Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 28 Sep 2018, at 06:29, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


But you do not seem to go the additional step of saying that 
mathematical objects, numbers and so on, are objects that actually 
exist (which would be a form of platonism).


I use “exist” in the same sense as “it exist a number x such that x + 
7 = 8”.


That is precisely why you need to study the philosophy of mathematics. 
It might teach you not to confuse the use of the existential quantifier 
with an ontology.


Bruce

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Re: Gene Drive and morality

[Russell Standish]

On Fri, Sep 28, 2018 at 01:42:02PM -0400, John Clark wrote:
> Russell Standish wrote:
> 
> 
> >There is also the possibility of wholesale ecosystem collapse, not
> just some birds. Do you know that these mosquitos _aren't_ a keystone
> species?
> 
> 
> I don't know anything for certain about the environment and never will but I
> have a strong hunch the  40 mosquito species that carry malaria going extinct
> and leaving just 3460 mosquito species around would not be the equivalent to
> the Chicxulub Event that occured 66 million years ago. However I do know for
> certain that for 725,000 people each and every year NOT using Gene Drive WILL
> be the equivalent to the Chicxulub Event .

That's a big exaggeration. Name one species that's going extinct due to 
malaria, as compared to 80% extinction of life in the Chicxulub Event.

>  
> 
> > I'm not saying they are, but until ecological studies are done, we don't
> know.
> 
> 
> Such ecological studies will never ever be done, there will always be one more
> study that needs to be completed before we can make a decision.

If that is the case, then there is either a problem with the decision
makers (analysis paralysis) or in their terms of reference. Either
problem is solvable (the first by replacing the decision makers by
people who can, the second by revising the terms of reference to allow
decisions to be made without incurring legal liability in the face of
imperfect knowledge).

> Always.
> Meanwhile as we do nothing 725,000 people die each and every year.   
> 
> 
> > I don't think you have considered _all_ the facts
> 
> 
> Well of course I haven't! In the physical world decisions are never based on
> perfect information so we must use judgement. It is my judgement that 725,000
> human deaths per year is a greater evil than 40 out of 3500 mosquito species
> going extinct.  What is your judgement? 
>

My judgement is that we do not currrently know the impacts of removing
even one of those species, so we cannot weigh which is the
better/worse outcome. Peforming foodweb analysis and modelling is
probably a couple of years work, with the effect of unknown quantites
constrained by ensemble modelling - much like weather forecasts. We
could also run a limited field trial, again for a few years - to bring
to light any "unknown unknowns". I expect that 5 years moratorium
might be enough, 10 years on the outside.

With the calici trial, the right things were being done, but then some
idiot (probably with your mindset) decided to release the virus on the
mainland anyway. Fortunately, in that case, we dodged a bullet. Not so
with cane toads, or the bloody rabbits in the first place.

> 
> > The decision properly should be taken by regulatory agencies, preferably
> an
> international one under (say) the auspices of the UN
> 
> 
> The most important thing for an employee of one of those regulatory agencies 
> is
> to cover your ass, and for reasons I don't understand people will blame them
> for making a decision that results in one person getting sick but they will 
> not
> blame them for killing 725,000 people a year by not acting. So if you're a
> bureaucrat the wisest thing to do is ask for yet another study and do nothing.

The CYA problem is fixed by having the right terms of reference. So
long as the decisions are made in the light of the best scientific
evidence available, is that such a problem? We can employ scientific
peers to decide what is the best scientific evidence, and to identify
obvious gaps in the knowledge that can be filled on a reasonable
timeframe. Wouldn't you say this was better than having a total
free-for-all (like you're proposing), or complete paralysis? Both of
these extremes are arguably equally legally liable (action or
no-action), as we're starting to see in relation to climate change
litigation.

 
>  
> 
> Actually I'm underestimating the political and bureaucratic inertia of
> regulatory agencies.  There is not a single well documented case of 
> genetically
> modified food even making somebody sick much less killing then, and yet
> millions, perhaps billions, of people have the superstition that id something
> has been genetically modified then it must be satanic.  
> 
> Rice is the staple food for half of the human race but unfortunately it
> contains no vitamin A and that deficiency causes 670,000 people to die every
> year and made half a million children go blind every year. However there is a
> strain of rice that does contain vitamin A called "Golden Rice" that was
> developed more than a decade ago but regulatory agencies are dragging
> their feet on allowing it because it was made with genetic engineering. 
> 
> Just a few months ago it was finally approved in the USA but it isn't needed
> there, is still banned in the places where it's needed most, a small
> experimental plot of Golden Rice in the Philippines was destroyed by 
> protestors
> 5 years ago and Bangladesh is still thinking 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Brent Meeker]

On 9/28/2018 2:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

It's not something outside mathematics that is true


OK.



in the sense that ice is cold.



That is also a belief by some machine, and it might be recovered in 
their phenomenology, in arithmetic.


We cannot discuss in the abstract. Doing metaphysics with the 
scientific method as for theory and means of verifying empirically the 
theory.


The mechanist theory predicts both matter and consciousness.


The question is whether it predicts that ice is cold.  It not at all 
impressive to say it predicts that a some machine will believe something 
like "ice is cold" when it also predicts some machine will also believe 
"ice is hot" and another that "ice is friendly" and that "ice is 
quadratic" and so on.


Brent


Materialist theory assume matter, with some magical attribute, and 
miss consciousness. So …




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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 4:37:17 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 4:04:41 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 28 Sep 2018, at 11:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
>>> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:
>>> f
>>> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
>>> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
>>> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
>>> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in 
>>> diverse structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or 
>>> mathematicism vide Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
>>>
>>> What are your thoughts. 
>>>
>>
>> If it's what I think it is, it's demonstrably wrong. One counter example 
>> suffices; there are plane wave solutions to Maxwell's equations, but if you 
>> know what plane waves are, they clearly do NOT exist in physical reality. 
>>
>>
>>
>> With mathematicalism, we don’t assume that there is a 
>> (primitive/irreducible) physical reality.
>>
>> You are begging the question.
>>
>
> *In what way?  The MUH says, for example, that for every mathematical 
> solution or equation, there is a (perceived) physical universe mapped 
> identically from, or into that solution or equation. I gave a simple 
> counter example. AG*
>

*I used "perceived" to indicate no bias for or against a material universe. 
We are always dealing with observations, so if the MUH were correct, it 
would mean we could observe plane waves (or for that matter, advanced 
waves). But the former can never be observed in any universe unless you 
want to posit instantaneous propagation initially, at their creation, and 
on-going as the amplitude changes immediately in all directions to infinity 
as the wave propagates. As for advanced waves, they have never been 
observed and their existence likely trashes causality. So IMO, the MUH is 
easily falsified. AG *

>
>
>> Since the antic dream argument, we know that observation cannot be used 
>> to prove that anything exist, but an observer.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> If this is correct, other models also fall by the wayside. AG 
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Regards
>>>
>>
>> -- 
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>>
>>
>>
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 4:04:41 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 28 Sep 2018, at 11:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
>>> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:
>>> f
>>> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
>>> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
>>> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
>>> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in 
>>> diverse structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or 
>>> mathematicism vide Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
>>>
>>> What are your thoughts. 
>>>
>>
>> If it's what I think it is, it's demonstrably wrong. One counter example 
>> suffices; there are plane wave solutions to Maxwell's equations, but if you 
>> know what plane waves are, they clearly do NOT exist in physical reality. 
>>
>>
>>
>> With mathematicalism, we don’t assume that there is a 
>> (primitive/irreducible) physical reality.
>>
>> You are begging the question.
>>
>> Since the antic dream argument, we know that observation cannot be used 
>> to prove that anything exist, but an observer.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>> If this is correct, other models also fall by the wayside. AG 
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Regards
>>>
>>
>> -- 
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>> "Everything List" group.
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>>
>>
>>

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 6:49:37 PM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>  
> Thank you everybody for your responses. 
>
> Bruno Marchal I looked at your statement, they are very interesting but 
> some very good neruoscientists argue that brain is not like computer
> Here for example (4min video) Edelman:
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmyfQY4TaVc
>

The question can be turned around. Why would anyone think a brain is 
strongly comparable or identical to a computer? It has some superficial 
similarities such as being able to store memory and logical functions 
(which are simulated by a computer), but its cells are not two state 
systems like computer transistors. AG

Please give me your thought on that. 
>
>

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[kujawskilucjan85]

 
Thank you everybody for your responses. 

