Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On Thursday, February 27, 2014 7:30:22 PM UTC-5, Liz R wrote: On 28 February 2014 12:36, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: Identity isn't self contained in MSR. All identity is leased within some perspective. The more common the perspective, the longer the lease, and the more 'seems like' or 'has a similar quality' appears stabilized as 'is equal'. What is a perspective, and how would I construct or discover or recognise one without using any underlying theory of identity? A perspective is a perceptual-inertial frame. Everything that we can construct, recognize, or discover is filtered through all of the contexts of the encounter. I don't see identity as a requirement. Every human experience is filtered through their own individual frame which is dynamically compounded with each additional experience. The individual frame overlaps and underlaps with social frames, anthopological frames, zoological, biological, chemical-geological, and astrophysical-quantum frames. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:31, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?' But we cannot be content to let how else? stand as mere rhetoric, can we? Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress of having to ask 'how does asking how' work? If you follow the unavoidably more mathematical thread (which exploits the link between computationalism and theoretical computer science) you might eventually understand how a machine can explain its entire 3p functioning (and with chance: at its correct 1p substitution level). Like a tiny part of arithmetical truth can already explain why normal universal numbers get in awe in front of the gap between proof and truth. We don't have to ask how it works, nor must there be an answer which could satisfy such an expectation. But we *can* ask, isn't it? We might never find the correct answer, but we can find better and better theories. Advantage of comp? We can easily do science. The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons. Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to anything primordial. Comp is a banal theory, in the sense of being believed (consciously or not) by many people, mainly materialist . Few computationalists today are aware that it put theology and physics upside down, yet in a simple elementary interpretations capable to be understood by any universal machine. It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they got into a projection on a screen. Bad analogy, misused. You beg the question. You just can't compare authentic self-referentially correct machines, amenable to mathematical studies, with dolls. Study the movie graph argument, and you will see that you are almost correct here, but this only by reifying mind and/or matter in a way where in comp it becomes a problem in math. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On Thursday, February 27, 2014 9:38:05 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 24 Feb 2014, at 17:31, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?' But we cannot be content to let how else? stand as mere rhetoric, can we? Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress of having to ask 'how does asking how' work? If you follow the unavoidably more mathematical thread (which exploits the link between computationalism and theoretical computer science) you might eventually understand how a machine can explain its entire 3p functioning (and with chance: at its correct 1p substitution level). The only mathematical thread I would be interested in following is one which exploits the link between computationalism or theoretical computer science and aesthetic realism. Like a tiny part of arithmetical truth can already explain why normal universal numbers get in awe in front of the gap between proof and truth. Why would the gap between proof and truth cause awe? What arithmetic function does awe server? We don't have to ask how it works, nor must there be an answer which could satisfy such an expectation. But we *can* ask, isn't it? We might never find the correct answer, but we can find better and better theories. We can ask, sure, but its a mistake. We can ask who matter is made of also, or where arithmetic is, but they don't lead to better theories, they lead to confusion. Advantage of comp? We can easily do science. Sure, it makes sense that theories that are made from science instead of reality would be easier to manage with science. The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons. Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to anything primordial. Comp is a banal theory, in the sense of being believed (consciously or not) by many people, mainly materialist . Few computationalists today are aware that it put theology and physics upside down, yet in a simple elementary interpretations capable to be understood by any universal machine. I have no problem with that. I'm never talking about materialist physics, only the physics of computation and how it supervenes on deeper, non-arithmetic participation. It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they got into a projection on a screen. Bad analogy, misused. You beg the question. You just can't compare authentic self-referentially correct machines, amenable to mathematical studies, with dolls. I compare them with dolls only as opposed to zombies. Dolls are 3D machines which perform a very limited range of behaviors. Dolls that can cry or walk add some 4D behavioral capabilities, but they are still 3D dolls doing 4D playback of a 4D recording. Talking about self-referentially correct machines is an order of magnitude more sophisticated, obviously. These are 4D dolls doing 5D meta-playbacks of 4D recordings. They not only play back their program on cue, they have a program to store and evaluate cues in a progressive way. Despite appearances to the contrary, I am not dismissing the significance of this, nor am I failing to take into account that your view of machines includes even more persuasive evidence...perhaps the UM or Lobian machine qualifies as a 5D or 6D masterpiece, and I don't deny that. What I deny is that it makes any fundamental difference to the impersonal, rootless vantage point of any possible program. Consciousness is not entirely dimensional, it creates dimensionality. What computational theory produces is not mind, but rather mentalism - cardboard cut outs of beliefs and intensional references through which a kind of cychic cold-reading can be deduced, but there is no feeling, no aesthetic content necessary for this to occur. Study the movie graph argument, and you will see that you are almost correct here, but this only by reifying mind and/or matter in a way where in comp it becomes a problem in math. I've looked at the MGA before. I don't see that it addresses any of the issues that I keep bringing up. Craig Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:36, meekerdb wrote: On 2/25/2014 7:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: admitting simply that indexical notion are modal notion, and thus don't need to obey to Leibniz identity rule. I don't understand that remark. Are you saying that there is some modal notion that makes identity of indiscernibles wrong? I think of indexical predicates as being ostensive. I am saying that here: W = H M = H But only in the 3-1 view it make sense (locally) to say that M = W. In the 1-view M ≠ W. yet, in the 1-view, W = H, and M = H. There is nothing paradoxal. It comes from the fact that we agree surviving in both place, but are aware we can see only one of them, from the 1p view. Now, provability, and even more provability--truth provide intensional predicates, their numerical extension have a secondary role. From []A, and A - B, it does not follow that []B. You need [](A - B). Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 25 Feb 2014, at 18:44, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/25/2014 7:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:38, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Not my consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM
ultimately relies on some transcendent notion of perspective
itself. IOW, the sensible world is conceived as the resultant of
the inter-subjective agreement of its possible observers, each of
which discovers itself to be centred in some perspective.
Is the sensible world of *possible* observers supposed to include
the whole world. I'm always suspicious of the word possible.
Does it refer to chance, i.e. many events were possible, I might
have had coffee instead of tea this morning, but only a few are
actual? Does it refer to anything not prohibited by (our best
theory of) physics: It's possible a meteorite might strike my
house? Or is it anything not entailing a contradiction: X and not
X?
Possible in the large sense, is the diamond of the modal logic.
But is just a symbol that we use with certain rules of
inference. To be applied it requires some interpretation.
That's the point.
Mathematical semantics provides then the math for describing a lot of
them, including sound and complete in their characterization of some
modal theory.
There are as many notions of possibility than there are modal
logics, and there are many.
I appreciate that you put in your enumeration the possible in the
sense of the consistent (not entailing A ~A, or not entailing f).
David used possible observers as part of a definition. I don't
know what it would mean for an observer to not entail f. So I think
he had some other meaning (nomological) in mind. But in that case
his definition is somewhat circular.
I will interview correct rational machine, and I will say that a
machine believes A is she asserts A.
To say that they do not assert f means that they are consistent.
Bruno
Brent
That one, consistency, can be defined in arithmetic for all
arithmetically correct machine(~beweisbar('~(0=0)')), and it
happens also that such a definition entails different logics for
the philosophical or physical variant of it, and this choose
the different modal logics from machines self-references.
Bruno
PS my p-time seems to be delayed, I am still in the 23 february,
gosh!
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Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 25 Feb 2014, at 23:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: 0 doesn't = 0 in my theory. I was beginning suspecting this. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On Thursday, February 27, 2014 12:52:41 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 25 Feb 2014, at 23:30, Craig Weinberg wrote: 0 doesn't = 0 in my theory. Identity isn't self contained in MSR. All identity is leased within some perspective. The more common the perspective, the longer the lease, and the more 'seems like' or 'has a similar quality' appears stabilized as 'is equal'. Craig I was beginning suspecting this. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 28 February 2014 12:36, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: Identity isn't self contained in MSR. All identity is leased within some perspective. The more common the perspective, the longer the lease, and the more 'seems like' or 'has a similar quality' appears stabilized as 'is equal'. What is a perspective, and how would I construct or discover or recognise one without using any underlying theory of identity? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 23 Feb 2014, at 13:54, David Nyman wrote: On 23 February 2014 09:22, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote: On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote: No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past? This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state? Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone seems to be on their first consciousness. Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can be made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite lifetime? Well, you have to start somewhere.) Right. And I guess you'd expect me by now to invite you to consider this with a Hoylean hat on. From Hoyle's perspective a momentary experience can be *typical* only to the degree that equivalent fungible experiences predominate in some underlying measure contest. So, as an analogy, experiences in which I hold a losing ticket in the UK lottery predominate hugely over those in which I hold a winning ticket, and this continues to be the case even though from Hoyle's perspective I am *all* the ticket holders. If this makes any sense, we must assume (for the analogy to hold) that experiences in which I appear to have a relatively recent origin in space and time predominate in the measure battle with those in which my apparent origin recedes towards some asymptotic limit. The former, one might say, are more *typical* of the experience of the universal observer than the latter. For me this touches open problems (some made worst by explaining in comp the possibility of the salvia experience). All memorized past can only scratches the futures. In a sense we are always young. From inside, it always look like a beginning, and in a sense it is (I think). Bruno David Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness, I see no reason to assume that. Hence the phraseology used above. If you say given that X, that means you're assuming it for the sake of argument. Sorry, maybe I should have said if we assume that... to make it clearer. does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that I am he as you are he as he is me, etc). Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain physical processes? Since you can see no reason to assume the initial premise (see above) it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:07, meekerdb wrote: On 2/23/2014 1:13 AM, LizR wrote: On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote: On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote: No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul- de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past? This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state? Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone seems to be on their first consciousness. Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can be made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite lifetime? Well, because you have to start somewhere... This could be similar - there may be reasons to expect everyone to be on their first consciousness this near to the big bang, perhaps.) Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness, I see no reason to assume that. Hence the phraseology used above. If you say given that X, that means you're assuming it for the sake of argument. (Sorry, maybe I should have said if we assume that... to make it clearer?) does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that I am he as you are he as he is me, etc). Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain physical processes? Since you can see no reason to assume the initial premise (see above) it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it! I wrote no reason to assume that consciousness is not the content of consciousness. The premise I took is everyone's on their first consciousness. For which you offered the explanation of amnesia; and I offered a different one. If you're going to criticize logic you need to parse correctly. But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing up with different experiences and memories in what sense could you be the same person. I John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the one thing they always agree on is that as soon as the M-man and the W-man open the transporter doors and see different scenes they are different people. We agree that the W-man and the M-man are different, yes. We even agree that both the W-man and the M-man are the H-man, admitting simply that indexical notion are modal notion, and thus don't need to obey to Leibniz identity rule. I am not sure there is any disagreement, actually, except only on this, but even there he does not convince me. Why he stays mute on step 4 is perhaps that he does already understand it and the consequences, and he dislikes them, perhaps. Well, it is weird, but we are accustom of irrationality in theology aren't we? Bruno Brent Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:38, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Not my consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately
relies on some transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the
sensible world is conceived as the resultant of the inter-
subjective agreement of its possible observers, each of which
discovers itself to be centred in some perspective.
