum branch. Maybe we could approximate some such variat! ion by v arying the experimental conditions, I'm unsure how to think about that. Would it be bad for Tegmark if there were no probability distribution for a multiverse's having one mathematical structure instead of another? Maybe that's where variational or optimizational principles would come in. [Ben But I haven't noticed anybody here talking about variational principles or optimizational equations in any connection, much less in relation to Level IV. (While there is an obvious echo of optimization in applying Occam's Razor to Level IV's mathematical structures, this doesn't seem to involve any application of mathematical extremization, variations, Morse Theory, etc., so it seems not really the same thing. It's certainly not the only echo between a mode of inference (present instance: surmise, simplest explanation) and a mathematical formalism (extremization, shortest paths, etc.).) [Russell] Extremum principles come up mostly in Roy Frieden's work. No-one has managed to integrate Frieden's stuff into the usual framework of this list, so little mention has been made of it, but I do mention it in my book. The hope is that some connection can be forged. I'll try looking into him. Best, Ben Udell
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Russell, list, Thanks for pointing out Roy Frieden and EPI. At first skim, it reminds me vaguely of the argument by C.S. Peirce (there's that name again) that space was curved. The idea was that it would take infinite precision of measurement to establish that space were perfectly Euclidean all the way down, and that, given all the scales and ways in which it could be curved, and the single and unique way for it to be Euclidean, it was overwhelmingly likely to be curved. I'm not sure how such an argument holds up in consideration of things like the Planck radius, or in Frieden's or EPI's terms, but the general notion is that of inferring physical laws or spatial geometries from measurement issues. In Peirce's case, the idea seems to have involved considering what would be established by research indefinitely prolonged, which ultimate or indefinitely far destination Peirce equated with truth, though in most cases Peirce considered it to be findable mainly only by actually doing the research. [Russell] Extremum principles come up mostly in Roy Frieden's work. No-one has managed to integrate Frieden's stuff into the usual framework of this list, so little mention has been made of it, but I do mention it in my book. The hope is that some connection can be forged. [Ben] I'll try looking into him. Best, Ben Udell
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Le 15-janv.-06, à 19:04, Benjamin Udell a écrit : The dovetailer keeps sounding like a powerful idea. I do remember that it has often been mentioned here, but somehow I failed to pick up a sense of what it was really about. The Universal Dovetailer is a program which generates and executes all programs. Its existence is a non trivial consequence of Church thesis. Please recall me to explain this in detail in one or two weeks. The necessity to dovetail (that is to run successiveley on the initial segement of the execution never waiting any programs stop is due to the fact that the always defined programs cannot be generated mechanically (this can be done in the case of all programs). Actually I have already explain this on the list (in 2001) but the escribe archive seems no more working again, and the new archive seems not go enough backward in time. The first published paper where I define it, is Mechanism ans Personal Identity paper: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/MPI_15-MAI-91.pdf Russell Standish attributes it (wrongly) to Schmidhuber in his book. My fault, perhaps, because I have (charitably) compare Schmidhuber great programmer with the Universal Dovetailer in some message to James Higgo. You can google on universal dovetailer. I have also introduced the distinction between the first person, plural and non plural, and third person view, although this has been done by some philosophers of mind in different context before. I introduce it in the self-multiplication and UD context. This is explained in most of my papers (recent or not). Schmidhuber never accepted that distinction (or took it as unscientific like may scientist, but that is a category error). Actually he leaves the list at the time most people acknowledge the idea. Schmidhuber's work is more akin to a constructive physics based on Universal effective prior than an attempt toward a TOE capable of treating the mind-body relation problems. Here too with some imagination we can see the shadow of that 1-3 distinction appearing in Tegmark through the frog and bird view. In the Quantum Mechanics setting the 1-3 distinction appears in Everett fundamental paper under the term subjective and objective. The full conceptual power of the UD arises from the 1-3 distinction applied to it. This leads easily to the mind/matter reversal (except for the remaining movie-graph/Occam difficulty). Of course dovetailing algorithm are well known by computer scientists as a way to simulate parallelism on a sequential computer. Was there a message to the Everything-List in which it was explained so that non-experts can understand it? I'm not asking you to track that message (or series of messages) down, but if you or somebody remembers around which month it was, that should be enough for me to find it. Or is there a link to a Webpage with such an exposition? I have a lot in my web pages but the Everything Archive does not function properly. I will try to find my own backup, once I have more time. But now, Ben, it could be an opportunity and a pleasure for me to explain the UD and the UDA, again. (Those who have already understand are not obliged to reread the explanations but actually not many people have acknowledge a complete understanding of it). After all, the interview with the lobian machine will bear on the UDA. The UDA explains why physics is reduce to a measure on computations seen from some 1-point-of-view, and the lobian machine will be able to extract the logic of probability one. This is enough to make the comparison with quantum logic (the logic of probability one in physics). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
On Sun, Jan 15, 2006 at 01:04:02PM -0500, Benjamin Udell wrote: The dovetailer keeps sounding like a powerful idea. I do remember that it has often been mentioned here, but somehow I failed to pick up a sense of what it was really about. Was there a message to the Everything-List in which it was explained so that non-experts can understand it? I'm not asking you to track that message (or series of messages) down, but if you or somebody remembers around which month it was, that should be enough for me to find it. Or is there a link to a Webpage with such an exposition? Do a Google search, or a search on the everything list archives eg Google everything list dovetailer. Level III varies across quantum branchings. Level II varies across times and places along a single quantum branch in such a way that its features come out the same as Level III's features. This is not my reading. Level II universes vary their fundamental physical constants, eg G, alpha and so on. Level I universes merely vary in time and space, but sufficiently separated as to be causally independent. ... But I haven't noticed anybody here talking about variational principles or optimizational equations in any connection, much less in relation to Level IV. (While there is an obvious echo of optimization in applying Occam's Razor to Level IV's mathematical structures, this doesn't seem to involve any application of mathematical extremization, variations, Morse Theory, etc., so it seems not really the same thing. It's certainly not the only echo between a mode of inference (present instance: surmise, simplest explanation) and a mathematical formalism (extremization, shortest paths, etc.).) Extremum principles come up mostly in Roy Frieden's work. No-one has managed to integrate Frieden's stuff into the usual framework of this list, so little mention has been made of it, but I do mention it in my book. The hope is that some connection can be forged. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpL0fN1WoWUS.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
On Fri, Jan 13, 2006 at 11:12:15AM -0500, Benjamin Udell wrote: [Russell] The particular Plenitude I assume (ensemble of all bitstrings) is actually a completely uninteresting place to have a view of (it has precisely zero informational complexity). Is this kind of Plenitude (ensemble of all bitstrings) more or less Tegmark's Level IV of all mathematical structures? (I.e., if it's different, does the difference involve a restriction to discrete or finitistic structures or some such? It does correspond to Tegmark's level 4, but Tegmark's proposal All mathematical structures is rather vague. I have interpreted his proposal as all finite axiomatic systems. This is in fact a subset of my ensemble (well basically Schmidhuber's ensemble) of all descriptions (since an FAS is a description), yet one can also describe the entire ensemble of descriptions by a finite method (the dovetailer), hence one can find the ensemble of all descriptions contained within Tegmark's. Note, however that the relationships going both ways do _not_ imply equivalence between the two ensembles. This is described in my paper Why Occam's Razor, as well as talked about on the everything list. IV. possibility waves (variational principles) III. probabilities for various outcomes II. information, news, outcomes, events, interactions, phenomena I. evidence of causes/dependencies (dependencies, e.g., emission -- open slit -- hit) I'm somewhat sceptical of your associations here, but it is possibly because I don't understand what you're getting at. You may need to develop this some more. -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpq6N7Uhq0iC.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Russell, list, When I said: But I haven't noticed anybody here talking about variational principles or optimizational equations in any connection, much less in relation to Level IV. I meant that as being part of why I feel out on a limb (rather than in the sense of some sort of chiding toward people here for not discussing those subjects enough.) Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: EverythingList everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Sunday, January 15, 2006 1:04 PM Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Le 13-janv.-06, à 18:51, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 13-janv.-06, à 04:56, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : I sympathise with the conclusions of the young Danny, but there is a philosophical non sequitur here. The fact that I would like something to be true, or not to be true, has no bearing on whether it is in fact true. I don't like what happened in Germany under the Nazis, but that doesn't mean I should believe the Nazis did not exist, so why should my revulsion at the thought of infidels burning in Hell lead me to believe that God and Hell do not exist? It might make me reluctant to worship such a God, but that is not the same as believing he does not exist. Totally agree. But if it's scientific, it's not religion, is it? Religion means believing something in the absence of sufficient evidence. But here the word evidence is too large. Imagine two seconds that Christian religion is true and you face God after your earthly existence. In that case you would have evidence for the existence of God. Would it be a reason to stop believing in religion? At the same time, operationally I do somehow agree with you, but then you should accept the idea that many scientist are religious in the sense that many scientist believe in the existence of a stuffy or substancial primitive physical reality, but obviously there are no evidence at all for this. Surely you don't mean there's no evidence for tables, chairs, atoms, etc...? Are you using primitive in some special philosophical sense? You are right. we have evidence for chairs, galaxies, bosons and fermions and even anyons, and all that. But we have no evidence that this is eventually made up of substances capable of closing the physical worlds. Like Plato guessed it could be the shadow or the border of something bigger. Like the sharable and unsharable part of the machine ignorance as I hope to show we get into, once we take some comp hyp. or weaker seriously enough. No physicists does even postulate it in scientific paper. Sure they do - the most commonly postulated primitive stuff is a quantum field. This is a wonderful mathematical construct, but I don't think wise to believe no one really knows how to interpret it really, despite Everett MWI which I think is a key progress, but not necessarily towards physical primitivity (giving that Everett postulated a mechanical observer trigging the UDA paradoxe). (People confuse often the belief in a reality and a belief in a physical reality). What's your definition of reality? It is whatever it is. It should be the roots of our knowledge and beliefs. It is what makes us bet on the physical realities, on the psychological realities, on the arithmetical realities and many other related realities, ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith
Bruno, list, Thank your for clarifying with regard to semantics and truth-preservation, enough for me to do a little homework. I searched around the Internet and see that you're quite right, I've wandered into semantic-vs.-syntactic issues with my talk of truth preservation in inference. How did I get into this? For what it's worth, here's how: Here and elsewhere I've started mentioning truth preservation and falsity preservation because it has seemed a concise and striking way to sum up (in terms of formal implicational relations between premisses and conclusion) a four-way distinction among kinds of inference. So in a sense it was my choices in rhetoric that got me into this. My argument is with some who see three basic kinds of inference -- deductive, inductive, and abductive, and not so much with people who count two, since they'll probably grant at the very least some importance, albeit smaller, to a further subdivision. Basically, I've wanted to moot, by resolving in a simple and systematic way, the excessively chewed-over issue of _formal_ reducibility of certain kinds of inferences to others, and to do so while pointing out that such definitions don't at all completely capture what's interesting or valuable about the thereby defined kinds of inference, not in _only some_ cases (surmise and inductive generalization, regarding which the objections may be anticipated) but instead in _all_ cases (i.e., also strict aka reversible deduction and equipollential aka reversible deduction (which includes the mathematical induction step in its usual application, i.e., to a set whose well-orderedness has already been granted)). This sort of thing, taken further, would lead to why I joined the Everything-List -- correlations between families of research and the four Levels. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Everything-List List everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Saturday, January 14, 2006 8:43 AM Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith Le 13-janv.-06, à 19:13, Benjamin Udell wrote in part: I'm wondering whether we mean the same thing by truth preservation. I mean the validity of such arguments as exemplified (in trivial forms) by p, ergo p and pq, ergo p or whatever argument such that the conclusion is contained in the premisses. Or maybe I've been using the word deductive in too broad a sense? Actually it is the contrary. What you describe is classical truth preservation, which occurs with the classical deductive rules (so that they are sound and complete). In general truth preservation is a semantics dependant concept, where semantics can sometimes be given by some mathematical structures. I don't want to be too technical at this point. (Mathematically a semantics is a subspaces' classifier) How did you guess that I currently have patience and time on my hands? :-) Thanks for witnessing the interest. I wish only I would have more time for now. I have the patience I think :-) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith
Sorry, had to make a few corrections. 1. [correction] ...my definitions don't at all completely capture... [instead of vague] ...such definitions don't at all completely capture... 2. [correction] ...'strict' aka 'non-reversible' deduction... [instead of mistake] ...'strict' aka 'reversible' deduction... This is an after-second-cup-of-coffee post and should be more reliable. The corrections are incorporated below. Again, sorry. - Best Ben Udell. - Original Message [corrected] - From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything-List List everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Saturday, January 14, 2006 12:26 PM Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith Bruno, list, Thank your for clarifying with regard to semantics and truth-preservation, enough for me to do a little homework. I searched around the Internet and see that you're quite right, I've wandered into semantic-vs.-syntactic issues with my talk of truth preservation in inference. How did I get into this? For what it's worth, here's how: Here and elsewhere I've started mentioning truth preservation and falsity preservation because it has seemed a concise and striking way to sum up (in terms of formal implicational relations between premisses and conclusion) a four-way distinction among kinds of inference. So in a sense it was my choices in rhetoric that got me into this. My argument is with some who see three basic kinds of inference -- deductive, inductive, and abductive, and not so much with people who count two, since they'll probably grant at the very least some importance, albeit smaller, to a further subdivision. Basically, I've wanted to moot, by resolving in a simple and systematic way, the excessively chewed-over issue of _formal_ reducibility of certain kinds of inferences to others, and to do so while pointing out that my definitions don't at all completely capture what's interesting or valuable about the thereby defined kinds of inference, not in _only some_ cases (surmise and inductive generalization, regarding which the objections may be anticipated) but instead in _all_ cases (i.e., also strict aka non-reversible deduction and equipollential aka reversible deduction (which includes the mathematical induction step in its usual application, i.e., to a set whose well-orderedness has already been granted)). This sort of thing, taken further, would lead to why I joined the Everything-List -- correlations between families of research and the four Levels. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Everything-List List everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Saturday, January 14, 2006 8:43 AM Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith Le 13-janv.-06, à 19:13, Benjamin Udell wrote in part: I'm wondering whether we mean the same thing by truth preservation. I mean the validity of such arguments as exemplified (in trivial forms) by p, ergo p and pq, ergo p or whatever argument such that the conclusion is contained in the premisses. Or maybe I've been using the word deductive in too broad a sense? Actually it is the contrary. What you describe is classical truth preservation, which occurs with the classical deductive rules (so that they are sound and complete). In general truth preservation is a semantics dependant concept, where semantics can sometimes be given by some mathematical structures. I don't want to be too technical at this point. (Mathematically a semantics is a subspaces' classifier) How did you guess that I currently have patience and time on my hands? :-) Thanks for witnessing the interest. I wish only I would have more time for now. I have the patience I think :-) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Thanks. The expression rational theology is quite nice and I have been tempted to use it but it is already used by Mormons in a too much a priori christian frame. http://www.lds-mormon.com/widtsoe.shtml But if a adjective should be added to theology I think I would use lobian perhaps. But not in a title. Machine theology is better, although superficially (pregodelian) contradictory. Bruno Le 12-janv.-06, à 20:22, Benjamin Udell a écrit : Bruno, list, It occurred to me that I ought not merely to wing it on the meaning of theology as a word. There are various places online to look it up, but this is an interesting one and, anyway, some may find this to be an introduction to a good resource. From the Century Dictionary http://www.global-language.com/century/ (About the really rather useful Century Dictionary: http://www.leoyan.com/century-dictionary.com/why.php ) (Requires installing software) Century Dictionary, Vol. VIII, Page 6274, Theologus to Theorbo (DjVu) http://www.leoyan.com/century-dictionary.com/08/index08.djvu? djvuoptspage=66 , (DjVu Highlighted), (Java) (JPEG) theology (the¯-ol' o¯-ji), n. [ ME. theologie, OF. theologie, F. théologie = Pr. teologia = Sp. teología = Pg. theologia = It. teologia = D. G. theologie = Sw. Dan. teologi, LL. theologia, Gr. theología, a speaking concerning God, theológos, speaking of God (see theologue), theós, god, + légein, speak.] The science concerned with ascertaining, classifying, and systematizing all attainable truth concerning God and his relation to the universe; the science of religion; religious truth scientifically stated. The ancient Greeks used the word to designate the history of their gods; early Christian writers applied it to the doctrine of the nature of God; Peter Abelard, ill the twelfth century, first began to employ it to denote scientific instruction concerning God and the divine life. Theology differs from religion as the science of any subject differs from the subject matter itself. Religion in the broadest sense is a life of right affections and right conduct toward God; theology is a scientific knowledge of God and of the life which reverence and allegiance toward him require. Theology is divided, in reference to the sources whence the knowledge is derived, into natural theology, which treats of God and divine things in so far as their nature is disclosed through human consciousness, through the material creation, and through the moral order discernible in the course of history apart from specific revelation, and revealed theology, which treats of the same subject-matter as mad! e known in the scriptures of the 0ld and the New Testament. The former is theistic merely; the latter is Christian, and includes the doctrine of salvation by Christ, and of future rewards and punishments. In reference to the ends sought and the methods of treatment, theology is again divided into theoretical theology, which treats of the doctrines and principles of the divine life for the purpose of scientific and philosophical accuracy, and practical theology, which treats of the duties of the divine life for immediate practical ends. Theology is further divided, according to subject-matter and methods, into various branches, of which the principal are given below. Ac Theologie hath tened me ten score tymes, The more I muse there-inne the mistier it seemeth. Piers Plowman (B), x. 180. Theology, what is it but the science of things divine? Hooker, Eccles. Polity, iii. 8. Theology, properly and directly, deals with notional apprehension; religion with imaginative. J. H. Newman, Gram. of Assent, p. 115. --Ascetical theology. See ascetical. --Biblical theology, that branch of theology which has for its object to set forth the knowledge of God and the divine life as gathered from a large study of the Bible, as opposed to a merely minute study of particular texts on the one hand, and to a mere use of philosophical methods on the other. --Dogmatic theology, that department of theology which has for its object a connected and scientific statement of theology as a complete and harmonious science as authoritatively held and taught by the church. --Exegetical theology. See exegetical. --Federal theology, a system of theology based upon the idea of two covenants between God and man--the covenant of nature, or of works, before the fall, by which eternal life was promised to man on condition of his perfect obedience to the moral law, and the covenant of grace, after the fall, by which salvation and eternal life are promised to man by the free grace of God. Kloppenburg, professor of theology at Franeker in the Netherlands (died 1652), originated the system, and it was perfected (1648) by John Koch (Cocceius), successor of Kloppenburg in the same chair. See Cocceian. --Fundamental theology, that
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith
Le 12-janv.-06, à 16:54, Benjamin Udell a écrit : Bruno, list, If I understand you correctly, then you mean, more generally: G* \ G will correspond to any true conclusion that the machine can draw by other than deductive (= truth-preservative)inference. Yes. Except that if deduction are generally thought indeed as truth preservative, truth preservation is far more general than deduction. I f I get the time and the patience of the lister, I could one day introduce you to some typical lobian entity which are NOT machine for illustrating more concretely such phenomena. The incompleteness phenomena itself illustrates that truth preservation is much more general than deduction. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Le 13-janv.-06, à 04:56, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : I sympathise with the conclusions of the young Danny, but there is a philosophical non sequitur here. The fact that I would like something to be true, or not to be true, has no bearing on whether it is in fact true. I don't like what happened in Germany under the Nazis, but that doesn't mean I should believe the Nazis did not exist, so why should my revulsion at the thought of infidels burning in Hell lead me to believe that God and Hell do not exist? It might make me reluctant to worship such a God, but that is not the same as believing he does not exist. Totally agree. But if it's scientific, it's not religion, is it? Religion means believing something in the absence of sufficient evidence. But here the word evidence is too large. Imagine two seconds that Christian religion is true and you face God after your earthly existence. In that case you would have evidence for the existence of God. Would it be a reason to stop believing in religion? At the same time, operationally I do somehow agree with you, but then you should accept the idea that many scientist are religious in the sense that many scientist believe in the existence of a stuffy or substancial primitive physical reality, but obviously there are no evidence at all for this. No physicists does even postulate it in scientific paper. (People confuse often the belief in a reality and a belief in a physical reality). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
at least mental notice of it, especially in a scientific manner. Seeing and noting. Consciousness itself is also in a sense an experience, insofar as it involves a cognitive/affective subjectedness to things beyond one's entire control. In some way, with the talk of observers, I was thinking of experiencers. Perhaps you're taking experience in the sense of the experience sharable among members of a community, such that my personal, unsharable experience doesn't count as empirical. I sometimes trip over differences in meaning across traditions. Anyway, how would I know of (or believe in) my quantum immortality except by inference from abstractions? What sort of personal, non-sharable knowledge would one have of quantum immortality such that the knowledge of it is comparable with the knowledge of consciousness? Is it a subjective sense that it's somehow possible for oneself not to exist? -- i.e., not a consciousness of immortality, but a consciousness of an underlying impossibility of mortality? Something like that? [Ben] Nevertheless, I've liked the idea of distinguishing an inclusive 1st--2nd person we, both addressor and addressee, from an exclusive 1st person addressor-only, so I'm glad to see it pop up in this context. [Russell] I think we can credit Bruno with this distinction :) I'll count that credit as established. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Friday, January 13, 2006 12:13 AM Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue On Thu, Jan 12, 2006 at 11:12:13PM -0500, Benjamin Udell wrote: Russell, list, Tegmark's 4 level Multiverse (actually the Multiverse is only one of the levels) does not really have viewpoints at each level. In my book, which largely follows the tradition of this list, there is 3 viewpoints identified: 1st person, 1st person plural and 3rd person. The 3rd person corresponds to the bird viewpoint of the Multiverse, or Tegmark Level 3 'verse. Calling it a viewpoint is a stretch of the language since necessarily observers must be embedded in the Multiverse. Where does Tegmark say that the Multiverse is only one of the levels? Which one? Multiverse was coined by David Deutsch to refer to the many worlds of MWI. This corresponds to Tegmark's level 3 parallel universe. I follow this terminology, as do many others on this list. We also tend to use the terms Plenitude or Platonia to refer to his Level 4 parallel universe. The other levels have not been christened so to speak. Tegmark uses multiverse to refer to any type of parallel universe - which I think contradicts usual usage. What is meant by viewpoint? Tegmark's elementary description of the four levels sounds like the outline of four viewpoints, with frog and bird marking the extremes of a four-step set of gradations. Level IV is associated with pure maths. Level III is associated with alternatives among cases, which marks it as associated with maths of logic, information, probability, etc., despite what Tegmark says about logic's being the most general and underlying thing in maths. Level III is more abstract than Level II and actualizes alternate outcomes across quantum branchings, while Level II actualizes alternate outcomes in various times and places along a single branch, so that the two levels come out the same in their features. Level II seems associable with statistical theory, some areas of information theory, and some other fields deal in a general way with gathering data from various actual places and times and drawing ampliatively-inductive conclusions from parts, sampl! es, etc., to totalities. Level I, with its possibly idiosyncratic constants, initial conditions, historical dependencies, seems associable with physical, chemical, life sciences and human social studies. So those seem four viewpoints with distinctive content and associations, though not the kind of content which the idea of viewpoint seems to have received on the everything list, which is decidedly not to say that there's anything wrong with the kind of content given on the everything list to the idea of viewpoint. Is it Tegmark's view, that the bird's eye view is associated particularly with Level III, or does it depend on ideas as developed on the everything list? Why wouldn't a view be associated with Level IV as well? (I thought that, at least in Tegmark's view, the bird's eye view _was_ Level IV). The term bird/frog viewpoint is Tegmark's, which he used in his 1998 paper. I can well imagine applying to his 2003 multilevel scheme. The association of 3rd person viewpoint (not bird viewpoint) with the Multiverse is mine, and is justified on the basis that all observers must be embedded in quantum mechanical many worlds structure. This result is derived by assuming a level 4 plenitude, and is given in my 2004 paper Why Occams Razor
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith
Bruno, list, [Ben] Bruno, list, If I understand you correctly, then you mean, more generally: G* \ G will correspond to any true conclusion that the machine can draw by other than deductive (= truth-preservative)inference. [Bruno] Yes. Except that if deduction are generally thought indeed as truth preservative, truth preservation is far more general than deduction. If I get the time and the patience of the lister, I could one day introduce you to some typical lobian entity which are NOT machine for illustrating more concretely such phenomena. The incompleteness phenomena itself illustrates that truth preservation is much more general than deduction. I'm wondering whether we mean the same thing by truth preservation. I mean the validity of such arguments as exemplified (in trivial forms) by p, ergo p and pq, ergo p or whatever argument such that the conclusion is contained in the premisses. Or maybe I've been using the word deductive in too broad a sense? I tend to think, for instance, of the reductio ad absurdum as deductive in a broad sense, because I'm trying to differentiate simply in terms of truth-(non)preservativeness and falsity-(non)preservativeness of the overall reasoning process in which such a piece of reasoning takes place. How did you guess that I currently have patience and time on my hands? :-) Best, Ben Udell
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith
Le 09-janv.-06, à 18:30, Benjamin Udell a écrit :
By ampliative induction I mean, not mathematical induction.
Nice! I hope you will be patient enough to see that this is a good
description of G* \ G.
G characterises the self-referential discourse of the lobian machine,
which is fundamentally a machine capable of using mathematical
induction(+).
G* \ G will correspond to anything true that the machine can guess
without using mathematical induction.
Bruno
(+) IF a property is such that 1) it is true for 0, and 2) if true for
n it is true for n+1; THEN it will be true for all numbers.
More compactly: {P(0) [for all n: P(n) - P(n+1)]} - for all n
P(n).
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith
Bruno, list,
If I understand you correctly, then you mean, more generally:
G* \ G will correspond to any true conclusion that the machine can draw by
other than deductive (= truth-preservative)inference.