Bruno Marchal I looked at your statement, they are very interesting but 
some very good neruoscientists argue that brain is not like computer
Here for example (4min video) Edelman:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmyfQY4TaVc

Please give me your thought on that. 

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[kujawskilucjan85]

Thank you everybody for your responses. O Lord discussion go very 
technical, maybe I'm too uneducated for questions like that, but at least I 
have some glimpses on intuitive level.

Bruno Marchal I looked at your statement, they are very interesting but 
some very good neruoscientists argue that brain is not like computer

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qmyfQY4TaVc

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Some modal logics for conscious agents research

[Philip Thrift]

The Other-Condemning Moral Emotions - A Modal Logic Approach
 https://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/319982

A logic for reasoning about counterfactual emotions
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0004370210002110

A logic for intention
https://www.ijcai.org/Proceedings/99-1/Papers/026.pdf


Intensionality and Intentionality: Phenomenology, Logic, and Mind
https://escholarship.org/content/qt25m22937/qt25m22937.pdf

Emotional Belief-Desire-Intention Agent Model: Previous Work and Proposed 
Architecture
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/521c/d68e96579db8cf5dadbbc51ca3a78f790c71.pdf

Modality, The Synthetic Apriori, and Phenomenology
http://von-wachter.de/lv/08-2-modality/

Logic, Neuroscience and Phenomenology: In Cahoots?
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.1.4683=rep1=pdf

A Modal Logic for Gödelian Intuition 
https://philarchive.org/archive/KHUAML

An Introduction to Löb’s Theorem in MIRI Research
http://intelligence.org/files/lob-notes-IAFF.pdf


- pt

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 11:00:58 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> Yet, I define matter by “the object of study of physics”, or the study of 
> the observable mode, making strong materialism implying physicalism.
>
>
> Bruno
>

I think (along with Philip Goff*) that physics is not complete in its study 
of matter. Either a new physics is needed, of there is a theoretical gap 
between physics and brains.


* https://twitter.com/philipthrift/status/1045666843304890368

- pt


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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 11:20:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Sep 2018, at 13:02, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 3:07:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 27 Sep 2018, at 21:41, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thursday, September 27, 2018 at 7:44:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 Sep 2018, at 19:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I should add that in parallel to mathematical logic and computability 
>>> theory and even type theory there is the somewhat more practical subject of 
>>> programming language theory (*PLT*).
>>>
>>> Any entry point is OK.
>>>
>>> https://www.google.com/search?q=progamming+language+theory+books
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory
>>>
>>>
>>> Some concepts from PLT (continuations, reflective monads, ...) can go 
>>> back into mathematica logic.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> No problem with this. I guess you appreciate topos theory and 
>>> intutionistic logic, but as I said to Bruce, machine’s theology, even 
>>> without oracle (but even more with oracle) is necessarily non constructive. 
>>> I am aware that some people, like the French logicians Jean-Yves Girard, 
>>> or Jean-Louis Krivine tried to extend the Curry-Howard isomorphism to 
>>> classical logic. If they succeed, PLT might have application in theology, 
>>> but a lot of works would have to be done before.
>>>
>>> If you follow the combinators thread, at some point I might talk about 
>>> typed combinators and constructive logics, but mainly to point out how much 
>>> non constructive theoretical computer needs to be. 
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> The debate of arithmetical realism (arithmeticalism) vs. material realism 
>> (materialism) is a continuation of the older immaterialism vs. materialism 
>> type debates: It will just evolve.
>>
>> For materialists, arithmetic is genre of fiction - a useful one. Why does 
>> math describe what matter does? *Because matter has a programmatic 
>> nature*. 
>>
>>
>> And a non programmatic aspect to, at least phenomenologically, like the 
>> quantum indeterminacy confirmed. It has to ben due to the fact that a 
>> universal machine is emulate by infinities of programs in arithmetic.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> But matter includes both informationality and experientiality,
>>
>>
>> Why? Primary matter is the devoid of structure, if not it is hardly 
>> conceivable as being primary.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> the latter seemingly missing from arithmetic.
>>
>>
>> Not at all. Arithmetic contains all possible self-reflecting machines 
>> (and other entities) which all have the same fundamental theology, which 
>> contains a theory of soul, knowledge and consciousness. The only problem is 
>> that such a theory does not allowed magical identity link between a mind 
>> and a piece of matter. A piece of matter is a view from inside arithmetic 
>> on infinitely many computations. That is already deducible from the first 
>> seven steps of the argument presented in the SANE papers.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> From "The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics" there could be an 
>> approach for how experientiality could come from arithmetic.
>>
>>
>> Yes indeed. 
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> It could be interesting for PLT research (where modal logics are also 
>> used).
>>
>>
>>
>> That is the crux of the matter. Before I though that the ontology could 
>> be any extension of arithmetic. Since then I know that we cannot ad an 
>> infinity axiom, like set theory, still less use the whole of Mathematics, 
>> like Tegmark did at the beginning (but he has corrected this since, but is 
>> stilll missing the FPI and the whole theology of numbers). What is nice for 
>> philosophers, is that Mechanism pick up precise modal logics imposed to 
>> incompleteness. That is nice, because there are *many* modal logics (and 
>> weak logics) possible/ Mechanism, simply thanks to computer science, put a 
>> lot of structure in the internal view of arithmetic possible for universal 
>> machine, including the separation of what is shamble (quanta) and what is 
>> not sharable (qualia).
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> On the programmatic nature of the quantum substrate, if one allows for *real 
> randomness and retrodependency* 
>
>
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/03/16/mirror-mirror/
>  
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/25/retrosignaling-in-the-quantum-substrate/
>
> then quantum programming is just another programming.
>
> (It is a strange superstition that physicists have to be allergic to 
> randomness and retrodependency.)
>
>
> But programs live in the material world in the following sense: *A 
> simulation is not a synthesis.*
>
>
> ?
>
> Programs, Turing machine, combinators, have been discovered purely 
> mathematically, and shown to exist already in all models of any theory of 
> arithmetic, or in any model of any Turing complete theory. 
>
> (I use “model” in the logician sense, it means mainly an 

Re: Gene Drive and morality

[John Clark]

Russell Standish wrote:


>
> *>There is also the possibility of wholesale ecosystem collapse, notjust
> some birds. Do you know that these mosquitos _aren't_ a keystonespecies?*


I don't know anything for certain about the environment and never will but
I have a strong hunch the  40 mosquito species that carry malaria going
extinct and leaving just 3460 mosquito species around would not be the
equivalent to the Chicxulub Event that occured 66 million years ago.
However I do know for certain that for 725,000 people each and every year
NOT using Gene Drive WILL be the equivalent to the Chicxulub Event .


>
> *> I'm not saying they are, but until ecological studies are done, we
> don't know.*


Such ecological studies will never ever be done, there will always be one
more study that needs to be completed before we can make a decision.
Always. Meanwhile as we do nothing 725,000 people die each and every year.


> *I don't think you have considered _all_ the facts*
>

Well of course I haven't! In the physical world decisions are never based
on perfect information so we must use judgement. It is my judgement that
725,000 human deaths per year is a greater evil than 40 out of 3500
mosquito species going extinct.  What is your judgement?

 >>There will never be a day when the ESP fans will say " I'm seen enough
>> well conducted studies with negative results to convince me that ESP is not
>> worth pursuing further and we should move on to studying something new with
>> more potential to find something interesting". Environmentalists and ESP
>> fans will ALWAYS demand just one more study before moving on.
>
>
>
> * >By ESP - do you mean extrasensory perception and similar psychic woo?*


Yes. And flying saucer men in Roswell New Mexico.


