Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Aug 2019, at 03:34, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Thursday, August 22, 2019 at 8:41:40 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 21 Aug 2019, at 15:47, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell > 
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>>> Bruno,
>>> 
>>> I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds 
>>> account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have 
>>> produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding 
>>> irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.
>>> 
>>> So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people 
>>> casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few 
>>> even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to 
>>> shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have 
>>> given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.
>>> 
>>> As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real 
>>> existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the 
>>> Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave 
>>> function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how 
>>> the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of 
>>> probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the 
>>> objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate 
>>> (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real 
>>> existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can 
>>> safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.
>>> 
>>> It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a 
>>> substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it 
>>> always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. 
>>> There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical 
>>> nonsense.
>>> 
>>> Bruce
>>> 
>>> I started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including 
>>> reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I 
>>> will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of 
>>> PR box argument.
>>> 
>>> MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to 
>>> QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem 
>>> into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any 
>>> interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it 
>>> feels good" sort of argument. 
>> 
>> 
>> My point is that with the MWI (by which I mean the QM axiomatics without the 
>> collapse postulate) the violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail 
>> Faster than Light action at a distance (FTLAD), it entails only a local 
>> appearance of such action.
>> 
>> So Aspect experience proves the disjunction “FTLAD or Many-worlds”. But the 
>> term “world” should be taken with some caution (there are mathematical 
>> phenomenological constructs).
>> 
>> 
>>  I would agree with that. MWI and this curious quantum frame dragging along 
>> a restricted quantum basis is not some causal influence. I doubt any MWI 
>> upholder is saying that. 
>> 
>> 
>>> I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:
>>> 
>>> No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is 
>>> still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI 
>>> the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding 
>>> to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is 
>>> this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, 
>>> the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer 
>>> who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on 
>>> that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to 
>>> discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic 
>>> jump.
>>> 
>>> If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I 
>>> may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states 
>>> encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's 
>>> theorem.
>> 
>> That is a good insight, and it can be proved when you assume (explicitly) 
>> the Mechanist hypothesis. All computations exist in the arithmetical 
>> reality, and physics emerges from a statistics on all first person 
>> experience related to those computations. Eventually “physical prediction” 
>> with “measure one” have to obey to the logic of []p & <>t, with p partially 
>> computable (sigma_1). That gives already a quantum logic.
>> 
>> 

Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Thursday, August 22, 2019 at 8:41:40 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Aug 2019, at 15:47, Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell  
>> wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>>>
>>> Bruno,
>>>
>>> I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds 
>>> account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have 
>>> produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding 
>>> irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.
>>>
>>> So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many 
>>> people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, 
>>> but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be 
>>> able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would 
>>> have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.
>>>
>>> As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the 
>>> real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the 
>>> Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave 
>>> function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how 
>>> the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of 
>>> probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the 
>>> objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate 
>>> (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real 
>>> existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can 
>>> safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.
>>>
>>> It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a 
>>> substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it 
>>> always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. 
>>> There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical 
>>> nonsense.
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>
>> I started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including 
>> reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I 
>> will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of 
>> PR box argument.
>>
>> MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence 
>> to QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the 
>> problem into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if 
>> any interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a 
>> "it feels good" sort of argument. 
>>
>>
>>
>> My point is that with the MWI (by which I mean the QM axiomatics without 
>> the collapse postulate) the violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail 
>> Faster than Light action at a distance (FTLAD), it entails only a local 
>> appearance of such action.
>>
>> So Aspect experience proves the disjunction “FTLAD or Many-worlds”. But 
>> the term “world” should be taken with some caution (there are mathematical 
>> phenomenological constructs).
>>
>>
>  I would agree with that. MWI and this curious quantum frame dragging 
> along a restricted quantum basis is not some causal influence. I doubt any 
> MWI upholder is saying that. 
>
>
>> I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:
>>
>> No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is 
>> still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI 
>> the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding 
>> to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is 
>> this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, 
>> the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer 
>> who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on 
>> that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to 
>> discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic 
>> jump.
>>
>> If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I 
>> may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states 
>> encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's 
>> theorem. 
>>
>>
>> That is a good insight, and it can be proved when you assume (explicitly) 
>> the Mechanist hypothesis. All computations exist in the arithmetical 
>> reality, and physics emerges from a statistics on all first person 
>> experience related to those computations. Eventually “physical prediction” 
>> with “measure one” have to obey to the logic of []p & <>t, with p partially 
>> computable (sigma_1). That gives already a quantum logic.
>>
>>
>>
> It is of course not clear whether this Gödel self-reference is what nature 
> actually does, or whether 

Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Aug 2019, at 16:27, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> 
> Things are much simpler if we assume mechanism, like Everett. But Everett 
> stil assumes some universal wave, which, when we assume mechanism, must be 
> justify by the mechanist first person indeterminacy in arithmetic. 
> 
> To apply physics, “shut up and calculate” is all good, but in Metaphysics, it 
> is pure authoritative argument to prevent finding and testing possible 
> solutions of the problem. That is doubly true in the Mechanist frame, 
> probably because the Mechanist solution is troubling for those who are 
> physicalist, and believe in an ontological physical universe.
> 
> The mechanist solution is empirically testable, so let us test it. Up to now, 
> Mechanism is the only theory which explains the appearance without 
> eliminating consciousness and its mechanist explanation (the theology G* and 
> its variants).
> 
> With Mechanism, physics is not the fundamental science. Physics is reduced to 
> a sort of arithmetical probability/credibility machine theory.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> This distinction between what is physical and what is mechanistic seems 
> somewhat contrived. I suppose in the philosophical world this is what people 
> do, where now there are people into meta-metaphysics. I am not an enemy of 
> philosophy quite in the way Feynman was or his followers as Weinberg, but I 
> do think science is best with a minimum of metaphysics.

That is why I study Digital Mechanism. It makes metaphysics and theology into 
an experimental science. 

What some people often missed (and it is normal after 1500 years of materialist 
brainwashing) is that the hypothesis of the existence of a *primaty* physical 
reality (physicalism) *is* an hypothesis in metaphysics. With mechanism, that 
hypothesis has been shown inconsistent, and the mind)body problem is shown to 
be reduced in deriving the belief in the physical reality from a theory of 
consciousness, which is offered by the G* logic of Gödel-Löb-Solovay, so we can 
test it (and indeed, QM (without collapse) favours it, by far, I would argue).

It is just a bad habit we have since 529 (symbolic date, closure of Plato 
academy) to abandon rigorous in the fundamental domain, and in the human domain 
(which explains Shoah, Rwanda, etc., plausibly enough). The truth is that we 
can keep the scientific attitude in all domains, just by adding enough 
interrogation mark after clear assumption, and never claim to have obtained the 
truth.

