[PEIRCE-L] Peire's final version of EGs (was Categorizations of triadic Relationships
matters is not how we understand the term ‘symbol’ today, but how Schelling did: the contexts on which he drew and the conversations into which he entered when forming his theory of the symbol. In what follows, therefore, I will be almost entirely concerned with ‘the romantic symbol’ which emerged in German aesthetics and philosophy at the turn of the nineteenth century— even if one of my aims in what follows is to problematize the very existence of one, monolithic ‘romantic’ symbol. Part I of this book is devoted to the context in which Schelling’s construc- tion of symbolic language takes place. The present chapter considers theories of the symbol written during the Goethezeit, prior to Schelling’s own. I initially consider them historically, then from a synchronic viewpoint, examining in particular the essential properties of a symbol and the typical ways in which it was interpreted. As always, it is the interplay between ‘the romantic symbol’ and the Schellingian symbol in which I am interested: to what extent is Schelling to be positioned unproblematically in a genealogy of ‘the romantic symbol’ and to what extent does his theory in fact react against such an interpretation of the symbol? On Jan 11, 2024, at 6:16 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Jon, Jerry, List, We had discussed this issue many times before. R 669 was an attempt by Peirce to relate all the versions of EGs he had written, published, and toyed with. The result (R 669) was a hodge-podge that had many ad hoc constructions that Peirce was unable to justify by any convincing proof. He knew that it was bad. In R 670, he began to sketch out a new version, and a few weeks later he produced his clearest, most precise, and most elegant foundation for EGs. And he confirmed that version as his final choice in his last major letter in 2013. Peirce's three primitives are conjunction (AND), negation (NOT), and the existential quantifier (line of identity). These three primitives with Peirce's 1911 rules of inference are so general and powerful, that they unify and simplify Gerhard Gentzen's two systems -- clause form and natural deduction. As a result an unsolved research problem about the relationship between the two systems (stated in the 1970s) was finally solved by a simple proof when translated to Peirce's 1911 notation and rules of inference. That is conclusive evidence beyond any shadow of a doubt that Peirce's 1911 system is one of his most brilliant achievements. I'll send another note with all the references. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 1/11/24 6:13 PM Jerry, List: JLRC: The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional. Actually, Peirce points out that only two signs are needed as primitives, with the others being derived from them. CSP: Out of the conceptions of non-relative deductive logic, such as consequence, coexistence or composition, aggregation, incompossibility, negation, etc., it is only necessary to select two, and almost any two at that, to have the material needed for defining the others. What ones are to be selected is a question the decision of which transcends the function of this branch of logic. (CP 2.379, 1902) For example, in the Alpha part of Existential Graphs for propositional logic, the simplest approach is to select the two primitives as juxtaposition for conjunction (coexistence) and shading for negation* such that disjunction is then defined as multiple unshaded areas within a shaded area, material conditional (consequence) as one unshaded area within a shaded area (scroll), and bi-conditional as juxtaposed scrolls with the antecedent and consequent reversed. The Beta part for first-order predicate logic adds one more primitive, the line of identity for existential quantification such that universal quantification is then defined as a line of identity whose outermost part is within a shaded area. *As I have discussed on the List many times before, although this choice is practically more efficient and easier to explain, Peirce suggests on several occasions that it is philosophically more accurate to select the scroll for material implication as the second primitive such that negation is then defined as a scroll with a blackened inner close shrunk to infinitesimal size, signifying that every proposition is true if the antecedent is true (CP 4.454-456, 1903; CP 4.564n, c. 1906; R 300:[47-51], 1908; R 669:[16-18], 1911). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Edwina, list, my point was, that with consciousness, there is or may be a semiotic process without interaction with the surroundings. I mean, a not-conscious organism or a crystal needs the exterior for a semiotic process. I think, a plant doesn´t anticipate anything, it just reacts due to inherited routines, which are somehow exterior, because they are habits not of the individual plant, but its molecular mechanics are the habits, formed by its specie´s evolution. And a conscious organism, e.g. a person, or another animal with a brain, can formate its individual habits, and can perform a semiotic process just by interaction of the said three -senses, without the environment involved. Or parts of the environment are internalized, as a copy: The memories. Well, I just am pondering about the role of the memory, but it is complicated. I guess, while a crystal or a plant performs a simple semiosis, a human semiosis is a somehow cascaded reflexion- reaction thing, involving more than one sign triad. Maybe it even is an infinite regress or progress of awareness of awareness of awareness...of a feeling. And before interaction with the environment takes place, a lot already has happened, semiotically. Best, Helmut Gesendet: Donnerstag, 11. Januar 2024 um 22:52 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce List" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce) Helmut, list I’m not sure of your point. Peirce is here writing about consciousness - and I think that not all, indeed, a great portion of the universe’s semiosic triads have little to do with ‘consciousness. That is, in the physics-chemical and biological realms, the semiosic process is a vibrant reality in the formation and functioning of matter. And, as noted, “thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world” 4.551 This doesn’t mean that the three categories are not fully operational in the non-brain/mind world [ ie, Firstness or feeling, Secondness or reaction; Thirdness or the formation of habits]. Indeed, I think that it is clear that all categorical modes are found in these realms.These enable anticipation - ie, Thirdness or habits is a key mode enabling the material entities to, without consciousness, anticipate. Surely a plant anticipates the warmer weather and begins to develop leaves? But consciousness? Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just as in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to speak, for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes [Sensagion and Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, Suggestion, Association’. 7.551. Again - I’m not sure of your point. Edwina On Jan 11, 2024, at 12:40 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Edwina, list, what about primisense, altersense, medisense? Three entities in one person. E.g. I have a headache (feeling, primisense), then I remember, that coffee can help (memory from altersense), then I think, I should drink one (thinking, medisense). Best, Helmut Gesendet: Donnerstag, 11. Januar 2024 um 18:28 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Jerry LR Chandler" Cc: "Peirce List" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce) jerry Yes- you can feel a headache without going through the rather complicated analysis that it’s a triadic experience. No- I don’t think the triad requires ‘exterior objects’ in the sense of being external to the person. You can mutter through your own thoughts all alone! But I think the notion of external does apply to the semiotic process. Take a cell- it necessarily interacts with its surroundings- otherwise it would be dead - and these interactions function within the triadic process. In that sense - yes , semiosis functions by an entity interacting with its exterior. And no - the triadic relation is basic within the physical and chemical and biological realms. Ie the non symbolic realms. But you already know this Edwina Sent from my iPhone On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: Edwina, List. Very interesting response. The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable. In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of triadicity!u The question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of experiences. Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects? Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other? Cheers. Jerry.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
List: Jon, John: Obviously, both of you are struggling with what I am seeking to communicate. Perhaps the following paragraph will open your minds, your cognitive capabilities for understanding, to navigating a semantic “symbol space” more like a biological organism (the sonar system of a bat) than a machine (an oil tanker with massive momentum). I think that cognitive triadic relations are “real” - mens re. I continue to struggle with how CSP navigated the symbolic channels of the quantitative chemical notational system into a theory of logic. This is not merely a question of semantics or classical symbolic logic. According to some, Schelling had a powerful influence on CSP. "Was Schelling’s “Identitatssystem” a contributing factor to organizing the trichotomies?” is a rhetorical question worthy of significant perusal . Cheers Jerry Research Professor (Retired) Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study George Mason University From: Daniel Whistler. Symbolic Language ‘Symbol’ is one of the most polysemic words in theoretical discourse. Its connotations can be logico-mathematical, Lacanian, Peircean, anthropo- logical, liturgical, or romantic—and more often than not the symbol plays on a mixture of more than one of these discursive frameworks. What is more, the symbol takes on divergent, often opposed forms depending on the conno- tations one has in mind: the slippage and deferral constitutive of the Lacanian symbolic realm stand opposed to the unity of meaning and being in ‘the romantic symbol’. Nevertheless, the following is not a Begriffsgeschichte of the symbol, but a study of its fate in the hands of F. W. J. Schelling alone. What matters is not how we understand the term ‘symbol’ today, but how Schelling did: the contexts on which he drew and the conversations into which he entered when forming his theory of the symbol. In what follows, therefore, I will be almost entirely concerned with ‘the romantic symbol’ which emerged in German aesthetics and philosophy at the turn of the nineteenth century— even if one of my aims in what follows is to problematize the very existence of one, monolithic ‘romantic’ symbol. Part I of this book is devoted to the context in which Schelling’s construc- tion of symbolic language takes place. The present chapter considers theories of the symbol written during the Goethezeit, prior to Schelling’s own. I initially consider them historically, then from a synchronic viewpoint, examining in particular the essential properties of a symbol and the typical ways in which it was interpreted. As always, it is the interplay between ‘the romantic symbol’ and the Schellingian symbol in which I am interested: to what extent is Schelling to be positioned unproblematically in a genealogy of ‘the romantic symbol’ and to what extent does his theory in fact react against such an interpretation of the symbol? > On Jan 11, 2024, at 6:16 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Jon, Jerry, List, > > We had discussed this issue many times before. R 669 was an attempt by > Peirce to relate all the versions of EGs he had written, published, and toyed > with. The result (R 669) was a hodge-podge that had many ad hoc > constructions that Peirce was unable to justify by any convincing proof. He > knew that it was bad. > > In R 670, he began to sketch out a new version, and a few weeks later he > produced his clearest, most precise, and most elegant foundation for EGs. > And he confirmed that version as his final choice in his last major letter in > 2013. > > Peirce's three primitives are conjunction (AND), negation (NOT), and the > existential quantifier (line of identity). These three primitives with > Peirce's 1911 rules of inference are so general and powerful, that they unify > and simplify Gerhard Gentzen's two systems -- clause form and natural > deduction. > > As a result an unsolved research problem about the relationship between the > two systems (stated in the 1970s) was finally solved by a simple proof when > translated to Peirce's 1911 notation and rules of inference. That is > conclusive evidence beyond any shadow of a doubt that Peirce's 1911 system is > one of his most brilliant achievements. > > I'll send another note with all the references. > > John > > > From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > Sent: 1/11/24 6:13 PM > To: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: > Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce) > > Jerry, List: > > JLRC: The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs > - negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and > bi-conditional. > > Actually, Peirce points out that only two signs are needed as primitives, > with the others be
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Jon, Jerry, List, We had discussed this issue many times before. R 669 was an attempt by Peirce to relate all the versions of EGs he had written, published, and toyed with. The result (R 669) was a hodge-podge that had many ad hoc constructions that Peirce was unable to justify by any convincing proof. He knew that it was bad. In R 670, he began to sketch out a new version, and a few weeks later he produced his clearest, most precise, and most elegant foundation for EGs. And he confirmed that version as his final choice in his last major letter in 2013. Peirce's three primitives are conjunction (AND), negation (NOT), and the existential quantifier (line of identity). These three primitives with Peirce's 1911 rules of inference are so general and powerful, that they unify and simplify Gerhard Gentzen's two systems -- clause form and natural deduction. As a result an unsolved research problem about the relationship between the two systems (stated in the 1970s) was finally solved by a simple proof when translated to Peirce's 1911 notation and rules of inference. That is conclusive evidence beyond any shadow of a doubt that Peirce's 1911 system is one of his most brilliant achievements. I'll send another note with all the references. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" Sent: 1/11/24 6:13 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce) Jerry, List: JLRC: The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional. Actually, Peirce points out that only two signs are needed as primitives, with the others being derived from them. CSP: Out of the conceptions of non-relative deductive logic, such as consequence, coexistence or composition, aggregation, incompossibility, negation, etc., it is only necessary to select two, and almost any two at that, to have the material needed for defining the others. What ones are to be selected is a question the decision of which transcends the function of this branch of logic. (CP 2.379, 1902) For example, in the Alpha part of Existential Graphs for propositional logic, the simplest approach is to select the two primitives as juxtaposition for conjunction (coexistence) and shading for negation* such that disjunction is then defined as multiple unshaded areas within a shaded area, material conditional (consequence) as one unshaded area within a shaded area (scroll), and bi-conditional as juxtaposed scrolls with the antecedent and consequent reversed. The Beta part for first-order predicate logic adds one more primitive, the line of identity for existential quantification such that universal quantification is then defined as a line of identity whose outermost part is within a shaded area. *As I have discussed on the List many times before, although this choice is practically more efficient and easier to explain, Peirce suggests on several occasions that it is philosophically more accurate to select the scroll for material implication as the second primitive such that negation is then defined as a scroll with a blackened inner close shrunk to infinitesimal size, signifying that every proposition is true if the antecedent is true (CP 4.454-456, 1903; CP 4.564n, c. 1906; R 300:[47-51], 1908; R 669:[16-18], 1911). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 12:52 PM Jerry LR Chandler wrote: On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: But you already know this Edwinia: If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste my time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the grammatical structures of your and other responses. Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between ordered pairs. The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional. These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian syllogisms. Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence grammars. For a discussion of Peircian “tokens and types” from a categorical perspective, see the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic - Language - Ontology. 2022. Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation constrained to multi-valued logics? My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that the classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of molecular sentences. (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert Rosen’s writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy or dog
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Jerry, Jon, List, There is no single theory by Peirce that can explain everything. For any particular quotation, it's important to study the context to determine which theory (or theories) Peirce was using when he wrote that paragraph. JLRC> We seem to be on different wavelengths... It seems to me that there is a profound distinction between a categorical decision to express a feeling / emotion and experiencing a relation with the exterior world... Further the design and conduct of chemical experiments necessary to compose two nouns into a single “sin-sign”, such as planning to combine Sodium and Chlorine to create Sodium Chloride (NaCl) is another example. Perhaps the modern usage of symbols differs at a foundational level of logical meanings than during the CSP era. Peirce's background in philosophy, science, formal logic, and semeiotic is very much at the same level as modern developments in the cognitive sciences (Philosopy, Psychology, Linguistics, Artificial Intelligence, Neuroscience, and Anthropology). At Peirce conferences (Sesquicentennial in 1989 and Centennial in 2019), there were many specialists from all those fields who showed how modern and up-to-date his contributions have been. In the quotations cited by Jon (copy below), the context shows that Peirce was addressing different issues from different areas of his vast range of thought. In some cases, the issues are about logic, in other cases phaneroscopy or some other field may be more relevant. I agree with Jon that "We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other common noun for "camel" in this passage." But it's essential to ask in what context Peirce might happen to mention those three words. If it's merely to use those words as signs, he might talk about them in the same way. But if he is talking about feelings, such as a headache, he is more likely to be talking about phaneroscopy. If he is talking about an orange, he might be talking about the chemistry and methods for analyzing the constituents of orange juice. And he might mention a camel for many other reasons. Issues about signs are relevant to chemical experiments in many ways. But when Peirce talks about any science, he does so with a focus on applications of logic to propositions stated in the terminology of that science. Issues about interpretants of signs are, of course, relevant at the lowest levels of interpretinf anything. But those issues are so detailed that a discussion at that level might obscure, rather than clarify the more relevant issues. Summary: when citing any quotation by Peirce, we need to consider the context of the quotation and how it is related to the context we are discussing -- and consider how Peirce himself would relate those two different contexts. 'when we consider multiple contexts that happen to mention the same words, we may have to interpret those words in different senses. With his deep experience in lexicography for the Century Dictionary, Peirce knew very well how words senses shift from one context to another. We must always consider how and whether words from different contexts might be used in different senses. John From: "Jerry LR Chandler" Sent: 1/11/24 4:09 PM To: Jon Alan Schmidt Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce) Thanks for your answer. We seem to be on different wavelengths. On Jan 11, 2024, at 12:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other common noun for "camel" in this passage. It seems to me that there is a profound distinction between a categorical decision to express a feeling / emotion and experiencing a relation with the exterior world. One example is that combines both an internal feeling and an external experience is sexual copulation. Further the design and conduct of chemical experiments necessary to compose two nouns into a single “sin-sign”, such as planning to combine Sodium and Chlorine to create Sodium Chloride (NaCl) is another example. Perhaps the modern usage of symbols differs at a foundational level of logical meanings than during the CSP era. I appreciate your responses. Cheers Jerry From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Peirce-L Every word is a token of a type--in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy, a replica of a rhematic symbol or symbolic rheme, and therefore a peculiar kind of rhematic indexical sinsign. CSP: Eighth, a Rhematic Symbol, or Symbolic Rheme, is a sign connected with its Object by an association of general ideas in such a way that its Replica calls up an image in the mind which image, owing to certain habits or dispositions of that mind, tends to produce a general concept, and t
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Jerry, List: JLRC: The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional. Actually, Peirce points out that only two signs are needed as primitives, with the others being derived from them. CSP: Out of the conceptions of non-relative deductive logic, such as consequence, coexistence or composition, aggregation, incompossibility, negation, etc., it is only necessary to select two, and almost any two at that, to have the material needed for defining the others. What ones are to be selected is a question the decision of which transcends the function of this branch of logic. (CP 2.379, 1902) For example, in the Alpha part of Existential Graphs for propositional logic, the simplest approach is to select the two primitives as juxtaposition for conjunction (coexistence) and shading for negation* such that disjunction is then defined as multiple unshaded areas within a shaded area, material conditional (consequence) as one unshaded area within a shaded area (scroll), and bi-conditional as juxtaposed scrolls with the antecedent and consequent reversed. The Beta part for first-order predicate logic adds one more primitive, the line of identity for existential quantification such that universal quantification is then defined as a line of identity whose outermost part is within a shaded area. *As I have discussed on the List many times before, although this choice is practically more efficient and easier to explain, Peirce suggests on several occasions that it is philosophically more accurate to select the scroll for material implication as the second primitive such that negation is then defined as a scroll with a blackened inner close shrunk to infinitesimal size, signifying that *every *proposition is true if the antecedent is true (CP 4.454-456, 1903; CP 4.564n, c. 1906; R 300:[47-51], 1908; R 669:[16-18], 1911). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 12:52 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > > But you already know this > > Edwinia: > > If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste > my time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the > grammatical structures of your and other responses. > > Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between > *ordered > pair*s. > > The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - > negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and > bi-conditional. > > These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian > syllogisms. Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence > grammars. For a discussion of Peircian *“tokens and types” *from a > categorical perspective, see the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic - > Language - Ontology. 2022. > > Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation > constrained to multi-valued logics? > > My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that > the classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of > molecular sentences. (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert > Rosen’s writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy > or dogmas or…. Just seeking a scientifically useful meaning for my > research. > > Cheers > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Helmut, list I’m not sure of your point. Peirce is here writing about consciousness - and I think that not all, indeed, a great portion of the universe’s semiosic triads have little to do with ‘consciousness. That is, in the physics-chemical and biological realms, the semiosic process is a vibrant reality in the formation and functioning of matter. And, as noted, “thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world” 4.551 This doesn’t mean that the three categories are not fully operational in the non-brain/mind world [ ie, Firstness or feeling, Secondness or reaction; Thirdness or the formation of habits]. Indeed, I think that it is clear that all categorical modes are found in these realms.These enable anticipation - ie, Thirdness or habits is a key mode enabling the material entities to, without consciousness, anticipate. Surely a plant anticipates the warmer weather and begins to develop leaves? But consciousness? Peirce’s outline of these forms of consciousness [7.551] of Feeling, Altersense and Medisense’ or primisense, alter sense, medisense. And, just as in his outline of the modal categories, these can be subdivided, so to speak, for ‘primisense’ has only one mode; Altersnese has two modes [Sensagion and Will]; and Medisense has three modes ‘Abstraction, Suggestion, Association’. 7.551. Again - I’m not sure of your point. Edwina > On Jan 11, 2024, at 12:40 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Edwina, list, > > what about primisense, altersense, medisense? Three entities in one person. > E.g. I have a headache (feeling, primisense), then I remember, that coffee > can help (memory from altersense), then I think, I should drink one > (thinking, medisense). > > Best, Helmut > > Gesendet: Donnerstag, 11. Januar 2024 um 18:28 Uhr > Von: "Edwina Taborsky" > An: "Jerry LR Chandler" > Cc: "Peirce List" > Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: > Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce) > jerry > > Yes- you can feel a headache without going through the rather complicated > analysis that it’s a triadic experience. > > No- I don’t think the triad requires ‘exterior objects’ in the sense of being > external to the person. You can mutter through your own thoughts all alone! > But I think the notion of external does apply to the semiotic process. Take a > cell- it necessarily interacts with its surroundings- otherwise it would be > dead - and these interactions function within the triadic process. In that > sense - yes , semiosis functions by an entity interacting with its exterior. > > And no - the triadic relation is basic within the physical and chemical and > biological realms. Ie the non symbolic realms. > But you already know this > > Edwina > > Sent from my iPhone > > On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > > Edwina, List. > > Very interesting response. > > The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable. > > In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of > triadicity!u > > The question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of > experiences. > Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects? > > Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that > can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other? > > Cheers. > Jerry. > > Sent from my iPad > > On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > > Jerry - list > > Ii think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = > or any sound > > 1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that > recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is: > > Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word > > 2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the > triadic interaction is: > > Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the > sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. > > I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or > to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. > > By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative > Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of > Secondness. > > So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, > that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Thanks for your answer. We seem to be on different wavelengths. > On Jan 11, 2024, at 12:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > We can substitute "headache," "orange," or any other common noun for "camel" > in this passage. It seems to me that there is a profound distinction between a categorical decision to express a feeling / emotion and experiencing a relation with the exterior world. One example is that combines both an internal feeling and an external experience is sexual copulation. Further the design and conduct of chemical experiments necessary to compose two nouns into a single “sin-sign”, such as planning to combine Sodium and Chlorine to create Sodium Chloride (NaCl) is another example. Perhaps the modern usage of symbols differs at a foundational level of logical meanings than during the CSP era. I appreciate your responses. Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Jerry - frankly - I’ve never been a fan of Robert Rosen ; my reference to entropy was more along the lines of Prigogine. And yes- I consider that signs can be understood within the outline of the Aristotlean syllogism. ..but I don’t see this triad as confined to the symbolic realm of language. Edwina > On Jan 11, 2024, at 1:55 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > wrote: > > > >> On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky >> wrote: >> >> But you already know this > > Edwinia: > > If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste my > time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the > grammatical structures of your and other responses. > > Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between > ordered pairs. > > The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - > negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional. > > These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian syllogisms. > Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence grammars. For a > discussion of Peircian “tokens and types” from a categorical perspective, see > the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic - Language - Ontology. 2022. > > Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation > constrained to multi-valued logics? > > My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that the > classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of > molecular sentences. (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert > Rosen’s writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy or > dogmas or…. Just seeking a scientifically useful meaning for my research. > > Cheers > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
> On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:28 AM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote: > > But you already know this Edwinia: If I understood the meaning of the “triadic relations”, I would not waste my time attempting to frame precise questions and intensely analyzing the grammatical structures of your and other responses. Mathematical reasoning is grounded in set theory - the relation between ordered pairs. The classical logic of mathematical reasoning (symbolized by five signs - negation, conjunction, disjunction, material conditional, and bi-conditional. These signs are often interpreted in terms of the Aristotelian syllogisms. Which in turn, are related to sentences and sentence grammars. For a discussion of Peircian “tokens and types” from a categorical perspective, see the recent text by Ursula Skadowski, Logic - Language - Ontology. 2022. Or, asserted in similar terms, is the meaning of a triadic relation constrained to multi-valued logics? My interpretation of the posts by the John / Jon / Robert posts is that the classical logic for deduction preserves the truths of propositions of molecular sentences. (Note, it was not necessary to invoke either Robert Rosen’s writings on the philosophy of science or thermodynamics or entropy or dogmas or…. Just seeking a scientifically useful meaning for my research. Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
urned> > , restored <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/restored>, repaid > <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/repaid> > 3. (having been) reported <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/reported> > 4. (having been) reconsidered > <https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/reconsidered> > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Edwina, list, what about primisense, altersense, medisense? Three entities in one person. E.g. I have a headache (feeling, primisense), then I remember, that coffee can help (memory from altersense), then I think, I should drink one (thinking, medisense). Best, Helmut Gesendet: Donnerstag, 11. Januar 2024 um 18:28 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Jerry LR Chandler" Cc: "Peirce List" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce) jerry Yes- you can feel a headache without going through the rather complicated analysis that it’s a triadic experience. No- I don’t think the triad requires ‘exterior objects’ in the sense of being external to the person. You can mutter through your own thoughts all alone! But I think the notion of external does apply to the semiotic process. Take a cell- it necessarily interacts with its surroundings- otherwise it would be dead - and these interactions function within the triadic process. In that sense - yes , semiosis functions by an entity interacting with its exterior. And no - the triadic relation is basic within the physical and chemical and biological realms. Ie the non symbolic realms. But you already know this Edwina Sent from my iPhone On Jan 11, 2024, at 11:43 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: Edwina, List. Very interesting response. The absence of Persian terminology about semiotics is notable. In other words, I can have a feeling of a headache Without any notion of triadicity!u The question becomes one of the role of cognition in creating descriptions of experiences. Does this suggest to you that Peircian semiotics is only for exterior objects? Is the triadic relation merrily a suggestion for determining a feeling that can be given symbolic descriptions that can be communicated to the Other? Cheers. Jerry. Sent from my iPad On Jan 11, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Jerry - list Ii think you yourself know the answer - but…let’s say, the word ‘ headache’ = or any sound 1] If you have, within your mind, a developed, learned knowledge base that recognizes this sound as having-a-meaning-, then, the triadic interaction is: Sound-> Memory or Knowledge Base -> Meaning of the sound as a word 2] If you don’t have this sound within your mind’s knowledge base, then, the triadic interaction is: Sound->Memory or Knowledge Base -> noise/ ..the ‘meaning’ is empty…and the sound entropically dissipates, so to speak. I like your definitions of ‘relation’ - particularly the sense of ’to bear or to carry’.. I think that describes the semiosic relation quite well. By the way - the Sinsign is not a single term, but is the mediative Represetnamen within a triad, where the Representamen is in a mode of Secondness. So- all of life functions within these triadic relations…and , of course, that means that there is even no such thing as a singular triad. Everything is networking with other triads. Edwina On Jan 10, 2024, at 10:04 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: List: Well, I will continue to search for an adequate semantic _expression_ for my feelings about the meanings (plural) of a triadic relation. Perhaps it would be helpful to note that the meaning of “triadic” is a critical part of the question, but not particularly difficult or controversial (outside the CSP community.) The term “relation” is highly controversial throughout the kingdom of mathematics. The word “relation” is derived from the Latin, “relates” (See the Wikipedia declension below) , putatively meaning to bear or to carry, including sense of “bearing a child”, that is, the biological sense. That is, in the genetic sense. In mathematics, it may mean to “entail”, that is, as an inheritance from a prior sentence or terms of a sentence. So, the implication of a family of relatives may be intrinsic (symbolically) to a set of triadic relations. From these perspectives, I now give an examples. When one simply states a sinsign, a single term, how is the meaning interpreted as a “triadic relation”. “HEADACHE”. Or “ORANGE” How does one ascribe meaning to the “triadic relation” in the sense of interrogatories - What, Who, When, Where, How and Why ? (Or any other sense or sensory mode you are capable of exploring.) In the cognitive (grammatical) sense, what locates the three predicates(?) (Or, what locates the three subjects?) Or are the three terms of the triadic relations merely adjectives? Beyond what CSP may have opined about, personal interpretations of CSP’s phrases are welcome. (Yes, Robert, your’s in particular! As you are aware of the role of “ordered pairs” in set theory.) (Ben: In part, this refers back to your “tetradicity” if that term is correctly remembered.) Alternatively, is this a meaningful conund