> >
> *The decision properly should be taken by regulatory agencies, preferably
> an international one under (say) the auspices of the UN*


The most important thing for an employee of one of those regulatory
agencies is to cover your ass, and for reasons I don't understand people
will blame them for making a decision that results in one person getting
sick but they will not blame them for killing 725,000 people a year by not
acting. So if you're a bureaucrat the wisest thing to do is ask for yet
another study and do nothing.

Actually I'm underestimating the political and bureaucratic inertia of
regulatory agencies.  There is not a single well documented case of
genetically modified food even making somebody sick much less killing then,
and yet millions, perhaps billions, of people have the superstition that id
something has been genetically modified then it must be satanic.

Rice is the staple food for half of the human race but unfortunately it
contains no vitamin A and that deficiency causes 670,000 people to die
every year and made half a million children go blind every year. However
there is a strain of rice that does contain vitamin A called "Golden Rice"
that was developed more than a decade ago but regulatory agencies are
dragging their feet on allowing it because it was made with genetic
engineering.

Just a few months ago it was finally approved in the USA but it isn't
needed there, is still banned in the places where it's needed most, a small
experimental plot of Golden Rice in the Philippines was destroyed by
protestors 5 years ago and Bangladesh is still thinking about it.
Meanwhile 670,000
people die every year and made half a million children go blind.

>
> *Of course there is no such thing as a zero risk decision, but all we ask
> is that the decision is taken on the best scientific knowledge,*


For decades the best scientific knowledge has been that eating genetically
modified food is not risky but NOT eating genetically modified food is very
risky indeed. And yet we do nothing and people continue to die. And now it
looks like the same thing is going to happen with Gene Drive.

>
>
> *Of course, everyone has an input into the makeup of the regulatory
> agencies, including the likes of Greenpeace, and Donald Trump.*


That's the problem, those with the loudest voice have the most influence
regardless of how stupid they are. Greenpeace claims to be super moral but
they oppose all forms of genetic engineering despite the millions of deaths
that opposition has caused, and Donald Trump in his ignorance has
shamefully advanced the fiction that vaccinations cause autism.  And I
can't think of anything that has reduced the net amount of human misery
more than vaccination.

John K Clark

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 4:04:41 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Sep 2018, at 11:32, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
>> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:
>> f
>> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
>> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
>> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
>> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse 
>> structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide 
>> Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
>>
>> What are your thoughts. 
>>
>
> If it's what I think it is, it's demonstrably wrong. One counter example 
> suffices; there are plane wave solutions to Maxwell's equations, but if you 
> know what plane waves are, they clearly do NOT exist in physical reality. 
>
>
>
> With mathematicalism, we don’t assume that there is a 
> (primitive/irreducible) physical reality.
>
> You are begging the question.
>

*In what way?  The MUH says, for example, that for every mathematical 
solution or equation, there is a (perceived) physical universe mapped 
identically from, or into that solution or equation. I gave a simple 
counter example. AG*

>
> Since the antic dream argument, we know that observation cannot be used to 
> prove that anything exist, but an observer.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> If this is correct, other models also fall by the wayside. AG 
>
>>
>>
>> Regards
>>
>
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an 
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>
>
>
On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 4:04:41 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Sep 2018, at 11:32, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
>> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:
>> f
>> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
>> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
>> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
>> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse 
>> structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide 
>> Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
>>
>> What are your thoughts. 
>>
>
> If it's what I think it is, it's demonstrably wrong. One counter example 
> suffices; there are plane wave solutions to Maxwell's equations, but if you 
> know what plane waves are, they clearly do NOT exist in physical reality. 
>
>
>
> With mathematicalism, we don’t assume that there is a 
> (primitive/irreducible) physical reality.
>
> You are begging the question.
>
> Since the antic dream argument, we know that observation cannot be used to 
> prove that anything exist, but an observer.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> If this is correct, other models also fall by the wayside. AG 
>
>>
>>
>> Regards
>>
>
> -- 
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Sep 2018, at 13:02, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 3:07:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 27 Sep 2018, at 21:41, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thursday, September 27, 2018 at 7:44:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 26 Sep 2018, at 19:32, Philip Thrift > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I should add that in parallel to mathematical logic and computability 
>>> theory and even type theory there is the somewhat more practical subject of 
>>> programming language theory (PLT).
>>> 
>>> Any entry point is OK.
>>> 
>>> https://www.google.com/search?q=progamming+language+theory+books 
>>> 
>>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Some concepts from PLT (continuations, reflective monads, ...) can go back 
>>> into mathematica logic.
>> 
>> 
>> No problem with this. I guess you appreciate topos theory and intutionistic 
>> logic, but as I said to Bruce, machine’s theology, even without oracle (but 
>> even more with oracle) is necessarily non constructive. 
>> I am aware that some people, like the French logicians Jean-Yves Girard, or 
>> Jean-Louis Krivine tried to extend the Curry-Howard isomorphism to classical 
>> logic. If they succeed, PLT might have application in theology, but a lot of 
>> works would have to be done before.
>> 
>> If you follow the combinators thread, at some point I might talk about typed 
>> combinators and constructive logics, but mainly to point out how much non 
>> constructive theoretical computer needs to be. 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> The debate of arithmetical realism (arithmeticalism) vs. material realism 
>> (materialism) is a continuation of the older immaterialism vs. materialism 
>> type debates: It will just evolve.
>> 
>> For materialists, arithmetic is genre of fiction - a useful one. Why does 
>> math describe what matter does? Because matter has a programmatic nature.
> 
> And a non programmatic aspect to, at least phenomenologically, like the 
> quantum indeterminacy confirmed. It has to ben due to the fact that a 
> universal machine is emulate by infinities of programs in arithmetic.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> But matter includes both informationality and experientiality,
> 
> Why? Primary matter is the devoid of structure, if not it is hardly 
> conceivable as being primary.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> the latter seemingly missing from arithmetic.
> 
> Not at all. Arithmetic contains all possible self-reflecting machines (and 
> other entities) which all have the same fundamental theology, which contains 
> a theory of soul, knowledge and consciousness. The only problem is that such 
> a theory does not allowed magical identity link between a mind and a piece of 
> matter. A piece of matter is a view from inside arithmetic on infinitely many 
> computations. That is already deducible from the first seven steps of the 
> argument presented in the SANE papers.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> From "The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics" there could be an 
>> approach for how experientiality could come from arithmetic.
> 
> Yes indeed. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> It could be interesting for PLT research (where modal logics are also used).
> 
> 
> That is the crux of the matter. Before I though that the ontology could be 
> any extension of arithmetic. Since then I know that we cannot ad an infinity 
> axiom, like set theory, still less use the whole of Mathematics, like Tegmark 
> did at the beginning (but he has corrected this since, but is stilll missing 
> the FPI and the whole theology of numbers). What is nice for philosophers, is 
> that Mechanism pick up precise modal logics imposed to incompleteness. That 
> is nice, because there are *many* modal logics (and weak logics) possible/ 
> Mechanism, simply thanks to computer science, put a lot of structure in the 
> internal view of arithmetic possible for universal machine, including the 
> separation of what is shamble (quanta) and what is not sharable (qualia).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On the programmatic nature of the quantum substrate, if one allows for real 
> randomness and retrodependency 
> 
> 
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/03/16/mirror-mirror/
>  
> https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/25/retrosignaling-in-the-quantum-substrate/
> 
> then quantum programming is just another programming.
> 
> (It is a strange superstition that physicists have to be allergic to 
> randomness and retrodependency.)
> 
> 
> But programs live in the material world in the following sense: A simulation 
> is not a synthesis.

?

Programs, Turing machine, combinators, have been discovered purely 
mathematically, and shown to exist already in all models of any theory of 
arithmetic, or in any model of any Turing complete theory. 