Is the sensible world of *possible* observers supposed to include
the whole world. I'm always suspicious of the word possible.
Does it refer to chance, i.e. many events were possible, I might
have had coffee instead of tea this morning, but only a few are
actual? Does it refer to anything not prohibited by (our best
theory of) physics: It's possible a meteorite might strike my
house? Or is it anything not entailing a contradiction: X and not X?
Possible in the large sense, is the diamond of the modal logic. There
are as many notions of possibility than there are modal logics, and
there are many.
I appreciate that you put in your enumeration the possible in the
sense of the consistent (not entailing A ~A, or not entailing f).
That one, consistency, can be defined in arithmetic for all
arithmetically correct machine(~beweisbar('~(0=0)')), and it happens
also that such a definition entails different logics for the
philosophical or physical variant of it, and this choose the
different modal logics from machines self-references.
Bruno
PS my p-time seems to be delayed, I am still in the 23 february, gosh!
Brent
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Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:57, ghib...@gmail.com wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 7:07:21 PM UTC, Brent wrote: On 2/23/2014 1:13 AM, LizR wrote: On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote: On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote: No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul- de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past? This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state? Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone seems to be on their first consciousness. Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can be made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite lifetime? Well, because you have to start somewhere... This could be similar - there may be reasons to expect everyone to be on their first consciousness this near to the big bang, perhaps.) Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness, I see no reason to assume that. Hence the phraseology used above. If you say given that X, that means you're assuming it for the sake of argument. (Sorry, maybe I should have said if we assume that... to make it clearer?) does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that I am he as you are he ashe is me, etc). Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain physical processes? Since you can see no reason to assume the initial premise (see above) it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it! I wrote no reason to assume that consciousness is not the content of consciousness. The premise I took is everyone's on their first consciousness. For which you offered the explanation of amnesia; and I offered a different one. If you're going to criticize logic you need to parse correctly. But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing up with different experiences and memories in what sense could you be the same person. I John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the one thing they always agree on is that as soon as the M-man and the W-man open the transporter doors and see different scenes they are different people. Brent I'd be very interested to know who in this community currently subscribes to this idea that consciousness is not entirely a product of evolution of the nervous system and physical I cannot see the faintest hint of things going this way. The brain is exactly the right conditions this extraordinary thing can be explicable. On the bright side, perhaps we can look on this as a distinct predict. Bruno - what is hanging on this prediction? Are you willing to nail the colours of your work to something hard here? I have nailed comp+theaetetus on something hard, as I give the comp quantum logic, and compare them to the one derived from observation. That's the whole point. Things are advancing briskly enough in brain sciences, so it's realistic to think a resolution might emerge in the not distant future. That is logically impossible. Or you assume comp, and get the conceptual solution which is almost modest as it is not much more than listen to the machines. What they say is already quite astonishing, even if today this require some study of mathematical logic. What sort of standard of proof would it take then, for you to regard your theory falsified? The result is that comp+theaetetus is falsified if nature contradicts a physical comp tautology, that if a theorem of Z1*. Or, where do your assertions about consciousness fit into your whole theory? I define comp with consciousness. Comp is the belief that I will keep my consciousness through the use of *some* universal machine relatively to some probable universal machine. But the UDA use not a lot, as it uses only a sharable notion of 1p (memory accompanying the person entering in the telebox). Is it just a loosely associated preference, or is it absolutely indispensable? You judge. Will you formalize a falsifiable prediction? I did. The arithmetical material hypostases, that is mainly the arithmetical quantum logic Z1*.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 24 Feb 2014, at 04:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, February 23, 2014 11:50:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Feb 2014, at 18:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote: If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an illusion Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preserved all the time. I'm not thinking of 1p originality though, I'm talking about originality itself - absolute uniqueness. The idea that something can occur for the first, last, and only time, and perhaps, by extension that everything is in some sense utterly unique and irreplacable. You reify an 1p notion. What makes you think its more of a 1p notion than arithmetic is? What makes you think that arithmetic is a 1p notion? Answer: because you assume only 1p, and believe that you can derive anything from that. The problem is that you don't have a theory, but a collection of image, which I still could appreciate, if you were not using it in a non valid way on computationalism. In the H-WM duplication experience, the experiencers get all a unique experience of the type I am the H-guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy and again Moscow guy ... He never feel the split, and keeps its originality all along. he get doppelgangers who also keep up their originality and develop their personality. I understand, but I think it is based on the assumption that I am the H-guy comes along for the ride when you reproduce a description of his body, or the blueprints for his behaviors. Or a diophantine approximation of the quantum string-brane state with 10^(10^10) correct decimal for the rational complex numbers involved. That assumes originality is not fundamental though. I grant you that. Nor is it easy to define. I don't see a compelling reason to allow that bottom up construction of consciousness will work. I might agree with you. I am not sure comp allow a bottom up construction of consciousness, due to its peculiar relation with truth. You must study a theory, as you take time to criticize only your own restricted comprehension of it. To the contrary, everything that I have seen suggests that it cannot. I think you are right on this. It is only your uses of things like this against computationalism which are not valid. My point has been from the start that this is false. But that is an extraordinary claim, which requires an extraordinary arguments. Why would it be any more extraordinary than the claim that a unique conscious experience can be assembled from generic unconscious parts? That uniqueness is 1p. Comp, if true, guaranties it for each 1p view. God knows better, but we are not yet there, isn't it? No lifetime or event within a lifetime can be reproduced wholly - I completely agree with you, but those are 1p notion. They have referent, but we cannot invoke them when we study them. All notions are 1p, including the notion that there could be notions which are not 1p. That is akin to solipsism. And then again explain me why 0 = 0 in your theory, of why there is an infinite of primes. The acceptable level of rigor is to be able to be clear enough so that someone else can translated in a first or higher order logic or in some already existing theory. I love poets but I dislike the use of poetry in science. there is no such thing. You have to prove that. It may not be possible to prove anything related to consciousness. Again I can make a lot sense to this. If it can be proved, then it only has to do with some particular relation within consciousness. But then how do you know that the digital duplicate is a doll. Very often, you do the opposite of what your own phenomenology should suggest. All that can be reproduced is a representation within some sensory context. Outside of that context, it is a facade. You should search for an experiment testing your idea, if only with the pedagogical goal of giving more sense to it. The experiments are all around us. I see an actor on TV, but if I turn off the TV, it becomes clear that the image is only a visual facade. This is not valid, and beside I was asking for an experience giving a different number than say string theory, or computationalism. Yes, I am saying that C-t and CTM have only to do with representations of a particular kind of logic and measurement. On the contrary, CT makes many different logics mathematically amenable, that is the reason to be study it. Whatever the truth is, it can only be more complex and subtle. But is still quantifiable, impersonal kinds of logic, as
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 2/25/2014 7:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: admitting simply that indexical notion are modal notion, and thus don't need to obey to Leibniz identity rule. I don't understand that remark. Are you saying that there is some modal notion that makes identity of indiscernibles wrong? I think of indexical predicates as being ostensive. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 2/25/2014 7:15 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 23 Feb 2014, at 20:38, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote:
Not my consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately relies on some
transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the sensible world is conceived as the
resultant of the inter-subjective agreement of its possible observers, each of which
discovers itself to be centred in some perspective.
Is the sensible world of *possible* observers supposed to include the whole world. I'm
always suspicious of the word possible. Does it refer to chance, i.e. many events
were possible, I might have had coffee instead of tea this morning, but only a few are
actual? Does it refer to anything not prohibited by (our best theory of) physics: It's
possible a meteorite might strike my house? Or is it anything not entailing a
contradiction: X and not X?
Possible in the large sense, is the diamond of the modal logic.
But is just a symbol that we use with certain rules of inference. To be applied it
requires some interpretation.
There are as many notions of possibility than there are modal logics, and there
are many.
I appreciate that you put in your enumeration the possible in the sense of the
consistent (not entailing A ~A, or not entailing f).
