Re: [PEIRCE-L] Synechism and Peirce's Categories typo correction

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Typo correction:

‘Synergism' should read ’synechism'

> On May 8, 2024, at 2:41 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> Jon:
> 
>> On May 7, 2024, at 5:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> What additional insights can we gain from further contemplating continuity 
>> in light of the categories, and the categories in light of continuity?
>> 
> Material reality of the chemical sciences is based on the uniqueness of every 
> chemical element.
> 
> How do you rationalize this view of synergism with the computations of atomic 
> logics as discrete elements of the table of elements and the corresponding 
> copulative logic that CSP described? (Recall, roughly speaking, that all 
> numeric computation that uses discrete symbols, that is, the index for 
> symbols  / icons is not continuous.)
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry
>   
> 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Synechism and Peirce's Categories

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon:

> On May 7, 2024, at 5:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> What additional insights can we gain from further contemplating continuity in 
> light of the categories, and the categories in light of continuity?
> 
Material reality of the chemical sciences is based on the uniqueness of every 
chemical element.

How do you rationalize this view of synergism with the computations of atomic 
logics as discrete elements of the table of elements and the corresponding 
copulative logic that CSP described? (Recall, roughly speaking, that all 
numeric computation that uses discrete symbols, that is, the index for symbols  
/ icons is not continuous.)

Cheers
Jerry
  

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Robert; List-

> On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:18 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> 
> You know very well that we don't mention "what goes without saying" in 
> mathematics. For example, when Peirce names the classes of signs, he doesn't 
> note that symbols are legisigns, any more than he mentions that the three 
> iconic signs are rhematic.

After further thought, I find these sentences to be problematic.

Within mathematics, if a sentence is not placed in a specified contact, then 
the reader is open to multiple potential assignments of meanings and possibly 
multiple possible arrangements of consequences.  

In the case of “signs”, I would suggest that without specification of the 
location of the sign, both the 2nd and 3ns are open to the reader’s mind (seme).

This example of seeking to category theory as a generic form of absolute 
vagueness is remote from the trichotomy.  Legisssign is a direct consequence of 
genesis from “argument” and symbol. 

Further, the sequence of 
O—>S—> I
As an implicative sequence would not be an causal axiomatic sequence as a 
consequence of the multiple possible meanings of a sign or the context in which 
the sign occurs. 

BTW, are you aware of CSP’s reference to Maxwell’s equations? 

Cheers
Jerry_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Classifying Signs (was Mark Token Type)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Jon:

> On Apr 16, 2024, at 1:10 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> HR: But all this doesn´t mean, that between parallel classes (such as icon, 
> index, symbol) there is a gradient instead of a sharp distinction.
> 
> According to Peirce, one sign can be more or less iconic, indexical, or 
> symbolic than another sign--especially since all symbols involve indices and 
> icons, and all indices involve icons. Moreover, a sign can be predominately 
> iconic while still having indexical and symbolic aspects, or predominately 
> indexical while still having symbolic aspects. On the other hand, both tones 
> as "indefinite significant characters" and types as "definitely significant 
> Forms" are embodied in tokens, such that every type involves tokens (its 
> instances) and every token involves tones. Most (maybe all) of the other 
> eight trichotomies in Peirce's 1906-1908 taxonomies are sharp distinctions, 
> although the necessitant typically involves the existent and the possible, 
> and the existent involves the possible. For example, every sign must be 
> either a seme, a pheme, or a delome; but all delomes involve phemes and 
> semes, and all phemes involve semes.

Returning to the 1868 metaphysical definition of substance, one can attempt to 
ascribe names to substances following the rhetorical guidance that would 
presumably follow from the agency of these manufactured descriptors.  Note the 
three distinctions that CSP hypotheses for his metaphysics.

For example, I could attempt to assign the names of the ordered sequence of 
saturated hydrocarbons, methane, ethane, propane, butane, pentane, hexane, 
septane, octane, nonane, decane, and so forth.  (It is probable that CSP was 
aware of the relative compositions of these (the first ten) saturated 
hydrocarbons.). The molecular formula are given by the general formula, 
C(n)H(2n+2). 

Each of these substances has properties related to temperature, such as melting 
point or boiling point and flammability.

Each of these substances has a graph, a specific graph of the arrangement of 
the (n) + (2n+2) atoms in a pattern that was determined by methodologies of 
chemical ANALYSIS and SYNTHESIS.  Furthermore, in the late 1890’s, CSP produced 
a research article on acetylene, a related hydrocarbon that indicated he was 
knowledgable of the state of the art.  

Can you create any correlates between the categories ( 9, or 10, or 66 or any 
other integer) of the semantics you appear to believe in?  Or, are semantics 
merely rhetoric semantics for the sake of argument that can not be related to 
substances?

More generally, from a philosophical point of view, when and how will such 
terminology generate the agency need for pragmatic work of symbolic agency? 

Cheers

Jerry 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon:  

On review, this comment is of possible interest to a purist! 

> On Feb 27, 2024, at 12:26 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> JAS: Every explicitly scribed EG is a replica (instance), a sinsign (token) 
> of a peculiar kind that embodies a legisign (type).
> 
> JLRC: Frankly, I fail to find a connection between this stance regarding the 
> existential graphs and the prior development of the metaphysics of substance 
> of 1868. This reading of token and type is novel. 
> 
> Peirce does not introduce the terminology of qualisign/sinsign/legisign and 
> tone/token/type until 1903 and 1906, respectively, so I am puzzled by your 
> reference to something from nearly four decades earlier. In any case, there 
> is nothing novel about this reading, it is a well-known aspect of his 
> speculative grammar within the normative science of logic as semeiotic. 


The 1868 notions from metaphysics remain foundational today.  History has not 
not changed these foundational arguments and the organization of these semes 
and semantics.

Cheers
Jerry 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Dear Edwinia, List 

> On Apr 7, 2024, at 1:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> And I also am a strong supporter of Peirce’s three categories, with the 
> interplay between Firstnerss [ randomnness, chance, freedom]; steady-state 
> interaction [Secondness] and the development of new habits of organization [ 
> Thirdness]. One can explain a capitalist economy using all three categories. 
> 

Your exuberant assertions are a bit beyond my amateurish  reach. 

I am curious about these theses from the perspective of CSP theory of 
categories with respect to your understandings of semiosis and semantic 
closures. 

In the “A New List of Categories”, CSP describes the meaning of his terms and 
then asserts:

"BEING
Quality (Reference to a Ground)
Relation(Reference to a Correlate)
Representation  (Reference to an Interpretant)
SUBSTANCE

The three intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents.”

(The punctuation is reproduced from the Essential Peirce, Vol 1., page 6)

I am attempting to sort through the terms in light of “icons, indices, and 
symbols”.

Can you briefly connect to an understanding of “BEING”? 
Can you briefly elucidate the threads of reasoning that connect this view of 
“SUBSTANCE”  to the conclusions in economics?

Yes, I know that you may find these to be “Philosophy 101” questions, but I 
have been reading a bit of Metaphysics in recent months…

Michael, your thoughts are equally welcomed.

Cheers

Jerry 










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[PEIRCE-L] Zoom lecture on the CSP's role in philosophy of science (U Pitt)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

FYI 
JLRC 

Friday, April 12th @ 12:00 pm - 1:30 pm EDT

This talk will also be available live streamed on: Zoom at 
https://pitt.zoom.us/j/94576817686

Title: Peirce Disappears: C.S. Peirce and Early Logical Empiricism

Abstract:  Scholars of the history of philosophy of science read and hear a lot 
about Duhem, Mach, Poincaré, and the members of the Vienna Circle. C.S. Peirce, 
however, is not generally considered a canonical figure in the history of 
philosophy of science. But in the early years of the logical empiricist 
movement in the United States, Peirce received a warm reception from prominent 
representatives, proponents, and sympathizers of logical empiricism including 
Charles Morris, Ernst Nagel, Herbert Feigl, Phillip Frank, and W.V.O. Quine. 
This reception was short-lived though and Peirce gradually disappeared from the 
mainstream philosophy of science while logical empiricism turned into a 
formidable movement.
In this talk, I begin by discussing examples of the early reception of Peirce’s 
philosophy in the works of Morris, Nagel (and his student Justus Buchler), 
Feigl, and Frank. I show the variety of topics (including logic, probability 
theory, theories of truth and meaning, and social dimensions of science) in 
which Peirce received a warm (though not uncritical) reception. We see that the 
engagements with his works are persistent from the late 1920s to the 1950s and 
get more refined over time. I then provide some explanations for the eventual 
marginalization of Peirce in mainstream philosophy of science.
 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta

[Jerry LR Chandler]

In mathematical texts, it's common to say "Given A1, A2, A3..., it follows 
> THAT T1, T2, T3...  where the A's are axioms, and the T's are theorems that 
> follow from the axioms.
> 
> Note the word 'that'.  It is a sign of METALANGUAGE, between two clauses of a 
> sentence.   It is not a sign of implication.  The word 'follows' or more 
> precisely 'my be proved from' indicate the steps of a proof.
> 
> As for the notations in R514 and L376, Peirce made another distinction:  
> postulates are propositions on which the utterer and the interpreter agree. 
> The choice of postulates is the result of an AGREEMENT between the utterer 
> and the interpreter.  The results inside the red line are the result of an 
> INVESTIGATION  that may be far more complex than an mathematical proof.  The 
> complexity of the investigation is the reason why Delta graphs are a 
> completely new branch of EGs. 
> 
> In summary, metalanguage is the "secrete sauce" that makes Gamma graphs a 
> third branch.  But investigation makes Delta graphs the fourth branch.   That 
> difference is very important.
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> 
> Jerry, List:
> 
> No one is claiming that Peirce ever used the term "metalanguage," only the 
> concept. Specifically, he provided a Gamma EG notation for asserting a 
> proposition about a proposition--the lightly drawn (1898) or dotted (1903) 
> oval for treating a complete proposition as a subject that fills the blank in 
> a rheme attached to the oval by a lightly drawn (1898) or dotted (1903) line 
> to compose another complete proposition (CP 4.560, 1906). For example, here 
> is the Gamma EG for "A thinks that it is possible that B," where A is a 
> person, B is a proposition, "A thinks ___" and "___ is possible" are rhemes, 
> and each instance of "that" in English corresponds to a dotted oval/line in 
> the graph.
> 

> 
> The "red pencil" notation (1909) is entirely different from this--a red line 
> is drawn just inside the physical edge of the sheet, and postulates are 
> written in the resulting margin. These are not propositions about the 
> propositions written inside the red line (metalanguage), they are premisses 
> (antecedent) from which the propositions written inside the red line follow 
> necessarily as deductive conclusions (consequent). For example, if the EGs 
> for Euclid's five postulates are scribed in the margin, then they can be 
> iterated to the interior, where the EGs for all the theorems of Euclidean 
> geometry can be derived from them in accordance with the usual permissions.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>  
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Fri, Mar 22, 2024 at 11:43 PM Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote:
> Jon,  List 
>> On Mar 20, 2024, at 12:46 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> Peirce's 1898 and 1903 notations for metalanguage are identical, except that 
>> the oval and line are lightly drawn in the former and dotted in the latter.
>> Peirce's "red pencil" notation in R 514 has nothing to do with 
>> metalanguage--it turns an entire sheet into nested cuts for implication, 
>> with the antecedent (postulates) in the margin and the consequent (theorems) 
>> inside the red line.
> In these two paragraphs, the term “metalanguage” is used.
> Was I misled by the assertion  (by another logician) that Tarski was the 
> first to use this term? 
> 
> Although this may seem as a trivial point, it becomes rather critical from 
> the perspectives of emergence and evolution with the putative levels of 
> development and the corresponding grammatical distinctions between the social 
> and natural sciences and current notions of “metalogics”. 
> 
> At issue is the languages in which propositions are posited. 
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John:

> On Mar 20, 2024, at 3:16 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> That quotation shows that Gamma graphs add one and only one NECESSARY feature 
> to Alpha + Beta graphs:  the same or equivalent metalanguage feature used in 
> 1898 (RLT).   When Peirce referred to the DIVISION of Gamma graphs, that is 
> the only feature required.He later did much more talking about modality 
> and with new notations.  He never again used any of the notations that are 
> unique to the 1903 Gamma graphs. 

I am puzzled by this paragraph.

If the critical concept that is under scrutiny here the issue of “graphs of 
graphs” , how is this related to the arithmetical notion of division?  

And what sort of mental operations would be required to assert the nature of a 
division of a “graph of graphs“?

Cheers
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[PEIRCE-L] Meta-languages. Re: Four branches of existential graphs: Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon,  List 

> On Mar 20, 2024, at 12:46 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Peirce's 1898 and 1903 notations for metalanguage are identical, except that 
> the oval and line are lightly drawn in the former and dotted in the latter.
> 
> Peirce's "red pencil" notation in R 514 has nothing to do with 
> metalanguage--it turns an entire sheet into nested cuts for implication, with 
> the antecedent (postulates) in the margin and the consequent (theorems) 
> inside the red line.
> 
In these two paragraphs, the term “metalanguage” is used.
Was I misled by the assertion  (by another logician) that Tarski was the first 
to use this term? 

Although this may seem as a trivial point, it becomes rather critical from the 
perspectives of emergence and evolution with the putative levels of development 
and the corresponding grammatical distinctions between the social and natural 
sciences and current notions of “metalogics”. 

At issue is the languages in which propositions are posited. 

Cheers
Jerry  

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon, John:



> On Mar 12, 2024, at 4:59 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry, List:
> 
> Your questions as posed are extremely general, and their answers depend 
> heavily on the particular context of interest.

Human reasoning is as general or as specific as the situation warrants in the 
mind of an author.

> 
> Peirce assigns specific logical content to certain signs in his Existential 
> Graphs (EGs) and develops the transformation rules for them accordingly.

Assigns?  Ascribes?  Arranges? Asserts?  Abduces? Induces? Relates? Infers? 
Implies? Identifies? Terms?  Terminals? Etc etc etc. 
How many possible semantic terms can be related to the supporting text?


> In all parts, the blank sheet represents the universe of discourse, graphs 
> scribed on it represent propositions that are asserted as true in that 
> universe, juxtaposition represents coexistence in that universe (conjunction),

Conjunction? Or Adjacency? Or Positions?  Or co-positions? Or simply arranges?  
Do these terms all have the same meaning in any two universes of discourse? 
How would you describe the differential meanings in discourse A contrasted 
negatively with B?  …positively with B?

> and a scroll (double cut or ring-shaped shaded area) represents a consequence 
> (material implication) from which a single cut or shaded area is derived as 
> representing negation (implication of falsity/absurdity). In the Beta part, 
> heavy lines of identity denote indefinite individuals and attached names 
> denote general concepts being attributed to those individuals.
Can anyone ascribe any identity to any heavy line based on its terms?
What is the meaning of the profound semantic term “constraint” and how does it 
apply to a heavy line in discourse A relative to the natural constraints in 
discourse B? 

Obviously, I could continue to ask a vast range of interrogatory ‘who, what 
when where why and how questions.

Hopefully, the readers of this message will explore the meanings of such 
questions AS THEY APPLY to semes (thoughts) of various tokens, types, and 
tones.  In particular, one can ask how such questions apply to the logics of 
the sciences (discourse A) and how they might apply to literary narratives 
(Discourse B).

How can anyone find such conjectures compelling?

Cheers

Jerry   



> In the Gamma part, there are various additional signs for various purposes, 
> such as the broken cut for possible falsity (modal logic), the heavy line 
> with dotted lines along both sides for quantifying predicates (second-order 
> logic), and the dotted oval for treating a proposition as a subject that 
> fills the blank in a rheme attached to the oval by a dotted line 
> (metalanguage).


> 
> As I keep emphasizing, we cannot know for sure what Peirce had in mind for 
> the Delta part, other than that it would "deal with modals," unless and until 
> new manuscript evidence turns up, such as the missing pages of R L376. My 
> hypothesis is that he was considering a new notation for representing and 
> reasoning about modal propositions involving possibility or necessity, such 
> as the one that he introduces in his Logic Notebook (R 339:[340r], 1909 Jan 
> 7). In that case, heavy lines represent "circumstances" or "times"--more 
> formally, possible states of things (PSTs)--and attached letters represent 
> propositions that would be true under those circumstances, at those times, or 
> in those PSTs. The transformation rules for these "lines of compossibility" 
> (my term) are different from the ones for the "lines of identity" (Peirce's 
> term) in the Beta part because of the obvious and fundamental semiotic 
> difference between describing things with names (rhemes/semes) and describing 
> states of things with propositions (dicisigns/phemes).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 8:01 AM Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote:
>> Jon, John, List:
>> 
>> The attempts to interpret the on going discussions leads to simple questions 
>> about meaning of symbols and logics. 
>> 
>> Given a graphic object, how does one decipher the logical content of it? 
>> 
>> What types of semantics can be associated with what types of visual 
>> distinctions?
>> 
>> How many distinctions are to be associated with a graphic object? And how 
>> are these distinctions associated with the forms embodied in the objects 
>> with logical premises OF ANY ORDER?
>>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John:

> On Mar 13, 2024, at 4:24 PM, Gary Richmond  wrote:
> 
> JFS: Once again, Peirce's logic is at the forefront of 21st C developments.

While in one sense, I agree with your ascertain, but probably for different 
reasons.

The question is, what aspects of “21st C developments” are you referring to?

Cheers

Jerry

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Higher-Order Logics (was Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon, John, List:

The attempts to interpret the on going discussions leads to simple questions 
about meaning of symbols and logics. 

Given a graphic object, how does one decipher the logical content of it? 

What types of semantics can be associated with what types of visual 
distinctions?

How many distinctions are to be associated with a graphic object? And how are 
these distinctions associated with the forms embodied in the objects with 
logical premises OF ANY ORDER?

I pose these questions because as the discussion unfolds into the vast richness 
of modal logics within the modern forms of symbolic logics, the roles of 
individual minds in expressing semes appears to become dominant.   In other 
words, the boundaries between symbols and icons seems to disappearing...

Cheers

Jerry 


> On Mar 8, 2024, at 9:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> Jeff, List:
> 
> Indeed, as Don Roberts summarizes, "The Gamma part of EG corresponds, 
> roughly, to second (and higher) order functional calculi, and to modal logic. 
> ... By means of this new section of EG Peirce wanted to take account of 
> abstractions, including qualities and relations and graphs themselves as 
> subjects to be reasoned about" 
> (https://www.felsemiotica.com/descargas/Roberts-Don-D.-The-Existential-Graphs-of-Charles-S.-Peirce.pdf,
>  1973, p. 64). Likewise, according to Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, "In the Gamma 
> part Peirce proposes a bouquet of logics beyond the extensional, 
> propositional and first-order systems. Those concern systems of modal logics, 
> second-order (higher-order) logics, abstractions, and logic of multitudes and 
> collections, among others" (LF 2/1:28). Jay Zeman says a bit more about Gamma 
> EGs for second-order logic in his dissertation.
> 
> JZ: There is also another suggestion, in 4.470, which is interesting but to 
> which Peirce devotes very little time. Here he shows us a different kind of 
> line of identity, one which expresses the identity of spots rather than of 
> individuals. This is an intriguing move, since it strongly suggests at least 
> the second order predicate calculus, with spots now acquiring 
> quantifications. Peirce did very little with this idea, so far as I am able 
> to determine, but it seems to me that there would not be too much of a 
> problem in working it into a graphical system which would stand to the higher 
> order calculi as beta stands to the first-order calculus. The continuity 
> interpretation of the "spot line of identity" is fairly clear; it maps the 
> continuity of a property or a relation. The redness of an apple is the same, 
> in a sense, as the redness of my face if I am wrong; the continuity of the 
> special line of identity introduced in 4.470 represents graphically this 
> sameness. This sameness or continuity is not the same as the identity of 
> individuals; although its representation is scribed upon the beta sheet of 
> assertion, its "second intentional" nature seems to cause Peirce to classify 
> it with the gamma signs. (https://isidore.co/calibre/get/pdf/4481, 1964, pp. 
> 31-32)
> 
> The CP reference here is to the paragraph right before the one where Peirce 
> suggests the notation of a dotted oval and dotted line to assert a 
> proposition about a proposition (CP 4.471, 1903), similar to the first EG on 
> RLT 151 (1898), as John and I discussed recently 
> (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00141.html). Here is 
> what Peirce says (and scribes) in that text; the image is from LF 2/1:165, 
> with Peirce's handiwork on the right and Pietarinen's reproduction on the 
> left.
> 
> CSP: Convention No. 13. The letters ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, etc. each with a number 
> of hooks greater by one than the subscript number, may be taken as rhemata 
> signifying that the individuals joined to the hooks, other than the one 
> vertically above the ρ taken in their order clockwise are capable of being 
> asserted of the rhema indicated by the line of identity joined vertically to 
> the ρ.
> Thus, Fig. 57 expresses that there is a relation in which every man stands to 
> some woman to whom no other man stands in the same relation; that is, there 
> is a woman corresponding to every man or, in other words, there are at least 
> as many women as men. The dotted lines between which, in Fig. 57, the line of 
> identity denoting the ens rationis is placed, are by no means necessary.

> 
> On the other hand, as I keep pointing out, Peirce's only stated purpose for 
> needing to add a new Delta part was "in order to deal with modals" (R L376, 
> 1911 Dec 6), so I doubt that it would have had anything to do with 
> higher-order logics. John Sowa seems to be convinced that Peirce had in mind 
> a more generalized situation/context logic using metalanguage, but so far, I 
> see no evidence for this in the extant 19 pages of that letter to Risteen. 
> Pietarinen speculates, "Perhaps he planned the Delta part on quantificational 
> multi-modal logics as can be 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon, List

> On Feb 23, 2024, at 5:22 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> 
> JLRC> First, the question of modern modal symbolic logic is remote from 
> probability theory and even remoter from the Peircian notion of “qualisign, 
> sinsign, legisign”  
> 
> That is true of Peirce's modal logic of 1903, which was the mainstream of 
> modal logic for most of the 20th C and which is still taught in introductory 
> courses.  But Peirce became very interested in probability theory, as shown 
> in his writings in the Logic Notebook.   The that-operator from 1898 and the 
> "papers" of June and December 1911 can support the kind of metalanguage that 
> is widely used today for computational and theoretical methods for either or 
> both possibilities and probabilities.  
> 

I respectably disagree with breadth and depth of this justification of the 
meanings to be associated with the sign-generating terms, qualisign, sin-sign 
and legisign. These three terms all refer to the metaphysics of Being paper of 
1868, don’t they?

The concept of a sign is intrinsically singular, yet any real object in the 
world offers many many necessary and possible signs. Thus, the need for a 
concept of “sin-sign” as a singular entity.  
Corresponding to this need is an exact name for the object under inquiry, that 
is, a legisign. 
The quali-sign determines the attributes of the sin-sign and the name for the 
legisign, does it not? 

My point is that these three terms point to the metaphysical nature of the 
“Being" of the subject of a sentence that specifies an existent object. These 
terms are necessarily deterministic in form and character in order to specify 
the identity of the object.  

Please note that this interpretation of the semiology of the CSP’s semantics 
also addresses the distinction between the copulative grammar of sentences from 
the pseudo-first order logic of modern probability theories, discrete or 
continuous. 

The fact that the  “computational and theoretical methods” used today are based 
on probability theories lacks  relevancy to the situational logic developed by 
CSP.  The terms of the trichotomy were defined by CSP to ascribe meaning to the 
metaphysical “being” of objects with precision, not to merely describe a 
convenient possibility for engineering purposes.

Cheers
Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon, John, List:

Thanks to both of you for pushing the discourse toward the potential modern 
interpretations of CSP’s thoughts (semes?).  

I only have time for a couple of feedbacks, although your texts motivated 
deeper deliberations.

1. First, the question of modern modal symbolic logic is remote from 
probability theory and even remoter from the Peircian notion of “qualisign, 
sinsign, legisign”

Is not the distinction between logic of syntax and the logic of semantics?  The 
semantic gap in the meanings of signs was probably a constitutive factor in the 
categorization of signs, would you agree?

2. Jon: What particular texts of CSP were you referring to when you listed five 
modal phrases?  I am more than a little skeptical that this is both sound and 
complete interpretations of CSP’s texts but I am open to persuasion!   You 
might look at my online paper, An Introduction to Chemical Information Theory, 
where I search for a Peircian approach from a Natural science perspective. 

3. Do either of you feel that your interpretations of "delta graphs" bridge the 
yawning gaps between semiotics and semiology?

Cheers

Jerry  


> On Feb 23, 2024, at 12:21 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> John, List:
> 
> I fully agree with your comment last week that "Peirce List is a 
> collaboration, not a competition," and I hope that you will receive this 
> response in that spirit. My questions are genuinely intended to help me (and 
> others) better understand your position, and I would appreciate direct 
> answers.
> 
> JFS: The single most important innovation of Delta graphs is an operator for 
> metalangage or metalogic.
> 
> That is not what Peirce says about Delta EGs in the letter to Risteen. He 
> simply states, "I shall now have to add a Delta part in order to deal with 
> modals," and we do not have to guess at what he means by "modals" since he 
> provides a straightforward definition elsewhere. "A modal proposition takes 
> account of a whole range of possibility. According as it asserts something to 
> be true or false throughout the whole range of possibility, it is necessary 
> or impossible. According as it asserts something to be true or false within 
> the range of possibility (not expressly including or excluding the existent 
> state of things), it is possible or contingent" (CP 2.323, EP 2:283, 1903). 
> Hence, the 1898 example--"That you are a good girl is much to be wished"--is 
> not what Peirce considered to be a modal proposition; only something like 
> "That you are a good girl is possible" would qualify.
> 
> Where exactly do you see anything about "an operator for metalanguage or 
> metalogic" in the letter to Risteen? Again, what does Peirce say in that text 
> that would not be fully applicable to Alpha, Beta, and Gamma EGs as he had 
> described them previously? Please provide exact quotations.
> 
> JFS: Although Peirce never developed it further (as far as I know), the 
> option of attaching a line of identity to an oval is exactly the same 
> operation as taking a sheet of paper, drawing a line around the nested text 
> (You are a good girl), and stating postulates in the margin (as in R514 and 
> L376).
> 
> It is not the same operation at all since "--is much to be wished" is not a 
> postulate from which "you are a good girl" follows necessarily. As I 
> explained before, Peirce's "red pencil" operation in R 514 effectively turns 
> each individual sheet of paper on which EGs are scribed into a conditional 
> proposition. Its physical edges and the red line drawn just inside them are 
> cuts, the latter nested within the former, so that the margin is the outer 
> close (antecedent) and the area within the red line is the inner close 
> (consequent). Any propositions in the margin (postulates) are "merely 
> asserted to be possible," and if they are all true, then all the propositions 
> within the red line (theorems) are also true. There is no "line of identity" 
> connecting the red line to the postulates in the margin.
> 
> Where exactly do you see anything about "stating postulates in the margin" in 
> R L376? Please provide exact quotations.
> 
> JFS: As for the five EGs from 1909, quoted below, none of them express modal 
> logic. All five of them can be translated to statements in first-order logic:
> 
> Those translations are incorrect. It is unambiguous from Peirce's own 
> handwritten translations that the EGs scribed on that Logic Notebook page are 
> not Beta graphs with heavy lines for indefinite individuals attached to 
> lowercase letters for general concepts being attributed to them. Instead, the 
> heavy lines are for "circumstances," and they are attached to lowercase 
> letters for propositions (as in Alpha) that would be true in them. There is 
> an analogy between quantifying predicates over subjects in first-order 
> predicate logic and quantifying propositions over possible states of things 
> in propositional modal logic--in Peirce's words, "The 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Interpretants, Sign Classification, and 3ns (was Who, What, When, Where, How, and Why)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Jon

> On Feb 14, 2024, at 12:56 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> There are indeed six classes of signs according to their dyadic relations 
> with their two external interpretants (immediate is internal), but they have 
> nothing to do with "the six basic question words.”