(I use “model” in the logician sense, it means mainly an interpretation 

Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Sep 2018, at 17:10, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 8:52:19 AM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 12:42:11 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 2:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 28 Sep 2018, at 00:34, kujawski...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>> 
>> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
>> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:
> 
> Yes, it was proved as a consequence of the Mechanist Hypothesis (well before 
> Tegmark introduced it as an hypothesis).
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
>> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
>> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
> 
> What Tegmark missed is the first person indeterminacy, which makes the 
> physical reality into a sort of statistics on *all* mathematical structures. 
> The physical reality is not a mathematical structure among others, but a 
> precise mathematical phenomenon, occurring in arithmetic.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse 
>> structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide 
>> Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
>> 
>> What are your thoughts. 
> 
> If mechanism is false, both substantial physicalism and non substantial 
> physicalism are wrong. Mechanism, in the cognitive science, makes the 
> physical reality not Turing emulbale (“digital physics” is incoherent). 
> Physics becomes reducible to machine’s psychology, or better, machine or 
> number theology. Unfortunately a giant gap remain between physicists (who 
> have the right question, but an inadequate metaphysics) and logician (who 
> have the right tool but run away from theology and metaphysics).
> 
> The main advantage in using Mechanism (properly) is that incompleteness 
> justified all the modes of the self, and this makes possible to get a precise 
> theory of quanta and qualia.
> 
> In this list, we are a bit in advance on this, to be short. I can give 
> references if asked. Actually I just gave them in some preceding posts.
> 
> What some people missed, is that there has never been any evidence for 
> Aristotelian Primary Matter. Materialism will be abandoned as a lasting 
> supersitition.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On the other side it is held that numbers - universal numbers - actually 
> exist (arithmeticalism) is superstition. 
> 
> Even the texts in which the definition of the universal numbers appear are 
> material: They are seen as electronic dots on a screen in a PDF viewer, or 
> ink glyphs on paper in a printout, etc. But there is nothing more than that . 
> 
> There is nothing outside matter.
> 
> Space is outside matter. Why can't you guys admit you're wrong about the MUH? 
> I gave a solid counter-example that puts it in the trash heap of erroneous 
> theories. AG 
> 
> (Materialism is not physicalism.)
> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> I don't know. I think physicists say that there is no place in space where 
> there is actually nothing at all (and everything is somewhere).

Everting physical is somewhere, except the physical universe, if that exists.

But with mechanism, there is no physical universe. The physical reality is 
entirely phenomenological. 
A persistent illusion of numbers, living in deep and linear histories…

Bruno




> 
> 
> - pt 
> 
> -- 
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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Sep 2018, at 17:09, smitra  wrote:
> 
> On 28-09-2018 00:34, kujawskilucja...@gmail.com wrote:
>> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about
>> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that
>> hypothesis:
>> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
>> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the
>> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
>> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in
>> diverse structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or
>> mathematicism vide Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
>> What are your thoughts.
>> Regards
> 
> I've written up my thoughts here:
> 
> https://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Mitra_without.pdf
> 
> Whether or not there exists a mathematical multiverse is, of course, 
> debatable.

Lawyere has tried, with CAT, the category of all categories, but this did not 
work, and he discover the toposes, independently of Grothendieck who discovered 
them in abstract geometry.

The notion of the whole of mathematics is not definable in mathematics, and I 
am not sure it makes any sense.

Fortunately, with mechanism; we can limit ourselves to the arithmetical truth, 
and eventually to the sigma_1 arithmetical truth, which is related to the 
universal dovetailer (which is sigma_1 provability). G* proves them equivalent, 
but G does not, so the equivalence of sigma_1 truth and sigma_1 provability is 
known only by “God".




>  However, a multiverse of any sort that's large enough to give rise of 
> identical copies of observers, will affect the laws of physics.

Assuming mechanism, or wekemening of it. Yes. 



> Since the laws of physics are what we observe them to be, this means that 
> what we observe already includes the effects of the multiverse, i.e. the laws 
> of physics actually describe some sector of the multiverse rather than a 
> particular universe.
> 
> This then means that if the mathematical multiverse hypothesis is correct, 
> the laws of quantum mechanics should be considered to give an effective 
> description of that multiverse. The set of all your copies considered as 
> algorithms that are in the same state (your state simply refers to what 
> algorithm is running including what information is being processed), are 
> distributed over the entire multiverse, they are not all in the same 
> universe. To derive the effective laws of physics, one needs to do statistics 
> over the ensemble of identical observers. This involves performing summations 
> over the multiverse, but these summations are with a constraint that says 
> that some given observer is present. Mathematically it is more convenient to 
> perform unrestricted summations, a convenient way to take into account 
> constraints is by including them using phase factors.
> 
> For example, if we want to compute a summation over a function f(n1, n2, n3, 
> n4,) where the nj are integers, we can just sum over n1, n2,...etc., 
> independently. But suppose that we need to sum over  f(n1, n2, n3, n4,), 
> such that some other function g(n1,n2,n3,...) is kept fixed to some constant 
> value M. The way one handles that is by summing over the function f(n1, n2, 
> n3, n4,) Exp[i t g (n1,n2,...)] without any restrictions. This summation 
> then becomes a function of the parameter t. By taking the Fourier transform 
> of this function, one can extract the component of Exp[i t M] of that 
> function, obviously only terms of the original summation such that  
> g(n1,n2,...) takes the value M, contribute to that.
> 
> In case of keeping track of a given observer, one needs to include a vast 
> number of constraints, one can then get to a something similar to the path 
> integral formulation of QM. But I have no rigorous arguments at this moment 
> that one can really reproduce QM this way.


The universal machine have been proved to say this, but in a more 
“arithmeticalist setting”.

The physical reality becomes the border of the Turing universal machine's 
mindscape.

Bruno




> 
> 
> Saibal
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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Sep 2018, at 11:32, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:
> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:
> f
> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse 
> structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide 
> Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
> 
> What are your thoughts. 
> 
> If it's what I think it is, it's demonstrably wrong. One counter example 
> suffices; there are plane wave solutions to Maxwell's equations, but if you 
> know what plane waves are, they clearly do NOT exist in physical reality.


With mathematicalism, we don’t assume that there is a (primitive/irreducible) 
physical reality.

You are begging the question.

Since the antic dream argument, we know that observation cannot be used to 
prove that anything exist, but an observer.

Bruno



> If this is correct, other models also fall by the wayside. AG 
> 
> 
> Regards
> 
> -- 
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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Sep 2018, at 14:42, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 2:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 28 Sep 2018, at 00:34, kujawski...@gmail.com  wrote:
>> 
>> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
>> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:
> 
> Yes, it was proved as a consequence of the Mechanist Hypothesis (well before 
> Tegmark introduced it as an hypothesis).
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
>> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
>> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
> 
> What Tegmark missed is the first person indeterminacy, which makes the 
> physical reality into a sort of statistics on *all* mathematical structures. 
> The physical reality is not a mathematical structure among others, but a 
> precise mathematical phenomenon, occurring in arithmetic.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse 
>> structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide 
>> Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
>> 
>> What are your thoughts. 
> 
> If mechanism is false, both substantial physicalism and non substantial 
> physicalism are wrong. Mechanism, in the cognitive science, makes the 
> physical reality not Turing emulbale (“digital physics” is incoherent). 
> Physics becomes reducible to machine’s psychology, or better, machine or 
> number theology. Unfortunately a giant gap remain between physicists (who 
> have the right question, but an inadequate metaphysics) and logician (who 
> have the right tool but run away from theology and metaphysics).
> 
> The main advantage in using Mechanism (properly) is that incompleteness 
> justified all the modes of the self, and this makes possible to get a precise 
> theory of quanta and qualia.
> 
> In this list, we are a bit in advance on this, to be short. I can give 
> references if asked. Actually I just gave them in some preceding posts.
> 
> What some people missed, is that there has never been any evidence for 
> Aristotelian Primary Matter. Materialism will be abandoned as a lasting 
> supersitition.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On the other side it is held that numbers - universal numbers - actually 
> exist (arithmeticalism) is superstition. 