Bruno



> 
> LC 
> 
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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Aug 2019, at 15:47, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>> Bruno,
>> 
>> I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds 
>> account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have 
>> produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding 
>> irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.
>> 
>> So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people 
>> casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few 
>> even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to 
>> shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have 
>> given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.
>> 
>> As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real 
>> existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett 
>> insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the 
>> quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred 
>> basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities 
>> and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical 
>> world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As 
>> Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other 
>> worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as 
>> superfluous mathematical superstructure.
>> 
>> It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a 
>> substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it 
>> always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. 
>> There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical 
>> nonsense.
>> 
>> Bruce
>> 
>> I started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including 
>> reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I will 
>> try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of PR box 
>> argument.
>> 
>> MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to 
>> QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem 
>> into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any 
>> interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it 
>> feels good" sort of argument. 
> 
> 
> My point is that with the MWI (by which I mean the QM axiomatics without the 
> collapse postulate) the violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail Faster 
> than Light action at a distance (FTLAD), it entails only a local appearance 
> of such action.
> 
> So Aspect experience proves the disjunction “FTLAD or Many-worlds”. But the 
> term “world” should be taken with some caution (there are mathematical 
> phenomenological constructs).
> 
> 
>  I would agree with that. MWI and this curious quantum frame dragging along a 
> restricted quantum basis is not some causal influence. I doubt any MWI 
> upholder is saying that. 
> 
> 
>> I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:
>> 
>> No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is 
>> still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI 
>> the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding to 
>> a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is this 
>> idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, the 
>> world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer who is 
>> in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on that 
>> measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to 
>> discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic jump.
>> 
>> If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I may 
>> work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states 
>> encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's 
>> theorem.
> 
> That is a good insight, and it can be proved when you assume (explicitly) the 
> Mechanist hypothesis. All computations exist in the arithmetical reality, and 
> physics emerges from a statistics on all first person experience related to 
> those computations. Eventually “physical prediction” with “measure one” have 
> to obey to the logic of []p & <>t, with p partially computable (sigma_1). 
> That gives already a quantum logic.
> 
> 
> 
> It is of course not clear whether this Gödel self-reference is what nature 
> actually does, or whether this is something we do with our QM theory. 


With Mechanism, nature does not exist. The appearance of nature and physical 

Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
>
> Things are much simpler if we assume mechanism, like Everett. But Everett 
> stil assumes some universal wave, which, when we assume mechanism, must be 
> justify by the mechanist first person indeterminacy in arithmetic. 
>
> To apply physics, “shut up and calculate” is all good, but in Metaphysics, 
> it is pure authoritative argument to prevent finding and testing possible 
> solutions of the problem. That is doubly true in the Mechanist frame, 
> probably because the Mechanist solution is troubling for those who are 
> physicalist, and believe in an ontological physical universe.
>
> The mechanist solution is empirically testable, so let us test it. Up to 
> now, Mechanism is the only theory which explains the appearance without 
> eliminating consciousness and its mechanist explanation (the theology G* 
> and its variants).
>
> With Mechanism, physics is not the fundamental science. Physics is reduced 
> to a sort of arithmetical probability/credibility machine theory.
>
> Bruno
>

This distinction between what is physical and what is mechanistic seems 
somewhat contrived. I suppose in the philosophical world this is what 
people do, where now there are people into meta-metaphysics. I am not an 
enemy of philosophy quite in the way Feynman was or his followers as 
Weinberg, but I do think science is best with a minimum of metaphysics.

LC 

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Wednesday, August 21, 2019 at 4:42:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds 
>> account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have 
>> produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding 
>> irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.
>>
>> So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many 
>> people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, 
>> but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be 
>> able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would 
>> have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.
>>
>> As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the 
>> real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the 
>> Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave 
>> function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how 
>> the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of 
>> probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the 
>> objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate 
>> (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real 
>> existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can 
>> safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.
>>
>> It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a 
>> substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it 
>> always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. 
>> There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical 
>> nonsense.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> I started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including 
> reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I 
> will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of 
> PR box argument.
>
> MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence 
> to QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the 
> problem into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if 
> any interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a 
> "it feels good" sort of argument. 
>
>
>
> My point is that with the MWI (by which I mean the QM axiomatics without 
> the collapse postulate) the violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail 
> Faster than Light action at a distance (FTLAD), it entails only a local 
> appearance of such action.
>
> So Aspect experience proves the disjunction “FTLAD or Many-worlds”. But 
> the term “world” should be taken with some caution (there are mathematical 
> phenomenological constructs).
>
>
 I would agree with that. MWI and this curious quantum frame dragging along 
a restricted quantum basis is not some causal influence. I doubt any MWI 
upholder is saying that. 


> I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:
>
> No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is 
> still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI 
> the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding 
> to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is 
> this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, 
> the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer 
> who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on 
> that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to 
> discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic 
> jump.
>
> If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I 
> may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states 
> encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's 
> theorem. 
>
>
> That is a good insight, and it can be proved when you assume (explicitly) 
> the Mechanist hypothesis. All computations exist in the arithmetical 
> reality, and physics emerges from a statistics on all first person 
> experience related to those computations. Eventually “physical prediction” 
> with “measure one” have to obey to the logic of []p & <>t, with p partially 
> computable (sigma_1). That gives already a quantum logic.
>
>
>
It is of course not clear whether this Gödel self-reference is what nature 
actually does, or whether this is something we do with our QM theory. Gödel's 
theorem involves an infinite number of statements or predicates that act on 
Gödel 
numbers of such predicates. For physics this is tantamount to the 
assumption the number of qubits N 

Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Aug 2019, at 03:42, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
> Bruno,
> 
> I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds 
> account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced 
> it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant 
> truisms as if they were great insights.
> 
> So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people 
> casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few 
> even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to 
> shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have given 
> some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.
> 
> As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real 
> existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett 
> insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave function, and the 
> quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis 
> is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the 
> Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world 
> emerges from this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek 
> points out, once you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds 
> becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can safely abandon them as superfluous 
> mathematical superstructure.
> 
> It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a 
> substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it 
> always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. 
> There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical 
> nonsense.
> 
> Bruce
> 
> I started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including reading 
> papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I will try to 
> read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of PR box 
> argument.
> 
> MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to 
> QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem 
> into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any 
> interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it 
> feels good" sort of argument. 


My point is that with the MWI (by which I mean the QM axiomatics without the 
collapse postulate) the violation of Bell’s inequality does not entail Faster 
than Light action at a distance (FTLAD), it entails only a local appearance of 
such action.

So Aspect experience proves the disjunction “FTLAD or Many-worlds”. But the 
term “world” should be taken with some caution (there are mathematical 
phenomenological constructs).




> 
> I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:
> 
> No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is 
> still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI 
> the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding to 
> a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is this 
> idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, the 
> world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer who is 
> in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on that 
> measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to discern 
> one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic jump.
> 
> If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I may 
> work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states 
> encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's 
> theorem.

That is a good insight, and it can be proved when you assume (explicitly) the 
Mechanist hypothesis. All computations exist in the arithmetical reality, and 
physics emerges from a statistics on all first person experience related to 
those computations. Eventually “physical prediction” with “measure one” have to 
obey to the logic of []p & <>t, with p partially computable (sigma_1). That 
gives already a quantum logic.





> The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether QM is 
> ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation and 
> Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and … .

The only physics become a subbranch of machine/number psychology/theology, once 
we assume Mechanism. There is no problem with physics, but there is a problem 
with physicalism, if we make that Mechanist assumption.



> 
> All of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and 
> classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is an 
> ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI 

Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Aug 2019, at 01:11, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> Bruno,
> 
> I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds 
> account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have produced 
> it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding irrelevant 
> truisms as if they were great insights.


I thought we were agreeing. Are you telling me that you believe in FTL after 
all?

All what I said is that non-locality does not imply any physical 
action/influence at a distance.(Even “non-signalling one”).

You loss me completely. 



> 
> So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people 
> casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality,

Yes, it solve it by showing that non-locality does not require FTL at a 
distance. But the price to pay is that no outcome is ever unique in the 3p 
picture (superpositions never die). Uniqueness of outcome  is always a first 
person view of the experience.




> but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be 
> able to shed some light on the matter.

The real light I give comes from the mechanist hypothesis: the physical reality 
is explained in a new way, by deriving the QM formalism from the statistics on 
all computations structure by self-reference.

