Hector,
I skimmed your paper linked to in the post below.
From my quick read it appears the only meaningful way it suggests a brain
might be infinite was that since the brain used analogue values --- such as
synaptic weights, or variable time intervals between spikes (and presumably
On Dec 2, 2008, at 8:31 AM, Ed Porter wrote:
From my quick read it appears the only meaningful way it suggests a
brain might be infinite was that since the brain used analogue
values --- such as synaptic weights, or variable time intervals
between spikes (and presumably since those
J.,
Your arguments seem to support my intuitive beliefs, so my instinctual
response is to be thankful for them.
But I have to sheepishly admit I don't totally understand them.
Could you please give me a simple explanation for why it is an obvious
argument against infinite values ...
Hi Ed,
I am glad you have read the paper with such detail. You have
summarized quite well what it is about. I have no objection to the
points you make. It is only important to bear in mind that the paper
is about studying the possible computational power of the mind by
using the model of an
Suppose that the gravitational constant is a non-computable number (it
might be, we don't know because as you say, we can only measure with
finite precision). Planets compute G as part of the law of gravitation
that rules their movement (you can of course object, that G is part of
a model that has
Hector,
Yes, it's possible that the brain uses uncomputable neurons to predict
uncomputable physical dynamics in the observed world
However, even if this is the case, **there is no possible way to
verify or falsify this hypothesis using science**, if science is
construed to involve evaluation of
On Wed, Dec 3, 2008 at 1:51 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hector,
Yes, it's possible that the brain uses uncomputable neurons to predict
uncomputable physical dynamics in the observed world
However, even if this is the case, **there is no possible way to
verify or falsify this
Hi Hector,
You may say the hypothesis of neural hypercomputing valid in the sense
that it helps guide you to interesting, falsifiable theories. That's
fine. But, then you must admit that the hypothesis of souls could be
valid in the same sense, right? It could guide some other people to
We cannot
ask Feynman, but I actually asked Deutsch. He does not only think QM
is our most basic physical reality (he thinks math and computer
science lie in quantum mechanics), but he even takes quite seriously
his theory of parallel universes! and he is not alone. Speaking by
myself, I
2008/12/1 Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED]:
And, science cannot tell us whether QM or some empirically-equivalent,
wholly randomness-free theory is the right one...
If two theories give identical predictions under all circumstances
about how the real world behaves, then they are not two separate
If two theories give identical predictions under all circumstances
about how the real world behaves, then they are not two separate
theories, they are merely rewordings of the same theory. And choosing
between them is arbitrary; you may prefer one to the other because
human minds can
Ed, they used to combine ritalin with lsd for psychotherapy. It
assists in absorbing insights achieved from psycholitic doses, which
is a term for doses that are not fully psychedelic. Those are edifying
on their own but are less organized. I don't know if you can get this
in a clinical setting
Ed,
Unfortunately to reply to your message in detail would absorb a lot of
time, because there are two issues mixed up
1) you don't know much about computability theory, and educating you
on it would take a lot of time (and is not best done on an email list)
2) I may not have expressed some of
But quantum theory does appear to be directly related to limits of the
computations of physical reality. The uncertainty theory and the
quantization of quantum states are limitations on what can be computed by
physical reality.
Not really. They're limitations on what measurements of
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 11:19 AM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
You said QUANTUM THEORY REALLY HAS NOTHING DIRECTLY TO DO WITH
UNCOMPUTABILITY.
Please don't quote people using this style, it hurts my eyes.
But quantum theory does appear to be directly related to limits of the
Regarding the uncertainty principal, Wikipedia says:
In quantum physics, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle states that the
values of certain pairs of conjugate variables (position and momentum, for
instance) cannot both be known with arbitrary precision. That is, the more
precisely one
HI,
In quantum physics, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle states that the
values of certain pairs of conjugate variables (position and momentum, for
instance) cannot both be known with arbitrary precision. That is, the more
precisely one variable is known, the less precisely the other is
OTOH, there is no possible real-world test to distinguish a true
random sequence from a high-algorithmic-information quasi-random
sequence
So I don't find this argument very convincing...