Thanks for pointing back to the metaphysics of Peircian categories!  I re-read 
this text for the first time in at least two decades and now find it to be 
profound.  

Because, if you read this text from the modern views of categorical logics, it 
clarifies the semantic of his materially oriented metaphysical conjectures as 
sources of the syntactical elements of logic.  Profound indeed.
I will have more to say about this later, perhaps even attempt to address 
Edwinia tensions with her internal conundrums with her concepts of semiosis!  
:-)

WRT John Sowa’s argument asserting some formal? connnections between the 
interrogatives and the Peircian metaphysics, I would make a much stronger 
argument.  

That is, a logician would be hard put to relate CSP’s concept of Being in the 
sense of his categories/ relations/ correlations with these six interrogatives. 
Formally, both classical logics as well as modal logics are difficult if not 
impossible to assert the format of representations of truth consequences 
implied by Peircian categories. I would invite our meta-physicians to take a 
serious look at the tensions implicit in John’s Sowa’s assertions. 

BTW, Edwinia, I am curious if you have a rationalization for QM that coheres 
with CSP’s categories?

Cheers

Jerry 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Proper Way in Logic (was Peirce's Ongoing Semiotic Project)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Edwinia, Mike

First, thanks to JAS for his well crafted initial post and an a direct inquiry 
to him if those are the only relevant citations to the intermingling of 
grammatical semantics with CSP’s notion of a copulant.
I strongly suspect a deeper meaning is to be found in other manuscripts. I 
would suggest that extension of trichotomy to ’n’ other semantic terms (scores, 
hundreds of different names) demands further attachments of meanings or 
augmentations to the notions of copulant <—> predicate illations and 
illationships. Just a feeling.

Edwinia and Mike:

The following comments are motivated by subtle “differences that make a 
difference” between the vernacular scientific usages in the 19th Century and 
current (21 st century) partitions of disciplinary languages into various 
‘levels’ of semiotic meanings (as given by the imaginative but perhaps not 
meaningful jargon “inter-theoretic modalities of reasoning”.) 

 I presuppose that “The Proper Way in Logic” was a bit hasty and the intended 
meaning was “A Proper Way…)

I believe that both of you are missing, relative to 21st Century logic, the 
crucial distinctions in CSP’s text that motivated the historical developments 
of Russell / Quine notions of relational logics in the first half of the 20 th 
Century.  (As a remote yet pertinent aside, according to R. Cook), the symbolic 
logics used today, can be separated into four dialects: mathematics, computer 
science, formal logics and linguistics (see, for example, the book by 
Skardowska, Logic - Language -Ontology (2022), but that is a topic for another 
day.)

The modal logics of modern form (see, Non-Classical Logics by Graham Preist and 
Relevant Logics by Stephen Read.) are remote from these citations.  The reason 
they are is very simple. 

The developments of symbolic logics introduced a “sound and complete” set of 
symbols to relate the object language to the interpretant language(s).  The 
relationships between subject and predicate are symbolically remote from CSP’s 
assertions about the linguistic consequences of the antecedents of Firstness, 
Secondness and Thirdness as adjectives.

Furthermore, among the principle reasons I  invested years in the construction 
of the logics of chemistry was because of the foundational differences between 
the copula and the predicate in vernacular English that ascribes meanings to 
chemical sentences. 

The citations unearthed by Jon are vaguely in the neighborhood of current 
molecular-biological usage of material illations respecting empirical causal 
measurements and consistencies.  Minor, but significant editorial changes could 
conjoin CSP’s texts to modern chemical grammars describing chemical structures.

Secondly, I ask, is everyone conflating the subtle distinctions between CSP’s 
usage of continuants and mathematical continuity?  This remains one of the 
modern dilemmas in distinguishing quanta theories of science (QM) from 
continuous variables of physical semiotics (such as thermodynamics.)

Looking forward to future developments of Jon’s unearthings.

Cheers

Jerry 



 

> On Feb 11, 2024, at 6:09 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Mike list
> 
> I agree with your comments. Synechism is the functionality of Thirdness [the 
> becoming governed by laws} 5.4] - and isn’t the penultimate, because, just as 
> you say - the world requires the discrete and discontinuousness of 
> ontological Secondness [entropy] and also- the chance functions of Firstness. 
> 
> Indeed, Peirce in his critique of Hegel, considered that Thirdness “is an 
> essential ingredient of reality, yet does not by itself constitute reality, 
> since this category [which in that cosmology appears as the element of habit] 
> can have no concrete being without action, as a separate object on which to 
> work its government, just as action cannot exist without the immediate being 
> of feeling on which to act” 5.436….and Peirce continues that he differs from 
> Hegel’s  ‘absolute idealism’. By which “it is sundered by its vigorous denial 
> that the third category [which Hegel degrades to a mere stage of thinking] 
> suffices to make the world “…and Pierce also rejects Hegels’ rejection of 
> ’the first two stages [ ie 1ns and 2ns].
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
> 
>> On Feb 11, 2024, at 6:14 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
>> 
>> Hi Jon,
>> To quibble, I see synechism and its great definer of continuity as the 
>> guiding principle of Thirdness (as I think Peirce did, too). It can't be 
>> elevated to the penultimate, because our operative world also requires the 
>> discrete and discontinuous. (Enter 2nd law of thermodynamics stage left.)
>> Best, Mike
>> On 2/11/2024 5:03 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
>>> Mike: 
>>> 
>>> I am glad that we agree on that point. I also agree that it is a mistake to 
>>> treat semiosis as the most fundamental aspect of Peirce's philosophy, and 
>>> that his three universal categories--firmly grounded in both the 
>>> hypothetical science of mathematics and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:
Edwina:

Please step back a bit from your professional persona as a scholar.

Please ask yourself “what do these words mean in terms of my life experiences?”

Do you experience “forms of consciousness”?

How are the forms of personal consciousness you experience related to or 
conjoined to your memories?  

Thanks for considering my “off the wall” questions.

Cheers
Jerry 

> On Jan 19, 2024, at 8:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry, list
> 
> I’m not sure of your question. I’m quoting Peirce.  These terms refer to his 
> outline of ‘forms of consciousness’. 
> 
> And I don’t see what your reference to aphantasia means.
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
> 
>> On Jan 18, 2024, at 10:49 PM, Jerry LR Chandler 
>>  wrote:
>> 
>> List: 
>> 
>>> On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
>>> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, 
>>> Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just 
>>> as in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to 
>>> speak, for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes 
>>> [Sensagion and Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, 
>>> Suggestion, Association’. 7.551.
>>> 
>>> 
>> I am curious about your reasoning here.
>> 
>> In particular with regard to those individuals with the genetic deficiency 
>> of aphantasia (lack of ability to recall images or mental pictures).
>> 
>> Are these terms intended to be “forms” of consciousness? 
>> Would perhaps conscious “tones” more like musical notations?   
>> Clearly, a basis to related such terms to either “tokens” or “types” seem 
>> inappropriate given CSP’s allocation of these terms to words (composed from 
>> alphabetic symbols).
>> 
>> Alternatively, perhaps I’m not reading your usage of “modal categories” 
>> properly….
>> 
>> Cheers
>> 
>> Jerry  
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List: 

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 3:52 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, 
> Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just as 
> in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to speak, 
> for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes [Sensagion and 
> Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, Suggestion, Association’. 
> 7.551.
> 
> 
I am curious about your reasoning here.

In particular with regard to those individuals with the genetic deficiency of 
aphantasia (lack of ability to recall images or mental pictures).

Are these terms intended to be “forms” of consciousness? 
Would perhaps conscious “tones” more like musical notations?   
Clearly, a basis to related such terms to either “tokens” or “types” seem 
inappropriate given CSP’s allocation of these terms to words (composed from 
alphabetic symbols).

Alternatively, perhaps I’m not reading your usage of “modal categories” 
properly….

Cheers

Jerry  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

gt; CSP: Out of the conceptions of non-relative deductive logic, such as 
> consequence, coexistence or composition, aggregation, incompossibility, 
> negation, etc., it is only necessary to select two, and almost any two at 
> that, to have the material needed for defining the others. What ones are to 
> be selected is a question the decision of which transcends the function of 
> this branch of logic. (CP 2.379, 1902)
> 
> For example, in the Alpha part of Existential Graphs for propositional logic, 
> the simplest approach is to select the two primitives as juxtaposition for 
> conjunction (coexistence) and shading for negation* such that disjunction is 
> then defined as multiple unshaded areas within a shaded area, material 
> conditional (consequence) as one unshaded area within a shaded area (scroll), 
> and bi-conditional as juxtaposed scrolls with the antecedent and consequent 
> reversed. The Beta part for first-order predicate logic adds one more 
> primitive, the line of identity for existential quantification such that 
> universal quantification is then defined as a line of identity whose 
> outermost part is within a shaded area.
> 
> *As I have discussed on the List many times before, although this choice is 
> practically more efficient and easier to explain, Peirce suggests on several 
> occasions that it is philosophically more accurate to select the scroll for 
> material implication as the second primitive such that negation is then 
> defined as a scroll with a blackened inner close shrunk to infinitesimal 
> size, signifying that every proposition is true if the antecedent is true (CP 
> 4.454-456, 1903; CP 4.564n, c. 1906; R 300:[47-51], 1908; R 669:[16-18], 
> 1911).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>  
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt>www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 12:52 PM Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote:
>> On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky > <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> But  you already know this 
> 
> Edwinia:  
> 
> If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste my 
> time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the 
> grammatical structures of your and other responses.
> 
> Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between 
> ordered pairs.  
> 
> The classical  logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - 
> negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional.
> 
> These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian syllogisms.  
> Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence grammars.  For a 
> discussion of Peircian “tokens and types” from a categorical perspective, see 
> the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic - Language - Ontology. 2022.
> 
> Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation 
> constrained to multi-valued logics?  
> 
> My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that the 
> classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of 
> molecular sentences.  (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert 
> Rosen’s writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy or 
> dogmas or….  Just seeking a scientifically useful meaning for my research.
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Thanks for your answer.

We seem to be on different wavelengths. 

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 12:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other common noun for "camel" 
> in this passage.

It seems to me that there is a profound distinction between a categorical 
decision to express a feeling / emotion and experiencing a relation with the 
exterior world.

One example is that combines both an internal feeling and an external 
experience is sexual copulation.  

Further the design and conduct of chemical experiments necessary to compose two 
nouns into a single “sin-sign”, such as planning to combine Sodium and Chlorine 
to create Sodium Chloride (NaCl) is another example. 

Perhaps the modern usage of symbols differs at a foundational level of logical 
meanings than during the CSP era.

I appreciate your responses.

Cheers

Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

> On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> But  you already know this 

Edwinia:  

If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste my 
time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the 
grammatical structures of your and other responses.

Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between ordered 
pairs.  

The classical  logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - 
negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional.

These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian syllogisms.  
Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence grammars.  For a 
discussion of Peircian “tokens and types” from a categorical perspective, see 
the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic - Language - Ontology. 2022.

Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation constrained 
to multi-valued logics?  

My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that the 
classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of molecular 
sentences.  (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert Rosen’s 
writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy or dogmas 
or….  Just seeking a scientifically useful meaning for my research.

Cheers
Jerry

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Edwina, List.Very interesting response.The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable.In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of triadicity!uThe question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of experiences.Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects?Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other?Cheers.Jerry.Sent from my iPad On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:Jerry - listIi think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = or any sound1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the triadic interaction is:Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of Secondness. So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is networking with other triads.EdwinaOn Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:List: Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic _expression_ for my feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or controversial (outside the CSP community.)The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of mathematics. The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense.  That is, in the genetic sense.  In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set of triadic relations.From these perspectives, I now give an examples.When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning interpreted as a “triadic relation”.“HEADACHE”.Or“ORANGE”How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ?  (Or any other sense or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.)In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) (Or, what locates the three subjects?)  Or are the three terms of the triadic relations merely adjectives?Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s phrases are welcome.  (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered pairs” in set theory.)  (Ben:  In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is correctly remembered.)Alternatively, is this a meaningful conundrum?CheersJerry Participlerelātus (feminine relāta, neuter relātum); first/second-declension participlePerfect passive participle of referō(having been) driven or carried back(having been) returned, restored, repaid(having been) reported(having been) reconsideredOn Jan 10, 2024, at 1:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:ListI think the quotations provided by JAS do not change the meaning of the quotations I provided to show that the categories are described by Peirce as having both genuine and degenerate modes. That is, the category of Secondness has both a genuine and degenerate mode; the category of Thirdness has a genuine, a degenerate in the first degree, a degenerate in the third degree.These terms of ‘genuine’ and ‘degenerate' are completely different in meaning from the quotation provided by JAS CSP: A sign is a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object. It has two Objects, the immediate, to which it is degenerately Secundan, the dynamic, to which it is genuinely Secundan. It has three Interpretants, the immediate, to which it is primarily Tertian, the dynamic, to which it is secundally Tertian, the rational, to which it is genuinely Tertian. (R 339:247r, 1905 Jul 7)The above terms , with, eg, reference to the two objects, means only that the Immediate Object has a ‘degenerate’ or less intact’ form of informational content than the Dynamic Object. These terms, I suggest, refer to the determination of the semiosic process - and have nothing to do with the categories.  That is, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

t;> besides these, "killed" = committed murder upon, is a third Subject, since 
>>> no study of the words alone, without extraneous experience, would enable 
>>> the Ad[d]ressee to understand it. What, then, is left to serve as 
>>> Predicate? Nothing but the flow of causation. It is true that we are more 
>>> acquainted even with that in Experience. When we see a babe in its cradle 
>>> bending its arms this way and that, while a smile of exultation plays upon 
>>> its features, it is making acquaintance with the flow of causation. So 
>>> acquaintance with the flow of causation so early as to make it familiar 
>>> before speech is so far acquired that an assertion can be syntactically 
>>> framed, and it is embodied in the syntax of every tongue. (R 664, 1910)
>>> 
>>> The proposition "Cain killed Abel" has three subjects denoted by its three 
>>> words--the dyadic relation of killing and its two correlates, Cain and 
>>> Abel, all of which require collateral experience/observation to 
>>> understand--and exactly one predicate, a pure or continuous predicate that 
>>> "is signified as the logical connexion between the Subjects" (R 611, 1908) 
>>> only by its syntax. As Peirce explains elsewhere, "A proposition can be 
>>> separated into a predicate and subjects in more ways than one," but this 
>>> approach is "the proper way in logic" (NEM 3:885, 1908) because "when we 
>>> have carried analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we 
>>> have carried it to its ultimate elements" (SS 72, 1908). For more on this, 
>>> I highly recommend Francesco Bellucci's 2013 paper about it 
>>> (https://www.academia.edu/11685812/Peirces_Continuous_Predicates).
>>> 
>>> In the Beta part of Existential Graphs (EG), there are two ways of 
>>> indexically denoting subjects--lines of identity for indefinite 
>>> individuals, and names for general concepts--while the pure/continuous 
>>> predicate is again iconically signified by the syntax, in this case the 
>>> arrangement of the lines and names (as well as any shaded areas for 
>>> negation) on the sheet of assertion that represents the universe of 
>>> discourse. Attributing concepts to individuals by attaching names to lines 
>>> increases the information being conveyed by making those individuals more 
>>> definite (increasing logical depth) and those concepts more determinate 
>>> (increasing logical breadth). As a dyadic relation, the EG for killing has 
>>> two lines and three names, while as genuine triadic relations, the EGs for 
>>> representing/mediating and giving have three lines and four names each (as 
>>> I have noted previously).
>>> 
>>> When it comes to ordinal numbers, phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine 
>>> triadic relation of representing/mediating establishes that the sign is the 
>>> first (simplest) correlate, the object is the second (of middling 
>>> complexity), and the interpretant is the third (most complex). The upshot 
>>> is that there is only the genuine correlate for the sign itself, there are 
>>> genuine (dynamical) and degenerate (immediate) correlates for the object, 
>>> and there are genuine (final), degenerate (dynamical), and doubly 
>>> degenerate (immediate) correlates for the interpretant. Nevertheless, the 
>>> dyadic relations of determining are always from the object through the sign 
>>> to the interpretant, such that the sign is passive with respect to the 
>>> object and active with respect to the interpretant (EP 2:544n22, 1906). 
>>> Again ...
>>> 
>>> CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which 
>>> mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined 
>>> by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the 
>>> interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the 
>>> interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this 
>>> "sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates 
>>> of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. 
>>> (EP 2:410, 1907)
>>> 
>>> Regards,
>>> 
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 

[PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Following Robert’s efforts to clarify meanings of terminology in symbolic 
logics...

> On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:45 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> The directionality of semiosis is such that the object determines the sign 
> while being unaffected by that sign, and the sign determines the interpretant 
> while being unaffected by that interpretant. 

Jon:

Given your background as an engineer, I would appreciate your opinion on the 
following.

In recent years, I have turned my attention to the distinctions between the 
classical philosophy of signs, originating in the medical arts and other 
simpler perspectives of communications.  Let’s call these texts as “semiology” 
texts.  In these writings, I do not find any reason not to assume that both the 
object (detected by writer) and the signs that were described by the ancients 
in scripts were naturally external to the writer.
So, the questions arises, how does one locate the origins of the “triadic 
relations”?

Then the question arises, how does one distinguish CSP’s “semiotics”.
Which semantic aspects of the “triadic relations” are external?
Which semantic aspects of the "triadic relations are internal to the describer?

In other words, Where does the syntax for triadic relation originate?
And, Where does the syntax for triadic relation reside?

And, how would such a determination fix the differentiation between the 
adjectives (…ness) and the numbers, either / or cardinal or ordinal?   ….  
neither /nor?  

Cheers

Jerry 



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

> On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:18 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> 
> Jerry, List
> 
> You know very well that we don't mention "what goes without saying" in 
> mathematics. 
> 

Sorry, Robert.
Interesting but hardly compelling response.

Human communications in multidisciplinary forums such as this are open to 
misunderstandings.  To “invoke” such a phrase is meaningless to your readers.

In applied mathematics, the calculations are contained to the interpretations 
of the symbols asserted in the formula.  

In philosophy, each individual philosopher assigns symbols and asserts premises 
ad hoc with an intended “unit of meaning.”  Isn’t that what philosophical 
discourse is all about?

Cheers
Jerry 



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

> On Jan 7, 2024, at 9:10 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> 
> It's clear, then, that the composition of the two determinations gives rise 
> to the triadic relation for Peirce. That's why I've underlined "therefore." 
> Consequently, the formalization is simplified considerably, without any loss 
> of information, by : 
> 
> O  à S à I
> 
> The arrows represent determinations, and this diagram reads:
> 
> O determines S, which determines I
> 
> Referring to the Peircean conception of a determination:
> 
> We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be such 
> as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner. (CP 8.361, 1908)
> 
> We can see that O determines I by transitivity. Peirce verified this in MS 
> 611 (Nov. 1908).
> 
> This diagram has the considerable advantage of being equivalent to the 
> mathematical object below:
> 
> Schematic representation of a category with objects X, Y, Z and morphisms f, 
> g, g ∘ f. 
> 
>   (click)
> 
> It's an algebraic category, the simplest there is (non-trivial). This one is 
> the archetypal example of a category on the 
> 

Robert: 
 
You may want to check your mathematical conclusions.

While I understand that the following details are highly technical in nature, 
it is important that mathematics NOT be treated as merely a symbolic metaphor 
when an inquiry into the meaning of symbols is under the microscope.

The sequence O—> S —> I. as three alphabets symbols and two arrows.

The schematic diagram referenced by the “click," (which is, by the way, only a 
partial representation of a mathematical category,) has three arrows and 
repeats the function labels and even composes the two functions.  

In addition, the identity arrows necessary to define a mathematical category 
are missing. These notational constraints are essential for the additional 
property of closure, which is far beyond the simple property of transitivity 
illustrated by the simple sequence of three alphabetic symbols and two arrows.


Cheers
Jerry 




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Representing sign relations in existential graphs

[Jerry LR Chandler]

> On Jan 6, 2024, at 9:48 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Since nobody has found an EG drawn by Peirce to represent the sign relation,

In the 1870’s or early eighties, CSP referred to the ammonia molecule as a 
symbol.
More precisely, pictorially, he demonstrated the three bonds between the three 
hydrogen atoms and the central nitrogen.  The historical precedence must be 
given substantial weight in discussion of existential graphs.

This is a natural triadic relationship.

This is also an existential graph.

Cheers
Jerry  

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List: 

It was amusing to read theses historic responses to an issue that faded away in 
most of the philosophical community and almost all the scientific community. 

Edwinia broaches on current (and meaningful) aspects of the stipulations of 
cognitive forms to objects of the external world.  

> On Jan 7, 2024, at 12:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> And that’s another reason why it’s difficult to create a visual diagram of 
> the semiosic process - those modalities - which are rarely discussed on this 
> site. 
> 
> But, just as we acknowledge the semiosic determinative process of 
> O-R-I…..and even
> DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. [and I’m assuming everyone knows what these letters 
> stand for….
> 
> We also have to acknowledge the modal restrictions, 
> It is obvious that a Possible cannot determine anything other than a 
> Possible, and likewise a Necessitant cannot be determined by anything other 
> than a Necessitant (letter to Lady Welby of December 23, 1908 )
> 

The clarity of human capacities to deal with the external world is what is at 
stake.  During the lifespan of CSP, the scientific methodologies were in the 
early state of development.  The relationships between matter, attributes, and 
cognitive consequences were in the early stages of development.  

Subsequent to CSP’s writings, it became crystal clear that “three” was a 
minimum number for meditating 
about the assignment of a name to a natural object.   In the scientific world 
today, the meaning of a sign can be assigned to hundreds, thousands of 
contributing factors.  With precision! Thus, the value of this discussion is 
problematic.

Far more important, in my judgment, is the designation of the terms “Possible” 
and "Necessitant.”  These terms have morphed into logical symbols essential to 
formal logics that assign meanings to observations about objects based on the 
collections of signs emanating from natural forms. The emerged methodology 
creates one:one correspondence between cognitive forms (icons?) and external 
forms.  [This methodology emerged from the mathematics of graph theory and the 
chemical table of elements.]

My purpose in drafting this note is to point to a specific challenge that opens 
the gap between scientific writing and philosophical writings such as this set 
of exchanges.  In my understanding of the communications gaps, the languages of 
the sciences have developed the capacity of cognitive creativity that uses 
abstract mathematics and logic and observations to associate specific forms for 
the identity of abstracts objects, mathematical, chemical, genetic, etc.  This 
cognitive capacity has generated unbounded numbers of signs and interpretations 
of signs, symbols and behaviors.  Such capacities are of little interest to 
other disciplines.

In the absence of boundary-forming terms that constrain meanings of signs, 
forms, and behaviors, the conversations endlessly wonder, such as this series 
of posts illustrates without ever getting to the essential fact.  That is, 
nature can produce endless varieties of signs and human languages can produce 
endless classifications of natural signs.

Cheers 
Jerry

A personal note to Robert:  
Thank you for your recent remark. However, the interpretation of my post on 
aphantasia in terms of category theory was wide, very wide from the mark.
You may wish to consider that the necessary reasons why and how philosophers of 
matter and material causality developed the language of chemistry and molecular 
biology and hence the mathematics of life.
More precisely, the critical hinges are the connects between permutation groups 
and space groups.
Cheers
JLRC




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] More about Dr. Karl Firston, Chief Scientist at Verses AI

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John:

Thanks for posting this.
The online book is a long argument with an intent…
This is a very aggressive “Start-up” with a powerful motive.  It will be fun to 
watch the feathers fly as the fox invades the henhouse of “Big Tech”.

Happy New Year to All and Everyone Else too!