I don’t assume QM, except in this thread where we discuss if QM’s non local 
feature, and my point is only that

1) with the one-world hypothesis there is FTL action at a distance (FTLAD)
2) with the many-world hypothesis, there is no such FTLAD, the non-locality 
remains a real *phenomenon*, Bell’s inequality are violated, but only as a 
first person plural perception. The local causal explanation is the Wave 
equation (although this one should become also an appearance when we assume 
Mechanism (but that is another thread).



> If you could have done so, it would have given some reason for taking the 
> many-worlds ontology more seriously.

Assuming QM.

(With Mechanism, we get a 0 world theory.). 



> 
> As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real 
> existence of the other worlds.


There are reasons to believe in the non existence of any world. With Mechanism, 
there are only computations, whose existence are proven in RA and PA.

In Everett, the many-worlds should not be taken literally. I told you that the 
closer (to mechanism) account of QM is the one by Griffith, Hartle, Gell-Man 
and Omnes (with some nuances not yet decided by Mechanism).




> One can then follow Zurek and use the Everett insights into the primacy of 
> unitary evolution of the wave function, and the quantum basis for the 
> classical world, to investigate how the preferred basis is found 
> (einselection); to investigate the origin of probabilities and the Born rule 
> (envariance); and to explain how the objective classical world emerges from 
> this unitary quantum substrate (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once 
> you can do this, the real existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant 
> to physics,

Even to mechanism, where we know that there is no physical world at all.



> and one can safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.

Yes, they become explicitly phenomenological appearances. Even the whole wave 
is an appearance with computationalism. 


> 
> It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a 
> substitute for non-locality is now dead,


I was the last hope? Well, what an honour!


> and we are left with physics as it always was -- a single classical world 
> emerging from a quantum substrate. There are many who will see this 
> development as a relief from metaphysical nonsense.

With only one world, you do have a collapse of the wave, and Bell’s inequality 
does imply FTLAD. The non-locality becomes physical, which, Imo, is much more 
nonsensical than the … theorem showing the existence of all computations 
executed in arithmetic.

Bruno





> 
> Bruce
> 
> 
> On Tue, Aug 20, 2019 at 8:34 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 20 Aug 2019, at 08:24, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 6:41 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>> On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal >> > wrote:
>>> Brent, Bruce,
>>> 
>>> On 16 Aug 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from 
>> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes 
>> within the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, 
>> which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice 
>> and Bob.
> 
> That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, 

Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Philip Thrift]

On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 8:42:58 PM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> Bruno,
>>
>> I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds 
>> account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have 
>> produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding 
>> irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.
>>
>> So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many 
>> people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, 
>> but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be 
>> able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would 
>> have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.
>>
>> As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the 
>> real existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the 
>> Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave 
>> function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how 
>> the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of 
>> probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the 
>> objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate 
>> (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real 
>> existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can 
>> safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.
>>
>> It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a 
>> substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it 
>> always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. 
>> There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical 
>> nonsense.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> I started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including 
> reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I 
> will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of 
> PR box argument.
>
> MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence 
> to QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the 
> problem into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if 
> any interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a 
> "it feels good" sort of argument. 
>
> I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:
>
> No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is 
> still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI 
> the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding 
> to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is 
> this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, 
> the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer 
> who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on 
> that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to 
> discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic 
> jump.
>
> If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I 
> may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states 
> encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's 
> theorem. The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether 
> QM is ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation 
> and Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and ... .
>
> All of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and 
> classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is 
> an ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI proposes a splitting 
> of worlds, but there is no definitive meaning to a spatial surface or set 
> of them according to probabilities. Bohm's idea really only has sense in 
> nonrelativistic domain, but that could hold for physics on a holographic 
> screen, so while this has serious weaknesses I will not throw it completely 
> under the bus. There are I read at last count over 50 interpretations. 
> Collapses are not the result of unitary evolution and so appear 
> inconsistent with the evolution of quantum states. I think this is some 
> sort of incompleteness in the axioms or postulate of QM. It might be 
> compared to the fifth axiom of Euclid in geometry. I think in the end, or 
> if I am right, then this is simply a state of affairs that exists, there is 
> no causal process behind it and we are best to just accept this and press 
> on. Maybe this is Mermin's *Shut up and calculate* and this search for 
> interpretations is a waste of time. 
>
> LC
>


I think it is also true of *Many Worlds *(BTW, Sean Carroll is 

Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Tuesday, August 20, 2019 at 6:12:05 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>
> Bruno,
>
> I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds 
> account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have 
> produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding 
> irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.
>
> So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many 
> people casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, 
> but few even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be 
> able to shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would 
> have given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.
>
> As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real 
> existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the 
> Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave 
> function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how 
> the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of 
> probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the 
> objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate 
> (quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real 
> existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can 
> safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.
>
> It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a 
> substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it 
> always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate. 
> There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical 
> nonsense.
>
> Bruce
>

I started reading this paper, but things got in the way --- including 
reading papers that are of more relevance to me. But --- but if I can I 
will try to read this before the week is out. This looks like some sort of 
PR box argument.

MWI seems at first blush to be a nice way to avoid the apparent violence to 
QM that occurs with Bohr's CI. However, really it just remolds the problem 
into another shape. Since there appears to be no way to discern if any 
interpretation is empirically supported MWI in the end just might be a "it 
feels good" sort of argument. 

I wrote the following on Hossenfelder's blog recently:

No matter how you look at it from a phenomenological perspective there is 
still a stochastic quantum jump, or what we call collapse. With Bohr and CI 
the replacement of a quantum state by a quantum basis state corresponding 
to a measured eigenvalue is considered to be axiomatic. With MWI there is 
this idea that on a deep quantum level there is no such violence committed, 
the world simply appears according to a local measurement by an observer 
who is in a sense "quantum frame dragged" along a reduced world based on 
that measured eigenvalue. From an empirical perspective there is no way to 
discern one from the other. They also both involve a sort of stochastic 
jump.

If I have the time and temerity to jump into this cauldron of trouble, I 
may work out this conjecture I have this ultimately involves quantum states 
encoding quantum states. This runs into some incompleteness of Gödel's 
theorem. The implication is there is no decidable way to determine whether 
QM is ψ-epistemic, say in the sense of Bohr and Copenhagen Interpretation 
and Fuch's QuBism, or if it is ψ-ontic in the sense of MWI and GRW and ... .

All of these have problems. Bohr and CI posit as fundamental quantum and 
classical domains. However as pointed out by Heisenberg early on there is 
an ambiguous boundary between these two domains. MWI proposes a splitting 
of worlds, but there is no definitive meaning to a spatial surface or set 
of them according to probabilities. Bohm's idea really only has sense in 
nonrelativistic domain, but that could hold for physics on a holographic 
screen, so while this has serious weaknesses I will not throw it completely 
under the bus. There are I read at last count over 50 interpretations. 
Collapses are not the result of unitary evolution and so appear 
inconsistent with the evolution of quantum states. I think this is some 
sort of incompleteness in the axioms or postulate of QM. It might be 
compared to the fifth axiom of Euclid in geometry. I think in the end, or 
if I am right, then this is simply a state of affairs that exists, there is 
no causal process behind it and we are best to just accept this and press 
on. Maybe this is Mermin's *Shut up and calculate* and this search for 
interpretations is a waste of time. 

LC

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruce Kellett]

Bruno,

I think it is clear that you have no coherent local causal many-worlds
account of the EPR correlations. If you did have one, you would have
produced it by now. Instead you keep changing the subject and propounding
irrelevant truisms as if they were great insights.