With Turing’s definition (or any equivalent one (Church, Kleene, Post, …), the 
existence of universal number is a theorem of Peano Arithmetic. Robinson 
arithmetic is itself a universal number, but has not the cognitive ability to 
prove it. But Peano can, without any problem. 

It is has nothing to do with arithmeticalism. Most logicians are materialist 
(without necessarily vindicating it), but none doubt that the universal numbers 
exist in the same sense (of existence) than the prime numbers.





> 
> Even the texts in which the definition of the universal numbers appear are 
> material:

Yes, but that does not make it existing ontologically. Keep in mind that Plato 
and Aristotle differs on the very criterion of existence. To see, touch, 
observe, measure is not a criterion of existence, as we can dream this things, 
and then with mechanism we have a model where number existence is enough to 
have the dreams.

Observing and touching matter is not an argument of existence, unless you 
assume materialism at the start. But when we do metaphysics seriously, we 
cannot assume any ontology other that what we need to develop the discourse.




> They are seen as electronic dots on a screen in a PDF viewer, or ink glyphs 
> on paper in a printout, etc. But there is nothing more than that . 
> 
> There is nothing outside matter.

That is strong materialism.

That is a quite strong metaphysical assumption. It is incompatible with 
Mechanism in cognitive science.

In fact, even weak materialism (matter exists ontologically and is not 
reducible to anything else) is incompatible with Mechanism.



> 
> (Materialism is not physicalism.)

Physicalism does not imply materialism. OK.

Yet, I define matter by “the object of study of physics”, or the study of the 
observable mode, making strong materialism implying physicalism.


Bruno




> 
> - pt
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 8:52:19 AM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 12:42:11 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 2:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 28 Sep 2018, at 00:34, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
>>> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, it was proved as a consequence of the Mechanist Hypothesis (well 
>>> before Tegmark introduced it as an hypothesis).
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
>>> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
>>> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
>>>
>>>
>>> What Tegmark missed is the first person indeterminacy, which makes the 
>>> physical reality into a sort of statistics on *all* mathematical 
>>> structures. The physical reality is not a mathematical structure among 
>>> others, but a precise mathematical phenomenon, occurring in arithmetic.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in 
>>> diverse structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or 
>>> mathematicism vide Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
>>>
>>> What are your thoughts. 
>>>
>>>
>>> If mechanism is false, both substantial physicalism and non substantial 
>>> physicalism are wrong. Mechanism, in the cognitive science, makes the 
>>> physical reality not Turing emulbale (“digital physics” is incoherent). 
>>> Physics becomes reducible to machine’s psychology, or better, machine or 
>>> number theology. Unfortunately a giant gap remain between physicists (who 
>>> have the right question, but an inadequate metaphysics) and logician (who 
>>> have the right tool but run away from theology and metaphysics).
>>>
>>> The main advantage in using Mechanism (properly) is that incompleteness 
>>> justified all the modes of the self, and this makes possible to get a 
>>> precise theory of quanta and qualia.
>>>
>>> In this list, we are a bit in advance on this, to be short. I can give 
>>> references if asked. Actually I just gave them in some preceding posts.
>>>
>>> What some people missed, is that there has never been any evidence for 
>>> Aristotelian Primary Matter. Materialism will be abandoned as a lasting 
>>> supersitition.
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>> On the other side it is held that numbers - universal numbers - actually 
>> exist (arithmeticalism) is superstition. 
>>
>> Even the texts in which the definition of the universal numbers appear 
>> are material: They are seen as electronic dots on a screen in a PDF viewer, 
>> or ink glyphs on paper in a printout, etc. But there is nothing more than 
>> that . 
>>
>> There is nothing outside matter.
>>
>
> *Space is outside matter. Why can't you guys admit you're wrong about the 
> MUH? I gave a solid counter-example that puts it in the trash heap of 
> erroneous theories. AG *
>
>>
>> (Materialism is not physicalism.)
>>
>> - pt
>>
>>
>>
I don't know. I think physicists say that there is no place in space where 
there is actually nothing at all (and everything is somewhere).


- pt 

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[smitra]

On 28-09-2018 00:34, kujawskilucja...@gmail.com wrote:

Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about
Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that
hypothesis:

- applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
- all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the
diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
- scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in
diverse structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or
mathematicism vide Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.

What are your thoughts.

Regards


I've written up my thoughts here:

https://fqxi.org/data/essay-contest-files/Mitra_without.pdf

Whether or not there exists a mathematical multiverse is, of course, 
debatable.  However, a multiverse of any sort that's large enough to 
give rise of identical copies of observers, will affect the laws of 
physics. Since the laws of physics are what we observe them to be, this 
means that what we observe already includes the effects of the 
multiverse, i.e. the laws of physics actually describe some sector of 
the multiverse rather than a particular universe.


This then means that if the mathematical multiverse hypothesis is 
correct, the laws of quantum mechanics should be considered to give an 
effective description of that multiverse. The set of all your copies 
considered as algorithms that are in the same state (your state simply 
refers to what algorithm is running including what information is being 
processed), are distributed over the entire multiverse, they are not all 
in the same universe. To derive the effective laws of physics, one needs 
to do statistics over the ensemble of identical observers. This involves 
performing summations over the multiverse, but these summations are with 
a constraint that says that some given observer is present. 
Mathematically it is more convenient to perform unrestricted summations, 
a convenient way to take into account constraints is by including them 
using phase factors.


For example, if we want to compute a summation over a function f(n1, n2, 
n3, n4,) where the nj are integers, we can just sum over n1, 
n2,...etc., independently. But suppose that we need to sum over  f(n1, 
n2, n3, n4,), such that some other function g(n1,n2,n3,...) is kept 
fixed to some constant value M. The way one handles that is by summing 
over the function f(n1, n2, n3, n4,) Exp[i t g (n1,n2,...)] without 
any restrictions. This summation then becomes a function of the 
parameter t. By taking the Fourier transform of this function, one can 
extract the component of Exp[i t M] of that function, obviously only 
terms of the original summation such that  g(n1,n2,...) takes the value 
M, contribute to that.


In case of keeping track of a given observer, one needs to include a 
vast number of constraints, one can then get to a something similar to 
the path integral formulation of QM. But I have no rigorous arguments at 
this moment that one can really reproduce QM this way.



Saibal


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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 12:42:11 PM UTC, Philip Thrift wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 2:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 28 Sep 2018, at 00:34, kujawski...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
>> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:
>>
>>
>> Yes, it was proved as a consequence of the Mechanist Hypothesis (well 
>> before Tegmark introduced it as an hypothesis).
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
>> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
>> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
>>
>>
>> What Tegmark missed is the first person indeterminacy, which makes the 
>> physical reality into a sort of statistics on *all* mathematical 
>> structures. The physical reality is not a mathematical structure among 
>> others, but a precise mathematical phenomenon, occurring in arithmetic.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse 
>> structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide 
>> Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
>>
>> What are your thoughts. 
>>
>>
>> If mechanism is false, both substantial physicalism and non substantial 
>> physicalism are wrong. Mechanism, in the cognitive science, makes the 
>> physical reality not Turing emulbale (“digital physics” is incoherent). 
>> Physics becomes reducible to machine’s psychology, or better, machine or 
>> number theology. Unfortunately a giant gap remain between physicists (who 
>> have the right question, but an inadequate metaphysics) and logician (who 
>> have the right tool but run away from theology and metaphysics).
>>
>> The main advantage in using Mechanism (properly) is that incompleteness 
>> justified all the modes of the self, and this makes possible to get a 
>> precise theory of quanta and qualia.
>>
>> In this list, we are a bit in advance on this, to be short. I can give 
>> references if asked. Actually I just gave them in some preceding posts.
>>
>> What some people missed, is that there has never been any evidence for 
>> Aristotelian Primary Matter. Materialism will be abandoned as a lasting 
>> supersitition.
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> On the other side it is held that numbers - universal numbers - actually 
> exist (arithmeticalism) is superstition. 
>
> Even the texts in which the definition of the universal numbers appear are 
> material: They are seen as electronic dots on a screen in a PDF viewer, or 
> ink glyphs on paper in a printout, etc. But there is nothing more than that 
> . 
>
> There is nothing outside matter.
>