Cheers
Jerry 

> On Dec 28, 2023, at 3:54 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> I agree with Mihai Nadin "that AGI is yet another of those impossible to 
> achieve tasks."   I have repeatedly said that it won't be achieved in the 
> 21st C, but I won't make any predictions about the 22nd.   So far, nobody has 
> produced the slightest shred of evidence for any kind of AGI any sooner.  
> Best summary of the issues:  "AGI is 30 years in the future, always was and 
> always will be."There are still some diehards who claim that the 
> prediction from the year 2000 will come to pass in the next 6 years, but the 
> hopes for generative AI are already dying.  --  But there are many useful 
> applications for better natural language interfaces to all kinds of systems, 
> not just AI.
> 
> Dan Brickley dug up some excellent references on predictive coding, and Karl 
> Friston is one of the pioneers in the field (see below).  A recent book 
> (2022) from MIT Press with a foreword by Friston covers the field:  "Active 
> Inference: The Free Energy Principle in Mind, Brain, and Behavior."  Chapters 
> of that book can be downloaded for free.   Appendix C has an annotated 
> example of the Mathlab code.
> 
> I believe that this is the approach and the software techniques that Verses 
> AI has adopted.  I don't know how well Friston and his colleagues can develop 
> this approach, but I strongly suspect that some of the co-authors and/or 
> their colleagues and students will be working with them.  However, practical 
> applications always take more time and more investment than was predicted.  
> (I worked at IBM R & D for 30 years, and I know the issues from close 
> observation and participation.)
> 
> Ricardo Sanz:  Friston's work is ok. Neuroscience, statististics and optimal 
> control. Good, ol' classic math.  VERSES' narrative is classic bullshit. Not 
> "breakthrough" bullshit; just classic bullshit. In my opinion, 
> anthropocentrism, the intelligence=brain fallacy, and biomesmerization are 
> the biggest roadblocks in the way to AGI.
> 
> Neuroscience is much broader than anthropomorphism.  Living things from 
> bacteria on up are far more successful in complex behavior than any of the 
> latest and greatest driverless cars.  Furthermore, very few of the people who 
> have been working on generative AI know anything about neuroscience or the 
> other branches of cognitive science.  Therefore, none of the work in those 
> fields could deter (or inspire) them.  And it shows.
> 
> I won't defend the claims by Verses AI unless and until they come up with 
> software that implements their promises.   But I love their criticisms of 
> generative AI.  I can't see how anybody could claim that it's on a path 
> toward AGI.
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Dan Brickley" 
> 
> For an implementation-oriented survey see 
> https://github.com/BerenMillidge/Predictive_Coding_Papers and in general work 
> under “predictive processing” and “predictive coding” banners
> 
> Also this book has PDFs available;
> https://direct.mit.edu/books/oa-monograph/5299/Active-InferenceThe-Free-Energy-Principle-in-Mind
>  and also gets pretty specific eg ch8 on continuous time dynamical systems 
> representation, see 
> https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12441.003.0012
> 
> Dan
> 
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[PEIRCE-L] Synesthesia Was Re: interpretant and thirdness

[Jerry LR Chandler]

ge for the convenience of economic incentives is a very low grade of 
“scholarship”.

Cheers

Jerry 

Jerry LR Chandler, PhD
Research Professor
GMU

Headwater House,
Little Falls, MN









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Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

If I may add a realistic note to the discussion on changing terminology. 
My opinion come from three significant experiences with scientific notations.

Before I offer my opinions I would note historically that CSP writings are 
flows of changing terminologies with rare examples of concerns about precedence 
of prior terminologies.  Indeed, these flows of terminologies are essential to 
the developments of his views, style, propositions and logics.  

 

> On Dec 13, 2023, at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky  
> wrote:
> 
> Jon, list
> 
> With regard to bringing Peirce’s work to a broader audience - I can think of 
> a number of issues.
> 
> 1] We should not assume that our audience are first year undergraduates; as 
> you point out - the people who are exploring Peirce may very well be much 
> more advanced scholars in other fields, with their own discipline’s 
> vocabulary and frameworks. I think we should be more amenable to enabling 
> them to use their vocabulary and framework - within a Peircean framework. 
> There is, for example, a great deal of excellent work on Anticipation - 
> within physics, computers, AI, biology - which certainly fits in with 
> Peirce’s work on Existential Graphs.  The terms used are different - but- the 
> concepts are similar - and Peircean conferences should encourage this 
> awareness - and not require the authors to use Peirce’s terms.
> 
> 2] I think a great setback and problem with using Peirce in these scientific 
> areas was the original marginalizing of him by setting his work up as a ‘ 
> Semiotics’ - with de Saussure as the main author and Saussure’s semiology as 
> the main analytic framework within the field of semiotics. Saussure’s 
> semiology is, in my view, a simplistic binary framework of ’this-means -that’ 
> with an external Agent necessarily uniting the two - and furthermore - it is 
> linguistic or cultural, and ignores the natural semiosis.. This framework 
> readily enables an overarching ideology of other dyads - which fit right into 
> the leftist Marxist frames of created  class and ‘oppressor/oppressed’ . And 
> so, we get semiotics viewed as semiology [ which it is not] and operating as 
> some kind of subjectivist free-interpretation…
> The many books on semiotics all misuse Peirce in this way -  including 
> providing images of the semiotic triad as a triangle [rather than an 
> ‘umbrella-triadic spoke].
> And of course - these works also totally misunderstand the categories.
> 
> Indeed - I think the categories are one of the most misunderstood of Peirce’s 
> basic theories…[well, yes, so is the triad, locked into that triangle image]…
> 
> Edwina
> 
>> On Dec 13, 2023, at 5:36 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>> 
>> Jon, Robert, Edwina, List,
>> 
>> All three of your discussions are well considered.  As I said at the 
>> beginning, we have to distinguish two audiences:  Peirce scholars, for whom 
>> exact quotations, sources, and dates are essential; and 21st century readers 
>> in all branches of cognitive science.  I'll say a bit more, using the 
>> attached figs2_3.pdf for examples.
>> 
>> For textual criticism and for establishing connections between and among 
>> texts, exact quotations are essential.  But in writing for a 21st century 
>> audience, the terminology must be faithful to Peirce, to his sources, and to 
>> the expected vocabulary of the readers.   To illustrate the issues, I'm 
>> enclosing an excerpt from Section 2 of the article I'm writing -- 
>> figs2_3.pdf.
>> 
>> Re Peirce's ethics of terminology:  As Peirce said, he would consider 
>> himself bound by those ethics if anybody else had adopted and used his 
>> terminology.   That is why he coined the term pragmaticism to distinguish 
>> his intentions from a broader usage by others.  I believe that is also why 
>> he coined the new term phaneroscopy, which was strongly influenced by his 
>> correspondence with Lady Welby.
>> 
>> To Jon:  I agree with Robert about "your unusually exhaustive work on" 
>> Peirce's writings about interpretants.  I had read most of the excerpts you 
>> cited, but the absence of dates in CP and NEM made it hard to keep track of 
>> the sequence.
>> 
>> Peirce's own terminology had changed over the years.  He did not consider 
>> himself to be limited by the words he coined himself, unless other people 
>> had adopted them.  That is the major reason why he adopted the term 
>> pragmaticism.   But when nobody else adopted one of his coinages, he felt no 
>> obligation to continue using that term.  
>> 
>> For the attached excerpt I was writing for a mixed audience.  Most of my 
>> expected readers have a strong background in one or more branches of 
>> cognitive science, a field that was organized at a conference in 1983.  The 
>> six founding branches include philosophy, psychology, linguistics, 
>> artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology.  Peirce contributed 
>> to or studied in depth aspects of all those fields, and experts in each 

[PEIRCE-L] Role of Copula in the logic of Grammars. Re: Peirce and Knowledge Representation

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Mike, List

> On Dec 5, 2023, at 1:51 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
> 
>> 
>> In a slightly related issue, have you any comments on CSP’s papers on the 
>> role of the copula in representation theory?  In other words, have you 
>> addressed the inferences between predicate logics and the grammar of 
>> copulated sentences (syllogisms)?
> No, I have not studied this topic. I do speculate some on Peirce and grammars 
> and semantic parsing in Chap 16, but without specific reference to the 
> copula. I'd welcome hearing whatever thoughts you have on this topic.
> 
> 

Symbolic logic is an economic tool.  My concerns are scientific logics 
expressed in various scientific notations that are not easily translated into 
bits and bytes..

Briefly, the developments  of symbolic logics through the inventions of logical 
constants has nearly eliminated the possibility of expressing the 
fine-structures of scientific discourse.  The difficulty of illating between 
complex grammatical structures, such as though commonly used in molecular 
biology and precision medicine is immense. The transactional foundations of a 
copulated “subject-subject” sentences is extra-ordinarily difficult to express 
in predicate logic.  

Finally, the challenges related to ascribing attributes of systems (noun 
properties) rather than merely descriptions further limit the utility of the 
current intellectual mess known as “symbolic logic”.  

[Some readers here will recall my posts on the axiological mathematics of the 
atomic number system which in grounded in the scientific S-V-P sentences. ]

Hopefully, these terse sentences will give you a glimpse at the meanings CSP 
intended in his scientifically-grounded texts on multiple graph theories.  

Cheers
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce and Knowledge Representation

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Hi Mike:

Thank you very very much for posting the links to the sections of your book.

I enjoyed the first sections and will explore it further as time permits. 
My initial comment is that Peirce’s linkable to natural philosophy are 
submerged.

In a slightly related issue, have you any comments on CSP’s papers on the role 
of the copula in representation theory?  In other words, have you addressed the 
inferences between predicate logics and the grammar of copulated sentences 
(syllogisms)?


Cheers

Jerry



> On Dec 4, 2023, at 8:44 PM, Mike Bergman  wrote:
> 
> Hi John,
> 
> Thanks for your kind words about the book [1]. I included it in the prior 
> thread, the subject of which I have changed, because Alex had inquired as to 
> what my theoretical interest was in ChatGPT prompt engineering for possible 
> use in assistance in ontology mapping. I try not to use these fora for 
> self-promotion, but I welcomed the question nonetheless. In that regard, I 
> also 'hijacked' the thread a bit. Besides being fallible, an essential point 
> repeatedly emphasized by Peirce, we are all hypocritical at times. Color me 
> guilty.
> 
> I would welcome discussing Peirce and KR topics with you should you have 
> criticisms or observations based on my book (or elsewise). As a Peirce 
> scholar, I hope you agree with me that Peirce is perhaps the 
> philosopher/logician/mathematician par excellence on this very topic. I think 
> many on this forum, and the Peirce forum that I have added to this list, 
> would benefit from learning more about his cogent insights.
> 
> Best, Mike
> 
> [1] https://www.mkbergman.com/a-knowledge-representation-practionary/ 
> 
> On 12/4/2023 5:54 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
>> Mike,
>> 
>> I apologize for not seeing the original note about your book.  I downloaded 
>> a copy, which is very interesting indeed.   I have only had a chance to 
>> browse through it.  But from what I've read so far, it appears to be an 
>> excellent overview of Peirce's theories and strong evidence of their 
>> importance for knowledge representation theory and practice.  I would 
>> recommend it for Ontolog subscribers as a presentation of Peirce's theories 
>> of logic and ontology and their use as a foundation for knowledge systems 
>> and applications.
>> 
>> There are topics and comments that I would quibble about.  For example, 
>> Peirce's existential graphs have the full expressive power of the ISO 
>> standard for Common Logic, and they are much clearer, simpler, and more 
>> powerful than OWL2.But anybody who read or adopted the methods in your 
>> book could extend them to Common Logic.
>> 
>> As you said,  my remarks below "have nothing to do with the topics and 
>> discussion of this thread" -- as you wrote in the note I had not seen seen.  
>> Please note that your book has nothing to do with quantum mechanics (the 
>> subject line).  I was responding to the following point by Mike Denny:  "But 
>> is comparing quantum mechanics to pointillism indeed a clever idea?  Perhaps 
>> the analogy is more misleading than helpful." 
>> 
>> GPT had found an article with just one sentence about that topic, and it did 
>> not cite the original source.  In the original, the person who made that 
>> comparison was a physicist who knew perfectly well that it was just a 
>> one-line comment that had very little justification in a deeper theoretical 
>> sense.  But GPT made it sound like a summary of a serious theory.   Since 
>> GPT did not cite the source, there was no way of knowing (1) who said it 
>> first, (2) what was the context, (3) what was the scientific justification 
>> for it,  and most importantly (4) how could the reader find the original 
>> source and check those points?
>> 
>> Those are very serious flaws of GPT.  I believe that my response to Mike D 
>> (which you quoted below) was justified.   People who understand the 
>> limitations of GPT can use it effectively -- as you do.   But the great 
>> majority of people (of all ages and backgrounds) include a huge number who 
>> do not understand its limitations.  For them, it can be highly misleading -- 
>> even to the danger point, if taken seriously.
>> 
>> John
>>  
>> 
>> From: "Mike Bergman"  
>> Hi John,
>> 
>> My god, John, your lack of self-introspection on my response to you is 
>> astounding. You respond:
>> 
>>> As I keep repeating, I am enthusiastic about the LLM technology for many 
>>> valuable purposes, such as the ones you mention.  But I have been reading 
>>> many articles by GPT users and developers who are making very strong claims 
>>> about what LLMs do.   Many of them claim that GPT is passing the Turing 
>>> test for a human-level of intelligence.  Others are claiming that GPT 
>>> technology is getting better every day, and it will soon make all other AI 
>>> technology obsolete.
>>> 
>>> Whenever I see notes that repeat those 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Conflict between deduction and discovery in mathematics

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Matias, Jon:

First, I am very curious, Matias, on where your critical question emerges from? 
 What are the sources of your curiosity?  The fuller the ascriptions of your 
cognitive status, the better I will be able to respond to this simple but 
daring question.

Jon, in your numerous posts that seek to intertwine your world wisdom with 
CSP’s philosophy, I have often questioned the origins of your interpretations 
of CSP’s descriptions of the relationships between graph theory and modern 
mathematics.  Thank you for these quotes from CSP as they illuminate two 
questions - or at least a tantalizing fragment - of why CSP’s usage of the 
corollary is rather distance from the classical language of geometry as well as 
my interpretation of your views.

More later.

Cheers

Jerry 







> On Aug 19, 2023, at 11:04 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Matias, List:
> 
> Although I cannot offer "any information that traces the history of this 
> problem" as requested, I can suggest Peirce's own explanation of it.
> 
> CSP: Deductions are of two kinds, which I call corollarial and theorematic. 
> The corollarial are those reasonings by which all corollaries and the 
> majority of what are called theorems are deduced; the theorematic are those 
> by which the major theorems are deduced. If you take the thesis of a 
> corollary,--i.e. the proposition to be proved, and carefully analyze its 
> meaning, by substituting for each term its definition, you will find that its 
> truth follows, in a straightforward manner, from previous propositions 
> similarly analyzed. But when it comes to proving a major theorem, you will 
> very often find you have need of a lemma, which is a demonstrable proposition 
> about something outside the subject of inquiry; and even if a lemma does not 
> have to be demonstrated, it is necessary to introduce the definition of 
> something which the thesis of the theorem does not contemplate. (CP 7.204, 
> 1901)
> 
> See also NEM 4:1-12 (1901), which begins with the second quotation below; CP 
> 4.233 (1902), where Peirce proposes that "corollarial, or 'philosophical' 
> reasoning is reasoning with words; while theorematic, or mathematical 
> reasoning proper, is reasoning with specially constructed schemata"; and 
> especially CP 4.612-616 (1908), where he discusses at length "the step of so 
> introducing into a demonstration a new idea not explicitly or directly 
> contained in the premisses of the reasoning or in the condition of the 
> proposition which gets proved by the aid of this introduction," which he 
> calls "a theoric step." As he writes in another contemporaneous manuscript ...
> 
> CSP: Everybody knows that mathematics, which covers all necessary reasoning, 
> is as far as possible from being purely mechanical work; that it calls for 
> powers of generalization in comparison with which all others are puny, that 
> it requires an imagination which would be poetical were it not so vividly 
> detailed, and above all that it demands invention of the profoundest. There 
> is, therefore, no room to doubt that there is some theoric reasoning, 
> something unmechanical, in the business of mathematics. I hope that, before I 
> cease to be useful in this world, I may be able to define better than I now 
> can what the distinctive essence of theoric thought is. I can at present say 
> this much with some confidence. It is the directing of the attention to a 
> sort of object not explicitly referred to in the enunciation of the problem 
> in hand. (NEM 3:622, 1908)
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Fri, Aug 18, 2023 at 6:14 PM Matias  > wrote:
>> Dear list members, 
>> 
>> I am trying to contextualize Peirce's reference to the long-standing 
>> conflict between the notion of mathematical reasoning and the novelty of 
>> mathematical discoveries. I would appreciate any information that traces the 
>> history of this problem. 
>> 
>> Here are two citations in which Peirce mentions such a conflict: 
>> 
>> "It has long been a puzzle how it could be that, on the one hand, 
>> mathematics is purely deductive in its nature, and draws its conclusions 
>> apodictically, while on the other hand, it presents as rich and apparently 
>> unending a series of surprising discoveries as any observational science. 
>> Various have been the attempts to solve the paradox by breaking down one or 
>> other of these assertions, but without success." (Peirce, 1885, On the 
>> Algebra of Logic, p. 182) 
>> 
>> "It was because those logicians who were mathematicians saw that the notion 
>> that mathematical reasoning was as rudimentary as that was quite at war with 
>> its producing such a world of novel theorems from a few relatively 

[PEIRCE-L] Formal ontologies from Rutherford and Schrödinger Re: Why vagueness is important

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John:

You write:

> Your notes remind me of the importance of vagueness and the limitations of 
> precision in any field -- especially science, engineering, and formal 
> ontology. 

You may wish to consider the distinctions between the methodology of the 
chemical sciences from that of mathematics and whatever the views of various 
“semantic” ontologies might project for quantification of grammars by 
algorithms. 

In short, the chemical methodologies for determinations of mathematically 
precise quantities for concrete objects containing billions of atoms are 
routinely used.   For example, in the clinical chemistry used to determine 
genetic sequences where the reference terms are molecular names and numbers. 
Orders of magnitude more precise than the objects you refer to.  This precision 
is possible because the scale of the ontology is at the atomic scale of 
ascription and description. 

I would pose a simple question:  What are the formal logical relationships 
between the precision of the atomic numbers as defined by Rutherford and 
logically deployed by Rutherford and the syntax of a “formal ontology” in this 
questionable form of artificial semantics?

Cheers

Jerry 

> On Aug 10, 2023, at 2:27 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Alex,
> 
> The answer to your question below is related to your previous note:  "Just a 
> question: do flies or bees have mental models?"
> 
> Short answer:  They behave as if they do,  Bees definitely develop a model of 
> the environment, and they go back to their nest and communicate it to their 
> colleagues by means of a dance that indicates (a) direction to the source of 
> food; (b) the distance; and (c) the amount available at that source.
> 
> That is very close to my definition of consciousness: "The ability to 
> generate, modify, and use mental models as the basis for perception, thought, 
> action, and communication."   The bees demonstrate generating and using 
> something that could be called a mental model for perception, action, and 
> communication.  The only question is about the amount and kind of thinking.  
> 
> In the quotation by Damasio, he wrote "Ultimately consciousness allows us to 
> experience maps as images, to manipulate those images, and to apply reasoning 
> to them."It's not clear how and whether the bees can "manipulate those 
> images and apply reasoning to them."
> 
> Flies aren't as smart as bees.  They may have simple images that may be 
> generated automatically by perception and used for action.  But flies don't  
> use them for communication.
> 
> I admit that my definition is based on philosophical issues, but so is any 
> mathematical version.  And the issue of vagueness is related to generality.  
> An image that can only be applied to a single pattern is not very useful. 
> 
> Alex> The main question is: can we create a device (now these are autonomous 
> robots) capable of studying the outside world and then itself?
> 
> The application to bees and flies can be adapted to designing devices 
> "capable of studying the outside world and then itself".Every aspect of 
> perception, thinking, action, and communication is certainly relevant, and 
> those four words are easier to explain and to test than the complex books 
> that Anatoly cited.  The most complex issues involve the definition of mental 
> models and methods of thinking about them and their relationship to the 
> world, to oneself, and to the future of oneself in the world.
> 
> And the issues about vagueness are extremely important to issues about 
> similarity, generality, and changes in the world and oneself in the future. 
> Those are fundamental issues of ontology, and every one of them involves 
> vagueness or incompleteness in perception, thinking, action, and 
> communication.  
> 
> As for mathematical precision, please note that Peirce, Whitehead, and 
> Wittgenstein all had a very strong background in logic, mathematics, and 
> science.   That may be why they were also very sensitive to issues about 
> vagueness.  I'll also quote Lord Kelvin:  "Better an approximate answer to 
> the right question than an exact answer to the wrong question."
> 
> John
>  
> 
> From: "Alex Shkotin" 
> 
> Excerpt is very interesting and mostly philosophical.  The main question is: 
> can we create a device (now these are autonomous robots) capable of studying 
> the outside world and then itself?  The progress in this direction is one of 
> the main topics in robotic news.  And this progress is significant.
> 
> Alex
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chat GPT and Peirce

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

Just a brief comment on Professor Everett wide-reaching scientific assertion 
that appears to me to subscribe too and pontificate about CSP writings with 
respect to realism of scientific phenomenology.

> On Jul 18, 2023, at 1:44 PM, Thomas903  wrote:
> 
> Dan,
> 
> I wanted to comment briefly on a sentence from your earlier posting: 
> "ChatGPT simply and conclusively shows that there is no need for any innate 
> learning module in the brain to learn language.”

Human language is widely regarded as a vehicle of communication between 
individuals.  The possibility of human linguistic communications requires 
necessarily both a speaker and a listener. 

Both are necessary; one without the other is insufficient.

My comments seek to explore three well-differentiated aspects of the possible 
interpretations of this conjecture.

First, it is obvious to most philosophers that a common mother tongue is the 
foundation of human culture and that the capability to speak and understand the 
same tongue is essential to normal human communication.  The natural genetic 
potential of a new-born does not entail instantaneous linguistic proficiency.  
This assertion must be explored from this perspective.  

Secondly, CSP referred to the critical notions of the distinctions among token, 
type and tone on the interpretation of signs and signals. Learning these 
distinctions are necessary for analysis of pragmatic realism associated with 
human communication.

In her well-grounded work, Logic-Language-Ontology, Professor Ursula Skardowska 
demonstrates the roots of forms of understandings between speaker and listener 
in terms of Peircian tokens and types.   In order for verbal communication to 
occur, both participants need experience with tokens, types and tones as 
described by CSP.  The inscription of semantic terms in both minds is essential 
for the precise reproduction of meaningful terms.This assertion must be 
explored from this perspective.  

Thirdly, CSP developed his trichotomy for the communication of the factual 
foundations of natural sciences.  Such communications are functions of the 
knowledge bases associated with the internal semes of the individual minds.  
Historical sensory experiences are necessary to ground the relationships among 
the scientific symbols used to express the tokens, types and tones of 
scientific communication. This assertion must be explored from this 
perspective. 

WRT specifically ChatGTP, I would ask two simple questions: 

1.  Under what situational circumstances would subscriptions to the algorithm 
correspond to circumscriptions of natural descriptions (such that the 
intentions of questioners’ sentences inscribed in the responses of the 
algorithm) ?

2. How do human communicators inscribe meaning into words (as logical terms) 
such that the presentation to the recipient corresponds with the 
re-presentations of the speaker? 

Cheers

Jerry


 



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Who was Cerberus?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John, List: 

> On Jan 22, 2023, at 10:41 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> In a letter to Lady Welby on 25 December 1908? 
> "I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called 
> its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call 
> its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the 
> former. My insertion of 'upon a person' is a sop to Cerberus, because I 
> despair of making my own broader conception understood.”
> 


During the past 20-30 years, the works on symbolic logics has exploded, as you 
are well aware, John.

As my effort to grasp the meanings of these multitudes of symbolic conjectures 
began bearing fruit ww.r.t. the atomic sciences, some of these issues are being 
refocused. 

In particular, it is clear that the nature of reasoning in formal logics vary 
over wide ranges of meanings that are of local character and certainly not of 
the general character that CSP appears to assume in his texts, such as this 
“sop".  What has happened is that the common path for systems of proofs has 
diverged into tree-structures of related semantic terms and related logical 
constants? Today, who would assert that the notions of “conjunction” and 
“disjunction” have the same meanings in all logics?

Should one pose a parallel question for the forms of computations?

So, John (or any other survivor here), is there any hope for semantic 
propositions to become mathematically exact without employing number symbols?

Cheers
Jerry 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Who was Cerberus?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Hi John:

A bit speculative but certainly not totally implausible.

The tone of the message leaves little doubt about his level of frustration with 
his colleagues.

By the way, the phrase:
> that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the former.
> 
Is a bit over stated.  In order to assert a sign (as a set of signals derived 
from chemical analysis) determines the object, a massive amount of laboratory 
work as well as numerous calculations may be essential.

The simpler the molecule, the less work need to assign the structure.
The more perplex the molecule, the more connections to identity and hence the 
greater investment in laboratory work needed to decode the interior 
relationships among the atoms  of the molecule.

Cheers
Jerry 


> On Jan 19, 2023, at 11:04 PM, John F Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Literally, Cerberus was the three-headed dog that guarded the gates to the 
> underworld.  But who did Peirce have in mind when he wrote the following 
> paragraph in a letter to Lady Welby on 25 December 1908?
> "I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called 
> its Object, and so determines an effect upon a person, which effect I call 
> its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby mediately determined by the 
> former. My insertion of 'upon a person' is a sop to Cerberus, because I 
> despair of making my own broader conception understood."
> 
> Could it be Carus, who guarded the gates to the Monist?  Note that both names 
> begin with C and end with RUS.
> 
> John
> 
>  
>  
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce Interprets Peirce

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Robert, John, List:

I would predict that this project will generate many many new insights into CSP 
nachlass.

Robert’s concern is super important.

In the past century, the re-symbolizations of mathematics and the natural 
sciences has emasculated Peircian meaning, especially in the obligations of of 
Logic and Grammar.

cheers
Jerry

Sent from my iPad

> On Nov 24, 2022, at 4:33 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> 
> 
> This is a wonderful project that will be of great benefit to all members of 
> the Peircian community. However, the question may arise of a possible 
> technological black box between the manuscripts and the final product. I have 
> no doubt that the community to be vigilant in this regard! Thank you and good 
> luck to all !
> Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy 
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty
> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/
> 
> 
> 
>> Le jeu. 24 nov. 2022 à 05:15, John F Sowa  a écrit :
>> Peirce Interprets Peirce
>> 
>> The project aims to study, disseminate, and valorize Charles S. Peirce’s 
>> work by transcribing, analyzing, and visualizing the Peirce archives, held 
>> at Harvard’s Houghton Library.
>>  
>> https://mlml.io/p/peirce-interprets-peirce/
>>  
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopic Analysis (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon:



> On Oct 25, 2021, at 2:39 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry C., List:
> 
> In context, Peirce is plainly referring to phaneroscopy, so "the different 
> indecomposable elements" are simply 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns.

Jon:  the text in no way addresses such as enormous constraint.   One can image 
anything one wishes, but it seems relatively clear what the nature of realism 
is.

Furthermore, phanerscopy is merely a term that is not a science in the usual 
sense of meaning.

 The vagueness of the concepts 1 ns, 2ns and 3 ns in no way restrict the 
meaning of sentence.  

Certainly, the terminology of the trichotomy can be read in terms of 1ns, 2ns, 
and 3ns.

So, the suggestion that Peirce is "plainly referring" to phanerscopy is 
speaking for CSP ex cathedra.