Best, Ben Udell
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Everything-List List everything-list@eskimo.com
Sent: Thursday, January 12, 2006 10:03 AM
Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue-faith
Le 09-janv.-06, à 18:30, Benjamin Udell a écrit :
By ampliative induction I mean, not mathematical induction.
Nice! I hope you will be patient enough to see that this is a good
description of G* \ G.
G characterises the self-referential discourse of the lobian machine,
which is fundamentally a machine capable of using mathematical
induction(+).
G* \ G will correspond to anything true that the machine can guess
without using mathematical induction.
Bruno
(+) IF a property is such that 1) it is true for 0, and 2) if true for
n it is true for n+1; THEN it will be true for all numbers.
More compactly: {P(0) [for all n: P(n) - P(n+1)]} - for all n
P(n).
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Bruno, list, It occurred to me that I ought not merely to wing it on the meaning of theology as a word. There are various places online to look it up, but this is an interesting one and, anyway, some may find this to be an introduction to a good resource. From the Century Dictionary http://www.global-language.com/century/ (About the really rather useful Century Dictionary: http://www.leoyan.com/century-dictionary.com/why.php ) (Requires installing software) Century Dictionary, Vol. VIII, Page 6274, Theologus to Theorbo (DjVu) http://www.leoyan.com/century-dictionary.com/08/index08.djvu?djvuoptspage=66 , (DjVu Highlighted), (Java) (JPEG) theology (the¯-ol' o¯-ji), n. [ ME. theologie, OF. theologie, F. théologie = Pr. teologia = Sp. teología = Pg. theologia = It. teologia = D. G. theologie = Sw. Dan. teologi, LL. theologia, Gr. theología, a speaking concerning God, theológos, speaking of God (see theologue), theós, god, + légein, speak.] The science concerned with ascertaining, classifying, and systematizing all attainable truth concerning God and his relation to the universe; the science of religion; religious truth scientifically stated. The ancient Greeks used the word to designate the history of their gods; early Christian writers applied it to the doctrine of the nature of God; Peter Abelard, ill the twelfth century, first began to employ it to denote scientific instruction concerning God and the divine life. Theology differs from religion as the science of any subject differs from the subject matter itself. Religion in the broadest sense is a life of right affections and right conduct toward God; theology is a scientific knowledge of God and of the life which reverence and allegiance toward him require. Theology is divided, in reference to the sources whence the knowledge is derived, into natural theology, which treats of God and divine things in so far as their nature is disclosed through human consciousness, through the material creation, and through the moral order discernible in the course of history apart from specific revelation, and revealed theology, which treats of the same subject-matter as mad! e known in the scriptures of the 0ld and the New Testament. The former is theistic merely; the latter is Christian, and includes the doctrine of salvation by Christ, and of future rewards and punishments. In reference to the ends sought and the methods of treatment, theology is again divided into theoretical theology, which treats of the doctrines and principles of the divine life for the purpose of scientific and philosophical accuracy, and practical theology, which treats of the duties of the divine life for immediate practical ends. Theology is further divided, according to subject-matter and methods, into various branches, of which the principal are given below. Ac Theologie hath tened me ten score tymes, The more I muse there-inne the mistier it seemeth. Piers Plowman (B), x. 180. Theology, what is it but the science of things divine? Hooker, Eccles. Polity, iii. 8. Theology, properly and directly, deals with notional apprehension; religion with imaginative. J. H. Newman, Gram. of Assent, p. 115. --Ascetical theology. See ascetical. --Biblical theology, that branch of theology which has for its object to set forth the knowledge of God and the divine life as gathered from a large study of the Bible, as opposed to a merely minute study of particular texts on the one hand, and to a mere use of philosophical methods on the other. --Dogmatic theology, that department of theology which has for its object a connected and scientific statement of theology as a complete and harmonious science as authoritatively held and taught by the church. --Exegetical theology. See exegetical. --Federal theology, a system of theology based upon the idea of two covenants between God and man--the covenant of nature, or of works, before the fall, by which eternal life was promised to man on condition of his perfect obedience to the moral law, and the covenant of grace, after the fall, by which salvation and eternal life are promised to man by the free grace of God. Kloppenburg, professor of theology at Franeker in the Netherlands (died 1652), originated the system, and it was perfected (1648) by John Koch (Cocceius), successor of Kloppenburg in the same chair. See Cocceian. --Fundamental theology, that branch of systematic theology which vindicates man's knowledge of God by the investigation of its grounds and sources in general, and of the trustworthiness of the Christian revelation in particular, and which therefore includes both natural theology and the evidences of Christianity. --Genevan theology. See Genevan. --Historical theology, the science of the history and growth of Christian doctrines. --Homiletic theology. Same as homiletics. --Liberal theology. See liberal Christianity, under liberal.
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
theology. On the other hand, if you have a certain appetite for trouble, then maybe theology is the way to go, assuming that you don't simply thereby drive away your desired audience. Also, some kinds of fame are always unexpected and often regretted. You don't want to win the wrong kind of lottery. Some popular columnist or pundit happens upon your theory, vituperates semi-literately against it for thousands or millions to read, and suddenly you're a Bad Guy to thousands or millions who know nothing about you. In more general form, it's one of the ! oldest and most common stories: You'll be on unfamiliar turf and your habits and instincts on unfamiliar turf may end up mis-serving you. Anyway, the bad-celebrity problem can happen even within academe. [Bruno] the UDA argument explains only but completely that if the comp hyp. is true then necessarily matter emerges from mind. Because this sounds so weird I have begin a derivation, at first just in order to illustrate what that could mean. It would be interesting to see such a clarification of the Universal Dovetailer Argument. [Bruno] The problem is that physics does never really address the mind-body problem Yes, but I was referring to the fact that, even aside from that issue, it seems fairly presumable that physical science is incomplete. Can you show that the UDA shows that the physical arises from the mental, no matter how incomplete our knowledge of physical principles and laws? Or can you at least show that the UDA shows that the physical arises from the mental under, let's say, most families of physical theories which we may come to hold? [Bruno] Well I already distinguish the mind from the soul. The mind is a very general notion comprehending all imaterial notion from the number PI to the game of bridge and anything not reasonnablu described by pieces of Stuff (even nations and person belongs to mind). Well, that clarifies. I've read Rucker's book _Mind Tools: The Five Levels of Mathematical Reality_, though not his book Infinity and the Mind which you mention further on. But I get the idea. A question arises for me here and elsewhere. To what extent do you hold with Tegmark's Four-Level Multiverse view and to what extent is your theory logically linked to it? I ask this because, for instance, in such a Four-Level world, I'd expect not just two salient views (bird's eye frog's eye, 3rd-person 1st-person, etc.), but four. I'd expect not just mind-matter dichotomies but 4-chotomies. And so on. In some cases, one may argue that one distinction across the 4-chotomy is more important than the other, say in the case of inference, where arguably the truth-perservative versus truth-nonpreservative is a more important distinction, more like a chasm, than is the distinction between falsity-preservative and falsity-nonpreservative, but I'd still want to know about that the four-way distinction because its relevance should not be presumptively precluded, especially in a Tegmarkian four-level Multiverse. For me there it's partly a matter of some non-maximal degree of sur! eness on my part, and partly a matter of my motivation; I take an interest in patterns of four-way logical distinctions, though I do wander from that interest in an interesting place like this. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Thursday, January 12, 2006 10:52 AM Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue Le 11-janv.-06, à 17:57, Benjamin Udell a écrit : Bruno, list, Well, on the basis of that which you say below (much of which I unfortunately only vaguely understand), where you don't focus it all decidedly on the particular issues of faith and belief, it actually does now sound more like some sort of theology. It has various elements of theology in the broader or more comprehensive sense. Thanks for telling. Note that it is all normal you only vaguely understand my last post, because it is a very concise summary. The thing that it seems to be missing is gods or God. Considered as theology, it seems like a wheel sorely missing its hub. The neoplatonician use often the term God for ultimate explanation, and also use often (but it is an idiosyncrasies) the names of the greek Gods for concept (EROS = love, THANATOS = death, etc.). Strictly speaking, it has nothing to do with the judeo-christian notion of God. Still, I like to define axiomatically God by something so big that it escapes any attempt to define it, except perhaps in some negative way. In that sense I could argue that the God of comp theology can be identified either with either the ultimate explanation, the root of everything or even with the unnameable SELF which caracterizes the comp first person. Perhaps the chapter of God will be a necessary blank page in comp treatise. Now, I think that GOD as a term has much more
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Tegmark's 4 level Multiverse (actually the Multiverse is only one of the levels) does not really have viewpoints at each level. In my book, which largely follows the tradition of this list, there is 3 viewpoints identified: 1st person, 1st person plural and 3rd person. The 3rd person corresponds to the bird viewpoint of the Multiverse, or Tegmark Level 3 'verse. Calling it a viewpoint is a stretch of the language since necessarily observers must be embedded in the Multiverse. Both of the 1st person viewpoints correspond to the frog viewpoint, the difference being the 1st person plural is an objective viewpoint - all things in the 1pp vpt will be agreed upon by 2 or more observers, whereas the 1p vpt is subjective, containing items such as quantum immortality that are _necessarily_ subjective. I have tried to identify 1pp with G and 1p with G*, but I'm really unsure that the analogy is sound. Cheers On Thu, Jan 12, 2006 at 01:18:21PM -0500, Benjamin Udell wrote: A question arises for me here and elsewhere. To what extent do you hold with Tegmark's Four-Level Multiverse view and to what extent is your theory logically linked to it? I ask this because, for instance, in such a Four-Level world, I'd expect not just two salient views (bird's eye frog's eye, 3rd-person 1st-person, etc.), but four. I'd expect not just mind-matter dichotomies but 4-chotomies. And so on. In some cases, one may argue that one distinction across the 4-chotomy is more important than the other, say in the case of inference, where arguably the truth-perservative versus truth-nonpreservative is a more important distinction, more like a chasm, than is the distinction between falsity-preservative and falsity-nonpreservative, but I'd still want to know about that the four-way distinction because its relevance should not be presumptively precluded, especially in a Tegmarkian four-level Multiverse. For me there it's partly a matter of some non-maximal degree of sur! eness on my part, and partly a matter of my motivation; I take an interest in patterns of four-way logical distinctions, though I do wander from that interest in an interesting place like this. Best, Ben Udell -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpaS90ro8O9U.