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Helmut, List: HR: A sign (1) cannot determine an interpretant (3). On the contrary, the sign not only *can*, but *always does* determine the interpretant. One more time ... CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and *determines the interpretant* *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410, 1907; bold added) This is an analysis of what happens in an individual *event of semiosis* as prescinded from the real and continuous process. What I call Peirce's "rule of determination"--"It is evident that a Possible can determine nothing but a Possible; it is equally so that a Necessitant can be determined by nothing but a Necessitant" (EP 2:481, 1908)--applies specifically within the logical order of the various trichotomies for *sign classification*. His 1903 taxonomy has three of them--for the nature of the sign itself (qualisign/sinsign/legisign), its relation with its object (iconic/indexical/symbolic), and its relation with its interpretant (rheme/dicisign/argument). A qualisign can determine nothing but an icon, which can determine nothing but a rheme; and an argument can be determined by nothing but a symbol, which can be determined by nothing but a legisign. The upshot is that there are only ten classes of signs, not 27 as would be the case if all combinations were possible. That said, Peirce's three universal categories (1ns/2ns/3ns) have much broader application than these "categorical modes," including phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating that yields one sign with two objects and three interpretants. HR: Therefore I suggested, that the interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. This is also true in the sense that the interpreter's mind is *another *sign, which co-determines the dynamical interpretant--its actual effect on that individual interpreter--along with the sign being analyzed. Hence, the *same *sign can have *different *dynamical interpretants for different interpreters who have different collateral experience and different habits of interpretation. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Jan 11, 2024 at 10:42 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > Suppsupplement: And I am not the only one: Vincent Colapietro in a paper > in the internet wrote: > "So, Peirce in his investigation of signs considered signs in themselves, > in their secondness (i.e., in relationship to their object or other), and > in their thirdness (i.e., in relationship to their interpretant or as a > factor in a complex, ongoing process of mediation)" > > So, where i still may be completely wrong, is, that I didn´t call the > relations (sign itself, sign-object, sign-interpretant) categorial, but > sign, object, interpretant. But why not prescind e.g. an interpretant from > its relation with the sign, and then say, that it is thirdness? To say, > that that is forbidden, is a bit too strict, I think. > > Later Colapietro writes, that in this case it is not modes of being, but > modes of knowledge. I find the term "mode" or "modality" too unexact, and, > as I said, have for me replaced it with classification versus composition. > Supplement: And, I did not insist, that "a first, a second, a third" > belong to modal categories, but to categories. Of course I know the > difference between modality and the composition of a sign triad. > Edwina, what you wrote, is exactly what I wrote: That determination, or, > as you wrote, production, cannot go upward in category number: A sign (1) > cannot determin an interpretant (3). Therefore I suggested, that the > interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. Now I must add, > that all "entities" of course are prescinded, as they donot really exist > alone, before somebody feels the need of telling me so. > Best, Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
origins of the “triadic relations”?Then the question arises, how does one distinguish CSP’s “semiotics”.Which semantic aspects of the “triadic relations” are external?Which semantic aspects of the "triadic relations are internal to the describer?In other words, Where does the syntax for triadic relation originate?And, Where does the syntax for triadic relation reside?And, how would such a determination fix the differentiation between the adjectives (…ness) and the numbers, either / or cardinal or ordinal? …. neither /nor? CheersJerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html .► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
ax of every tongue. (R 664, 1910)The proposition "Cain killed Abel" has three subjects denoted by its three words--the dyadic relation of killing and its two correlates, Cain and Abel, all of which require collateral experience/observation to understand--and exactly one predicate, a pure or continuous predicate that "is signified as the logical connexion between the Subjects" (R 611, 1908) only by its syntax. As Peirce explains elsewhere, "A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more ways than one," but this approach is "the proper way in logic" (NEM 3:885, 1908) because "when we have carried analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it to its ultimate elements" (SS 72, 1908). For more on this, I highly recommend Francesco Bellucci's 2013 paper about it (https://www.academia.edu/11685812/Peirces_Continuous_Predicates).In the Beta part of Existential Graphs (EG), there are two ways of indexically denoting subjects--lines of identity for indefinite individuals, and names for general concepts--while the pure/continuous predicate is again iconically signified by the syntax, in this case the arrangement of the lines and names (as well as any shaded areas for negation) on the sheet of assertion that represents the universe of discourse. Attributing concepts to individuals by attaching names to lines increases the information being conveyed by making those individuals more definite (increasing logical depth) and those concepts more determinate (increasing logical breadth). As a dyadic relation, the EG for killing has two lines and three names, while as genuine triadic relations, the EGs for representing/mediating and giving have three lines and four names each (as I have noted previously).When it comes to ordinal numbers, phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating establishes that the sign is the first (simplest) correlate, the object is the second (of middling complexity), and the interpretant is the third (most complex). The upshot is that there is only the genuine correlate for the sign itself, there are genuine (dynamical) and degenerate (immediate) correlates for the object, and there are genuine (final), degenerate (dynamical), and doubly degenerate (immediate) correlates for the interpretant. Nevertheless, the dyadic relations of determining are always from the object through the sign to the interpretant, such that the sign is passive with respect to the object and active with respect to the interpretant (EP 2:544n22, 1906). Again ...CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. (EP 2:410, 1907)Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidtOn Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 10:06 PM Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:Following Robert’s efforts to clarify meanings of terminology in symbolic logics...On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:45 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:The directionality of semiosis is such that the object determines the sign while being unaffected by that sign, and the sign determines the interpretant while being unaffected by that interpretant. Jon:Given your background as an engineer, I would appreciate your opinion on the following.In recent years, I have turned my attention to the distinctions between the classical philosophy of signs, originating in the medical arts and other simpler perspectives of communications. Let’s call these texts as “semiology” texts. In these writings, I do not find any reason not to assume that both the object (detected by writer) and the signs that were described by the ancients in scripts were naturally external to the writer.So, the questions arises, how does one locate the origins of the “triadic relations”?Then the question arises, how does one distinguish CSP’s “semiotics”.Which semantic aspects of the “triadic relations” are external?Which semantic aspects of the "triadic relations are internal to the describer?In other words, Where does the syntax for triadic relation originate?And, Where does the syntax for triadic relation reside?And, how would such a determination fix the differentiation between the adjectives (…ness) and the numbers, either / or cardinal or ordinal? …. neither /nor? CheersJerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just a
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Cain and Abel, all of which require collateral experience/observation to understand--and exactly one predicate, a pure or continuous predicate that "is signified as the logical connexion between the Subjects" (R 611, 1908) only by its syntax. As Peirce explains elsewhere, "A proposition can be separated into a predicate and subjects in more ways than one," but this approach is "the proper way in logic" (NEM 3:885, 1908) because "when we have carried analysis so far as to leave only a continuous predicate, we have carried it to its ultimate elements" (SS 72, 1908). For more on this, I highly recommend Francesco Bellucci's 2013 paper about it (https://www.academia.edu/11685812/Peirces_Continuous_Predicates).In the Beta part of Existential Graphs (EG), there are two ways of indexically denoting subjects--lines of identity for indefinite individuals, and names for general concepts--while the pure/continuous predicate is again iconically signified by the syntax, in this case the arrangement of the lines and names (as well as any shaded areas for negation) on the sheet of assertion that represents the universe of discourse. Attributing concepts to individuals by attaching names to lines increases the information being conveyed by making those individuals more definite (increasing logical depth) and those concepts more determinate (increasing logical breadth). As a dyadic relation, the EG for killing has two lines and three names, while as genuine triadic relations, the EGs for representing/mediating and giving have three lines and four names each (as I have noted previously).When it comes to ordinal numbers, phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating establishes that the sign is the first (simplest) correlate, the object is the second (of middling complexity), and the interpretant is the third (most complex). The upshot is that there is only the genuine correlate for the sign itself, there are genuine (dynamical) and degenerate (immediate) correlates for the object, and there are genuine (final), degenerate (dynamical), and doubly degenerate (immediate) correlates for the interpretant. Nevertheless, the dyadic relations of determining are always from the object through the sign to the interpretant, such that the sign is passive with respect to the object and active with respect to the interpretant (EP 2:544n22, 1906). Again ...CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. (EP 2:410, 1907)Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAStructural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christianwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidtOn Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 10:06 PM Jerry LR Chandler <jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote:Following Robert’s efforts to clarify meanings of terminology in symbolic logics...On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:45 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:The directionality of semiosis is such that the object determines the sign while being unaffected by that sign, and the sign determines the interpretant while being unaffected by that interpretant. Jon:Given your background as an engineer, I would appreciate your opinion on the following.In recent years, I have turned my attention to the distinctions between the classical philosophy of signs, originating in the medical arts and other simpler perspectives of communications. Let’s call these texts as “semiology” texts. In these writings, I do not find any reason not to assume that both the object (detected by writer) and the signs that were described by the ancients in scripts were naturally external to the writer.So, the questions arises, how does one locate the origins of the “triadic relations”?Then the question arises, how does one distinguish CSP’s “semiotics”.Which semantic aspects of the “triadic relations” are external?Which semantic aspects of the "triadic relations are internal to the describer?In other words, Where does the syntax for triadic relation originate?And, Where does the syntax for triadic relation reside?And, how would such a determination fix the differentiation between the adjectives (…ness) and the numbers, either / or cardinal or ordinal? …. neither /nor? CheersJerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links!► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Suppsupplement: And I am not the only one: Vincent Colapietro in a paper in the internet wrote: "So, Peirce in his investigation of signs considered signs in themselves, in their secondness (i.e., in relationship to their object or other), and in their thirdness (i.e., in relationship to their interpretant or as a factor in a complex, ongoing process of mediation)" So, where i still may be completely wrong, is, that I didn´t call the relations (sign itself, sign-object, sign-interpretant) categorial, but sign, object, interpretant. But why not prescind e.g. an interpretant from its relation with the sign, and then say, that it is thirdness? To say, that that is forbidden, is a bit too strict, I think. Later Colapietro writes, that in this case it is not modes of being, but modes of knowledge. I find the term "mode" or "modality" too unexact, and, as I said, have for me replaced it with classification versus composition. Supplement: And, I did not insist, that "a first, a second, a third" belong to modal categories, but to categories. Of course I know the difference between modality and the composition of a sign triad. Edwina, what you wrote, is exactly what I wrote: That determination, or, as you wrote, production, cannot go upward in category number: A sign (1) cannot determin an interpretant (3). Therefore I suggested, that the interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. Now I must add, that all "entities" of course are prescinded, as they donot really exist alone, before somebody feels the need of telling me so. Best, Helmut Gesendet: Dienstag, 09. Januar 2024 um 17:42 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only suggest: Read Peirce. And think: How can an entity organized within Firstness [ pure vague feeling] produce an entity organized within the much more restrictive mode of Secondness [an actual single form]? Think of this situation in terms of ‘information -content. Can an entity with a low information content [ ie, just a feeling]..produce an entity with a higher information content [ a singular thing]? How? Where does it get that increased information to form something that is so much more organized? How does pure indeterminacy [Firstness] produce something determined [ Secondness]. You are moving into magical assumptions! Tha’s why the outline by Peirce in “EP:272 “A Sign , or Representamen, is a First which stands iin such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant”…. ….Has to be understood as referring to ordinal numbers rather than the modal categories. Peirce warned of this error [p 271 note] “The conception of a First, improperly called an ‘object’ and of aSecond, should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness’. I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood how they can come to such a conc Again - if you read what he wrote - Peirce was referring to the RELATIONS between the ’nodes’ [Representamen, Object, Interpretant] and to these relations as determinants. He was not referring to their mode-of-being, or the categories. And - just a wee bit of thought - would lead you to realize that something in a. Mode of Firstness [pure indeterminacy] doesn’t have the informational capacity to produce something in a mode of either Secondness or Thirdness with their much more restrictive natures! Edwina On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Supplement: All in all, I have the feeling, that by trying to distinguish the representamen from the object, and the immediate from the dynamical object, and including memory, then you look at more and more subsigns, the closer you try to analyse. But maybe that doesn´t matter, because with the mind it is the same, you cannot analyse mind by closer and closer looking at it? So, is semiotics rather a matter of somehow hovering over the situation, a matter of "Gestalt" (overall figure)? Another problem I see, is, that the sign determines the interpretant, that would be an upward determination in categoriality- I know that not everybody agrees, that sign-object-interpretant are categorically 1-2-3. This would mean, that the categories do not only apply to modes of being (classification), but also to generalization of triadic composition. I think so, because, well, categories should apply to everything, or at least to triadicity, whether this triadicity is a relation of classification, composition, or determination. Anyway,
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Supplement: And, I did not insist, that "a first, a second, a third" belong to modal categories, but to categories. Of course I know the difference between modality and the composition of a sign triad. Edwina, what you wrote, is exactly what I wrote: That determination, or, as you wrote, production, cannot go upward in category number: A sign (1) cannot determin an interpretant (3). Therefore I suggested, that the interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. Now I must add, that all "entities" of course are prescinded, as they donot really exist alone, before somebody feels the need of telling me so. Best, Helmut Gesendet: Dienstag, 09. Januar 2024 um 17:42 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only suggest: Read Peirce. And think: How can an entity organized within Firstness [ pure vague feeling] produce an entity organized within the much more restrictive mode of Secondness [an actual single form]? Think of this situation in terms of ‘information -content. Can an entity with a low information content [ ie, just a feeling]..produce an entity with a higher information content [ a singular thing]? How? Where does it get that increased information to form something that is so much more organized? How does pure indeterminacy [Firstness] produce something determined [ Secondness]. You are moving into magical assumptions! Tha’s why the outline by Peirce in “EP:272 “A Sign , or Representamen, is a First which stands iin such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant”…. ….Has to be understood as referring to ordinal numbers rather than the modal categories. Peirce warned of this error [p 271 note] “The conception of a First, improperly called an ‘object’ and of aSecond, should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness’. I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood how they can come to such a conc Again - if you read what he wrote - Peirce was referring to the RELATIONS between the ’nodes’ [Representamen, Object, Interpretant] and to these relations as determinants. He was not referring to their mode-of-being, or the categories. And - just a wee bit of thought - would lead you to realize that something in a. Mode of Firstness [pure indeterminacy] doesn’t have the informational capacity to produce something in a mode of either Secondness or Thirdness with their much more restrictive natures! Edwina On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Supplement: All in all, I have the feeling, that by trying to distinguish the representamen from the object, and the immediate from the dynamical object, and including memory, then you look at more and more subsigns, the closer you try to analyse. But maybe that doesn´t matter, because with the mind it is the same, you cannot analyse mind by closer and closer looking at it? So, is semiotics rather a matter of somehow hovering over the situation, a matter of "Gestalt" (overall figure)? Another problem I see, is, that the sign determines the interpretant, that would be an upward determination in categoriality- I know that not everybody agrees, that sign-object-interpretant are categorically 1-2-3. This would mean, that the categories do not only apply to modes of being (classification), but also to generalization of triadic composition. I think so, because, well, categories should apply to everything, or at least to triadicity, whether this triadicity is a relation of classification, composition, or determination. Anyway, from this point of view on, an upward determination (from 1ns to 3ns) is odd. So I guess, that what determines the interpretant is not only the sign, but the sign and the interpreter´s mind. Mind, of course, includes 3ns. Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr Von: "Helmut Raulien" An: "Edwina Taborsky" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Edwina, list, ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the knowledge of new snow is part of the immediate object, because this information is transported by the sign/representamen (while the real snow is not transported, it keeps lying there, so it is the material part of th
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Edwina, what you wrote, is exactly what I wrote: That determination, or, as you wrote, production, cannot go upward in category number: A sign (1) cannot determin an interpretant (3). Therefore I suggested, that the interpreter´s mind (3) rather is the determining entity. Now I must add, that all "entities" of course are prescinded, as they donot really exist alone, before somebody feels the need of telling me so. Best, Helmut Gesendet: Dienstag, 09. Januar 2024 um 17:42 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only suggest: Read Peirce. And think: How can an entity organized within Firstness [ pure vague feeling] produce an entity organized within the much more restrictive mode of Secondness [an actual single form]? Think of this situation in terms of ‘information -content. Can an entity with a low information content [ ie, just a feeling]..produce an entity with a higher information content [ a singular thing]? How? Where does it get that increased information to form something that is so much more organized? How does pure indeterminacy [Firstness] produce something determined [ Secondness]. You are moving into magical assumptions! Tha’s why the outline by Peirce in “EP:272 “A Sign , or Representamen, is a First which stands iin such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant”…. ….Has to be understood as referring to ordinal numbers rather than the modal categories. Peirce warned of this error [p 271 note] “The conception of a First, improperly called an ‘object’ and of aSecond, should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness’. I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood how they can come to such a conc Again - if you read what he wrote - Peirce was referring to the RELATIONS between the ’nodes’ [Representamen, Object, Interpretant] and to these relations as determinants. He was not referring to their mode-of-being, or the categories. And - just a wee bit of thought - would lead you to realize that something in a. Mode of Firstness [pure indeterminacy] doesn’t have the informational capacity to produce something in a mode of either Secondness or Thirdness with their much more restrictive natures! Edwina On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Supplement: All in all, I have the feeling, that by trying to distinguish the representamen from the object, and the immediate from the dynamical object, and including memory, then you look at more and more subsigns, the closer you try to analyse. But maybe that doesn´t matter, because with the mind it is the same, you cannot analyse mind by closer and closer looking at it? So, is semiotics rather a matter of somehow hovering over the situation, a matter of "Gestalt" (overall figure)? Another problem I see, is, that the sign determines the interpretant, that would be an upward determination in categoriality- I know that not everybody agrees, that sign-object-interpretant are categorically 1-2-3. This would mean, that the categories do not only apply to modes of being (classification), but also to generalization of triadic composition. I think so, because, well, categories should apply to everything, or at least to triadicity, whether this triadicity is a relation of classification, composition, or determination. Anyway, from this point of view on, an upward determination (from 1ns to 3ns) is odd. So I guess, that what determines the interpretant is not only the sign, but the sign and the interpreter´s mind. Mind, of course, includes 3ns. Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr Von: "Helmut Raulien" An: "Edwina Taborsky" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Edwina, list, ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the knowledge of new snow is part of the immediate object, because this information is transported by the sign/representamen (while the real snow is not transported, it keeps lying there, so it is the material part of the DO). And the knowledge, that snow may be handled by using a shovel, is not part of the sign, but comes from the memory. Now what is this remembered memory? Is it part of the dynamical object of "snow, actual and general&quo
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
individuals by attaching names to lines >>>> increases the information being conveyed by making those individuals more >>>> definite (increasing logical depth) and those concepts more determinate >>>> (increasing logical breadth). As a dyadic relation, the EG for killing has >>>> two lines and three names, while as genuine triadic relations, the EGs for >>>> representing/mediating and giving have three lines and four names each (as >>>> I have noted previously). >>>> >>>> When it comes to ordinal numbers, phaneroscopic analysis of the genuine >>>> triadic relation of representing/mediating establishes that the sign is >>>> the first (simplest) correlate, the object is the second (of middling >>>> complexity), and the interpretant is the third (most complex). The upshot >>>> is that there is only the genuine correlate for the sign itself, there are >>>> genuine (dynamical) and degenerate (immediate) correlates for the object, >>>> and there are genuine (final), degenerate (dynamical), and doubly >>>> degenerate (immediate) correlates for the interpretant. Nevertheless, the >>>> dyadic relations of determining are always from the object through the >>>> sign to the interpretant, such that the sign is passive with respect to >>>> the object and active with respect to the interpretant (EP 2:544n22, >>>> 1906). Again ... >>>> >>>> CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, >>>> which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both >>>> determined by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines >>>> the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the >>>> interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this >>>> "sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates >>>> of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. >>>> (EP 2:410, 1907) >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >>>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 10:06 PM Jerry LR Chandler >>>> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote: >>>>> Following Robert’s efforts to clarify meanings of terminology in symbolic >>>>> logics... >>>>>> On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:45 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt >>>>> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> The directionality of semiosis is such that the object determines the >>>>>> sign while being unaffected by that sign, and the sign determines the >>>>>> interpretant while being unaffected by that interpretant. >>>>> >>>>> Jon: >>>>> >>>>> Given your background as an engineer, I would appreciate your opinion on >>>>> the following. >>>>> >>>>> In recent years, I have turned my attention to the distinctions between >>>>> the classical philosophy of signs, originating in the medical arts and >>>>> other simpler perspectives of communications. Let’s call these texts as >>>>> “semiology” texts. In these writings, I do not find any reason not to >>>>> assume that both the object (detected by writer) and the signs that were >>>>> described by the ancients in scripts were naturally external to the >>>>> writer. >>>>> So, the questions arises, how does one locate the origins of the “triadic >>>>> relations”? >>>>> >>>>> Then the question arises, how does one distinguish CSP’s “semiotics”. >>>>> Which semantic aspects of the “triadic relations” are external? >>>>> Which semantic aspects of the "triadic relations are internal to the >>>>> describer? >>>>> >>>>> In other words, Where does the syntax for triadic relation originate? >>>>> And, Where does the syntax for triadic relation reside? >>>>> >>>>> And, how would such a determination fix the differentiation between the >>>>> adjectives (…ness) and the numbers, either / or cardinal or ordinal? …. >>>>> neither /nor? >>>>> Cheers >>>>> >>>>> Jerry >>> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >>> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >>> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >>> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the >>> links! >>> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . >>> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu >>> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in >>> the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >>> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >>> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the >> links! >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu >> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in >> the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
t> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >>> On Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 10:06 PM Jerry LR Chandler >>> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote: >>>> Following Robert’s efforts to clarify meanings of terminology in symbolic >>>> logics... >>>>> On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:45 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt >>>> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> The directionality of semiosis is such that the object determines the >>>>> sign while being unaffected by that sign, and the sign determines the >>>>> interpretant while being unaffected by that interpretant. >>>> >>>> Jon: >>>> >>>> Given your background as an engineer, I would appreciate your opinion on >>>> the following. >>>> >>>> In recent years, I have turned my attention to the distinctions between >>>> the classical philosophy of signs, originating in the medical arts and >>>> other simpler perspectives of communications. Let’s call these texts as >>>> “semiology” texts. In these writings, I do not find any reason not to >>>> assume that both the object (detected by writer) and the signs that were >>>> described by the ancients in scripts were naturally external to the writer. >>>> So, the questions arises, how does one locate the origins of the “triadic >>>> relations”? >>>> >>>> Then the question arises, how does one distinguish CSP’s “semiotics”. >>>> Which semantic aspects of the “triadic relations” are external? >>>> Which semantic aspects of the "triadic relations are internal to the >>>> describer? >>>> >>>> In other words, Where does the syntax for triadic relation originate? >>>> And, Where does the syntax for triadic relation reside? >>>> >>>> And, how would such a determination fix the differentiation between the >>>> adjectives (…ness) and the numbers, either / or cardinal or ordinal? …. >>>> neither /nor? >>>> Cheers >>>> >>>> Jerry >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the >> links! >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu >> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in >> the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Representing sign relations in existential graphs
xamples for representing sign relations in EGs -- including EGs that link together whatever graphs are necessary to express anything. I want to emphasize that I was inspired by some of Peirce's writings, but some examples go beyond what Peirce himself had said or done. I'll start with my previous example, consider the word "cat' as a sign-object A in a relation of representation r to a concept of a cat B to determine a fuzzy animal C as the interpretation of the sign. Following is an EG that represents the sentence: "The word "cat" represents a concept CAT to determine a particular animal named Felix." Represents /|\ "cat" CAT Felix Shorter sentence: "The word 'cat' represents a cat named Felix." The next EG expresses the sentence "The word 'Felix' represents a cat Felix that is portrayed by a photograph." Represents /|\ "Felix" CAT Felix---PortrayedByPhoto The label Photo refers to a photograph of the cat. Since Peirce himself had hoped to represent moving images, one might replace the label Photo with an actual photograph of the cat, Nobody knows exactly what Peirce himself might have done, but we can say that we were inspired by Peirce to make that extension to EGs. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
s from the object through the sign to the >> interpretant, such that the sign is passive with respect to the object and >> active with respect to the interpretant (EP 2:544n22, 1906). Again ... >> >> CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which >> mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined >> by the object relatively to the interpretant, and determines the >> interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the >> interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this >> "sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates >> of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. (EP >> 2:410, 1907) >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> <http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> >> On Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 10:06 PM Jerry LR Chandler >> mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>> wrote: >>> Following Robert’s efforts to clarify meanings of terminology in symbolic >>> logics... >>>> On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:45 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt >>> <mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>> wrote: >>>> >>>> The directionality of semiosis is such that the object determines the sign >>>> while being unaffected by that sign, and the sign determines the >>>> interpretant while being unaffected by that interpretant. >>> >>> Jon: >>> >>> Given your background as an engineer, I would appreciate your opinion on >>> the following. >>> >>> In recent years, I have turned my attention to the distinctions between the >>> classical philosophy of signs, originating in the medical arts and other >>> simpler perspectives of communications. Let’s call these texts as >>> “semiology” texts. In these writings, I do not find any reason not to >>> assume that both the object (detected by writer) and the signs that were >>> described by the ancients in scripts were naturally external to the writer. >>> So, the questions arises, how does one locate the origins of the “triadic >>> relations”? >>> >>> Then the question arises, how does one distinguish CSP’s “semiotics”. >>> Which semantic aspects of the “triadic relations” are external? >>> Which semantic aspects of the "triadic relations are internal to the >>> describer? >>> >>> In other words, Where does the syntax for triadic relation originate? >>> And, Where does the syntax for triadic relation reside? >>> >>> And, how would such a determination fix the differentiation between the >>> adjectives (…ness) and the numbers, either / or cardinal or ordinal? …. >>> neither /nor? >>> Cheers >>> >>> Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
terpretant is the third (most complex). The upshot > is that there is only the genuine correlate for the sign itself, there are > genuine (dynamical) and degenerate (immediate) correlates for the object, > and there are genuine (final), degenerate (dynamical), and doubly > degenerate (immediate) correlates for the interpretant. Nevertheless, the > dyadic relations of determining are always from the object through the sign > to the interpretant, such that the sign is passive with respect to the > object and active with respect to the interpretant (EP 2:544n22, 1906). > Again ... > > CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, > which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both > determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines > the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause > the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of > this "sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two > correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of > the sign. (EP 2:410, 1907) > > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 10:06 PM Jerry LR Chandler < > jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > >> Following Robert’s efforts to clarify meanings of terminology in symbolic >> logics... >> >> On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:45 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt >> wrote: >> >> The directionality of semiosis is such that the object determines the >> sign while being unaffected by that sign, and the sign determines the >> interpretant while being unaffected by that interpretant. >> >> Jon: >> >> Given your background as an engineer, I would appreciate your opinion on >> the following. >> >> In recent years, I have turned my attention to the distinctions between >> the classical philosophy of signs, originating in the medical arts and >> other simpler perspectives of communications. Let’s call these texts as >> “semiology” texts. In these writings, I do not find any reason not to >> assume that both the object (detected by writer) and the signs that were >> described by the ancients in scripts were naturally external to the writer. >> So, the questions arises, how does one locate the origins of the “triadic >> relations”? >> >> Then the question arises, how does one distinguish CSP’s “semiotics”. >> Which semantic aspects of the “triadic relations” are external? >> Which semantic aspects of the "triadic relations are internal to the >> describer? >> >> In other words, Where does the syntax for triadic relation originate? >> And, Where does the syntax for triadic relation reside? >> >> And, how would such a determination fix the differentiation between the >> adjectives (…ness) and the numbers, either / or cardinal or ordinal? …. >> neither /nor? >> Cheers >> >> Jerry >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