> 
> JLRC: Does the "enter into everything" quote refer to the Table of Elements?
> 
> No, that is studied within the special science of chemistry, not 
> phaneroscopy. The quote refers to whatever is or could be present to the mind 
> in any way.

The meanings of the attributes of matter and the coherence of natural sciences 
and natural philosophy of the concept of elements are not restricted.
Since CSP held that chemistry was the ” bedrock” of his logical system, any 
wholistic notion would necessary relate to chemical abstractions. 

> 
> JLRC: It is possible that the (ethical?) “should” refers to a nomological 
> science that relates to the relations between sin-signs and legi-signs?
> 
> No, those are studied within the normative science of logic as semeiotic, not 
> phaneroscopy. The "should" here is logical, not ethical.

Arbitrary and capricious interpretation of the grammar of “should”.  

In short, I find these comments disappointingly shallow, given the GRAVITY of 
the assertion of the sentence.

John:  could you search for some significant SCIENTIFIC arguments that address 
the structures of realism and addresses the foundational issues essential to a 
nomological science or realism?

Cheers

Jerry   


> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Mon, Oct 25, 2021 at 1:41 PM Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote:
> List:
>> On Oct 25, 2021, at 10:14 AM, robert marty > <mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> (Cited as from MS0602_012)
>> ...there should be a nomological science , which shall make out all the 
>> different indecomposable elements which enter into everything that is 
>> conceivably possible, discriminates them with care, and shows how can be 
>> varied and combined.
> 
> This sentence has little or any meaning to the iconic, indexical or symbolic 
> forms of mathematics or physics, but fits the compositions of logical 
> elements into unbounded numbers of unique compounds (such as the careful 
> discrimination needed to identify handedness (optical isomers)!)  Does the 
> "enter into everything" quote refer to the Table of Elements?  How dark a 
> shadow does this citation cast on the role of mathematics in phaneroscopy? 
> 
> It is possible that the (ethical?) “should” refers to a nomological science 
> that relates to the relations between sin-signs and legi-signs?
> 
> It is possible that such a nomological science would be interdependent with 
> the numerical calculations that relate the propositions of rhema, dici-signs 
> and arguments such that coherent truths are generated from the 
> correspondences between quali-signs, iconic forms, numerical indices?
> 
> These two possible assertions are consistence with the coherence of the 
> sin-signs of natural sorts and kinds in both the 2 nd half of the 19 th 
> Century and in the third decade of the 21 th Century.
> 
> Robert, the question to you is, if you remained interested in exploring 
> Peircian mathematics is: what is the quantitation of your models of lattices 
> such that a nomological sciences of numbers corresponds with natural sorts 
> and kinds?
> 
> In other words, how is it possible to compose the factors of a polynomial 
> index of elements into an exact symbolic legi-sign?
> 
> After all, this is the central thesis of the trichotomy - with both 
> hypo-theses and hyper-theses . 
> 
> As I have previously asserted, I believe that the polynomial index of logical 
> factors as well as a symbolic obligatory logic is essential to such a 
> nomological science, such as the perplex numbers in relation to the 
> compositions of organic mathematical symbols.
> 
> I will cl

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Phaneroscopic Analysis (was A key principle of normative semeiotic for interpreting texts)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Oct 25, 2021, at 10:14 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> (Cited as from MS0602_012)
> ...there should be a nomological science , which shall make out all the 
> different indecomposable elements which enter into everything that is 
> conceivably possible, discriminates them with care, and shows how can be 
> varied and combined.

This sentence has little or any meaning to the iconic, indexical or symbolic 
forms of mathematics or physics, but fits the compositions of logical elements 
into unbounded numbers of unique compounds (such as the careful discrimination 
needed to identify handedness (optical isomers)!)  Does the "enter into 
everything" quote refer to the Table of Elements?  How dark a shadow does this 
citation cast on the role of mathematics in phaneroscopy? 

It is possible that the (ethical?) “should” refers to a nomological science 
that relates to the relations between sin-signs and legi-signs?

It is possible that such a nomological science would be interdependent with the 
numerical calculations that relate the propositions of rhema, dici-signs and 
arguments such that coherent truths are generated from the correspondences 
between quali-signs, iconic forms, numerical indices?

These two possible assertions are consistence with the coherence of the 
sin-signs of natural sorts and kinds in both the 2 nd half of the 19 th Century 
and in the third decade of the 21 th Century.

Robert, the question to you is, if you remained interested in exploring 
Peircian mathematics is: what is the quantitation of your models of lattices 
such that a nomological sciences of numbers corresponds with natural sorts and 
kinds?

In other words, how is it possible to compose the factors of a polynomial index 
of elements into an exact symbolic legi-sign?

After all, this is the central thesis of the trichotomy - with both hypo-theses 
and hyper-theses . 

As I have previously asserted, I believe that the polynomial index of logical 
factors as well as a symbolic obligatory logic is essential to such a 
nomological science, such as the perplex numbers in relation to the 
compositions of organic mathematical symbols.

I will close by expressing a revealing but abstractly-encoded tease. Beware of 
Skolemization! 

Cheers
Jerry_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [CYBCOM] Re: Theme One • A Program Of Inquiry

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon:

This post is so muddled that I gave up on a meaningful scientific 
interpretation of it.

Cheers

Jerry


> On Oct 17, 2021, at 7:00 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> Cf: Theme One Program • Motivation 1
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2018/05/15/theme-one-program-motivation-1/
> 
> All,
> 
> The main idea behind the Theme One program is the efficient use
> of graph-theoretic data structures for the tasks of “learning”
> and “reasoning”.
> 
> I am thinking of learning in the sense of learning about an environment,
> in essence, gaining information about the nature of an environment and
> being able to apply the information acquired to a specific purpose.
> 
> Under the heading of reasoning I am simply lumping together all the
> ordinary sorts of practical activities which would probably occur
> to most people under that name.
> 
> There is a natural relation between the tasks.  Learning the character
> of an environment leads to the recognition of laws which govern the
> environment and making full use of that recognition requires the
> ability to reason logically about those laws in abstract terms.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
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[PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra (was Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1))

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Oct 6, 2021, at 4:38 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
>  I can't recall a single instance of anyone ever
> changing their opinion about anything of any significance. 

Interesting view.

I feel several regular contributors have substantially matured in the past 20 
odd years that I have participated.

One regular poster on mathematics has substantially abandoned earlier positions 
and is actually doing reasonable work.

The key, for me, is to read relevant posts carefully.  

Now that almost all scientists have been eliminated from the list serve, I find 
it increasing difficult to find relevant posts.

Almost all professional philosophers have either been eliminated or died. 

In my judgment, the average IQ of posters here on this list serve is in log 
decline. 

Cheers

Jerry


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abracadabra (was Modeling Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics (part B1))

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Bernard: 

> On Aug 27, 2021, at 5:33 PM, Bernard Morand  wrote:
> 
> It is a good illustration of my feeling about the bad quality level of the 
> discussions on Peirce-l. 

My feelings are fully parallel with yours.

Your articulative description of the styles of communication denotes the 
essential nature of the subjective logical fallacies that constrain the 
discussions to the very, very  narrow interests of some scholars. 

Such styles, while offering a sense of historical truth functions, ignore the 
historically historic roots of CSP writings in centuries of earlier scholarship 
as well as his extreme breath of knowledge and imagination in mathematics, 
logic, physics, chemistry and multiple natural languages, thereby reducing 
brilliance to dullness.  The consequence is the turning of lively ideas into 
deadly boredom.  (If not even more deadly complete mis-representation.)

What practical steps are necessary to re-enliven our community and our 
communications? 

Cheers

Jerry  


Postscript for Robert Marty:  Do you believe that CSP’s logic is congruent with 
Robinson arithmetic?:-). _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[PEIRCE-L] Novel Resources for scholars with an interest in the perplexity of CSP's logical abduction

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

Two significant reference volumes have recently been received and I await a 
third. 
Two of these volumes significantly illuminate the putative illations between 
propositional logic and model theory.
(I did not check if these books are on Ben’s list or not.)

Truth and Assertibility, Nik Weaver, 2015.

This well-written book is technical in nature and probably difficult for most 
lay readers. 
CSP’s logic are probably, in my opinion, Third order or Higher logic, depending 
on the taxonomy of the sin-signs.
This book clearly and crisply separates First order from Second order logic, 
materially beneficial to peruse.
One might say that this book is a fine example of Phaneroscopy of words, not 
merely old wine in new bottles. 

From Peirce to Skolem, Geraldine Brady, 2000.  

This book traces the historical developments of several logics and there 
intimately interconnected roots.
Many arguments trace the propositions directly from CSP’s and Mitchell's early 
papers to the papers by Lowenheim and Skolem upon which rests mathematical 
model theory and intuitionistic logic.
.
Very interestingly, this book was nurtured by a former student of Saunders Mac 
Lane, one of the founders of Mathematical Category Theory.
It answers, in detail, the questions concerning the propositional semi-lattices 
in relation to modern notions of identity (and hence the meanings of 
identifying signs (such as sin-signs.)

(Looking backward in time and epistemic understanding, I recall a two-hour 
conversation with Professor Mac Lane about the turn of the Century.  It was a 
turning point in my understanding of the mathematical foundations of natural 
philosophy.)

Frankly, many a chuckle was generated as these texts de-fogged the illations 
between CSP’s text and the formal logic of the chemical sciences as it emergesd 
from Sir Rutherford’s numbers. 

Cheers

Jerry 



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Fwd: Re: Cognitive Signs (was All Semiotic, No Puzzle)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jerry R:

I will just take a quick moment to respond to your posts.

My simple conjecture is that these statements rest on the role of sin-sign in 
constructing and confirming new forms of knowledge.

While a sinsign is singular, the index would ordinarily be plural as would the 
arguments that create the legisign.  

That is, the ontological constituents create the epistemic meaning.

This was standard practice in the methodology of the special sciences as 
deployed during CSP’s decades in the second half of the 18 th.

At least to me, this logical conjecture would not generally be a truth function 
in the Skolemized logics of the 20 th century.

(This is a bit technical; perhaps it answers your concern, perhaps not.)

Cheers

Jerry 







> On Oct 4, 2021, at 1:58 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
> 
> Dear Jack, list,
> 
> You have raised some very interesting points that invite reflective 
> propositions from the audience who, 
> as you say, “Would be very interested to receive any variety of response to 
> this 
> - preferably those which ardently disagree with me!”
> 
> I must say I do not ardently disagree with you, for it seems to me we are 
> interested in similar things.  
> And as far as similar things go, 
> I have recently sent out a letter, which I’m afraid went unnoticed, 
> inquiring about a similar question.
> 
> I wonder if you can help me, 
> since the similarity will become obvious once we place the two requests next 
> to one another:
> 
> The goal of an inference is 
> to establish the existence of an unperceived object, 
> and if we did perceive that object, 
> we would have no need to infer it; 
> however inference necessarily regards an object 
> that has already been perceived.
> 
> Does anyone know what this means and who wrote it?
> I am certain there is Wisdom in it but not sure why.
> (Sep 10, 2021)
> —-
> Knowledge in some way renders them efficient; and a sign is something by 
> knowing which we know something more.
> 
> What does Peirce mean by "a sign is something by knowing which we know 
> something more"?
> (Oct 4, 2021)
> 
> Would you say, based on your immediate recognition and habits, 
> that the purpose of bringing to attention these two sayings is the same?
> 
> But then this would suggest, 
> if we analyze the one to one correspondence, that an inference is like a 
> sign.  
> 
> And since our habit is not to look like an expert who knowingly ignores what 
> we have already acknowledged, 
> such as what definition of ‘normative inference’ means
> (that is, has Peirce ever spoken on what inference is?  
> I mean, it seems we would remember something like that and would be able to 
> tell us.), 
> do these two requests induce the same sort of questions as the things you are 
> now talking and thinking about
> in an efficient manner?
> 
> With best wishes, 
> Jerry R
> 
> On Mon, Oct 4, 2021 at 1:34 PM Jon Alan Schmidt  > wrote:
> Jack, List:
> 
> Good stuff, thanks. I would just like to clarify one other thing from your 
> earlier post.
> 
> JRKC: It also refers back, in a roundabout way, to the discussion we had here 
> last week regarding Peirce's position on the existence of god (insofar as 
> object-sign-interpretant implies that the object itself belongs to some 
> universe-external position ...
> 
> Peirce's conception of object-sign-interpretant only implies that the 
> (dynamical) object is external to, independent of, and unaffected by any sign 
> that it determines. Hence, an object that is "universe-external" is only 
> necessary if we also accept the distinct premiss that the entire universe is 
> a sign, i.e., "a vast representamen" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903). However, 
> Peirce also claims that "if any signs are connected, no matter how, the 
> resulting system constitutes one sign," calling this a theorem of "the 
> science of semeiotics" but unfortunately not providing a proof (R 
> 1476:36[5-1/2], 1904). Therefore, in order to avoid the conclusion that there 
> is a "universe-external" object that determines the entire universe, one must 
> either reject this particular theorem or deny the further premiss that the 
> entire universe is "composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394, 
> 1906).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
>  - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> 
> On Mon, Oct 4, 2021 at 12:41 PM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
> mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote:
> Jon, List,
> The only way to know something at all, and therefore the only way to know 
> something more, is by means of signs; and in accordance with Peirce's 
> pragmatism, the ultimate meaning of any acquired knowledge consists in 
> self-controlled habits of conduct, by which those signs have a real effect on 
> the external world
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Sep 28, 2021, at 9:30 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> The likeness theory of reference has the same problem as the
> correspondence theory of truth, namely, as used in those theories
> both terms refer to dyadic relations and dyadic relations are not
> adequate to the task of accounting for the complex of activities
> composing the intellect, for example, inquiry, learning, reasoning,
> speech, thought,

The applications of the principles of correspondence relations, in three forms, 
1:1 and 1:many and many:1are intrinsic to the logic of chemical notation as 
used by CSP.

These correspondence relations are necessary to express the truth functions of 
chemical reactions, chemical equilibrium, chemical thermodynamics and the Law 
of mass action.

And, by the way, all of these chemical processes for necessary to generate 
embryogenesis and neurogenesis and hence mentation.

Cheers
Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Off-List: Minimal Negation Operators

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Sep 27, 2021, at 7:56 PM, Imran Makani  wrote:
> 
>  But it remains unclear to me how you concluded that minimal negation 
> operators are not related to Peirce’s mathematical work. 

As a chemist, CSP often inscended hyle terminology into his logical corpse as 
he sought to extend the 15-17 th century historical usages of the meaning of 
the concept of a “term" .

One particularity of chemical synthesis is the absence of the “negative” 
operators on the chemical elements.  Each element is a logical constant in the 
language of chemistry and hence can not be negated.  Yet, in the notation for 
chemistry it is necessary to assert and signify the absence of a chemical unit 
in a logical product.  This could be referred to as a minimal negation in a 
logically consistent semantics of a chemical syntax.

I have no information, either positive or negative, of the meaning that Jon 
intends to infer logically with his usage of this non-standard semantics.
However, this semantics is obviously useful in attempting to give a logical 
semantics for the well-established semiosis of hyle. 

Cheers

Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theism (was Inquiry Into Inquiry)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

The meaning of the term “transcendence” was explored in considerable detail 
several years ago in order to grasp the bizarre writings of CSP on the meaning 
of chemical symbols as breadth and comprehension. 

Indeed, the originals of CSP’s father’s views were aligned with the 
“transcendent” philosophy of Emerson and Thoreau, as influenced by the factors 
that emerged following the migration of English settlers to New England.  In my 
view, the conservative views of Christianity that influenced the naturalism of 
American transcendentalism strongly influenced CSP’s philosophy prior to his 
abandonment of Unitarianism.  This is consistent with CSP’s effects to defend 
the atomic views of “vortices”  rather than accept the evidence for discrete 
particles (as atoms).

JAS views seem to be removed from the realities of American philosophical 
history of evolution of American religious beliefs. 

Cheers

Jerry 


> On Sep 18, 2021, at 10:05 PM, sowa @bestweb.net  wrote:
> 
>  Jon AS, Edwina, Helmut, List,
>  
> On this issue, I agree with Jon:
>  
> JAS: in this context, "transcendent" simply means "not immanent." Pantheists 
> believe that the universe is God, while panentheists believe that the 
> universe is in God, so both believe that God is impersonal and immanent. 
> Theists (including Peirce) reject these tenets, believing instead that God is 
> the real, personal, and transcendent (non-immanent) creator of the universe. 
> There is nothing intrinsically Platonic about this; in fact, it is affirmed 
> by the medieval scholastic theologians, who were primarily Aristotelians.
>  
> Re Plato vs Aristotle:  Early Christian theologians, the "Fathers of the 
> Church", were strongly influenced by Plato or Neoplatonism, and the Latin 
> writers, including Augustine, knew little or no Greek.  The only writings by 
> Aristotle that they knew were the few books that were translated to Latin by 
> Boethius before he lost his head.
>  
> By the early 13th century. new translations of Aristotle were coming from 
> Spain.  They were translated from Arabic by a collaboration of Jewish and 
> Christian scholars.  The Jews translated the Arabic to the local Spanish 
> dialect, and the Christians translated the Spanish to Latin.  This version of 
> Aristotle was highly suspect because of the influence of Arabs and Jews. 
>  
> But Aquinas realized the importance of Aristotle, and he  commissioned a new 
> translation directly from Greek.  Aquinas worked with Moerbecke to make sure 
> that the Latin version was as good as it could be, and the commentaries on 
> Aristotle by Aquinas are still  highly regarded today.
>  
> In fact, I suspect that Peirce used the commentaries by Aquinas as his 
> introduction to Aristotle.  In those days, they didn't have the Loeb editions 
> with Greek on the left and English on the right.
>  
> And by the way, I apologize for the mistake in my previous note.  I 
> originally wrote "factum est (was made)", but then I realized that 'panta' 
> was plural, so I changed "factum est" to "facta sunt", but I forgot to change 
> 'was' to 'were'.
>  
> John
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 46

[Jerry LR Chandler]

I was referring to papers in the computer science literature, as well as papers 
from philosophers, from Portugal, Italy and Finland.
These papers draw on abductive reasoning as well as classification techniques.  
Of Brazilians are also contributing.

The quality of the works from the University of Indiana speak for themselves.

Cheers
Jerry




> On Sep 14, 2021, at 4:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry, List:
> 
> I am curious, could you please identify a few members of the "new generation 
> of CSP scholars emerging in Europe" that you have in mind?
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 4:44 PM Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote:
> List, Edwina:
> 
> The disconnect is not complete.
> The signs for firstness, secondness, etc are preserved.
> 
> Was it Hegel who asserted: "Ignorance is not innocence.”?
> 
> A new generation of CSP scholars emerging in Europe offers promise.
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 46

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Edwina:

The disconnect is not complete.
The signs for firstness, secondness, etc are preserved.

Was it Hegel who asserted: "Ignorance is not innocence.”?

A new generation of CSP scholars emerging in Europe offers promise.

Cheers
Jerry



> On Sep 14, 2021, at 8:08 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> List
> 
> And as I've previously said - I consider these De Tienne descriptions as 
> absolutely bizarre.
> 
> I don't see that they have a thing to do with the Peircean categories - and 
> frankly, show a huge misunderstanding of those categories.
> 
> Edwina
> 
>  
> 
> On Tue 14/09/21 8:56 AM , g...@gnusystems.ca  sent:
> 
> Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
> Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
>  site. Slide 46 is 
> a continuation of 45.
> 
> Gary f.
>  
> 
>  
>  
> 
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The "generative potency" of the number three.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Gary: 

> On Sep 12, 2021, at 10:44 PM, sowa @bestweb.net  wrote:
> 
> GF:  as I said in my post this morning, formal logic produces explicit 
> formulations (which may include “letters of the alphabet” as symbols of the 
> variables). But the phaneroscopist’s attention would be distracted from the 
> basic task of phaneroscopic analysis if he had to pay conscious attention to 
> such formulations.

I believe that this sentence has unbounded potential to mis-lead the naive 
reader about the logical interpretations of mathematical terms and chemical 
terms in CSP’s writings.

An assertion about the meaning of a symbols and/or icons lies deep in CSP’s 
conundrums that address the philosophy of realism in contrast to nominalism.

Let me explain.

Aristotle (as I understand it) introduced the notion of a letter symbol as a 
representation for any sin-sign.  The modern usage of a letter symbol as a 
variable lies at the heart of mathematical generalizations and Tarski’s truth 
functions.  For discrete variables, the meaning of a letter symbol is that it 
can represent any conceivable numerical value. Repeat: ANY.  The grounding 
logic of arithmetic rests on this premise. 

On the other hand, the formal science of chemistry also uses letter symbols as 
representations of chemical elements. In sharp and distinctive contrast with 
the mathematical logic of letter symbols, the chemical letter symbols, such as 
I, K, O, N, S etc represent one particular species of matter. This species is 
also represented (equally exactly) with a particular number and with an 
indefinite range of categorical physical attributes. The grounding logic of 
chemistry rests on the identity of the species and this species symbol is 
preserved for all chemical relationships, e.g., molecular formula, molecular 
structure, molecular handedness, and, most notably, molecular number.  

Thus, the difference between the mathematical usage of a letter symbol and the 
chemical usage of a letter symbol is the distinction between the logics of 
generalities (nominalism, constructivism) and the logics of species (realism, 
chemical elements, biological species, human individual identities)

It is of interest to compare the meaning of the two forms of symbols, for 
example, “golden" in contrast with “twoness” or “secondness”,  iconicity in 
contrast with quantity without quality.

In the “simplest” mathematics, CSP is probably referring to latter usage of the 
ambiguity of the meaning of a letter symbol as a potential source of iconicity, 
(creating new images or ideas or thought or patterns or diagrams 

Cheers
Jerry 

BTW, some years ago, in a series of posts, I critiqued John Sowa textbook which 
sought to relate AI to the trichotomy.  At that time, I failed to recognize the 
origin of the concepts presented above because the  logic of chemistry was not 
yet formally developed. 



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The "generative potency" of the number three.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John:


> On Sep 12, 2021, at 10:44 PM, sowa @bestweb.net  wrote:
> 
> That definition of formal logic from Baldwin's Dictionary is very close to 
> the definition by DeMorgan, who first introduced the term 'formal logic'.  It 
> is true of all the algebraic notations for logic, including Peirce's versions 
> of 1877, 1880, 1885, and all the algebraic notations in the century after 
> Peirce.  The term 'formal logic' is used for all of them.

Would you post the reference to DeMorgan?

I explored the etymology and historical usage of the “form” several decades ago.
My recollection is that the usage formal logic is derived directly from the 
precedence of “antecedent and “consequence” with the implication of “because"
The forms of Aristotelian syllogisms give form to sorites .
Medieval logicians created the notion of logical forms of individual sentences 
by introducing the notion of beginnings and endings as logical terms. 

So, I would appreciate clarification, just for historical accuracy. 

Cheers
Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Edwinia, List:

I concur with you assertion below, but this view in inadequate to separate the 
dramatic differences between CSP’s notion of logic from classic logic and more 
importantly, why he choose to follow a semiotic path to ground his logic rather 
than the classic path of antecedents to consequences and / or syllogisms and 
/or Boolean logic and /or set theory? 

So, the challenge to interpretations of philosophy goes far deeper than this 
view suggests...

> On Aug 30, 2021, at 8:05 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Therefore ... the mathematician is not working as an isolate, indifferent to 
> whether his theories are relevant in the 'real world'  but -  as in the 
> example of Peirce - is quite capable of using abstract AND practical theories 
> in his work. Some people might be more comfortable in the abstract vs the 
> practical and vice versa but the point is - to differentiate between the 
> Agent and the Subject matter.
> 
> 
My personal experience is that the view of mathematics held by a mathematician 
matches the personal philosophy of the mathematician, usually in very occult 
ways.  However, occasionally, the forms of the subject matter dominates the 
deeply abstract roots of mathematical structures.  CSP falls into this latter 
category, he is very transparent on which subject matter he rests his pragmatic 
mathematics and logics on. The truth functions of the trichotomy rest on the 
realism of the illations, relations, and calculations of the natural sciences.

This point of view is not restricted to any one profession. Human individuality 
is not dissolved when on adopts a profession.  Think about professional 
philosophers….  :-) 

Cheers
Jerry 

 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Gary: 

Excellent post.  Thank you!
Below, I will postulate how Gary’s interpretation of this semantic distinction 
illates to syntactical distinctions of the natural philosophy of the natural 
sciences and natural diagrammatic mathematics resting on CSP’s notion of the 
symbolic relationships between icons and rhema.

This is of particular importance in view of the foundations of CSP’s notions of 
foundations of arguments (the linguistics of the trichotomistic descriptions of 
phenomena resting on semiotics).   

In the view of alternative views of Husserl / Cantor and Frege that dominate  
the axiomatic structures of nominalism, the contrasts and comparisons of 
meanings of the two quasi-parallel notions, phenomenology and phaneroscopy.

In particular, it not merely separates two philosophical perceptions of numbers 
and continuity, it widens the gap between truth functions based on the 
languaging of the definitions of the trichotomistic terms and the truth 
functions resting on the Whitehead and Russell’s notion of mathematical logic.

Further, this distinction in meaning is highly relevant to the contradictions 
of “liar’s paradox” of Russell (along with his notion of atomic and molecular 
sentences) and the realism of CSP composing  categorical "molecular sentences” 
by compounding Rhema and Decisions.
  
CSP’s logical compositions of arguments from rhematic terms and dicisignated 
terms can be used to define symbols and lattices of symbols representing 
legisigns because the truth of arguments rests on icons, not axioms. This view 
is constructed from the composition of atoms into categories of molecules.

The notions of scientific imagination necessary to relate the mathematical 
operations relating semiosis to the enumerable forms representing legi-signs 
cohere smoothly with diagrammatic forms would be specific examples of 
phaneroscopy.   

Perhaps someone who understand the meaning of the “contradictory term” of 
“phenomenology”, could imagine a counter-example relevant to the logics of the 
natural sciences?