David used possible observers as part of a definition. I don't know what it would mean
for an observer to not entail f. So I think he had some other meaning (nomological) in
mind. But in that case his definition is somewhat circular.
Brent
That one, consistency, can be defined in arithmetic for all arithmetically correct
machine(~beweisbar('~(0=0)')), and it happens also that such a definition entails
different logics for the philosophical or physical variant of it, and this choose
the different modal logics from machines self-references.
Bruno
PS my p-time seems to be delayed, I am still in the 23 february, gosh!
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Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?' But we cannot be content to let how else? stand as mere rhetoric, can we? The question of how the desire moves the hand is essentially the same question I have been asking you all along to try to justify in terms of a theory of primitive sensory-motive relations. How specifically might experience translate to function? Certainly it is the expression of what you actually are, but how can this be cashed out in detail, or even in principle? You may feel that it is unfair of me to make this demand at such an early stage because it is precisely the unsolved conundrum of any theory that doesn't fundamentally sweep consciousness under the rug. But I have been under the strong impression that you see the sensory-motive approach as the key precisely fitted to unlocking this puzzle; hence my enquiry as to the specifics. To be honest it was the realisation of (or at least the possibility of) a novel resolution of these issues in the comp formulation of the world-problem in general that eventually made me waver from my prior attachment to a sensory-motive approach. In the end, as I tried to frame counter-arguments in the debate and turned the thing over and over in my mind, I found that this possibility of resolution carried more immediate persuasive heft for me than my worries about the precise metaphysical relation of the various elements of the schema. After all, we cannot expect to be able to explain everything at once. And also it seemed to me that we were not that far away from being able to test at least some of this conjecture in yes doctor mode, by direct interface with digital prostheses and the like (hence my posting of that link). That would be rather persuasive wouldn't it? We shouldn't have to wait interminably for some unfortunate AI doll to become capable of protesting its heartfelt feelings to our unsympathetic ear; we could directly experience the computational simulation of real consciousness for ourselves and let that be the criterion. No? David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?' But we cannot be content to let how else? stand as mere rhetoric, can we? Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress of having to ask 'how does asking how' work? We don't have to ask how it works, nor must there be an answer which could satisfy such an expectation. The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons. Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to anything primordial. It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they got into a projection on a screen. The question of how the desire moves the hand is essentially the same question I have been asking you all along to try to justify in terms of a theory of primitive sensory-motive relations. How specifically might experience translate to function? It doesn't. It's a matter of the frame of reference. My experience looks like a function from your distance. From a greater, absolute distance, both of our functions looks like mathematics. Certainly it is the expression of what you actually are, but how can this be cashed out in detail, or even in principle? You may feel that it is unfair of me to make this demand at such an early stage because it is precisely the unsolved conundrum of any theory that doesn't fundamentally sweep consciousness under the rug. No, no, it's not unfair at all. I'm not ducking the question and saying 'we can't know the answer to this mystery because blah blah sacred ineffable', I am saying that the question cannot be asked because it can only be asked within sense to begin with. If you can ask what sense is, your asking is already a first hand demonstration of what it is. It can have no better description, nor could it ever require one. All that is required is for us to stop doubting what we already experience directly. We can doubt whether what we experience is this kind of an experience or that kind, whether it is more 'real' or more like a dream, but we cannot doubt that there is an experience in which there is a feeling of direct participation - a sense which includes the possibility of a sense of motive. But I have been under the strong impression that you see the sensory-motive approach as the key precisely fitted to unlocking this puzzle; hence my enquiry as to the specifics. Yes, I think it is the frame of the puzzle. If we start from sense, then every piece falls into place eventually. If we start from non-sense, then we can never find the piece of the puzzle which is the puzzle itself. To be honest it was the realisation of (or at least the possibility of) a novel resolution of these issues in the comp formulation of the world-problem in general that eventually made me waver from my prior attachment to a sensory-motive approach. I don't think that you had a sensory-motive approach, I think you probably had an idealist-theoretic approach...the idea of experience as a pseudo-substance rather than ordinary sense/sense-making. In the end, as I tried to frame counter-arguments in the debate and turned the thing over and over in my mind, I found that this possibility of resolution carried more immediate persuasive heft for me than my worries about the precise metaphysical relation of the various elements of the schema. After all, we cannot expect to be able to explain everything at once. We can if the explanation is felt directly rather than symbolized and communicated. And also it seemed to me that we were not that far away from being able to test at least some of this conjecture in yes doctor mode, by direct interface with digital prostheses and the like (hence my posting of that link). That would be rather persuasive wouldn't it? Nothing is persuasive until someone is transplanted into a synthetic brain and returns to tell the tale. We shouldn't have to wait interminably for some unfortunate AI doll to become capable of protesting its heartfelt feelings to our unsympathetic ear; we could directly experience the computational simulation of real consciousness for ourselves and let that be the criterion. No? As long as there is enough of us left to live and participate as a person, we can compensate to some extent for the shortfall of a prosthetic limb. We triangulate the gap and our perception can fill-in to a surprising degree. Only if our entire brain is amputated and replaced successfully will we know what it is like to
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 24 February 2014 16:31, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?' But we cannot be content to let how else? stand as mere rhetoric, can we? Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress of having to ask 'how does asking how' work? We don't have to ask how it works, nor must there be an answer which could satisfy such an expectation. The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons. Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to anything primordial. It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they got into a projection on a screen. Er, no I don't agree that it's like that at all, if I've managed to puzzle out your drift. I wasn't asking why primitive sense because that's a posit of your theory. I was asking how the desire to move your hand turns into the neurological changes which move them in terms of that posit. How. This is a question whose answer must lie *within* the theory, hence be derivable from it. I'm asking how your theory can frame these questions in such a way that they are capable of being answered. Or are you implying that the only right way to frame the problem is in such a way that no questions of this kind can ever be answered? The question of how the desire moves the hand is essentially the same question I have been asking you all along to try to justify in terms of a theory of primitive sensory-motive relations. How specifically might experience translate to function? It doesn't. It's a matter of the frame of reference. My experience looks like a function from your distance. Yes, but how or why does it look like that.? That's what my question means. I think this is what Bruno is getting at when he says that genuine problems should be invariant to the terms in which they are described. I find that you have an unfortunate tendency to assume that you have avoided the need to address a question just because you change the words you use to describe it. I don't think that helps either your understanding or your ability to convey it to me. From a greater, absolute distance, both of our functions looks like mathematics. Certainly it is the expression of what you actually are, but how can this be cashed out in detail, or even in principle? You may feel that it is unfair of me to make this demand at such an early stage because it is precisely the unsolved conundrum of any theory that doesn't fundamentally sweep consciousness under the rug. No, no, it's not unfair at all. I'm not ducking the question and saying 'we can't know the answer to this mystery because blah blah sacred ineffable', I am saying that the question cannot be asked because it can only be asked within sense to begin with. If you can ask what sense is, your asking is already a first hand demonstration of what it is. It can have no better description, nor could it ever require one. All that is required is for us to stop doubting what we already experience directly. We cannot doubt it. Uniquely so, in fact. We can doubt whether what we experience is this kind of an experience or that kind, whether it is more 'real' or more like a dream, but we cannot doubt that there is an experience in which there is a feeling of direct participation - a sense which includes the possibility of a sense of motive. I agree. As indeed did Descartes. But I have been under the strong impression that you see the sensory-motive approach as the key precisely fitted to unlocking this puzzle; hence my enquiry as to the specifics. Yes, I think it is the frame of the puzzle. If we start from sense, then every piece falls into place eventually. If we start from non-sense, then we can never find the piece of the puzzle which is the puzzle itself. I understand that feeling and share it. It's very common (though curiously, not universal) and perhaps it is not eliminable as long as we insist on understanding the puzzle exclusively from within the frame of sense. I know it seems as if once we step outside that frame, even conceptually, we can never step back in. It seems impossible, like lifting oneself by one's own bootstraps. But understanding the world in its fullness inevitably seems to involve believing six impossible things before breakfast. This step is not by any stretch the most impossible, especially if we can find ways of accurately modelling the reference to sense, as Bruno tries to teach us, if not quite bridging the gap
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On Monday, February 24, 2014 3:32:03 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 16:31, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Monday, February 24, 2014 9:13:26 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 24 February 2014 02:43, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: How do you turn your desire to move your hand into the neurological changes which move them? The neurological change is the expression of what you actually are. These primitive levels of sense are beyond the question of 'how', they are more in the neighborhood of 'how else?' But we cannot be content to let how else? stand as mere rhetoric, can we? Yes, in this case, we absolutely can. Otherwise you enter into a regress of having to ask 'how does asking how' work? We don't have to ask how it works, nor must there be an answer which could satisfy such an expectation. The whole idea of 'how' is a cognitive framing of sensible comparisons. Sure, it seems very important to the intellect, just as air seems very important to the lungs, but that doesn't mean that 'how' can refer to anything primordial. It's like asking an actor in a movie asking how they got into a projection on a screen. Er, no I don't agree that it's like that at all, if I've managed to puzzle out your drift. I wasn't asking why primitive sense because that's a posit of your theory. I was asking how the desire to move your hand turns into the neurological changes which move them in terms of that posit. The desire to move your hand doesn't 'turn into' anything. Think of your desire as an earthquake causing ripples in various parts of the world simultaneously, on all different scales. The molecules are changing polarity, the ion gates are closing, the neurons are firing, the muscle fibers are contracting, the arm is moving - they are all the same event, only expressed within different sized frames of 'here' and 'now'. Where there are neurons, there is no person. Where there is a person, there can be neurons in a figurative sense, derived through understanding and instrumental extension, but at the level of a personal experience, a 'neuron' is *really* an ability to feel or touch something. I am saying that is the ontological reality of what it is. The neuron is an outsider's view which reveals details that the insider view cannot, but I suggest that the view which reconciles them both is metaphenomenal rather than meta-mechanical (arithmetic). How. This is a question whose answer must lie *within* the theory, hence be derivable from it. I'm asking how your theory can frame these questions in such a way that they are capable of being answered. Or are you implying that the only right way to frame the problem is in such a way that no questions of this kind can ever be answered? Yes. There is no way to ask how you begin the chain of physical changes which moves your arm, or how you know how to do that. It is primitive. You can only experience it directly. A computation does not have that. It can never know how to initiate any physical or phenomenal change, any more than a ripple can initiate rippling in a lake. The question of how the desire moves the hand is essentially the same question I have been asking you all along to try to justify in terms of a theory of primitive sensory-motive relations. How specifically might experience translate to function? It doesn't. It's a matter of the frame of reference. My experience looks like a function from your distance. Yes, but how or why does it look like that.? Because that's how sense organizes itself to invite opportunities for richer qualities of experience. Mathematics can show us precisely why the relations which are used in nature make that kind of sense, but it is meaningless outside of a context which is worth making sense of. Counting what can never be encountered is a moot point ontologically. That's what my question means. I think this is what Bruno is getting at when he says that genuine problems should be invariant to the terms in which they are described. I find that you have an unfortunate tendency to assume that you have avoided the need to address a question just because you change the words you use to describe it. I don't think that helps either your understanding or your ability to convey it to me. I don't avoid the need to address a question, I explain that the question is coming from somewhere that evaporates as soon as you accept the consequences of the original premise. How comes from sense, so it makes no sense to ask how sense makes itself. From a greater, absolute distance, both of our functions looks like mathematics. Certainly it is the expression of what you actually are, but how can this be cashed out in detail, or even in principle? You may feel that it is unfair of me to make this demand at such an early stage because it is precisely the unsolved
