RE: A calculus of personal identity
> > Bruno writes >> I see what you mean and I agree with you, but now, you were again >> talking about third person description of the first person point of >> view (I will write 1-pov, 3-pov, ...). > > Yes. I find that the 1st person accounts to be pretty subjective, > actually. They also lead to inconsistencies and unnecessary > differences of opinion. In history, the 1st person experience > (e.g. the stars revolve around the Earth) are always upstaged > sooner or later by actual, objective data. Bruno! This is a very good joke! "I find that the 1st person accounts to be pretty subjective" LOLOLOLOLOL!!! :-) How could a 1st person account be anything else!? Actually I'd like to challenge your statement and suggest that there is no such thing as 'an objective view'! All we _actually_ have for our scientific evidence is first person experience! What we do (behave) is to carry out a procedure called _objectivity_ to select/agree on what we are studying within the individual subjective experience of those doing the 'agreeing'/being objective. When they have all agreed, there is _no_ _one_ _person_ actually having (experiencing) that so called 'view'. The objective view is a VIRTUAL construct. The universe is acting 'as if' there was someone having the view, but there is no-one actually having the view. Ernest Nagel called the so called objective view "the view from nowhere". Here's a scientific experiment for the list: 1) Close your eyes. 2) Now prove you can do science to the same extent you could before. That is if you are now even able to read the rest of the instructions for the experiment! .i.e it ain't gonna happen, is it? Such an odd position for a scientist! a) Totally dependent on subjective experience as a causal ancestor to the act of 'being scientific', .i.e. it is all there is. b) having a false belief in the existence of an 'objective view', and then, c) finds that when you use the scientific observation system (subjective experience) to try and observe and be scientific about the scientific observing system (subjective experience), you can't observe it! Your words "actual, objective data" are actually an oxymoron! There is objective data, but it's derived entirely from a subjective experience which is discarded by the act of objectivity. What does the word 'actual' mean in this context? We have something going on in the universe that has been mapped through a human's subjective experience and then mapped again by the 'method' we call objectivity. By the time this incredibly long causal chain/mapping through a situated cognitive agent called the scientist has finished with the original observed 'thing', how does this claim any cudos as 'actual', except in that it is all we have? Subjective experience has PRIMACY in science, and we don't even know it! cheers colin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A calculus of personal identity
On Thu, Jun 22, 2006 at 10:29:30PM -0700, George Levy wrote:
> In Bruno's calculus what are the invariances? (Comment on Tom Caylor's post)
The main one relates to universal computation. For example, the coding
theorem states that complexity measures will differ by at most a
constant, regardless of which UTM you use.
Cheers
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Re: A calculus of personal identity
Lee Corbin wrote: >I find that the 1st person accounts to be pretty subjective, >actually. They also lead to inconsistencies and unnecessary >differences of opinion. > Interestingly the geocentric Aristotelian system was replaced by the heliocentric Copernican system. Then Relativity and Quantum Theory came along and restored the centrality of the observer with a vengence. Now the frame of reference that defines what is to be observed is not the Earth anymore but the observer himself or herself. Different observers make different observations, however the important thing is to find the invariances. In Bruno's calculus what are the invariances? (Comment on Tom Caylor's post) >In history, the 1st person experience >(e.g. the stars revolve around the Earth) are always upstaged >sooner or later by actual, objective data. > > Objective data can only be deduced after all invariances are taken into account. Until then all data is subjective. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: A calculus of personal identity
Bruno writes > >> BM: In that case I would say there is (at first sight) > >> 999/1000 that in the next minute I will be the one > >> sent in the place P, so that in the "long run", there > >> is almost no chance I continue my normal life. I will be > >> upset. > > > > LC: I would say that you will continue your normal life, and you will > > also have a lot (too much) measure in the Martian penal colony. > > I see what you mean and I agree with you, but now, you were again > talking about third person description of the first person point of > view (I will write 1-pov, 3-pov, ...). Yes. I find that the 1st person accounts to be pretty subjective, actually. They also lead to inconsistencies and unnecessary differences of opinion. In history, the 1st person experience (e.g. the stars revolve around the Earth) are always upstaged sooner or later by actual, objective data. > When I am saying there is almost no chance I continue my normal > life, I was talking about my expectation for my future first > person experience, I agree with you. If, that is, we are talking about the entire set of future instantiations that have your memories. E.g., as we said, .99 of you go to an unpleasant place, and only one of you stays on Earth. If the rest of them get no runtime at all, or insignificant amounts of runtime, then you still continue to live, even if it might seem that you do not: objectively speaking, you do. After all, this business of making duplicates who die almost instantly could have been going on since your birth. > not about an absolute 3-description of where all my possible > 1-pov will be realized. Of course, once the multiplication has > been done, then normality resumes. > > Each morning I am multiplied into a continuum of Bruno Marchal drinking > cups of coffee, and by the quantum rule (or just comp actually) there > exist 1-pov where my coffee tastes tea. Despite this the relative > probability of such personal events are rare, and I don't take them > into account in my expectations. Exactly so. One should indeed not take them into account. We must go with the practical, and with that which happens in greatest measure. Now the version of me who continues on Earth *would* be very unhappy (though he would become used to it) if each second . percent of him was taken away to hell forever. This is because I must anticipate being in hell (just as you are saying). However, the *feeling* of anticipation cannot so far as I know be placed on entirely rational grounds. I gave up trying in 1986. Lee --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Duplicate email from everything-list
Hi, I am still getting duplicate postings from my old address (from the old 'eskimo' list?), my old address is not a member of googlegroups! Can someone please advise what is going on? How do I unsubscribe when I'm not subscribed? The sorting is a pain! colin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Only Existence is necessary?