So be it. I must admit that I am somewhat disappointed by this. Many people
casually claim that many-worlds solves the problem of non-locality, but few
even attempt to explain how this works. I thought that you might be able to
shed some light on the matter. If you could have done so, it would have
given some reason for taking the many-worlds ontology more seriously.

As it stands, there would appear to be no reason for believing in the real
existence of the other worlds. One can then follow Zurek and use the
Everett insights into the primacy of unitary evolution of the wave
function, and the quantum basis for the classical world, to investigate how
the preferred basis is found (einselection); to investigate the origin of
probabilities and the Born rule (envariance); and to explain how the
objective classical world emerges from this unitary quantum substrate
(quantum Darwinism). As Zurek points out, once you can do this, the real
existence of these other worlds becomes irrelevant to physics, and one can
safely abandon them as superfluous mathematical superstructure.

It seems that the last hope of finding a use for these other worlds as a
substitute for non-locality is now dead, and we are left with physics as it
always was -- a single classical world emerging from a quantum substrate.
There are many who will see this development as a relief from metaphysical
nonsense.

Bruce


On Tue, Aug 20, 2019 at 8:34 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 20 Aug 2019, at 08:24, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 6:41 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>>
>> On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>
>>> Brent, Bruce,
>>>
>>> On 16 Aug 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from
>>> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within
>>> the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is
>>> why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
>>>
>>>
>>> That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the
>>> violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of
>>> reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but
>>> both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can
>>> meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed
>>> lower than light.
>>>
>>>
>>> But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated.  To not be magic
>>> there must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to
>>> Bob's system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do they
>>> interact with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of Alice's
>>> results and not the other?
>>>
>>>
>>> The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) =
>>> 1.
>>>
>>> The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that
>>> whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being
>>> u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest
>>> herself relatively.
>>>
>>
>> That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.
>>
>>
>> I don’t see this. ud - du predicts this, by the quantum formalism.
>>
>
> Yes. And that is the standard non-local argument. Don't forget that, as
> Maudlin points out, the quantum wave function is, itself, a non-local
> object.
>
>
> I can hardly imagine a notion more local than a wave.
>
> But, yes, if a wave describe an amplitude of probability concerning a
> single particle, then, if that wave collapse, it can only do this in a
> highly non-local way. That was the reason why Einstein criticise Bohr’s QM,
> notably in 1927 at the Solvay Congress in Brussels, and which lead to EPR.
>
> I think Maudlin said that the quantum wave is a non-local object in the
> context of the “one-world” assumption. In my edition of his book on
> non-separability he explains this is no more true in the non-collapse
> theory (but you said he changes his mind on this?).
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>> And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means
>>> that her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon
>>> and d for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows
>>> that he will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The
>>> Alices seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d,
>>> will access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and
>>> Bobs observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or
>>> 

Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruno Marchal]

On 20 Aug 2019, at 08:24, Bruce Kellett  wrote:On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 6:41 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett  wrote:On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:Brent, Bruce,On 16 Aug 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List  wrote:
  I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at
  light speed from Alice's measurement event and decoheres
  Bob's system when it comes within the future light cone of
  Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is why it
  needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and
  Bob.

  



That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems
  to me, the violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but
  multi-versal type of reality. When Alice and Bob separates,
  they simply never meet again, but both can meet their
  correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only
  their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed
  lower than light.

  


But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated.  To not be magic
there must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's
result to Bob's system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how
exactly do they interact with Bob and his system to make them
orthogonal to one of Alice's results and not the other?  The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively.That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.I don’t see this. ud - du predicts this, by the quantum formalism.Yes. And that is the standard non-local argument. Don't forget that, as Maudlin points out, the quantum wave function is, itself, a non-local object.I can hardly imagine a notion more local than a wave.But, yes, if a wave describe an amplitude of probability concerning a single particle, then, if that wave collapse, it can only do this in a highly non-local way. That was the reason why Einstein criticise Bohr’s QM, notably in 1927 at the Solvay Congress in Brussels, and which lead to EPR.I think Maudlin said that the quantum wave is a non-local object in the context of the “one-world” assumption. In my edition of his book on non-separability he explains this is no more true in the non-collapse theory (but you said he changes his mind on this?).  And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or slower, and no physical influence exist at all. They both only localise themselves in the multiverse, at different possible cosmic branches.What makes a history "accessible"? You have offered only magic to rule out histories that violate the basic conservation rules.I don’t see this at all. (I assume QM here, not mechanism).I don't know how I can make you understand that just multiplying the number of "worlds", and appealing to some obscure notion of "histories", does nothing towards providing a coherent local causal account of the observed correlations.It is not the multiplication of worlds per se which solves the problem, it is the fact that the "multiplication of worlds” is itself a local phenomenon. When Alice measures her particle, and Bob measure his particle, they both “multiply” their accessible worlds, in which both will met eventually their correlated counterparts, whatever the results their could be said to have obtained initially (if we could give some sense for this). The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light physical influence.The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated singlet particles.I don’t see this. Alice and Bob have prepared the particle together (or by some entanglement swapping technic), the state ud-du require the correlations, in all base. Once separated, they 

Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 6:41 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> Brent, Bruce,
>>
>> On 16 Aug 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from
>> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within
>> the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is
>> why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
>>
>>
>> That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the
>> violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of
>> reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but
>> both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can
>> meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed
>> lower than light.
>>
>>
>> But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated.  To not be magic there
>> must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to Bob's
>> system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do they
>> interact with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of Alice's
>> results and not the other?
>>
>>
>> The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.
>>
>> The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that
>> whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being
>> u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest
>> herself relatively.
>>
>
> That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.
>
>
> I don’t see this. ud - du predicts this, by the quantum formalism.
>

Yes. And that is the standard non-local argument. Don't forget that, as
Maudlin points out, the quantum wave function is, itself, a non-local
object.


> And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that
>> her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d
>> for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he
>> will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices
>> seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will
>> access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs
>> observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or
>> slower, and no physical influence exist at all. They both only localise
>> themselves in the multiverse, at different possible cosmic branches.
>>
>
> What makes a history "accessible"? You have offered only magic to rule out
> histories that violate the basic conservation rules.
>
>
> I don’t see this at all. (I assume QM here, not mechanism).
>

I don't know how I can make you understand that just multiplying the number
of "worlds", and appealing to some obscure notion of "histories", does
nothing towards providing a coherent local causal account of the observed
correlations.


> The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob,
>> which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than
>> light physical influence.
>>
>
> The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is
> clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of
> Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and
> down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated
> singlet particles.
>
>
> I don’t see this. Alice and Bob have prepared the particle together (or by
> some entanglement swapping technic), the state ud-du require the
> correlations, in all base. Once separated, they can only access to their
> correlate parts, which requires the “creation” of “new” Bob and Alice.
>

Any copies of Alice and Bob that there might be are created at the time
they make their measurements and observe (record) their results. This
happens at space-like separations, so any correlations are necessarily
non-local in origin. All else is magic or mysticism.


> It is up to you, if you think that some FTL influence occur, to explain
> why and how.
>

Don't try and divert attention from your own failings by claiming that it
is all my responsibility. This is about you, and your failure to provide
the advertised local causal account through many worlds, that is at issue.