RE: Turning the tables on the doctor
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR Sent: Friday, February 21, 2014 11:37 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Turning the tables on the doctor I wouldn't ride in the damn thing! -- Larry Niven, The theory and practice of teleportation (from memory, I may not have got that quote 100% right) Certainly would not want to be a beta tester for it J On 22 February 2014 14:39, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com . To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote: On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote: No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past? This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state? Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone seems to be on their first consciousness. Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can be made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite lifetime? Well, because you have to start somewhere... This could be similar - there may be reasons to expect everyone to be on their first consciousness this near to the big bang, perhaps.) Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness, I see no reason to assume that. Hence the phraseology used above. If you say given that X, that means you're assuming it for the sake of argument. (Sorry, maybe I should have said if we assume that... to make it clearer?) does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that I am he as you are he as he is me, etc). Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain physical processes? Since you can see no reason to assume the initial premise (see above) it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote: On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote: No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past? This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state? Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone seems to be on their first consciousness. Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can be made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite lifetime? Well, you have to start somewhere.) Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness, I see no reason to assume that. Hence the phraseology used above. If you say given that X, that means you're assuming it for the sake of argument. Sorry, maybe I should have said if we assume that... to make it clearer. does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that I am he as you are he as he is me, etc). Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain physical processes? Since you can see no reason to assume the initial premise (see above) it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 23 February 2014 04:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past? Not my consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately relies on some transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the sensible world is conceived as the resultant of the inter-subjective agreement of its possible observers, each of which discovers itself to be centred in some perspective. Then the task of CTM, or any equivalent theory, is to justify on more general grounds why and how this might be the case. As you may have realised by now I'm rather fond of Hoyle's formulation of this intuition from the point of view of a single, universal observer, at least as a first approximation. In terms of Hoyle's quasi-frequency heuristic, all possible observer moments are perpetually in play; hence one might appeal to differential selection effects to justify why my past history might *typically* appear to have some relatively recent origin, whilst *atypically* appearing to be indefinitely extended in the asymptotic limit. I appreciate that, as in the Everett interpretation, it is unclear or at least controversial precisely how such a contest of measures can be finitely resolved; the possibility of definite momentary outcomes must be presupposed by framing the problem in this way. Of course you may feel that all of the above is just another good reason not to go beyond the assumption that consciousness is just a necessary accompaniment of physical activity. Each formulation entails its own peculiar conundrums. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 23 February 2014 09:22, LizR lizj...@gmail.com wrote: On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote: On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote: No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past? This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state? Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone seems to be on their first consciousness. Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can be made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite lifetime? Well, you have to start somewhere.) Right. And I guess you'd expect me by now to invite you to consider this with a Hoylean hat on. From Hoyle's perspective a momentary experience can be *typical* only to the degree that equivalent fungible experiences predominate in some underlying measure contest. So, as an analogy, experiences in which I hold a losing ticket in the UK lottery predominate hugely over those in which I hold a winning ticket, and this continues to be the case even though from Hoyle's perspective I am *all* the ticket holders. If this makes any sense, we must assume (for the analogy to hold) that experiences in which I appear to have a relatively recent origin in space and time predominate in the measure battle with those in which my apparent origin recedes towards some asymptotic limit. The former, one might say, are more *typical* of the experience of the universal observer than the latter. David Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness, I see no reason to assume that. Hence the phraseology used above. If you say given that X, that means you're assuming it for the sake of argument. Sorry, maybe I should have said if we assume that... to make it clearer. does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that I am he as you are he as he is me, etc). Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain physical processes? Since you can see no reason to assume the initial premise (see above) it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 23 February 2014 03:12, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:49:33 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 23 February 2014 00:27, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 4:06:39 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an illusion Not an illusion, an invariant. If it is invariant then it can't be original. Invariant means that it remains fixed across a multiplicity of variations. To be original means that it undergoes no variation. It is uncopied and uncopyable. But I think that any serious (i.e. non-eliminitavist) theory of consciousness must find it to be original and indeed uncopyable in the sense that you stipulate. That is the opposite of what CTM does though. In order to say yes to the doctor, we must believe that we are justified in expecting to be copied into an identical conscious personhood. No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. But it is directly contradicted by the idea that consciousness is tied to originality. You can't have it both ways. If consciousness can be continued by a computation, then it cannot be considered original. I don't see why that follows at all. The need to have it both ways is the basic paradox of mereology; there's no escaping it. The notion of the transcendent originality of consciousness I have in mind is not dissimilar to those typical of Eastern metaphysical systems, or the metaphysics of Plotinus that Bruno refers to when he's wearing his theological hat. In these systems the originality of consciousness per se is always contrasted with the ephemerality of the appearances that somehow arise within it. You could think of CTM as providing at least the basis of a principled somehow to justify the particularity of such appearances. It is no more original than a long IP address. Any computation which can reproduce the complex number must forever instantiate a non-original address of consciousness. I think you demand of originality more than it can possibly deliver. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). The world of comp is what is observed, which is why it can never contain even a single observer. Very true. The sensible world, or worlds, of comp contain not a single observer. What they contain are mutually correlated *appearances* of observers. Observation per se is necessarily out of sight. CTM, or any equivalently explanatory schema, concerns the systematic correlation of the mise-en-scène with the behind the scenes activity that might plausibly have produced it. Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. Any continuation is a violation of originality/authenticity and is therefore, by my definition, unconscious and impossible. Yes, I understand that this is your definition. I'm less sure that this definition leads to any promising resolution of the problems with which we wish to deal. I assure you that there is nothing significant that I misunderstand about comp. I seriously doubt that. You are telling me over and over what I already know, You think that you know that CTM, in assuming no more than arithmetic, can thereby derive no more than arithmetical conclusions from it. But I have suggested to you, as a corrective to this understanding, that CTM implicitly relies on a transcendental notion of originality and invariance; otherwise it must fail in precisely the way you suggest. This implicit notion is the transcendent originality of the observer perspective, the sensible context, call it what you will. It is the defining paradigm of the perennial philosophy, the ultimate original, sui generis, incontrovertible, ineffable, incomparably real. and your responses clearly indicate to me that you are primarily focused on your view being heard rather than considering mine. I'm sorry you feel like that. My original impetus for commenting on what you said was specifically that I felt your criticisms of CTM were ill-founded for the reasons I have tried to articulate. My personal view of CTM was transformed by the realisation that arithmetic could be contrived to refer to more than itself (indeed to refer to anything at all) by successively bootstrapping it through computation and logic until it emerged at some transcendent level. But that level