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Russell, list, Tegmark's 4 level Multiverse (actually the Multiverse is only one of the levels) does not really have viewpoints at each level. In my book, which largely follows the tradition of this list, there is 3 viewpoints identified: 1st person, 1st person plural and 3rd person. The 3rd person corresponds to the bird viewpoint of the Multiverse, or Tegmark Level 3 'verse. Calling it a viewpoint is a stretch of the language since necessarily observers must be embedded in the Multiverse. Where does Tegmark say that the Multiverse is only one of the levels? Which one? What is meant by viewpoint? Tegmark's elementary description of the four levels sounds like the outline of four viewpoints, with frog and bird marking the extremes of a four-step set of gradations. Level IV is associated with pure maths. Level III is associated with alternatives among cases, which marks it as associated with maths of logic, information, probability, etc., despite what Tegmark says about logic's being the most general and underlying thing in maths. Level III is more abstract than Level II and actualizes alternate outcomes across quantum branchings, while Level II actualizes alternate outcomes in various times and places along a single branch, so that the two levels come out the same in their features. Level II seems associable with statistical theory, some areas of information theory, and some other fields deal in a general way with gathering data from various actual places and times and drawing ampliatively-inductive conclusions from parts, samples! , etc., to totalities. Level I, with its possibly idiosyncratic constants, initial conditions, historical dependencies, seems associable with physical, chemical, life sciences and human social studies. So those seem four viewpoints with distinctive content and associations, though not the kind of content which the idea of viewpoint seems to have received on the everything list, which is decidedly not to say that there's anything wrong with the kind of content given on the everything list to the idea of viewpoint. Is it Tegmark's view, that the bird's eye view is associated particularly with Level III, or does it depend on ideas as developed on the everything list? Why wouldn't a view be associated with Level IV as well? (I thought that, at least in Tegmark's view, the bird's eye view _was_ Level IV). Both of the 1st person viewpoints correspond to the frog viewpoint, the difference being the 1st person plural is an objective viewpoint - all things in the 1pp vpt will be agreed upon by 2 or more observers, whereas the 1p vpt is subjective, containing items such as quantum immortality that are _necessarily_ subjective. The idea of quantum immortality doesn't seem like something that you could call an experience. If you found yourself alive even after what seemed an unlikely long period of time, after a series of periodic extraordinary escapes, any other observers would agree that you're still alive -- in other words, you'd still be alive from the 1pp vpt. Only in the case where _no records_ remain of your much earlier existence, nothing but your personal memory of it, would quantum immortality seem possibly like an experience, an especially subjective one. The quantum immortality idea seems like, not an experience, but an idea requiring one's intellectually adopting some sort of 3rd-person view. Nevertheless, I've liked the idea of distinguishing an inclusive 1st--2nd person we, both addressor and addressee, from an exclusive 1st person addressor-only, so I'm glad to see it pop up in this context. Best, Ben Udell I have tried to identify 1pp with G and 1p with G*, but I'm really unsure that the analogy is sound. Cheers On Thu, Jan 12, 2006 at 01:18:21PM -0500, Benjamin Udell wrote: A question arises for me here and elsewhere. To what extent do you hold with Tegmark's Four-Level Multiverse view and to what extent is your theory logically linked to it? I ask this because, for instance, in such a Four-Level world, I'd expect not just two salient views (bird's eye frog's eye, 3rd-person 1st-person, etc.), but four. I'd expect not just mind-matter dichotomies but 4-chotomies. And so on. In some cases, one may argue that one distinction across the 4-chotomy is more important than the other, say in the case of inference, where arguably the truth-perservative versus truth-nonpreservative is a more important distinction, more like a chasm, than is the distinction between falsity-preservative and falsity-nonpreservative, but I'd still want to know about that the four-way distinction because its relevance should not be presumptively precluded, especially in a Tegmarkian four-level Multiverse. For me there it's partly a matter of some non-maximal degree of s! ur! eness on my part, and partly a matter of my motivation; I take an interest in patterns of four-way logical distinctions, though I
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Danny Mayes writes: I haven't participated in the list in a while, but I try to keep up with the discussion here and there as time permits. I personally was raised a fundamentalist Baptist, but lost most of my interest in that religion when I was taught at 9 years old that all the little kids in Africa that are never told about Jesus Christ go to Hell. Even at 9, I knew that wasn't something I was going to be buying. Who wants to believe in a God that cruel? Even without the problematic cruel creator, I have always been to oriented toward logic and proof to just accept stuff on faith. I sympathise with the conclusions of the young Danny, but there is a philosophical non sequitur here. The fact that I would like something to be true, or not to be true, has no bearing on whether it is in fact true. I don't like what happened in Germany under the Nazis, but that doesn't mean I should believe the Nazis did not exist, so why should my revulsion at the thought of infidels burning in Hell lead me to believe that God and Hell do not exist? It might make me reluctant to worship such a God, but that is not the same as believing he does not exist. I started redeveloping religious belief, ironically, when I picked up a book on quantum physics 6 or so years ago. I was at a legal seminar and needed something to read during the boring sessions, and the author ran through a number of experiments of QM and concluded that the MWI was the most logical interpretation of these experiments. I had read all the Sci Fi strories of alternate realities and whatnot, but this was my first exposure to the concept that reality is created in such a way to allow all things to exist (that also actually appeared to be supported by some real science). I still remember my excitement in contemplating this explanation, in that it seems to explain so many questions. I guess I could go into a long explanation as to why I now believe intelligence plays a key role in understanding the nature of our reality and how it came to be, but I probably wouldn't be able to say much that almost anyone on this board has not already heard. For me it boils down to this: I see absolutely no reason to believe our experiences are not emulable. I strongly suspect it is possible to create a quantum computer. I strongly suspect technology will continue to evolve and computer processing will get more and more powerful. Finally, even if we are somehow precluded from creating new universes in the future (i.e. universes implented on the same level of reality as our universe, virtual universes are obviously possible), the one we are in will last for trillions of years. Final conclusion? Well, I'll let you do the math... But if it's scientific, it's not religion, is it? Religion means believing something in the absence of sufficient evidence. Stathis Papaioannou _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Hi , Can someone please tell me how I unsubscrive from this mailing list ? Thanks Graeme Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Danny Mayes writes: I haven't participated in the list in a while, but I try to keep up with the discussion here and there as time permits. I personally was raised a fundamentalist Baptist, but lost most of my interest in that religion when I was taught at 9 years old that all the little kids in Africa that are never told about Jesus Christ go to Hell. Even at 9, I knew that wasn't something I was going to be buying. Who wants to believe in a God that cruel? Even without the problematic cruel creator, I have always been to oriented toward logic and proof to just accept stuff on faith. I sympathise with the conclusions of the young Danny, but there is a philosophical non sequitur here. The fact that I would like something to be true, or not to be true, has no bearing on whether it is in fact true. I don't like what happened in Germany under the Nazis, but that doesn't mean I should believe the Nazis did not exist, so why should my revulsion at the thought of infidels burning in Hell lead me to believe that God and Hell do not exist? It might make me reluctant to worship such a God, but that is not the same as believing he does not exist. I started redeveloping religious belief, ironically, when I picked up a book on quantum physics 6 or so years ago. I was at a legal seminar and needed something to read during the boring sessions, and the author ran through a number of experiments of QM and concluded that the MWI was the most logical interpretation of these experiments. I had read all the Sci Fi strories of alternate realities and whatnot, but this was my first exposure to the concept that reality is created in such a way to allow all things to exist (that also actually appeared to be supported by some real science). I still remember my excitement in contemplating this explanation, in that it seems to explain so many questions. I guess I could go into a long explanation as to why I now believe intelligence plays a key role in understanding the nature of our reality and how it came to be, but I probably wouldn't be able to say much that almost anyone on this board has not already heard. For me it boils down to this: I see absolutely no reason to believe our experiences are not emulable. I strongly suspect it is possible to create a quantum computer. I strongly suspect technology will continue to evolve and computer processing will get more and more powerful. Finally, even if we are somehow precluded from creating new universes in the future (i.e. universes implented on the same level of reality as our universe, virtual universes are obviously possible), the one we are in will last for trillions of years. Final conclusion? Well, I'll let you do the math... But if it's scientific, it's not religion, is it? Religion means believing something in the absence of sufficient evidence. Stathis Papaioannou _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
On Thu, Jan 12, 2006 at 11:12:13PM -0500, Benjamin Udell wrote: Russell, list, Tegmark's 4 level Multiverse (actually the Multiverse is only one of the levels) does not really have viewpoints at each level. In my book, which largely follows the tradition of this list, there is 3 viewpoints identified: 1st person, 1st person plural and 3rd person. The 3rd person corresponds to the bird viewpoint of the Multiverse, or Tegmark Level 3 'verse. Calling it a viewpoint is a stretch of the language since necessarily observers must be embedded in the Multiverse. Where does Tegmark say that the Multiverse is only one of the levels? Which one? Multiverse was coined by David Deutsch to refer to the many worlds of MWI. This corresponds to Tegmark's level 3 parallel universe. I follow this terminology, as do many others on this list. We also tend to use the terms Plenitude or Platonia to refer to his Level 4 parallel universe. The other levels have not been christened so to speak. Tegmark uses multiverse to refer to any type of parallel universe - which I think contradicts usual usage. What is meant by viewpoint? Tegmark's elementary description of the four levels sounds like the outline of four viewpoints, with frog and bird marking the extremes of a four-step set of gradations. Level IV is associated with pure maths. Level III is associated with alternatives among cases, which marks it as associated with maths of logic, information, probability, etc., despite what Tegmark says about logic's being the most general and underlying thing in maths. Level III is more abstract than Level II and actualizes alternate outcomes across quantum branchings, while Level II actualizes alternate outcomes in various times and places along a single branch, so that the two levels come out the same in their features. Level II seems associable with statistical theory, some areas of information theory, and some other fields deal in a general way with gathering data from various actual places and times and drawing ampliatively-inductive conclusions from parts, samples, etc., to totalities. Level I, with its possibly idiosyncratic constants, initial conditions, historical dependencies, seems associable with physical, chemical, life sciences and human social studies. So those seem four viewpoints with distinctive content and associations, though not the kind of content which the idea of viewpoint seems to have received on the everything list, which is decidedly not to say that there's anything wrong with the kind of content given on the everything list to the idea of viewpoint. Is it Tegmark's view, that the bird's eye view is associated particularly with Level III, or does it depend on ideas as developed on the everything list? Why wouldn't a view be associated with Level IV as well? (I thought that, at least in Tegmark's view, the bird's eye view _was_ Level IV). The term bird/frog viewpoint is Tegmark's, which he used in his 1998 paper. I can well imagine applying to his 2003 multilevel scheme. The association of 3rd person viewpoint (not bird viewpoint) with the Multiverse is mine, and is justified on the basis that all observers must be embedded in quantum mechanical many worlds structure. This result is derived by assuming a level 4 plenitude, and is given in my 2004 paper Why Occams Razor. Bruno's work also seems to point to a similar conclusion. The particular Plenitude I assume (ensemble of all bitstrings) is actually a completely uninteresting place to have a view of (it has precisely zero informational complexity). I do not see any particular arguments suggesting that observers must be embedded in a universe described by string theory (which would move the 3rd person viewpoint to level 2) or embedded in just this universe (moved to level 1), but I would not rule it out a priori. Both of the 1st person viewpoints correspond to the frog viewpoint, the difference being the 1st person plural is an objective viewpoint - all things in the 1pp vpt will be agreed upon by 2 or more observers, whereas the 1p vpt is subjective, containing items such as quantum immortality that are _necessarily_ subjective. The idea of quantum immortality doesn't seem like something that you could call an experience. If you found yourself alive even after what seemed an unlikely long period of time, after a series of periodic extraordinary escapes, any other observers would agree that you're still alive -- in other words, you'd still be alive from the 1pp vpt. Only in the case where _no records_ remain of your much earlier existence, nothing but your personal memory of it, would quantum immortality seem possibly like an experience, an especially subjective one. The quantum immortality idea seems like, not an experience, but an idea requiring one's intellectually adopting some sort of 3rd-person view. I never used the word experience.