Cheers

Jerry 



> On Aug 30, 2021, at 7:26 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> John, I am aware that some scientists use the word “phenomenology” in 
> reference to “The division of any science which is concerned with the 
> description and classification of its phenomena, rather than causal or 
> theoretical explanation.” The Oxford English Dictionarycites both Whewell and 
> Hamilton as using the word in that sense in the 19th century, so it would not 
> surprise me if Peirce also used the word that way in 1878, especially in a 
> non-philosophical context.
> 
> I see I have failed to persuade you that Peirce’s use of the word from 1902 
> on referred to a radically different practice, but what persuaded me was a 
> close reading of Peirce’s work that uses the word specifically in reference 
> to a science which is neither a normative nor a special science, but provides 
> a formal grounding for those sciences in terms of the “formal elements” of 
> the phenomenon/phaneron. That he felt forced to change the name of this 
> science to “phaneroscopy” in 1904 is, to me, even more compelling evidence of 
> that he was referring not to “a division of any science” but to “the most 
> primal of all the positive sciences” (CP 5.39, 1903). But I won’t try to 
> change your mind, certainly not by quoting more of Peirce. I will simply have 
> to accept that what you call “phenomenology” or “phaneroscopy” is not what I 
> refer to by those terms when I am trying to mirror Peirce’s usage of them, or 
> when I am using them in any philosophical context. 
> 
> I’ll just go back to the discussion of ADT’s slides now, with that in mind. 
> We are getting close to the end of the slow read, but there are still some 
> issues to be resolved concerning the practice of phaneroscopy.
>  
> Gary f.
>  
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
>   > On Behalf Of John F. Sowa
> Sent: 30-Aug-21 00:16
> To: Jon Alan Schmidt  >
> Cc: Peirce-L mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>>
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pure math & phenomenology (was Slip & Slide
>  
> Jon AS, Gary F, List,
> 
> We must always distinguish the subject matter of any science from the
> people who (a) develop the science or (b) apply the science.
> 
> The dependencies among the sciences, which Comte noted and Peirce
> adopted after reading Comte's classification, show how each science
> depends on principles from the sciences that precede it.
> 
> But most people who develop or use any science are not aware of the
> Comte-Peirce classification.  I recall that Gary F said that the
> dependencies in the development seemed to be circular.  And I
> agree.  In their daily work, everybody, including professional
> mathematicians, are free to use any knowledge they acquired in any
> way from any source.  Remember Archimedes' Eureka moment, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon:

I share your concerns.
My thoughts are a bit sharper…

Sadly, the consequences of this public discussion of these slides for the 
future of CSP studies in the USA is unknowable.

Hopefully, our European colleagues will not abandon the inquiry.

Cheers

Jerry 

> On Aug 27, 2021, at 10:16 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:
> 
> Dear Gary,
> 
> I've really been trying my level best to hold off comment on
> ADT's interpretation of Peirce until the whole show wraps up,
> but every now and then the byte on my tongue lets a bit slip,
> as the selection and stress just seem too twisted and warped.
> It leads me to think he's trying assimilate Peirce into some
> new-fangled never-say-die reanimation of analytic philosophy.
> I could be wrong so I'll give it a while, but right now it's
> not looking so good ...
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon
> 
> On 8/27/2021 10:19 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>> O joy, another cryptic and slippery message from the Oracle Jon Awbrey, who 
>> of course will not deign to explain what connection it might have with Slide 
>> 34.
>> Gary f.
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Jon Awbrey 
>> Sent: 27-Aug-21 09:49
>> To: g...@gnusystems.ca; peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> Subject: Re: André De Tienne : Slip & Slide 34
>> oh goody,
>> after the revival of positivism and empiricism, logical or otherwise, i 
>> guess we should expect the revenge of the unknowable object in itself.
>> jon
> 
> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 31

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Aug 24, 2021, at 11:39 AM, 
> 
> On the contrary, André is explicitly discussing phaneroscopy, not semeiotic.

This sentence is a remarkable example of how emotional rhetorical thrusts 
generate the thoughts  that make no sense in the language of CSP.

Units of thoughts have units of meaning.   These two concepts are inseparable.

In the engineering sciences, especially the epistemology and ontology of 
pragmatic necessities, the connections between phaneroscopy and semiotics are 
essential to ethical actions.

The graphic diagrams that illustrate the iconic forms of engineering work 
connect, necessarily, the semeiotic with the phaneroscopy. Indeed, the 
connections of symbols with the indices of the diagrams derived from semiotic 
and phaneroscopy could be a central thesis of engineering sciences. 

Cheers

Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] possibility WAS Andre De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List: 

> On Aug 22, 2021, at 9:29 PM, John F. Sowa  wrote:
> 
>  I suggested the word 'diagram', one of Peirce's favorite terms, which could 
> be used in discussions of the issues that were raised.  The word diagram does 
> *not* mean 'qualitative possibility' (whatever that may mean).  But that is a 
> huge advantage.  The word 'diagram' steers the discussion into clear, precise 
> issues instead of some vague talk about qualitative possibilities.

This suggested substitutions are problematic from a chemist’s point of view.

Without going into the technical details, I note that semantic proof theories 
are rare in the logic of both mathematical and chemical diagrams.

The term “qualitative possibilities”, in the pragmatic methodologies of the 
biomedical sciences, is essential to “tweaking” the structures a little bit in 
order to explore the neighboring illations for cause and effect.  For concrete 
examples, consider the therapeutic drugs, where a large number of “statins” or 
‘antibiotics” or other bio-similars were discovered based on the qualitative 
possibilities.

It is easy to understand the deep need for mathematical definitions that 
express “all - or - none” pairs of logical terms. And such a need exist in the 
formal logic of sin-signs.  But the formal logic of sin-signs also need to 
generate exact distinctions between very small differences and hence the acute 
need for “qualitative differences”.  

Cheers

Jerry 

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 27. Needed correction.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Edwina:

> On Aug 18, 2021, at 12:27 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
>  I don't see Peircean Firstness as an ideal form, but as an open free 
> force-to-be-actualized ..

Why?

I concur that CSP’s notion of first-ness should not be transitioned into an 
ideal form such as an eager and scientifically illiterate 
mathematically-oriented philosophy could be tempted to contemplate.  Such 
scientifically ignorant philosophers could be further tempted to wander 
helter-skelter over a random dictionary of semantic synonyms in order to 
justify a perverse philosophy of nature, Ladyman-like. 

But, I have no idea how a “force” can be “to be”.

This is a strange bit of physics.

Logically, the norm for the usual literate physical thought is that of force as 
a consequent. (At least, the physical symbols of Newton and Coulomb were / are 
/ will be so deployed.)

I would suggest that the conversations be initiated in the notion of first-ness 
as a logical antecedent. This is formal ground of the logic of graph theory and 
the logical connectivity of nature. 

Such conversations can be modally potentiated to transverse to secondness by 
syndication with the possibility of remaining open to reversing the meaning 
from consequence to the antecedent (retroduction).

For example, Sodium can be transformed in Sodium Chloride by pragmatic 
syntropization without invoking any abstract theories or laws.

Mother Nature does the work spontaneously without any formal theoretical 
mathematical underpinnings of work and energy.

My argument is directly related to CSP’s generative logic of the trichotomy.  
The “one-ness” of a logical term as a unit of meaning and it modality as a 
sin-sign and as independent notation for a syntactical object (icon?) are 
essential to the generalization of the formal logic of the trichotomy. 

Does this rhetorical form (formulation) satisfy essential / critical 
anthropological yearnings?
(I am implying that invoking logical Skolenization would not be welcomed into 
CSP’s notions of relational logics because the semantic name “sodium” is a 
unitary predicate with a fixed position in a predecessor-sucessor sequence of 
natural numbers.)

:-). 

Cheers
Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

H…

Well, every individual can connect with pragmatism and realism with whatever 
competencies and experiential wisdom they have acquired.

Cheers

Jerry 

> On Aug 17, 2021, at 4:30 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> Jerry,
>  
> No problem. My assertions belong to the department of pragmatism that Peirce 
> called critical common-sensism.
>  
> Gary f.
>  
> From: Jerry LR Chandler  
> Sent: 17-Aug-21 17:18
> To: Peirce List 
> Cc: Gary Fuhrman 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's 
> Semiotics.(Part A)
>  
> List, Gary
>  
> CSP professed to be a pragmatist and a realist.
>  
> As such, he based his epistemology and ontology on semiosis and the meaning 
> of signs.
>  
> Can you clarify how the assertions of your message are related to CSP’s 
> philosophies?
>  
> Observation of a cedar tree is nice. 
>  
>  
> Cheers
>  
> Jerry 
>  
>  
>  
> 
> 
>> On Aug 17, 2021, at 3:35 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
>> wrote:
>>  
>> Bernard, the “converse” you refer to, stated exactly, would be that what is 
>> or is not true of the world of existences can be scientifically stated 
>> without the help of mathematical reasoning.
>> 
>> You are asking whether we can “ascertain” that.
>> 
>> Well, there is a cedar tree just outside the window next to me as I write 
>> this. This is true of the world of existences, and I have stated it without 
>> the help of mathematical reasoning. One example should suffice — unless you 
>> define “scientifically stated” in such a way as to exclude reports of direct 
>> observation, or else define “mathematical reasoning” in a way that includes 
>> direct observation. So which of those equally far-fetched definitions are 
>> you going to resort to, in order to prove your point?
>> 
>> Gary f.
>> 
>>  
>> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
>> <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> > <mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>> On Behalf Of Bernard Morand
>> Sent: 17-Aug-21 14:35
>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's 
>> Semiotics.(Part A)
>>  
>> List,
>> The quote CP 8.110 (JAS to Robert, below) asserting that "mathematical 
>> reasoning ... never reaches any conclusion at all as to what is or is not 
>> true of the world existences" is a quasi-truism.
>> But the problem at hand is: Is the converse also true ? 
>> That is to say : can we ascertain that the world of existences can be 
>> scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning ?
>> My response (and I think Peirce's too) is No. The slides by De Tienne 
>> explicitely claim: Yes. 
>> Such a standpoint will lead phaneroscopy to limit itself to simple 
>> inventories of so called phanerons (see the ADT slide about oenoscopy, a 
>> kind of study which has been known under the label of comparativism in Human 
>> Sciences before the arrival of Structuralism)
>> B. Morand
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>  
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Gary

CSP professed to be a pragmatist and a realist.

As such, he based his epistemology and ontology on semiosis and the meaning of 
signs.

Can you clarify how the assertions of your message are related to CSP’s 
philosophies?

Observation of a cedar tree is nice. 


Cheers

Jerry 




> On Aug 17, 2021, at 3:35 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> Bernard, the “converse” you refer to, stated exactly, would be that what is 
> or is not true of the world of existences can be scientifically stated 
> without the help of mathematical reasoning.
> 
> You are asking whether we can “ascertain” that.
> 
> Well, there is a cedar tree just outside the window next to me as I write 
> this. This is true of the world of existences, and I have stated it without 
> the help of mathematical reasoning. One example should suffice — unless you 
> define “scientifically stated” in such a way as to exclude reports of direct 
> observation, or else define “mathematical reasoning” in a way that includes 
> direct observation. So which of those equally far-fetched definitions are you 
> going to resort to, in order to prove your point?
> 
> Gary f.
> 
>  
> From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
> Behalf Of Bernard Morand
> Sent: 17-Aug-21 14:35
> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's 
> Semiotics.(Part A)
>  
> List,
> The quote CP 8.110 (JAS to Robert, below) asserting that "mathematical 
> reasoning ... never reaches any conclusion at all as to what is or is not 
> true of the world existences" is a quasi-truism.
> But the problem at hand is: Is the converse also true ? 
> That is to say : can we ascertain that the world of existences can be 
> scientifically stated without the help of mathematical reasoning ?
> My response (and I think Peirce's too) is No. The slides by De Tienne 
> explicitely claim: Yes. 
> Such a standpoint will lead phaneroscopy to limit itself to simple 
> inventories of so called phanerons (see the ADT slide about oenoscopy, a kind 
> of study which has been known under the label of comparativism in Human 
> Sciences before the arrival of Structuralism)
> B. Morand
> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Modeling in Humanities : the case of Peirce's Semiotics.(Part A)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Robert:

It may be useful to add a few comments that may be helpful for the comity of 
this group.

Higher education in the sciences is radically different from eduction in 
mathematics. 
I believe that my own personal experience is typical for most, but not all, 
scientists.

Mathematical terminology is intermingled and entangled with material 
terminology freely and with abandon. 
This entanglement of meanings reaches it zenith in the engineering disciplines.
Even though tacit recognition is given to the distinct  meaning of mathematical 
symbols, the logic used to ground scientific theories, including chemistry and 
biology become synonymous with mathematical terms.

The antecedent “maths-scientific" beliefs, formed under strict mentorships, 
from the early formative years are difficult to re-formulate in later years 
because they encompass both the ontology and epistemology of the scientific 
belief systems.

C P Snow (1958) diagnosed the grounding issues.  The situation has not changed 
much today.

For me personally, it required about three decades to fully separate the 
meanings of mathematical symbols for numbers from biochemical symbols for 
numbers (with heritable internal relational structures.). 

Admittedly, a good fraction of this effort was devoted to separating the 
sin-signs from the legi-signs  because the ontology of chemistry is tightly 
intermingled with the epistemology of chemistry.CSP often attempted to 
semantically express this fact by differentiating the meaning of the term 
“mathematics” from the term “logic”.  Unfortunately, the semantics of set 
theory, without a hint of natural semiosis, as promoted by Whitehead and 
Russell, compelled the development of proof structures for formal logics and 
indeed the natural semantics of computer science.It could have been 
otherwise!  CSP grounded his diagrammatic logics on the logical diagrams of 
chemistry (relevance logics) which we now know to be vastly more perplex than 
the Venn diagrams of Boolean logic. 

N,B. Recall the nature of arithmetic calculations has not changed in centuries, 
only the philosophical interpretations of mathematics and the structures of 
proof (Skolemization of logical semantic symbols).

Cheers

Jerry 


> On Aug 17, 2021, at 11:39 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> 
> Dear Jon Alan,
> 
> When we put the last lines of CP 3.559 before your eyes, do you look away?
> 
> "… Thus, the mathematician does two very different things: namely, he first 
> frames a pure hypothesis stripped of all features which do not concern the 
> drawing of consequences from it, and this he does without inquiring or caring 
> whether it agrees with the actual facts or not; and, secondly, he proceeds to 
> draw necessary consequences from that hypothesis" (CP 3.559)
> 
> Why does Peirce write this? Because it is obvious that the famous mathematics 
> of which you say that ADT "explicitly affirms the dependence of phaneroscopy 
> (and every other positive science) on mathematics for certain principles, 
> including formal deductive logic" [emphasize mine ], are for him pure 
> artifacts. Indeed, he does not exhibit any of them, and neither do you. They 
> are empty argumentation factors, "elements of language without denotation," 
> like "unseen characters" are in the theater (sorry, I have to repeat myself). 
> Thanks to them, one can sing the great merits of ghosts without risking being 
> contradicted to better exclude realities, like every mathematical object.  
> 
> Moreover, Peirce (mathematician) wrote this makes sense: how to recognize 
> "mathematical principles" and abstract them from complex phanerons if one 
> does not have them, either in one's mind or if one does not have the capacity 
> to construct them? 
> "At the same time, it frequently happens that the facts, as stated, are 
> insufficient to answer the question that is put. Accordingly, the first 
> business of the mathematician, often a most difficult task, is to frame 
> another simpler but quite fictitious problem (supplemented, perhaps, by some 
> supposition), which shall be within his powers, while at the same time it is 
> sufficiently like the problem set before him to answer, well or ill, as a 
> substitute for it." (CP 3.559, again)
> 
> But maybe it is "tribalistic" to remind it?
> 
> Regards, 
> Robert Marty
> Honorary Professor; Ph.D. Mathematics; Ph.D. Philosophy 
> fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty 
> 
> https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ 
> 
> 
> 
> Le mar. 17 août 2021 à 17:38, Jon Alan Schmidt  > a écrit :
> John, List:
> 
> JFS: They show that De Tienne has misunderstood the role of mathematics in 
> Peirce's philosophy.
> 
> On the contrary, those three quotations show that anyone accusing André of 
> hostility toward mathematics and mathematicians has completely misunderstood 
> his point. He explicitly affirms the dependence 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Edwina:

First, Edwina, I will not answer directly your question about allowances on 
this list.
In my experiences here on this list, I fear for my freedom to continue to 
express my analysis of the ontology and epistemology of the chemical sciences.  

As for the connections between the trichotomy (the nine terms that CSP used to 
express his feelings about the connections between mathematics and chemistry as 
well as an unrestricted number of other disciplines), it appears to me that CSP 
was clear about the nature of his beliefs about assertions (5.269-70).

 A valid inference is either complete or incomplete. An incomplete inference is 
one whose validity depends upon some matter of fact not contained in the 
premisses. This implied fact might have been stated as a premiss, and its 
relation to the conclusion is the same whether it is explicitly posited or not, 
since it is at least virtually taken for granted; so that every valid 
incomplete argument is virtually complete. Complete arguments are divided into 
simple and complex. A complex argument is one which from three or more 
premisses concludes what might have been concluded by successive steps in 
(W2.215) <> reasonings each of which is simple. Thus, a complex inference comes 
to the same thing in the end as a succession of simple inferences.
(CP5.270) <>  A complete, simple, and valid argument, or syllogism, is 
either apodictic or probable. An apodictic or deductive syllogism is one whose 
validity depends unconditionally upon the relation of the fact inferred to the 
facts posited in the premisses. A syllogism whose validity should depend not 
merely upon its premisses, but upon the existence of some other knowledge, 
would be impossible; for either this other knowledge would be posited, in which 
case it would be a part of the premisses, or it would be implicitly assumed, in 
which case the inference would be incomplete. But a syllogism whose validity 
depends partly upon the non-existence of some other knowledge, is a probable 
syllogism.

( In order to facilitate a reading of the basis for existential graphs, I have 
placed a number in brackets for each of the nine  “simple” “incomplete” 
trichotomistic  terms that are composed into the assertions in the sentences 
below.)

:  My assertion is that syllogisms about the graphic connections among  
>  "  the fragments of the sin-sign in the Rhematic Indexical Legi-sign in the 
> formal logic of the species of sin-signs.).”  (2)
> 

may require a substantial numbers of mathematical calculations to connect the 
measurements determining the icons (4) to the rhema.(7)

Of course, these numerous calculations would require knowledge of the chemical 
table of elements and numerous facts that are part of the epistemology and 
ontology of the chemical sciences.(quali-signs (1)) 

The term “index” (5) in the trichotomy can be construed as a collection of 
arithmetic mathematical operations associated with the atomic numbers as well 
lists of attributes of matter associated with the mathematical operations on 
thermodynamic parameters, such as the gas laws. 

These indices are necessary to inform the dicisigns(8) that are components of 
arguments(9) that generate the scientific symbols (6) expressed in the 
semantics of the legi-signs (3).  

In modern logical terms, the trichotomy forms a semantic base upon which rests 
the implicative structure of a family of facts that connect mathematical, 
physical and chemical facts of the vincula.

In this regard, to 'transition out of mathematics’ infers, from the perception 
chemical signs, transitioning out of Peirce. 

Cheers

Jerry 





> On Aug 15, 2021, at 12:50 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Jerry, list
> 
> That's an interesting comparison.
> 
> So- if the first view is "closely associated with the methodology of 
> mathematics."- then, doesn't this suggest, if we are following the strictures 
> of De Tienne, that we should be seeking to 'transition out of mathematics'!!! 
>  Is this 'allowed' on this List?
> 
> [and yes, I agree with you that we should preserve "  the fragments of the 
> sin-sign in the Rhematic Indexical Legi-sign in the formal logic of the 
> species of sin-signs.)."
> 
> Edwina
> 
>  
> 
> On Sun 15/08/21 12:16 PM , Jerry LR Chandler jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com 
> sent:
> 
> List:
> 
>> On Aug 15, 2021, at 10:06 AM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote:
>> 
>> Now - what is the point of the first view, other than a taxonomic focus on 
>> terms - and what is the point of the second view - which to me at least, 
>> seems to be to examine that 'general rule' as it articulates itself within 
>> the individual instantiations of the Real World’.
> 
> A very simple and direct response can be given to this question from the 
> dictionary of CSP’s (unrelenting!) t

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Semiosis and Mathematical abduction

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John, List:

You write:
> In any case, this is just one of many cases where it's essential to
> distinguish (a) mathematics as the infinite totality of all patterns
> and teories about them, (b) the people who discover mathematical
> theories, and (c) the application of mathematics in other theoretical
> and practical sciences.



 What are the distinctions that being referred to?

Are they merely semantic distinctions?

How do these distinctions relate to the writings of CSP?

Cheers

Jerry 




> On Aug 14, 2021, at 5:10 PM, John F. Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Gary F and Jerry,
> 
> A computer theorem prover that generates all possibilities and
> systematically eliminates (by deduction) the ones that generate
> contradictions could be called an abduction machine.
> 
> GF:  In the present context, this would imply that abduction is
> essentially mathematical, or at least that inquiry begins in the
> hypothetical realm.
> 
> JLRC:  Abduction is necessary for calculating the number of possible
> arrangements IN SPACE of the parts of the whole.  Statistically, it
> generates the potential arrangements in space.  This mathematical
> calculation of abduction is a logical function of the indices of
> sin-sign.
> 
> I agree with both of you.
> 
> But there's a difference between a machine and a well-informed human:
> The human uses insight (Thirdness) that can drastically reduce the
> blind search time.  For small finite cases, the blind search by the
> computer can be far faster than the intelligent human.  But humans
> can outperform computers in searches through large or even infinite
> spaces.
> 
> Example:  Self-driving cars outperform humans on limited-access
> highways where the computer has been trained on nearly all the options
> that might occur.  But the average human is better in recognizing
> unusual cases on city streets where the number of possibilities is
> immense.
> 
> In any case, this is just one of many cases where it's essential to
> distinguish (a) mathematics as the infinite totality of all patterns
> and teories about them, (b) the people who discover mathematical
> theories, and (c) the application of mathematics in other theoretical
> and practical sciences.
> 
> John_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Aug 15, 2021, at 10:06 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Now - what is the point of the first view, other than a taxonomic focus on 
> terms - and what is the point of the second view - which to me at least, 
> seems to be to examine that 'general rule' as it articulates itself within 
> the individual instantiations of the Real World’.

A very simple and direct response can be given to this question from the 
dictionary of CSP’s (unrelenting!) terminology. 

The second view differs from first in the sense of C P Snow’s two cultures 
(1958).

The first view is closely associated with the methodology of mathematics.

The second view is nearly identical with the formal logic of the semiosis of 
matter, as manifested in the connectivity (vincula) of fragments of matter and 
the composition of atomic sentences into molecular sentences.  (It is necessary 
to preserve the fragments of the sin-sign in the Rhematic Indexical Legi-sign 
in the formal logic of the species of skin-signs.). 

While I feel that most readers of this list would disagree with this gloss of 
CSP’s intent, at least, this is one pragmatic and consistent interpretation of 
the mindsets partially unconcealed by your (Edwina’s) excellent gloss and 
subsequent hypothesis.

Cheers

Jerry  

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Helmut:

Helmut:   Are we addressing different levels of abstract?

I do not find any connection between your response and my post.

Can you rephrase you comments so that the connection is clarified?

Cheers

Jerry




> On Aug 13, 2021, at 3:46 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> Jerry, List
>  
> They are generated as potential signs, I guess, but to be signs, i.e. 
> efficient signs with object and interpretant, they have to be perceived, by 
> perception put into existence. Being mathematically generated does not mean 
> being generated by some symbol system. The symbols are means merely needed 
> for perception. Ok, for a complete generation, perception is necessary, but 
> without it (perception), the hypothesis is real too (though it does not 
> exist), so "all hypotheses are mathematically generated" is true for 
> hypotheses as parts of reality, however not necessarily for existing ones. 
> But nobody said, that "to generate" means "to put into existence". Why should 
> it not mean "to make real"? By mathematics that does not need any 
> mathematician. I know, this argument totally would refute any constructivism.
>  
> Best,
> Helmut
>  
>  
> 13. August 2021 um 21:59 Uhr
>  "Jerry LR Chandler" 
> wrote:
>  
> Gary F., List: 
>  
> On Aug 13, 2021, at 1:42 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: [ quoting Gary F.]]
>  
>  "all hypotheses are mathematically generated," 
>  
> I would suggest that a categorical error is being perpetuated in the on-going 
> conversation about the nature of signs and semiosis.
>  
> In particular, the categorical error may be connected with the notion of one 
> of the systematic terms that CSP deployed to describe one of the human mental 
> activities that bind with a wide range of other mental activities of the 
> trivium.
>  
> The referential bindings are between the term “argument”, the term “symbol” 
> and the “system”.
>  
> Historically, human cultures have constructed, over eons of time, synthetic 
> symbol systems in order to express their feelings, emotions and thoughts.
>  
> The two principle symbol systems are referred to as alphabets (and other 
> symbols related to sounds) and numbers (and other symbols related to 
> quantity.).   The system of symbols used to express quantities creates the 
> mental structures of two other symbol systems, musical octaves (sounds) and 
> forms of matter (atomic numbers) 
>  
> Neither symbol system “generates hypotheses”, only the users of the symbol 
> systems to "generate hypotheses” to express their feeling.
>  
> The meaning associated with the recipients of the terms of either symbol 
> system is dependent on the competencies of the recipients.
>  
> With these sentences as background, it appears to me that these recent 
> attempts to wax philosophically about quantities and the meanings of 
> quantities are very shallow, if not empty.
>  
> Gary F.  - Could you create a few sentences that actually express your 
> concrete feelings about the connection  between the rules of grammar and the 
> grammar of mathematics, and the grammars of other experiences as that seems 
> to be the issue here as well as for CSP?  
>  
> Cheers
>  
> Jerry 
>  
>  
>  
>  
>  
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 25

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Gary F., List: 

> On Aug 13, 2021, at 1:42 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote: [ quoting Gary F.]]
> 
>  "all hypotheses are mathematically generated," 

I would suggest that a categorical error is being perpetuated in the on-going 
conversation about the nature of signs and semiosis.

In particular, the categorical error may be connected with the notion of one of 
the systematic terms that CSP deployed to describe one of the human mental 
activities that bind with a wide range of other mental activities of the 
trivium.

The referential bindings are between the term “argument”, the term “symbol” and 
the “system”.

Historically, human cultures have constructed, over eons of time, synthetic 
symbol systems in order to express their feelings, emotions and thoughts.

The two principle symbol systems are referred to as alphabets (and other 
symbols related to sounds) and numbers (and other symbols related to 
quantity.).   The system of symbols used to express quantities creates the 
mental structures of two other symbol systems, musical octaves (sounds) and 
forms of matter (atomic numbers) 

Neither symbol system “generates hypotheses”, only the users of the symbol 
systems to "generate hypotheses” to express their feeling.