Stephen writes > > What properties do you have in mind that pure platonic algorithms > > seem to lack? Anything, that is, besides *time* itself? > > How about an explanation as to how an "illusion" of time obtains > (assuming the theory of Platonic forms if correct)? I can't speak for advocates of a timeless Platonia, because I am not one. I have not yet been reconciled to timelessness. But here is what I think they would say (at least a simplified version of what they'd perhaps say): Future states contain some information about past states in an unambiguous way that past states do not contain about future states. For example, a future version of a photographic plate contains information about the incidence of a particle upon it. In the same way, photons moving outward from a source collectively contain information about their source, but not about their destination. By gradually going to more advance versions of photographic plates and carbon chemistry, it is seen that evolution allows for amoebas and other creatures who contain information about their past chemical environments. Now taking an amoeba for example, all the possible states of it exist in Platonia. 10^10^45 or so of them, if we are to believe Bekenstein. But if you observe the 10^10^45 carefully, you will find a tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny tiny set of them somewhere that seem to tell a story. The "story" thus told is the life-history of the amoeba, including every possible thing that can happen to it. (Now I myself have some objections to this account---though I reckon it can all be fixed up by a UD, that it by focusing instead on programs that themselves produce sequences of states ---but I have the same sort of objection that I've always had to Hilary Putnam's claims about all computations (within certain huge bounds) taking place in a single rock.) Lee --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Stathis,
I tried to expand on that a little in my last two posts (to Stephen) on
this thread, which somehow got disconnected. Here it is again:
Stephen,
I wrote the following before you wrote this post, but I think it
addresses it somewhat.
My two cents is again to say that mathematics is about invariance.
Platonia is about invariance. Invariance is even more fundamental than
number. Numbers are defined by invariance. The number 3 is the
invariant attribute of all sets of 3.
I take it that Bruno's existence is just the "interference pattern" of
computations, as I think he sometimes puts it. According to him, I
think the ether that we swim in (exist in) is computations, an ether of
consistency. John Barrow in his book "Pi in the Sky" brought up
the possibility that we are part of Platonia, but he concluded that
this didn't make sense. My opinion is that it doesn't make sense
if Platonia is only numbers, i.e. computation. This is for the very
reason you bring up, Stephen. An interference pattern requires a
particular point of view. But if all points of view are equally
unspecial (modulo consistency), then we are back to the "why
something instead of nothing?" problem ("why this particular point
of view that I am experiencing, rather than another point of view?").
Something has to break the symmetry of the zero information pool.
"Interference patterns" are not sufficient to break the symmetry.
(Along the same line of reasoning, even an anthropic principle is not
sufficient.) Summing the interference patterns over all points-of-view
results in zero. I've taken my answer to this from somewhere outside
myself. There has to be someone with universal power to say "Let
there be...".
Then we, who are in his image, can recognize that "There is...". The
purest form of this recognition, I believe, is mathematics. Of course
I'm a mathematician, so I'm biased. :)
Tom
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Tom Caylor writes:
>
> > I've been thinking about Platonia lately. I've just finished reading> John
> > Barrow's "Pi in the Sky" book, and he seems to have gotten wrapped> around
> > the axle in regard to mathematics and Platonia. I think that> mathematics
> > is not primarily about numbers. Mathematics is about> invariance.
> > Invariance is not about any *thing* (existence)> specifically. Perhaps
> > this thought can shed light on this somehow?
> What do you mean, "mathematics is about invariance"?