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Bruno, list, Well, on the basis of that which you say below (much of which I unfortunately only vaguely understand), where you don't focus it all decidedly on the particular issues of faith and belief, it actually does now sound more like some sort of theology. It has various elements of theology in the broader or more comprehensive sense. The thing that it seems to be missing is gods or God. Considered as theology, it seems like a wheel sorely missing its hub. At this point, in terms of descriptive accuracy, this hublessness seems the hub of the matter. So it sounds like a kind of psycho-cosmology, or -- well, not a psychophysics, but, in order to suggest your computationalist primacy of the soul -- a physiopsychics (in English, if the adjective is physicopsychical, it's a little less suggestive of paranormalism, which is strongly associated nowadays with the adjective psychic.) (C.S. Peirce held that matter is congealed mind. Though he thought that space would turn out to be curved, he was pre-Einstein and saw matter as a kind of spentness and barrenness rather than as a tight lockup of energy.) Your theory may be empirically refutable but, if it survives such tests, what is there to support its affirmation? Is derivability of physical laws from laws of mind really enough? An information theorist, John Collier, said at the peirce email forum peirce-l that he had managed to derive each two among logic, information theory, and probability theory, from the third remaining, though I don't know whether he ever published these derivations. Have you shown that your laws of mind cannot be derived from physics in a way that shows that the nonderivability is not merely a result of our insufficent knowledge of physical law? You may also encounter some flak on your conception of mind. For what it's worth, for my part, I would hold that a key factor in intelligence, at least, which learns and grows, is an evolvability factor, a kind of sufficient un-boundness to its codes and its methods and systems of interpretation, in order to be able to test those codes, methods, systems and to do so not only by trial and error but more sophisticated kinds of learning and testing, such that memory and active recollection take on particular importance. Do your laws of mind take evolvability into account? Maybe they don't need to, though, depending on what you mean by mind. I tend to think that the mind must involve the retention and evolvability factor in some radical way, but it's quite vague to me how that would work. Maybe there are things which could fairly be called mind though I would never have thought of them that way. If I understood your theory I might also try to challenge the idea that the soul is both ontologically AND epistemologically primary. Actually I wouldn't use, for my views, the term primary in a strong foundationalist sense, I just mean that, for various reasons, I regard the (sequential) order of knowledge to be the opposite of the (sequential) order of being. Of course, in logic, some oppositions seems to reverse themselves across changes of level, so who knows, I'm not totally convinced about my own views either. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: everything-list@eskimo.com Sent: Wednesday, January 11, 2006 10:38 AM Subject: Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue Hi Benjamin, List, I will comment your long post, taking into account some posts from its sequel (to avoid repetition). But I will try to make a sort of synthesis so that people will be able to recast the present thread, concerned with the theology-naming issue, and the more general goal of the list which consists globally in the search of a TOE (Theory of Everything) and more particularly consists (at our present stage) to find a measure on the computational histories. For this I need to summarise my own contribution in the list, which consists mainly in explaining results I got in the seventies, published in the eighties (in obscure journals or proceedings though) and eventually defended as a PhD thesis in France in 1998. This includes many things from the necessity of distinguishing first and third person notions, the first person comp indeterminacy, the comp immortality and its theoretical confirmation through the quantum suicide and quantum immortality, but mainly all this can be sum up into the reversal result. This is the result that IF we assume the computationalist hypothesis in the cognitive science then the physical science cannot be fundamental and are derivable from the laws of mind. With the comp hyp. the laws of mind can be taken as the laws of computation and computability, although a precise formulation would lead, well, to our current naming issue. The reduction of physics appears to be both epistemological and ontological. That means that not only physics will appear
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Hi Brent, The D is put for the modal Diamond possibility. Dp is ~B~p (possible p = not necessary not p). With the provability logics (G and/or G*): the B represent formal provability and the D represents formal consistency. Dt is the same as ~Bf and represents (self)-consistency. Semantically it is equivalent with the existence of at least one model/world/situation/observer-moment. You can translate Dt - ~BDt, by if I am consistent then I cannot prove my consistency, or (semantically): if there is an observer-moment then I cannot prove there is an observer-moment. I was just saying that there is a (next) observer-moment is already faith-based (theological?) for the lobian machine (or any lobian entity, actually). Bruno Le 05-janv.-06, à 19:16, Brent Meeker a écrit : Science should be agnostic, at least methodologically, even with g = there is a universe or there is an observer moment. Comp science is provably agnostic: Dt - ~BDt. What's D mean? http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Hi Benjamin, Bruno, list, I've looked over Bruno's recent replies and, though I don't understand much about Bruno's work or modal logic, etc., I wish to attempt a few general remarks. If Bruno is, as he puts it, [searching for] a general name for a field which studies fundamental type of faith, hope, fear, bets, etc., then there are set of Ancient Greek words like _pistis_ (faith, belief, confidence), _pistos_ (confident, faithful), _pisteuticos_ (deserving of faith or belief), etc. So he could call it Pistics (sounds awful in English, though, because of that to which it sound similar) or Pisteutics, etc. Or maybe there's some form of this word with a prefix which would make it sound less like, well, um, piss plus a suffix, and, having considered it, I do think that that's an issue. Ancient Greek is too unfamiliar to me, otherwise I'd try to come up with such a word myself, keeping in mind the next paragraph: Well thanks. Pistology perhaps? I must say I like to use already existing terms, but I am still trying to understand why people seems so negative for the term theology ... I do think, perhaps unmodestly, that my approach belongs to the Classical Platonic Theology from Pythagoras to Proclus. (Of course Pythagoras comes before Plato but can be considered as its one of its main important precursor.) What kind of belief? The focus in religion and theology on faith, belief, etc., seems (e.g., in Credo quia absurdum) to arise from a stubbornness in the belief despite resultant seemingly contradictory or inadequate interpretations and understandings, and despite seemingly contradictory or inadequate confirmations, corroborations, knowledge (knowledge in the everyday sense). Even just with the quantum hyp., or more deeply (I think) with just the comp hyp. I would say that we can say the same things about the notion of matter, or the notion of a primitive or primordial universe. ... Except that it is far more easier (cf UDA) to explain the epistemological contradictory nature of matter than of God, which I take as being PERHAPS just a more general notion of reality, like our common (with comp) unnameable ignorance, or even the Platonico-Aristotelian notion of Self, etc. Today's physics take for granted implicitly a major part of Aristotle theology: the religious idea of Nature, and the idea of linking souls to bodies in some one-one manner. This is a special kind of belief, not the most general kind, and we tend to distinguish it in English by calling it faith though faith does have other meanings. It tends to be motivated by valuations not pertaining primarily to investigating and establishing the character of the world. For Bruno, the question is, does he mean a kind of belief which, howsoever motivated, is stubborn? (in the face of resultant contradictory or inadequate understandings and in the face of contradictory knowledge or inadequate knwledge). For what it's worth, I think that the name most suitable will have the meaning! of this kind of belief. You don't need to be stubborn to belief (or hope) in God, especially if you are willing to take seriously pre-christian theology. Of course if you define God by a white male senior sitting on a cloud, it seems to me reasonable to suppose some level of stubbornness indeed. Are religion and theism just about belief? Maybe I'm wrong, because there's a lot of background here on the everything-list threads that I don't understand, so maybe I'm interpreting things in the wrong light, but there seems to be a tendency here to regard religion as if it were fundamentally a cognitive discipline -- as if it consisted in a set of cognitive beliefs about facts. Not at all. I would say the driving force is just truth, or even Truth. Then the theology of machine is entirely dependant of the gap between proof and truth, which you can seen as a gap between cognitive ability and the Truth. Perhaps I am just talking in a premature way, and I should explain more on the Godel-Lob provability-truth gap (G* \ G). Note that the Truth About-a-Lobian-Machine is an unnameable notion BY the lobian machine, and it verifies my favorite axiom of ... which is that it has no name. Note that I am not identifying God with Truth or with the Self. But in the whole family of Platonic thought, such notion are frequently related. Religion has been many things and in some societies has taken many forms in being involved in every aspect of life. But the core toward which it seems sometimes to retrench, seems to be affectivity and valuing with regard to decision-making, power, submission, governance and self-governance -- including valuing with regard to the greatest powers in one's life and in the universe. Science too, including affectivity, at least in practice. (All the same, I fully admit that religion can get involved quite widely, in valuings with regard to competence and work, and
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Le 04-janv.-06, à 19:30, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi John, I think you may have problems because you are not used neither trained in axiomatic thinking. The idea consists in NOT defining the objects we want to talk about, and keeping just some needed properties from which we prove other theorem. Let me give an example with the idea of knowledge. Many philosophers agree that knowledge should verify the following law, and I take it as the best definition of knowledge we can have: 1) If I know some proposition then that proposition is true 2) If I know some proposition then I know that I know that proposition 3) If I know that some proposition a entails some proposition b, then if I know a, I will know b. But that doesn't capture meaning of know. But nobody knows or agree on the *meaning* of know, that's was my point. If *you* think it leaves something out, for a mathematician it means that you agree with the definition! And then you propose a stronger theory by adding 4: It leaves out 4) If I know some proposition then I have experience causally connected to the fact that makes it true. See c.f. Gettier's paradox. Now, that 4 *is* problematical because it refers to a undefined notion of causality, which itself can only be defined axiomatically. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Hi John, I think you may have problems because you are not used neither trained in axiomatic thinking. The idea consists in NOT defining the objects we want to talk about, and keeping just some needed properties from which we prove other theorem. Let me give an example with the idea of knowledge. Many philosophers agree that knowledge should verify the following law, and I take it as the best definition of knowledge we can have: 1) If I know some proposition then that proposition is true 2) If I know some proposition then I know that I know that proposition 3) If I know that some proposition a entails some proposition b, then if I know a, I will know b. Then you don't need to look in a dictionary for a definition of knowledge, because mathematician will *defined* it by anything which obeys the laws above. Also the laws above are made more easily readable and memorisable when written in a shorter way like 1) Bp - p 2) Bp - BBp 3) B(p - q) - (Bp - Bq) Biologist, Chemist, and many Physicists just does not use the axiomatic method, and sometimes they feel they cannot understand math or logic because they feel they do not know the definition, when in fact there is just no definition at all: just axioms and rules describing some behavior of undefined terms or formulas. Actually I have already try to explain the systems G and G* in a non axiomatic way; notably when discussing with Hal Finney in the course of some trip into Smullyan Knight Knaves Island. And this settles also Stathis' natural question: given that there are many modal logics and many corresponding notion of multiverses, how to choose the right modal logic. The concrete answer I can give is that we will just interview a naive chatting Platonist machine which believe in enough arithmetical truth. With such a machine we can take the following expression as synonymous: - The machine will print that 1+1=2 - The machine will prove that 1+1=2 - The machine will believe that 1+1=2 -The machine will say that 1+1=2, or more simply (more shortly): - B1+1=2 This is very concrete. You must imagine yourself in front of some concrete machine/device which print propositions from time to time. Now, if the machine is enough rich in its language ability then the proposition The machine will print 1+1=2 is itself a proposition of the machine language. It could be that one day the machine will print the proposition the machine will print 1+1=2. In that way, the machine is able to talk about itself. Do you understand the difference between Bp (the machine print p) and BBp (the machine prints Bp) ? And the questions are then: A) what laws do the machine printability (provability ...) obey to? B) what laws do the machine prints And the answer for A will be given by a modal logic know as G*, and the answer for B will be given by a modal logic known as G. I stop here in case you want already make a remark. Believe me, what I try to say is probably much more simple than you may imagine. There is probably less to understand than what you think. The hardest part of logic for beginners consists in understanding how simple it really is. Best, Bruno Le 29-déc.-05, à 17:56, John M a écrit : your brief added last par is of great help. I would NEVER mix provability and probability, I am not Spanish (b=v?) and think in semantical rather than formal meanings. I wish I knew what is a modal logic (G and G*) and am a bit perplexed of your (??) logic defining G* as beeing 'something or not'. (Like: F is =,, or , of B)- Then again true may not exist, indeed. (1st pers?) Similarly it does not help me, if I get a lot of other 'names' for something I don't know what it is to begin with. I like WORDS. (I also like word-puzzles, but only solvable ones in my domains). * I glanced over the Stanford blurb and found exciting titles. When clicked, they overpoured me with equational lettering and I had no idea about their meaning. Even if I had a vocabulary of those letters, it is practically (humanly) impossible to read a text and follow those equations by looking up every letter for the meaning and content (with, of course clicking after all the connotations galore). Besides it is full of signs I cannot even read out and have nothing similar on my keyboard (maybe they are in some hidden modes as are the French accents). *** As a comparison: here is a description of a statement from my old profession about something I did: when mixing the DVB and St in a DBP catalysed 1:3 stoichiometry it exotherms and has to be temp-controled. At reaction-startup I added the DEB and then dispersed the mix in an aqueous medium with PVA stabilizer. The beads were then WV-boiled off and filtered. They showed a controllable macroporous structure with large sp. surface internally for adsorptive sites. Then came the transform by polymeranalogous reactions to introduce polar or ionic sites. And so on. It made perfect sense in my profession. (Never mind)