een the >> classical philosophy of signs, originating in the medical arts and other >> simpler perspectives of communications. Let’s call these texts as >> “semiology” texts. In these writings, I do not find any reason not to >> assume that both the object (detected by writer) and the signs that were >> described by the ancients in scripts were naturally external to the writer. >> So, the questions arises, how does one locate the origins of the “triadic >> relations”? >> >> Then the question arises, how does one distinguish CSP’s “semiotics”. >> Which semantic aspects of the “triadic relations” are external? >> Which semantic aspects of the "triadic relations are internal to the >> describer? >> >> In other words, Where does the syntax for triadic relation originate? >> And, Where does the syntax for triadic relation reside? >> >> And, how would such a determination fix the differentiation between the >> adjectives (…ness) and the numbers, either / or cardinal or ordinal? …. >> neither /nor? >> Cheers >> >> Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
correlates for the object, and there are genuine (final), degenerate (dynamical), and doubly degenerate (immediate) correlates for the interpretant. Nevertheless, the dyadic relations of determining are always from the object through the sign to the interpretant, such that the sign is passive with respect to the object and active with respect to the interpretant (EP 2:544n22, 1906). Again ... CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." The object and the interpretant are thus merely the two correlates of the sign; the one being antecedent, the other consequent of the sign. (EP 2:410, 1907) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 10:06 PM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > Following Robert’s efforts to clarify meanings of terminology in symbolic > logics... > > On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:45 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > The directionality of semiosis is such that the object determines the sign > while being unaffected by that sign, and the sign determines the > interpretant while being unaffected by that interpretant. > > Jon: > > Given your background as an engineer, I would appreciate your opinion on > the following. > > In recent years, I have turned my attention to the distinctions between > the classical philosophy of signs, originating in the medical arts and > other simpler perspectives of communications. Let’s call these texts as > “semiology” texts. In these writings, I do not find any reason not to > assume that both the object (detected by writer) and the signs that were > described by the ancients in scripts were naturally external to the writer. > So, the questions arises, how does one locate the origins of the “triadic > relations”? > > Then the question arises, how does one distinguish CSP’s “semiotics”. > Which semantic aspects of the “triadic relations” are external? > Which semantic aspects of the "triadic relations are internal to the > describer? > > In other words, Where does the syntax for triadic relation originate? > And, Where does the syntax for triadic relation reside? > > And, how would such a determination fix the differentiation between the > adjectives (…ness) and the numbers, either / or cardinal or ordinal? …. > neither /nor? > Cheers > > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Helmut - I think you have a lot of misunderstandings of Peirce - and can only suggest: Read Peirce. And think: How can an entity organized within Firstness [ pure vague feeling] produce an entity organized within the much more restrictive mode of Secondness [an actual single form]? Think of this situation in terms of ‘information -content. Can an entity with a low information content [ ie, just a feeling]..produce an entity with a higher information content [ a singular thing]? How? Where does it get that increased information to form something that is so much more organized? How does pure indeterminacy [Firstness] produce something determined [ Secondness]. You are moving into magical assumptions! Tha’s why the outline by Peirce in “EP:272 “A Sign , or Representamen, is a First which stands iin such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant”…. ….Has to be understood as referring to ordinal numbers rather than the modal categories. Peirce warned of this error [p 271 note] “The conception of a First, improperly called an ‘object’ and of aSecond, should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness’. I am aware of a number of people on this list who insist that these words First, Second, Third, refer to he modal categories - but I’ve never understood how they can come to such a conc Again - if you read what he wrote - Peirce was referring to the RELATIONS between the ’nodes’ [Representamen, Object, Interpretant] and to these relations as determinants. He was not referring to their mode-of-being, or the categories. And - just a wee bit of thought - would lead you to realize that something in a. Mode of Firstness [pure indeterminacy] doesn’t have the informational capacity to produce something in a mode of either Secondness or Thirdness with their much more restrictive natures! Edwina > On Jan 9, 2024, at 11:08 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > > Supplement: All in all, I have the feeling, that by trying to distinguish the > representamen from the object, and the immediate from the dynamical object, > and including memory, then you look at more and more subsigns, the closer you > try to analyse. But maybe that doesn´t matter, because with the mind it is > the same, you cannot analyse mind by closer and closer looking at it? So, is > semiotics rather a matter of somehow hovering over the situation, a matter of > "Gestalt" (overall figure)? > > Another problem I see, is, that the sign determines the interpretant, that > would be an upward determination in categoriality- I know that not everybody > agrees, that sign-object-interpretant are categorically 1-2-3. This would > mean, that the categories do not only apply to modes of being > (classification), but also to generalization of triadic composition. I think > so, because, well, categories should apply to everything, or at least to > triadicity, whether this triadicity is a relation of classification, > composition, or determination. Anyway, from this point of view on, an upward > determination (from 1ns to 3ns) is odd. So I guess, that what determines the > interpretant is not only the sign, but the sign and the interpreter´s mind. > Mind, of course, includes 3ns. > > Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr > Von: "Helmut Raulien" > An: "Edwina Taborsky" > Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" > > Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > Edwina, list, > > ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the > "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled > away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware > of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the knowledge of > new snow is part of the immediate object, because this information is > transported by the sign/representamen (while the real snow is not > transported, it keeps lying there, so it is the material part of the DO). And > the knowledge, that snow may be handled by using a shovel, is not part of the > sign, but comes from the memory. Now what is this remembered memory? Is it > part of the dynamical object of "snow, actual and general", or is this > memorization another representamen, that merges with the other representamen > to a blended one? But anyway I am confused now, because the knowledge, that > the white, fluffy layer is snow, comes from the memory too. So what is what? > Or is it not one sign, but a cascade or cluster of signs with different > objects, some from the memory, and others from the real snow? > > Best, Helmut > > > Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Supplement: All in all, I have the feeling, that by trying to distinguish the representamen from the object, and the immediate from the dynamical object, and including memory, then you look at more and more subsigns, the closer you try to analyse. But maybe that doesn´t matter, because with the mind it is the same, you cannot analyse mind by closer and closer looking at it? So, is semiotics rather a matter of somehow hovering over the situation, a matter of "Gestalt" (overall figure)? Another problem I see, is, that the sign determines the interpretant, that would be an upward determination in categoriality- I know that not everybody agrees, that sign-object-interpretant are categorically 1-2-3. This would mean, that the categories do not only apply to modes of being (classification), but also to generalization of triadic composition. I think so, because, well, categories should apply to everything, or at least to triadicity, whether this triadicity is a relation of classification, composition, or determination. Anyway, from this point of view on, an upward determination (from 1ns to 3ns) is odd. So I guess, that what determines the interpretant is not only the sign, but the sign and the interpreter´s mind. Mind, of course, includes 3ns. Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 19:44 Uhr Von: "Helmut Raulien" An: "Edwina Taborsky" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Edwina, list, ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the knowledge of new snow is part of the immediate object, because this information is transported by the sign/representamen (while the real snow is not transported, it keeps lying there, so it is the material part of the DO). And the knowledge, that snow may be handled by using a shovel, is not part of the sign, but comes from the memory. Now what is this remembered memory? Is it part of the dynamical object of "snow, actual and general", or is this memorization another representamen, that merges with the other representamen to a blended one? But anyway I am confused now, because the knowledge, that the white, fluffy layer is snow, comes from the memory too. So what is what? Or is it not one sign, but a cascade or cluster of signs with different objects, some from the memory, and others from the real snow? Best, Helmut Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 17:47 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Helmut, list I’m not quite sure if I understand your post - I don’t think that ‘habits’ [sleeping in memory?] are equivalent to Dynamicl Objects - and the Dynamical Object is always a part of the sign; ie, the DO doesn’t exist on its own outside of the semiosic interaction. With reference to the Interpretant changing the nature of the Object, I’d agree -within the understanding of the reality of evolution. That is, - a disease, formerly reduced in its effects by an antibiotic, ….understood as O->reduction in effect, becomes, over time changed by those results [ reduction in effect] to become immune to the antibiotic. - a tree, attacked by insects [ Objects]….which reduces its capacity to live [Interpretant: by the reduction of the leaves]….develops internal chemicals in the leaves to thwart the insects [O]. But then, the insects develop new immunities to those chemicals! - a word [Object] — such as the word ‘virus’…. Changes its meaning over time… The point is - such changes in the nature of the functioning of the Object in the world [ disease, insects, words] can only take place if the sign vehicle [ the disease, the tree, the word] are functioning in a mode of Thirdness. And Thirdness is vital to the nature of the universe. Again, I stress the importance of the categories in the functioning of semiosis. Edwina On Jan 8, 2024, at 10:19 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Edwina, yes, I agree. Only the model I used is different: While you say, that the representamen grows, I talk about old and new sign. Like the snow situation is a continuous thing in reality, in the mind of the interpreter it serves as a new sign again and again. If you say, the snow situation is the representamen, ok, then it grows, but for me the appearance of the snow situation in the interpreter´s mind is the representamen in either case of noticing it. What grows in the interpreter´s mind, is the object of snow. Whether that is the immediate or the dynamical object, is hard to decide for me: At times of no sign, it still is in
[PEIRCE-L] Categorizations of triadic Relationships (Was Re: Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce)
Following Robert’s efforts to clarify meanings of terminology in symbolic logics... > On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:45 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > The directionality of semiosis is such that the object determines the sign > while being unaffected by that sign, and the sign determines the interpretant > while being unaffected by that interpretant. Jon: Given your background as an engineer, I would appreciate your opinion on the following. In recent years, I have turned my attention to the distinctions between the classical philosophy of signs, originating in the medical arts and other simpler perspectives of communications. Let’s call these texts as “semiology” texts. In these writings, I do not find any reason not to assume that both the object (detected by writer) and the signs that were described by the ancients in scripts were naturally external to the writer. So, the questions arises, how does one locate the origins of the “triadic relations”? Then the question arises, how does one distinguish CSP’s “semiotics”. Which semantic aspects of the “triadic relations” are external? Which semantic aspects of the "triadic relations are internal to the describer? In other words, Where does the syntax for triadic relation originate? And, Where does the syntax for triadic relation reside? And, how would such a determination fix the differentiation between the adjectives (…ness) and the numbers, either / or cardinal or ordinal? …. neither /nor? Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Edwina, list, ok, I too think, that the DO does not exist without the sign, so the "sleeping" memory, in this case the knowledge, that snow can be shoveled away, is just a memory then. But in the next sign, when the person is aware of a new white, fluffy layer on the lawn and the pathway, the knowledge of new snow is part of the immediate object, because this information is transported by the sign/representamen (while the real snow is not transported, it keeps lying there, so it is the material part of the DO). And the knowledge, that snow may be handled by using a shovel, is not part of the sign, but comes from the memory. Now what is this remembered memory? Is it part of the dynamical object of "snow, actual and general", or is this memorization another representamen, that merges with the other representamen to a blended one? But anyway I am confused now, because the knowledge, that the white, fluffy layer is snow, comes from the memory too. So what is what? Or is it not one sign, but a cascade or cluster of signs with different objects, some from the memory, and others from the real snow? Best, Helmut Gesendet: Montag, 08. Januar 2024 um 17:47 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Helmut, list I’m not quite sure if I understand your post - I don’t think that ‘habits’ [sleeping in memory?] are equivalent to Dynamicl Objects - and the Dynamical Object is always a part of the sign; ie, the DO doesn’t exist on its own outside of the semiosic interaction. With reference to the Interpretant changing the nature of the Object, I’d agree -within the understanding of the reality of evolution. That is, - a disease, formerly reduced in its effects by an antibiotic, ….understood as O->reduction in effect, becomes, over time changed by those results [ reduction in effect] to become immune to the antibiotic. - a tree, attacked by insects [ Objects]….which reduces its capacity to live [Interpretant: by the reduction of the leaves]….develops internal chemicals in the leaves to thwart the insects [O]. But then, the insects develop new immunities to those chemicals! - a word [Object] — such as the word ‘virus’…. Changes its meaning over time… The point is - such changes in the nature of the functioning of the Object in the world [ disease, insects, words] can only take place if the sign vehicle [ the disease, the tree, the word] are functioning in a mode of Thirdness. And Thirdness is vital to the nature of the universe. Again, I stress the importance of the categories in the functioning of semiosis. Edwina On Jan 8, 2024, at 10:19 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: Edwina, yes, I agree. Only the model I used is different: While you say, that the representamen grows, I talk about old and new sign. Like the snow situation is a continuous thing in reality, in the mind of the interpreter it serves as a new sign again and again. If you say, the snow situation is the representamen, ok, then it grows, but for me the appearance of the snow situation in the interpreter´s mind is the representamen in either case of noticing it. What grows in the interpreter´s mind, is the object of snow. Whether that is the immediate or the dynamical object, is hard to decide for me: At times of no sign, it still is in the interpreter´s memory: How to handle the snow. But while this knowledge is sleeping in the memory, it is not a part of any sign, so it is dynamical object, i would say. Anyway, it is hard for me to distinguish between immediate and dynamical/real object: An object part may be dynamical in the intentional or effectual interpretant, but immediate in the cominterpretant, and sometimes it may be hard to know the size of the commens, because, especially in the internet, nobody knows who is taking part in a discourse. I know, that the flow of determination can categorally not go upwards. The object determines the sign, the sign the interpretant, and the interpretant changes the object, which is some sort of determination too. And then I guess, as the interpretant serves as a new sign, this sign is, besides by the old interpretant, also determined by the now having changed object. This looks like a redundancy of course, but if the object is changed in a larger context/commens, this change too determines the sign of a smaller (sub-) commens, and in this case, this determination part is not redundant with the information/determination carried by the interpretant in the narrower commens. Like this, i think we might better see the complexity of all this, and how signs interact via object change, if we construct or tell more examples. In signs including physical action, there is an energetic interpretant, and the object change is material as well. The material part of the dynamical object then is easy to
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?
gt; relation name has three dots (also called "hooks" or "pegs" in other >> writings) to which Peirce assigned those names in the subsequent text. Here >> is an image of that handwritten sentence in R 670 (1911). >> >> [image: image.png] >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sun, Jan 7, 2024 at 11:54 AM Ben Udell wrote: >> >>> Hi, Robert, all, >>> >>> I wish a whole lot of us 15 or 20 years ago had noticed a paragraph that >>> you quote in your message, >>> >>> *The conceptions of a First, improperly called an "object," and of a >>> Second should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or >>> Secondness, both of which are involved in the conceptions of First and >>> Second. A First is something to which (or, more accurately, to some >>> substitute for which, thus introducing Thirdness) attention may be >>> directed. It thus involves Secondness as well as Firstness; while a Second >>> is a First considered as (here comes Thirdness) a subject of a Secondness. >>> An object in the proper sense is a Second.* (EP 2: 271) >>> >>> We had some long arguments many years ago at peirce-l about what Peirce >>> meant by "First" etc., when he wasn't explicitly tying those adjectives to >>> the categories. Joe Ransdell, Gary Richmond, I, and probably others, >>> argued that, yes, Peirce was alluding to his categories. >>> >>> I also remember a whole lot of discussion about Peirce's shift to >>> viewing the sign as not only determining the interpretant but also being >>> determined by the object. At the time, a 1906 quote was the earliest that >>> I could find (I happened to find it at Commens.org I think), and Joe came >>> up with a quote that prefigured Peirce's shift, from 1905 or 1904, I wish I >>> could remember (and I tried years ago without success to find Joe's message >>> about it), but I don't want send anybody on a wild goose chase. >>> >>> Folks, here, by the way, is a link to Robert's "76 DEFINITIONS OF THE >>> SIGN BY C.S. PEIRCE" >>> http://perso.numericable.fr/robert.marty/semiotique/76defeng.htm >>> >>> It includes added quotes absent from the Arisbe version. >>> >>> Robert, you wrote below that "*O → S → I*" reads: >>> >>> "*O determines S, which determines I*." >>> >>> I haven't tried to learn any category theory, since I got intimidated by >>> its being reputedly based in very high or abstract algebra. >>> >>> Generally I recall people saying that — >>> >>> an object determines a sign to determine an interpretant >>> >>> — rather than that — >>> >>> an object determines a sign, which determines an interpretant >>> >>> — a phrasing which makes the sign's determination of an interpretant >>> seem possibly coincidental to the sign's being determined by an object, >>> like dominoes toppling, each one the next, though the earlier dominoes are >>> not finally-caused to topple the later ones (except if they are literal >>> dominoes that some person set up to fall that way). I remember (though not >>> in detail) a whole lot of discussion of this at peirce-l. Does the >>> category-theoretical understanding of "O determines S, which determines I" >>> avoid that seeming problem? To put it another way, how does "*O → S → >>> I*" keep from breaking down into dyads "*O → S*" and "*S → I*"? I'm >>> not trying to be argumentative, I'm actually wondering. >>> >>> Best, Ben >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Helmut, list I’m not quite sure if I understand your post - I don’t think that ‘habits’ [sleeping in memory?] are equivalent to Dynamicl Objects - and the Dynamical Object is always a part of the sign; ie, the DO doesn’t exist on its own outside of the semiosic interaction. With reference to the Interpretant changing the nature of the Object, I’d agree -within the understanding of the reality of evolution. That is, - a disease, formerly reduced in its effects by an antibiotic, ….understood as O->reduction in effect, becomes, over time changed by those results [ reduction in effect] to become immune to the antibiotic. - a tree, attacked by insects [ Objects]….which reduces its capacity to live [Interpretant: by the reduction of the leaves]….develops internal chemicals in the leaves to thwart the insects [O]. But then, the insects develop new immunities to those chemicals! - a word [Object] — such as the word ‘virus’…. Changes its meaning over time… The point is - such changes in the nature of the functioning of the Object in the world [ disease, insects, words] can only take place if the sign vehicle [ the disease, the tree, the word] are functioning in a mode of Thirdness. And Thirdness is vital to the nature of the universe. Again, I stress the importance of the categories in the functioning of semiosis. Edwina > On Jan 8, 2024, at 10:19 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Edwina, yes, I agree. Only the model I used is different: While you say, that > the representamen grows, I talk about old and new sign. Like the snow > situation is a continuous thing in reality, in the mind of the interpreter it > serves as a new sign again and again. If you say, the snow situation is the > representamen, ok, then it grows, but for me the appearance of the snow > situation in the interpreter´s mind is the representamen in either case of > noticing it. What grows in the interpreter´s mind, is the object of snow. > Whether that is the immediate or the dynamical object, is hard to decide for > me: At times of no sign, it still is in the interpreter´s memory: How to > handle the snow. But while this knowledge is sleeping in the memory, it is > not a part of any sign, so it is dynamical object, i would say. Anyway, it is > hard for me to distinguish between immediate and dynamical/real object: An > object part may be dynamical in the intentional or effectual interpretant, > but immediate in the cominterpretant, and sometimes it may be hard to know > the size of the commens, because, especially in the internet, nobody knows > who is taking part in a discourse. I know, that the flow of determination can > categorally not go upwards. The object determines the sign, the sign the > interpretant, and the interpretant changes the object, which is some sort of > determination too. And then I guess, as the interpretant serves as a new > sign, this sign is, besides by the old interpretant, also determined by the > now having changed object. This looks like a redundancy of course, but if the > object is changed in a larger context/commens, this change too determines the > sign of a smaller (sub-) commens, and in this case, this determination part > is not redundant with the information/determination carried by the > interpretant in the narrower commens. Like this, i think we might better see > the complexity of all this, and how signs interact via object change, if we > construct or tell more examples. In signs including physical action, there is > an energetic interpretant, and the object change is material as well. The > material part of the dynamical object then is easy to identify, as it is > spatially defined, it can be marked. But the conceptual part of the dynamical > object can not, that is why it is not always easy to exactly tell it from the > immediate object, i guess. > > Best, Helmut > > > Gesendet: Sonntag, 07. Januar 2024 um 19:28 Uhr > Von: "Edwina Taborsky" > An: "Helmut Raulien" > Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" > > Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > Helmut - I think one has to be clear about terms. Do you mean that the > Interpretant [ which is a relation not a thing-in-itself] becomes a new triad > or only a new Representamen? > > My own view is that the Interpretant, which ‘holds and moulds’ information, > contributes to the formation of both a new triad [as, for example, when > nutrients from the food-as-object, contribute to the formation of the > cell-as a triadic Sign] ; when information about the weather [as object] > contributes to my Interpretant decision to shovel the snow…and I then, > remember in the future what to do when snow arrives.. > > That is, this interpretant would a
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?
That's okay Jerry ... I'm just trying to stay within the framework of exact philosophy as Peirce sees it : *The doctrine of exact philosophy, as I understand that phrase, is, that all danger of error in philosophy will be reduced to a minimum by treating the problems as mathematically as possible,** that is, by construction some sort of a diagram representing that which is supposed to be open to the observation of every scientific intelligence, and thereupon mathematically,--that is, intuitionally,--deducing the consequences of that hypothesis. *(NEM IV:12, unidentified fragment) Regards, Robert Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* Le lun. 8 janv. 2024 à 17:11, Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> a écrit : > > > On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:18 AM, robert marty wrote: > > Jerry, List > > You know very well that we don't mention "what goes without saying" in > mathematics. > > > Sorry, Robert. > Interesting but hardly compelling response. > > Human communications in multidisciplinary forums such as this are open to > misunderstandings. To “invoke” such a phrase is meaningless to your > readers. > > In applied mathematics, the calculations are contained to the > interpretations of the symbols asserted in the formula. > > In philosophy, each individual philosopher assigns symbols and asserts > premises ad hoc with an intended “unit of meaning.” Isn’t that what > philosophical discourse is all about? > > Cheers > Jerry > > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?
> On Jan 8, 2024, at 9:18 AM, robert marty wrote: > > Jerry, List > > You know very well that we don't mention "what goes without saying" in > mathematics. > Sorry, Robert. Interesting but hardly compelling response. Human communications in multidisciplinary forums such as this are open to misunderstandings. To “invoke” such a phrase is meaningless to your readers. In applied mathematics, the calculations are contained to the interpretations of the symbols asserted in the formula. In philosophy, each individual philosopher assigns symbols and asserts premises ad hoc with an intended “unit of meaning.” Isn’t that what philosophical discourse is all about? Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Helmut, List: HR: The object determines the sign, the sign the interpretant, and *the interpretant changes the object*, which is some sort of determination too. According to Peirce, the bolded part is incorrect. CSP: As a *medium*, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. In its relation to the Object, the Sign is *passive*; that is to say, its correspondence to the Object is brought about by an effect upon the Sign, the Object remaining unaffected. On the other hand, in its relation to the Interpretant the Sign is *active*, determining the Interpretant without being itself thereby affected. (EP 2:544n22, 1906) The directionality of semiosis is such that the object determines the sign while being unaffected by that sign, and the sign determines the interpretant while being unaffected by that interpretant. Hence, the object determines the interpretant through the mediation of the sign while being unaffected by that interpretant. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Jan 8, 2024 at 9:20 AM Helmut Raulien wrote: > Edwina, yes, I agree. Only the model I used is different: While you say, > that the representamen grows, I talk about old and new sign. Like the snow > situation is a continuous thing in reality, in the mind of the interpreter > it serves as a new sign again and again. If you say, the snow situation is > the representamen, ok, then it grows, but for me the appearance of the snow > situation in the interpreter´s mind is the representamen in either case of > noticing it. What grows in the interpreter´s mind, is the object of snow. > Whether that is the immediate or the dynamical object, is hard to decide > for me: At times of no sign, it still is in the interpreter´s memory: How > to handle the snow. But while this knowledge is sleeping in the memory, it > is not a part of any sign, so it is dynamical object, i would say. Anyway, > it is hard for me to distinguish between immediate and dynamical/real > object: An object part may be dynamical in the intentional or effectual > interpretant, but immediate in the cominterpretant, and sometimes it may be > hard to know the size of the commens, because, especially in the internet, > nobody knows who is taking part in a discourse. I know, that the flow of > determination can categorally not go upwards. The object determines the > sign, the sign the interpretant, and the interpretant changes the object, > which is some sort of determination too. And then I guess, as the > interpretant serves as a new sign, this sign is, besides by the old > interpretant, also determined by the now having changed object. This looks > like a redundancy of course, but if the object is changed in a larger > context/commens, this change too determines the sign of a smaller (sub-) > commens, and in this case, this determination part is not redundant with > the information/determination carried by the interpretant in the narrower > commens. Like this, i think we might better see the complexity of all this, > and how signs interact via object change, if we construct or tell more > examples. In signs including physical action, there is an energetic > interpretant, and the object change is material as well. The material part > of the dynamical object then is easy to identify, as it is spatially > defined, it can be marked. But the conceptual part of the dynamical object > can not, that is why it is not always easy to exactly tell it from the > immediate object, i guess. > > Best, Helmut > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Edwina, yes, I agree. Only the model I used is different: While you say, that the representamen grows, I talk about old and new sign. Like the snow situation is a continuous thing in reality, in the mind of the interpreter it serves as a new sign again and again. If you say, the snow situation is the representamen, ok, then it grows, but for me the appearance of the snow situation in the interpreter´s mind is the representamen in either case of noticing it. What grows in the interpreter´s mind, is the object of snow. Whether that is the immediate or the dynamical object, is hard to decide for me: At times of no sign, it still is in the interpreter´s memory: How to handle the snow. But while this knowledge is sleeping in the memory, it is not a part of any sign, so it is dynamical object, i would say. Anyway, it is hard for me to distinguish between immediate and dynamical/real object: An object part may be dynamical in the intentional or effectual interpretant, but immediate in the cominterpretant, and sometimes it may be hard to know the size of the commens, because, especially in the internet, nobody knows who is taking part in a discourse. I know, that the flow of determination can categorally not go upwards. The object determines the sign, the sign the interpretant, and the interpretant changes the object, which is some sort of determination too. And then I guess, as the interpretant serves as a new sign, this sign is, besides by the old interpretant, also determined by the now having changed object. This looks like a redundancy of course, but if the object is changed in a larger context/commens, this change too determines the sign of a smaller (sub-) commens, and in this case, this determination part is not redundant with the information/determination carried by the interpretant in the narrower commens. Like this, i think we might better see the complexity of all this, and how signs interact via object change, if we construct or tell more examples. In signs including physical action, there is an energetic interpretant, and the object change is material as well. The material part of the dynamical object then is easy to identify, as it is spatially defined, it can be marked. But the conceptual part of the dynamical object can not, that is why it is not always easy to exactly tell it from the immediate object, i guess. Best, Helmut Gesendet: Sonntag, 07. Januar 2024 um 19:28 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" An: "Helmut Raulien" Cc: "Peirce-L" , "Edwina Taborsky" Betreff: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Helmut - I think one has to be clear about terms. Do you mean that the Interpretant [ which is a relation not a thing-in-itself] becomes a new triad or only a new Representamen? My own view is that the Interpretant, which ‘holds and moulds’ information, contributes to the formation of both a new triad [as, for example, when nutrients from the food-as-object, contribute to the formation of the cell-as a triadic Sign] ; when information about the weather [as object] contributes to my Interpretant decision to shovel the snow…and I then, remember in the future what to do when snow arrives.. That is, this interpretant would also enhance the knowledge content of the Representamen if it were operating in its mode of Thirdness. That is, Representamens in a mode of Thirdness grow in informational content. And that’s another reason why it’s difficult to create a visual diagram of the semiosic process - those modalities - which are rarely discussed on this site. But, just as we acknowledge the semiosic determinative process of O-R-I…..and even DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. [and I’m assuming everyone knows what these letters stand for…. We also have to acknowledge the modal restrictions, It is obvious that a Possible cannot determine anything other than a Possible, and likewise a Necessitant cannot be determined by anything other than a Necessitant (letter to Lady Welby of December 23, 1908 ) Essentially this sets up restrictions on the development of the informational nature of the triad. That is, an Object in a mode of 2ns cannot determine/produce an Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. A Representamen in a mode of 2ns cannot produce an Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. And it gets even more complex when you Bring in the concept of the genuine and degenerate categorical modes. That is, as an example, there is only one of the ten classes where the Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness. One has to consider - are all three Interpretants in this mode? But - are they all ‘genuine Thirdness or is there any one of the three that is in a degenerate mode [3-1 or 3-2, ie, Thirdness degenerate in the 2nd degree or first degree]? BUT - we have to consider that one cannot move from Firstness to Secondness to Thirdness! Even within another mode - ie, you cannot move from 3-1 to 3-2 to 3-3 without an external ‘assistanc
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?