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 22 Feb 2014, at 18:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote: If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an illusion Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preserved all the time. I'm not thinking of 1p originality though, I'm talking about originality itself - absolute uniqueness. The idea that something can occur for the first, last, and only time, and perhaps, by extension that everything is in some sense utterly unique and irreplacable. You reify an 1p notion. In the H-WM duplication experience, the experiencers get all a unique experience of the type I am the H-guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy and again Moscow guy ... He never feel the split, and keeps its originality all along. he get doppelgangers who also keep up their originality and develop their personality. I understand, but I think it is based on the assumption that I am the H-guy comes along for the ride when you reproduce a description of his body, or the blueprints for his behaviors. Or a diophantine approximation of the quantum string-brane state with 10^(10^10) correct decimal for the rational complex numbers involved. My point has been from the start that this is false. But that is an extraordinary claim, which requires an extraordinary arguments. No lifetime or event within a lifetime can be reproduced wholly - I completely agree with you, but those are 1p notion. They have referent, but we cannot invoke them when we study them. there is no such thing. You have to prove that. All that can be reproduced is a representation within some sensory context. Outside of that context, it is a facade. You should search for an experiment testing your idea, if only with the pedagogical goal of giving more sense to it. Of course in your theory that is an illusion, as they are all zombies, and the H-guy is dead. Never zombies - always dolls. Zombies are supernatural fiction, dolls are ordinary. The consciousness of dolls is not at the level of the plastic figure - there is consciousness there but on the level which holds the plastic together, and perhaps which on the metaphenomenal level of synchronicity, poetry, etc. and simulation is absolute. Emulation is absolute by Church thesis, and a correct simulation is what comp assumes the existence through the existence of the substitution level. Yes, I am saying that C-t and CTM have only to do with representations of a particular kind of logic and measurement. On the contrary, CT makes many different logics mathematically amenable, that is the reason to be study it. Whatever the truth is, it can only be more complex and subtle. Your intution that comp is false is correct, but it is 1p, and by itself, it does not provide a refutation of comp, as comp already explain why machine can develop that intuition, and this correctly. The 1p is not a machine, he is the owner of the brain, that it borrows to the most probable universal neighbors. It is measurement which provides the local appearance of substitution. In reality, theory can never substitute for consciousness, You don't know that, and there are no evidences. An organic brain might already be a dynamical theory reflecting diverses dynamical theories. A genome might already be a theory. The theory is not a substitute for consciousness, but it might be handy to make possible for a conscious 1p person to say hello to other persons, and share histories. and consciousness can have no theories outside of consciousness. Not sure. Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can only be done once. That is ambiguous. I don't think it is. Arithmetic is based on recursive enumeration. Notably. But also on non recursive enumeration, and arbitrarily complex. recursive is just sigma_0 or sigma_1, beyond that the arithmetical proposition are not computably decidable. Keep in mind arithmetical is a much more general notion than computable (or sigma_1 arithmetical). There is no one and only time that any number can appear. Every number can be arrived at by many different routes - every number is always repeatable and transferable. Numbers can't own anything, they are generic addresses in a theoretical schema that appears again and again. They can talk also, but if your philosophy prevents you to listen to them, then well, that's not a good point to your philosophy. All conscious present instant are done once, in arithmetic. Where do we find a conscious present instant in arithmetic? If you assume that, then you would be begging the question of
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 2/23/2014 1:13 AM, LizR wrote: On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote: On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote: No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past? This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state? Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone seems to be on their first consciousness. Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can be made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite lifetime? Well, because you have to start somewhere... This could be similar - there may be reasons to expect everyone to be on their first consciousness this near to the big bang, perhaps.) Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness, I see no reason to assume that. Hence the phraseology used above. If you say given that X, that means you're assuming it for the sake of argument. (Sorry, maybe I should have said if we assume that... to make it clearer?) does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that I am he as you are he as he is me, etc). Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain physical processes? Since you can see no reason to assume the initial premise (see above) it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it! I wrote no reason to assume that consciousness is not the content of consciousness. The premise I took is everyone's on their first consciousness. For which you offered the explanation of amnesia; and I offered a different one. If you're going to criticize logic you need to parse correctly. But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing up with different experiences and memories in what sense could you be the same person. I John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the one thing they always agree on is that as soon as the M-man and the W-man open the transporter doors and see different scenes they are different people. Brent Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote: Not my consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately relies on some transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the sensible world is conceived as the resultant of the inter-subjective agreement of its possible observers, each of which discovers itself to be centred in some perspective. Is the sensible world of *possible* observers supposed to include the whole world. I'm always suspicious of the word possible. Does it refer to chance, i.e. many events were possible, I might have had coffee instead of tea this morning, but only a few are actual? Does it refer to anything not prohibited by (our best theory of) physics: It's possible a meteorite might strike my house? Or is it anything not entailing a contradiction: X and not X? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 7:07:21 PM UTC, Brent wrote: On 2/23/2014 1:13 AM, LizR wrote: On 23 February 2014 20:48, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net javascript:wrote: On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote: On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb meek...@verizon.net javascript:wrote: On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote: No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past? This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state? Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone seems to be on their first consciousness. Not necessarily. It might be a selection effect (a similar argument can be made for the QTI, if true - why are we at the start of an infinite lifetime? Well, because you have to start somewhere... This could be similar - there may be reasons to expect everyone to be on their first consciousness this near to the big bang, perhaps.) Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness, I see no reason to assume that. Hence the phraseology used above. If you say given that X, that means you're assuming it for the sake of argument. (Sorry, maybe I should have said if we assume that... to make it clearer?) does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that I am he as you are he as he is me, etc). Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain physical processes? Since you can see no reason to assume the initial premise (see above) it seems a bit odd that you are then trying to draw conclusions from it! I wrote no reason to assume that consciousness is not the content of consciousness. The premise I took is everyone's on their first consciousness. For which you offered the explanation of amnesia; and I offered a different one. If you're going to criticize logic you need to parse correctly. But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing up with different experiences and memories in what sense could you be the same person. I John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the one thing they always agree on is that as soon as the M-man and the W-man open the transporter doors and see different scenes they are different people. Brent I'd be very interested to know who in this community currently subscribes to this idea that consciousness is not entirely a product of evolution of the nervous system and physical I cannot see the faintest hint of things going this way. The brain is exactly the right conditions this extraordinary thing can be explicable. On the bright side, perhaps we can look on this as a distinct predict. Bruno - what is hanging on this prediction? Are you willing to nail the colours of your work to something hard here? Things are advancing briskly enough in brain sciences, so it's realistic to think a resolution might emerge in the not distant future. What sort of standard of proof would it take then, for you to regard your theory falsified? Or, where do your assertions about consciousness fit into your whole theory? Is it just a loosely associated preference, or is it absolutely indispensable? Will you formalize a falsifiable prediction? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 23 February 2014 19:38, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote: Not my consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately relies on some transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the sensible world is conceived as the resultant of the inter-subjective agreement of its possible observers, each of which discovers itself to be centred in some perspective. Is the sensible world of *possible* observers supposed to include the whole world. Well, in a way I was merely stating a tautology: i.e. the world of inter-subjective agreement is just what we infer from those observations. I didn't mean to imply that such a world stands alone or is in need of no further explanation, quite the contrary. But a stable perspective on a sensible world, in something like this sense, is what comp, for example, assumes to be invariant to substitution at the relevant level. David I'm always suspicious of the word possible. Does it refer to chance, i.e. many events were possible, I might have had coffee instead of tea this morning, but only a few are actual? Does it refer to anything not prohibited by (our best theory of) physics: It's possible a meteorite might strike my house? Or is it anything not entailing a contradiction: X and not X? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 23 February 2014 19:04, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: After all, the standard objection to starting from the putative universality of consciousness is why does it appear that so much of the world of appearance is *unconscious*? That is the only criticism that I have come up with so far of my own position that has some potential. Then it is the one you should concentrate on. It is very hard to imagine that what we see as inanimate objects could be just the tip of an iceberg of non-human storytelling, You might be surprised how similar this analogy is to my personal metaphor for the sensible worlds of CTM. That's why I sometimes call it the Programmatic Library of Babel. If Borges had known about CTM, I'm sure he would have relished it. however, it really is no more far fetched than imagining the underlying microphysics of any given object. True dat. All that it really means is that the relation that we enjoy with the world is in some sense the fundamental relation of all natural phenomena. But what sense is that? You say that it is the relation of common, ordinary sense, as though that alone will prime our intuition to leap the gap between the human scale and that of - well what precisely? Are we perhaps to suppose all conceivable relations to be those of reciprocal perception and acting-upon? That's out there as the poetic precursor to an idea. Gregg Rosenberg, for example, has re-analysed the notion of causality from first principles in order to argue that the effective (i.e. motive) notion of physical causality at the micro-scale cannot be fully coherent without a receptive (i.e. sensory) dual. But he struggles mightily to cash this out consistently at the macro-scale. I'm not suggesting that this is necessarily precisely equivalent to your basic assumption, but I do believe that you cannot avoid a similar struggle with these difficulties because they are inherent in the topic. All of the objectionable anthropocentrism can be potentially alleviated by applying exponential filters of insensitivity No doubt, if we can indeed elucidate precisely what is entailed by exponential filters of insensitivity. which are proportional to distance, scale, and unfamiliarity. It would make sense also, Make sense to whom? I'm not being facetious: we should be very careful in theory-making that we are not merely projecting terrestrial notions of what makes sense on to the cosmic scale. You yourself have used the analogy of the Galilean paradigm replacing the Ptolemaic and there are countless others. that in a universe produced from the start as an experiential phenomenon, that the partitioning of experiences, particularly those which are to contain psychologically sophisticated participants, must be especially firm. Must be indeed. But how specifically? It may not be possible even for my hypothesis to gain traction on these grounds. It may be too much of a spoiler and too many storylines would have to be dropped. Well this is the interesting and also the hard part. Your doubt does you credit. But I really think you may be making it harder by setting your face so resolutely against CTM, or at least what such an approach has to teach us (which is really Bruno's fundamental aim). I'm sure there must be a more mutually informative way of approaching such über-puzzling issues that isn't merely a wearisome recycling of yes-it-is no-it-isn't. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 2/23/2014 2:45 PM, David Nyman wrote: On 23 February 2014 19:38, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/23/2014 4:35 AM, David Nyman wrote: Not my consciousness, no. I'm just suggesting that CTM ultimately relies on some transcendent notion of perspective itself. IOW, the sensible world is conceived as the resultant of the inter-subjective agreement of its possible observers, each of which discovers itself to be centred in some perspective. Is the sensible world of *possible* observers supposed to include the whole world. Well, in a way I was merely stating a tautology: i.e. the world of inter-subjective agreement is just what we infer from those observations. I didn't mean to imply that such a world stands alone or is in need of no further explanation, quite the contrary. But a stable perspective on a sensible world, in something like this sense, is what comp, for example, assumes to be invariant to substitution at the relevant level. The point I was getting at was whether you're supposing there are *insensible^ parts to the world, which we may infer from the sensible part or from mathematics? Brent David I'm always suspicious of the word possible. Does it refer to chance, i.e. many events were possible, I might have had coffee instead of tea this morning, but only a few are actual? Does it refer to anything not prohibited by (our best theory of) physics: It's possible a meteorite might strike my house? Or is it anything not entailing a contradiction: X and not X? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 24 February 2014 00:05, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: The point I was getting at was whether you're supposing there are *insensible^ parts to the world, which we may infer from the sensible part or from mathematics? In short, yes. David -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 2/23/2014 4:57 PM, LizR wrote: But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing up with different experiences and memories in what sense could you be the same person. I John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the one thing they always agree on is that as soon as the M-man and the W-man open the transporter doors and see different scenes they are different people. Yes, it does of course raise this problem, and I agree with you that this seems to stretch the definition of similarity to meaninglessness. For this to mean anything, one really requires some way for one stream of consciousness to segue into another, so that although the amnesia becomes complete eventually, there is a transition between the two. Or perhaps each stream of consciousness cycles back and forth between some tabula rasa state (assuming any of this has any validity at all, of course). Of course (as per the transporter) we also find ourselves in the position of Heraclitus' man entering the river, of a person being in constant flux in any case. This is a result of the idea of the brain being at some level a digital computer (and probably of it being an analogue one too...). For my analysis I'll invoke my favorite intuition pump, the AI Mars Rover. As the Rover explores the terrain and learns things to enhance its probability of mission success it fills its memory with things like don't try to cross those white patches and look for another rock that looks like a donut. Now we can see what degrees of amnesia would mean. If just the learned stuff were erased, as they would be blank on a second Rover, then the Rover would be the same in terms of what it tried to do and how it tried to do it, but it would be different in that it would develop different memories and learn new tricks. You might say it had the same personality as the other AI Rover. But then consider a more extreme case: Back a JPL they have a spare Rover that's identical to those sent to Mars. But after the mission is over they move the cpu and memory with the same general AI into an AI deep submersible where they are connected to different sensors and controllers. Then I'd say it had a different consciousness, based on my theory that consciousness depends on how one perceives and acts on the environment. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 6:51:21 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 23 February 2014 19:04, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: After all, the standard objection to starting from the putative universality of consciousness is why does it appear that so much of the world of appearance is *unconscious*? That is the only criticism that I have come up with so far of my own position that has some potential. Then it is the one you should concentrate on. Yes, I already have. As I explain, it's not actually a problem, but it does require more of a counter-intuitive solution than most of the other criticisms I get (which are straw men from the start). It is very hard to imagine that what we see as inanimate objects could be just the tip of an iceberg of non-human storytelling, You might be surprised how similar this analogy is to my personal metaphor for the sensible worlds of CTM. That's why I sometimes call it the Programmatic Library of Babel. If Borges had known about CTM, I'm sure he would have relished it. CTM was the closest thing to how I conceived of metaphysics before I stumbled on the deeper necessity of sense. The idea of sensible worlds of CTM is not objectionable to me at all, except that computation does not require sense, and has no plausible use for it. however, it really is no more far fetched than imagining the underlying microphysics of any given object. True dat. All that it really means is that the relation that we enjoy with the world is in some sense the fundamental relation of all natural phenomena. But what sense is that? You say that it is the relation of common, ordinary sense, as though that alone will prime our intuition to leap the gap between the human scale and that of - well what precisely? I don't think that there is a gap. Our ordinary sense - the practice of participating in aesthetic experiences is exactly what is happening on every level of physics and at every time in history. The content is different, obviously, but the fundamental capacity to relate is the same, and it is the polar opposite of computation. Are we perhaps to suppose all conceivable relations to be those of reciprocal perception and acting-upon? Yes. All relations diverge from the nesting of that capacity. That's out there as the poetic precursor to an idea. Gregg Rosenberg, for example, has re-analysed the notion of causality from first principles in order to argue that the effective (i.e. motive) notion of physical causality at the micro-scale cannot be fully coherent without a receptive (i.e. sensory) dual. But he struggles mightily to cash this out consistently at the macro-scale. I'm not suggesting that this is necessarily precisely equivalent to your basic assumption, but I do believe that you cannot avoid a similar struggle with these difficulties because they are inherent in the topic. He'll have problems if he assumes that the microphysical appearance adds up to macrophenomenal content. That problem goes away with the primoridial identity version of pansensitivity. We begin with metaphenomenal content, so that all distinctions between micro and macro, physical and phenomenal are embedded at the higher level. The microphysics that we see through our body does not match the microphenomena. Physics can be thought of as alienated phenomena nested in discrete rows across space, while phenomenal experience would be nested as a single figurative column through time. The nesting is orthogonal. Coincidences synchronize events on multiple physical scales and build on meaningful associations in many seemingly different semantic contexts. The relation of physical and phenomenal is basically one of accelerated coincidence. http://s33light.org/post/77527626589 If you try to force panpsychism into an emergence model, then yeah, it won't work. You have to think of consciousness as relativity and the speed of light all rolled into one. All of the objectionable anthropocentrism can be potentially alleviated by applying exponential filters of insensitivity No doubt, if we can indeed elucidate precisely what is entailed by exponential filters of insensitivity. I call it eigenmorphism. I don't know that we need to publish a theory about how it works at this point, for now, I think its enough to point in this general direction and see how it might plug into existing physics. which are proportional to distance, scale, and unfamiliarity. It would make sense also, Make sense to whom? I'm not being facetious: we should be very careful in theory-making that we are not merely projecting terrestrial notions of what makes sense on to the cosmic scale. You yourself have used the analogy of the Galilean paradigm replacing the Ptolemaic and there are countless others. Makes sense in terms of 'if we start from this premise that the universe is a
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 24 February 2014 15:04, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/23/2014 4:57 PM, LizR wrote: But it raises the question, given complete amnesia and then growing up with different experiences and memories in what sense could you be the same person. I John Clark and Bruno's back and forth, the one thing they always agree on is that as soon as the M-man and the W-man open the transporter doors and see different scenes they are different people. Yes, it does of course raise this problem, and I agree with you that this seems to stretch the definition of similarity to meaninglessness. For this to mean anything, one really requires some way for one stream of consciousness to segue into another, so that although the amnesia becomes complete eventually, there is a transition between the two. Or perhaps each stream of consciousness cycles back and forth between some tabula rasa state (assuming any of this has any validity at all, of course). Of course (as per the transporter) we also find ourselves in the position of Heraclitus' man entering the river, of a person being in constant flux in any case. This is a result of the idea of the brain being at some level a digital computer (and probably of it being an analogue one too...). For my analysis I'll invoke my favorite intuition pump, the AI Mars Rover.As the Rover explores the terrain and learns things to enhance its probability of mission success it fills its memory with things like don't try to cross those white patches and look for another rock that looks like a donut. Now we can see what degrees of amnesia would mean. If just the learned stuff were erased, as they would be blank on a second Rover, then the Rover would be the same in terms of what it tried to do and how it tried to do it, but it would be different in that it would develop different memories and learn new tricks. You might say it had the same personality as the other AI Rover. But then consider a more extreme case: Back a JPL they have a spare Rover that's identical to those sent to Mars. But after the mission is over they move the cpu and memory with the same general AI into an AI deep submersible where they are connected to different sensors and controllers. Then I'd say it had a different consciousness, based on my theory that consciousness depends on how one perceives and acts on the environment. Yes. I think this is what might be called the standard view of consciousness, the sort that most people who think about this sort of thing think should exist, especially if the brain is like a computer (and assuming the consequences of comp don't follow from that assumption). I think some aspects would be wired in of course (that's equivalent to a genetic version of tuning the brain to interact with an expected environment) and some would be learned from experience. This is the view I have when I put my materialist hat on (This is certainly the view that I would take as read if I was writing a hard / cyberpunk SF novel, for example). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On Sunday, February 23, 2014 11:50:57 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Feb 2014, at 18:36, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote: If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an illusion Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preserved all the time. I'm not thinking of 1p originality though, I'm talking about originality itself - absolute uniqueness. The idea that something can occur for the first, last, and only time, and perhaps, by extension that everything is in some sense utterly unique and irreplacable. You reify an 1p notion. What makes you think its more of a 1p notion than arithmetic is? In the H-WM duplication experience, the experiencers get all a unique experience of the type I am the H-guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy and again Moscow guy ... He never feel the split, and keeps its originality all along. he get doppelgangers who also keep up their originality and develop their personality. I understand, but I think it is based on the assumption that I am the H-guy comes along for the ride when you reproduce a description of his body, or the blueprints for his behaviors. Or a diophantine approximation of the quantum string-brane state with 10^(10^10) correct decimal for the rational complex numbers involved. That assumes originality is not fundamental though. I don't see a compelling reason to allow that bottom up construction of consciousness will work. To the contrary, everything that I have seen suggests that it cannot. My point has been from the start that this is false. But that is an extraordinary claim, which requires an extraordinary arguments. Why would it be any more extraordinary than the claim that a unique conscious experience can be assembled from generic unconscious parts? No lifetime or event within a lifetime can be reproduced wholly - I completely agree with you, but those are 1p notion. They have referent, but we cannot invoke them when we study them. All notions are 1p, including the notion that there could be notions which are not 1p. there is no such thing. You have to prove that. It may not be possible to prove anything related to consciousness. If it can be proved, then it only has to do with some particular relation within consciousness. All that can be reproduced is a representation within some sensory context. Outside of that context, it is a facade. You should search for an experiment testing your idea, if only with the pedagogical goal of giving more sense to it. The experiments are all around us. I see an actor on TV, but if I turn off the TV, it becomes clear that the image is only a visual facade. Of course in your theory that is an illusion, as they are all zombies, and the H-guy is dead. Never zombies - always dolls. Zombies are supernatural fiction, dolls are ordinary. The consciousness of dolls is not at the level of the plastic figure - there is consciousness there but on the level which holds the plastic together, and perhaps which on the metaphenomenal level of synchronicity, poetry, etc. and simulation is absolute. Emulation is absolute by Church thesis, and a correct simulation is what comp assumes the existence through the existence of the substitution level. Yes, I am saying that C-t and CTM have only to do with representations of a particular kind of logic and measurement. On the contrary, CT makes many different logics mathematically amenable, that is the reason to be study it. Whatever the truth is, it can only be more complex and subtle. But is still quantifiable, impersonal kinds of logic, as opposed to dream logic or sentimental logic, etc. Your intution that comp is false is correct, but it is 1p, and by itself, it does not provide a refutation of comp, as comp already explain why machine can develop that intuition, and this correctly. If you use comp to explain why I develop this correct intuition then comp cannot explain how you use your incorrect counter-intuition to support the possibility of comp. Your assertion that my intuition is 1p is also a 1p intuition based on your 1p experiences with math. The 1p is not a machine, he is the owner of the brain, that it borrows to the most probable universal neighbors. I am not the owner of a brain, I am the participant in a life. I don't think that a true 1p exists in Comp, only a 3p-x. It is measurement which provides the local appearance of substitution. In reality, theory can never substitute for consciousness, You