*Space is outside matter. Why can't you guys admit you're wrong about the 
MUH? I gave a solid counter-example that puts it in the trash heap of 
erroneous theories. AG *

>
> (Materialism is not physicalism.)
>
> - pt
>
>
>

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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 2:44:18 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 28 Sep 2018, at 00:34, kujawski...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:
>
>
> Yes, it was proved as a consequence of the Mechanist Hypothesis (well 
> before Tegmark introduced it as an hypothesis).
>
>
>
>
> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
>
>
> What Tegmark missed is the first person indeterminacy, which makes the 
> physical reality into a sort of statistics on *all* mathematical 
> structures. The physical reality is not a mathematical structure among 
> others, but a precise mathematical phenomenon, occurring in arithmetic.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse 
> structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide 
> Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
>
> What are your thoughts. 
>
>
> If mechanism is false, both substantial physicalism and non substantial 
> physicalism are wrong. Mechanism, in the cognitive science, makes the 
> physical reality not Turing emulbale (“digital physics” is incoherent). 
> Physics becomes reducible to machine’s psychology, or better, machine or 
> number theology. Unfortunately a giant gap remain between physicists (who 
> have the right question, but an inadequate metaphysics) and logician (who 
> have the right tool but run away from theology and metaphysics).
>
> The main advantage in using Mechanism (properly) is that incompleteness 
> justified all the modes of the self, and this makes possible to get a 
> precise theory of quanta and qualia.
>
> In this list, we are a bit in advance on this, to be short. I can give 
> references if asked. Actually I just gave them in some preceding posts.
>
> What some people missed, is that there has never been any evidence for 
> Aristotelian Primary Matter. Materialism will be abandoned as a lasting 
> supersitition.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
On the other side it is held that numbers - universal numbers - actually 
exist (arithmeticalism) is superstition. 

Even the texts in which the definition of the universal numbers appear are 
material: They are seen as electronic dots on a screen in a PDF viewer, or 
ink glyphs on paper in a printout, etc. But there is nothing more than that 
. 

There is nothing outside matter.

(Materialism is not physicalism.)

- pt


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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Philip Thrift]

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 3:07:28 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 27 Sep 2018, at 21:41, Philip Thrift > 
> wrote:
>
>
>
> On Thursday, September 27, 2018 at 7:44:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 26 Sep 2018, at 19:32, Philip Thrift  wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> I should add that in parallel to mathematical logic and computability 
>> theory and even type theory there is the somewhat more practical subject of 
>> programming language theory (*PLT*).
>>
>> Any entry point is OK.
>>
>> https://www.google.com/search?q=progamming+language+theory+books
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory
>>
>>
>> Some concepts from PLT (continuations, reflective monads, ...) can go 
>> back into mathematica logic.
>>
>>
>>
>> No problem with this. I guess you appreciate topos theory and 
>> intutionistic logic, but as I said to Bruce, machine’s theology, even 
>> without oracle (but even more with oracle) is necessarily non constructive. 
>> I am aware that some people, like the French logicians Jean-Yves Girard, 
>> or Jean-Louis Krivine tried to extend the Curry-Howard isomorphism to 
>> classical logic. If they succeed, PLT might have application in theology, 
>> but a lot of works would have to be done before.
>>
>> If you follow the combinators thread, at some point I might talk about 
>> typed combinators and constructive logics, but mainly to point out how much 
>> non constructive theoretical computer needs to be. 
>>
>> Bruno
>>
>>
>>
>>
> The debate of arithmetical realism (arithmeticalism) vs. material realism 
> (materialism) is a continuation of the older immaterialism vs. materialism 
> type debates: It will just evolve.
>
> For materialists, arithmetic is genre of fiction - a useful one. Why does 
> math describe what matter does? *Because matter has a programmatic nature*. 
>
>
>
> And a non programmatic aspect to, at least phenomenologically, like the 
> quantum indeterminacy confirmed. It has to ben due to the fact that a 
> universal machine is emulate by infinities of programs in arithmetic.
>
>
>
>
> But matter includes both informationality and experientiality,
>
>
> Why? Primary matter is the devoid of structure, if not it is hardly 
> conceivable as being primary.
>
>
>
>
> the latter seemingly missing from arithmetic.
>
>
> Not at all. Arithmetic contains all possible self-reflecting machines (and 
> other entities) which all have the same fundamental theology, which 
> contains a theory of soul, knowledge and consciousness. The only problem is 
> that such a theory does not allowed magical identity link between a mind 
> and a piece of matter. A piece of matter is a view from inside arithmetic 
> on infinitely many computations. That is already deducible from the first 
> seven steps of the argument presented in the SANE papers.
>
>
>
>
>
> From "The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics" there could be an 
> approach for how experientiality could come from arithmetic.
>
>
> Yes indeed. 
>
>
>
>
> It could be interesting for PLT research (where modal logics are also 
> used).
>
>
>
> That is the crux of the matter. Before I though that the ontology could be 
> any extension of arithmetic. Since then I know that we cannot ad an 
> infinity axiom, like set theory, still less use the whole of Mathematics, 
> like Tegmark did at the beginning (but he has corrected this since, but is 
> stilll missing the FPI and the whole theology of numbers). What is nice for 
> philosophers, is that Mechanism pick up precise modal logics imposed to 
> incompleteness. That is nice, because there are *many* modal logics (and 
> weak logics) possible/ Mechanism, simply thanks to computer science, put a 
> lot of structure in the internal view of arithmetic possible for universal 
> machine, including the separation of what is shamble (quanta) and what is 
> not sharable (qualia).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>


On the programmatic nature of the quantum substrate, if one allows for *real 
randomness and retrodependency* 


https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/03/16/mirror-mirror/

 
https://codicalist.wordpress.com/2018/09/25/retrosignaling-in-the-quantum-substrate/

then quantum programming is just another programming.

(It is a strange superstition that physicists have to be allergic to 
randomness and retrodependency.)


But programs live in the material world in the following sense: *A 
simulation is not a synthesis.*

If I have a synbio (synthetic biology) program for a life form that could 
attack a disease, if it is just transformed into a simulation that runs in 
a MacBook, it me does no good. But it could via a biocompiler/assembler be 
transformed to an object that "runs" inside me.



- pt

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Re: #darkmatter theory

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 27 Sep 2018, at 22:27, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> The dark matter of a galaxy responsible for the flat rotation curve is 
> presumably in a cloud of spherical orbits around the galaxy.  It doesn't 
> collapse to a disk, as the visible matter does, because being dark it doesn't 
> radiate away energy via EM in collisions.  But it must still radiate 
> gravitational waves in collisions.  Are there estimates of how long this 
> would take to collapse dark matter to a disk?  Are there any galaxies we can 
> see which are old enough for this to have happened?


There are galaxies with strange shape that apparently nobody can explain, so 
perhaps …

Let me look for an example. Ah …  the Burçin Mutlu-Pakdil galaxy:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uv5-hIif7BQ

Not sure how much hard it would be to detect a dark matter disk, but that 
should not be impossible. I would try this on those strange looking one.