Jerry, List You know very well that we don't mention "what goes without saying" in mathematics. For example, when Peirce names the classes of signs, he doesn't note that symbols are legisigns, any more than he mentions that the three iconic signs are rhematic. Since my diagram represents a category, an axiom assures us that identity morphism exists for every object. They are rarely mentioned. That's why I didn't worry about it when I realized they'd disappeared. I thought it would lighten the load without doing any damage. For the same reasons, the diagram shows that there are not two but three arrows in O * →* S * →* I, simply because we know or affirm that it represents a category. The third morphism is the compound of the two. It is also, by definition, for those who know what the word "category" means (i.e., for those who know the category axioms). There's no metaphor here; it's a formalization of the triadic sign, implicitly validated by Peirce: *I define a Sign as anything which on the one hand is so determined by an Object and on the other hand so determines an idea in a person's mind, that this latter determination, which I term the Interpretant of the Sign, is thereby mediately determined by that Object. A sign, therefore, has a triadic relation to its Object and to its Interpretant. *(n° 47 bis – 1908 - Letter to Lady Welby in CP 8.343 ). All because for Peirce "determination" means: *renders definitely to be such as it will be* (CP 8.361, 1908) Regards, Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* Le lun. 8 janv. 2024 à 06:07, Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> a écrit : > > > On Jan 7, 2024, at 9:10 AM, robert marty wrote: > > It's clear, then, that the composition of the two determinations gives > rise to the triadic relation for Peirce. That's why I've underlined > "therefore." Consequently, the formalization is simplified considerably, > without any loss of information, by : > > O à S à I > > The arrows represent determinations, and this diagram reads: > > O determines S, which determines I > > Referring to the Peircean conception of a determination: > *We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be > such as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner. *(CP 8.361, 1908) > > We can see that O determines I by transitivity. Peirce verified this in MS > 611 (Nov. 1908). > > This diagram has the considerable advantage of being equivalent to the > mathematical object below: > > Schematic representation of a category with objects *X*, *Y*, *Z* and > morphisms *f*, *g*, *g* ∘ *f*. > <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/ef/Commutative_diagram_for_morphism.svg/200px-Commutative_diagram_for_morphism.svg.png> > (click) > > It's an algebraic category, the simplest there is (non-trivial). This one > is the archetypal example of a category on the > > > Robert: > > You may want to check your mathematical conclusions. > > While I understand that the following details are highly technical in > nature, it is important that mathematics NOT be treated as merely a > symbolic metaphor when an inquiry into the meaning of symbols is under the > microscope. > > The sequence O—> S —> I. as three alphabets symbols and two arrows. > > The schematic diagram referenced by the “click," (which is, by the way, > only a partial representation of a mathematical category,) has three arrows > and repeats the function labels and even composes the two functions. > > In addition, the identity arrows necessary to define a mathematical > category are missing. These notational constraints are essential for the > additional property of closure, which is far beyond the simple property of > transitivity illustrated by the simple sequence of three alphabetic symbols > and two arrows. > > > Cheers > Jerry > > > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?
List: Here is a modified version of my EG with the two dyadic relations of determining now included. Erasing them in accordance with the usual transformation rules gives the other version of my original EG as posted on Friday, its only difference from the one below being the convention for where to locate the three correlate lines of identity around the relation name. Erasing "mediating" instead gives my EG for "the object determines the sign, which determines the interpretant," which again is not false but could be misleading--although the genuine triadic relation of mediating (or representing) *involves *those two dyadic relations, it is not *composed *of them in the sense that it is not built up from them nor reducible to them. [image: image.png] Regards, Jon On Sun, Jan 7, 2024 at 1:39 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > Ben, List: > > I share your concern about describing the *genuine *triadic relation of > mediating (or representing) with its three correlates (sign, object, > interpretant) as if it were reducible to dyadic relations of determining, > which could only be true if it were a *degenerate *triadic relation. It > is not *false *to say, "the object determines the sign, which determines > the interpretant," but it could be misleading because it omits the *mediation > *of the sign by which the object *also *determines the interpretant. > Indeed, it is more accurate to say, "the object determines the sign to > determine the interpretant." Peirce expresses this even more precisely as > follows, in what I consider to be one of his very best definitions of a > sign. > > CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, > which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both > determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines > the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause > the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of > this "sign." (EP 2:410, 1907) > > > That is why I call the relation "mediating" in my Existential Graph (EG) > that I posted on Friday, rather than "representing," although the latter > could be substituted with some loss of generality. Here is that EG again. > > [image: image.png] > > Peirce himself apparently never scribed this EG, but he did scribe the one > for the genuine triadic relation of *giving *with its three correlates > (giver, gift, recipient). As one would expect for *any *genuine triadic > relation, it is isomorphic with the EG above, except that instead of three > heavy lines of identity with the correlate names attached, the relation > name has three dots (also called "hooks" or "pegs" in other writings) to > which Peirce assigned those names in the subsequent text. Here is an image > of that handwritten sentence in R 670 (1911). > > [image: image.png] > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sun, Jan 7, 2024 at 11:54 AM Ben Udell wrote: > >> Hi, Robert, all, >> >> I wish a whole lot of us 15 or 20 years ago had noticed a paragraph that >> you quote in your message, >> >> *The conceptions of a First, improperly called an "object," and of a >> Second should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or >> Secondness, both of which are involved in the conceptions of First and >> Second. A First is something to which (or, more accurately, to some >> substitute for which, thus introducing Thirdness) attention may be >> directed. It thus involves Secondness as well as Firstness; while a Second >> is a First considered as (here comes Thirdness) a subject of a Secondness. >> An object in the proper sense is a Second.* (EP 2: 271) >> >> We had some long arguments many years ago at peirce-l about what Peirce >> meant by "First" etc., when he wasn't explicitly tying those adjectives to >> the categories. Joe Ransdell, Gary Richmond, I, and probably others, >> argued that, yes, Peirce was alluding to his categories. >> >> I also remember a whole lot of discussion about Peirce's shift to viewing >> the sign as not only determining the interpretant but also being determined >> by the object. At the time, a 1906 quote was the earliest that I could >> find (I happened to find it at Commens.org I think), and Joe came up with a >> quote that prefigured Peirce's shift, from 1905 or 1904, I wish I could >> remember (and I tried years ago without success to find Joe's message about >>
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?
so determined by an Object and on the other hand so determines an idea in a person's mind, that this latter determination, which I term the Interpretant of the Sign, is thereby mediately determined by that Object. A sign, therefore, has a triadic relation to its Object and to its Interpretant. *(n° 47 bis – 1908 - Letter to Lady Welby in CP 8.343 ). *Every object of experience excites an idea of some sort; but if that idea is not associated sufficiently and in the right way so with some previous experience so as to narrow the attention, it will not be a sign.* (from n°56 - 1911 - MS 849) This is the latest stage in his reflection on the triadic sign. He extended it to the hexadic sign, defined using a sequence of five determinations between 6 elements everyone knows. The question of the determinations of the decadic sign is still open. I challenge anyone to master the combinatorial explosion of the number of classes of signs without these determinations. Regards, Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* Le dim. 7 janv. 2024 à 18:54, Ben Udell a écrit : > Hi, Robert, all, > > I wish a whole lot of us 15 or 20 years ago had noticed a paragraph that > you quote in your message, > > *The conceptions of a First, improperly called an "object," and of a > Second should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or > Secondness, both of which are involved in the conceptions of First and > Second. A First is something to which (or, more accurately, to some > substitute for which, thus introducing Thirdness) attention may be > directed. It thus involves Secondness as well as Firstness; while a Second > is a First considered as (here comes Thirdness) a subject of a Secondness. > An object in the proper sense is a Second.* (EP 2: 271) > > We had some long arguments many years ago at peirce-l about what Peirce > meant by "First" etc., when he wasn't explicitly tying those adjectives to > the categories. Joe Ransdell, Gary Richmond, I, and probably others, > argued that, yes, Peirce was alluding to his categories. > > I also remember a whole lot of discussion about Peirce's shift to viewing > the sign as not only determining the interpretant but also being determined > by the object. At the time, a 1906 quote was the earliest that I could > find (I happened to find it at Commens.org I think), and Joe came up with a > quote that prefigured Peirce's shift, from 1905 or 1904, I wish I could > remember (and I tried years ago without success to find Joe's message about > it), but I don't want send anybody on a wild goose chase. > > Folks, here, by the way, is a link to Robert's "76 DEFINITIONS OF THE SIGN > BY C.S. PEIRCE" > http://perso.numericable.fr/robert.marty/semiotique/76defeng.htm > > It includes added quotes absent from the Arisbe version. > > Robert, you wrote below that "*O → S → I*" reads: > > "*O determines S, which determines I*." > > I haven't tried to learn any category theory, since I got intimidated by > its being reputedly based in very high or abstract algebra. > > Generally I recall people saying that — > > an object determines a sign to determine an interpretant > > — rather than that — > > an object determines a sign, which determines an interpretant > > — a phrasing which makes the sign's determination of an interpretant seem > possibly coincidental to the sign's being determined by an object, like > dominoes toppling, each one the next, though the earlier dominoes are not > finally-caused to topple the later ones (except if they are literal > dominoes that some person set up to fall that way). I remember (though not > in detail) a whole lot of discussion of this at peirce-l. Does the > category-theoretical understanding of "O determines S, which determines I" > avoid that seeming problem? To put it another way, how does "*O → S → I*" > keep from breaking down into dyads "*O → S*" and "*S → I*"? I'm not > trying to be argumentative, I'm actually wondering. > > Best, Ben > > On 1/7/2024 10:10 AM, robert marty wrote: > > Cécile, List > > I present here, in the most condensed form possible, the merits of a > purely algebraic formalization of Peirce's semiotics, entirely indexed to > the history of its development. > > > *How do we distinguish the correlates of a triadic sign? How do we > formalize the triadic sign?* > > This question arises because the definition of a triad, strictly speaking, > implies no a priori distinction between the elements it links together.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?
> On Jan 7, 2024, at 9:10 AM, robert marty wrote: > > It's clear, then, that the composition of the two determinations gives rise > to the triadic relation for Peirce. That's why I've underlined "therefore." > Consequently, the formalization is simplified considerably, without any loss > of information, by : > > O à S à I > > The arrows represent determinations, and this diagram reads: > > O determines S, which determines I > > Referring to the Peircean conception of a determination: > > We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be such > as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner. (CP 8.361, 1908) > > We can see that O determines I by transitivity. Peirce verified this in MS > 611 (Nov. 1908). > > This diagram has the considerable advantage of being equivalent to the > mathematical object below: > > Schematic representation of a category with objects X, Y, Z and morphisms f, > g, g ∘ f. > <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/ef/Commutative_diagram_for_morphism.svg/200px-Commutative_diagram_for_morphism.svg.png> > (click) > > It's an algebraic category, the simplest there is (non-trivial). This one is > the archetypal example of a category on the > Robert: You may want to check your mathematical conclusions. While I understand that the following details are highly technical in nature, it is important that mathematics NOT be treated as merely a symbolic metaphor when an inquiry into the meaning of symbols is under the microscope. The sequence O—> S —> I. as three alphabets symbols and two arrows. The schematic diagram referenced by the “click," (which is, by the way, only a partial representation of a mathematical category,) has three arrows and repeats the function labels and even composes the two functions. In addition, the identity arrows necessary to define a mathematical category are missing. These notational constraints are essential for the additional property of closure, which is far beyond the simple property of transitivity illustrated by the simple sequence of three alphabetic symbols and two arrows. Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Representing sign relations in existential graphs
> On Jan 6, 2024, at 9:48 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Since nobody has found an EG drawn by Peirce to represent the sign relation, In the 1870’s or early eighties, CSP referred to the ammonia molecule as a symbol. More precisely, pictorially, he demonstrated the three bonds between the three hydrogen atoms and the central nitrogen. The historical precedence must be given substantial weight in discussion of existential graphs. This is a natural triadic relationship. This is also an existential graph. Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
List: It was amusing to read theses historic responses to an issue that faded away in most of the philosophical community and almost all the scientific community. Edwinia broaches on current (and meaningful) aspects of the stipulations of cognitive forms to objects of the external world. > On Jan 7, 2024, at 12:28 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > And that’s another reason why it’s difficult to create a visual diagram of > the semiosic process - those modalities - which are rarely discussed on this > site. > > But, just as we acknowledge the semiosic determinative process of > O-R-I…..and even > DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. [and I’m assuming everyone knows what these letters > stand for…. > > We also have to acknowledge the modal restrictions, > It is obvious that a Possible cannot determine anything other than a > Possible, and likewise a Necessitant cannot be determined by anything other > than a Necessitant (letter to Lady Welby of December 23, 1908 ) > The clarity of human capacities to deal with the external world is what is at stake. During the lifespan of CSP, the scientific methodologies were in the early state of development. The relationships between matter, attributes, and cognitive consequences were in the early stages of development. Subsequent to CSP’s writings, it became crystal clear that “three” was a minimum number for meditating about the assignment of a name to a natural object. In the scientific world today, the meaning of a sign can be assigned to hundreds, thousands of contributing factors. With precision! Thus, the value of this discussion is problematic. Far more important, in my judgment, is the designation of the terms “Possible” and "Necessitant.” These terms have morphed into logical symbols essential to formal logics that assign meanings to observations about objects based on the collections of signs emanating from natural forms. The emerged methodology creates one:one correspondence between cognitive forms (icons?) and external forms. [This methodology emerged from the mathematics of graph theory and the chemical table of elements.] My purpose in drafting this note is to point to a specific challenge that opens the gap between scientific writing and philosophical writings such as this set of exchanges. In my understanding of the communications gaps, the languages of the sciences have developed the capacity of cognitive creativity that uses abstract mathematics and logic and observations to associate specific forms for the identity of abstracts objects, mathematical, chemical, genetic, etc. This cognitive capacity has generated unbounded numbers of signs and interpretations of signs, symbols and behaviors. Such capacities are of little interest to other disciplines. In the absence of boundary-forming terms that constrain meanings of signs, forms, and behaviors, the conversations endlessly wonder, such as this series of posts illustrates without ever getting to the essential fact. That is, nature can produce endless varieties of signs and human languages can produce endless classifications of natural signs. Cheers Jerry A personal note to Robert: Thank you for your recent remark. However, the interpretation of my post on aphantasia in terms of category theory was wide, very wide from the mark. You may wish to consider that the necessary reasons why and how philosophers of matter and material causality developed the language of chemistry and molecular biology and hence the mathematics of life. More precisely, the critical hinges are the connects between permutation groups and space groups. Cheers JLRC _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?
Ben, List: I share your concern about describing the *genuine *triadic relation of mediating (or representing) with its three correlates (sign, object, interpretant) as if it were reducible to dyadic relations of determining, which could only be true if it were a *degenerate *triadic relation. It is not *false *to say, "the object determines the sign, which determines the interpretant," but it could be misleading because it omits the *mediation *of the sign by which the object *also *determines the interpretant. Indeed, it is more accurate to say, "the object determines the sign to determine the interpretant." Peirce expresses this even more precisely as follows, in what I consider to be one of his very best definitions of a sign. CSP: I will say that a sign is anything, of whatsoever mode of being, which mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object *relatively to the interpretant*, and determines the interpretant *in reference to the object*, in such wise as to cause the interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of this "sign." (EP 2:410, 1907) That is why I call the relation "mediating" in my Existential Graph (EG) that I posted on Friday, rather than "representing," although the latter could be substituted with some loss of generality. Here is that EG again. [image: image.png] Peirce himself apparently never scribed this EG, but he did scribe the one for the genuine triadic relation of *giving *with its three correlates (giver, gift, recipient). As one would expect for *any *genuine triadic relation, it is isomorphic with the EG above, except that instead of three heavy lines of identity with the correlate names attached, the relation name has three dots (also called "hooks" or "pegs" in other writings) to which Peirce assigned those names in the subsequent text. Here is an image of that handwritten sentence in R 670 (1911). [image: image.png] Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sun, Jan 7, 2024 at 11:54 AM Ben Udell wrote: > Hi, Robert, all, > > I wish a whole lot of us 15 or 20 years ago had noticed a paragraph that > you quote in your message, > > *The conceptions of a First, improperly called an "object," and of a > Second should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or > Secondness, both of which are involved in the conceptions of First and > Second. A First is something to which (or, more accurately, to some > substitute for which, thus introducing Thirdness) attention may be > directed. It thus involves Secondness as well as Firstness; while a Second > is a First considered as (here comes Thirdness) a subject of a Secondness. > An object in the proper sense is a Second.* (EP 2: 271) > > We had some long arguments many years ago at peirce-l about what Peirce > meant by "First" etc., when he wasn't explicitly tying those adjectives to > the categories. Joe Ransdell, Gary Richmond, I, and probably others, > argued that, yes, Peirce was alluding to his categories. > > I also remember a whole lot of discussion about Peirce's shift to viewing > the sign as not only determining the interpretant but also being determined > by the object. At the time, a 1906 quote was the earliest that I could > find (I happened to find it at Commens.org I think), and Joe came up with a > quote that prefigured Peirce's shift, from 1905 or 1904, I wish I could > remember (and I tried years ago without success to find Joe's message about > it), but I don't want send anybody on a wild goose chase. > > Folks, here, by the way, is a link to Robert's "76 DEFINITIONS OF THE SIGN > BY C.S. PEIRCE" > http://perso.numericable.fr/robert.marty/semiotique/76defeng.htm > > It includes added quotes absent from the Arisbe version. > > Robert, you wrote below that "*O → S → I*" reads: > > "*O determines S, which determines I*." > > I haven't tried to learn any category theory, since I got intimidated by > its being reputedly based in very high or abstract algebra. > > Generally I recall people saying that — > > an object determines a sign to determine an interpretant > > — rather than that — > > an object determines a sign, which determines an interpretant > > — a phrasing which makes the sign's determination of an interpretant seem > possibly coincidental to the sign's being determined by an object, like > dominoes toppling, each one the next, though the earlier dominoes are not > finally-caused to topple the later ones (except if they are literal > dominoes that some person set up t
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?
Ben, list I remember discussions on this list about that paragraph with follows the p. 271 warning in this text “A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same aObject” EP: 272-3 - and being chastised and even sneered at, when I suggested that the terms of First, Second and Third, referred to ordinal numbers and not to the modal categories. The list members, several who still post here, insisted in very authoritative terms, that those words referred to the categories! But a small bit of thought would have shown that it makes no logical sense for a Representamen to be in a mode of Firstness - for it would then have been unable to interact with an Object or Interpretant unless they also were in a mode of Firstness!. However, the list wasn’t willing to take this ’small bit of thought’. I think the whole point of the semiosic process is its generative capacity; ie, that a semiotic triad is capable of developing and creating new knowledge and therefore, new forms. The reason it can do this is because the object and interpretant are separated from each other by the mediative function of the representamen. So- rather than mitosis, or mimetic clones where x produces another x, [ which has its functionality] you get the more complex meiosis where x produces y - ie, a unique cell. With the triad, its this ‘insertion’ of a mediating force, the representamen, that gathers information from other interactions over time, develops habits or knowledge of ‘how to deal with the external world’ and thus enables both anticipation and yes, adaptation, for Thirdness isn’t only ‘pure’ or genuine, but can connect indexically with the outside world [Thirdness-as-Secondness] , and thus, inform itself of those external properties and come up with adaptive Interpretants. Edwina > On Jan 7, 2024, at 12:53 PM, Ben Udell wrote: > > Hi, Robert, all, > > I wish a whole lot of us 15 or 20 years ago had noticed a paragraph that you > quote in your message, > > The conceptions of a First, improperly called an "object," and of a Second > should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness, both > of which are involved in the conceptions of First and Second. A First is > something to which (or, more accurately, to some substitute for which, thus > introducing Thirdness) attention may be directed. It thus involves Secondness > as well as Firstness; while a Second is a First considered as (here comes > Thirdness) a subject of a Secondness. An object in the proper sense is a > Second. (EP 2: 271) > > We had some long arguments many years ago at peirce-l about what Peirce meant > by "First" etc., when he wasn't explicitly tying those adjectives to the > categories. Joe Ransdell, Gary Richmond, I, and probably others, argued > that, yes, Peirce was alluding to his categories. > > I also remember a whole lot of discussion about Peirce's shift to viewing the > sign as not only determining the interpretant but also being determined by > the object. At the time, a 1906 quote was the earliest that I could find (I > happened to find it at Commens.org I think), and Joe came up with a quote > that prefigured Peirce's shift, from 1905 or 1904, I wish I could remember > (and I tried years ago without success to find Joe's message about it), but I > don't want send anybody on a wild goose chase. > > Folks, here, by the way, is a link to Robert's "76 DEFINITIONS OF THE SIGN BY > C.S. PEIRCE" > http://perso.numericable.fr/robert.marty/semiotique/76defeng.htm > > It includes added quotes absent from the Arisbe version. > > Robert, you wrote below that "O → S → I" reads: > > "O determines S, which determines I." > > I haven't tried to learn any category theory, since I got intimidated by its > being reputedly based in very high or abstract algebra. > > Generally I recall people saying that — > > an object determines a sign to determine an interpretant > > — rather than that — > > an object determines a sign, which determines an interpretant > > — a phrasing which makes the sign's determination of an interpretant seem > possibly coincidental to the sign's being determined by an object, like > dominoes toppling, each one the next, though the earlier dominoes are not > finally-caused to topple the later ones (except if they are literal dominoes > that some person set up to fall that way). I remember (though not in detail) > a whole lot of discussion of this at peirce-l. Does the ca
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Helmut - I think one has to be clear about terms. Do you mean that the Interpretant [ which is a relation not a thing-in-itself] becomes a new triad or only a new Representamen? My own view is that the Interpretant, which ‘holds and moulds’ information, contributes to the formation of both a new triad [as, for example, when nutrients from the food-as-object, contribute to the formation of the cell-as a triadic Sign] ; when information about the weather [as object] contributes to my Interpretant decision to shovel the snow…and I then, remember in the future what to do when snow arrives.. That is, this interpretant would also enhance the knowledge content of the Representamen if it were operating in its mode of Thirdness. That is, Representamens in a mode of Thirdness grow in informational content. And that’s another reason why it’s difficult to create a visual diagram of the semiosic process - those modalities - which are rarely discussed on this site. But, just as we acknowledge the semiosic determinative process of O-R-I…..and even DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. [and I’m assuming everyone knows what these letters stand for…. We also have to acknowledge the modal restrictions, It is obvious that a Possible cannot determine anything other than a Possible, and likewise a Necessitant cannot be determined by anything other than a Necessitant (letter to Lady Welby of December 23, 1908 ) Essentially this sets up restrictions on the development of the informational nature of the triad. That is, an Object in a mode of 2ns cannot determine/produce an Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. A Representamen in a mode of 2ns cannot produce an Interpretant in a mode of 3ns. And it gets even more complex when you Bring in the concept of the genuine and degenerate categorical modes. That is, as an example, there is only one of the ten classes where the Interpretant is in a mode of Thirdness. One has to consider - are all three Interpretants in this mode? But - are they all ‘genuine Thirdness or is there any one of the three that is in a degenerate mode [3-1 or 3-2, ie, Thirdness degenerate in the 2nd degree or first degree]? BUT - we have to consider that one cannot move from Firstness to Secondness to Thirdness! Even within another mode - ie, you cannot move from 3-1 to 3-2 to 3-3 without an external ‘assistance from another sign input]. So- the universe is a complex system. Edwina > On Jan 7, 2024, at 8:56 AM, Helmut Raulien wrote: > > Cecile, List, > > I think, the interconnection towards other signs takes place where the > interpretant serves as a new sign. Especially, if the commens (e.g. the > conversation) is not a closed one, like between two people, but includes some > publishing (like in this conversation), then the conceptual dynamical object > (the concept´s intension) is changed. Or with an energetic interpretant, then > even the physical properties of a material object can be changed. For any > sign in any other commens for which the change of object may play a role, the > interpretant can serve as a new sign, which, in relation with the object, > causes a new interpretant, which again may serve as a new sign in the > original semiosis (the spiral). > > Best, Helmut > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?