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an illusion and simulation is absolute. Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can only be done once. Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be done more than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one time. It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite, progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other sensibly. Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it reflects itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of form. The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the done-over-and-overness of its self reflection can be made to seem equivalent from any local perspective, since the very act of looking through a local perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives, and therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of originality is preserved, but always behind our back. Paradoxically, it is only when we suspend our rigid attention and unexamine the forms presented within consciousness and the world that we can become the understanding that we expect. On Friday, February 21, 2014 8:39:47 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an illusion Not an illusion, an invariant. and simulation is absolute. Not absolute, but hopefully sufficient (i.e. the idea of a level of substitution). Hope that helps. David Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can only be done once. Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be done more than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one time. It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite, progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other sensibly. Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it reflects itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of form. The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the done-over-and-overness of its self reflection can be made to seem equivalent from any local perspective, since the very act of looking through a local perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives, and therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of originality is preserved, but always behind our back. Paradoxically, it is only when we suspend our rigid attention and unexamine the forms presented within consciousness and the world that we can become the understanding that we expect. On Friday, February 21, 2014 8:39:47 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an illusion Not an illusion, an invariant. If it is invariant then it can't be original. Invariant means that it remains fixed across a multiplicity of variations. To be original means that it undergoes no variation. It is uncopied and uncopyable. and simulation is absolute. Not absolute, but hopefully sufficient (i.e. the idea of a level of substitution). Hope that helps. I'm saying that the idea of a level of substitution is absolute. I wish I could hope that helps, but I expect that it will only be twisted around, dismissed, and diluted. Craig David Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can only be done once. Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be done more than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one time. It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite, progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other sensibly. Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it reflects itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of form. The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the done-over-and-overness of its self reflection can be made to seem equivalent from any local perspective, since the very act of looking through a local perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives, and therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of originality is preserved, but always behind our back. Paradoxically, it is only when we suspend our rigid attention and unexamine the forms presented within consciousness and the world that we can become the understanding that we expect. On Friday, February 21, 2014 8:39:47 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 22 Feb 2014, at 02:39, David Nyman wrote: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc Ha ha! I love when he shows the identity cards! Note that this is among the thought experiences that I call forbidden on this list, some years ago. They are shortcuts, and can also provide arguments against either the truth of comp or its ethical consequences. They share this with the thought experiments involving amnesia. The movie prestige exploits one such experience too. Step five is close, but we don't ask the original to commit suicide though! Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 11:27:45 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Feb 2014, at 15:25, Craig Weinberg wrote: If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an illusion Not at all. Your 1p-originality is preserved all the time. I'm not thinking of 1p originality though, I'm talking about originality itself - absolute uniqueness. The idea that something can occur for the first, last, and only time, and perhaps, by extension that everything is in some sense utterly unique and irreplacable. In the H-WM duplication experience, the experiencers get all a unique experience of the type I am the H-guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy I am the H-guy-Washington guy, then Moscow guy, then again Moscow guy and again Moscow guy ... He never feel the split, and keeps its originality all along. he get doppelgangers who also keep up their originality and develop their personality. I understand, but I think it is based on the assumption that I am the H-guy comes along for the ride when you reproduce a description of his body, or the blueprints for his behaviors. My point has been from the start that this is false. No lifetime or event within a lifetime can be reproduced wholly - there is no such thing. All that can be reproduced is a representation within some sensory context. Outside of that context, it is a facade. Of course in your theory that is an illusion, as they are all zombies, and the H-guy is dead. Never zombies - always dolls. Zombies are supernatural fiction, dolls are ordinary. The consciousness of dolls is not at the level of the plastic figure - there is consciousness there but on the level which holds the plastic together, and perhaps which on the metaphenomenal level of synchronicity, poetry, etc. and simulation is absolute. Emulation is absolute by Church thesis, and a correct simulation is what comp assumes the existence through the existence of the substitution level. Yes, I am saying that C-t and CTM have only to do with representations of a particular kind of logic and measurement. It is measurement which provides the local appearance of substitution. In reality, theory can never substitute for consciousness, and consciousness can have no theories outside of consciousness. Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can only be done once. That is ambiguous. I don't think it is. Arithmetic is based on recursive enumeration. There is no one and only time that any number can appear. Every number can be arrived at by many different routes - every number is always repeatable and transferable. Numbers can't own anything, they are generic addresses in a theoretical schema that appears again and again. All conscious present instant are done once, in arithmetic. Where do we find a conscious present instant in arithmetic? If you assume that, then you would be begging the question of consciousness. Trivially in the bloc mindscape of the numbers possible extensional and intensional relations. What is making relations possible, other than sense? Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be done more than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one time. From inside arithmetic that's necessarily the case. Then how can it be said to have a substitution level? It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite, progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other sensibly. The UD, and arithmetic determines all effective endings and non endings (by Church's thesis). Then the internal views put colors on this. Why and how would internal views put anything non-arithmetic on it though? Why and how does the UD develop the idea of endings and non-endings? It is not clear that there can be any endings or beginnings within arithmetic. Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it reflects itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of form. OK. The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the done-over-and- overness of its self reflection can be made to seem equivalent from any local perspective, since the very act of looking through a local perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives, and therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of originality is preserved, but always behind our back. OK. By OK I mean that the correct Lôbian machines roughly agree with you (stretching definitions enough ... Paradoxically, it is only when we suspend
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an illusion Not an illusion, an invariant. If it is invariant then it can't be original. Invariant means that it remains fixed across a multiplicity of variations. To be original means that it undergoes no variation. It is uncopied and uncopyable. But I think that any serious (i.e. non-eliminitavist) theory of consciousness must find it to be original and indeed uncopyable in the sense that you stipulate. Sense is never copied; rather it is encountered wherever there is a sensible context. One might say that it is encountered wherever what is obscuring it has been sufficiently clarified. It originates perpetually at the centre of a circle whose limits are not discoverable. One shouldn't therefore think of sense as what is copied in the protocol; rather what is copiable is only that which is capable of differentiating one sensible context from another. I think that consciousness, transcendently, is a necessary, original and invariant assumption of any theory of itself. As such it is perpetually capable of self-manifestation, given the sufficient conditions of a sensible context. Always in terms of some theory, of course. David and simulation is absolute. Not absolute, but hopefully sufficient (i.e. the idea of a level of substitution). Hope that helps. I'm saying that the idea of a level of substitution is absolute. I wish I could hope that helps, but I expect that it will only be twisted around, dismissed, and diluted. Craig David Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can only be done once. Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be done more than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one time. It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite, progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other sensibly. Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it reflects itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of form. The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the done-over-and-overness of its self reflection can be made to seem equivalent from any local perspective, since the very act of looking through a local perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives, and therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of originality is preserved, but always behind our back. Paradoxically, it is only when we suspend our rigid attention and unexamine the forms presented within consciousness and the world that we can become the understanding that we expect. On Friday, February 21, 2014 8:39:47 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 4:06:39 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an illusion Not an illusion, an invariant. If it is invariant then it can't be original. Invariant means that it remains fixed across a multiplicity of variations. To be original means that it undergoes no variation. It is uncopied and uncopyable. But I think that any serious (i.e. non-eliminitavist) theory of consciousness must find it to be original and indeed uncopyable in the sense that you stipulate. That is the opposite of what CTM does though. In order to say yes to the doctor, we must believe that we are justified in expecting to be copied into an identical conscious personhood. Sense is never copied; rather it is encountered wherever there is a sensible context. Encountered by what? Nonsense? What is a non-sensible context? One might say that it is encountered wherever what is obscuring it has been sufficiently clarified. It originates perpetually at the centre of a circle whose limits are not discoverable. One shouldn't therefore think of sense as what is copied in the protocol; rather what is copiable is only that which is capable of differentiating one sensible context from another. What else could be capable of differentiating one sensible context from another besides sense? You are saying that sense is not copied, only sense-making is copied. I am saying that nothing is copied except for the ratios of distance between experiences. I think that consciousness, transcendently, is a necessary, original and invariant assumption of any theory of itself. We agree then, but how does that allow for CTM? As such it is perpetually capable of self-manifestation, given the sufficient conditions of a sensible context. Always in terms of some theory, of course. Theory is always in terms of a deeper sense-making substrate. Craig David and simulation is absolute. Not absolute, but hopefully sufficient (i.e. the idea of a level of substitution). Hope that helps. I'm saying that the idea of a level of substitution is absolute. I wish I could hope that helps, but I expect that it will only be twisted around, dismissed, and diluted. Craig David Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can only be done once. Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be done more than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one time. It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite, progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other sensibly. Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it reflects itself in different sensible ways through every appreciation of form. The not-even-done-onceness of consciousness and the done-over-and-overness of its self reflection can be made to seem equivalent from any local perspective, since the very act of looking through a local perspective requires a comparison with prior perspectives, and therefore attention to the done-over-and-overness - the rigorously measured and recorded. In this way, the diagonalization of originality is preserved, but always behind our back. Paradoxically, it is only when we suspend our rigid attention and unexamine the forms presented within consciousness and the world that we can become the understanding that we expect. On Friday, February 21, 2014 8:39:47 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com javascript:. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.comjavascript: . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 23 February 2014 00:27, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 4:06:39 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an illusion Not an illusion, an invariant. If it is invariant then it can't be original. Invariant means that it remains fixed across a multiplicity of variations. To be original means that it undergoes no variation. It is uncopied and uncopyable. But I think that any serious (i.e. non-eliminitavist) theory of consciousness must find it to be original and indeed uncopyable in the sense that you stipulate. That is the opposite of what CTM does though. In order to say yes to the doctor, we must believe that we are justified in expecting to be copied into an identical conscious personhood. No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. Sense is never copied; rather it is encountered wherever there is a sensible context. Encountered by what? Nonsense? What is a non-sensible context? There is no precisely apposite vocabulary here. I simply meant the sufficient conditions for the self-relative actualisation of a who, a where, a when, a history and so forth. In short-hand: a sensible context. One might say that it is encountered wherever what is obscuring it has been sufficiently clarified. It originates perpetually at the centre of a circle whose limits are not discoverable. One shouldn't therefore think of sense as what is copied in the protocol; rather what is copiable is only that which is capable of differentiating one sensible context from another. What else could be capable of differentiating one sensible context from another besides sense? You are saying that sense is not copied, only sense-making is copied. I am saying that nothing is copied except for the ratios of distance between experiences. I am only saying, or trying to say, what follows from the assumptions and explicit rules of derivation of a particular theory. I can do no other and no more. Under CTM, what might look like arithmetic, computation and logic from the bird perspective transforms, in terms of those very rules of derivation, into an inter-subjective Multiverse in the frog perspective. In so doing it relies implicitly, as I have suggested, on a notion of consciousness as a transcendent observational invariant. I think that consciousness, transcendently, is a necessary, original and invariant assumption of any theory of itself. We agree then, but how does that allow for CTM? Because if we are on the track of a theory of everything (vainglorious though that may be) we need more than just a transcendent assumption. We need a robust framework that shows at least some early promise of being able to address the formidable conceptual and technical challenges that infest the world-problem, hopefully without sweeping any of them under the rug. As such it is perpetually capable of self-manifestation, given the sufficient conditions of a sensible context. Always in terms of some theory, of course. Theory is always in terms of a deeper sense-making substrate. I would say rather that theory must be capable of situating the required notions of sense both transcendently and contextually. And theory mustn't cheat by assuming a priori that its postulates are real (as opposed to the point of departure of an argument). David and simulation is absolute. Not absolute, but hopefully sufficient (i.e. the idea of a level of substitution). Hope that helps. I'm saying that the idea of a level of substitution is absolute. I wish I could hope that helps, but I expect that it will only be twisted around, dismissed, and diluted. Craig David Arithmetic can do so many things, but it can't do something that can only be done once. Think of consciousness as not only that which can't be done more than once, it is that which cannot even be fully completed one time. It doesn't begin or end, and it is neither finite nor infinite, progressing or static, but instead it is the fundamental ability for beginnings and endings to seem to exist and to relate to each other sensibly. Consciousness is orthogonal to all process and form, but it reflects itself in different sensible
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On Saturday, February 22, 2014 8:49:33 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 23 February 2014 00:27, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comjavascript: wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 4:06:39 PM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 22 February 2014 15:09, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: On Saturday, February 22, 2014 9:34:08 AM UTC-5, David Nyman wrote: On 22 February 2014 14:25, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.com wrote: If you say yes to the doctor, you are saying that originality is an illusion Not an illusion, an invariant. If it is invariant then it can't be original. Invariant means that it remains fixed across a multiplicity of variations. To be original means that it undergoes no variation. It is uncopied and uncopyable. But I think that any serious (i.e. non-eliminitavist) theory of consciousness must find it to be original and indeed uncopyable in the sense that you stipulate. That is the opposite of what CTM does though. In order to say yes to the doctor, we must believe that we are justified in expecting to be copied into an identical conscious personhood. No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. But it is directly contradicted by the idea that consciousness is tied to originality. You can't have it both ways. If consciousness can be continued by a computation, then it cannot be considered original. It is no more original than a long IP address. Any computation which can reproduce the complex number must forever instantiate a non-original address of consciousness. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). The world of comp is what is observed, which is why it can never contain even a single observer. Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. Any continuation is a violation of originality/authenticity and is therefore, by my definition, unconscious and impossible. I assure you that there is nothing significant that I misunderstand about comp. You are telling me over and over what I already know, and your responses clearly indicate to me that you are primarily focused on your view being heard rather than considering mine. You are getting some of my view, more than most others on this list have been willing to sit through, but still, your argument is 90% shadow boxing. Sense is never copied; rather it is encountered wherever there is a sensible context. Encountered by what? Nonsense? What is a non-sensible context? There is no precisely apposite vocabulary here. I simply meant the sufficient conditions for the self-relative actualisation of a who, a where, a when, a history and so forth. In short-hand: a sensible context. I understand exactly what you simply meant, but I am challenging you to see that it is too simple. My attack on CTM begins miles beneath the facile assumptions of modal logic and enumerated data fields. I'm talking about screaming, crying, stinking reality here, not a hypothesis of pretty puzzles. Fuck the puzzles. I'm not playing with words, I'm saying simply that it is impossible for sense to be superseded in any way. Every context is a context of sense and nothing else. One might say that it is encountered wherever what is obscuring it has been sufficiently clarified. It originates perpetually at the centre of a circle whose limits are not discoverable. One shouldn't therefore think of sense as what is copied in the protocol; rather what is copiable is only that which is capable of differentiating one sensible context from another. What else could be capable of differentiating one sensible context from another besides sense? You are saying that sense is not copied, only sense-making is copied. I am saying that nothing is copied except for the ratios of distance between experiences. I am only saying, or trying to say, what follows from the assumptions and explicit rules of derivation of a particular theory. You must know by now though that I have no interest in that theory except to show that it is inside out. I can do no other and no more. Why? Can't you set aside CTM for a while to contemplate other possibilities? Under CTM, what might look like arithmetic, computation and logic from the bird perspective transforms, in terms of those very rules of derivation, into an inter-subjective Multiverse in the frog perspective. In so doing it relies implicitly, as I have suggested, on a notion of consciousness as a transcendent observational invariant. Why wouldn't arithmetic and computation look like
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote: No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past? Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote: No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past? This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state? Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness, does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that I am he as you are he as he is me, etc). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 23 Feb 2014, at 06:21, LizR wrote: On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote: No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past? This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state? It might start from a state of consciousness which is beyond time. Let us say the blank state of the universal virgin (non programmed) machine. The []p t modality makes the world into a non-cul-de-sac world, but does not imply an infinite past, or previous computational history per se, although this is not entirely excluded for the physics in comp. Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness, does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that I am he as you are he as he is me, etc). In some sense, perhaps. That can be related somehow. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
On 2/22/2014 9:21 PM, LizR wrote: On 23 February 2014 17:40, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/22/2014 5:49 PM, David Nyman wrote: No, I don't think that follows. The indefinite continuation of consciousness is directly entailed by CTM. In fact it is equivalent to the continuing existence of the sensible world (i.e. per comp, the world is what is observed). Hence any observer can expect to remain centred in the circle of observation, come what may, to speak rather loosely. There is a transcendent expectation of a definite continuation (aka no cul-de-sac). This expectation is relativised only secondarily in terms of the specifics of some particular continuation. So does your consciousness continue indefinitely into the past? This would imply there is no initial state of mind - assumed digital, I assume? - or that every possible mental state has a precursor. Does computational theory assume this, or can a mind start from a blank state? Even if it doesn't, it would seem a remarkable coincidence that everyone seems to be on their first consciousness. Or given that consciousness is not the contents of consciousness, I see no reason to assume that. does this just imply amensia about previous lives? (And maybe that I am he as you are he as he is me, etc). Or does it imply that consciousness and memory are intrinsic to certain physical processes. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Turning the tables on the doctor
I wouldn't ride in the damn thing! -- Larry Niven, The theory and practice of teleportation (from memory, I may not have got that quote 100% right) On 22 February 2014 14:39, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pdxucpPq6Lc -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