Bruno



> 
> Brent
> 
> On 9/27/2018 5:00 AM, Philip Thrift wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> Someone to perhaps follow, doing #darkmatter theory:
>> 
>> Axel Maas @axelmaas 
>> 
>> Professor for Theoretical Particle Physics at the University of Graz 
>> (Austria). Doing everything from low-energy QCD to beyond-the-standard-model 
>> #np3 
>> 
>> More   
>> I have published a new blog entry on how a model, which we investigated for 
>> a very different purpose, may actually be a (perhaps even useful) 
>> #darkmatter  candidate, see 
>> https://axelmaas.blogspot.com/2018/09/unexpected-connections.html … 
>>  #np3 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> - pt
>> 
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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[agrayson2000]

On Friday, September 28, 2018 at 1:02:36 AM UTC, kujawski...@gmail.com 
wrote:
>
> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:
> f
> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse 
> structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide 
> Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
>
> What are your thoughts. 
>

If it's what I think it is, it's demonstrably wrong. One counter example 
suffices; there are plane wave solutions to Maxwell's equations, but if you 
know what plane waves are, they clearly do NOT exist in physical reality. 
If this is correct, other models also fall by the wayside. AG 

>
>
> Regards
>

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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Sep 2018, at 06:51, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/27/2018 9:29 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>>> 
>>> But now, let us move forward. Stop saying “realism or platonism”, in pour 
>>> metaphysical context this lead to misunderstanding.
>>> 
>>> Assuming classical arithmetic = arithmetical realism.
>> 
>> It is becoming clear that we have very different understandings of what is 
>> meant by arithmetical (or mathematical) realism. I gathered a few statements 
>> about realism from your recent post -- included here:
>> 
>> "Realism = classical. Realism means that I use the axiom (A v ~A)."
>> 
>> "All scientific theories use arithmetical realism, but you are still using 
>> it in a philosophical/metaphysical sense, when it means simply that we 
>> accept the excluded middle principle in arithmetic."
>> 
>> "Of course, given what I mean by arithmetical realism (which I thought I 
>> already told you), this would mean that you reject the use of (A v ~A) in 
>> arithmetic"
>> 
>> 
>> My understanding of 'realism' comes from the idea of scientific realism. 
>> This can have a number of nuanced interpretations, but the basic idea of 
>> scientific realism is a cluster of views about the nature of scientific 
>> theories and theorizing. A common core might be the following: 
>> (1) The aim of scientific inquiry is to produce theories that provide 
>> description of the world that are literally true.
>> (2) Theories in the 'mature sciences' are usually approximately true, and 
>> the entities postulated by those theories usually exist.
>> 
>> One of the most popular arguments for scientific realism is the so-called 
>> 'miracle argument'. Following Putnam, scientific realism is capable of 
>> explaining why a predictively successful theory is predictively successful, 
>> whereas the success of a theory would be miraculous if scientific realism 
>> were not true.
>> 
>> Stathis Psillos adds a metaphysical component: the world has a definite 
>> mind-independent structure; and a semantic component: scientific theories 
>> are truth-conditioned descriptions of their intended domain, so the 
>> theoretical terms in theories have factual reference -- the unobservable 
>> entities they posit populate the world -- form the 'furniture' of reality.
>> 
>> The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, in the section on the philosophy of 
>> mathematics, gives the following definitions:
>> 
>> "There are two distinct types of realism in the philosophy of mathematics. 
>> Realism-in-ontology is the view that the subject matter of mathematics is 
>> the realm of objects that exist independent of the mind, conventions, and 
>> language of the mathematician. Most advocates of this view hold that 
>> mathematical objects -- numbers, functions, points, sets, etc. -- are 
>> abstract, eternal, and do not enter into causal relationships with material 
>> objects. Because of this, realism-in-ontology is sometimes called platonism.
>> "Realism-in-truth-value is the view that unambiguous assertions of 
>> mathematics are non-vacuously true or false, independent of the mind, 
>> language, and conventions of the mathematician. (This would seem to be close 
>> to the view that you, Bruno, espouse.)
>> 
>> "There is a natural connection between the two varieties of realism. 
>> Consider the following statement:
>> 
>> 'There is a prime number greater than 1,000,000.'
>> 
>> "The realist-in-truth-value holds that this is an objective truth. But what 
>> does it mean? Prima facie, '1,000,000' is a singular terms, and 'prime 
>> number' is a common noun. If the surface grammar of this sentence reflects 
>> its logical form, and if 'there is' means 'there exists', then the sentence 
>> entails that both the number 1,000,000 and a greater prime number exist. For 
>> the realist-in-truth-value, this existence is objective, and so we are led 
>> to realism-in-ontology. In sum, if one is a realist-in-truth-value, then 
>> realism-in-ontology is the result of taking mathematical assertions at face 
>> value."
>> 
>> Other references that I have looked up, such as entries in the Stanford 
>> Encyclopedia of Philosophy on "Realism" and "Platonism in the Philosophy of 
>> Mathematics", say similar things. Though, of course, there are probably more 
>> nuances in the understanding of mathematical realism than there are 
>> philosophers of mathematics.
>> 
>> 
>> Given the above references, I think it should be clear why I say "realism or 
>> platonism", and refer to "an independently existing mathematical realm". In 
>> Western philosophy at least, that is what realism in mathematics means -- 
>> although things might be different in Gallic philosophy.
>> 
>> It seems that your idea of arithmetical (mathematical) realism is entirely 
>> from classical logic and is, therefore, essentially a 
>> 'realism-in-truth-value' understanding. It is interesting, in that case, 
>> that you make no reference to 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Sep 2018, at 06:29, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
>> 
>> But now, let us move forward. Stop saying “realism or platonism”, in pour 
>> metaphysical context this lead to misunderstanding.
>> 
>> Assuming classical arithmetic = arithmetical realism.
> 
> It is becoming clear that we have very different understandings of what is 
> meant by arithmetical (or mathematical) realism. I gathered a few statements 
> about realism from your recent post -- included here:
> 
> "Realism = classical. Realism means that I use the axiom (A v ~A)."
> 
> "All scientific theories use arithmetical realism, but you are still using it 
> in a philosophical/metaphysical sense, when it means simply that we accept 
> the excluded middle principle in arithmetic."
> 
> "Of course, given what I mean by arithmetical realism (which I thought I 
> already told you), this would mean that you reject the use of (A v ~A) in 
> arithmetic"
> 
> 
> My understanding of 'realism' comes from the idea of scientific realism.

That is doing philosophy (of science) before doing the science. You need to 
understand that I am a scientist. What I do does not ask for any philosophy, 
just understanding. In science, there is no agreement or disagreement, but 
understanding or no understanding. That is a point that some people do not 
grasp, and it is normal, as we used “philosophical terms (to ease the 
understanding, especially for those who does not do the math).  I will still 
comments, but the idea is that such philosophy should be done only after a good 
understanding of the “scientific theory” (the metaphysics or theology of 
numbers).



> This can have a number of nuanced interpretations, but the basic idea of 
> scientific realism is a cluster of views about the nature of scientific 
> theories and theorizing. A common core might be the following: 
> (1) The aim of scientific inquiry is to produce theories that provide 
> description of the world


That is what we cannot do? The idea that there is a world, or not, is part of 
the inquiry when we do metaphysics with the scientific method. The very notion 
of world cannot be used. 
I can be OK, by enlarging probably the sense for “world” (the logician large 
definition is an element of a set).



> that are literally true.

Same problem for the notion of “true”. Here, with Mechanism, we can use Tarski 
theory of truth. Eventually, the only notion of truth which plays a role will 
be the notion of arithmetical truth, and even this one will eventually be 
limited to sigma_1-truth (which id definable by Peano arithmetic).



> (2) Theories in the 'mature sciences' are usually approximately true, and the 
> entities postulated by those theories usually exist.

Same problem here. The notion of “existence” will be refine a lot through the 
Mechanist hypothesis. The ontological existence is given by the “use” of the 
existential quantifier in the base theory (combinators or Robinson Q theory, 
for example, but a diophantine polynomial equation is as good). All other 
existence will appear to be phenomenological, and mathematically are the 
existential quantifiers in the modal logis extracted from incompleteness. But 
that is for the second part, when we translate the UDA (Universal Dovetailer 
Argument) in arithmetic.



> 
> One of the most popular arguments for scientific realism is the so-called 
> 'miracle argument'. Following Putnam, scientific realism is capable of 
> explaining why a predictively successful theory is predictively successful, 
> whereas the success of a theory would be miraculous if scientific realism 
> were not true.