On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 10:42 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 3:09 AM,
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 3:09 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But quantum theory does appear to be directly related to limits of the
computations of physical reality. The uncertainty theory and the
quantization of quantum states are limitations on what can be computed by
physical
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:44 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
OTOH, there is no possible real-world test to distinguish a true
random sequence from a high-algorithmic-information quasi-random
sequence
I know, but the point is not whether we can distinguish it, but that
quantum
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:53 AM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:44 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
OTOH, there is no possible real-world test to distinguish a true
random sequence from a high-algorithmic-information quasi-random
sequence
I know,
But I don't get your point at all, because the whole idea of
nondeterministic randomness has nothing to do with physical
reality... true random numbers are uncomputable entities which can
never be existed, and any finite series of observations can be modeled
equally well as the first N bits of an
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:55 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But I don't get your point at all, because the whole idea of
nondeterministic randomness has nothing to do with physical
reality...
It has all to do when it is about quantum mechanics. Quantum mechanics
is non-deterministic
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:55 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But I don't get your point at all, because the whole idea of
nondeterministic randomness has nothing to do with physical
reality...
I don't get it. You don't think that quantum mechanics is part of our
physical reality (if
On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 11:48 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:55 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But I don't get your point at all, because the whole idea of
nondeterministic randomness has nothing to do with physical
reality...
I don't get it.
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 6:20 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 11:48 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:55 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But I don't get your point at all, because the whole idea of
nondeterministic
Hector Zenil wrote:
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 6:20 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Sun, Nov 30, 2008 at 11:48 PM, Hector Zenil [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, Dec 1, 2008 at 4:55 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But I don't get your point at all, because the
Matt Mahoney wrote:
Autobliss...
Imagine that there is another human language which is the same as
English, just the pain/pleasure related words have the opposite
meaning. Then consider what would that mean for your Autobliss.
My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that
On Wed, Nov 19, 2008 at 6:20 PM, Jiri Jelinek [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Trent Waddington wrote:
Apparently, it was Einstein who said that if you can't explain it to
your grandmother then you don't understand it.
That was Richard Feynman
When? I don't really know who said it.. but everyone else
--- On Wed, 11/19/08, Jiri Jelinek [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that learns.
IMO, pain is more like a data with the potential to cause disorder in
hard-wired algorithms. I'm not saying this fully covers it but it's
IMO already out of
Trent,
Feynman's page on wikipedia has it as: If you can't explain something
to a first year student, then you haven't really understood it. but
Feynman reportedly said it in a number of ways, including the
grandmother variant. I learned about it when taking physics classes a
while ago so I don't
From: Trent Waddington [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 7:44 AM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For
example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it
is stuck in the eye with a needle
I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain.
Wow! You are one sick puppy, dude. Personally, you have just hit my Do
not bother debating with list.
You can decide anything you like -- but that doesn't make it true.
- Original Message -
From: Matt Mahoney [EMAIL
--- On Tue, 11/18/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain.
Wow! You are one sick puppy, dude. Personally, you have
just hit my Do not bother debating with list.
You can decide anything you like -- but that
doesn't make it true.
--- On Tue, 11/18/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Autobliss has no grounding, no internal feedback, and no
volition. By what definitions does it feel pain?
Now you are making up new rules to decide that autobliss doesn't feel pain. My
definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 6:26 PM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
--- On Tue, 11/18/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Autobliss has no grounding, no internal feedback, and no
volition. By what definitions does it feel pain?
Now you are making up new rules to decide that
On Wed, Nov 19, 2008 at 9:29 AM, Ben Goertzel [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Clearly, this can be done, and has largely been done already ... though
cutting and pasting or summarizing the relevant literature in emails would
not a productive use of time
Apparently, it was Einstein who said that if
Now you are making up new rules to decide that autobliss doesn't feel
pain. My definition of pain is negative reinforcement in a system that
learns. There is no other requirement.