A quantum state does not describe a world, but is only an indexical map,
>> for a subject, of the histories that he/she can access to.  ud-du means
>> only, to Alice and Bob, that they will always means their corresponding
>> correlated counterpart, whatever they found.
>>
>
> Given the miracle that occurs at this step in your account.
>
> Which miracle? I just use the fact that once a superposition is there, it
> never collapse. It is the collapse which would be magical.
>

Collapse is irrelevant. This is just 

Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Aug 2019, at 13:59, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 6:41 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>> On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>> The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.
>> 
>> The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever 
>> she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with 
>> bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself 
>> relatively.
>> 
>> That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.
> 
> I don’t see this. ud - du predicts this, by the quantum formalism. 
> 
> Yes, and that formalism requires what for you is "the dreaded collapse". 
> Think about it. How else does this work in conventional QM?
> 
> 
>> The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, 
>> which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than 
>> light physical influence.
>> 
>> The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is 
>> clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of 
>> Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and 
>> down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated 
>> singlet particles.
> 
> I don’t see this. Alice and Bob have prepared the particle together (or by 
> some entanglement swapping technic), the state ud-du require the 
> correlations, in all base. Once separated, they can only access to their 
> correlate parts, which requires the “creation” of “new” Bob and Alice. 
> 
> No, this is just an appeal to magic. "They can only have access to their 
> correlate parts"? That is what you have to explain. What prevents them from 
> accessing all the other combinations.

Unitarity.



> 
> Look, it is actually quite simple for you. All you have to do is provide a 
> local causal explanation for the appearance of the cos^2(theta/2) dependence 
> on the relative angle between Alice's and Bob's separate and independent 
> measurements. If Alice gets 'up', Bob has a probability of sin^2(theta/2) of 
> getting 'up', and cos^2(theta/2) probability of getting 'down'.  Do that, and 
> I might be convinced. So far, you haven't even come close.

The local causal explanation, here, is the wave equation. The non-locality (the 
violation of Bell’s inequality, or GHZ’s even more weird happening) is 
explained by the causal evolution of the wave in a higher dimensional space.

Everett has been criticised for giving the same prediction, but that was the 
idea: showing that the average relative observer in the relatives state theory 
gives the same prediction than conventional QM. There is no need to assume an 
Heisenberg cut or a von Neuman-Wigner ultimate first person reduction of the 
wave: there is just no collapse, and observation/measurement is 
self-entanglement. 







> 
> 
> It is up to you, if you think that some FTL influence occur, to explain why 
> and how.
> 
> It is not up to me to provide a local explanation. I claim that the effect is 
> non-local.

But both Digital mechanism and Quantum mechanics suggests, if not impose some 
“non-locality”. My point is that with the relative state notion, that you get 
when you decide to apply QM on the couple observer + observed, the 
non-locality, the inseparability of D’Espagnat, is a true observable 
phenomenon, but it does not requires faster than light influence: it is a 
statistical effect depending on our indetermination on which histories we 
belong too in the infinities of histoires described by the singlet state.




> You are the one who is required to provide a local explanation.

H phi = E phi

If you can show how this implies FTL action at distance, you might try to show 
me.



> You claim that it is a consequence of many worlds, or the absence of 
> collapse. OK, then convince me…….

You are the guy making the extraordinary claim, which in my opinion contradicts 
already special relativity (or pushing the instrumentalist “shut up and 
compute” maximally).

The singlet state is independent of the base in which it is written. It is a 
state where both Alice and Bob could find any result, then you have to take 
into account that Alice share the world with Bob, but they have different 
indetermination in between the measurement. Your four worlds interpretation get 
wrong when you take all the relative state into account. I prove this to myself 
by a simple induction on the lattice defining a localised object, then all 
interactions generates a wave of self-entanglement with the environment at each 
step of the histories. In this way, despite everything is described by a 
local/causal history, it will look indeterminate and non local from some 
classes of histories. The astract treatment of this is well done in the book 

Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruce Kellett]

On Mon, Aug 19, 2019 at 6:41 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>>
>> The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.
>>
>> The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that
>> whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being
>> u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest
>> herself relatively.
>>
>
> That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.
>
>
> I don’t see this. ud - du predicts this, by the quantum formalism.
>

Yes, and that formalism requires what for you is "the dreaded collapse".
Think about it. How else does this work in conventional QM?


The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob,
>> which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than
>> light physical influence.
>>
>
> The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is
> clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of
> Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and
> down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated
> singlet particles.
>
>
> I don’t see this. Alice and Bob have prepared the particle together (or by
> some entanglement swapping technic), the state ud-du require the
> correlations, in all base. Once separated, they can only access to their
> correlate parts, which requires the “creation” of “new” Bob and Alice.
>

No, this is just an appeal to magic. "They can only have access to their
correlate parts"? That is what you have to explain. What prevents them from
accessing all the other combinations.

Look, it is actually quite simple for you. All you have to do is provide a
local causal explanation for the appearance of the cos^2(theta/2)
dependence on the relative angle between Alice's and Bob's separate and
independent measurements. If Alice gets 'up', Bob has a probability of
sin^2(theta/2) of getting 'up', and cos^2(theta/2) probability of getting
'down'.  Do that, and I might be convinced. So far, you haven't even come
close.


It is up to you, if you think that some FTL influence occur, to explain why
> and how.
>

It is not up to me to provide a local explanation. I claim that the effect
is non-local. You are the one who is required to provide a local
explanation. You claim that it is a consequence of many worlds, or the
absence of collapse. OK, then convince me...



> Both EPR and Bell assumes that "Alice and Bob” are well defined and keep
> their identity throughout the experience, which indeed would require some
> FTL influence, but I don’t see that FTL when we keep all branch of the
> superposition into account.
>

Bell does not require that assumption. I have given you full accounts of
Bell that did not rely on any collapse assumption, accounts in which both
Alice and Bob get both up and down results. You just have to show how the
(theta/2) dependence between their results arises from purely local
interactions in the many worlds situation.

I can offer you considerable odds that you will not be able to do this.

Bruce

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 19 Aug 2019, at 04:02, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> Brent, Bruce,
> 
> On 16 Aug 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
>> On 8/16/2019 4:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
 >>> > wrote:
 
 
 On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell 
>  > wrote:
> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
> 
> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally 
> according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the 
> incorrect pairs ever meeting.
 
 I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from 
 Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within 
 the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is 
 why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
>>> 
>>> That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the 
>>> violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of 
>>> reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but 
>>> both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can 
>>> meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed 
>>> lower than light.
>> 
>> But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated.  To not be magic there 
>> must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to Bob's 
>> system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do they 
>> interact with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of Alice's 
>> results and not the other?  
> 
> The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.
> 
> The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever 
> she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with 
> bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself 
> relatively.
> 
> That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.

I don’t see this. ud - du predicts this, by the quantum formalism. 




>  
> And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that 
> her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d 
> for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he 
> will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices 
> seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will 
> access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs 
> observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or slower, 
> and no physical influence exist at all. They both only localise themselves in 
> the multiverse, at different possible cosmic branches.
> 
> What makes a history "accessible"? You have offered only magic to rule out 
> histories that violate the basic conservation rules.

I don’t see this at all. (I assume QM here, not mechanism).



> 
> The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which 
> would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light 
> physical influence.
> 
> The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is 
> clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of 
> Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and down 
> results are always possible for any measurement on the separated singlet 
> particles.

I don’t see this. Alice and Bob have prepared the particle together (or by some 
entanglement swapping technic), the state ud-du require the correlations, in 
all base. Once separated, they can only access to their correlate parts, which 
requires the “creation” of “new” Bob and Alice. 

It is up to you, if you think that some FTL influence occur, to explain why and 
how.




>  
> A quantum state does not describe a world, but is only an indexical map, for 
> a subject, of the histories that he/she can access to.  ud-du means only, to 
> Alice and Bob, that they will always means their corresponding correlated 
> counterpart, whatever they found.
> 
> Given the miracle that occurs at this step in your account.

Which miracle? I just use the fact that once a superposition is there, it never 
collapse. It is the collapse which would be magical.