Hi, Robert, all, I wish a whole lot of us 15 or 20 years ago had noticed a paragraph that you quote in your message, /The conceptions of a First, improperly called an "object," and of a Second should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness, both of which are involved in the conceptions of First and Second*. A First is something to which* (or, more accurately, to some substitute for which, thus introducing Thirdness) *attention may be directed*. It thus involves Secondness as well as Firstness; *while a Second is a First considered as (here comes Thirdness) a subject of a Secondness.* An object in the proper sense is a *Second*./ (EP 2: 271) We had some long arguments many years ago at peirce-l about what Peirce meant by "First" etc., when he wasn't explicitly tying those adjectives to the categories. Joe Ransdell, Gary Richmond, I, and probably others, argued that, yes, Peirce was alluding to his categories. I also remember a whole lot of discussion about Peirce's shift to viewing the sign as not only determining the interpretant but also being determined by the object. At the time, a 1906 quote was the earliest that I could find (I happened to find it at Commens.org I think), and Joe came up with a quote that prefigured Peirce's shift, from 1905 or 1904, I wish I could remember (and I tried years ago without success to find Joe's message about it), but I don't want send anybody on a wild goose chase. Folks, here, by the way, is a link to Robert's "76 DEFINITIONS OF THE SIGN BY C.S. PEIRCE" http://perso.numericable.fr/robert.marty/semiotique/76defeng.htm It includes added quotes absent from the Arisbe version. Robert, you wrote below that "*O → S → I*" reads: "*O determines S, which determines I*." I haven't tried to learn any category theory, since I got intimidated by its being reputedly based in very high or abstract algebra. Generally I recall people saying that — an object determines a sign to determine an interpretant — rather than that — an object determines a sign, which determines an interpretant — a phrasing which makes the sign's determination of an interpretant seem possibly coincidental to the sign's being determined by an object, like dominoes toppling, each one the next, though the earlier dominoes are not finally-caused to topple the later ones (except if they are literal dominoes that some person set up to fall that way). I remember (though not in detail) a whole lot of discussion of this at peirce-l. Does the category-theoretical understanding of "O determines S, which determines I" avoid that seeming problem? To put it another way, how does "*O → S → I*" keep from breaking down into dyads "*O → S*" and "*S → I*"? I'm not trying to be argumentative, I'm actually wondering. Best, Ben On 1/7/2024 10:10 AM, robert marty wrote: Cécile, List I present here, in the most condensed form possible, the merits of a purely algebraic formalization of Peirce's semiotics, entirely indexed to the history of its development. */How do we distinguish the correlates of a triadic sign? How do we formalize the triadic sign?/* This question arises because the definition of a triad, strictly speaking, implies no a priori distinction between the elements it links together. If you represent them by letters, you're surreptitiously introducing lexicographical order and by numbers, the order of natural integers. This is why I draw attention to an important warning Peirce gives about "First" and "Second" in a footnote to the Syllabus in Part III (EP 2, selection 20): */The conceptions of a First, improperly called an "object," and of a Second should be carefully distinguished from those of Firstness or Secondness, both of which are involved in the conceptions of First and Second*. A First is something to which* (or, more accurately, to some substitute for which, thus introducing Thirdness) *attention may be directed*. It thus involves Secondness as well as Firstness; *while a Second is a First considered as (here comes Thirdness) a subject of a Secondness.* An object in the proper sense is a *Second*./ (EP 2: 271) This warning should shed light on the following definition of the Sign (which, in my opinion, is far from the best) on page 272: /A *Sign*, or *Representamen,* is *a First* which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a *Second*, called its *Object*, as to be capable of determining a *Third*, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its *Object* in which it stands itself to the same *Object*./ (EP 2: 272) On the other hand, the definition given in the fifth version of the Syllabus (EP 2, selection 21), which is much more precise, will avoid confusion: /*Representamen* is the *Firs
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Representing sign relations in existential graphs
Cécile and Helmut, After sending my previous note, I thought of more examples for representing sign relations in EGs -- including EGs that link together whatever graphs are necessary to express anything. I want to emphasize that I was inspired by some of Peirce's writings, but some examples go beyond what Peirce himself had said or done. I'll start with my previous example, consider the word "cat' as a sign-object A in a relation of representation r to a concept of a cat B to determine a fuzzy animal C as the interpretation of the sign. Following is an EG that represents the sentence: "The word "cat" represents a concept CAT to determine a particular animal named Felix." Represents /|\ "cat" CAT Felix Shorter sentence: "The word 'cat' represents a cat named Felix." The next EG expresses the sentence "The word 'Felix' represents a cat Felix that is portrayed by a photograph." Represents /|\ "Felix" CAT Felix---PortrayedByPhoto The label Photo refers to a photograph of the cat. Since Peirce himself had hoped to represent moving images, one might replace the label Photo with an actual photograph of the cat, Nobody knows exactly what Peirce himself might have done, but we can say that we were inspired by Peirce to make that extension to EGs. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] How do we formalize the triadic sign?
es I Referring to the Peircean conception of a determination: *We thus learn that the Object determines (i.e. renders definitely to be such as it will be) the Sign in a particular manner. *(CP 8.361, 1908) We can see that O determines I by transitivity. Peirce verified this in MS 611 (Nov. 1908). This diagram has the considerable advantage of being equivalent to the mathematical object below: Schematic representation of a category with objects *X*, *Y*, *Z* and morphisms *f*, *g*, *g* ∘ *f*. <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/ef/Commutative_diagram_for_morphism.svg/200px-Commutative_diagram_for_morphism.svg.png> (click) It's an algebraic category, the simplest there is (non-trivial). This one is the archetypal example of a category on the Wikipedia site devoted to this part of mathematics, which emerged in the second half of the 20th century (Category theory - Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category_theory>). In 1977 (in French) and 1982 (in English), I was able to use it to generate, in just a few pages, not only classes of triadic signs but also, above all, to show that these classes are naturally organized in a lattice structure (which Peirce had intuited in the form of affinities). I've verified that Peirce knew about this type of structure, but limited by set theory, he couldn't obtain it formally. In his classification of the Sciences, this lattice occupies the place of the *Grammatica Speculativa*. It's his ultimate form. Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Representing sign relations in existential graphs
Cécile, After reading this thread, I found a quotation by Peirce that shows how to draw an existential graph that follows Peirce's words quite closely. It's also consistent with the quotation by Noeth: "Peirce did consider the sign to be a triadic relation, but only in 1868. However, from 1873 onwards, sign, representamen, or representation were synonymously used as the names referring to the first correlate of the triadic relation of semiosis" (p. 455). The key to the analysis is the recognition that every sign has a physically perceptible mark. That mark is only a sign when somebody interprets it as a sign. Therefore, we should distinguish the physical sign-mark or sign-object from its action as a representamen or representation. Since nobody has found an EG drawn by Peirce to represent the sign relation, the best we can do is to find a quotation by Peirce that has a simple translation to an EG. The following quotation is a good candidate: “A sign is anything A, in a relation, r to something B, its object, this relation r consisting in fitness to determine something so as to produce something, C, the interpretant of the sign." (1904 MS L107:25) Since Peirce had drawn many EGs before and after 1904, he probably had a direct translation to an EG in mind. He might have drawn an example on his blackboard. Note that this quotation mentions four items: A, B, C, and a triadic relation r. As an example, let's consider the word "cat' as a sign-object A in a relation of representation r to a concept of a cat B to determine a fuzzy animal C as the interpretation of the sign. Following is an EG that represents the sentence: "The word "cat" represents a concept CAT to determine a particular animal named Felix." Represents /|\ "cat" CAT Felix Shorter sentence: The word 'cat' repreents a cat named Felix. This example follows L107;25 quite directly. I won't claim that it is exactly what Peirce would have drawn, but it follows his words closely. Since Peirce often represented EG relations by verbs, the verb 'represents' may be used as the verb from which 'representamen' and 'representation' were derived. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Jon: Yes! Absolutely! Your explanation of the quasi-sign makes much more sense! Thank you! Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" À: "Peirce-L" Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 22:28:13 Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Cécile: CC: Yet, Peirce mentions, for instance, 'the essentially triadic nature of a Sign' (1906, CP 4.531, p. 415) ... Indeed, a sign is "triadic" in the specific sense that something can only serve as a sign within the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating between its object and interpretant; and whatever serves as a sign within one such relation might also serve as the interpretant of a previous sign in another such relation, or as the object of a subsequent sign in yet another such relation. In my view, all these designations are artifacts of analysis, entia rationis that we prescind from the real and continuous process of semiosis--the entire universe as one immense sign, a vast argument that is constantly "working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903). BQ_BEGIN CC: Does this excerpt from CP 5.473 mean that the term 'sign' refers to the representamen, and the term "quasi-sign“ refer to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? BQ_END On the contrary, in that passage, Peirce is actually contrasting a "sign" that triadically produces an interpretant with a "quasi-sign" that dyadically produces an effect of some kind. In other words, he is suggesting that "sign" be reserved for the first correlate of a genuine triadic relation and "quasi-sign" be employed instead for the first correlate of a degenerate triadic relation, i.e., one that is reducible to its dyadic input and output relations. His example of the latter is a Jacquard loom, "which used punched cards to control the weaving of the cloth so that intricate patterns could be obtained automatically" (EP 2:547n15). As he says elsewhere ... BQ_BEGIN CSP: Speculative Grammar ought not to confine its studies to those conventional signs of which language is composed, but ... will do well to widen its field of view so as to take into consideration also kinds of signs which, not being conventional, are not of the nature of language. In fact, as a point of theory, I am of opinion that we ought not to limit ourselves to signs but ought to take account of certain objects more or less analogous to signs. In practice, however, I have paid little attention to these quasi-signs. (EP 2:257, 1903) BQ_END Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian [ http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt | www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt ] / [ http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt | twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt ] On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 1:56 PM Cécile Cosculluela < [ mailto:cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr | cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr ] > wrote: BQ_BEGIN Jon, Edwina, John, List, Thanks again. Indeed, I do want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of the term "sign". I think it's interesting to note that "The collocation “triadic sign” isn’t to be found in the CP" (Jappy, 2023, p. 145, note 1). Yet, Peirce mentions, for instance, 'the essentially triadic nature of a Sign' (1906, CP 4.531, p. 415) or points to what might be regarded as the arbitrary character of terminology when stating (in CP 5.473, 1905) that "Whether the interpretant be necessarily a triadic result is a question of words, that is, of how we limit the extension of the term "sign"; but it seems to me [Peirce] convenient to make the triadic production of the interpretant essential to a "sign," calling the wider concept like a Jacquard loom, for example, a "quasi-sign.“ " Does this excerpt from CP 5.473 mean that the term 'sign' refers to the representamen, and the term "quasi-sign“ refer to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? Best regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation BQ_END _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cecile I think the spiral is an interesting image of the dynamic nature of the semiosic process - The reality of semiosis is as a transformative process, where energy/matter is constantly being transformed into another form of energy/matter, via the mediating Representamen - In other words - it’s not a static ‘OK- I’ve got the meaning’ state’; It’s dynamic and transformative. I’ve understood this process as a function : f(x)=y. Or…R(O)=I. The point is, to acknowledge the transformative actions of the mediative Representamen within the triadic process. My question to you, however, is how do you introduce, as an image, in this spiral, the fact that other triads are affecting each other. That is. If you take one triad, with the Y form of O I \/ | R Excuse my sloppy image above, I’m useless at computer drawings...but you get the triadic relations…Well, my point is that you can have another triad connecting to the O, and another connecting with the I and the R….. That is, you can have this Y form….and the Object Relation could be, in another triad, the Interpretant. The Interpretant could be moving into becoming another R in another triad. How does one show this complexity? In my view, it’s the dynamic processing and the complexity that is the basis of Peircean semiosis. Edwina > On Jan 5, 2024, at 5:04 PM, Cécile Cosculluela > wrote: > > Edwina, List, > > I appreciate your clarifying comments and I am thankful also for the > enriching references that have been shared. Interesting though it might be to > distinguish the sign as a representamen (or first correlate of a triadic > relation) from the (quasi-)sign (or Sign) as a triadic relation (that > includes a first, a second, and a third correlate without whose triadic > relation there is no sign), it is useful to me to be able to draw a graphical > representation of the sign, and then of the semiosis, i.e. the continuum of > signs. I have been using the Y diagram since my doctoral dissertation > (http://tinyurl.com/Semiotraductologie) and little by little over the years > the Y turned into a spiral. Here are the five steps that stand out (I'm also > sending them in an attached document in case the diagrams don't come across > well in the email): > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I would love to hear what you think about this graphical representation of > the triadic sign as a spiral. Please let me know! > > Best regards, > > Cécile > > Cécile Cosculluela > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > Associate Professor of English as a Second Language > Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation > > > De: "Edwina Taborsky" <mailto:edwina.tabor...@gmail.com>> > À: "Cécile Menieu-Cosculluela" <mailto:cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr>> > Cc: "Peirce-L" mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> > Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 21:24:59 > Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > > Cecile - I understand the reference by Peirce to a ‘quasi -sign, which is the > wider reference to the triadic process, but I think one can talk oneself into > a dead end. > > The reality is, from examining the many discussions within Peirce, that the > triad, which he refers to as a Sign, [ see Letter to William James 1909 > 8.305] functions within three relations [in itself, with the object, as the > Interpretant] ..That is, the Sign exists as a triadic function. It doesn’t > exist except as a triad. > > Then, you can analytically ’take apart’ this triadic function into > Object-Representamen/sign-Interpretant. > And you can analyze that mediating process, known as the Representamen or > sign….you can analyze it just within itself, all alone [ but it doesn’t exist > as such all alone]...within the three modal categories and come up with this > representamen/sign as a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign. > > Then - you can analyze the relations as well within the modal categories. > See an outline of the basic ten classes in 2.255 etc. > > ALL of this is, in my view, is just a further analysis of the basic triad, > the Sign, “as a triadic form’ [1909]. > > But I think it’s a mistake to get trapped in terms. > > Edwina > > On Jan 5, 2024, at 2:56 PM, Cécile Cosculluela > wrote: > > Jon, Edwina, John, List, > > Thanks again. Indeed, I do want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of the > term "sign". I think it's interesting to note that "The collocation “triadic > sign” isn’t to be found in the CP" (Jappy, 2023, p. 145, note 1). Yet, Peirce > mentions, for instance, 'the e
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cécile: CC: Yet, Peirce mentions, for instance, 'the essentially triadic nature of a Sign' (1906, CP 4.531, p. 415) ... Indeed, a sign is "triadic" in the specific sense that something can only *serve *as a sign *within *the genuine triadic relation of representing/mediating between its object and interpretant; and whatever serves as a *sign *within one such relation might also serve as the *interpretant *of a previous sign in another such relation, or as the *object *of a subsequent sign in yet another such relation. In my view, all these designations are artifacts of analysis, *entia rationis* that we prescind from the real and continuous process of semiosis--the entire universe as one immense sign, a vast argument that is constantly "working out its conclusions in living realities" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193, 1903). CC: Does this excerpt from CP 5.473 mean that the term 'sign' refers to the representamen, and the term "quasi-sign“ refer to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? On the contrary, in that passage, Peirce is actually contrasting a "sign" that *triadically *produces an interpretant with a "quasi-sign" that *dyadically *produces an effect of some kind. In other words, he is suggesting that "sign" be reserved for the first correlate of a *genuine *triadic relation and "quasi-sign" be employed instead for the first correlate of a *degenerate *triadic relation, i.e., one that is *reducible *to its dyadic input and output relations. His example of the latter is a Jacquard loom, "which used punched cards to control the weaving of the cloth so that intricate patterns could be obtained automatically" (EP 2:547n15). As he says elsewhere ... CSP: Speculative Grammar ought not to confine its studies to those conventional signs of which language is composed, but ... will do well to widen its field of view so as to take into consideration also kinds of signs which, not being conventional, are not of the nature of language. In fact, as a point of theory, I am of opinion that we ought not to limit ourselves to signs but ought to take account of certain objects more or less analogous to signs. In practice, however, I have paid little attention to these quasi-signs. (EP 2:257, 1903) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 1:56 PM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Jon, Edwina, John, List, > > Thanks again. Indeed, I do want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of > the term "sign". I think it's interesting to note that "The collocation > “triadic sign” isn’t to be found in the CP" (Jappy, 2023, p. 145, note 1). > Yet, Peirce mentions, for instance, 'the essentially triadic nature of a > Sign' (1906, CP 4.531, p. 415) or points to what might be regarded as the > arbitrary character of terminology when stating (in CP 5.473, 1905) that > "Whether the interpretant be necessarily a triadic result is a question of > words, that is, of how we limit the extension of the term "sign"; but it > seems to me [Peirce] convenient to make the triadic production of the > interpretant essential to a "sign," calling the wider concept like a > Jacquard loom, for example, a "quasi-sign.“ " > > Does this excerpt from CP 5.473 mean that the term 'sign' refers to the > representamen, and the term "quasi-sign“ refer to the triadic relation of > the representamen to the object for the interpretant? > > Best regards, > > Cécile > > -- > *Cécile Cosculluela* > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > *Associate Professor of English as a Second Language* > *Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation* > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cecile - I understand the reference by Peirce to a ‘quasi -sign, which is the wider reference to the triadic process, but I think one can talk oneself into a dead end. The reality is, from examining the many discussions within Peirce, that the triad, which he refers to as a Sign, [ see Letter to William James 1909 8.305] functions within three relations [in itself, with the object, as the Interpretant] ..That is, the Sign exists as a triadic function. It doesn’t exist except as a triad. Then, you can analytically ’take apart’ this triadic function into Object-Representamen/sign-Interpretant. And you can analyze that mediating process, known as the Representamen or sign….you can analyze it just within itself, all alone [ but it doesn’t exist as such all alone]...within the three modal categories and come up with this representamen/sign as a Qualisign, Sinsign, or Legisign. Then - you can analyze the relations as well within the modal categories. See an outline of the basic ten classes in 2.255 etc. ALL of this is, in my view, is just a further analysis of the basic triad, the Sign, “as a triadic form’ [1909]. But I think it’s a mistake to get trapped in terms. Edwina > On Jan 5, 2024, at 2:56 PM, Cécile Cosculluela > wrote: > > Jon, Edwina, John, List, > > Thanks again. Indeed, I do want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of the > term "sign". I think it's interesting to note that "The collocation “triadic > sign” isn’t to be found in the CP" (Jappy, 2023, p. 145, note 1). Yet, Peirce > mentions, for instance, 'the essentially triadic nature of a Sign' (1906, CP > 4.531, p. 415) or points to what might be regarded as the arbitrary character > of terminology when stating (in CP 5.473, 1905) that "Whether the > interpretant be necessarily a triadic result is a question of words, that is, > of how we limit the extension of the term "sign"; but it seems to me [Peirce] > convenient to make the triadic production of the interpretant essential to a > "sign," calling the wider concept like a Jacquard loom, for example, a > "quasi-sign.“ " > > Does this excerpt from CP 5.473 mean that the term 'sign' refers to the > representamen, and the term "quasi-sign“ refer to the triadic relation of the > representamen to the object for the interpretant? > > Best regards, > > Cécile > > Cécile Cosculluela > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > Associate Professor of English as a Second Language > Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation > > > De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > À: "Peirce-L" > Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 20:36:50 > Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > > Cécile, List: > > CC: Would it be appropriate to consider that the term 'sign' may actually > have two different meanings, referring either to the representamen, or to the > triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? > > Not if we want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of the term "sign" after > a single instance in 1868. For the remaining 56 years of his life, he never > used "sign" for the triadic relation, only for its first correlate. Again, > the term for the triadic relation is "representing" or (more generally) > "mediating." > > For a while, Peirce treated a sign as a certain kind of representamen--one > "with a mental interpretant" (CP 2.274, EP 2:273, 1903). However, he > ultimately decided that the two terms are synonymous--"there was no need of > this horrid long word" [representamen] because "sign" is "a wonderful case of > an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the > scientific definition" (SS 193, 1905). > > Regards, > > Jon > > On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 1:23 PM Cécile Cosculluela > mailto:cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr>> > wrote: >> Jon, Edwina, List, >> >> Thank you for your time and interesting answers. Would it be appropriate to >> consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, >> referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the >> representamen to the object for the interpretant? >> >> Best regards, >> >> Cécile >> >> Cécile Cosculluela >> MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA >> Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones >> Associate Professor of English as a Second Language >> Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation >> >> De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > <mailto:jo
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cecile - yes, I think you could come to such a conclusion. That’s why I always use ‘representamen’ to refer to the mediative process. And I capitalize the term of Sign when I refer to the triad. I think it’s important to recognize that the triad is functionally irreducible; That is, the Object-Representamen/Sign-Interpretant isn’t made up of three separately existing entities - which is why I don’t think one can come up with a graph of ‘an object’ or ‘a sign’ or ‘an interpretant’. >There are no such separate entities. As Peirce said [8.305] “I shall define a Sign and show its triadic form”. That seems to me, fairly straightforward - that the Sign has a triadic form!. So- yes, when referring to the triad, you can use the term of Sign! Then he breaks down this triadic form into parts, “A sign has two objects, its object as it is represented and its object in itself’ 8.333. My understanding of this - is that the Triadic Sign - functions within the relationships of ’two objects correlated to it. Then - Peirce continues: “It has also three interpretants” [ibid]..and these are also part of that whole functional triad of the Sign. And Peirce does refer just to that mediating relation, the representamen/sign which he refers to “as it is in itself” [8334. That is - just that single relation without the interaction with the object[s] and interpretant[s]. “A Sign, or Representmen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, Called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant…” EP 2:272. “A respresentamen, or sign, is anything which stands, in any respect, at once in a relation of correspondence to a correlate, called its object, and to another correlate, its interpretant” 1901 MS[R]1147”A sign is an object capable of determining in a mind a cognition of an object, called the object of the sign. A sign is a species under the genus representamen. A representamen is an object A, in such a triadic relation to an objet B, for an objet C’…1903 MS[R]792:2 “Every sign is in a triad relation to an object and to an interpretant” 1904 MS[R]L107 My point again, is that the mediating relation [called the sign, the representamen] doesn’t exist per se on its own but within a triadic function of Object-sign/representamen- Interpretant. We can analytically explore the categorical nature of this mediative relation [ as a Qualisign, Sinsign, Legisign] but again - it doesn’t exist on its own but only within the full triad, which can also be considered as a Sign….because it functions only within relationships! Edwina > On Jan 5, 2024, at 2:23 PM, Cécile Cosculluela > wrote: > > Jon, Edwina, List, > > Thank you for your time and interesting answers. Would it be appropriate to > consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, > referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the > representamen to the object for the interpretant? > > Best regards, > > Cécile > > Cécile Cosculluela > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > Associate Professor of English as a Second Language > Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation > > > De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" > À: "Peirce-L" > Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 19:09:55 > Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > > Cécile, List: > > CC: And the sign is a triadic relation. ... Nevertheless, since the sign is a > triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol "Y" > (preferably with three branches equally spaced). > > No, again, the sign is not a triadic relation--it is the first (simplest) > correlate of the triadic relation of representing or (more generally) > mediating, whose other two correlates are the sign's object and interpretant. > As Winfred Noeth correctly summarizes in a 2011 paper > (https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics), > "Peirce did consider the sign to be a triadic relation, but only in 1868. > However, from 1873 onwards, sign, representamen, or representation were > synonymously used as the names referring to the first correlate of the > triadic relation of semiosis" (p. 455). > > This relation can be represented in Existential Graphs by placing the name > "representing" or "mediating" where CP 1.347 shows an individual lowercase > letter, with three lines of identity attached to it--one with the name "sign" > at the other end, one with the name "object" at the other end, and one with > the name "interpretant" at the other end. Equal spaci
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Jon, Edwina, John, List, Thanks again. Indeed, I do want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of the term "sign". I think it's interesting to note that "The collocation “triadic sign” isn’t to be found in the CP" (Jappy, 2023, p. 145, note 1). Yet, Peirce mentions, for instance, 'the essentially triadic nature of a Sign' (1906, CP 4.531, p. 415) or points to what might be regarded as the arbitrary character of terminology when stating (in CP 5.473, 1905) that "Whether the interpretant be necessarily a triadic result is a question of words, that is, of how we limit the extension of the term "sign"; but it seems to me [Peirce] convenient to make the triadic production of the interpretant essential to a "sign," calling the wider concept like a Jacquard loom, for example, a "quasi-sign.“ " Does this excerpt from CP 5.473 mean that the term 'sign' refers to the representamen, and the term "quasi-sign“ refer to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? Best regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" À: "Peirce-L" Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 20:36:50 Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Cécile, List: CC: Would it be appropriate to consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? Not if we want to be consistent with Peirce's usage of the term "sign" after a single instance in 1868. For the remaining 56 years of his life, he never used "sign" for the triadic relation, only for its first correlate. Again, the term for the triadic relation is "representing" or (more generally) "mediating." For a while, Peirce treated a sign as a certain kind of representamen--one "with a mental interpretant" (CP 2.274, EP 2:273, 1903). However, he ultimately decided that the two terms are synonymous--"there was no need of this horrid long word" [representamen] because "sign" is "a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition" (SS 193, 1905). Regards, Jon On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 1:23 PM Cécile Cosculluela < [ mailto:cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr | cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr ] > wrote: BQ_BEGIN Jon, Edwina, List, Thank you for your time and interesting answers. Would it be appropriate to consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? Best regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" < [ mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com | jonalanschm...@gmail.com ] > À: "Peirce-L" < [ mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu | peirce-l@list.iupui.edu ] > Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 19:09:55 Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Cécile, List: BQ_BEGIN CC: And the sign is a triadic relation. ... Nevertheless, since the sign is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). BQ_END No, again, the sign is not a triadic relation--it is the first (simplest) correlate of the triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating, whose other two correlates are the sign's object and interpretant. As Winfred Noeth correctly summarizes in a 2011 paper ( [ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics | https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics ] ), "Peirce did consider the sign to be a triadic relation, but only in 1868. However, from 1873 onwards, sign, representamen, or representation were synonymously used as the names referring to the first correlate of the triadic relation of semiosis" (p. 455). This relation can be represented in Existential Graphs by placing the name "representing" or "mediating" where CP 1.347 shows an individual lowercase letter, with three lines of identity attached to it--one with the name "si