The meaning associated with the recipients of the terms of either symbol system 
is dependent on the competencies of the recipients.

With these sentences as background, it appears to me that these recent attempts 
to wax philosophically about quantities and the meanings of quantities are very 
shallow, if not empty.

Gary F.  - Could you create a few sentences that actually express your concrete 
feelings about the connection  between the rules of grammar and the grammar of 
mathematics, and the grammars of other experiences as that seems to be the 
issue here as well as for CSP?  

Cheers

Jerry 





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Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Re: Mathematical phaneroscopy (was slow read...

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List: 

> On Aug 9, 2021, at 5:57 AM, JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY  
> wrote:
> 
> Well mathematics is much more homogenous than other languages or sign-systems 
> but whilst mathematical truths are universal, existing whatever 
> language/method one uses, the manner of reaching those truths can surely 
> differ?

Again I find this assertion to be problematic.

At the ground, mathematics emerged from calculations with numbers.
In order to make calculations, mathematicians started to develop algebraic 
theories that were useful in helping to solve problems were a (large) number of 
functions and parameters were interacting.

In order to give meaning to such symbolic operations…. Mathematicians assigned 
special meanings to ordinary language terms and then used these linguistic 
terms to promote and defend the notions of the universality of mathematics.  
Thus, communication of meanings about logical mathematical  calculations in 
ordinary semantic sentences is nigh impossible. (I worked on Quantitative 
Health Risk analysis for nearly two decades.)

For simple examples, how can a number be irrational?  Or imaginary? Or 
transcendental?  How does one calculate with such terms?  Thanks to You Tube, 
rigorous discussions of such concepts are now readily available to the general 
public. The natural, meaning and cultures of mathematics are being opened to 
thoughtful inspection.

Please do not mis-understand me.  I appreciate deeply that vast successes of 
practical calculations emerging from calculations based on extra-ordinary 
sophisticated abstractions, perhaps even related to approximations of category 
theory.  Our modern economy needs such calculations to run on a day-to-day 
basis. But certainly these facts are do not imply that much about the meaning 
of such universals.

Cheers

Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mathematical phaneroscopy (was slow read...

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List: 

> On Aug 7, 2021, at 9:05 AM, JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY  
> wrote:
> 
> I agree completely. Similar to Barthes' argument in Death of the Author in 
> that there is always a degree to which the reader "writes" the text as he/she 
> reads it; actively constructs rather than passively receives, and this is due 
> to the mediatory nature of "meaning". Mathematics seeks to avoid this but not 
> even mathematics is entirely free of it as different mathematicians can 
> approach the same problem from drastically different angles (using different 
> varieties of math and methodologies, even). 


I believe that this assertion is highly problematic.

A communication between professional mathematics is strictly dependent on the 
reader to actively re-construct the text (often diagrams) in order to 
understand the associations between the mathematical signs, the mathematical 
syntax and the mathematical semantics. Only by actively engaging the 
correspondence between the mathematical signs, syntax and semantics can the 
reader either accept or reject the assertions that relate the antecedent and 
the consequent. 

The same is true for the proof of molecular structures (legi-signs) from 
quali-signs (measurements).  

The consistency of the propositions that relate mathematics truths are 
stringently dependent on the coherence of the correspondence relations among 
the signs, syntax and semantics.  How could it be otherwise? How else could 
global consistency within a symbol system emerge?

A distinction that can be explored by Peircian philosophers is the role of 
emotions and definitions in creating meanings of propositional and assertorial 
sentences. What are the nature of the constraints that relate propositions in 
literary texts / poetry?

Cheers
Jerry 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Role of Semiotics in Life

[Jerry LR Chandler]

t although 
colligation certainly gives a higher intellectuality to inference, yet its 
importance is exaggerated when it is represented to be of more account than the 
conscious control of the operation. The latter ought to determine the title of 
reasoning.”

1899-1900 [c.] | Notes on Topical Geometry | MS [R] 142:6
Symbols are of three classes: terms, which call attention to things or 
quasi-things; propositions, which declare facts; and arguments, which profess 
to enlighten us as to the rational connections of facts or possible facts.
1901-1902 [c.] | Definitions for Baldwin's Dictionary [R] | MS [R] 1147
An argument may be defined as a symbol which definitely and separately shows 
what interpretant, or conclusion, it aims at.
1866 | Logic Chapter I | W 1:355
… the relation of a repraesentamen to its object (correlate) may be a real 
relation and, then, either an agreement or a difference, or it may be an ideal 
r[elati]on or one from which the reference to a correspondent (subject of 
representation) cannot be prescinded by position. [—] In the second case, there 
is a real difference of the repraesentamen from its object, that is to say not 
a mere difference in quality but also a bringing of them together in nature; in 
this case the representative character of the one will consist in constant 
accompaniment by the other, so that it indicates the existence of the latter 
without noting any characters of it. Such a representation may be termed an 
index.

1903 | Syllabus: Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations, as far as they 
are determined | EP 2:294
… a Qualisign is any quality in so far as it is a sign. Since a quality is 
whatever it is positively in itself, a quality can only denote an object by 
virtue of some common ingredient or similarity; so that a Qualisign is 
necessarily an Icon. Further, since a quality is a mere logical possibility, it 
can only be interpreted as a sign of essence, that is, as a Rheme.

1903 | Syllabus: Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations, as far as they 
are determined | EP 2:291
A Sinsign (where the syllable sin is taken as meaning “being only once,” as in 
single, simple, Latin semel, etc.) is an actual existent thing or event which 
is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it involves a 
qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are of a 
peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied.
1903 [c.] | P of L | MS [R] 800:4
…signs are divisible, first, according to their modes of being, as objects; 
secondly, according to the modes of their references to their objects; thirdly, 
according to the modes of their references to their interpretants. In the first 
way of dividing them, signs are either qualisigns, or signs that are abstract 
qualities (in a wide sense), or suisigns, signs that are essentially existent 
as individual objects or events, or legisigns, signs that [are] general types, 
laws, or habits.
1904 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 32
As it is in itself, a sign is either of the nature of an appearance, when I 
call it a qualisign; or secondly, it is an individual object or event, when I 
call it a sinsign (the syllable sin being the first sillable [sic] of semel, 
simul, singular, etc); or thirdly, it is of the nature of a general type, when 
I call it a legisign.

The readiest characteristic test showing whether a sign is a Dicisign or not is 
that a Dicisign is either true or false, but does not directly furnish reasons 
for its being so. This shows that a Dicisign must profess to refer or relate to 
something as having a real being independently of the representation of it as 
such, and further that this reference or relation must not be shown as 
rational, but must appear as a blind Secondness. But the only kind of sign 
whose object is necessarily existent is the genuine Index. This Index might, 
indeed, be a part of a Symbol; but in that case the relation would appear as 
rational. Consequently a Dicisign necessarily represents itself to be a genuine 
Index, and to be nothing more.


Cheers

Jerry 


> On Aug 4, 2021, at 3:57 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> Jerry C., List:
> 
> No word games, just a simple request and a sincere question as I try to 
> understand your claim as quoted. I am well aware of 
> qualisign/sinsign/legisign as Peirce's 1903 division of all signs according 
> to the nature of the sign itself, which he later changes to tone/token/type. 
> I am asking what specific relation you are expressing with the arrows between 
> them, and what specific passage(s) from Peirce's writings you can cite to 
> support your interpretation.
> 
> Thanks again,
> 
> Jon S.
> 
> On Wed, Aug 4, 2021 at 2:50 PM Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote:
> Jon:
> 
> The sentence you cite is merely the top row of CSP table of the trichotomy.
> 
> If you wish to play word game

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Mathematical phaneroscopy (was slow read...

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Edwinia: 

> On Aug 7, 2021, at 6:50 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> I think that's an interesting question from Gary F - how do we distinguish 
> between the actual and the imagined world.

If one is seeking absolute certitude, no LINGUISTIC sentence will bridge this 
gap. How could it?

If one is seeking a method that is good enough for all practical purposes, the 
empirical methods based on the reproducibility of the process is the first step 
in validating the perception of a “real event”.  

Substantially stronger certitude can be generated by showing the process can be 
reproduced by anyone at anyplace and any time, given knowledge of the 
conditions of the process.  Further explorations of the variations in 
circumstances (such as, for example, the range of temperatures over which the 
process es will manifest themselves.

This is the empirical meaning of the actual.
But, Edwinia, you are aware of this, so why do I re-state it here?

The simple reason is that the natural sciences vary widely on the role of the 
actual in establishing hypotheses and distinguishing imaginary fables from 
reproducible results.

The critical pragmatic "differences that makes a difference" is the scale of 
the system and the relative simplicity of components of the system.
In the case of CSP’s training, he recognized that the scale of atoms and 
molecules, the preparation of pure forms of the “sin-sign” and capability of 
the experimenter to reproduce the same circumstances ensured a very high level 
of certitude, sufficient to ground his philosophy of logic and of graph theory. 

The successful development of the Chemical Table of Elements is the 
mathematical consequence of the reproducibility of the “truths” of nature and 
natural philosophy and serves as the pragmatic foundation of the concept of 
electricity, of quantum theory and the thermodynamics of life. 

This is the view from the year 2021; CSP did not have the empirical foundations 
or the hypothetical causal theories to reach these strong logical conclusions.  
Nevertheless, his prescient was extra-ordinary.  It is noteworthy that he did 
NOT assume that Newton’s Law, Coulomb’s Law, or Boolean logic were adequate 
“bedrocks” for scientific thought and inquiry for the “scientific man” 
(whatever a “scientific man” might be.) 

Cheers

Jerry_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Role of Semiotics in Life

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon:

The sentence you cite is merely the top row of CSP table of the trichotomy.

If you wish to play word games, count me out.

Cheers
Jerry


> On Aug 4, 2021, at 10:31 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry C., List:
> 
> JLRC: CSP assertion of Quali-sign —> Sinsign —> Legi-sign forms the logical 
> and semantic grounding for the chemical sciences.
> 
> Please provide an exact quotation for the particular "CSP assertion" that you 
> have in mind. What relation are the arrows from qualisign to sinsign and from 
> sinsign to legisign supposed to represent?
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Wed, Aug 4, 2021 at 9:35 AM Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote:
> Helmut:
> 
> As a footnote to the exceedingly curious developments of scientific 
> terminologies, I would note that:
>  
> 1. Robert Rosen denied the role of chemical emergence in his category-theory 
> based book, Life Itself.
> 2. The Scandia school of Biosemiotics adopts the evolutionary theory while 
> rejecting the chemical theory.
> 3. The formal logic advocates ignore emergence and evolution but nevertheless 
> assert the implication sign as symbolic anticipation!.
> 
> CSP assertion of Quali-sign —> Sinsign —> Legi-sign forms the logical and 
> semantic grounding for the chemical sciences.
> Consequently, his syntactical trichotomy for the relative logics of the 
> chemical table of elements also grounds the abstractions for the numerical 
> logics of atomic and molecular sentences.
> 
> Thus, by vague conjecture, CSP was motivated to develop the concept of the 
> phanoscopy differs from the Husserl’s notion of phenomenology by the modal 
> logics of conscious feelings.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Role of Semiotics in Life

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Helmut:

As a footnote to the exceedingly curious developments of scientific 
terminologies, I would note that:
 
1. Robert Rosen denied the role of chemical emergence in his category-theory 
based book, Life Itself.
2. The Scandia school of Biosemiotics adopts the evolutionary theory while 
rejecting the chemical theory.
3. The formal logic advocates ignore emergence and evolution but nevertheless 
assert the implication sign as symbolic anticipation!.

CSP  assertion of Quali-sign —> Sinsign —> Legi-sign forms the logical and 
semantic grounding for the chemical sciences.
Consequently, his syntactical trichotomy for the relative logics of the 
chemical table of elements also grounds the abstractions for the numerical 
logics of atomic and molecular sentences.

Thus, by vague conjecture, CSP was motivated to develop the concept of the 
phanoscopy differs from the Husserl’s notion of phenomenology by the modal 
logics of conscious feelings.


Cheers

Jerry
 

> On Aug 4, 2021, at 8:30 AM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> Jerry, List
>  
> Thank you, Jerry. Very interesting. And emergence-evolution-anticipation 
> sounds like a categorial triad. Maybe it is related to the steps 
> physicochemical-, organisms`-, brain animals` realm, in the sense of what may 
> happen there?
>  
> Best,
> Helmut
>  
>  
>  04. August 2021 um 04:17 Uhr
>  "Jerry LR Chandler" 
> wrote:
>  
> List, Helmut,
>  
> On Aug 3, 2021, at 3:04 PM, Helmut Raulien  <mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>> wrote:
>  
> "Emergence" for me seems to be a not yet logically fully explained 
> phenomenon. My temporal assumption (not belief, in which I don´t believe) is, 
> that it is individuation and downscaling.
>  
> You may wish to consider the opposite if you originate your analysis from the 
> opposite perspective, namely, the history of science perspective.
>  
> J S Mills introduced the term “heteropathy” ( in contrast to “homeopathy") to 
> point to the accretion of attributes by the compounding of chemical elements. 
>  This accretion of attributes differs from the simple change of attributes of 
> other abstract quantities, such as by addition or multiplication where the 
> regularity of the operations is simple and consistent, that is, homopathic.
>  
> The index case used by J S Mills (ca 1843) was the combination of hydrogen 
> and oxygen to form water.  Similarly, for sodium and chlorine to form salt.
> This dramatic mutation of attributes remains unexplained to this day.  
> Neither thermodynamics nor quantum theory address this transformation of 
> matter into novel forms with semantic attributes UNRELATED to the semantic 
> and quantitative attributes of the elements.  
>  
> The phenomena of heteropathic transformation was termed “emergence” about 
> 1870 (in contrast with submergence) and was a hot topic in British philosophy 
> in the first quarter of the 20th Century.  Excellent books are available on 
> the topic. A nice collection of historical papers by Alicia Juarrero (sp?) 
> exists.  A steady stream of papers on the concept of emergence continue, 
> often under the topic of “complexity”. 
>  
> Thus, in terms of today’s semantics, we see the notion of the categorical 
> paths of chemical “heteropathy” morph into the notion of inorganic into 
> organic, emergence into evolution, evolution into anticipation.  Of course, 
> from the perspective of natural philosophy and CSP, the 9-fold terminology of 
> the semiosis of signs that relate the realisms of natural philosophical logic 
> to reality is merely an inquiry into emergence of legi-signs from sin-signs. 
>  
> I suspect that this is what Edwinia was alluding to in her posts. 
>  
> Cheers
>  
> Jerry 
>  
>  
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Role of Semiotics in Life

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Helmut,

> On Aug 3, 2021, at 3:04 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:
> 
> "Emergence" for me seems to be a not yet logically fully explained 
> phenomenon. My temporal assumption (not belief, in which I don´t believe) is, 
> that it is individuation and downscaling.

You may wish to consider the opposite if you originate your analysis from the 
opposite perspective, namely, the history of science perspective.

J S Mills introduced the term “heteropathy” ( in contrast to “homeopathy") to 
point to the accretion of attributes by the compounding of chemical elements.  
This accretion of attributes differs from the simple change of attributes of 
other abstract quantities, such as by addition or multiplication where the 
regularity of the operations is simple and consistent, that is, homopathic.

The index case used by J S Mills (ca 1843) was the combination of hydrogen and 
oxygen to form water.  Similarly, for sodium and chlorine to form salt.
This dramatic mutation of attributes remains unexplained to this day.  Neither 
thermodynamics nor quantum theory address this transformation of matter into 
novel forms with semantic attributes UNRELATED to the semantic and quantitative 
attributes of the elements.  

The phenomena of heteropathic transformation was termed “emergence” about 1870 
(in contrast with submergence) and was a hot topic in British philosophy in the 
first quarter of the 20th Century.  Excellent books are available on the topic. 
A nice collection of historical papers by Alicia Juarrero (sp?) exists.  A 
steady stream of papers on the concept of emergence continue, often under the 
topic of “complexity”. 

Thus, in terms of today’s semantics, we see the notion of the categorical paths 
of chemical “heteropathy” morph into the notion of inorganic into organic, 
emergence into evolution, evolution into anticipation.  Of course, from the 
perspective of natural philosophy and CSP, the 9-fold terminology of the 
semiosis of signs that relate the realisms of natural philosophical logic to 
reality is merely an inquiry into emergence of legi-signs from sin-signs. 

I suspect that this is what Edwinia was alluding to in her posts. 

Cheers

Jerry 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John:

While the abstractions of mathematics are extremely powerful, 
and have had profound influence on our economic systems,
such abstractions are far less powerful in analysis of complex systems of 
chemistry and biology.
I believe that your statement below is categorically in error.

> On Jul 27, 2021, at 2:55 PM, John F. Sowa  wrote:
> 
>  In his three universes of
> discourse -- possibilities, actualities, and necessities -- mathematics
> is first because it includes every possible pattern of any kind.  That
> includes everything that any human or any living thing of any kind could
> imagine -- plus all the possible patterns that no finite being could
> imagine.

Scientific languages and semiotic grounding of the chemical and genetic symbol 
systems are 
syntactically developed from the epistemology of human sensory interpretations 
and symbolizations.

The illations that connect the chemical and genetic symbol systems are not 
necessarily grounded in mathematics,
 but rather are ground in semiotics and the epistemologies of the natural 
sciences.

In short, the abductive logic used by CSP in the 
illative assertions of the trichotomy is 
relative to the adductive logic of mathematics 
BUT remote from the multiplicative logic of physical philosophy.

Furthermore, at present, no mathematical or physical method exists to calculate 
all possible chemical patterns (isomers) because of the multiplicity of 
branchings associated with concatenations of chemical elements (atomic numbers) 
with valences exceeding 2.

Once again, in my opinion,
 the logical operations of geometrically based mathematical theories are
 insufficient to ground the calculations
 of the semantically grounded and syntactically grounded calculations of number 
theory of chemistry. 

I would urge you to peruse the mathematics of an introductory organic chemistry 
textbook from the perspective of (atomic) number theory and the quanta physics 
of electricity. CSP grasp the essential elements of this obligatory logic a 
century ago and you certainly can too. CSP valued semiotic reasoning higher 
than geometry when he expressed his views on the simplest mathematics. 
(4.240-243).  

Cheers

Jerry 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Re: RE: Thinking in diagrams vs thinking in words

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Edwinia:

> On Jul 25, 2021, at 12:11 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Yes, of course. I see what you mean. His categories are indeed 'innate 
> semiosic predispositions'...and are indeed necessary initial conditions. 
> Exactly.
> 
> And that's where mathematics comes in - to outline the nature of these 
> categories, which we then use to examine the phaneron.
> 
Your continued development of your substantial capacities is impressive!

An enthusiastic YES! to your assertions.

The next STEP (in the logical diagram) in analysis is to ask the biological 
question, HOW to the mathematical groundings come into existence?

Is it possible that molecular biological dynamics GROUND the innate 
capabilities to which you refer?
Is it possible that the atomic numbers ground the molecular biological dynamics?
Is it possible that the CSP anticipated this chemical grounding of the phaneron?
( Note that this line of formal  associative logics is remote from the set 
theory logic of Husserl’s phenomenology!)

Cheers
Jerry_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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[PEIRCE-L] Deep Surprises! Was Re: André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 17

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon, Edwinia, List:

The citation 
"What, in a general way, does the Diagram of Existential Graphs represent the 
mode of structure of the Phaneron to be like? The question calls for a 
comparison, and in answering it a little flight of fancy will be in order. It 
represents the structure of the Phaneron to be quite like that of a chemical 
compound. ... Each Elementary Graph, like each chemical element, has its 
definite Valency ... . This is resemblance enough. (NEM 4:320-321, 1906)”

further confirms the extraordinarily deep role of the science of chemistry in 
the deepest structures of CSP’s rhetorical stance and semantic forms. 

This strikes me as being an extraordinary surprise! 

Why?   
Because a chemical compound has a chemical formula. 
Because the chemical formula has a specific RELATIVE weight.
Because the chemical elements are bound together by valence, thereby becoming 
RELATIVES.
Because these three terms are RELATED by exact mathematical calculations from 
semiotic references from the table of elements and from the quali-signs and 
indices of individual compounds.

Consequently, these propositional terms unite unequivocally the existence, the 
logic and the semiotics of natural objects.  Hence the logic of relatives. The 
assertion rests on human experience, augmented by simple mathematics of 
addition. 

These cause-effect theses follow from the semiotics proposed by John Dalton at 
the turn of the 19th Century.

While modern chemistry requires further information to define an individual 
molecular compound, these implications are historically reasonable. 

The last words,  "This is resemblance enough.” is equally surprising. 
 
Enough for what?  

In the chemical sciences at that time, these three terms were sufficient to 
experimentally determine the molecular structures of many compounds. And to 
recognize that that the valences of elements varied with the relations to other 
elements. 

Thus, these assertions are sufficient for the thesis that the semantics of 
trichotomy was grounded on the sufficiency of these terms for analysis and 
synthesis of chemical compounds. Consequently, it can be asserted that the 
trichotomy was a direct restatement of the logic of chemistry as it was 
understood at that time. 

What other logical assertions are supported by this conceptualization of the 
phaneron?

In particularly, what are the implications for the current hypothesizes that 
relate CSP’s writings to biosemiotics?

Cheers

Jerry 


> On Jul 16, 2021, at 9:42 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Gary R., List:
> 
> GR: Is it in that "next chapter" that Peirce takes up the logic of relations?
> 
> This seems to have been the plan that he had in mind when he was writing "The 
> Simplest Mathematics" as chapter 3 of Minute Logic (R 429, CP 4.227-323, 
> 1902).
> 
> CSP: In this chapter, I propose to consider certain extremely simple branches 
> of mathematics which, owing to their utility in logic, have to be treated in 
> considerable detail, although to the mathematician they are hardly worth 
> consideration. In Chapter 4, I shall take up those branches of mathematics 
> upon which the interest of mathematicians is centred, but shall do no more 
> than make a rapid examination of their logical procedure. In Chapter 5, I 
> shall treat formal logic by the aid of mathematics. There can really be 
> little logical matter in these chapters; but they seem to me to be quite 
> indispensable preliminaries to the study of logic. (CP 4.227)
> 
> There are at least two other manuscript drafts of chapter 3 (R 430-431), but 
> the manuscripts for chapter 4 (R 432-434) all bear a very different 
> title--"Ethics"--and there are no manuscripts catalogued by Robin for chapter 
> 5. However, in one of the manuscripts for How to Reason: A Critick of 
> Arguments (1893)--which is supposed to be published in its entirety someday 
> as Volume 10 of the Chronological Edition--Peirce states, "We now come to the 
> Logic of Relations ... which was only brought to essential completion in 
> 1884" (R 481:5). In an accompanying footnote, he cites his own landmark 
> paper, "On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of 
> Notation" (CP 3.359-403, 1885); but "logic of relations" never appears in 
> that text, only "logic of relatives." He proceeds to explain why.
> 
> CSP: A relation is precisely defined as a fact about several subjects. A fact 
> is an element of the truth expressible as a proposition. As all logic deals 
> with relations, it is more accurate to describe the branch of logic which I 
> am going to expound as the logic of relatives, i.e. relative terms. Relations 
> as relatives are either dual, as in "A loves B" or plural, as "A gives B to 
> C." (R 481:5)
> 
> Hence, it appears that Atkins is right not to see much difference between 
> "the -adicity of relative terms themselves" and "propositional forms." 
> Nevertheless, both terms and propositions are obviously signs, and I 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The formal logic of chemistry and the trichotomy.(Revised) Was Re: The 1911 EGs

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List: 

> On Jun 8, 2021, at 8:12 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> Jerry, list
> 
> This is a very densely packed outline, and therefore, at the moment, I have 
> just  a few comments.
> 
> 1] I note that you wrote: "semiosis of singular (unique) objects, identified  
> (termed) “sin-signs” by CSP. "
> 
> I am pleased to see that you define a singular object as a sign [in this 
> case, a sin-sign]. I have long argued that the Peircean semiosic triad, of 
> Object-Representamen-Interpretant, which is irreducible, should be understood 
> as a 'singular object', which I understand as a Sign.
> 
> 
While I appreciate your interpretation, it is not quite the case.
CSP introduced the term “sin-sign”.  While this compound word was coined by 
CSP, the question was “Why” the semantics of "sin-sign" and not just “sign”?

For the logic of identity of a sign, one must first presuppose the number of 
“identities” that the sign represents. Usually, the simple syntax is to assume 
one identity and not semantically express the potential of multiple components 
(terms).  If one supposes multiple terms, then the nature of the conjunctions 
among the identities must be addressed for a truth function. 

In the chemical sciences, it is essential practice to first ascertain the 
singularity of the material form.  Otherwise, the multiplicity of indices 
provide ambitious truth tables for the molecular formula. Technically, chemists 
speak of “isomers” for  two "sin-signs" with similar truth tables.  Pastuer’s 
determination of handedness of crystals from wine bottoms in the 1860 puzzled 
CSP greatly, as noted in his texts in the 1880’s or early 1890’s.  This 
observation is an extremely important constrain on the logic of chemistry and 
hence the forms of logic proposed by CSP. 
> I note that the major theorist in biosemiotics, Jesper Hoffmeyer, also wrote; 
> "Peirce called the triad - the basic relational element in logic - quite 
> simply a sign" {1996, 18}.
> 
> 
Possibly. I suspect, however, that Jasper, a microbial chemist, was referring 
to the form of propositions as “subject-copula-predicate.”  In other words, he 
recognized the need for a richer semantics and syntax than is afforded by 
orthodox mathematics of set theory / physics and predicate logic.
> That is - no part of the triad 'exists' or is even pragmatically functional, 
> except within that triadic process.
> 
> 2] You write: "From these three antecedents, a plethora of many to one and 
> one to many semantic mappings emerge as possible propositional sentences"
> 
> And this points out  how the semiosic logical process, which is triadic, 
> enables multi-dimensional networks.  As a side note, such multidimensional 
> networking is impossible using the dyadic Saussurian framework.
> 
> 
Yes, I concur. 
But, more importantly, the form of semiotic logic needed to grow a semiotic 
network obligates conjunctive forms of terms.  Hence, the necessity for the 
table of elements as logical constants that can copulate (co-operate) to form 
semiotic patterns.  

3] The above points also acknowledge that semiosis - and singular objects - do 
not exist except within the dynamic process of, as you note, a logical process 
of 'antecedent and consequent’.