>  
>  Even if we give sense to “they both find u”, each of us will meet they 
> counterparts, which they can interact with when meeting again,  having found 
> d.
> 
> You are not convincing anyone other than yourself here, Bruno.

I don’t think so. I am not sure if you are not the only one, perhaps with 

Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 18 Aug 2019, at 20:46, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/18/2019 2:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 17 Aug 2019, at 21:49, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>>  
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 8/17/2019 6:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that 
 whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being 
 u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest 
 herself relatively. And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice 
 see u, it means that her accessible histories will all be consistent with 
 u for her photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be 
 the same: he knows that he will meet Alice having seen d. Both 
 possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u will access a world with Bob 
 seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a world with Bob seeing u. The 
 same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs observations will spread toward each 
 other at the speed of light, or slower, and no physical influence exist at 
 all. 
>>> If there is no physical influence, then why is it limited to light speed?
>> Because the spreading of the superposition is a local phenomenon.
> A local physical phenomenon.  "Local" means interactions only occur  at the 
> same spacetime point...all both interactions and spacetime are physical 
> concepts..  So you've done nothing but say the same thing again while 
> avoiding the word "physical”.

I meant that  the spreading of the wave is a local physical local phenomenon, 
as oppose to a collapse into *one* physical reality, with one couple Alice-Bobn 
which would require a faster than light physical influence at a distance.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 11:00 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> Brent, Bruce,
>
> On 16 Aug 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
> On 8/16/2019 4:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>
> On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <
> goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
>>
>
> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally
> according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the
> incorrect pairs ever meeting.
>
>
> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from
> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within
> the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is
> why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
>
>
> That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the
> violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of
> reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but
> both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can
> meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed
> lower than light.
>
>
> But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated.  To not be magic there
> must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to Bob's
> system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do they
> interact with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of Alice's
> results and not the other?
>
>
> The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.
>
> The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that
> whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being
> u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest
> herself relatively.
>

That is exactly the magic that needs to be explained.


> And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that
> her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d
> for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he
> will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices
> seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will
> access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs
> observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or
> slower, and no physical influence exist at all. They both only localise
> themselves in the multiverse, at different possible cosmic branches.
>

What makes a history "accessible"? You have offered only magic to rule out
histories that violate the basic conservation rules.

The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob,
> which would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than
> light physical influence.
>

The argument does not depend on any "one world" assumption. The problem is
clearly present even in the Everettian setting, when there are copies of
Alice and Bob who see each result. These always exist, since both up and
down results are always possible for any measurement on the separated
singlet particles.


> A quantum state does not describe a world, but is only an indexical map,
> for a subject, of the histories that he/she can access to.  ud-du means
> only, to Alice and Bob, that they will always means their corresponding
> correlated counterpart, whatever they found.
>

Given the miracle that occurs at this step in your account.


>  Even if we give sense to “they both find u”, each of us will meet they
> counterparts, which they can interact with when meeting again,  having
> found d.
>

You are not convincing anyone other than yourself here, Bruno.

Bruce

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 8/18/2019 2:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 17 Aug 2019, at 21:49, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything 
List  wrote:



On 8/17/2019 6:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she 
will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob 
photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively. 
And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that her 
accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d for 
bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will 
meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u 
will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a world 
with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs observations will 
spread toward each other at the speed of light, or slower, and no physical 
influence exist at all.

If there is no physical influence, then why is it limited to light speed?

Because the spreading of the superposition is a local phenomenon.
A local physical phenomenon.  "Local" means interactions only occur at 
the same spacetime point...all both interactions and spacetime are 
physical concepts..  So you've done nothing but say the same thing again 
while avoiding the word "physical".


Brent

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 15 Aug 2019, at 17:56, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm 
> 
> 
> Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our world 
> is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more than does 
> quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local realism 
> with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along the way, 
> we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, 
> and come to the conclusion that they were right in their questioning the 
> completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, provided one 
> believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our journey, we strive to 
> explain our views from first principles, without expecting mathematical 
> sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from the reader.

As farra as I understand, with few ambiguous propositions, it seems coherent 
with Mechanism and the type of many-histories it implies, and I appreciate it 
leads to a local physics (although this is still an open problem with 
mechanism).

Bruno



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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 17 Aug 2019, at 21:49, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/17/2019 6:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever 
>> she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with 
>> bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself 
>> relatively. And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it 
>> means that her accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her 
>> photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he 
>> knows that he will meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. 
>> The Alices seeing u will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing 
>> d, will access a world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and 
>> Bobs observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or 
>> slower, and no physical influence exist at all. 
> 
> If there is no physical influence, then why is it limited to light speed?

Because the spreading of the superposition is a local phenomenon. That is why 
both Alice and Bob “create” their own counterparts.




> and why does it have physical consequences?

Because we belong to all histories, and the formalism entail statistical 
interference of the histories that we cannot distinguish.

The Aspect experience shows that this lakes sense. It entails (assuming no 
loophole and all that) the existence of the alternate outcomes or of faster 
than light (FTL)  influence, I would say.

It is up to believer in fhe FTL to devise an experience showing its existence. 
I think. Aspect experience certainly show this if we add the assumption that 
the singlet state describe one universe, with one Alice and Bob, but my 
interpretation of the singlet state involves an infinity (or a great number, 
that depend on how space-time-gravity is quantised) of Alices and Bobs.

Bruno



> 
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> 
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Re: Local Realism and Bell

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 8/17/2019 6:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that 
whatever she will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon 
being u and with bob photon being d, including the bob she could ever 
manifest herself relatively. And reciprocally with Bob. It is just 
that when Alice see u, it means that her accessible histories will all 
be consistent with u for her photon and d for bob’s photon. If Bob 
sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will meet Alice 
having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u will 
access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a 
world with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs 
observations will spread toward each other at the speed of light, or 
slower, and no physical influence exist at all. 


If there is no physical influence, then why is it limited to light 
speed? and why does it have physical consequences?


Brent

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruno Marchal]

Brent, Bruce,


> On 16 Aug 2019, at 22:26, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/16/2019 4:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
 On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell 
 >>> > wrote:
 I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
 
 I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally 
 according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the 
 incorrect pairs ever meeting.
>>> 
>>> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from 
>>> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within 
>>> the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is 
>>> why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
>> 
>> That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the 
>> violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. 
>> When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can 
>> meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only 
>> their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than 
>> light.
> 
> But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated.  To not be magic there 
> must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to Bob's 
> system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do they interact 
> with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of Alice's results and 
> not the other?  

The state is ud - du, for d = down and u = up, with the usual sqrt(2) = 1.

The idea is that when Alice see her photon being u, she knows that whatever she 
will be interact with will be consistent wit her photon being u and with bob 
photon being d, including the bob she could ever manifest herself relatively. 
And reciprocally with Bob. It is just that when Alice see u, it means that her 
accessible histories will all be consistent with u for her photon and d for 
bob’s photon. If Bob sees u to, that will be the same: he knows that he will 
meet Alice having seen d. Both possibilities will exist. The Alices seeing u 
will access a world with Bob seeing d. The Alice seeing d, will access a world 
with Bob seeing u. The same for Bob. Both Alices and Bobs observations will 
spread toward each other at the speed of light, or slower, and no physical 
influence exist at all. They both only localise themselves in the multiverse, 
at different possible cosmic branches.

The magic comes only from the idea that there is one Alice and one Bob, which 
would make this reasoning obviously invalid, or introduce faster than light 
physical influence.