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cécile, List: CC: Would it be appropriate to consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? Not if we want to be consistent with *Peirce's *usage of the term "sign" after a single instance in 1868. For the remaining 56 years of his life, he *never *used "sign" for the triadic relation, *only *for its first correlate. Again, the term for the triadic relation is "representing" or (more generally) "mediating." For a while, Peirce treated a sign as a certain kind of representamen--one "with a mental interpretant" (CP 2.274, EP 2:273, 1903). However, he ultimately decided that the two terms are synonymous--"there was no need of this horrid long word" [representamen] because "sign" is "a wonderful case of an almost popular use of a very broad word in almost the exact sense of the scientific definition" (SS 193, 1905). Regards, Jon On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 1:23 PM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Jon, Edwina, List, > > Thank you for your time and interesting answers. Would it be appropriate > to consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, > referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the > representamen to the object for the interpretant? > > Best regards, > > Cécile > > -- > *Cécile Cosculluela* > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > *Associate Professor of English as a Second Language* > *Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation* > -- > *De: *"Jon Alan Schmidt" > *À: *"Peirce-L" > *Envoyé: *Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 19:09:55 > *Objet: *Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > > Cécile, List: > > CC: And the sign is a triadic relation. ... Nevertheless, since the sign > is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the > symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). > > > No, again, the sign is *not *a triadic relation--it is the first > (simplest) *correlate *of the triadic relation of representing or (more > generally) mediating, whose other two correlates are the sign's object and > interpretant. As Winfred Noeth correctly summarizes in a 2011 paper ( > https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics), > "Peirce did consider the sign to be a triadic relation, but only in 1868. > However, from 1873 onwards, sign, representamen, or representation were > synonymously used as the names referring to the first correlate of the > triadic relation of semiosis" (p. 455). > > This relation can be represented in Existential Graphs by placing the name > "representing" or "mediating" where CP 1.347 shows an individual lowercase > letter, with three lines of identity attached to it--one with the name > "sign" at the other end, one with the name "object" at the other end, and > one with the name "interpretant" at the other end. Equal spacing of the > branches is not essential, there just needs to be some convention for where > the names of the first/second/third correlates are shown around the > perimeter of the name of the relation itself. Hence, these two examples are > equivalent. > > [image: image.png] > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 11:38 AM Cécile Cosculluela < > cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > >> Edwina, Jon, John, & fellow Listers, >> >> Thank you for your much appreciated clarifications. It is clear that the >> oft-shown graph of the sign as a triangle is not appropriate because it >> represents three dyadic relations, not one triadic one. And the sign is a >> triadic relation. Peirce used the "Y" symbol" to represent the triad (in CP >> 1.346 for instance), but he did not explicitly use the "Y" symbol" to >> represent the sign. (That's what I mean by the phrase "a diagram of the >> sign". I don't mean a diagram of Peirce's method of defining a sign, or >> examples of actual instances of marks, tokens, and types. I simply mean a >> representation / symbol of the triadic concept of sign.) There are actually >&g
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
hones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Jon, Edwina, List, Thank you for your time and interesting answers. Would it be appropriate to consider that the term 'sign' may actually have two different meanings, referring either to the representamen, or to the triadic relation of the representamen to the object for the interpretant? Best regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation De: "Jon Alan Schmidt" À: "Peirce-L" Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 19:09:55 Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Cécile, List: CC: And the sign is a triadic relation. ... Nevertheless, since the sign is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). No, again, the sign is not a triadic relation--it is the first (simplest) correlate of the triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating, whose other two correlates are the sign's object and interpretant. As Winfred Noeth correctly summarizes in a 2011 paper ( [ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics | https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics ] ), "Peirce did consider the sign to be a triadic relation, but only in 1868. However, from 1873 onwards, sign, representamen, or representation were synonymously used as the names referring to the first correlate of the triadic relation of semiosis" (p. 455). This relation can be represented in Existential Graphs by placing the name "representing" or "mediating" where CP 1.347 shows an individual lowercase letter, with three lines of identity attached to it--one with the name "sign" at the other end, one with the name "object" at the other end, and one with the name "interpretant" at the other end. Equal spacing of the branches is not essential, there just needs to be some convention for where the names of the first/second/third correlates are shown around the perimeter of the name of the relation itself. Hence, these two examples are equivalent. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian [ http://www.linkedin.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt | www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt ] / [ http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt | twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt ] On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 11:38 AM Cécile Cosculluela < [ mailto:cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr | cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr ] > wrote: BQ_BEGIN Edwina, Jon, John, & fellow Listers, Thank you for your much appreciated clarifications. It is clear that the oft-shown graph of the sign as a triangle is not appropriate because it represents three dyadic relations, not one triadic one. And the sign is a triadic relation. Peirce used the "Y" symbol" to represent the triad (in CP 1.346 for instance), but he did not explicitly use the "Y" symbol" to represent the sign. (That's what I mean by the phrase "a diagram of the sign". I don't mean a diagram of Peirce's method of defining a sign, or examples of actual instances of marks, tokens, and types. I simply mean a representation / symbol of the triadic concept of sign.) There are actually no graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. Nevertheless, since the sign is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). Would you agree that this sums up the general consensus among Peircean scholars on the question of the graphical representation of the sign by Peirce? Thanks for continuing the semiosis of enquiry ... Warm regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation BQ_END _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cécile, List: CC: And the sign is a triadic relation. ... Nevertheless, since the sign is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). No, again, the sign is *not *a triadic relation--it is the first (simplest) *correlate *of the triadic relation of representing or (more generally) mediating, whose other two correlates are the sign's object and interpretant. As Winfred Noeth correctly summarizes in a 2011 paper ( https://www.researchgate.net/publication/254965612_From_Representation_to_Thirdness_and_Representamen_to_Medium_Evolution_of_Peircean_Key_Terms_and_Topics), "Peirce did consider the sign to be a triadic relation, but only in 1868. However, from 1873 onwards, sign, representamen, or representation were synonymously used as the names referring to the first correlate of the triadic relation of semiosis" (p. 455). This relation can be represented in Existential Graphs by placing the name "representing" or "mediating" where CP 1.347 shows an individual lowercase letter, with three lines of identity attached to it--one with the name "sign" at the other end, one with the name "object" at the other end, and one with the name "interpretant" at the other end. Equal spacing of the branches is not essential, there just needs to be some convention for where the names of the first/second/third correlates are shown around the perimeter of the name of the relation itself. Hence, these two examples are equivalent. [image: image.png] Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 11:38 AM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Edwina, Jon, John, & fellow Listers, > > Thank you for your much appreciated clarifications. It is clear that the > oft-shown graph of the sign as a triangle is not appropriate because it > represents three dyadic relations, not one triadic one. And the sign is a > triadic relation. Peirce used the "Y" symbol" to represent the triad (in CP > 1.346 for instance), but he did not explicitly use the "Y" symbol" to > represent the sign. (That's what I mean by the phrase "a diagram of the > sign". I don't mean a diagram of Peirce's method of defining a sign, or > examples of actual instances of marks, tokens, and types. I simply mean a > representation / symbol of the triadic concept of sign.) There are actually > no graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. Nevertheless, > since the sign is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the > sign with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). > Would you agree that this sums up the general consensus among Peircean > scholars on the question of the graphical representation of the sign by > Peirce? > > Thanks for continuing the semiosis of enquiry ... > > Warm regards, > > Cécile > > -- > *Cécile Cosculluela* > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > *Associate Professor of English as a Second Language* > *Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation* > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cecile - I won’t presume to provide a ‘general consensus’ of how other Peircean scholars view the graphical representation of the sign; I’ll speak only for myself. My view - as based within Peirce’s writings - is that there is no such thing as a separate ’sign-in-itself’, or a separate object-in-itself- or an ‘interpretant in itself’. Therefore one cannot even ask for an image of any one of these correlates/relations ‘in themselves’….since they don’t exist. That is also why I prefer to refer to the mediate sign in the triad [Object-Sign-Interpretant] instead as the Representamen [a term also used by Peirce for this relation] - to avoid confusion with the term used for the FULL TRIAD [Sign]. The Sign, as used by Peirce, refers to the triadic set of three relations which operate as one unit; as a function, so to speak. As he writes, the sign is” “anything which determines something else [its interpretant] to refer to an object to which itself refers [ its object] in the same way, the interpretant becoming in turn a sign, and so on ad infnitum’ "2.303. Or “As a medium, the Sign is essentially in a triadic relation, to its Object which determines it, and to its Interpretant which it determines. “ [1906; EP 2.544 [notes].] In the above, we can see that Price’s definition of the Sign is always as an active function, a triadic function. None of the three relations exist 'per se’, by themselves for that would be to deny the action. Peirce himself used the image of a Y to show this triad as a ‘graph with three tails’. [1.346-347] Edwina > On Jan 5, 2024, at 12:37 PM, Cécile Cosculluela > wrote: > > Edwina, Jon, John, & fellow Listers, > > Thank you for your much appreciated clarifications. It is clear that the > oft-shown graph of the sign as a triangle is not appropriate because it > represents three dyadic relations, not one triadic one. And the sign is a > triadic relation. Peirce used the "Y" symbol" to represent the triad (in CP > 1.346 for instance), but he did not explicitly use the "Y" symbol" to > represent the sign. (That's what I mean by the phrase "a diagram of the > sign". I don't mean a diagram of Peirce's method of defining a sign, or > examples of actual instances of marks, tokens, and types. I simply mean a > representation / symbol of the triadic concept of sign.) There are actually > no graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. Nevertheless, > since the sign is a triadic relation, it is acceptable to represent the sign > with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). Would > you agree that this sums up the general consensus among Peircean scholars on > the question of the graphical representation of the sign by Peirce? > > Thanks for continuing the semiosis of enquiry ... > > Warm regards, > > Cécile > > Cécile Cosculluela > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > Associate Professor of English as a Second Language > Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation  > > De: "Edwina Taborsky" > À: "Edwina Taborsky" > Cc: "Peirce-L" > Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 16:15:34 > Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce > > Cecile > Just to continue with the argument against the triangle as the graphic image > of the Peircean sign- one can start with Peirce’s definition of the Sign, > which is always a triad, > > “I..shall define a Sign and show its triadic form” 8.305”A sign therefore is > an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an > interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a > relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object” > 8.332….and in the next paragraph.. “a sign has two objects…it has also three > interpretants’. 8.333. > > “A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind. “…and > refers frequently to “the triple relation between the sign, its object and > the mind” 3.359-60 > > Robert Marty has an extensive outline of Peirce’s definition of the Sign, but > it is important to understand that the Sign is made up of three > correlates/relations AND - above all that the FORM of this triad is not a > closed triangle in itself…which would be utterly useless, but is an open Y > shape, enabling networking with other triadic Signs. > > Edwina > > On Jan 5, 2024, at 9:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Cecile > > Understandinig the Sign as a triadic relation, made up of three > correlates/relations of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, you will find a > good outline of Peirce’s analysis of thi
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Edwina, Jon, John, & fellow Listers, Thank you for your much appreciated clarifications. It is clear that the oft-shown graph of the sign as a triangle is not appropriate because it represents three dyadic relations, not one triadic one. And the sign is a triadic relation. Peirce used the "Y" symbol" to represent the triad (in CP 1.346 for instance), but he did not explicitly use the "Y" symbol" to represent the sign. (That's what I mean by the phrase "a diagram of the sign". I don't mean a diagram of Peirce's method of defining a sign, or examples of actual instances of marks, tokens, and types. I simply mean a representation / symbol of the triadic concept of sign.) There are actually no graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. Nevertheless, since the sign is a triadic relation , it is acceptable to represent the sign with the symbol "Y" (preferably with three branches equally spaced). Would you agree that this sums up the general consensus among Peircean scholars on the question of the graphical representation of the sign by Peirce? Thanks for continuing the semiosis of enquiry ... Warm regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation De: "Edwina Taborsky" À: "Edwina Taborsky" Cc: "Peirce-L" Envoyé: Vendredi 5 Janvier 2024 16:15:34 Objet: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce Cecile Just to continue with the argument against the triangle as the graphic image of the Peircean sign- one can start with Peirce’s definition of the Sign, which is always a triad, “I..shall define a Sign and show its triadic form” 8.305”A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object” 8.332….and in the next paragraph.. “a sign has two objects…it has also three interpretants’. 8.333. “A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind. “…and refers frequently to “the triple relation between the sign, its object and the mind” 3.359-60 Robert Marty has an extensive outline of Peirce’s definition of the Sign, but it is important to understand that the Sign is made up of three correlates/relations AND - above all that the FORM of this triad is not a closed triangle in itself…which would be utterly useless, but is an open Y shape, enabling networking with other triadic Signs. Edwina On Jan 5, 2024, at 9:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Cecile Understandinig the Sign as a triadic relation, made up of three correlates/relations of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, you will find a good outline of Peirce’s analysis of this triad in 1.345-347. As he says “genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and of qualities is easily shown…and gives as an example a “node connecting three lines of identity” - with the image of a ‘Y’. 1.346. And iin 1.347 - he shows how this Y graph enables networking . That’s a key factor in semiosis- that capacity to interact and enable new meanings/ new Signs. Also - in 4.307-310, he also focuses on the generative capacity of the triad, with that ‘Y’ form, and shows how “so prolific is the triad in forms that one may conceive of all the variety and multiplicity of the universe springs from it” The point, again, of the Y-triad graph of the Sign, understood as a form of three correlates/relations, is that it is not closed, but open to interaction with other triadic Signs. As Peirce also writes, “the most fundamental fact about the number three is its generative potency” 4.309. And its generative potency can only be be realized if those three relations are open to interaction with other triads….which is why the oft-shown graph of the Sign as a closed triangle - is so incorrect. Edwina BQ_BEGIN BQ_BEGIN Dear Peirce-Listers, I hope this message finds you well. I am currently researching graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. If you know of any in his papers and can guide me to their location, I would greatly appreciate it. Ideally, a link to a manuscript page with a diagram of the sign drawn by Peirce would be most helpful. Thank you for your consideration and have a great day! Best regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to rep
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cecile Just to continue with the argument against the triangle as the graphic image of the Peircean sign- one can start with Peirce’s definition of the Sign, which is always a triad, “I..shall define a Sign and show its triadic form” 8.305”A sign therefore is an object which is in relation to its object on the one hand and to an interpretant on the other, in such a way as to bring the interpretant into a relation to the object, corresponding to its own relation to the object” 8.332….and in the next paragraph.. “a sign has two objects…it has also three interpretants’. 8.333. “A sign is in a conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the mind. “…and refers frequently to “the triple relation between the sign, its object and the mind” 3.359-60 Robert Marty has an extensive outline of Peirce’s definition of the Sign, but it is important to understand that the Sign is made up of three correlates/relations AND - above all that the FORM of this triad is not a closed triangle in itself…which would be utterly useless, but is an open Y shape, enabling networking with other triadic Signs. Edwina > On Jan 5, 2024, at 9:43 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Cecile > > Understandinig the Sign as a triadic relation, made up of three > correlates/relations of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, you will find a > good outline of Peirce’s analysis of this triad in 1.345-347. > > As he says “genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations > and of qualities is easily shown…and gives as an example a “node connecting > three lines of identity” - with the image of a ‘Y’. 1.346. > > And iin 1.347 - he shows how this Y graph enables networking . That’s a key > factor in semiosis- that capacity to interact and enable new meanings/ new > Signs. > > Also - in 4.307-310, he also focuses on the generative capacity of the triad, > with that ‘Y’ form, and shows how “so prolific is the triad in forms that one > may conceive of all the variety and multiplicity of the universe springs from > it” > > The point, again, of the Y-triad graph of the Sign, understood as a form of > three correlates/relations, is that it is not closed, but open to interaction > with other triadic Signs. As Peirce also writes, “the most fundamental fact > about the number three is its generative potency” 4.309. > > And its generative potency can only be be realized if those three relations > are open to interaction with other triads….which is why the oft-shown graph > of the Sign as a closed triangle - is so incorrect. > > Edwina >> >>> Dear Peirce-Listers, >>> >>> I hope this message finds you well. I am currently researching graphical >>> representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. If you know of any in his >>> papers and can guide me to their location, I would greatly appreciate it. >>> Ideally, a link to a manuscript page with a diagram of the sign drawn by >>> Peirce would be most helpful. >>> >>> Thank you for your consideration and have a great day! >>> >>> Best regards, >>> >>> Cécile >>> >>> Cécile Cosculluela >>> MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA >>> Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones >>> Associate Professor of English as a Second Language >>> Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the >> links! >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu >> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in >> the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
I agree with Edwina's comments. And I would add that it's important to ask what do you mean by the phrase "a diagram of the sign". Do you mean a diagram of Peirce's method of defining a sign. Or do you mean examples of actual instances of marks, tokens, and types? Since anything perceptible can be a mark, there are an infinity of possibilities, some of which Peirce mentioned. The same is true of tokens and types. For examples, flip the pages of CP, EP, the Logic Notebook, and various MSS that may be accessible. Suggestion: Find some drawings by Peirce in any of those sources, send copies or citations to Peirce L, and ask for opinions about them. John From: "Edwina Taborsky" Cecile Understandinig the Sign as a triadic relation, made up of three correlates/relations of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, you will find a good outline of Peirce’s analysis of this triad in 1.345-347. As he says “genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and of qualities is easily shown…and gives as an example a “node connecting three lines of identity” - with the image of a ‘Y’. 1.346. And iin 1.347 - he shows how this Y graph enables networking . That’s a key factor in semiosis- that capacity to interact and enable new meanings/ new Signs. Also - in 4.307-310, he also focuses on the generative capacity of the triad, with that ‘Y’ form, and shows how “so prolific is the triad in forms that one may conceive of all the variety and multiplicity of the universe springs from it” The point, again, of the Y-triad graph of the Sign, understood as a form of three correlates/relations, is that it is not closed, but open to interaction with other triadic Signs. As Peirce also writes, “the most fundamental fact about the number three is its generative potency” 4.309. And its generative potency can only be be realized if those three relations are open to interaction with other triads….which is why the oft-shown graph of the Sign as a closed triangle - is so incorrect. Edwina Dear Peirce-Listers, I hope this message finds you well. I am currently researching graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. If you know of any in his papers and can guide me to their location, I would greatly appreciate it. Ideally, a link to a manuscript page with a diagram of the sign drawn by Peirce would be most helpful. Thank you for your consideration and have a great day! Best regards, Cécile _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cecile Understandinig the Sign as a triadic relation, made up of three correlates/relations of Object-Representamen-Interpretant, you will find a good outline of Peirce’s analysis of this triad in 1.345-347. As he says “genuine triadic relations can never be built of dyadic relations and of qualities is easily shown…and gives as an example a “node connecting three lines of identity” - with the image of a ‘Y’. 1.346. And iin 1.347 - he shows how this Y graph enables networking . That’s a key factor in semiosis- that capacity to interact and enable new meanings/ new Signs. Also - in 4.307-310, he also focuses on the generative capacity of the triad, with that ‘Y’ form, and shows how “so prolific is the triad in forms that one may conceive of all the variety and multiplicity of the universe springs from it” The point, again, of the Y-triad graph of the Sign, understood as a form of three correlates/relations, is that it is not closed, but open to interaction with other triadic Signs. As Peirce also writes, “the most fundamental fact about the number three is its generative potency” 4.309. And its generative potency can only be be realized if those three relations are open to interaction with other triads….which is why the oft-shown graph of the Sign as a closed triangle - is so incorrect. Edwina > >> Dear Peirce-Listers, >> >> I hope this message finds you well. I am currently researching graphical >> representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. If you know of any in his >> papers and can guide me to their location, I would greatly appreciate it. >> Ideally, a link to a manuscript page with a diagram of the sign drawn by >> Peirce would be most helpful. >> >> Thank you for your consideration and have a great day! >> >> Best regards, >> >> Cécile >> >> Cécile Cosculluela >> MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA >> Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones >> Associate Professor of English as a Second Language >> Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Cécile, List: I am not aware of any graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. You asked a similar question on the List a few years ago, and as I said back then ( https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2018-08/msg00280.html), some scholars *mistakenly *point to the Existential Graphs with three tails in CP 1.347, or the inverted Y for a triad in CP 4.310, or the triangle for a triplet in CP 7.426. However, Peirce does not describe *any* of these as diagrams of a *sign*, which is neither a triadic relation nor a triad nor a triplet--it is the first (simplest) *correlate *of the triadic relation of *representing *or (more generally) *mediating*. As such, it corresponds to one of the three lines of identity in CP 1.347, while its object and interpretant correspond to the other two. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Jan 5, 2024 at 3:45 AM Cécile Cosculluela < cecile.coscullu...@univ-pau.fr> wrote: > Dear Peirce-Listers, > > I hope this message finds you well. I am currently researching graphical > representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. If you know of any in his > papers and can guide me to their location, I would greatly appreciate it. > Ideally, a link to a manuscript page with a diagram of the sign drawn by > Peirce would be most helpful. > > Thank you for your consideration and have a great day! > > Best regards, > > Cécile > > -- > *Cécile Cosculluela* > MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA > Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones > *Associate Professor of English as a Second Language* > *Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation* > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Graphical Representations of the Sign by Peirce
Dear Peirce-Listers, I hope this message finds you well. I am currently researching graphical representations of the sign in Peirce's texts. If you know of any in his papers and can guide me to their location, I would greatly appreciate it. Ideally, a link to a manuscript page with a diagram of the sign drawn by Peirce would be most helpful. Thank you for your consideration and have a great day! Best regards, Cécile Cécile Cosculluela MC anglais UPPA ∗ SSH ∗ LEA Maître de Conférences en Etudes Anglophones Associate Professor of English as a Second Language Semiotics • Linguistics • Grammar • Translation _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] More about Dr. Karl Firston, Chief Scientist at Verses AI
John: Thanks for posting this. The online book is a long argument with an intent… This is a very aggressive “Start-up” with a powerful motive. It will be fun to watch the feathers fly as the fox invades the henhouse of “Big Tech”. Happy New Year to All and Everyone Else too! Cheers Jerry > On Dec 28, 2023, at 3:54 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > I agree with Mihai Nadin "that AGI is yet another of those impossible to > achieve tasks." I have repeatedly said that it won't be achieved in the > 21st C, but I won't make any predictions about the 22nd. So far, nobody has > produced the slightest shred of evidence for any kind of AGI any sooner. > Best summary of the issues: "AGI is 30 years in the future, always was and > always will be."There are still some diehards who claim that the > prediction from the year 2000 will come to pass in the next 6 years, but the > hopes for generative AI are already dying. -- But there are many useful > applications for better natural language interfaces to all kinds of systems, > not just AI. > > Dan Brickley dug up some excellent references on predictive coding, and Karl > Friston is one of the pioneers in the field (see below). A recent book > (2022) from MIT Press with a foreword by Friston covers the field: "Active > Inference: The Free Energy Principle in Mind, Brain, and Behavior." Chapters > of that book can be downloaded for free. Appendix C has an annotated > example of the Mathlab code. > > I believe that this is the approach and the software techniques that Verses > AI has adopted. I don't know how well Friston and his colleagues can develop > this approach, but I strongly suspect that some of the co-authors and/or > their colleagues and students will be working with them. However, practical > applications always take more time and more investment than was predicted. > (I worked at IBM R & D for 30 years, and I know the issues from close > observation and participation.) > > Ricardo Sanz: Friston's work is ok. Neuroscience, statististics and optimal > control. Good, ol' classic math. VERSES' narrative is classic bullshit. Not > "breakthrough" bullshit; just classic bullshit. In my opinion, > anthropocentrism, the intelligence=brain fallacy, and biomesmerization are > the biggest roadblocks in the way to AGI. > > Neuroscience is much broader than anthropomorphism. Living things from > bacteria on up are far more successful in complex behavior than any of the > latest and greatest driverless cars. Furthermore, very few of the people who > have been working on generative AI know anything about neuroscience or the > other branches of cognitive science. Therefore, none of the work in those > fields could deter (or inspire) them. And it shows. > > I won't defend the claims by Verses AI unless and until they come up with > software that implements their promises. But I love their criticisms of > generative AI. I can't see how anybody could claim that it's on a path > toward AGI. > > John > > > From: "Dan Brickley" > > For an implementation-oriented survey see > https://github.com/BerenMillidge/Predictive_Coding_Papers and in general work > under “predictive processing” and “predictive coding” banners > > Also this book has PDFs available; > https://direct.mit.edu/books/oa-monograph/5299/Active-InferenceThe-Free-Energy-Principle-in-Mind > and also gets pretty specific eg ch8 on continuous time dynamical systems > representation, see > https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12441.003.0012 > > Dan > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] More about Dr. Karl Firston, Chief Scientist at Verses AI
I agree with Mihai Nadin "that AGI is yet another of those impossible to achieve tasks." I have repeatedly said that it won't be achieved in the 21st C, but I won't make any predictions about the 22nd. So far, nobody has produced the slightest shred of evidence for any kind of AGI any sooner. Best summary of the issues: "AGI is 30 years in the future, always was and always will be."There are still some diehards who claim that the prediction from the year 2000 will come to pass in the next 6 years, but the hopes for generative AI are already dying. -- But there are many useful applications for better natural language interfaces to all kinds of systems, not just AI. Dan Brickley dug up some excellent references on predictive coding, and Karl Friston is one of the pioneers in the field (see below). A recent book (2022) from MIT Press with a foreword by Friston covers the field: "Active Inference: The Free Energy Principle in Mind, Brain, and Behavior." Chapters of that book can be downloaded for free. Appendix C has an annotated example of the Mathlab code. I believe that this is the approach and the software techniques that Verses AI has adopted. I don't know how well Friston and his colleagues can develop this approach, but I strongly suspect that some of the co-authors and/or their colleagues and students will be working with them. However, practical applications always take more time and more investment than was predicted. (I worked at IBM R & D for 30 years, and I know the issues from close observation and participation.) Ricardo Sanz: Friston's work is ok. Neuroscience, statististics and optimal control. Good, ol' classic math. VERSES' narrative is classic bullshit. Not "breakthrough" bullshit; just classic bullshit. In my opinion, anthropocentrism, the intelligence=brain fallacy, and biomesmerization are the biggest roadblocks in the way to AGI. Neuroscience is much broader than anthropomorphism. Living things from bacteria on up are far more successful in complex behavior than any of the latest and greatest driverless cars. Furthermore, very few of the people who have been working on generative AI know anything about neuroscience or the other branches of cognitive science. Therefore, none of the work in those fields could deter (or inspire) them. And it shows. I won't defend the claims by Verses AI unless and until they come up with software that implements their promises. But I love their criticisms of generative AI. I can't see how anybody could claim that it's on a path toward AGI. John From: "Dan Brickley" For an implementation-oriented survey see https://github.com/BerenMillidge/Predictive_Coding_Papers and in general work under “predictive processing” and “predictive coding” banners Also this book has PDFs available; https://direct.mit.edu/books/oa-monograph/5299/Active-InferenceThe-Free-Energy-Principle-in-Mind and also gets pretty specific eg ch8 on continuous time dynamical systems representation, see https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/12441.003.0012 Dan _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] More about Dr. Karl Firston, Chief Scientist at Verses AI