Well, yes and no.
The table of chemical elements is held to exist as a reference source for all 
of chemical logic.  These logical constants form an order relation.
Any dynamics of interpreting the relevant, relational and illational 
propositional (atomic and molecular) forms is a problem created by human being. 
 This problem is of very recent origin as my references indicated. 


Cheers
Jerry 
> This puts us 'back' into the analysis of the hylomorphic correlation of 
> matter and mind.
> 
> 

Edwina
> 
>  
> 
> On Mon 07/06/21 11:16 PM , Jerry LR Chandler jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com 
> <mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> sent:
> 
> (List: Please substitute this edited version of my post earlier today.  I 
> accidentally submitted the first draft of the post which was extensively 
> revised over the week-end with numerous additions and clarifications.  JLRC)
> 
> List: 
> 
> This submission addresses the potential connections between category theory, 
> formal chemical logic and CSP’s  critical constituents of a philosophy of 
> pragmaticism such as notions of the trichotomy and existential graphs. At 
> issue is the connection, if any, between the vast plethora of modern logics, 
> chemical logic and existential graphs. 
> 
> In particular, it addresses the dictionary of terms deployed in drawing 
> conclusions from semiosis of singular (unique) objects, identified (termed) 
> “sin-signs” by CSP.  
> 
> The first row of the trichotomy proposes that the representation of pragmati

[PEIRCE-L] The formal logic of chemistry and the trichotomy.(Revised) Was Re: The 1911 EGs

[Jerry LR Chandler]

(List: Please substitute this edited version of my post earlier today.  I 
accidentally submitted the first draft of the post which was extensively 
revised over the week-end with numerous additions and clarifications.  JLRC)

List: 

This submission addresses the potential connections between category theory, 
formal chemical logic and CSP’s  critical constituents of a philosophy of 
pragmaticism such as notions of the trichotomy and existential graphs. At issue 
is the connection, if any, between the vast plethora of modern logics, chemical 
logic and existential graphs. 

In particular, it addresses the dictionary of terms deployed in drawing 
conclusions from semiosis of singular (unique) objects, identified  (termed) 
“sin-signs” by CSP.  

The first row of the trichotomy proposes that the representation of pragmatic 
objects as signs - qualisigns, sin-signs and legisigns. Presumably, these three 
terms are pragmatically coherent, that is, all refer to the same object.  
Presumably, all three terms could refer to a multitude of scientific objects 
and sematic terms for any particular “sin-sign” that are relevant to pragmatic 
inquiry.

The second row of the trichotomy proposes three identifiable constraints on the 
meaning of signs - icons, indices, and symbols. Again, presumably, each of 
these semantic terms could refer to a vast multitude of scientific terms that 
represent the unique object of the designated (existent) sin-sign.  Of 
particular importance to the logic of chemistry is the term “index.”  This term 
has implications for  measurements, counting, listing, illations, relations, 
categorizing, organizing, and (critically) the artificial name assigned to the 
singularity. 
Again, presumably, each of the semantic terms associated with the indices of a 
sin-sign are relevant to the sin-sign
and also can be symbolized (and also vaguely iconized).

The third row of the trichotomy proposes that a proposition can be 
categorically composed from the relevant terms of the second row that describe 
the interpretations of the semiosis of the interpreter.  Again, presumably each 
of the three terms could be composed from the potential logical implications of 
the plethora of terms emanating from the first and second rows of the 
trichotomy, CSP’s personal weltanschaung. Further, CSP used symbolic arrows to 
express implications from the third row to the second and first rows. 

>From these three antecedents, a plethora of many to one and one to many 
>semantic mappings emerge as possible propositional sentences. (In special 
>cases,matheamtical mappings are also necessary, e.g. chemical structures).  
>The logical terms of each possible propositional sentence is constrained to 
>the relevant indices of the sin-sign . That is, the attributes of sin-sign are 
>necessary terms in the argument if the sin-sign is be logically coherent with 
>the relevant qualities and quantities and the name (legisign) of the emanating 
>sign-generator.  

One very very special case of trichotomistic reasoning is the formal logic of 
chemistry which is based on atomic and molecular sentences (Russell/Whitehead). 
 Each symbol for a chemical element represents a triad, an informed logical 
constant, an atomic number, an informed integer.  That is, a symbol, an index 
and an icon.

 The perplexity of table of chemical elements was well-known to CSP; in his 
earlier writings, be often gives exact chemical descriptions to his examples of 
logical reasoning. Later, after the discovery of unique parts of atoms 
(electrons, JJ Tompson, 1897), the chemical examples faded from his writings. 
The mystical nature of the plethora of electrical forms does not rest 
comfortably in this semantic milieu. 
 
The formal inquiries of chemistry are referenced to and indexed by the chemical 
table of elements (which CSP acknowledged as the bedrock of his reasoning.) 
 
A formal logic of the chemical sciences is based on five indices.  These five 
indices are the molecular weight, the molecular formula, the molecular number, 
the molecular structure, and the handedness. By convention, the name of a 
chemical molecule  is commensurable with exactly one permutation group that 
matches these quali-signs.  The molecular permutation group matches the index 
with the sin-sign. The indices of the permutation group also match the 
existential bipolar graphs representing atomic and molecular sentences as well 
as metabolic graphs.

  The formal logic of chemistry matches the meanings of these terms with the 
signs emanating from the sin-sign.  The one to many and many to one mappings 
unconcealed (Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Whitehead) by the quali-signs reveal the 
composition of the identity of the object.  The proof of the validity of the 
matchings of numerical terms is valided by the adjunctive synthesis of the 
object designated by the sin-sign. The antecedent and consequent are related by 
analysis and synthesis. Metaphorically, one can propose a 

[PEIRCE-L] The formal logic of chemistry and the trichotomy. Was Re: The 1911 EGs

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List: 

This submission addresses the potential connections between category theory,  
formal chemical logic and  critical propositions of CSP's philosophy of 
pragmaticism, such as notions of the trichotomy and existential graphs. At 
issue is the connection, if any, between the vast plethora of modern logics, 
modern chemical logic and existential graphs. 

In particular, it addresses the dictionary of terms deployed in drawing 
conclusions from semiosis of singular (unique) objects termed “sin-signs”.  

The first row of the trichotomy proposes that the representation of pragmatic 
objects as signs - qualisigns, sin-signs and legisigns. Presumably, these three 
terms are pragmatically coherent, that is, all refer to the same object.  
Presumably, all three terms could refer to a multitude of scientific objects 
and sematic terms for any particular “sin-sign” that are relevant to pragmatic 
inquiry.

The second row of the trichotomy proposes three constraints on the meaning of 
signs - icons, indices, and symbols. Again, presumably, each of these semantic 
terms could refer to a vast multitude of scientific terms that represent the 
unique object of the existent sin-sign.  Of particular importance to the logic 
of chemistry is the term “index.”  This term has implications for  
measurements, counting, listing, illations, relations, categorizing, 
organizing, and critically the artificial name assigned to the singularity. 
Again, presumably, each of the semantic terms associated with the indices of a 
sin-sign are relevant to the sinsign
and can be symbolized (and also vaguely iconized).

The third row of the trichotomy proposes that a proposition can be 
categorically composed from the relevant terms of the second row that describe 
the interpretations of the semiosis of the interpreter.  Again, presumably each 
of the three terms could be composed from the potential logical implications of 
the plethora of terms emanating from the first and second rows of the 
trichotomy, CSP’s personal weltanschaung. 

>From these three antecedents, a plethora of many to one and one to many 
>semantic mappings emerge as possible propositional sentences. (In special 
>cases,matheamtical mappings are also necessary)  The logical terms of each 
>possible propositional sentence is constrained to the relevant indices of the 
>sin-sign . That is, the attributes of sin-sign are necessary terms in the 
>argument if the sin-sign is be logically coherent with the relevant qualities 
>and quantities and the name (legisign) of the emanating sign-generator.  

One very very special case of trichotomistic reasoning is the formal logic of 
chemistry which is based on atomic and molecular sentences (Russell/Whitehead). 
 Each symbol for a chemical element represents a triad, an informed logical 
constant, an atomic number, an informed integer.  That is, a symbol, an index 
and an icon.  The set of atomic number follow Peano’s successor relation, each 
is commensurable with numerous qualities-signs and each is incommensurable with 
all other atomic numbers.

 The perplexity of table of chemical elements was well-known to CSP; in his 
earlier writings, be often gives exact chemical descriptions to his examples of 
logical reasoning. Later, after the discovery of unique parts of atoms 
(electrons, JJ Tompson, 1897), the chemical examples faded from his writings. 
The mystical nature of the plethora of electrical forms does not rest 
comfortably in this semantic milieu. 
 
The formal inquiries of chemistry are referenced to and indexed by the chemical 
table of elements (which CSP acknowledged as the bedrock of his reasoning.) 
 
A formal logic of the chemical sciences is based on five indices.  These five 
indices are the molecular weight, the molecular formula, the molecular number, 
the molecular structure, and the handedness. The name of a chemical molecule 
(inclusive of proteins and genetic sequences) is commensurable with exactly one 
permutation group that matches these quali-signs.  The molecular permutation 
group matches the index with the sin-sign. The indices of the permutation group 
also match the existential bipolar graphs representing atomic and molecular 
sentences as well as metabolic graphs.

  The formal logic of chemistry matches the meanings of these terms with the 
signs emanating from the sin-sign.  The one to many and many to one mappings 
unconcealed (Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Whitehead) by the quali-signs reveal the 
composition of the identity of the object.  The proof of the validity of the 
matchings of numerical terms is valided by the adjunctive synthesis of the 
object designated by the sin-sign. The antecedent and consequent are related by 
analysis and synthesis. Metaphorically, one can propose a “cybernetic” illation 
between the sin-sign and the legisign. Hence, closure is approached.

This post is merely a short introduction to certain aspects of the formal logic 
of chemistry that are relevant to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] EGs as a calculus

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

Partial closure?

> On Feb 27, 2021, at 11:57 PM, John F. Sowa  wrote:
> 
> JAS> Peirce's actual claim was that his primary purpose when
> developing both algebraic and graphical systems of logic was "not at
> all the construction of a calculus to aid the drawing of inferences,"
> but rather "that the system devised for the investigation of logic
> should be as analytical as possible, breaking up inferences into the
> greatest possible number of steps, and exhibiting them under the most
> general categories possible" (CP 4.373, 1902).

What are the possible / potential scientific origins of these quotes from CSP? 
In his words, what were the leading principles that guide the antecedents to 
the consequences?

I was struck (dumbfounded?) by the tension among the configurations of the 
phrases in relation to the grammatical context. But, a meaningful gloss was 
constructible.

First a simplistic gloss of the fragment: 
> when developing both algebraic and graphical systems of logic was "not at all 
> the construction of a calculus to aid the drawing of inferences,"


An algebraic system (prior to modern category theory) necessarily required 
numerical calculations, that is number symbols that cohered with concepts of 
geometric distances and with geometric forms. This notion of a realistic 
calculus is the notion of concrete quantities that are meaningful. New 
quantities are created by operations of calculations on antecedent quantities.  
By meaningful, it is inferred that the logic of the calculus is realistic for 
economic, governmental and engineering purposes. In other words, the calculus 
is pragmatic.  The calculus is applicable to any materialistic  nominative case 
and the material implications of calculations fuels the associative logics of 
the subjects of the assertions.  These aspects of a calculus contribute to the 
modern mathematical notions of predicate logic and model theory.  CSP was aware 
of Leibniz’s view of predicate logic but model theory is a post-Taraki 
consequence. 

The grammar of chemistry is radically different.

Secondly, glossing the phrase: 
> "that the system devised for the investigation of logic
> should be as analytical as possible, breaking up inferences into the
> greatest possible number of steps, and exhibiting them 


This phrase places the emphasis on analysis.  Analysis is, by etymology, the 
very essence of finding the parts of the whole.  In realism, analysis is 
pragmatic by its very nature. The nominative case is disassembled. On 
disassembly, the parts are identified as originating in the initial nominative 
case.  But, the analytical process (A N Whitehead’s process phenomenology)  
does not inform the whole.  The form of the parts are only sub-forms of whole. 
The “greatest possible number of steps” was, for CSP, the atomic count of the 
molecular formula.  The calculus of assembly of parts into a whole is a 
question of function.  The form and number of calculations that function in the 
calculus of creating the whole from the parts must necessarily consist of a 
number of inferences, a number of symbols and indices that image the whole.  
This is “and then exhibiting them”.

Inclusively, the grammar of chemistry is dualistic.  The analysis of material 
nominative cases (sin-signs), separates qualities and quantities, namely, the 
molecular formula and other qualities (such as taste, smell, color, 
granularity, form, and so forth (qualisigns)).  Abstractly, one of these 
qualities-signs,  is named the molecular formula, it consists of a set of 
parts, atoms from the table of elements.  It is an index.  It is a calculation 
of the form of matter of the sin-sign. These are antecedent to the emergent 
terms of CSP logic of argument.

The second part of the dualism of the grammar of chemistry is the synthesis of 
molecules. The parts of the whole, the molecular formula, the unique individual 
nominative cases are assembled into the pattern of the original form of the 
sin-sign. The logical inferences of second dualism of the grammar of chemistry 
are created ad hoc by the synthesizer.  The ad hoc formation of these 
inferences, as many steps as necessary to account for every element in the 
sin-sign index, is the art of chemical pragmatism. 
 
The validity of this chemical calculus of inference is pragmatic.  The product 
of the synthesis must be the same as the material originally subjected to 
analysis. 
 
Pragmatically, the “sameness” of the natural sin-sign and the laboratory 
product produced by logical inferences in the laboratory is empirically 
demonstrated by showing the exact one-to-one correspondence between the 
predicates of the two sin-signs, one from nature and the other from the logical 
inference so of the mind of the chemist.  The formal logical name of the 
nominative case (the legisign) is officially assigned when the correspondences 
between the natural and synthetic material predicates are indistinguishable.  

In the language of 

Handedness as Logical Primitiveness Re: [PEIRCE-L] Consequence as Logical Primitive (was Resending)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon: 

> On Feb 10, 2021, at 7:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> JFS: In mathematics and logic, equivalence means freely interchangeable in 
> all contexts without any change in meaning.
> 
> No, it means freely interchangeable within a particular formal system. In the 
> context of classical logic, which treats the universe of discourse as 
> individual, a scroll is indeed equivalent to and interchangeable with nested 
> cuts/ovals. Nevertheless, as I demonstrated with Shafiei's example of ex 
> falso quodlibet 
> (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2021-02/msg00019.html 
> ), the same 
> classical EG with nested cuts/ovals can have multiple natural-language 
> translations, which is not the case when scrolls are employed instead. After 
> all, does someone really mean exactly the same thing when saying "if A then 
> B" as when saying "not both A and not-B"? Peirce certainly does not think so.
> 
> 

While I agree with your assertion, Jon, in realism, the situation is more 
highly constrained than this paragraph alludes too.

CSP may have used the bedrock logic of chemical radicals to construct the 
logical distinctions among natural nominative objects (plural individuals) in 
order to construct the perplex predicates of meaningful abstract sentences.  
This is necessary to copulate the individual abstract symbols from the many to 
the one; that is, from atoms to a molecule, or, another words, from n 
individual distinctive atoms to a single polyatomic molecule. 

Within the possible patterns of “n” individual terms of a composite sentence, 
the natural logic may need to make specify a specific unique pattern for all n 
terms.

That is, “a" is here and not at any of the other n-1 locations, “b” is there 
and not at any of the other n-2 locations, “c” is over there and not at any of 
the other n-3 locations, “d” is opposite of “c” and not at any of the other n-4 
locations. And so forth to any arbitrary large n. 

 These logical assertions were well known to CSP under the guise of the 
handedness of molecules such as described by Pastuer and by van't Hoff and 
LaBel.

 Thus, such assertions are necessary but not sufficient to copulate the 
nominative forms of the numerical information as antecedent to the pragmatic 
consequences predicated by the indices of “n”. 

In the chemical sciences, these locative logics are organized into a scientific 
logic of valence and handedness and are components of the standard scientific 
methodology of today.

>From the perspective of CSP logical trichotomies, these forms of negations are 
>essential. And necessary to relate and to copulate the indices of the sin-sign 
>to the legi-sign via the dicisign. 

Copulation makes chemistry attractive, fun and creates natural sorts and kinds. 
Under thoughtful planning of contexts, repetition is habit forming and 
reproducible.

Cheers

Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Sowa and the Meaning of Equivalence Relation. Was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Consequence as Logical Primitive (was Resending)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Feb 10, 2021, at 7:44 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Feb 9, 2021 at 11:25 PM John F. Sowa  > wrote:
>  and Jerry LRC,
> 
> JFS> In mathematics and logic, equivalence means freely interchangeable in 
> all contexts without any change in meaning.
> 
> JLRC> Really?
> 
> Yes, indeed.  As Casey Stengel used to say, "Ya could look it up." 
> 
> John
> 

The question of interchangeability of meaning of mathematical symbols is remote 
from the simplistic view you present, John.

In standard mathematics, that is, the usual mathematics of analysis and applied 
mathematics of physical analysis,
including such graphic structures as categories, topological spaces, Hilbert 
spaces, etc, 
the term equivalence relations is used to distinguish one form of mathematical 
structure from another.
The constraints used to separate the meanings of equivalence relations can be 
interpreted as a triad,
firstness (or transitivity), secondness (or symmetry) and thirdness (or 
reflexivity).


One very simple usage of the notion of “equivalence relations” is to structure 
the ordering of mathematical spaces such as (x,y,z), by inclusivity, that is, 
x is contained in y and
 y is contained in z and therefore
x is contained in z. 

With these antecedent definitions, one can order the meanings of the structural 
graphs for various spaces.
For example, a Hilbert space is logically contained in a metric space and a 
metric space is contained in a general topological space.

These distinctions are critical for interpreting the relationships between CSP 
usage of “topology” / graph theory
and the usage of Hilbert spaces in modern chemical graph theory.   (That is, 
perplex number theory of electrical relations.)
Note that the “handedness” of biomolecules are NOT symmetric as a consequence 
of the existential graphic patterns of internal electrical relations of 
chemical atoms in these compositions.

If you are not aware of these advanced mathematical concepts, to quote Casey 
Stengel, you could look it up.

But, I will save you the time and effort and suggest that the term 
“equivalence” as you used it in the sentence:

> JFS> In mathematics and logic, equivalence means freely interchangeable in 
> all contexts without any change in meaning.
> 

does not have a triadic meaning and does not imply an “equivalence relation”. 

Cheers

Jerry 

Research Professor
Krasnow Institute of Advanced Study

Headwater House
Little Falls, MN




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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Ampliative Reasoning (was Asymmetry of Logic and Time)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

 produces conclusions that are not already 
> contained in or implied by the premisses" 
> (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-12/msg00016.html 
> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2020-12/msg00016.html>).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Mon, Dec 14, 2020 at 10:07 PM Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote:
> List:  
> 
> Following Jon's assertion, an internet search reveal fresh information on the 
> usage of “ampliative”, starting with the  citation in the Comment Dictionary.
> 
> The Commens dictionary states:
> News | Posted 12/03/2017
> Workshop: Ampliative Reasoning in the Sciences 
> <http://www.commens.org/news/item/workshop-ampliative-reasoning-sciences>
> Charles Peirce introduced the term “ampliative” for reasoning in which the 
> conclusion of an argument goes beyond that what is already contained in its 
> premises (Collected Papers 2.623).
> 
> 
> The citation at 2.623 concerns the bean counting examples wrt Induction and 
> Hypothesis. 
> Ampliative does not occur in 2.623
> 
> Apparently, the citation was picked by the sponsors of the subsequent 
> conference where Commens provides the following statement:
> 
> Charles Peirce introduced the term “ampliative” for reasoning in which the 
> conclusion of an argument goes beyond that what is already contained in its 
> premises (Collected Papers 2.623). This is how the term is still standardly 
> used in contemporary logic and philosophy of science, and how it is to be 
> understood in the title of this workshop.
> 
> (The purpose of the workshop was to explore possible meanings of the term.)
> 
> Analytically, the citation lacks logical coherence.  After all, even a simple 
> deduction goes beyond what is already contained in the premises!  
> 
> BTW, 2.630 uses the term, “amplifiative”, perhaps in a different sense. 
> 
> The Oxford  dictionary cites “amplicative reasoning”.  (But reasoning is a 
> general term with many meanings
> Term used by Peirce to denote arguments whose conclusions go beyond their 
> premises (and hence amplify the scope of our beliefs). Inductive arguments 
> and arguments to the best explanation are not deductively valid, but may 
> yield credible conclusions. Most reasoning takes us to conclusions that go 
> beyond our data, in ways that interest us.
> 
> Historically, apparently the term did not originate with CSP:
> 
> "1653, Hugh Binning (1627–1653), “Sermon VI.”, in  The Works of the Rev. Hugh 
> Binning‎[1] <http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/24238>, page 579:
> Therefore I take it to be rather declarative, or ampliative, or both."
> In summary, this evidence appears to support the ablative usage of the term 
> “ampliative” as an adjective that modifies the perception of the scale of the 
> scope of a logic in order to be consistent with the meaning of the Latin root.
> 
> Jon wrote:
>>>  That being the case, necessary reasoning is by definition not ampliative 
>>> but merely explicative.
> 
> I continue to maintain that this is problematic.  Necessary reasoning in 
> often ampliative.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry 

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Abductive and adductive logic of chemistry was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Gary, List: 

Thank you for posting this listing.  It is highly probably the source of my 
recall of CSP’s usage of the term “ampliative” as the pages in EP 2 contain 
many many marginal remarks.  

The assertions in this lecture focus on the logic of relations / relatives.  He 
rejects Kantian categories and contrasts the notion of Kantian “judgments” with 
the (mathematical) logic of relatives.

On re-reading this section, no other mention of “ampliative” is made. Rather, 
he continues with the necessary logic of mathematics and the meaning of “term” 
with respect to an index and the grammar of sentences.

One of my concerns with the usage of term “ampliative” relates to the genesis 
of relations between atoms and molecules.  The compositions of individual 
atoms, each as a singularity of meaning and as a “line of identity” generates a 
molecule, also a singularity with an extended "line of identity" that 
incorporates all of the atoms from which it is composed.  

Meaning.  In the logic of chemistry, the antecedent atomic weights of each 
element and the atomic numbers of every element are added to specify the 
molecular weight of the consequence and the molecular number of the 
consequence. This is an adductive logic that is common to all chemical 
syntheses of molecules from atoms. Because there are many possible ways to 
organize a set of atoms in space, abductive logic is needed to index the 
possible organizational arrangements of atoms in molecules that create the 
specific identity of the molecule.  

Examples of the meaning of these abstract sentences are adding Hydrogen and 
Oxygen to form Water and adding Carbon and Oxygen to form carbon dioxide.   The 
reference system for such chemical propositions is the chemical table of 
elements. The logical calculations are based on the reference values.

Thus, the necessary logic of chemistry is directly and quantitatively related 
the line of identity in CSP graph theory by both adductive and abductive 
mathematical logic because of the quantitative reference system for all 
chemical relatives. 

Obviously, this form of propositional logic is remote from the notation and 
meaning of “elements”  as used in set theory and ALSO in Russell’s assertions 
linking atomic propositions to molecular propositions. Section IV (p. 220-225) 
continues with a profound discussion of his views of the meaning of language 
with relation to his usage of propositional terms.  In effect, CSP denies 
Church’s thesis more than two decades before its assertion! 

The texts in this manuscript are not consistent with Sowa’s oft-repeated 
beliefs, at least as I understand them. 

Cheers

Jerry  



: 

Thank you for posting this

> On Dec 15, 2020, at 6:36 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
> 
> Jerry, the following paragraph from Harvard Lecture 6 (1903, EP2:218, 
> CP5.176) might help to explain Peirce’s usage of ampliative (his translation 
> of Kant’s erweiternde):
>  
> [[ I may presume that you are all familiar with Kant's reiterated insistence 
> that necessary reasoning does nothing but explicate the meaning of its 
> premisses. Now Kant's conception of the nature of necessary reasoning is 
> clearly shown by the logic of relations to be utterly mistaken, and his 
> distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, which he otherwise and 
> better terms explicatory (erläuternde)  and ampliative (erweiternde) 
> judgments, which is based on that conception, is so utterly confused that it 
> is difficult or impossible to do anything with it. But, nevertheless, I think 
> we shall do very well to accept Kant's dictum that necessary reasoning is 
> merely explicatory of the meaning of the terms of the premisses, only 
> reversing the use to be made of it. Namely instead of adopting the conception 
> of meaning from the Wolffian logicians, as he does, and making use of this 
> dictum to express what necessary reasoning can do, about which he was utterly 
> mistaken, we shall do well to understand necessary reasoning as mathematics 
> and the logic of relations compels us to understand it, and to use the 
> dictum, that necessary reasoning only explicates the meanings of the terms of 
> the premisses, to fix our ideas as to what we shall understand by the meaning 
> of a term. ]]
>  
> Gary f.
>  
> From: Jerry LR Chandler  
> Sent: 14-Dec-20 23:08
> To: Peirce List 
> Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued 
> logic)
>  
> List:  
>  
> Following Jon's assertion, an internet search reveal fresh information on the 
> usage of “ampliative”, starting with the  citation in the Comment Dictionary.
>  
> The Commens dictionary states:
> News | Posted 12/03/2017
> Workshop: Ampliative Reasoning in the Sciences 
> <http://www.commens.org/news/item/workshop-ampliative-reasoning-scienc

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:  

Following Jon's assertion, an internet search reveal fresh information on the 
usage of “ampliative”, starting with the  citation in the Comment Dictionary.

The Commens dictionary states:
News | Posted 12/03/2017
Workshop: Ampliative Reasoning in the Sciences 
<http://www.commens.org/news/item/workshop-ampliative-reasoning-sciences>
Charles Peirce introduced the term “ampliative” for reasoning in which the 
conclusion of an argument goes beyond that what is already contained in its 
premises (Collected Papers 2.623).


The citation at 2.623 concerns the bean counting examples wrt Induction and 
Hypothesis. 
Ampliative does not occur in 2.623

Apparently, the citation was picked by the sponsors of the subsequent 
conference where Commens provides the following statement:

Charles Peirce introduced the term “ampliative” for reasoning in which the 
conclusion of an argument goes beyond that what is already contained in its 
premises (Collected Papers 2.623). This is how the term is still standardly 
used in contemporary logic and philosophy of science, and how it is to be 
understood in the title of this workshop.