A quantum state does not describe a world, but is only an indexical map, for a 
subject, of the histories that he/she can access to.  ud-du means only, to 
Alice and Bob, that they will always means their corresponding correlated 
counterpart, whatever they found. Even if we give sense to “they both find u”, 
each of us will meet they counterparts, which they can interact with when 
meeting again,  having found d.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, Aug 17, 2019 at 12:21 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 16 Aug 2019, at 13:30, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:23 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>> On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <
>> goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
>>>
>>
>> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally
>> according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the
>> incorrect pairs ever meeting.
>>
>>
>> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from
>> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within
>> the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is
>> why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
>>
>>
>> That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the
>> violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of
>> reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but
>> both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can
>> meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed
>> lower than light.
>>
>
>
> That doesn't explain anything.
>
>
> I know you’ve already try to expand on this, but it seems to me that this
> was based on some incorrect interpretation of the notion of worlds, like if
> a measurement made by Alice has to change the possible outcomes available
> to Bob, but that does not happen in the relative state view. Only a
> physical collapse would entail some “action at a distance”; without
> collapse anywhere, I don’t see how could such influence at a distance
> occurs. We did disagree also on the numbers of histories involved, which I
> take to be always infinite.
>

Clarify your argument, then, and remove the suggestion of magic.

Bruce

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, August 16, 2019 at 3:26:47 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 8/16/2019 4:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everyth...@googlegroups.com > wrote:
>
>
>
> On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
>> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
>>
>
> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally 
> according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the 
> incorrect pairs ever meeting.
>
>
> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from 
> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within 
> the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is 
> why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
>
>
> That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the 
> violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of 
> reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but 
> both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can 
> meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed 
> lower than light.
>
>
> But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated.  To not be magic there 
> must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to Bob's 
> system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do they 
> interact with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of Alice's 
> results and not the other?  
>
> Brent
>



People were asking this question decades ago, and will still be asking it 
decades in the future.

@philipthrift 

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 8/16/2019 4:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell 
> wrote:


I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.


I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split 
locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to 
prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.


I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed 
from Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it 
comes within the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice 
versa, which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry 
between Alice and Bob.


That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the 
violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of 
reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, 
but both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each 
Bob can meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, 
at a speed lower than light.


But as Bruce says, it's a kind of magic as stated.  To not be magic 
there must be some physical interactions communicating Alice's result to 
Bob's system: Photons would the obvious candidate, but how exactly do 
they interact with Bob and his system to make them orthogonal to one of 
Alice's results and not the other?


Brent

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Aug 2019, at 13:30, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:23 PM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
>> On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
>>> 
>>> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally 
>>> according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the 
>>> incorrect pairs ever meeting.
>> 
>> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from 
>> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within 
>> the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is why 
>> it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
> 
> That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the 
> violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. 
> When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet 
> their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their 
> correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.
> 
> 
> That doesn't explain anything.

I know you’ve already try to expand on this, but it seems to me that this was 
based on some incorrect interpretation of the notion of worlds, like if a 
measurement made by Alice has to change the possible outcomes available to Bob, 
but that does not happen in the relative state view. Only a physical collapse 
would entail some “action at a distance”; without collapse anywhere, I don’t 
see how could such influence at a distance occurs. We did disagree also on the 
numbers of histories involved, which I take to be always infinite.

Bruno




> 
> Bruce 
> 
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>  
> .

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:23 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
> On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <
> goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
>>
>
> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally
> according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the
> incorrect pairs ever meeting.
>
>
> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from
> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within
> the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is
> why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
>
>
> That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the
> violation of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of
> reality. When Alice and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but
> both can meet their correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can
> meet only their correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed
> lower than light.
>


That doesn't explain anything.

Bruce

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 16 Aug 2019, at 03:27, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell 
>> mailto:goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
>> 
>> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally 
>> according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the 
>> incorrect pairs ever meeting.
> 
> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from 
> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within the 
> future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is why it 
> needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.

That is my understanding. That explains entirely, it seems to me, the violation 
of Bell’s inequality in a local, but multi-versal type of reality. When Alice 
and Bob separates, they simply never meet again, but both can meet their 
correlated counterparts. Each Alice and each Bob can meet only their 
correlates, that they enforce by decoherence, at a speed lower than light.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> Not convincing.
>> 
>> Bruce
>>  
>> LC
>> 
>> On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>> From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm 
>> 
>> 
>> Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our world 
>> is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more than 
>> does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local 
>> realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along 
>> the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky 
>> and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their 
>> questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, 
>> provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our journey, 
>> we strive to explain our views from first principles, without expecting 
>> mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from the reader.
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>>  
>> .
> 
> 
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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Philip Thrift]

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 8:27:23 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
>> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
>>
>
> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally 
> according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the 
> incorrect pairs ever meeting.
>
>
> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from 
> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within 
> the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is 
> why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
>
> Brent
>
>
>

All of this is well-established physics.

@philipthrift 


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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 2:07 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 8:43 PM Bruce Kellett 
> wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 11:27 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <
>>> goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
 I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

>>>
>>> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split
>>> locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to
>>> prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.
>>>
>>>
>>> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from
>>> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within
>>> the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is
>>> why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> It is paragraphs like this that seem to me to appeal to magic:
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>>  "It is only when Alice and Bob interact that correlations are
>> established. Let us assume for the moment that both Alice and Bob always
>> push their buttons before interacting. The magical rule is that an Alice is
>> allowed to interact with a Bob if and only if they jointly satisfy the
>> conditions of the nonlocal box set out in Table 1
>> 
>> .
>> "For example, if Alice pushes button 1, she splits. Consider the Alice
>> who sees green. Her system can be imagined to carry the following rule: You
>> are allowed to interact with Bob if either he had pushed button 0 on his
>> box and seen green, or pushed button 1 and seen red. Should this Alice ever
>> come in presence of a Bob who had pushed button 1 and seen green, she would
>> simply not become aware of his presence and could walk right through him
>> without either one of them noticing anything. Of course, the other Alice,
>> the one who had seen red after pushing button 1, would be free to shake
>> hands with that Bob."
>>
>> "When they meet, the correlations they experience are simply due to the
>> matching rule that determines which Alices are allowed to interact with
>> which Bobs,"
>>
>>
> The scenario described in the paper isn't meant to be an account of
> reality, it's a contrived scenario stated up front to be an imaginary
> universe. The paper is meant to show that Bell does not disprove local
> realism, only local hidden variables with single definite outcomes of
> measurement.
>
> As for the magic, there is magic as the Non-local boxes in the scenario
> operate by magic, and the rule that enforces consistency can be viewed as a
> a form of magic too.  In our world and in QM things are a bit different.
> Perfect functioning non-local boxes are not possible, at best we can
> violate Bell's inequality by 10% using entanglement.  If one uses entangled
> particles to build approximately functioning non-local boxes, then the rule
> that prevents interacting with incompatible branches is the same
> consistency rule that ensures if you make the repeated measurements of the
> same observable you get consistent results.  In the case of the entangled
> particles, they have both already interacted (they'be both already measured
> each other), so measuring one and finding it to be spin down, tells you
> already the other one is spin up.  So when you Alice receives a radio
> message from Bob, she already knows the result.  You can view meeting the
> Bob as just another kind of measurement (and for the same observable).
>

That doesn't work for entangled particles in the singlet state either.
Since the measurements by Alice and Bob are independent, both can get
either up or down. They both split into two universes, separately and
locally. But when Alice-up, say, meets Bob, she splits according to his
result. So we get two possibilities: (Alice-up + Bob-up), and (Alice-up +
Bob-down). For the case of aligned S-G magnets, the (Alice-up + Bob-up)
combination is not possible. The impossibility of such a meeting requires
exactly the same magic as the Brassard et al. paper proposes.