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 26-déc.-05, à 04:14, Russell Standish a écrit : On Wed, Dec 21, 2005 at 04:07:28PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: (*) Well, I'm certainly interested in that naming issue, and perhaps I could ask you right now what expression do you find the less shocking: Physics is derivable from machine psychology, or Physics is derivable from machine theology ? 'course, you can put computer science or number theory instead of machine psycho or theology, but then the reference to a soul or a person is eliminated, and giving the current tendency of many scientist to just eliminate the person from the possible object of rational inquiry, I prefer to avoid it. Note that in conscience and mechanism I have used the expression theology, and in computability, physics and cognition, I have been asked to use psychology instead. I find theology much more correct and honest, but then I realise (empirically) that it it could seem too much shocking for some people (especially the atheist). What do you think? I have already avoid metaphysics because it is confusing in the metamathematical (Godelian) context, and also I'm in a country where the word metaphysics already means crackpot. Does the word theology means crackpot in some country ? I don't think so, but please tell me if you know about such practice. Bruno My preference is for machine psychology. This is shocking enough, but amerliorated by the prefix machine. Theology, on the other hand does not seem justified. In my mind, and I suspect for most people, theology means the study of God. A study of atheism would probably be included in this also, Thanks for giving me your feeling. I obviously agree with you that atheism is a religion. Actually I see this as a reason to keep the word theology , although I remain open to the possibility of changing my mind on this issue. I have (G*) reason to consider that just the belief in one Observer-Moment, or World, State, Situation, etc. is already theological, like the hope in our own sanity or consistency. Physics is already theological too; in particular most physicists endow implicitly Aristotle solution of the mind-body problem, which is in part a sort of bullet making impossible to really progress there. however, I fail to see what the study of the limits to machine intelligence has to do with something as nebulous as God. It is, I think, as nebulous as any everything concept, except that it makes clearer the necessity of distinguishing a sort of pure science, captured by G and the whole truth about that captured by G*. I can come back on this but I think I should attempt to say more in some non technical way about the G G* gap. Also, I think God is just a chapter in theology, and I don't even address that chapter neither in Conscience et Mecanisme, where I do introduce the term theology, nor in Calculabilité Physique et Cognition, where I have been asked to use machine psychology instead of theology, and then I am beginning to think it is a sort of logical error. Like I said to George, either I try to be as clear as possible, but then it looks provocative; or I try to manage the ten thousands human susceptibilities, but then the message will take more that one millenium to be conveyed :( Ah la la.. One of my current motivation for using the label theology is the fact that my work can be framed into the Pythagorean, Platonist and NeoPlatonist tradition. People interested could read the very gentle introduction to Plotinus by Dominic O'Meara: Plotinus. An Introduction to the Enneads. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992. Note that The Enneads have been themselves published by Penguin, with a readable translation. The fact is that the arithmetical interpretation of Plato's Theaetetus leads to a rather natural arithmetical interpretation of many questions and answers by Plotinus around the mind-body problem, and apparently this bounces back toward an arithmetical interpretation of the whole Plato's Parmenides. But here I am not yet convinced and I am perhaps just overoptimistic, for sure. Late James Higgo would have perhaps added that many trends in the Buddhist traditions have much in common with Platonism and Plotinism. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Theism is the belief that the world was created by a single omnipotent, superhuman agent who cares about human behavoir and intervenes in worldly events. Is that your theory?? Brent Meeker Atheism is not a religion, just as a vacant lot is not a type of building, and health is not a form of sickness. Atheism is not a religion. --- Jim Heldberg, San Francisco Atheist Coordinator
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Hi, Le Mercredi 4 Janvier 2006 19:21, Brent Meeker a écrit : Theism is the belief that the world was created by a single omnipotent, superhuman agent who cares about human behavoir and intervenes in worldly events. Is that your theory?? Brent Meeker Atheism is not a religion, just as a vacant lot is not a type of building, and health is not a form of sickness. Atheism is not a religion. --- Jim Heldberg, San Francisco Atheist Coordinator Atheïsm is a religion as I would say any metaphysical theories... (which are only set of beliefs... if not they are falsifiable and enter the realm of physical theories/science. Atheism is not science in that it is not falsifiable... Atheïsm is composed of dogma negation of the existence of any god/suprem being and is a set of beliefs and as such fit well in the religion category. Quentin
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
On Wed, Jan 04, 2006 at 12:30:49PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: Thanks for giving me your feeling. I obviously agree with you that atheism is a religion. Actually I see this as a reason to keep the word theology , although I remain open to the possibility of changing my mind on this issue. I have (G*) reason to consider that just the belief in one Observer-Moment, or World, State, Situation, etc. is already theological, like the hope in our own sanity or consistency. Physics is already theological too; in particular most physicists endow implicitly Aristotle solution of the mind-body problem, which is in part a sort of bullet making impossible to really progress there. You seem to be confusing a study of metaphysical beliefs with a study of a subset of metaphysical beliefs called the belief in one or more Gods (which is what theology means to most people). I would not use the word theology to describe the study of physics' foundational beliefs - not sure what word I would use actually, it probably an indication that very few people think about it. Also, I think God is just a chapter in theology, again this seems to be using theology in a more expansive meaning than it usually is. Theology to me is the study of belief in God, although I note that the Oxford concise dictionary defines it thusly: a study of or system of religion; rational analysis of a religious faith Using this definition, the study of Kosher practices would be considered theology, which doesn't seem right to me. It should come under the label of cultural studies, or comparative religion perhaps. and I don't even address that chapter neither in Conscience et Mecanisme, where I do introduce the term theology, nor in Calculabilit? Physique et Cognition, where I have been asked to use machine psychology instead of theology, and then I am beginning to think it is a sort of logical error. Like I said to George, either I try to be as clear as possible, but then it looks provocative; or I try to manage the ten thousands human susceptibilities, but then the message will take more that one millenium to be conveyed :( Ah la la.. One of my current motivation for using the label theology is the fact that my work can be framed into the Pythagorean, Platonist and NeoPlatonist tradition. Indeed, however most people would not regard Pythagoranism, Platonism et al as a topic of theology. If you insist on using the term, you will be condemned to defining the word theology so as to include Pythagoranism etc as part of its domain of study in every paper your write. Psychology, on the other hand seems unproblematical, as psychology normally covers belief as part of its remit. About the only real problem I see with it is those who think machine psychology is an oxymoron (contradiction of terms). But those same people would think computationalism is incoherent as well... On a related point, which I meant to comment on earlier, but ran out of time. In French and German, there is no distinction between the words mind, soul, ghost or spirit. In French the word esprit covers all these notions, and in German, the words are Geist and Seele. Yet in English soul as well as ghost/spirit (the latter two being largely synonymous) imply an independent existence apart from the body, whereas mind has no such connotation. Soul tends to be used in a theological setting, whereas ghost appears more in literature or movies - ghost stories :). But apart from that, I cannot see any obvious distinction. Interestingly in my aforementioned Oxford dictionary, it defines mind as seat of consciousness (def 6.) and soul (def 7.) Oh well, maybe everyday people's understanding of these things is muddied, or perhaps my usage of these terms is particularly Australian (Australia being one of the least religious countries in the world) Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgprjrxlAMFMn.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Brent Meeker writes: Theism is the belief that the world was created by a single omnipotent, superhuman agent who cares about human behavoir and intervenes in worldly events. Is that your theory?? Brent Meeker Atheism is not a religion, just as a vacant lot is not a type of building, and health is not a form of sickness. Atheism is not a religion. --- Jim Heldberg, San Francisco Atheist Coordinator Indeed! And the lack of belief in the Sun and the Moon as deities is not a religion, and the lack of belief in Santa Claus and the Grinch Who Stole Christmas is not a religion. Stathis Papaioannou _ Buy now @ Tradingpost.com.au http://a.ninemsn.com.au/b.aspx?URL=http%3A%2F%2Fad%2Eau%2Edoubleclick%2Enet%2Fclk%3B24875379%3B12369854%3Ba%3Fhttp%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Etradingpost%2Ecom%2Eau%3Freferrer%3DnmsnHMetagv1_t=752643439_r=hotmailtagline_m=EXT
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
It is worth repeating that machine theology would be a bad choice of words quite aside from the debate that has been generated on this thread about the meaning of atheism etc. This is because of the negative reaction the term theology would inspire in the (English-speaking, at least) scientific and philosophical community. I think even the savvier crackpots would avoid that word! It may not be fair, but that's the way it is. Stathis Papaioannou _ ASUS M5 Ultra-slim lightweight is Now $1999 (was $2,999) http://a.ninemsn.com.au/b.aspx?URL=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Easus%2Ecom%2Eau%2F_t=752129232_r=Hotmail_tagline_23Nov05_m=EXT
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Le 27-déc.-05, à 05:43, George Levy a écrit : Naming this field is difficult. This is why I made several suggestions none of which I thought were excellent. I think it is difficult because there is a conflict between pedagogy and diplomacy there. Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't think it is a question of vocabulary, It is only a question of vocabulary if you intend to communicate with other people. And this is where the difficulty lies. If you make the name too esoteric they will not even understand what the field is about. OK. But is not theology less esoteric than psychomechanics. Everyone knows what theology is all about: immortalilty/mortality issues, soul's fate in possible consciousness states, where do we come from, cosmogony, etc. Scientific theology is of course 100% agnostic on all this; yet it can provide theories and with comp (or weaker) even testable or partially testable theories (indeed with comp, physics is an integral part of theology: physics is given somehow by the mathematical structure describing the border of the intrinsic ignorance of machines. and actually I am not sure we are not in, well *perfect* perhaps not, but at least in an a larger matching area than you think. Perhaps, like so many, you have not yet really understand the impact of the discovery by Turing and its relation with Godel's theorem. When I talk on Platonia, it is really Platonia updated by Godel's and Lob's theorem. I hope you are open to the idea I could perhaps progress in my way of communicating that. It really concerns machines and even many non-machines. I think about abandoning comp for ind, where ind is for indexical, given that G and G* applies to almost anything self-referentially correct. I knew this for long, the comp hyp just makes the reasoning and the verification easier. I can already say that I disagree the word quantum should be in it. The name should not issue what will or should be derived by the theory. I do not fully understand the full ramification of how indexical relates to this field. Indexical is used in philosophy to designate term like now, here, modern, I, this etc. Their meaning change with the situation of their uses. For example I means Bruno for me and George for you. here and now means Brussels and 10h54 am, here and now, but the time I finish the sentence it already means something else (Brussels and 10h55 am). The approach I follow is based on the logic of self-reference. Bp is really an indexical: it means I prove p where I is put for a third person self-reference by the machine M, and strictly speaking the meaning of I is different for each machine (but by Godel Lob, still obeys similar laws of the self-referentially correct machine). However, I think that to use Indexical now is like Heisenberg using Entanglement instead of Quantum. Nobody would have understood what he was talking about. It was hard enough already to understand Quantum. All right, but quantum still does not work for this field because it would give the wrong impression that the quantum hyp. is assumed, where the UDA shows it must be derived. the comp hyp is neutral about which type of machine we would be. It could be a quantum one or not. All what matters is that the machine should be Turing emulable (or weaker: some Turing oracle can be assumed without changing the self-reference logics G and G*). BTW, COMP is not very good, because you have to explain what it is. Well, that is the name of the hypothesis. The point is to have some short acronym to put results in short formula like: COMP - REVERSAL. But we were discussing the name of the entire field. What *is* G* \ G from a machine point of view? It is the self-referential truth which we cannot prove, but which can be hope or fear or just bet upon, like Dt, DDt, ... At first glance it appears to be the Mechanist Philosophy and this is what I originally thought. Yes. Comp is the DIGITAL or numerical or computational mechanist hypothesis. The mechanist philosophy is logically weaker due to the (mathematical at least) existence of non Turing-emulable analogue machine. The UDA, as it is now, does not work on such analogue machine. Of course comp is a natural modern sister of the mechanist philosophy. I think the best approach is to use a compound expression to bridge the gap between different fields. (i.e., Quantum electro-chromo dynamics, electro-magnetism, physical chemistry) There is nothing surprising that quantum physics could be derived from quantum psycho mechanics. Of course it is surprising...not to you or me or others on the list because we have been talking about it for so long... but to the average scientist in the street... or the university. And these are the people you intend to communicate with. I don't follow what you say. Quantum mechanics assumes the quantum hyp , and some mechanics, by definition.
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Hi John, To search informations on the net on G and G*, it is easier to search on logic of provability. G is also called KW, KW4, L, GL, PRL in other papers or book. G* is also called G', PRL^omega, GLS The Stanford entry is rather good: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-provability/ In brief words G is a modal logic which describes what a classical theory or machine can prove about its own provability abilities. And G* is a modal logic which describes what is true (provable or not by the machine) about its own provability abilities. Don't confuse provability with probability. Careful when typing because the b and the v are close on the keyboard! Bruno Le 29-déc.-05, à 00:48, John M a écrit : Bruno, could you include some BRIEF words for the profanum vulgus about that ominous G - G* magic as well? I searched Google, Yahoo, Wikipedia, but could not find any reasonable hint. You and other savants on the list apply this magic many times always. Am I the only one who missed that in grammar school? John http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Thanks, Bruno, your brief added last par is of great help. I would NEVER mix provability and probability, I am not Spanish (b=v?) and think in semantical rather than formal meanings. I wish I knew what is a modal logic (G and G*) and am a bit perplexed of your (??) logic defining G* as beeing 'something or not'. (Like: F is =,, or , of B)- Then again true may not exist, indeed. (1st pers?) Similarly it does not help me, if I get a lot of other 'names' for something I don't know what it is to begin with. I like WORDS. (I also like word-puzzles, but only solvable ones in my domains). * I glanced over the Stanford blurb and found exciting titles. When clicked, they overpoured me with equational lettering and I had no idea about their meaning. Even if I had a vocabulary of those letters, it is practically (humanly) impossible to read a text and follow those equations by looking up every letter for the meaning and content (with, of course clicking after all the connotations galore). Besides it is full of signs I cannot even read out and have nothing similar on my keyboard (maybe they are in some hidden modes as are the French accents). *** As a comparison: here is a description of a statement from my old profession about something I did: when mixing the DVB and St in a DBP catalysed 1:3 stoichiometry it exotherms and has to be temp-controled. At reaction-startup I added the DEB and then dispersed the mix in an aqueous medium with PVA stabilizer. The beads were then WV-boiled off and filtered. They showed a controllable macroporous structure with large sp. surface internally for adsorptive sites. Then came the transform by polymeranalogous reactions to introduce polar or ionic sites. And so on. It made perfect sense in my profession. (Never mind) No modal or out of modal logic, no 'ABC... with signs' equations. *** How does the provability (no b) jibe with Poppers scientific 'unprovability'? Is falsifiability = provability? Bruno, I like what you SAY, I like YOUR logic, not somebody else's. I don't want to 'give up' on you because of a system so strange to me. I am 'fishing' for word-hooks in your writings. In 1940 I took philosophy (to major chemistry) and sociology. I should have taken logic instead of the Br. of Brandenstein. Of course it would have been of little use now, 65 years later. With friendship John --- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi John, To search informations on the net on G and G*, it is easier to search on logic of provability. G is also called KW, KW4, L, GL, PRL in other papers or book. G* is also called G', PRL^omega, GLS The Stanford entry is rather good: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-provability/ In brief words G is a modal logic which describes what a classical theory or machine can prove about its own provability abilities. And G* is a modal logic which describes what is true (provable or not by the machine) about its own provability abilities. Don't confuse provability with probability. Careful when typing because the b and the v are close on the keyboard! Bruno Le 29-déc.