I made up no rules. I merely asked a question. You are the one who makes a
definition like this and then says
I am just trying to point out the contradictions in Mark's sweeping
generalizations about the treatment of intelligent machines
Huh? That's what you're trying to do? Normally people do that by pointing to
two different statements and arguing that they contradict each other. Not by
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
For example, in
fifty years, I think it is quite possible we will be able to say with some
confidence if certain machine intelligences we design are conscious nor not,
and whether their pain is as real as the pain of another type of
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
No it won't, because people are free to decide what makes pain real.
What? You've got to be kidding . . . . What makes
pain real is how the sufferer reacts to it -- not some
abstract wishful thinking that we use to justify our
Matt,
First, it is not clear people are free to decide what makes pain real,
at least subjectively real. If I zap you will a horrible electric shock of
the type Sadam Hussein might have used when he was the chief
interrogator/torturer of Iraq's Baathist party, it is not clear exactly how
much
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
First, it is not clear people
are free to decide what makes pain real, at least
subjectively real.
I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a
scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 7:44 AM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I mean that people are free to decide if others feel pain. For example, a
scientist may decide that a mouse does not feel pain when it is stuck in the
eye with a needle (the standard way to draw blood) even though it
There are procedures in place for experimenting on humans. And the
biologies of people and animals are orthogonal! Much of this will be
simulated soon
On 11/17/08, Trent Waddington [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 7:44 AM, Matt Mahoney [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I mean that
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Mark Waser [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Autobliss responds to pain by changing its behavior to
make it less likely. Please explain how this is different
from human suffering. And don't tell me its because one
is human and the other is a simple program, because...
Why
Matt,
With regard to your first point I largely agree with you. I would, however,
qualify it with the fact that many of us find it hard not to sympathize with
people or animals, such as a dog, under certain circumstances when we
directly sense outward manifestations that they are experiencing
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Trent Waddington [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 7:44 AM, Matt Mahoney
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I mean that people are free to decide if others feel
pain. For example, a scientist may decide that a mouse does
not feel pain when it is stuck in the eye
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Eric Burton [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
There are procedures in place for experimenting on humans. And the
biologies of people and animals are orthogonal! Much of this will be
simulated soon
When we start simulating people, there will be ethical debates about that. And
Before you can start searching for consciousness, you need to describe
precisely what you are looking for.
-- Matt Mahoney, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
From: Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: RE: FW: [agi] A paper that actually does solve
Matt,
Matt,
Although different people (or even the same people at different times)
define consciousness differently, there as a considerable degree of overlap.
I think a good enough definition to get started with is that which we humans
feel our minds are directly aware of, including
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 9:03 AM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think a good enough definition to get started with is that which we humans
feel our minds are directly aware of, including awareness of senses,
emotions, perceptions, and thoughts. (This would include much of what
Richard
[so who's near Berkeley to report back?]:
UC Berkeley Cognitive Science Students Association presents:
Pain and the Brain
Wednesday, November 19th
5101 Tolman Hall
6 pm - 8 pm
UCSF neuroscienctist Dr. Howard Fields and Berkeley philosopher John Searle
represent some of the most
Trent,
No, it is not easy to implement.
I am talking about the type of awareness that we humans have when we say we
are conscious of something. Some of the studies we have on the neural
correlates of consciousness indicate humans only report being consciously
aware of things that receive
On Tue, Nov 18, 2008 at 10:21 AM, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I am talking about the type of awareness that we humans have when we say we
are conscious of something.
You must talk to different humans to me. I've not had anyone use the
word conscious around me in decades.. and usually
--- On Mon, 11/17/08, Ed Porter [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I think a good enough definition
to get started with is that which we humans feel our minds are directly aware
of, including awareness of senses, emotions, perceptions, and thoughts.
You are describing episodic memory, the ability to recall
This is a subject on which I have done a lot of talking to myself, since as
Richard's paper implies, our own subjective experiences are among the most
real things to us. And we have the most direct access to our own
consciousness, and is since of richness, simultaneity, and meaning. I am
also
See the post I just sent to Matt Mahoney. You have a much greater access to
your own memory than just high level episodic memory. Although your
memories of such experience are more limited than their actual experience,
you can remember qualities about them, that include their sense of richness,
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