After a bit of searching, I found more info about Verses AI and their new chief scientist. I like the approach they're taking: putting more emphasis on natural thinking process in neuroscience. And their new chief scientist has publications that would lead them in that direction. The ideas look good, and I would recommend them. But I don't know how far he and his colleagues have gone in implementing them, or how long it will take for anything along those lines to be running in a practical system. However, it's unlikely that any company would hire somebody as chief scientist without a considerable amount of prior work. And I doubt that any company would make an announcement in a full-page ad in the New York Times unless they already had some kind of prototype. Following is a list of theoretical publications by Karl Friston: https://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/~karl/#_Computational_neuroscience None of them describe an implementation. But it's possible that he and his colleagues (and/or graduate students) have implemented something that Verses AI wanted. And by the way, one reason why I like this approach is that it's related to methods that Peirce was suggesting. He is famous for his innovations in logic, but he also had many ideas about biosemiotics and reasoning methods in living things down to the level of insects and plants. He even mentioned possible aliens in outer space as agents that might continue research if humans didn't survive. Although I don't know whether Verses AI will succeed with their plans, I believe that the direction they're taking is more promising than anything OpenAI or Google is doing. I believe that any design that ignores neuroscience is a dead end for AGI. John ___ An excerpt from https://www.verses.ai/press-2/vers-karl-friston “It is with great enthusiasm and excitement that we welcome Karl Friston to VERSES as our Chief Scientist,” said Gabriel René, Founder, and CEO of VERSES. “Dr. Friston’s breakthrough work in neuroscience and biologically-inspired AI, known as Active Inference, aligns beautifully with our vision and mission to enable a “smarter world” where AI powers the applications of the 21st century. As the originator of this principle, it is only fitting that Karl has a significant role in VERSES AI research and development all the way through their applied uses in product commercialization.” Friston who was ranked #1 most influential neuroscientist in the world by Semantic Scholar in 2016 has had an illustrious and decorated scientific career. He became a Fellow of the Royal Society in 2006 and The Royal Society of Biology in 2012, received the Weldon Memorial Prize and Medal in 2013 for his remarkable contributions to mathematical biology and was elected as a member of EMBO in 2014 and the Academia Europaea in 2015. He was the 2016 recipient of the Charles Branch Award for unparalleled breakthroughs in Brain Research and the Glass Brain Award from the Organization for Human Brain Mapping. He holds Honorary doctorates from the universities of York, Zurich, Liège, and Radboud University. “I am delighted and honored to join VERSES. I have seldom met such a friendly, focused, committed, and right-minded group of colleagues. On a personal note, my appointment as Chief Scientist is exactly the kind of dénouement of my academic career I had hoped for – a dénouement that marks the beginning of a new and exciting journey of discovery and enabling.” said Karl Friston. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] An alternative to generative AI for achieving AGI
Verses AI published an article in the NY Times that criticizes and debunks generative AI, and proposes an alternative. I agree with their criticism, but I don't know enough about the alternative to make any further comments. If anybody has difficulty getting the following website, an excerpt without the graphics follows. In any case, it confirms my basic point: the technology based on LLMs is valuable for many purposes, especially translations between and among languages, natural and artificial. But there is a huge amount of intelligence (by humans and other living things) that it cannot do. Google and others supplement LLMs with different technologies. The question about how much and what kind of other technology is an open question. The reference below is a suggestion. John ___ https://medium.com/aimonks/verses-ai-announces-agi-breakthrough-invokes-open-ais-assist-clause-7e657bcbce60 In an unprecedented move by VERSES AI, today’s announcement of a breakthrough revealing a new path to AGI based on ‘natural’ rather than ‘artificial’ intelligence, VERSES took out a full page ad in the NY Times with an open letter to the Board of Open AI appealing to their stated mission “to build artificial general intelligence (AGI) that is safe and benefits all of humanity.” Specifically, the appeal addresses a clause in the Open AI Board’s charter that states in pursuit of their mission to “to build artificial general intelligence (AGI) that is safe and benefits all of humanity,” and the concerns about late stage AGI becoming a “competitive race without time for adequate safety precautions. Therefore, if a value-aligned, safety-conscious project comes close to building AGI before we do, we commit to stop competing with and start assisting this project.” What Happened? VERSES has achieved an AGI breakthrough within their alternative path to AGI that is Active Inference. And they are appealing to Open AI “in the spirit of cooperation and in accordance with [their} charter.” According to their press release today, “VERSES recently achieved a significant internal breakthrough in Active Inference that we believe addresses the tractability problem of probabilistic AI. This advancement enables the design and deployment of adaptive, real-time Active Inference agents at scale, matching and often surpassing the performance of state-of-the-art deep learning. These agents achieve superior performance using orders of magnitude less input data and are optimized for energy efficiency, specifically designed for intelligent computing on the edge, not just in the cloud.” In a video published as part of the announcement today titled, “The Year in AI 2023,” VERSES takes a look at the incredible journey of AI acceleration over this past year and what it suggests about the current path from Artificial Narrow Intelligence (where we are now) to Artificial General Intelligence — AGI (the holy grail of AI automation)… Noting that all of the major players of Deep Learning technology have publicly acknowledged throughout the course of 2023 that “another breakthrough” is needed to get to AGI. For many months now, there has been overwhelming consensus that machine learning/deep learning cannot achieve AGI. Sam Altman, Bill Gates, Yann LeCunn, Gary Marcus, and many others have publicly stated so. Just last month, Sam Altman declared at the Hawking Fellowship Award event at Cambridge University that “another breakthrough is needed” in response to a question asking if LLMs are capable of achieving AGI. [See graphic in article] Even more concerning are the potential dangers of proceeding in the direction of machine intelligence, as evidenced by the “Godfather of AI”, Geoffrey Hinton, creator of back propagation and the deep learning method, withdrawing from Google early this year over his own concerns of the potential harm to humanity by continuing down the path he had dedicated half a century of his life to. So What Are The Potential Dangers of Deep Learning Neural Nets? The many problems that pose these potential dangers of continuing down the current path of generative AI, are compelling and quite serious. · Black box problem · Alignment problem · Generalizability problem · Halucination problem · Centralization problem — one corporation owning the AI · Clean data problem · Energy consumption problem · Data update problem · Financial viability problem · Guardrail problem · Copyright problem All Current AI Stems from This ‘Artificial’ DeepMind Path [see graphics and much more of this article] . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send
[PEIRCE-L] Paraconsistent Newsletter Fall-Spring 2023
Just released, including an interview with Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre papers, books, videos, events of interest for paraconsistentists and a contest to win holidays on the island of inconsistency Enjoy ! Paraconsistent Newsletter Fall-Spring-2023 https://sites.google.com/view/paranews-2023-4/ Jean-Yves Beziau Editor of the Paraconsistent Newsletter https://philpeople.org/profiles/jean-yves-beziau _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
Object >>>> (Following the vector of determination in semiosis.) >>>> >>>> Peirce says that "Signs are divisible by three trichotomies" (CP 2.43) >>>> these being (with no vectorial associations): >>>> >>>> The Sign in itself: >>>> >>>> Qualisign >>>> |> Legisign >>>> Sinsign >>>> >>>> The Sign in relation to its Object >>>> >>>> Icon >>>> |> Symbol >>>> Index >>>> >>>> The Sign in relation to its Interpretant >>>> >>>> Rheme >>>> |> Argument >>>> Dicisign >>>> >>>> "These three trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing Signs into >>>> Ten Classes Signs." (CP2.254) >>>> >>>> So, I guess one could see these several uses of 'Sign' by Peirce as but >>>> 'loose' language and, in fact, this terminological looseness -- especially >>>> coming from a scholar much concerned with scientific terminology has >>>> resulted in some confusion in the past on this List and in, especially, >>>> insome of the early literature where there were those who argued that an >>>> Icon was indeed a Sign (whereas in the 10-adic classification there are >>>> three iconic signs). >>>> >>>> While it is certain that, for example, the Qualisign is not and, indeed, >>>> cannot itself be a Sign, such constituents of authentic signs have been >>>> included at least as preparatory in Peirce's discussion of the >>>> classification of signs. Some others, perhaps including the three >>>> interpretant signs (as the interpretant is itself seen as a sign that has >>>> been developed according to Peirce) may constitute something like a >>>> supplement to that classification. But again, strictly speaking, you are >>>> quite correct regarding the 10 classes of signs. >>>> >>>> (Disclosure: I'm currently reviewing some semeiotic 'basics' as I'm >>>> preparing a presentation on Peirce's architectonic philosophy at APA this >>>> January to an audience likely having little knowledge of Peirce's >>>> architectonic, namely, Santayana scholars.) >>>> >>>> Best, >>>> >>>> Gary R >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >> https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at >> https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the >> links! >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu >> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in >> the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
;> 'loose' language and, in fact, this terminological looseness -- especially >>> coming from a scholar much concerned with scientific terminology has >>> resulted in some confusion in the past on this List and in, especially, >>> insome of the early literature where there were those who argued that an >>> Icon was indeed a Sign (whereas in the 10-adic classification there are >>> three iconic signs). >>> >>> While it is certain that, for example, the Qualisign is not and, indeed, >>> cannot itself be a Sign, such constituents of authentic signs have been >>> included at least as preparatory in Peirce's discussion of the >>> classification of signs. Some others, perhaps including the three >>> interpretant signs (as the interpretant is itself seen as a sign that has >>> been developed according to Peirce) may constitute something like a >>> supplement to that classification. But again, strictly speaking, you are >>> quite correct regarding the 10 classes of signs. >>> >>> (Disclosure: I'm currently reviewing some semeiotic 'basics' as I'm >>> preparing a presentation on Peirce's architectonic philosophy at APA this >>> January to an audience likely having little knowledge of Peirce's >>> architectonic, namely, Santayana scholars.) >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Gary R > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
aps several to all 6 of the categorial >> vectors (that is, the six possible movements through the three categories). >> >> Regarding why you do not believe the trichotomy of interpretants ought to >> be included in Peirce's Classification of Signs you write: "The point >> here is that a sign is never classified according to *whether *its >> interpretant is immediate, dynamical, or final. On the contrary, *every *sign >> can have *all three* interpretants." >> >> Strictly speaking, you are undoubtedly correct. But Peirce's analyses of >> signs includes much more than merely the classification of individual signs >> (the signs in the chart of the 10 classes of signs are but abstractions as >> are the three interpretants, not 'living' signs in semiosis). >> >> Again, strictly speaking, the classification of signs ought to be limited >> to that chart and Peirce's discussion of the 10 classes. But some of >> Peirce's analyses also include those elements which are involved (in the >> non-technical sense) in semiosis. So, famously: >> >> Sign >> |> Interpretant >> Object >> (Following the vector of determination in semiosis.) >> >> Peirce says that "Signs are divisible by three trichotomies" (CP 2.43) >> these being (with no vectorial associations): >> >> The Sign in itself: >> >> Qualisign >> |> Legisign >> Sinsign >> >> The Sign in relation to its Object >> >> Icon >> |> Symbol >> Index >> >> The Sign in relation to its Interpretant >> >> Rheme >> |> Argument >> Dicisign >> >> "These three trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing Signs into >> Ten Classes Signs." (CP2.254) >> >> So, I guess one could see these several uses of 'Sign' by Peirce as but >> 'loose' language and, in fact, this terminological looseness -- especially >> coming from a scholar much concerned with scientific terminology has >> resulted in some confusion in the past on this List and in, especially, >> insome of the early literature where there were those who argued that an >> Icon was indeed a Sign (whereas in the 10-adic classification there are >> three *iconic* signs). >> >> While it is certain that, for example, the Qualisign is not and, indeed, >> *cannot* itself be a Sign, such constituents of authentic signs have >> been included at least as *preparatory* in Peirce's discussion of the >> classification of signs. Some others, perhaps including the three >> interpretant signs (as the interpretant is itself seen as a sign that has >> been developed according to Peirce) may constitute something like a >> *supplement* to that classification. But again, strictly speaking, you >> are quite correct regarding the 10 classes of signs. >> >> (Disclosure: I'm currently reviewing some semeiotic 'basics' as I'm >> preparing a presentation on Peirce's architectonic philosophy at APA this >> January to an audience likely having little knowledge of Peirce's >> architectonic, namely, Santayana scholars.) >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Synesthesia Was Re: interpretant and thirdness
The problem with using the triangle to represent a sign is not its vertices, but its sides. The triangle above, which illustrates a very simple (algebraic) category in Wikipedia, represents the triadic sign as Peirce defined it after 1905, in which the arrows represent determinations, A the object, B the sign S and C the interpretant I. gof is the compound of f and g. Le lun. 18 déc. 2023 à 20:54, John F Sowa a écrit : > Mary, List, > > I agree that the triangle by Ogden & Richards is horribly misleading. But > a triangle by itself can be used for many useful purposes of various kinds. > > What is misleading is that O & R drew their triangle in a book that also > contained an appendix with MSS by Peirce. That combination may have misled > people to think that their triangle had some connection to Peirce's > writings. > > And by the way, Arthur Burks cites the O & R book in CP8. He was editing > that volume at Harvard while I. A. Richards happened to be a professor in > the philosophy dept. Since both of them were at Harvard at the same time, > it's very likely that they met on various occasions. > > Does anyone know of any interactions they may have had? > > John > > PS: I have been very busy trying to finish this article I'm writing. I > have wanted to repond to various notes on these threads but when I start > writing, it's hard to stop. > > John > > > -- > *From*: "Mary Libertin" > > I agree with Edwina about “the generative capabilities of the Peircean > infrastructure.” Robert Marty’s trellis of 28 classes opens a perspective > that the "semiotic triangle” never did. [By the way, Peirce never uses a > triangle, that I am aware of. Was the triangle first popularized by Ogden > in *The Meaning of Meaning,* in his presentation of Peirce’s ideas? That > triangle has done more harm to semiotics than one can imagine.] > > Mary > > > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Synesthesia Was Re: interpretant and thirdness
Mary, List, I agree that the triangle by Ogden & Richards is horribly misleading. But a triangle by itself can be used for many useful purposes of various kinds. What is misleading is that O & R drew their triangle in a book that also contained an appendix with MSS by Peirce. That combination may have misled people to think that their triangle had some connection to Peirce's writings. And by the way, Arthur Burks cites the O & R book in CP8. He was editing that volume at Harvard while I. A. Richards happened to be a professor in the philosophy dept. Since both of them were at Harvard at the same time, it's very likely that they met on various occasions. Does anyone know of any interactions they may have had? John PS: I have been very busy trying to finish this article I'm writing. I have wanted to repond to various notes on these threads but when I start writing, it's hard to stop. John From: "Mary Libertin" I agree with Edwina about “the generative capabilities of the Peircean infrastructure.” Robert Marty’s trellis of 28 classes opens a perspective that the "semiotic triangle” never did. [By the way, Peirce never uses a triangle, that I am aware of. Was the triangle first popularized by Ogden in The Meaning of Meaning, in his presentation of Peirce’s ideas? That triangle has done more harm to semiotics than one can imagine.] Mary _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Synesthesia Was Re: interpretant and thirdness
Mary- yes, I fully agree with you. Tha semiotic triangle is disastrous to the study of genuine semiotics. Peirce never used it; his diagram/image was of a three-tailed ‘umbrella’..[for want of a better metaphor]. In 1.347, you can see his outline of “a graph with three tails”. >- This can be connected and networked to other triads. The triad represents the three Relations of Object-Sign/Representamen-Interpretant….and prevents dyadic closure. That is a dyadic interaction is closed, but a triadic end blew an interaction with other triads. As for who thought up putting Peirce’s triad into a triangle - I’ve no idea - but it is everywhere, in all basic texts of semiotics, aligning Peirce with Saussurian dyadic semiology [disgraceful thing to do] .. And reducing Peirce to….. Edwina > On Dec 18, 2023, at 2:27 PM, Mary Libertin wrote: > > I agree with Edwina about “the generative capabilities of the Peircean > infrastructure.” Robert Marty’s trellis of 28 classes opens a perspective > that the "semiotic triangle” never did. [By the way, Peirce never uses a > triangle, that I am aware of. Was the triangle first popularized by Ogden in > The Meaning of Meaning, in his presentation of Peirce’s ideas? That triangle > has done more harm to semiotics than one can imagine.] > > Mary > > >> On Dec 18, 2023, at 12:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: >> >> I particularly like, however, the outline of the trellis of the 28 classes, >> [also provided by Robert Marty]. That shows, even more clearly, the >> generative capabilities of the Peircean infrastructure. It shows how the >> Interpretant can function, for example, in any of the three modes [ >> following Peirce’s laws of such]. The Decent Symbol Legisign can have all >> three Interpretants in a mode of 2ns. It can still be - less genuine - >> moving triad-by-triad- into a Rhematic Symbol, with those Interpretants in >> a mode of 1ns. >> > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Synesthesia Was Re: interpretant and thirdness
I agree with Edwina about “the generative capabilities of the Peircean infrastructure.” Robert Marty’s trellis of 28 classes opens a perspective that the "semiotic triangle” never did. [By the way, Peirce never uses a triangle, that I am aware of. Was the triangle first popularized by Ogden in The Meaning of Meaning, in his presentation of Peirce’s ideas? That triangle has done more harm to semiotics than one can imagine.] Mary > On Dec 18, 2023, at 12:06 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > I particularly like, however, the outline of the trellis of the 28 classes, > [also provided by Robert Marty]. That shows, even more clearly, the > generative capabilities of the Peircean infrastructure. It shows how the > Interpretant can function, for example, in any of the three modes [ following > Peirce’s laws of such]. The Decent Symbol Legisign can have all three > Interpretants in a mode of 2ns. It can still be - less genuine - moving > triad-by-triad- into a Rhematic Symbol, with those Interpretants in a mode > of 1ns. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Clear Ideas,
: > > *Such false distinctions do as much harm as the confusion of beliefs > really different, and are among the pitfalls of which we ought constantly > to beware, especially when we are upon metaphysical ground. One singular > deception of this sort, which often occurs, is to mistake the sensation > produced by our own unclearness of thought for a character of the object we > are thinking. Instead of perceiving that the obscurity is purely > subjective, we fancy that we contemplate a quality of the object which is > essentially mysterious; and if our conception be afterward presented to us > in a clear form we do not recognize it as the same, owing to the absence of > the feeling of unintelligibility. So long as this deception lasts, it > obviously puts an impassable barrier in the way of perspicuous thinking; so > that it equally interests the opponents of rational thought to perpetuate > it, and its adherents to guard against it*.(CP 5.398, from How To Make > Our Ideas Clear). > > Robert Marty > Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy > fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty > *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Clear Ideas,
List, In the end, Peirce left us a research journal of over 100,000 pages. The current debate shows that any assertion or term can give rise to sourced contestation. However, the choice of sources and the meanings attributed to them can create a fog, mainly through biased responses, which can discourage even the best-disposed people. Proof: The message I reply to begins with “*For the record (again), although the three interpretants are not a trichotomy for sign classification, they do constitute a trichotomy in the specific sense defined by Peirce as follows*.” I’ll spend little time on “*again,”* which shows a certain self-importance on the part of the person who, *once again*, has to defend himself against a false accusation. Then comes the rhetorical process of admitting what you’re about to contest (*the three interpretants are not a trichotomy for sign classification*), only to deny it by invoking another meaning of the terms, a “specific” meaning attributed to Peirce and pointed out by the author for the sake of his argument. This is pure fantasy, as there is nothing new or specific in 5.72 that follows. Indeed, all you have to do is look it up and read just the two sentences that precede the quotation and which have not been reproduced by the author: *5.72. The relatively degenerate forms of the Third category do not fall into a catena, like those of the Second. What we find is this.* So, there’s nothing “specific” about what follows. It’s about genuine Thirdness and its two degenerate forms. It’s easy to see that this is a trichotomy in Peirce’s sense since authentic Thirdness is the Category of the law independently of any application; it degenerates in the first degree in its role of governing facts (relatively reactional) and in the second degree in its role of governing qualities of feeling embodied in these same facts (relatively qualitative). Peirce’s use of this supposedly “specific” trichotomy is usual; it is found a little further on in 5.73 : *5.73. The representamen, for example, divides by trichotomy into the general sign or symbol, the index, and the icon*. And he confirms this without possible dispute: *5.73 Of these three genera of representamens the Icon is the Qualitatively Degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while the Symbol is the relatively genuine genus.* Therefore, I stand by my statement in its entirety, particularly by the fact that the three interpretants, however Peirce calls them, cannot be the result of a trichotomy. Moreover, we get no results if we research the terms “trichotomy” or “trichotomies” in my thesaurus of definitions, which contains 76 definitions of signs including those with two objects and three interpretants. What can we learn from this dissension? Peirce again provides it: *Such false distinctions do as much harm as the confusion of beliefs really different, and are among the pitfalls of which we ought constantly to beware, especially when we are upon metaphysical ground. One singular deception of this sort, which often occurs, is to mistake the sensation produced by our own unclearness of thought for a character of the object we are thinking. Instead of perceiving that the obscurity is purely subjective, we fancy that we contemplate a quality of the object which is essentially mysterious; and if our conception be afterward presented to us in a clear form we do not recognize it as the same, owing to the absence of the feeling of unintelligibility. So long as this deception lasts, it obviously puts an impassable barrier in the way of perspicuous thinking; so that it equally interests the opponents of rational thought to perpetuate it, and its adherents to guard against it*.(CP 5.398, from How To Make Our Ideas Clear). Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: interpretant and thirdness
as effects that signs *possibly could* produce are > relatively qualitative (doubly degenerate). > > I initially addressed the explicit/effective/destinate interpretants at > greater length in my *Semiotica *paper, but an anonymous reviewer > adamantly rejected my argument for aligning them with > immediate/dynamical/final. The terms themselves clearly imply this, and it > is also consistent with the principle that the genuine correlate > (destinate/final) determines the degenerate correlate > (effective/dynamical), which determines the doubly degenerate correlate > (explicit/immediate)--a logical ordering, not a temporal sequence. > Nevertheless, I ultimately opted to leave out that entire section and only > provide note 3 instead of continuing to debate the matter, especially since > it was not directly relevant to my central thesis--the alignment of > emotional/energetic/logical with immediate/dynamical/final. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Synesthesia Was Re: interpretant and thirdness
sage for the convenience of economic incentives is a very low grade of “scholarship”. Cheers Jerry Jerry LR Chandler, PhD Research Professor GMU Headwater House, Little Falls, MN _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
f be a Sign, such constituents of authentic signs have been > included at least as *preparatory* in Peirce's discussion of the > classification of signs. Some others, perhaps including the three > interpretant signs (as the interpretant is itself seen as a sign that has > been developed according to Peirce) may constitute something like a > *supplement* to that classification. But again, strictly speaking, you > are quite correct regarding the 10 classes of signs. > > (Disclosure: I'm currently reviewing some semeiotic 'basics' as I'm > preparing a presentation on Peirce's architectonic philosophy at APA this > January to an audience likely having little knowledge of Peirce's > architectonic, namely, Santayana scholars.) > > Best, > > Gary R > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
t;>> adamantly rejected my argument for aligning them with >>> immediate/dynamical/final. The terms themselves clearly imply this, and it >>> is also consistent with the principle that the genuine correlate >>> (destinate/final) determines the degenerate correlate >>> (effective/dynamical), which determines the doubly degenerate correlate >>> (explicit/immediate)--a logical ordering, not a temporal sequence. >>> Nevertheless, I ultimately opted to leave out that entire section and only >>> provide note 3 instead of continuing to debate the matter, especially since >>> it was not directly relevant to my central thesis--the alignment of >>> emotional/energetic/logical with immediate/dynamical/final. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
categories are one of the most misunderstood of >> Peirce’s basic theories…[well, yes, so is the triad, locked into that >> triangle image]… >> >> Edwina >> >>> On Dec 13, 2023, at 5:36 PM, John F Sowa >> <mailto:s...@bestweb.net>> wrote: >>> >>> Jon, Robert, Edwina, List, >>> >>> All three of your discussions are well considered. As I said at the >>> beginning, we have to distinguish two audiences: Peirce scholars, for whom >>> exact quotations, sources, and dates are essential; and 21st century >>> readers in all branches of cognitive science. I'll say a bit more, using >>> the attached figs2_3.pdf for examples. >>> >>> For textual criticism and for establishing connections between and among >>> texts, exact quotations are essential. But in writing for a 21st century >>> audience, the terminology must be faithful to Peirce, to his sources, and >>> to the expected vocabulary of the readers. To illustrate the issues, I'm >>> enclosing an excerpt from Section 2 of the article I'm writing -- >>> figs2_3.pdf. >>> >>> Re Peirce's ethics of terminology: As Peirce said, he would consider >>> himself bound by those ethics if anybody else had adopted and used his >>> terminology. That is why he coined the term pragmaticism to distinguish >>> his intentions from a broader usage by others. I believe that is also why >>> he coined the new term phaneroscopy, which was strongly influenced by his >>> correspondence with Lady Welby. >>> >>> To Jon: I agree with Robert about "your unusually exhaustive work on" >>> Peirce's writings about interpretants. I had read most of the excerpts you >>> cited, but the absence of dates in CP and NEM made it hard to keep track of >>> the sequence. >>> >>> Peirce's own terminology had changed over the years. He did not consider >>> himself to be limited by the words he coined himself, unless other people >>> had adopted them. That is the major reason why he adopted the term >>> pragmaticism. But when nobody else adopted one of his coinages, he felt >>> no obligation to continue using that term. >>> >>> For the attached excerpt I was writing for a mixed audience. Most of my >>> expected readers have a strong background in one or more branches of >>> cognitive science, a field that was organized at a conference in 1983. The >>> six founding branches include philosophy, psychology, linguistics, >>> artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology. Peirce >>> contributed to or studied in depth aspects of all those fields, and experts >>> in each of them participated in the Peirce Bicentennial in 1989 and the >>> Centennial in 2009. >>> >>> There is much more to discuss about these issues and about ways of bringing >>> Peirce's work and its modern implications to the attention of a broader >>> audience. I would like to hear and discuss various suggestions. >>> >>> John >>> >> >> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ >> ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at >> https://cspeirce.com <https://cspeirce.com/> and, just as well, at >> https://www.cspeirce.com <https://www.cspeirce.com/> . It'll take a while >> to repair / update all the links! >> ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu <mailto:peirce-L@list.iupui.edu> . >> ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu >> <mailto:l...@list.iupui.edu> with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE >> of the message and nothing in the body. More at >> https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . >> ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and >> co-managed by him and Ben Udell. > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
al/final. The terms themselves clearly imply this, and it >> is also consistent with the principle that the genuine correlate >> (destinate/final) determines the degenerate correlate >> (effective/dynamical), which determines the doubly degenerate correlate >> (explicit/immediate)--a logical ordering, not a temporal sequence. >> Nevertheless, I ultimately opted to leave out that entire section and only >> provide note 3 instead of continuing to debate the matter, especially since >> it was not directly relevant to my central thesis--the alignment of >> emotional/energetic/logical with immediate/dynamical/final. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