-05, à 00:48, John M a écrit : Bruno, could you include some BRIEF words for the profanum vulgus about that ominous G - G* magic as well? I searched Google, Yahoo, Wikipedia, but could not find any reasonable hint. You and other savants on the list apply this magic many times always. Am I the only one who missed that in grammar school? John http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Hi Stephen, Le 24-déc.-05, à 02:27, Stephen Paul King a écrit : As for a name, following the comments of George and John, what about I^st and 3^rd Person aspects in Computational Logics? That is not too bad ... for the title of a paper, but I'm afraid it is too long for a field's name. Also, strictly speaking, computational logic is misleading because people could take it as a form of constructive or effective or algorithmic logic (like computational chemistry is chemistry through algorithm). So, more correct, (and then obviously more ugly) would be 1st and 3rd Person aspects in computationalist logic. Remember that the first Person aspect is not necessarily computational or effective, although it is so, accidentally, for the propositional parts. Many thanks for trying, and making me realise that the word theology is apparently as problematic in English than in French. Actually I am very astonished by that, and even somehow anxious about that. People can understand that Galileo has refuted Aristotle Physics, or even that QM is incompatible with Aristotle theory of substances. But Aristotle is also the first guy who did built a thoroughly scientific (Popper-Falsifiable) theology, and then the comp hyp refutes it, and forces us to go back to Plato and Pythagorus or to some neo-Platonician; mainly Plotinus, because the one who will follow Plotinus will again try to reintroduce some Aristotelian mind/body ideas which are, unlike Plato's and Pythagorus' one) incompatible with the comp hyp or even much weaker hyp.). I am just trying to find simple word to convey to a general audience what are the logics G and G*. I will say more this afternoon (It is 12h50 am in Brussels) in my reply to Kim. Best regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
On Wed, Dec 21, 2005 at 04:07:28PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote: (*) Well, I'm certainly interested in that naming issue, and perhaps I could ask you right now what expression do you find the less shocking: Physics is derivable from machine psychology, or Physics is derivable from machine theology ? 'course, you can put computer science or number theory instead of machine psycho or theology, but then the reference to a soul or a person is eliminated, and giving the current tendency of many scientist to just eliminate the person from the possible object of rational inquiry, I prefer to avoid it. Note that in conscience and mechanism I have used the expression theology, and in computability, physics and cognition, I have been asked to use psychology instead. I find theology much more correct and honest, but then I realise (empirically) that it it could seem too much shocking for some people (especially the atheist). What do you think? I have already avoid metaphysics because it is confusing in the metamathematical (Godelian) context, and also I'm in a country where the word metaphysics already means crackpot. Does the word theology means crackpot in some country ? I don't think so, but please tell me if you know about such practice. Bruno My preference is for machine psychology. This is shocking enough, but amerliorated by the prefix machine. Theology, on the other hand does not seem justified. In my mind, and I suspect for most people, theology means the study of God. A study of atheism would probably be included in this also, however, I fail to see what the study of the limits to machine intelligence has to do with something as nebulous as God. Cheers -- *PS: A number of people ask me about the attachment to my email, which is of type application/pgp-signature. Don't worry, it is not a virus. It is an electronic signature, that may be used to verify this email came from me if you have PGP or GPG installed. Otherwise, you may safely ignore this attachment. A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 pgpIhLOtyOW0V.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Le 23-déc.-05, à 23:46, John M a écrit : BTW, Bruno, from the little I did understand from your texts so far and from the lots I didn't I think we are NOT in a perfect match of worldviews. Hard to pinpoint, because I bleong to those who do not speak/(think) within your vocabulary G I don't think it is a question of vocabulary, and actually I am not sure we are not in, well *perfect* perhaps not, but at least in an a larger matching area than you think. Perhaps, like so many, you have not yet really understand the impact of the discovery by Turing and its relation with Godel's theorem. When I talk on Platonia, it is really Platonia updated by Godel's and Lob's theorem. I hope you are open to the idea I could perhaps progress in my way of communicating that. It really concerns machines and even many non-machines. I think about abandoning comp for ind, where ind is for indexical, given that G and G* applies to almost anything self-referentially correct. I knew this for long, the comp hyp just makes the reasoning and the verification easier. All what I say John is that anyone interested in Truth should look deep inside him or her or itself, and that's all. That's hardly original, but I add something: a diskette with a couple of programs enabling you to follow in a finite time some sort of infinite conversation with a Universal Turing Machine looking deep inside herself. Which programs? G, G*, G* \ G, S4Grz, S4Grz1, Z1, Z1*, X1, X1*, etc. And this leads to a testable TOE explaining both qualia and quanta, without assuming quanta or any piece of stuff at the start. Verifiability is ensured by the fact that propositional physics should be given, with the ind hyp, by S4Grz1, or X1* or Z1* precise propositional logics (and as far as I have been able to proceed we got quantum logics there) John, George, Stephen, Kim, thanks for your naming suggestion. I will continue to medidate upon! I can already say that I disagree the word quantum should be in it. The name should not issue what will or should be derived by the theory. There is nothing surprising that quantum physics could be derived from quantum psycho mechanics. Please recall I am not assuming anything physical. Also, the questions that I address has been addressed by many people before (Plato, Plotinus, Proclos, and many others in different continents). Nobody would say that ocidental psychomechanics has begun with Plato or Plotinus. The word I am searching should be large, general, and without as few presupposition as possible. Plato is the one who introduced the word theology with the meaning of Science of Gods, and by extension I take it as the science of what we can hope or bet upon. It is just the truth *about* machine, and we can talk and reason about it without ever knowing that truth, given that no scientist at all can *know* the truth, at least as knowed. To talk on immortality issues (cf: quantum immortality or comp-immortality) without accepting we are doing theology is perhaps a form of lack of modesty. Nobody would dare to try to help me making a case for the use of the word theology? I am not yet convinced by your argument against the use of the word theology but you help me to be aware that some misunderstanding prevails here. I should perhaps say more about Plotinus, and other neo-platonists. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Bruno, thanks for your VERY considerate reply, I will respond later in more detail. Now I simply want to point to some facetious(?) connotations about words, as the profanum vulgus may (flippantly) misunderstand them (and YES, I believe it is vocabularial): psycho (in a hazy phrase) points to loony. quantum recalls Niels Bohr and ilk. mechanics points to something 'physical'. Machinery, gadget. And prejudice upon a title (words) is distorting objectivity. (Don't forget, English is my 5th, so I am more bound to semantic content than people born into (even any) Indo-European. These are my feelings, maybe all wrong.) Are we close in thinking? I wish I had a well enough formulated view to compare. I definitely would not speak about TRUTH, which is 1st person belief, the objective reality (not a perception of such) is IMO beyond our mental capturing capability. I try to keep away from model-topics, like God or longer: Godel, (although I use the proper German pronounciation). And I am very suspicious about conclusions of the pre-Flat Earth age old Greeks - no matter how ingenious - missing humanity's 2.5 millenia-long epistemic/cognitive enrichment as basis for their thinking. Still stifling our (free - advanced) thinking. Best regards John --- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 23-déc.-05, à 23:46, John M a écrit : BTW, Bruno, from the little I did understand from your texts so far and from the lots I didn't I think we are NOT in a perfect match of worldviews. Hard to pinpoint, because I bleong to those who do not speak/(think) within your vocabulary G I don't think it is a question of vocabulary, and actually I am not sure we are not in, well *perfect* perhaps not, but at least in an a larger matching area than you think. Perhaps, like so many, you have not yet really understand the impact of the discovery by Turing and its relation with Godel's theorem. When I talk on Platonia, it is really Platonia updated by Godel's and Lob's theorem. I hope you are open to the idea I could perhaps progress in my way of communicating that. It really concerns machines and even many non-machines. I think about abandoning comp for ind, where ind is for indexical, given that G and G* applies to almost anything self-referentially correct. I knew this for long, the comp hyp just makes the reasoning and the verification easier. All what I say John is that anyone interested in Truth should look deep inside him or her or itself, and that's all. That's hardly original, but I add something: a diskette with a couple of programs enabling you to follow in a finite time some sort of infinite conversation with a Universal Turing Machine looking deep inside herself. Which programs? G, G*, G* \ G, S4Grz, S4Grz1, Z1, Z1*, X1, X1*, etc. And this leads to a testable TOE explaining both qualia and quanta, without assuming quanta or any piece of stuff at the start. Verifiability is ensured by the fact that propositional physics should be given, with the ind hyp, by S4Grz1, or X1* or Z1* precise propositional logics (and as far as I have been able to proceed we got quantum logics there) John, George, Stephen, Kim, thanks for your naming suggestion. I will continue to medidate upon! I can already say that I disagree the word quantum should be in it. The name should not issue what will or should be derived by the theory. There is nothing surprising that quantum physics could be derived from quantum psycho mechanics. Please recall I am not assuming anything physical. Also, the questions that I address has been addressed by many people before (Plato, Plotinus, Proclos, and many others in different continents). Nobody would say that ocidental psychomechanics has begun with Plato or Plotinus. The word I am searching should be large, general, and without as few presupposition as possible. Plato is the one who introduced the word theology with the meaning of Science of Gods, and by extension I take it as the science of what we can hope or bet upon. It is just the truth *about* machine, and we can talk and reason about it without ever knowing that truth, given that no scientist at all can *know* the truth, at least as knowed. To talk on immortality issues (cf: quantum immortality or comp-immortality) without accepting we are doing theology is perhaps a form of lack of modesty. Nobody would dare to try to help me making a case for the use of the word theology? I am not yet convinced by your argument against the use of the word theology but you help me to be aware that some misunderstanding prevails here. I should perhaps say more about Plotinus, and other neo-platonists. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Naming this field is difficult. This is why I made several suggestions none of which I thought were excellent. Bruno Marchal wrote: I don't think it is a question of vocabulary, It is only a question of vocabulary if you intend to communicate with other people. And this is where the difficulty lies. If you make the name too esoteric they will not even understand what the field is about. and actually I am not sure we are not in, well *perfect* perhaps not, but at least in an a larger matching area than you think. Perhaps, like so many, you have not yet really understand the impact of the discovery by Turing and its relation with Godel's theorem. When I talk on Platonia, it is really Platonia updated by Godel's and Lob's theorem. I hope you are open to the idea I could perhaps progress in my way of communicating that. It really concerns machines and even many non-machines. I think about abandoning comp for ind, where ind is for indexical, given that G and G* applies to almost anything self-referentially correct. I knew this for long, the comp hyp just makes the reasoning and the verification easier. I can already say that I disagree the word quantum should be in it. The name should not issue what will or should be derived by the theory. I do not fully understand the full ramification of how indexical relates to this field. However, I think that to use Indexical now is like Heisenberg using Entanglement instead of Quantum. Nobody would have understood what he was talking about. It was hard enough already to understand Quantum. BTW, COMP is not very good, because you have to explain what it is. At first glance it appears to be the Mechanist Philosophy and this is what I originally thought. I think the best approach is to use a compound expression to bridge the gap between different fields. (i.e., Quantum electro-chromo dynamics, electro-magnetism, physical chemistry) There is nothing surprising that quantum physics could be derived from quantum psycho mechanics. Of course it is surprising...not to you or me or others on the list because we have been talking about it for so long... but to the average scientist in the street... or the university. And these are the people you intend to communicate with. Plato is the one who introduced the word theology with the meaning of Science of Gods, and by extension I take it as the science of what we can hope or bet upon. It is just the truth *about* machine, and we can talk and reason about it without ever knowing that truth, given that no scientist at all can *know* the truth, at least as knowed. I think this science relates primarily to the self. As I said before, I think that it it the I that creates the (orderliness in the) world. This is not a new idea. Some philosophers have asserted this idea before. Does this makes I a god? Not in the traditional sense of Theology which carries too much baggage. This is my own emphasis which may not be shared by everyone on this list. I am aware of the popular meaning of psycho = crazy as John mentioned. We could draw from other language than the Greek (auto, psyche) or Latin (anima, spiritus) but we lose the ability to be widely understood: Hebrew: nefesh, neshamah Japanese: tamashii. Neshamah Mechanics is not going to fly. Tamashii Mechanics sounds like sushi to the average westerner. To talk on immortality issues (cf: quantum immortality or comp-immortality) without accepting we are doing theology is perhaps a form of lack of modesty. Nobody would dare to try to help me making a case for the use of the word theology? Of course we are doing theology but don't say it too loud or you'll get involved in a religious war. I think theology has too much baggage and is populated by people with faith - a virtue for them, a vice for us. :-) George
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Bruno, John and Stephen More on naming: I think the name should include the following concepts 1) modal or relativistic or relative formulation or first person, 2) quantum or quantics, 3) psycho or psyche or consciousness or ego, 4) mechanics or theory. So, picking one term from each row we could get names such as first person quantum psychomechanics or relative formulation of quantum psyche theory (this alludes to Everett's interpretation) Sounds impressive! :-) George