(The purpose of the workshop was to explore possible meanings of the term.)

Analytically, the citation lacks logical coherence.  After all, even a simple 
deduction goes beyond what is already contained in the premises!  

BTW, 2.630 uses the term, “amplifiative”, perhaps in a different sense. 

The Oxford  dictionary cites “amplicative reasoning”.  (But reasoning is a 
general term with many meanings
Term used by Peirce to denote arguments whose conclusions go beyond their 
premises (and hence amplify the scope of our beliefs). Inductive arguments and 
arguments to the best explanation are not deductively valid, but may yield 
credible conclusions. Most reasoning takes us to conclusions that go beyond our 
data, in ways that interest us.

Historically, apparently the term did not originate with CSP:

"1653, Hugh Binning (1627–1653), “Sermon VI.”, in  The Works of the Rev. Hugh 
Binning‎[1] <http://www.gutenberg.org/etext/24238>, page 579:
Therefore I take it to be rather declarative, or ampliative, or both."

In summary, this evidence appears to support the ablative usage of the term 
“ampliative” as an adjective that modifies the perception of the scale of the 
scope of a logic in order to be consistent with the meaning of the Latin root.

Jon wrote:
>>  That being the case, necessary reasoning is by definition not ampliative 
>> but merely explicative.

I continue to maintain that this is problematic.  Necessary reasoning in often 
ampliative.

Cheers

Jerry 







> On Dec 14, 2020, at 1:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry, List:
> 
> A simple Google search confirms that there is nothing "problematic" or 
> "radical" about the well-established definition of "ampliative reasoning" 
> within the discipline of logic.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Mon, Dec 14, 2020 at 1:01 PM Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote:
> List, Jon:
>> On Dec 14, 2020, at 12:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> As Peirce explains in various places, ampliative reasoning produces 
>> conclusions that are not already contained in or implied by the premisses. 
>> As such, it encompasses both abductive/retroductive reasoning and inductive 
>> reasoning, but not deductive reasoning. That being the case, necessary 
>> reasoning is by definition not ampliative but merely explicative.
> Your interpretations of the term “ampliative” is problematic.
> 
> As I read the sentences, it appears that the logic of chemistry is excluded. 
> 
> Can you be more explicit wrt the texts from which you draw such radical 
> conclusions?
> 
> Do you believe that a conclusion (consequence) from a collection of premises 
> (antecedents) must necessarily be one syntactical interpretations of the 
> Latin root, ducere?(Consider, for example, the proposition, X produces Y. 
>  If you wish, you may consider X and Y as n-dimensional vectors or other 
> mathematical structures.)
> 
> Thanks for your thought - it is helpful.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Your non-answer is OK with me. .

My interpretation of your response is that your deep fears are well grounded.


Cheers
Jerry 

> On Dec 14, 2020, at 1:23 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> Jerry, List:
> 
> A simple Google search confirms that there is nothing "problematic" or 
> "radical" about the well-established definition of "ampliative reasoning" 
> within the discipline of logic.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt 
> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
> On Mon, Dec 14, 2020 at 1:01 PM Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote:
> List, Jon:
>> On Dec 14, 2020, at 12:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>> As Peirce explains in various places, ampliative reasoning produces 
>> conclusions that are not already contained in or implied by the premisses. 
>> As such, it encompasses both abductive/retroductive reasoning and inductive 
>> reasoning, but not deductive reasoning. That being the case, necessary 
>> reasoning is by definition not ampliative but merely explicative.
> Your interpretations of the term “ampliative” is problematic.
> 
> As I read the sentences, it appears that the logic of chemistry is excluded. 
> 
> Can you be more explicit wrt the texts from which you draw such radical 
> conclusions?
> 
> Do you believe that a conclusion (consequence) from a collection of premises 
> (antecedents) must necessarily be one syntactical interpretations of the 
> Latin root, ducere?(Consider, for example, the proposition, X produces Y. 
>  If you wish, you may consider X and Y as n-dimensional vectors or other 
> mathematical structures.)
> 
> Thanks for your thought - it is helpful.
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Helmut:
> 
> I think, that final causation (or induction) requires a need, which is 
> something only organisms have. No stone or molecule needs anything. 

I suggest that semantics of scientific causality and substantially wider than 
the narrow usage suggested by your philosophy.

 CSP logic is grounded in the set of terms:
Quali-sign. Sin-sign. Legi-sign. 

No constraints are placed on any of these terms.
The Latin root of the logical terminology is used extensively in all the 
sciences.
I strongly suspect that the German logical terminology differs substantially 
from the English.

In any case, here are some examples of the causal usages of L. ducere

Adduction - limb motions
Induction - electrical motors, genetic response to stimulus, chemical reaction 
catalysis
Production - many, many,….  For example, interpretation of sin-signs produce 
indices.
Transduction - forms of energy 

Synduction is idio-syntactic for truth generating functions that create the 
uniqueness of the “line of identity”.

Cheers

Jerry

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Jon:

> On Dec 14, 2020, at 12:40 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> As Peirce explains in various places, ampliative reasoning produces 
> conclusions that are not already contained in or implied by the premisses. As 
> such, it encompasses both abductive/retroductive reasoning and inductive 
> reasoning, but not deductive reasoning. That being the case, necessary 
> reasoning is by definition not ampliative but merely explicative.
> 
Your interpretations of the term “ampliative” is problematic.

As I read the sentences, it appears that the logic of chemistry is excluded. 

Can you be more explicit wrt the texts from which you draw such radical 
conclusions?

Do you believe that a conclusion (consequence) from a collection of premises 
(antecedents) must necessarily be one syntactical interpretations of the Latin 
root, ducere?(Consider, for example, the proposition, X produces Y.  If you 
wish, you may consider X and Y as n-dimensional vectors or other mathematical 
structures.)

Thanks for your thought - it is helpful.

Cheers

Jerry

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Existential Graphs and Backchaining Reasoning (was Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Asymmetry of Logic and Time (was multiple-valued logic))

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jon, List:

Some comments from the perspective of modern science are offered.  While 
technical language is remote from the languaging of CSP, there is a remote 
possibility that it may be useful since the notion that atoms beget molecules 
has not changed.   

It is well known that abductive logic is essential to constructing the 
alignments of atoms of chemical graphs, locative logic among pairs of the 
indices. These abductive propositions are later verified by physical methods 
that became available after 1913, such as X-ray crystallography.  

Given that the composition of terms is necessary to construct molecular graphs 
from atomic names of elements (the index), the challenge of “proof of 
structure” is to construct such existential graphs that are consistent the 
attributes (predicates) of matter.

Scientific locative logic uses the algebra of atomic numbers and their valence 
to draw objective truth functions from the thematic and dicisigns to generate 
the symbol that corresponds with the legisign.  These factors are necessary in 
chemistry to differentiate isomers (such as handedness).

These occasions arise when the analysis of the two different sin-signs 
generates identical atomic indices but with two different sets of quali-signs.  
Existential graphs can be used to show why / how the patterns of the two 
natural objects (sin-signs) differ and hence are nominated as two different 
legisigns with names that specify the sameness of the indices but also specify 
the difference in the relative locations of the same parts in the two different 
wholes. (This is a crude statement of the concept of isomerism.)

While I find your explications of your beliefs to be unrefined, it appears 
possible that a semantic path between your beliefs and CSP’s assertion that 
chemistry is the bedrock of his logic is conceivable.

Reasoning “backwards" from molecules to atomic constituents and alignments 
within a locative logic is essential to the pragmatism of the chemical 
sciences. Also, modern work (21 st Century) in artificial intelligence often 
crow about the power of back-chaining propositions and many papers assert 
positions about various meanings of “abductive” reasoning. 

Avoiding narratives about “lattices” will probably serve you well.

Cheers

Jerry
 

> On Dec 13, 2020, at 5:46 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> I have been thinking about existential graphs again lately and wondering how 
> they might be employed to represent abduction, rather than deduction. Peirce 
> describes the form of abductive inference as follows.
> 
> CSP: The surprising fact, C, is observed;
> But if A were true, C would be a matter of course.
> Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189, EP 2:341, 1903)
> 
> He elaborates on this a few years later.
> 
> CSP: Every inquiry whatsoever takes its rise in the observation, in one or 
> another of the three Universes, of some surprising phenomenon, some 
> experience which either disappoints an expectation, or breaks in upon some 
> habit of expectation ... . The inquiry begins with pondering these phenomena 
> in all their aspects, in the search of some point of view whence the wonder 
> shall be resolved. At length a conjecture arises that furnishes a possible 
> Explanation,--by which I mean a syllogism exhibiting the surprising fact as 
> necessarily consequent upon the circumstances of its occurrence together with 
> the truth of the credible conjecture, as premisses. On account of this 
> Explanation, the inquirer is led to regard his conjecture, or hypothesis, 
> with favor. As I phrase it, he provisionally holds it to be "Plausible" ... 
> (CP 6.469, EP 2:441, 1908) 
> 
> Hence abduction is "reasoning from consequent to antecedent" (ibid) or 
> reasoning from conclusion to premisses--i.e., reasoning backwards, which is 
> why Peirce ultimately prefers to call it retroduction. Accordingly, in EGs we 
> can scribe any true proposition on the sheet of assertion--such as a 
> surprising fact (C)--and "scroll" it so that it becomes the consequent of a 
> conditional (in the inner close), then insert any proposition whatsoever (A) 
> as the hypothetical antecedent (in the outer close). Since C is true and we 
> have complied with the transformation rules, the resulting consequence (if A 
> then C) cannot be false no matter what we choose for A. But does this entail 
> that it is true?
> 
> On the contrary, as with intuitionistic logic, excluded middle does not hold 
> in such a case. Given that C is true, we only have reason to suspect that A 
> is true if C follows from A as a matter of course. In other words, the 
> plausibility of A as an explanation of C relies on there being a rational 
> sequence from A to C. This requirement is obscured in classical deductive 
> logic, "completely hidden behind the superfluous machinery which is 
> introduced in order to give an appearance of symmetry to logical law" (R 
> 490:29, CP 4.581, 1906), by 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Kindle editions of Writings

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Jon

To me, the value of these editions would be fantastically enhanced if the 
indexing is complete and if searching by multiple terms is possible.

Any comments from purchasers?

Cheers 
JLRC 


Sent from my iPad

> On Nov 30, 2020, at 9:32 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt  
> wrote:
> 
> 
> Gary F., List:
> 
> At Amazon.com, the current Kindle edition prices are as follows.
> Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition -  $7.99 each for 
> Volumes 1, 2, 6, and 8; $10.83 for Volume 3, $11.16 for Volume 4, and $11.24 
> for Volume 5 ($65.19 for all seven).
> The Essential Peirce - $7.99 for Volume 1, $14.74 for Volume 2 ($22.73 for 
> both).
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
>> On Sat, Nov 28, 2020 at 1:59 PM  wrote:
>> Aloha Peirceans,
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> I just noticed that Kindle editions of all 7 volumes of the Writings 
>> Chronological Edition are selling for $9.99 each. (At least they are on 
>> Amazon.ca, I haven’t checked Amazon.com.) I bought and downloaded one of 
>> them at it appears to be all there (compared to the hardcover edition) … 
>> quite a bargain if you don’t already have them. Essential Peirce Vol. 1 is 
>> also $9.99 on Kindle.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Gary f.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> } All messages are coded. [G. Bateson] {
>> 
>> https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ living the time
>> 
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Hi Charles:

Well, this form of response is inadequate to address the substantial issue at 
question.

>From a personal perspective, I have over five decades of experience as a 
>chemist.  I am simply saying that the language of chemistry is not formed in 
>the way the semantics of other natural languages are formed.  I come to this 
>conclusion from decades of efforts attempting to explain chemical reasoning to 
>non-chemists  - particularly mathematicians and physicists.  I have a few 
>scars from my failures to communicate!  :-). 

As for markedness theory, I read widely in a range of reference materials 
during the fist decade of this century, historical as well as modern and 
developed a reasonable understanding of “markedness theory.”  

If markedness theory serves the social / academic purposes of linguists, fine.  

At the same time, several of your rhetoric claims are “over the top” and not 
very close to the theory itself.  
The metaphor for “gravity” could be omitted without changing markedness theory, 
could it not? 

As far as I am aware, Michael Shapiro’s work does not address the science of 
chemistry or any other of the natural sciences, all of which require 
idiosyntactic association of idiopathic assertions to relate semantics to 
mathematics.  

Have you studied the linguistic developments of mathematics?  I have looked at 
a good bit.  It is totally bizarre!  
It would be totally unfair to assert that mathematical language is based on 
scientific ignorance, it just appears that way.
A classic example is B. Russell’s notion of the logical composition of ‘atomic 
sentences’ into 'molecular sentences'.  

At least, that is my understanding of the conundrums raised by CSP’s texts.  
That being said, I think one essential notion of understanding CSP rhetoric is 
his introduction of “abductive” logic as derivative from the latin case (and 
Finnish).  This usage is widespread in the semantics of chemistry. 

Perhaps the socialistic linguistic theories are open to further developments?

Cheers

Jerry 



> On Nov 23, 2020, at 6:38 PM, Charles Pyle  wrote:
> 
> Hi Jerry,
>  
> It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around 
> since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body 
> of data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. 
> Nevertheless, as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to 
> have come to the attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the 
> civilian world.
>  
> If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a lot of 
> information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice statement about 
> the beginning of markedness theory.
>  
> begin quote
> Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world certain 
> linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent (unmarked) than 
> others which are referred to as marked. The concept of Markedness is first 
> proposed by the Prague School scholars Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy and 
> Roman Jakobson.
> https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c855/a0ad0e00662ee7b813c6d332f7374ef221e4.pdf
>  
> <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c855/a0ad0e00662ee7b813c6d332f7374ef221e4.pdf>
> end quote
>  
> There is also an informative Wikipedia page: 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness 
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness>
>  
> As to falsification of the hypothesis, as I said it has been subject to 
> extensive empirical testing.
>  
> As to the relation between markedness theory and Peirce, again numerous 
> scholars in many different fields have explored the relationship.
>  
> Michael Shapiro is a well-known scholar of markedness theory and he has been 
> active on this list for many years. See this article for example.
> https://cspeirce.iupui.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/shapiro/shapiro-mclc.pdf 
> <https://cspeirce.iupui.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/shapiro/shapiro-mclc.pdf>
>  
> Finally, I note that markedness theory in no way vitiates Peirce’s doctrine 
> of the tripartite nature of the sign. And the idea that there is a truth that 
> is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s 
> thinking.
>  
> Cheers,
> Charles Pyle
>  
>  
>  
> From: Jerry LR Chandler  
> Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 6:57 PM
> To: Charles Pyle 
> Cc: Peirce List 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
>  
> Hi Charles
>  
> Your post below left me stone cold!
>  
> One counter example to your hypothesis (conjecture?) is the language of 
> chemistry.
> It is built on positive evidence and reproducible empirical observations. The 
> propositional webs of inferences of chemical structures is one of the several 
> facets of chemical logic that CSP explo

Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Edwinia:

> On Nov 23, 2020, at 7:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis!

This is not my understanding of CSP realism.

I recall a text that, roughly speaking,  asserts that signs are “emanations” of 
“sin-signs” as objects. Objects that are the same as legisigns and are the 
necessary sources the qualisigns (observations / measurements).   This does not 
deny the possibilities that all interpretants are semiotic relatives. 

Some line of reasoning along these lines is necessary if any sense at all is to 
be made of the scientific foundations of pragmaticism.

Cheers

Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Hi Charles

Your post below left me stone cold!

One counter example to your hypothesis (conjecture?) is the language of 
chemistry.
It is built on positive evidence and reproducible empirical observations. The 
propositional webs of inferences of chemical structures is one of the several 
facets of chemical logic that CSP exploited in constructing his philosophies. 

The sensory properties of matter are fixed by experience.  Taste and smell are 
remembered and associated with activities and events. The timelessness of 
chemical names, such as water, or sugar or gold or…. are deeply embedded in 
human communication.

Chemical language grows from these positive impressions of sensory experiences 
on feelings / emotions.  The connections between chemical receptor encoded 
directly from the chemical genetic structures and the chemical circumstances is 
firmly grounded in decades of experience and centuries of experience.  The 
consistency of the chemical language has remained unchallenged for centuries.  

What separates the acquisition of chemical language from other languages? 

What, if any, role does Popperian falsification theory play in your assertions?

Cheers

Jerry

> On Nov 22, 2020, at 6:14 PM, Charles Pyle  wrote:
> 
> Hi Helmut,
>  
> Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of 
> Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further.  
>  
> The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where 
> truth is the center from which language arises in the form of marks each of 
> which is an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is a sign of falsity. 
> Thus the structure of language arises layer by layer as a structure of 
> falsity. The more marked, the more false. And it is a gravitational space 
> because the false tends by its nature to fall apart and reveal the 
> underlying, whether it is only a relatively less false underlying layer, or 
> the ultimate underlying layer of truth itself. Because of the nature of the 
> relation between truth and falsity, falsity must be continually reinforced, 
> repaired, defended, etc. or it will fall apart.  
>  
> In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is silent. 
> Every element of language arises from some prior by elaborating on the prior. 
> Thus the first event in the arising of language is the production of a sound 
> that interrupts silence and in doing so creates the derivative ground on 
> which language is elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, 
> the most sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first 
> mark which establishes the space of language as deviant from truth.
>  
> Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities. Sound is 
> a kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But it has a 
> beginning and an end, whereas silence was already there before the sound 
> begins, and it will be there after the sound ends. Silence is even there 
> during the sound: sound consists of a rapid sequence of pulses of energy; 
> between each of the pulses of energy is a brief gap that has the 
> characteristics of silence, i.e. the absence of sound. Sound is a kind of 
> continuity of discontinuity. You can clearly see this in a sonographic 
> analysis of sound. And here we can also see how it is that the very ground of 
> language is deviant from sound, seeking to interrupt the continuity of truth 
> by means of a faux continuity, and thus is essentially a sign of falsity. 
>  
> Given this fundamental ground,  the next logical step would be to mark the 
> vocalic ground continuity by its opposite, that is, to interrupt the 
> continuity, which is done in language by a consonant resulting in such basic 
> infantile linguistic forms as ama, aba, aka, ata, etc. Driven by factors of 
> timing these are often morphed into mama, baba, kaka, tata, etc. From here 
> phonologically the vowel space is further divided into at least three 
> elements naturally occupying the extreme margins of the vocalic space 
> resulting in a vowel inventory of a, i, u. And of course these can be further 
> divided. Consonants are similarly elaborated by the logic of opposition. 
> Roman Jakobson provided the classical explanation of this process of 
> development here:
> Jakobson, Roman. 1968.  Child Language Aphasia and Phonological Universals, 
> Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 72, Moutoun, The Hague.
>  
> And I reframed his explanation in the context of Peirce’s theory of signs in 
> “Wild Language” which can be found 
> here:https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle 
> 
>  
> Charles Pyle 
>  
> From: Helmut Raulien  
> Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 4:25 PM
> To: Charles Pyle 
> Cc: Peirce-L 
> Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
>  
> Charles,
> wow, interesting! I think about it. By first glance it seems to me like a 
> linguistic elaboration of Spencer-Brown. Do all 

[PEIRCE-L] The periodic table and other wallcharts in the teaching of chemistry in St Andrews, 1884–1919

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

As a courtesy to the list members that are seeking to place CSP writings in 
historical context, the following recently published paper (a remarkably 
detailed first person look at the philosophy of chemistry as it was 
pragmatically practiced in the later part of CSP lifetime)  is posted below.  
Do these lecture notes illustrate the vast diversity of the “bedrocks” of CSP's 
mental processes?

Analytically, logically, mathematically and philosophically, the prime issue is 
the role of chemical thought in CSP thought at that period in scientific 
history, well over a century ago.

In my personal efforts to understand the formal logics of the chemical sciences 
and how these logics support the pragmatic success of atomic theory in modern 
medicine (as well as the chemical industry), one facet of this historical paper 
stands out.  

That is, the commentary of Prof. Purdie on the success of his lectures!  

Do these commentaries justify CSP’s focus on the “line of identity” in his 
interpretations of his personal experiences as a chemist?  If so, how and why?

A second facet of substantial interest is logical diagram of the elemental 
chemical relatives, published in Vienna.

I would be astounded if anyone on this list could identify the critical logical 
distinction that separates this philosophical view of chemistry from the modern 
notions of physics!

Anyone up to finding this historical ignorance of a fact of great scientific 
important that eventually altered the basic history of physics, and 
subsequently many concepts of nature and of the pragmatic and ethical role of 
science in society today? 

As some list readers are curious about the possible meanings of how CSP used 
(deployed, abused, depended on?) the terms, icon, index and symbol, how can one 
fit Prof. Purdie’s usage of chemical symbols into CSP’s propositional logic 
that links qualisign, sinsign, and legisign? 

This set of theoretical chemical sorites leads to simple question relevant to 
the current discussion, Is the concept of chemical identity related to CSP’s 
“line of identity”?

Have fun!

Cheers

Jerry 


Opinion piece
The periodic table and other wallcharts in the teaching of chemistry in St 
Andrews, 1884–1919

R. Alan Aitken 
 
 and M. Pilar Gil 

Published:17 August 2020https://doi.org/10.1098/rsta.2019.0299 



Abstract

The teaching of the chemistry of the elements at the University of St Andrews 
by Professor Thomas Purdie FRS is examined with reference to selections from a 
collection of recently discovered historic wallcharts and extracts from his 
detailed hand-written lecture notes. Together these reveal a comprehensive and 
exciting programme of lectures incorporating numerous practical demonstrations 
which were continually updated to reflect the latest state of knowledge in what 
was a rapidly changing field.

This article is part of the theme issue ‘Mendeleev and the periodic table’.


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Topical Continuum

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> On Jul 27, 2020, at 11:14 AM, John F. Sowa  wrote:
> 
>  Therefore, it's essential to consider developments during the century 
> *after* Peirce in order to understand Peirce's early versions of those ideas.

I agree. 

Yes, it is essential.

To consider both the areas (domains) where his genius is evident and those 
where it was not.

  I consider two examples. 

The conceptualizations of the natural sciences has diverged with the 
experimental demonstration of the “atomic numbers” as compositions of 
electrical particles, a nucleus with a positive charge and an 
electro-neutralizing set of negative charges.  The count of these two different 
types of matter are the same, despite the deeply different forms and 
information content. 

Nevertheless, the handedness of organic molecules (exactly composed from the 
same set of elements) exists AND the left-handed and right-handed forms are 
otherwise physically identical. 

To what extent do CSP’s writings lead the naive mathematician/scientist down a 
path of falsehoods about the nature of continuity?

See: 2.119-2.143

It is also essential to conjecture about the current writings in modern 
mathematics. In what sense is modern mathematics relevant to Peircean realism?  
Earlier today was was studying J. Conway’s book on Game Theory.  This genius 
boldly embeds his beliefs about surrealism ( surrealistic number theory) in 
metaphors of time and temperature!  Fantastic imaginary icons for number 
symbols!  

To what extent do CSP’s writings lead to attributing indices of time and 
temperature to the icons, rhema , and  dicisigns to construct propositional 
mathematical arguments?  

I, for one, would not hold CSP accountable for such trends in metaphoric 
mathematics!

Cheers

Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Logic of Interpretation

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List: 

> On Jul 19, 2020, at 10:34 AM, John F. Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Since Peirce was so far ahead of his time, his contemporaries couldn't 
> understand them, and he had no examples that he could cite. 

See: W8, p. 37.

Throughout his life, CSP consistently selected example from the bedrock of his 
logic.

His examples from his bedrock, even today, are not understood by his students. 

Cheers

Jerry  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Logic of Interpretation

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Robert: 

> On Jul 16, 2020, at 6:56 AM, robert marty  wrote:
> 
> Your "demonstration" on the chemical combinations between atoms shows above 
> all your ignorance of mathematical modelling in chemistry. 

Again, you give me a deep belly laugh.

You can access my writing on the mathematical logics of the atomic numbers, 
including an analysis of the potential connections between category theory and 
the natural sciences, are available on Research Gate. 

The paper “An Introduction to Chemical Information Theory” (which is directed 
toward a general scientific readership) was strongly influenced by the 
“Qualsign, Sinsign, Legisign; Icon, Index, Symbol; Rheme, Dicisign, Argument” 
structure of reasoning for the construction of the propositional logics of 
chemical graph theory that relate identity to quantity to scientific logics. 

Your critical comments are welcomed.

Cheers

Jerry 


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: The Logic of Interpretation

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Robert, List:

Perhaps my message was to subtle. 

The following quote from a recent paper by Jean-Yves Beziau, category theorist, 
may give your text the interpretation it could motivate.

"Many people are afraid of being too simple, or of expressing themselves in a 
too simple way. If you say something simple which is wrong, then you have more 
chance to be detected than if you were to say something wrong in a complicated 
way. If you don’t speak clearly and someone says that what you are saying is 
wrong, you can always say the person made a wrong interpretation of what you 
wanted to say. A common trick among sophists. Simplicity is risky."



Cheers

Jerry   


> On Jul 15, 2020, at 1:15 PM, robert marty  wrote:
> 
> Jerry,
> Glad you liked it! I am determined not to polemicize and not to confuse 
> science with erudition ...
> Cheers, 
> Robert Marty 
> 
> Le mer. 15 juil. 2020 à 19:58, Jerry LR Chandler 
> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> a écrit :
> Robert:
> 
>> On Jul 15, 2020, at 9:04 AM, robert marty > <mailto:robert.mart...@gmail.com>> wrote:
>> 
>>  Indeed I know that I will be subject to the Law set out by the Russian 
>> physicist Sergey Lopatnikov who anonymously published an essay in which he 
>> introduced a following definition:
>> 
>> If the text of each phrase requires a paragraph (to disprove), each 
>> paragraph - a section, each section - a chapter, and each chapter - a book, 
>> the whole text becomes effectively irrefutable and, therefore, acquires 
>> features of truthfulness. I define such truthfulness as transcendental.(see 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandolini%27s_law 
>> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brandolini%27s_law>, similar concepts)
>> 
>> I am sorry but I can't discuss your logic.
>> 
>> 
> 
> Your assertion is very amusing,
> 
> Thank you very very much for the deep belly-laugh!
> 
> It is also irrelevant to the philosophical and epistemic challenges that the 
> genius of CSP presents to an informed scholar today.
> 
> 
> Cheers
> Jerry 
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