Jon, Thank you for presenting the alignment of the Peirce's three different terminological expressions of the three interpretants so succinctly, which is also to say that I agree with you -- as opposed to that anonymous reviewer -- that the "[explicit/ effective/ destinate interpretants] ought be aligned with the others" since, as you wrote: "The terms themselves clearly imply this." You also write that aligning them thusly "is also consistent with the principle that the genuine correlate (destinate/final) determines the degenerate correlate (effective/dynamical), which determines the doubly degenerate correlate (explicit/immediate). . .'' So expressed, this seems to follow the i*nvolutional* vector commencing at 3ns, moving through 2ns, to 1ns. I note that you use the term 'determine' to express these relations while in thePeirce quotation above Peirce writes "involving." I also don't see -- or, perhaps, don't yet understand -- why you write that the three interpretants "are not a trichotomy for sign classification." Why not? It seems to me that immediate/dynamical/final are aligned with 1ns/2ns/3ns. Granted the three interpretants "constitute a trichotomy in the specific sense defined by Peirce," but the "genuine thirdness" of the final interpretant followed by the two genera of degeneracy seem to me marked categorially: dynamic/"reactional" (2ns) and immediate/"qualitative"1ns) as are all the other elements in Peirce's classification as I read it. So why exclude the three interpretants from Peirce's classification of signs as they seem to be a categorial subdivision of an essential sign element, viz., the interpretant? Best, Gary R On Fri, Dec 15, 2023 at 8:49 AM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > List: > > For the record (again), although the three interpretants are not a > trichotomy for sign classification, they do constitute a trichotomy in the > specific sense defined by Peirce as follows. > > CSP: Taking any class in whose essential idea the predominant element is > Thirdness, or Representation, the self-development of that essential idea > ... results in a *trichotomy *giving rise to three subclasses, or genera, > involving respectively a relatively genuine thirdness, a relatively > reactional thirdness or thirdness of the lesser degree of degeneracy, and a > relatively qualitative thirdness or thirdness of the last degeneracy. (CP > 5.72, EP 2:162, 1903) > > > Final interpretants as effects that signs *ideally would* produce are > relatively genuine, dynamical interpretants as effects that signs *actually > do* produce are relatively reactional (degenerate), and immediate > interpretants as effects that signs *possibly could* produce are > relatively qualitative (doubly degenerate). > > I initially addressed the explicit/effective/destinate interpretants at > greater length in my *Semiotica *paper, but an anonymous reviewer > adamantly rejected my argument for aligning them with > immediate/dynamical/final. The terms themselves clearly imply this, and it > is also consistent with the principle that the genuine correlate > (destinate/final) determines the degenerate correlate > (effective/dynamical), which determines the doubly degenerate correlate > (explicit/immediate)--a logical ordering, not a temporal sequence. > Nevertheless, I ultimately opted to leave out that entire section and only > provide note 3 instead of continuing to debate the matter, especially since > it was not directly relevant to my central thesis--the alignment of > emotional/energetic/logical with immediate/dynamical/final. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on &quo
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
List: For the record (again), although the three interpretants are not a trichotomy for sign classification, they do constitute a trichotomy in the specific sense defined by Peirce as follows. CSP: Taking any class in whose essential idea the predominant element is Thirdness, or Representation, the self-development of that essential idea ... results in a *trichotomy *giving rise to three subclasses, or genera, involving respectively a relatively genuine thirdness, a relatively reactional thirdness or thirdness of the lesser degree of degeneracy, and a relatively qualitative thirdness or thirdness of the last degeneracy. (CP 5.72, EP 2:162, 1903) Final interpretants as effects that signs *ideally would* produce are relatively genuine, dynamical interpretants as effects that signs *actually do* produce are relatively reactional (degenerate), and immediate interpretants as effects that signs *possibly could* produce are relatively qualitative (doubly degenerate). I initially addressed the explicit/effective/destinate interpretants at greater length in my *Semiotica *paper, but an anonymous reviewer adamantly rejected my argument for aligning them with immediate/dynamical/final. The terms themselves clearly imply this, and it is also consistent with the principle that the genuine correlate (destinate/final) determines the degenerate correlate (effective/dynamical), which determines the doubly degenerate correlate (explicit/immediate)--a logical ordering, not a temporal sequence. Nevertheless, I ultimately opted to leave out that entire section and only provide note 3 instead of continuing to debate the matter, especially since it was not directly relevant to my central thesis--the alignment of emotional/energetic/logical with immediate/dynamical/final. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
;> expected readers have a strong background in one or more branches of >> cognitive science, a field that was organized at a conference in 1983. The >> six founding branches include philosophy, psychology, linguistics, >> artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology. Peirce contributed >> to or studied in depth aspects of all those fields, and experts in each of >> them participated in the Peirce Bicentennial in 1989 and the Centennial in >> 2009. >> >> There is much more to discuss about these issues and about ways of bringing >> Peirce's work and its modern implications to the attention of a broader >> audience. I would like to hear and discuss various suggestions. >> >> John >> > > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in > the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
Jon, list With regard to bringing Peirce’s work to a broader audience - I can think of a number of issues. 1] We should not assume that our audience are first year undergraduates; as you point out - the people who are exploring Peirce may very well be much more advanced scholars in other fields, with their own discipline’s vocabulary and frameworks. I think we should be more amenable to enabling them to use their vocabulary and framework - within a Peircean framework. There is, for example, a great deal of excellent work on Anticipation - within physics, computers, AI, biology - which certainly fits in with Peirce’s work on Existential Graphs. The terms used are different - but- the concepts are similar - and Peircean conferences should encourage this awareness - and not require the authors to use Peirce’s terms. 2] I think a great setback and problem with using Peirce in these scientific areas was the original marginalizing of him by setting his work up as a ‘ Semiotics’ - with de Saussure as the main author and Saussure’s semiology as the main analytic framework within the field of semiotics. Saussure’s semiology is, in my view, a simplistic binary framework of ’this-means -that’ with an external Agent necessarily uniting the two - and furthermore - it is linguistic or cultural, and ignores the natural semiosis.. This framework readily enables an overarching ideology of other dyads - which fit right into the leftist Marxist frames of created class and ‘oppressor/oppressed’ . And so, we get semiotics viewed as semiology [ which it is not] and operating as some kind of subjectivist free-interpretation… The many books on semiotics all misuse Peirce in this way - including providing images of the semiotic triad as a triangle [rather than an ‘umbrella-triadic spoke]. And of course - these works also totally misunderstand the categories. Indeed - I think the categories are one of the most misunderstood of Peirce’s basic theories…[well, yes, so is the triad, locked into that triangle image]… Edwina > On Dec 13, 2023, at 5:36 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Jon, Robert, Edwina, List, > > All three of your discussions are well considered. As I said at the > beginning, we have to distinguish two audiences: Peirce scholars, for whom > exact quotations, sources, and dates are essential; and 21st century readers > in all branches of cognitive science. I'll say a bit more, using the > attached figs2_3.pdf for examples. > > For textual criticism and for establishing connections between and among > texts, exact quotations are essential. But in writing for a 21st century > audience, the terminology must be faithful to Peirce, to his sources, and to > the expected vocabulary of the readers. To illustrate the issues, I'm > enclosing an excerpt from Section 2 of the article I'm writing -- figs2_3.pdf. > > Re Peirce's ethics of terminology: As Peirce said, he would consider himself > bound by those ethics if anybody else had adopted and used his terminology. > That is why he coined the term pragmaticism to distinguish his intentions > from a broader usage by others. I believe that is also why he coined the new > term phaneroscopy, which was strongly influenced by his correspondence with > Lady Welby. > > To Jon: I agree with Robert about "your unusually exhaustive work on" > Peirce's writings about interpretants. I had read most of the excerpts you > cited, but the absence of dates in CP and NEM made it hard to keep track of > the sequence. > > Peirce's own terminology had changed over the years. He did not consider > himself to be limited by the words he coined himself, unless other people had > adopted them. That is the major reason why he adopted the term pragmaticism. > But when nobody else adopted one of his coinages, he felt no obligation to > continue using that term. > > For the attached excerpt I was writing for a mixed audience. Most of my > expected readers have a strong background in one or more branches of > cognitive science, a field that was organized at a conference in 1983. The > six founding branches include philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial > intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology. Peirce contributed to or > studied in depth aspects of all those fields, and experts in each of them > participated in the Peirce Bicentennial in 1989 and the Centennial in 2009. > > There is much more to discuss about these issues and about ways of bringing > Peirce's work and its modern implications to the attention of a broader > audience. I would like to hear and discuss various suggestions. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
uot;modifications of consciousness.*" (JA Schmidt, p.222) In fact, the relationship between the two classes is one of general to particular (and not just of complementarity, which is a somewhat "ensembleist" view of the question). The latter is the particularity of the former. I fully subscribe to this vision as soon as it is formulated in this way. All the more so as it allows me to situate my work well (thank you for that), because with mathematics, I invest (formalize) the general with the universal, and that's all there is to it! And when that's done, I have a royal road to show, thanks to category theory (which enables me to do what set theory doesn't), that I can achieve a structuring of classes of signs (with lattices) ) that Peirce intuited (the "affinities"). These lattices correspond perfectly to Peirce's Gramatica Speculativa (this becomes clear in the rigorously organized Classification of the Sciences in Peirce's "Well of truth". That's why I've made it my Chapter 1, the entry point into "the peircean exact thinking." But that's another story... Regards, Robert Marty Honorary Professor ; PhD Mathematics ; PhD Philosophy fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Marty *https://martyrobert.academia.edu/ <https://martyrobert.academia.edu/>* Le mar. 12 déc. 2023 à 14:56, Jon Alan Schmidt a écrit : > List: > > JFS: Another term that raises confusion is "final interpretant". I > believe that Peirce used that term for discussing important issues. But > the details of multiple levels of interpretants are unclear. I noticed > that in the last decade of his life, when Lady Welby was his primary > correspondent, he avoided that issue. That does not imply that Peirce > thought that the word was irrelevant. But it suggests that he did not > require that word for the most important issues he discussed with her, > William James, and other late correspondents. > > > For the record, Peirce did not at all avoid the issue of multiple > interpretants, including the final interpretant, in his late correspondence > with Lady Welby and William James. On the contrary, he introduces the whole > notion of three interpretants in one such letter > (immediate/dynamic/signified; CP 8.333-339, SS 32-35, 1904 Oct 12), briefly > mentions it again in another (explicit/effective/destinate; EP 2:481, SS > 84, 1908 Dec 14), and elaborates on it extensively in several others > (immediate/dynamical/final; CP 8.184-185, EP 2:496, 1909 Feb 26; SS > 109-111, 1909 Mar 14; CP 8.315, EP 2:499-500, 1909 Apr 1). For more on this > subject, please see my recent *Semiotica *paper, "Peirce's Evolving > Interpretants" (https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHPEI-12.pdf). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to > l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the > message and nothing in the body. More at > https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . > ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and > co-managed by him and Ben Udell. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Mozi’s Philosophy of Universal Love and Analogical Reasoning: The Logic and Religion Webinar, Dec 14 (Thursday)
Dear Colleague, You are invited to participate in the next session of the Logic and Religion Webinar Series which will be held on December 14 (THIS THURSDAY), 2023, at 4pm CET with the topic: Mozi’s Philosophy of Universal Love and Analogical Reasoning Speaker: Caroline Pires Ting<https://philpeople.org/profiles/caroline-pires-ting> (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) Chair: Jean-Yves Beziau<http://www.jyb-logic.org/> (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) Please, register to receive a zoom link: https://www.logicandreligion.com/webinars Abstract: The forthcoming exposition delves into Mozi’s philosophy of Universal Love (兼愛, jian'ai) and its profound impact on Chinese civilization. Mozi (墨子, c. 470 BCE – c. 391 BCE) is a leading light in Chinese philosophical discourse of his time. At the heart of his idea lies the notion of impartial care, advocating that all human endeavors ought to originate from an unwavering foundation of undistinguished concern. This doctrine is instrumental in shaping a distinctive ethos grounded in the ethical and political aspirations for societal enhancement. Unbiased love becomes fundamental to his intellectual framework, acting as the benchmark for all logical actions. As Chinese philosophical traditions began engaging with Western thought in recent times, Mohist reasoning experienced a revival, reinforcing the notion that Chinese philosophical traditions also possess an analytical inclination. Our goal in this talk is to explain how Mozi's understanding of love embodies an idea of benevolence rooted in a rigorous epistemological construct. Join us 5 minutes prior to the beginning of the session! With best wishes, -- Francisco de Assis Mariano, The University of Missouri-Columbia (USA) LARA Secretary _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Mozi’s Philosophy of Universal Love and Analogical Reasoning: The Logic and Religion Webinar, Dec 14 (Thursday)
Dear Colleague, You are invited to participate in the next session of the Logic and Religion Webinar Series which will be held on December 14 (THIS THURSDAY), 2023, at 4pm CET with the topic: Mozi’s Philosophy of Universal Love and Analogical Reasoning Speaker: Caroline Pires Ting<https://philpeople.org/profiles/caroline-pires-ting> (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) Chair: Jean-Yves Beziau<http://www.jyb-logic.org/> (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) Please, register to receive a zoom link: https://www.logicandreligion.com/webinars Abstract: The forthcoming exposition delves into Mozi’s philosophy of Universal Love (兼愛, jian'ai) and its profound impact on Chinese civilization. Mozi (墨子, c. 470 BCE – c. 391 BCE) is a leading light in Chinese philosophical discourse of his time. At the heart of his idea lies the notion of impartial care, advocating that all human endeavors ought to originate from an unwavering foundation of undistinguished concern. This doctrine is instrumental in shaping a distinctive ethos grounded in the ethical and political aspirations for societal enhancement. Unbiased love becomes fundamental to his intellectual framework, acting as the benchmark for all logical actions. As Chinese philosophical traditions began engaging with Western thought in recent times, Mohist reasoning experienced a revival, reinforcing the notion that Chinese philosophical traditions also possess an analytical inclination. Our goal in this talk is to explain how Mozi's understanding of love embodies an idea of benevolence rooted in a rigorous epistemological construct. Join us 5 minutes prior to the beginning of the session! With best wishes, -- Francisco de Assis Mariano, The University of Missouri-Columbia (USA) LARA Secretary _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] Second Call for Small Grant Proposals: God and Consciousness in Indian Traditions
*Please circulate widely. Apologies for multiple emails.* *SECOND CALL FOR SMALL GRANT PROPOSALS: PAPER INCUBATOR* *Deadline*: January 5, 2024 *Website*: www.god-and-consciousness.com/grants The project Concepts of God and the Variety of Theisms in Indian Traditions: Towards a Theistic Theory of Consciousness <https://www.god-and-consciousness.com/> is an initiative that has as general goals (1) to philosophically reconstruct concepts of God in Indian theistic (or theistically inclined) traditions, namely from Vaishnava, Shaiva, Shakti, indigenous or other religious perspectives on the subcontinent, and (2) to investigate the extent to which issues explored by such traditions can contribute to the philosophy of consciousness. It is supported by funding totaling $260,000 from the John Templeton Foundation <https://www.templeton.org/grant/concepts-of-god-and-the-variety-of-theisms-in-indian-traditions-towards-a-theistic-theory-of-consciousness> . As part of the project, we will organize a paper incubator <http://www.god-and-consciousness.com/grants>: a systemized and sponsored mentorship program designed to help junior and mid-career philosophers and scholars of Indian studies to develop submitted papers proposals into publishable articles. Each selected researcher will work in cooperation with a tutor, who will help the candidate transform their text into a high-quality publishable article. Each successful applicant will receive a *grant of 3,000 USD*. They will have 18 months to write their article, which must be submitted to a peer-reviewed journal. Each researcher must present their work in at least one of our three conferences <https://www.god-and-consciousness.com/conferences> (a bonus of *1,000 USD* will be given to those who attend the conference in person). The grant will be awarded through bank transfer, on which bank and federal revenue fees may apply. Proposals must be written in English in the form of an extended abstract of a maximum of 2,000 words, clearly describing (1) the problem that will be addressed, (2) the context in which the problem has been approached (preferably through a brief literary review), (3) the goal of the paper, and (4) the way the proponent wants to achieve this goal. The proposal should also contain (5) a list with the relevant bibliography. The general intended approach must be consistent with analytic philosophy of religion. Proposals must address some of the questions and general goals <https://www.god-and-consciousness.com/questions> of the project. Applicants must be PhD candidates, or have completed their PhD within a maximum of 6 years. We welcome proposals both from philosophers and Indian Studies scholars. The proposal must be sent along with a summarized CV of the applicant to god.and.consciousn...@gmail.com by January 5, 2024. The list of selected proposals will be posted on the website on January 15, 2024. Follow us on social media: X (twitter): https://twitter.com/GodandConscious Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/God.and.Consciousnesss _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
[PEIRCE-L] LUW December 13 - Julio Stern - Dynamic Oppositional Symmetries for Color, Jungian and Kantian Categories
The next Logica Universalis Webinar session will be Wednesday December 13 at 4pm CET Paris-Geneva-Rome >--- Speaker: Julio Michael Stern, University of São Paulo, Brazil Title: "Dynamic Oppositional Symmetries for Color, Jungian and Kantian Categories" Abstract: This paper investigates some classical oppositional categories, like synthetic vs. analytic, posterior vs. prior, imagination vs. grammar, metaphor vs. hermeneutic, metaphysics vs. observation, innovation vs. routine, and image vs. sound, and the role they play in epistemology and philosophy of science. The epistemological framework of objective cognitive constructivism is of special interest in these investigations. Oppositional relations are formally represented using algebraic lattice structures like the cube and the hexagon of opposition, with applications in the contexts of modern color theory, Kantian philosophy, Jungian psychology, and linguistics. https://www.springer.com/journal/11787/ >- Associated organization/project: World Logic Day - 6th Edition https://www.logica-universalis.org/wld6 presented by Jean-Yves Beziau >-- Chair: Ioannis Vandoulakis, Vice-President LUA (Logica Universalis Association) https://www.logica-universalis.org/LUAD > Everybody is welcome to join, register here: https://cassyni.com/s/logica-universalis/seminars Jean-Yves Beziau Editor-in-Chief Logica Universalis / Organizer LUW _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
List: JFS: Another term that raises confusion is "final interpretant". I believe that Peirce used that term for discussing important issues. But the details of multiple levels of interpretants are unclear. I noticed that in the last decade of his life, when Lady Welby was his primary correspondent, he avoided that issue. That does not imply that Peirce thought that the word was irrelevant. But it suggests that he did not require that word for the most important issues he discussed with her, William James, and other late correspondents. For the record, Peirce did not at all avoid the issue of multiple interpretants, including the final interpretant, in his late correspondence with Lady Welby and William James. On the contrary, he introduces the whole notion of three interpretants in one such letter (immediate/dynamic/signified; CP 8.333-339, SS 32-35, 1904 Oct 12), briefly mentions it again in another (explicit/effective/destinate; EP 2:481, SS 84, 1908 Dec 14), and elaborates on it extensively in several others (immediate/dynamical/final; CP 8.184-185, EP 2:496, 1909 Feb 26; SS 109-111, 1909 Mar 14; CP 8.315, EP 2:499-500, 1909 Apr 1). For more on this subject, please see my recent *Semiotica *paper, "Peirce's Evolving Interpretants" (https://philpapers.org/archive/SCHPEI-12.pdf). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
ess, and Thirdness. > > Since 1905 was a year when Lady Welby and William James were his primary > correspondents, and neither of them would ever use those words, I suspect > that Peirce was searching for a more acceptable terminology for his most > respected colleagues and other readers he hoped to reach. > > Question for Peirce scholars who have been using the three ness-words for > years: Please think back to your first readings of Peirce's writings. > Would you find Primarity, Secudarity, and Tertiarity to be more > intelligible or acceptable than Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness? Why > or why not? > > And by the way, issues about the ethics of terminology do not apply, > because Peirce frequently changed his own terminology when he found that > nobody else had ever adopted it. Even today, nobody ever uses those terms > outside of a discussion about Peirce. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
heories; identity of indiscernibles; indiscernibility of > identicals; particulars (bare, perfect, thick, thin); tropes (a posteriori, > bundles, causality, co-extensive, higher-order, independent existence of, > natural classes of, nontransferable, sparse); universalia (ante res, in res, > inter res)." > > Armstrong’s final chapter summarizes the issues: > > "Metaphysicians should not expect any certainties in their inquiries... Of > all the results that have been argued for here, the most secure, I believe, > is the real existence of properties and relations. Whether they be universals > or particulars is a more delicate matter, and just what properties and > relations are required is obscure, and in any case not for the philosopher to > determine." <https://jfsowa.com/pubs/> _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
Dear Robert, Edwina, and all, As we have been discussing, Peirce's work is at the forefront of ongoing research and publications in the 21st century. But many people complain that his jargon is an obstacle. Yet those people don't realize that the jargon they're reading and writing today is far worse, less readable, and less precise than Peirce's. For examples. I was browsing through writings by more recent, highly regarded authors whose jargon is far worse and less precise than anything Peirce wrote. See below for excerpts that compare modern jargon to the clearer and more precise prose by Peirce. Since I did not want to frighten the readers, I avoided some of Peirce's Greek and the three "Nessie" monsters. Even without them Peirce's words are clearer and more precise than Armstrong's. I believe that we can and should show that Peirce's writings with a modest amount of updating of terminology can serve as a solid foundation for 21st C cognitive science. I don't believe that we need to reject anything that Peirce wrote. We can just avoid quoting some of the terms that tend to be confusing. One of the most confusing examples is the abbreviation of "logic as semeiotic" as just "logic". That is horribly confusing for a modern audience. Instead. we can use the pair of terms "formal logic" and "semeiotic". Exact quotations, of course, must be written verbatim. But with a judicious selection of quotations, we can be precise about Peirce and readable by a 21st C audience. That, in fact, was the choice Max Fisch (1981) made. Fisch, Max H. (1981) The “proof” of pragmatism, reprinted in Fisch (1986) pp. 362-375. Fisch, Max H. (1986) Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, ed. by K. L. Ketner & C. J. W. Kloesel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Another term that raises confusion is "final interpretant". I believe that Peirce used that term for discussing important issues. But the details of multiple levels of interpretants are unclear. I noticed that in the last decade of his life, when Lady Welby was his primary correspondent, he avoided that issue. That does not imply that Peirce thought that the word was irrelevant. But it suggests that he did not require that word for the most important issues he discussed with her, William James, and other late correspondents. I am not saying that Peirce scholars should avoid these words in detailed analyses of Peirce's texts. But I believe that they should be avoided in discussions with a broader audience. John An excerpt from the article https://jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf After thousands of years of debate, philosophers have inherited a large body of terminology from competing schools of thought with divergent ways of thinking and talking about what exists. They have all those terms at their fingertips when they write about ontology. To explain them, David Armstrong (1989) wrote an “opinionated introduction” that begins with the distinction between universals and particulars. His book is short (148 pages) and highly regarded by professional philosophers and Amazon reviewers, who gave it four or five stars. On page 1, Armstrong began with a cautionary note about the “Problem of Universals”: "So let me begin by saying what the problem is. It may turn out that it is really a pseudoproblem. That was the opinion of Wittgenstein and his followers, for instance. Quine is not far from thinking the same. But whether it is a real problem or not should not be decided in advance." The index of that book is a warning of the terminology to come: "abstract particulars; argument from almost indiscernible cycles; blob theories; bundle theories; identity of indiscernibles; indiscernibility of identicals; particulars (bare, perfect, thick, thin); tropes (a posteriori, bundles, causality, co-extensive, higher-order, independent existence of, natural classes of, nontransferable, sparse); universalia (ante res, in res, inter res)." Armstrong’s final chapter summarizes the issues: "Metaphysicians should not expect any certainties in their inquiries... Of all the results that have been argued for here, the most secure, I believe, is the real existence of properties and relations. Whether they be universals or particulars is a more delicate matter, and just what properties and relations are required is obscure, and in any case not for the philosopher to determine." _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSU
Re: [PEIRCE-L] interpretant and thirdness
John - yes, I agree with your comments. With regard to your point 4 - that’s an excellent comment. Primarity, Secundarity, and Tertiarity These are much better terms for the categorical modes than Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness. They are better descriptions of their modal nature - a primary sensation; an awareness of Other, and that mediative plural. I think the categories are basic and foundational to Peirce but these terms for them make it difficult for many. I’ve found that many easily mistake the three modal categories of Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness - and confuse them with ordinal linearity: First, Second, Third - and inform us that, for example, the Representamen functions as, First, within Firstness! Such a mode only functions when the triad has all three correlates in the mode of Firstness. [See 2.55 etc]. . Another confuses the three categories with the arithmetic numbers, where Secondness somehow refers to the nature of TWO objects, and Thirdness to the nature of THREE interpretants. So, it would certainly be helpful to use these suggested terms. Edwina > On Dec 9, 2023, at 6:47 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > Dear Robert, Edwina, and all readers of Peirce-List, > > I share the concerns of Robert, Edwina, and a large number of subscribers who > rarely comment on this list. We have discussed these and related issues > before. In the early 2000s, this list was a vital source of discussion by > some of the best and most respected Peirce scholars. But most of them have > dropped out. Some still subscribe, but they don't join the discussions > because they find their ideas rejected or distorted by people who "shoot > first" and ask questions later. > > There is one point I find significant, and I wish that I could discuss it > with people who would consider it seriously. In the Logic Notebook (LNB > 268r, 1905), Peirce mentions the following four points, which he intended to > develop in detail: > The phaneron and the logical composition of concepts in general. Here take up > Kant & Leibniz & a general sketch of Existential Graphs. > > The forms of elementary ideas and indecomposable elements thereof that are a > priori possible. > > The forms we actually find. > > The principal kinds of Primarity, Secundarity, and Tertiarity. > Point 4 is significant. It seems that Peirce was considering three new terms > that might replace Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. Was that what he > intended? Or did he plan to have a new kind of triad or trichotomy? I have > been searching for some discussion of these questions, but I can't find > anything anywhere. > > I believe that those three words would be an excellent replacement for > 1-ness, 2-ness, and 3-ness. Most people who never read much or any of > Peirce's writings find the 3 "nesses" to be hopelessly confusing. I was > recently reading an article by Jaime Nubiola, in which he said that his > initial response to them was a total rejection, but he later realized that > the concepts were absolutely fundamental. I strongly agree. > > Since my primary audience is 21st C readers who are not Peirce scholars, I > don't want my readers to stop reading at the point where I mention the three > "Nesses". I would very much prefer to write Primarity, Secundarity, and > Tertiarity to Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. > > Since 1905 was a year when Lady Welby and William James were his primary > correspondents, and neither of them would ever use those words, I suspect > that Peirce was searching for a more acceptable terminology for his most > respected colleagues and other readers he hoped to reach. > > Question for Peirce scholars who have been using the three ness-words for > years: Please think back to your first readings of Peirce's writings. Would > you find Primarity, Secudarity, and Tertiarity to be more intelligible or > acceptable than Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness? Why or why not? > > And by the way, issues about the ethics of terminology do not apply, because > Peirce frequently changed his own terminology when he found that nobody else > had ever adopted it. Even today, nobody ever uses those terms outside of a > discussion about Peirce. > > John > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ > ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at > https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at > https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the > links! > ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . > ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L b