Bruce.

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Jason Resch]

On Thu, Aug 15, 2019 at 8:43 PM Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 11:27 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>> On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <
>> goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
>>>
>>
>> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally
>> according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the
>> incorrect pairs ever meeting.
>>
>>
>> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from
>> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within
>> the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is
>> why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> It is paragraphs like this that seem to me to appeal to magic:
>
> Bruce
>
>  "It is only when Alice and Bob interact that correlations are
> established. Let us assume for the moment that both Alice and Bob always
> push their buttons before interacting. The magical rule is that an Alice is
> allowed to interact with a Bob if and only if they jointly satisfy the
> conditions of the nonlocal box set out in Table 1
> 
> .
> "For example, if Alice pushes button 1, she splits. Consider the Alice who
> sees green. Her system can be imagined to carry the following rule: You are
> allowed to interact with Bob if either he had pushed button 0 on his box
> and seen green, or pushed button 1 and seen red. Should this Alice ever
> come in presence of a Bob who had pushed button 1 and seen green, she would
> simply not become aware of his presence and could walk right through him
> without either one of them noticing anything. Of course, the other Alice,
> the one who had seen red after pushing button 1, would be free to shake
> hands with that Bob."
>
> "When they meet, the correlations they experience are simply due to the
> matching rule that determines which Alices are allowed to interact with
> which Bobs,"
>
>
The scenario described in the paper isn't meant to be an account of
reality, it's a contrived scenario stated up front to be an imaginary
universe. The paper is meant to show that Bell does not disprove local
realism, only local hidden variables with single definite outcomes of
measurement.

As for the magic, there is magic as the Non-local boxes in the scenario
operate by magic, and the rule that enforces consistency can be viewed as a
a form of magic too.  In our world and in QM things are a bit different.
Perfect functioning non-local boxes are not possible, at best we can
violate Bell's inequality by 10% using entanglement.  If one uses entangled
particles to build approximately functioning non-local boxes, then the rule
that prevents interacting with incompatible branches is the same
consistency rule that ensures if you make the repeated measurements of the
same observable you get consistent results.  In the case of the entangled
particles, they have both already interacted (they'be both already measured
each other), so measuring one and finding it to be spin down, tells you
already the other one is spin up.  So when you Alice receives a radio
message from Bob, she already knows the result.  You can view meeting the
Bob as just another kind of measurement (and for the same observable).

Jason

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 11:27 AM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

> On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <
> goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
>>
>
> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally
> according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the
> incorrect pairs ever meeting.
>
>
> I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from
> Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes within
> the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, which is
> why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice and Bob.
>
> Brent
>

It is paragraphs like this that seem to me to appeal to magic:

Bruce

 "It is only when Alice and Bob interact that correlations are established.
Let us assume for the moment that both Alice and Bob always push their
buttons before interacting. The magical rule is that an Alice is allowed to
interact with a Bob if and only if they jointly satisfy the conditions of
the nonlocal box set out in Table 1

.
"For example, if Alice pushes button 1, she splits. Consider the Alice who
sees green. Her system can be imagined to carry the following rule: You are
allowed to interact with Bob if either he had pushed button 0 on his box
and seen green, or pushed button 1 and seen red. Should this Alice ever
come in presence of a Bob who had pushed button 1 and seen green, she would
simply not become aware of his presence and could walk right through him
without either one of them noticing anything. Of course, the other Alice,
the one who had seen red after pushing button 1, would be free to shake
hands with that Bob."

"When they meet, the correlations they experience are simply due to the
matching rule that determines which Alices are allowed to interact with
which Bobs,"

Bruce

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 8/15/2019 5:06 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell 
> wrote:


I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.


I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split 
locally according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to 
prevent the incorrect pairs ever meeting.


I think you can interpret it as decoherence spreads at light speed from 
Alice's measurement event and decoheres Bob's system when it comes 
within the future light cone of Alice's measurementand vice versa, 
which is why it needs to assume MWI to maintain symmetry between Alice 
and Bob.


Brent



Not convincing.

Bruce

LC

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm

Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary
world. Our world is both local and realistic, yet it violates
a Bell inequality more than does quantum theory. This serves
to debunk the myth that equates local realism with local
hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along the
way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein,
Podolsky and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were
right in their questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen
version of quantum theory, provided one believes in a
local-realistic universe. Throughout our journey, we strive to
explain our views from first principles, without expecting
mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge
from the reader.

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

It postulates there is a change in the global state function which 
spreads at the speed of light and decoheres superpositions that are 
measured.


Brent

On 8/15/2019 4:25 PM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

LC

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:

From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm


Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world.
Our world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell
inequality more than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk
the myth that equates local realism with local hidden variables in
the simplest possible manner. Along the way, we reinterpret the
celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen, and come
to the conclusion that they were right in their questioning the
completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, provided
one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our
journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles,
without expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized
prior knowledge from the reader.

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 7:06:51 PM UTC-5, Bruce wrote:
>
> On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell  > wrote:
>
>> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
>>
>
> I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally 
> according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the 
> incorrect pairs ever meeting.
>
> Not convincing.
>
> Bruce
>

A black hole could do the trick. I have only looked at the first page of 
this, so I can't judge this deeply yet. I keep getting interrupted by 
things like phone calls and then my gallomph of a Labrador Retriever wanted 
attention.

LC
 

>  
>
>> LC
>>
>> On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>>
>>> From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm
>>>
>>> Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our 
>>> world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more 
>>> than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local 
>>> realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along 
>>> the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky 
>>> and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their 
>>> questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, 
>>> provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our 
>>> journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without 
>>> expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from 
>>> the reader.
>>>
>>

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Bruce Kellett]

On Fri, Aug 16, 2019 at 9:25 AM Lawrence Crowell <
goldenfieldquaterni...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.
>

I have skimmed through it. It seems that Alice and Bob both split locally
according to the results they get, but then rely on magic to prevent the
incorrect pairs ever meeting.

Not convincing.

Bruce


> LC
>
> On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>>
>> From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm
>>
>> Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our
>> world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more
>> than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local
>> realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along
>> the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky
>> and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their
>> questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory,
>> provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our
>> journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without
>> expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from
>> the reader.
>>
>

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Lawrence Crowell]

I started reading this. It looks similar to the PR box argument.

LC

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
> From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm
>
> Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our 
> world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more 
> than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local 
> realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along 
> the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky 
> and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their 
> questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, 
> provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our 
> journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without 
> expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from 
> the reader.
>

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Re: Local Realism and Bell

[Philip Thrift]

*"quantum theory is the science of preparing systems in one state and 
detecting them in another state; everything that happens in between is 
philosophy"*

- https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/philosophy-of-physics-quantum-theory/

Everyone has their own breed of gremlins that operate "in between".

@philipthrift

On Thursday, August 15, 2019 at 10:56:24 AM UTC-5, Jason wrote:
>
> From: https://www.mdpi.com/1099-4300/21/1/87/htm
>
> Abstract: We carry out a thought experiment in an imaginary world. Our 
> world is both local and realistic, yet it violates a Bell inequality more 
> than does quantum theory. This serves to debunk the myth that equates local 
> realism with local hidden variables in the simplest possible manner. Along 
> the way, we reinterpret the celebrated 1935 argument of Einstein, Podolsky 
> and Rosen, and come to the conclusion that they were right in their 
> questioning the completeness of the Copenhagen version of quantum theory, 
> provided one believes in a local-realistic universe. Throughout our 
> journey, we strive to explain our views from first principles, without 
> expecting mathematical sophistication nor specialized prior knowledge from 
> the reader.
>

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