Unfortunately that is not true, and use a brain-mind identity thesis which 
cannot work with Mechanism. We can “attach” a mind or a person to a computer, 
but a computer cannot attach its mind to a computer, only to an infinity of 
computer (in arithmetic).



> 
> Stathis Psillos adds a metaphysical component: the world has a definite 
> mind-independent structure;

If by world we mean the arithmetical reality, or the sigma_1 arithmetical 
reality, then I am OK with this, but the physical reality will appear to be 
more “mind-dependent”. Mind refers here to the mind of all universal 
machine/number, not to the human mind. The physical reality can be explained to 
be largely independent of the human mind, but not independent of the mind of 
*all* universal numbers.




> and a semantic component: scientific theories are truth-conditioned 
> descriptions of their intended domain, so the theoretical terms in theories 
> have factual reference -- the unobservable entities they posit populate the 
> world -- form the 'furniture' of reality.
> 
> The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, in the section on the philosophy of 
> mathematics, gives the following definitions:
> 
> "There are two distinct types of realism in the philosophy of mathematics. 
> Realism-in-ontology is the view that the subject matter of mathematics 

Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 27 Sep 2018, at 23:08, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/27/2018 5:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 27 Sep 2018, at 03:31, Bruce Kellett >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> From: Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
> On 26 Sep 2018, at 02:36, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> 
> I agree that the quote does not make sense. But it is what you said.
 
 It does not make sense out of hits context. It is the the “…” which does 
 not make sense. 
 
 The real question is “have you grasped now?”
 
>> I say that in the context of Mechanism. Then in the math part, I have 
>> (semi-) exiomatize consciousness as
>> True, unjustifiable, undefinable, immediately knowable, indubitable, and 
>> show how the modes of self-reference makes any universal machine 
>> verifying the existence of this.
> 
> This is an attempt at proof by definition. All it amounts to is your 
> usual "cat-dog" logic -- the argument that similarity implies identity.
 
 The question is “do you accept that your daughter marry a man who get a 
 digital heart, and later, a digital brain”?
>>> 
>>> My daughter can marry whomsoever she pleases.
>> 
>> Even a p-zombie?
> 
> How would you know?

I would not know, but a non computationalist would claim this, which is the 
reason of my question, indeed.

Bruno




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Re: Why is Church's thesis a Miracle?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 27 Sep 2018, at 21:41, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 27, 2018 at 7:44:04 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 26 Sep 2018, at 19:32, Philip Thrift > 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> I should add that in parallel to mathematical logic and computability theory 
>> and even type theory there is the somewhat more practical subject of 
>> programming language theory (PLT).
>> 
>> Any entry point is OK.
>> 
>> https://www.google.com/search?q=progamming+language+theory+books 
>> 
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Programming_language_theory 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> Some concepts from PLT (continuations, reflective monads, ...) can go back 
>> into mathematica logic.
> 
> 
> No problem with this. I guess you appreciate topos theory and intutionistic 
> logic, but as I said to Bruce, machine’s theology, even without oracle (but 
> even more with oracle) is necessarily non constructive. 
> I am aware that some people, like the French logicians Jean-Yves Girard, or 
> Jean-Louis Krivine tried to extend the Curry-Howard isomorphism to classical 
> logic. If they succeed, PLT might have application in theology, but a lot of 
> works would have to be done before.
> 
> If you follow the combinators thread, at some point I might talk about typed 
> combinators and constructive logics, but mainly to point out how much non 
> constructive theoretical computer needs to be. 
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
> The debate of arithmetical realism (arithmeticalism) vs. material realism 
> (materialism) is a continuation of the older immaterialism vs. materialism 
> type debates: It will just evolve.
> 
> For materialists, arithmetic is genre of fiction - a useful one. Why does 
> math describe what matter does? Because matter has a programmatic nature.

And a non programmatic aspect to, at least phenomenologically, like the quantum 
indeterminacy confirmed. It has to ben due to the fact that a universal machine 
is emulate by infinities of programs in arithmetic.




> But matter includes both informationality and experientiality,

Why? Primary matter is the devoid of structure, if not it is hardly conceivable 
as being primary.




> the latter seemingly missing from arithmetic.

Not at all. Arithmetic contains all possible self-reflecting machines (and 
other entities) which all have the same fundamental theology, which contains a 
theory of soul, knowledge and consciousness. The only problem is that such a 
theory does not allowed magical identity link between a mind and a piece of 
matter. A piece of matter is a view from inside arithmetic on infinitely many 
computations. That is already deducible from the first seven steps of the 
argument presented in the SANE papers.




> 
> From "The Universal Numbers. From Biology to Physics" there could be an 
> approach for how experientiality could come from arithmetic.

Yes indeed. 




> It could be interesting for PLT research (where modal logics are also used).


That is the crux of the matter. Before I though that the ontology could be any 
extension of arithmetic. Since then I know that we cannot ad an infinity axiom, 
like set theory, still less use the whole of Mathematics, like Tegmark did at 
the beginning (but he has corrected this since, but is stilll missing the FPI 
and the whole theology of numbers). What is nice for philosophers, is that 
Mechanism pick up precise modal logics imposed to incompleteness. That is nice, 
because there are *many* modal logics (and weak logics) possible/ Mechanism, 
simply thanks to computer science, put a lot of structure in the internal view 
of arithmetic possible for universal machine, including the separation of what 
is shamble (quanta) and what is not sharable (qualia).

Bruno




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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Sep 2018, at 06:52, Philip Thrift  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Thursday, September 27, 2018 at 8:02:36 PM UTC-5, kujawski...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:
> 
> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.
> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse 
> structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide 
> Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
> 
> What are your thoughts. 
> 
> 
> Regards
> 
> 
> 
> 
> A well-written response is by Jeremy Butterfield [ 
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeremy_Butterfield ]:
> 
> https://plus.maths.org/content/world-made-maths
> 
> extended arXiv version: https://arxiv.org/abs/1406.4348
> 
> (though I always chuckle at the Britishism "maths”).

That is still physicalism in disguise, and an implicit elimination of the first 
person.

Some critics there are valid, and have been presented here a long time ago. But 
other critic can be done. Maybe later … 

Bruno




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Re: Mathematical Universe Hypothesis

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 28 Sep 2018, at 00:34, kujawskilucja...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> Hello I think this good forum for this topic - what do you think about 
> Mathematical Universe, there are very big arguments for that hypothesis:

Yes, it was proved as a consequence of the Mechanist Hypothesis (well before 
Tegmark introduced it as an hypothesis).



> 
> - applicability of mathematic, to natural sciences
> - all we discovere are structures and I didnt find explanation of the 
> diference beetwen physical structures and mathematical structures.

What Tegmark missed is the first person indeterminacy, which makes the physical 
reality into a sort of statistics on *all* mathematical structures. The 
physical reality is not a mathematical structure among others, but a precise 
mathematical phenomenon, occurring in arithmetic.






> - scientists and philosophers of science tend to affirm belive in diverse 
> structure and homogeneous substance (neutral monism) or mathematicism vide 
> Ladyman, Ross, French, Tegmark etc.
> 
> What are your thoughts. 

If mechanism is false, both substantial physicalism and non substantial 
physicalism are wrong. Mechanism, in the cognitive science, makes the physical 
reality not Turing emulbale (“digital physics” is incoherent). Physics becomes 
reducible to machine’s psychology, or better, machine or number theology. 
Unfortunately a giant gap remain between physicists (who have the right 
question, but an inadequate metaphysics) and logician (who have the right tool 
but run away from theology and metaphysics).

The main advantage in using Mechanism (properly) is that incompleteness 
justified all the modes of the self, and this makes possible to get a precise 
theory of quanta and qualia.

In this list, we are a bit in advance on this, to be short. I can give 
references if asked. Actually I just gave them in some preceding posts.

What some people missed, is that there has never been any evidence for 
Aristotelian Primary Matter. Materialism will be abandoned as a lasting 
supersitition.

Bruno





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