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Le 22-déc.-05, à 23:51, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : What I will say is of course obvious from third-person hind-sight, but it helps me to guard against delusion to point out the limitedness of email list dialogue when it comes to accomplishing anything significant. I think that the significance is in becoming better at expressing ourselves. Especially on a delicate subject. So, Bruno, I've been bewildered for a while at why you are going to all this trouble to help lowly list participants like me in learning the rudiments of modal logic. Two bad news: 1) People on this list are one century in advance compared to what the average scientist can talk about in this time of overspecialisation and ivory towers. 2) I am probably *two* centuries in advance :) Look, I am asking to people to listen to the machines, but people does not yet listen to people. At least the lowly list participants seems to share some genuine interest in deep and hard fundamental questions. Yes, I know English, and I could perhaps help with basic English usage. But when it comes to insider questions like machine psychology, aren't there English-speaking philosophers out there that already know what you're trying to get at? Those who can grasp enough see me as an outsider competitor, the others are not serious. Very few people knows really simultaneously quantum mechanics, mathematical logic, and philosophy of mind. You seem to be implying that there are not. This is surprising. What is this path which can hardly be avoided you talk about? Listening to the machines. Listening to what a vast class of machines can already correctly prove and correctly guess about themselves. The word theology is made from the root theo, God, and this in my country is loaded with the historical baggage of puritanical (-hint to what my country is) whatever went wrong when I was growing up. We use theology/religion as the scapegoat for whatever went wrong when I was growing up. Some readers' blood pressure is already starting to rise. So we put on our scientist hat so we can objectively step aside from whatever went wrong when I was growing up that I don't want to deal with any more, as purely subjective, lumping it all into the religious pot, or at least the ignore pot, until it comes out on our medical bill. Yes, some of us out of necessity deal with some of it through the psychological label (or even mystical in a therapeutic sense), until we reach our personal saturation point, and then lump the rest of it into the religious/ignore pot. I will think of that. I think the problem is not with theology, but with religious institutions. But then OK, I guess this should be better taken into account. So I would say that both theology and psychology will not do if you are talking to the general audience. Gosh! I thought it would work *only* with some general audience. In academia I already know that most scientist are allergic to word like theology (but in my poor country, also in front of word like mind, person, thought, consciousness, and actually even quantum sometimes). (Just to toss something out there, how about machine introspection?) Of course, depending on who your audience is, even the words machine and physics are problematic. The term physics is particularly problematic because it is interpreted in the reductionist sense, which may or may know include the mind. Apparently many words are problematic here. Mathematicians should know the choice of word does not really matter. But most understand this only in their very specialised field. Now here is where I will ask some questions, and then it will be clear that I am missing the point because I am still an outsider when it comes to this self-referential self-enlightened machine stuff. We all are, really. Why are you afraid of eliminating the person? Look at history. All philosophies which eliminates the person lead to politics which eliminates the person, either in some bloody way of in some bureaucratic way ... But the scientific reason not to eliminate the person, is that it would be a scientific error, as the machines can already explain by using the logic of self-reference and the definition of the knower by Theaetetus. I know you define personal identity through logic (double-diagonal stuff etc.) But it sounds like you say, contrary to the reductionist view, that there is something essential to the person that cannot be completely described from the bottom-up, at least that there is something to a person that is forever incomplete. Yes, as Judson Webb(*) already understood clearly, Godel's theorem is a vaccine against almost all form of reductionism. Again, this is something contrary to the prevailing reductionist view, strengthened by simplistic popular desire, and a desire by some on this list, to have a COMPLETE explanation for everything. Sorry for them, but this is as impossible as finding a period in the
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Bruno I don't think either "machine psychology" or "machine theology" work because of the baggage those field already carry. In any case the attribute "machine" sends the wrong picture. And as you have pointed out the terms "computer science" and "number theory" do not capture the real issue of machine consciousness. In fact I do not think there is any word in English or French to describe what you are up to. Why don't you use a new word with no baggage to describe what you are doing? "Psychomechanics" is not listed in most dictionaries . Unfortunately, this word has already been invented. It can be found on Google in the context of animation and games and possibly Linguistics. It may be that others in this list can think of a better word. George
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
George (and Bruno, of course) First my coingrats to Bruno for completing his writing up to t publishable level, and now comes the proble: George, I struggle for the same quagmire, to find words for terms unmatched/able to the baggage EVERY habitual human word carries. I have 3 languages plus Latin and a not so complete French to look into and have a pretty good word-fantasy (I make lots of puns), however whatever I try, it comes back to the conventional meanings It is almpost imposible to have a title-phrase for an ignorant readership to take the text and read it - and refer at the same time to a novelty unfathomed by an innocent bystander so far. So I said: so what and explain my vocabulary 'inside' not minding those who will miss my divine wisdom G. There is a slow process to the Nobel, and not always open for the deservants. Our entire linguistics evolved while reductionist conventionalism ruled the human thinking. I guess (I gave up to 'understgand' his texts) Bruno has absolutely new ways of speculation and novel conclusions, different from the 'college-stuff' of scientific terms (language). George, you are absolutely right that 85% of people looking into titles of Elsevier (I reduced the 'audience already) will misunderstand 'machine', 'psych', tele- or the-ology, will think of software engineering as 'comput/er/ing(?) science or comp, and number theory will bring up integers, immaginaries, or fractions. The 15% will not care. I have problems over a decade to explain over and over again that my wholism is not holism as in some superstitious healing process and wholistic view is not holistic and does not look through a wormhole. But such is life. To be a mental pioneer does not mean the pecuniar benefits of a bestseller. To put your foot into Google/Wikipedia and watch for nitpickings by misundestanding (but reading!) strangers is one of the first steps. More than this (miraculous!) list-membership. BTW, Bruno, from the little I did understand from your texts so far and from the lots I didn't I think we are NOT in a perfect match of worldviews. Hard to pinpoint, because I bleong to those who do not speak/(think) within your vocabulary G How about Ideational Mechanisms of the Totality (world)? With friendship John --- George Levy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Bruno I don't think either machine psychology or machine theology work because of the baggage those field already carry. In any case the attribute machine sends the wrong picture. And as you have pointed out the terms computer science and number theory do not capture the real issue of machine consciousness. In fact I do not think there is any word in English or French to describe what you are up to. Why don't you use a new word with no baggage to describe what you are doing? Psychomechanics is not listed in most dictionaries http://www.onelook.com/?w=psychomechanics+ls=a . Unfortunately, this word has already been invented. It can be found on Google http://www.google.com/search?num=100hl=enlr=q=psychomechanicsbtnG=Search in the context of animation and games and possibly Linguistics. It may be that others in this list can think of a better word. George
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Dear Bruno, As for a name, following the comments of George and John, what about "I^st and 3^rd Person aspects in Computational Logics"? Onward! Stephen
Re: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Hi, My paper has been published and should be available on the site of Elsevier (not freely, except if your institution has a free acces on Elsevier Journals). The official reference are: Marchal B. Theoretical computer science and the natural science, Physics of Life Reviews, Vol 2/4, pp. 251-289. Congratulations, at least from this one data point of reading the above note. I will probably be busy until end of January. In the meantime I can give little exercises and then correct it. I know that a mailing list is not necessarily the best place for teaching. I do it because, at least concerning the approach I'm following, it is a path which can hardly be avoided. But I'm sure also this can be useful for a deepening of many everything-like issues, even if just to introduce the work of David Lewis (one of the main non quantum many-worlders). What I will say is of course obvious from third-person hind-sight, but it helps me to guard against delusion to point out the limitedness of email list dialogue when it comes to accomplishing anything significant. I think that the significance is in becoming better at expressing ourselves. So, Bruno, I've been bewildered for a while at why you are going to all this trouble to help lowly list participants like me in learning the rudiments of modal logic. Yes, I know English, and I could perhaps help with basic English usage. But when it comes to insider questions like machine psychology, aren't there English-speaking philosophers out there that already know what you're trying to get at? You seem to be implying that there are not. This is surprising. What is this path which can hardly be avoided you talk about? Stathis has already shown that IF (W,R) is reflexive THEN (W,R) respects Bp - p. And Tom Caylor agrees that IF (W,R) is symmetric THEN (W,R) respects p - BDp. Is it OK for everyone? Tom, Stathis, could you show the inverse ? That is: IF (W,R) respects Bp - p, THEN the multiverse is reflexive. IF (W,R) respects p - BDp, THEN the multiverse is symmetric. Could you show that all multiverse (W,R) respects B(p - q) - (Bp - Bq) ? I recall that a multiverse (W,R) respects a formula A if A is true in all illuminated (W, R, V). That is, whatever the illumination you choose (= whatever the value of the sentence letters you choose in each world) A is true in all the world of the multiverse. Please feel free NOT trying to solve those problem. First the UDA, which is not technical, is enough, it seems to me, for a complete understanding that comp entails the reversal between physics and computer science/machine-psychology/theology (we can discuss naming issue later(*)). The math is needed ONLY for making *explicit* the derivation of physics from comp, showing that comp (or weaker) is a scientific hypothesis, i.e. comp is testable. (*) Well, I'm certainly interested in that naming issue, and perhaps I could ask you right now what expression do you find the less shocking: Physics is derivable from machine psychology, or Physics is derivable from machine theology ? 'course, you can put computer science or number theory instead of machine psycho or theology, but then the reference to a soul or a person is eliminated, and giving the current tendency of many scientist to just eliminate the person from the possible object of rational inquiry, I prefer to avoid it. Note that in conscience and mechanism I have used the expression theology, and in computability, physics and cognition, I have been asked to use psychology instead. I find theology much more correct and honest, but then I realise (empirically) that it it could seem too much shocking for some people (especially the atheist). What do you think? I have already avoid metaphysics because it is confusing in the metamathematical (Godelian) context, and also I'm in a country where the word metaphysics already means crackpot. Does the word theology means crackpot in some country ? I don't think so, but please tell me if you know about such practice. Bruno The word theology is made from the root theo, God, and this in my country is loaded with the historical baggage of puritanical (-hint to what my country is) whatever went wrong when I was growing up. We use theology/religion as the scapegoat for whatever went wrong when I was growing up. Some readers' blood pressure is already starting to rise. So we put on our scientist hat so we can objectively step aside from whatever went wrong when I was growing up that I don't want to deal with any more, as purely subjective, lumping it all into the religious pot, or at least the ignore pot, until it comes out on our medical bill. Yes, some of us out of necessity deal with some of it through the psychological label (or even mystical in a therapeutic sense), until we reach our personal saturation point, and then lump the rest of it into the religious/ignore pot. So I would say that both theology and psychology will not do if you are
RE: Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Bruno Marchal writes: (*) Well, I'm certainly interested in that naming issue, and perhaps I could ask you right now what expression do you find the less shocking: Physics is derivable from machine psychology, or Physics is derivable from machine theology ? 'course, you can put computer science or number theory instead of machine psycho or theology, but then the reference to a soul or a person is eliminated, and giving the current tendency of many scientist to just eliminate the person from the possible object of rational inquiry, I prefer to avoid it. Note that in conscience and mechanism I have used the expression theology, and in computability, physics and cognition, I have been asked to use psychology instead. I find theology much more correct and honest, but then I realise (empirically) that it it could seem too much shocking for some people (especially the atheist). What do you think? I have already avoid metaphysics because it is confusing in the metamathematical (Godelian) context, and also I'm in a country where the word metaphysics already means crackpot. Does the word theology means crackpot in some country ? I don't think so, but please tell me if you know about such practice. My opinion is that theology would create at least as a bad an impression as metaphysics in the English-speaking world, if the intended audience is philosophers or scientists. Psychology is a more neutral and acceptable word. That's the easy part of your post to answer. The modal logic problems will need more than a few spare moments at work... Stathis Papaioannou _ realestate.com.au: the biggest address in property http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au
Paper+Exercises+Naming Issue
Hi, My paper has been published and should be available on the site of Elsevier (not freely, except if your institution has a free acces on Elsevier Journals). The official reference are: Marchal B. Theoretical computer science and the natural science, Physics of Life Reviews, Vol 2/4, pp. 251-289. I will probably be busy until end of January. In the meantime I can give little exercises and then correct it. I know that a mailing list is not necessarily the best place for teaching. I do it because, at least concerning the approach I'm following, it is a path which can hardly be avoided. But I'm sure also this can be useful for a deepening of many everything-like issues, even if just to introduce the work of David Lewis (one of the main non quantum many-worlders). Stathis has already shown that IF (W,R) is reflexive THEN (W,R) respects Bp - p. And Tom Caylor agrees that IF (W,R) is symmetric THEN (W,R) respects p - BDp. Is it OK for everyone? Tom, Stathis, could you show the inverse ? That is: IF (W,R) respects Bp - p, THEN the multiverse is reflexive. IF (W,R) respects p - BDp, THEN the multiverse is symmetric. Could you show that all multiverse (W,R) respects B(p - q) - (Bp - Bq) ? I recall that a multiverse (W,R) respects a formula A if A is true in all illuminated (W, R, V). That is, whatever the illumination you choose (= whatever the value of the sentence letters you choose in each world) A is true in all the world of the multiverse. Please feel free NOT trying to solve those problem. First the UDA, which is not technical, is enough, it seems to me, for a complete understanding that comp entails the reversal between physics and computer science/machine-psychology/theology (we can discuss naming issue later(*)). The math is needed ONLY for making *explicit* the derivation of physics from comp, showing that comp (or weaker) is a scientific hypothesis, i.e. comp is testable. (*) Well, I'm certainly interested in that naming issue, and perhaps I could ask you right now what expression do you find the less shocking: Physics is derivable from machine psychology, or Physics is derivable from machine theology ? 'course, you can put computer science or number theory instead of machine psycho or theology, but then the reference to a soul or a person is eliminated, and giving the current tendency of many scientist to just eliminate the person from the possible object of rational inquiry, I prefer to avoid it. Note that in conscience and mechanism I have used the expression theology, and in computability, physics and cognition, I have been asked to use psychology instead. I find theology much more correct and honest, but then I realise (empirically) that it it could seem too much shocking for some people (especially the atheist). What do you think? I have already avoid metaphysics because it is confusing in the metamathematical (Godelian) context, and also I'm in a country where the word metaphysics already means crackpot. Does the word theology means crackpot in some country ? I don't think so, but please tell me if you know about such practice. Bruno