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Tom Caylor writes: > I've been thinking about Platonia lately. I've just finished reading> John Barrow's "Pi in the Sky" book, and he seems to have gotten wrapped> around the axle in regard to mathematics and Platonia. I think that> mathematics is not primarily about numbers. Mathematics is about> invariance. Invariance is not about any *thing* (existence)> specifically. Perhaps this thought can shed light on this somehow? What do you mean, "mathematics is about invariance"? Stathis PapaioannouWith MSN Spaces email straight to your blog. Upload jokes, photos and more. It's free! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: A calculus of personal identity
Stathis writes > Perhaps it would help if I spoke about my computer rather > than myself. Clearly, its physical state changes from moment > to moment: the phosphors on the screen, the position of the > hard disk, the electrical activity in the CPU... > changing the CPU or the hard disk or the operating system may > or may not matter, changing the CPU AND the hard disk AND the > operating system probably does matter and I would then say > I have a new computer, even if the monitor and some of my > files are the same. The point is, these criteria are > *necessarily* vague, and it is always possible to come up > with examples that will defeat any attempt to pin down > what is "my computer". So yes, then it's not possible to say that it's the same computer from nanosecond to nanosecond. But then, perhaps we are using language wrong! While we've known since Hericlitus in 500 B.C. first pointed it out, that you can't step in the same river twice, people do not *mean* river in that overly precise sense. They in fact do *mean* the broad set of phenomena that flow through the valley over time. It is the same with us, or your computer. When someone says "you", they do not mean the instantaneous version. So, since when they say "you" and you say "I", it's almost never meant in such a pedantic and way over-specified way, we should talk about what we and they *mean* instead. And! Let's also, while we are at it, let the word stand for what we mean. > By what I have said above, I know that the person waking up > in my bed tomorrow is not me, but I behave as if it is me, > because this convenient and sanctioned-by-evolution view > is as deeply ingrained as is breathing. You seem to be after what the word really means. But actually, it only means what we use it to refer to. When he say "you just got a parking ticket for that, pal", the officer is talking about the Stathis phenomena over time and space. And he *should* be. It would be just terrible if he had to consciously recite what he means in detail. Instead, you actually know what he means already. > Moreover, although this working sense of continuity of > identity is vague and arbitrary, I have never thus far > been in a real world situation where there is ambiguity > as to whether it is or isn't me. Right. But except in mathematics, I don't believe it possible to have perfect definitions. Eternal Truth Number Two: every statement must be further modified. > When I am copied with one duplicate missing a third of my > memories while the other duplicate has all of my memories > but in addition has acquired half of your memories and > George Bush's sense of personal identity, then I will be > confused. Yes :-) and so will we all. Cryonics patients who are revived one day may be missing lots of memory. Are then then "the same person" is a sensible question! It is not arcane like wondering whether they are the same person they were last week (of course they are), or whether they would be the same person if the phone had just rung. > > Yes, but is it more deeply wired than your conviction > > that you are only in the here and now in a single world, > > and that the OMs over time and space and dovetailers is > > a stretch? > My conviction that I am a series of transient beings is an > intellectual conviction only. The illusion that I am not > is not something I can overcome intellectually. But what is reality? :-) Why not let the words "me", "I", "you", etc., refer to what we actually use them to refer to in daily life? > Or, I can put it somewhat differently, amounting to the same > thing: I know I exist only transiently, but I don't let this > affect my behaviour, which is determined by the view that am > a single entity persisting through time. You *know* that you only exist transiently? Actually, you only acquired this 'understanding' after a lot of reading. Most people are spared this. :-) The "you" that they mean and the one that you used to mean (before the protracted discussions and thought) *does* exist over time. Naturally, there are meaningful discussions still: namely, is a Nazi war-criminal who killed a lot of people when he was 18 still the same person as the 84 year old whose been tending sweet potatoes in his garden ever since? Am I really the same person that I was when I was ten? Clearly, these are difficult questions, like the difficult ones that you brought up about your memories being distributed among George Bush and others. So as a rough guide, what about this? What people ordinarily mean---and what we and they should continue to mean---is percent fidelity of memories? That is, if by some measure (?) my memories overlap only 50% with who I was when I was a teenager, then perhaps that teen would be 50% me. But even more difficult questions abound, as I'm sure that you well know. Lee --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Grou
Re: *THE* PUZZLE (was: ascension, Smullyan, ...)
On Thu, Jun 22, 2006 at 11:24:22AM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> > Whereas I don't think it does. It can be applied in an absolute way
> > (such as you refer) or in a relative subjective way (which is how I do
> > it). In fact I make the point that absolute measures aren't meaningful
> > - there just isn't an absolutely given UTM.
>
>
> From a recursive or computationalist standpoint there is. In particular
> "absolute measure" *can* be defined up to a constant.
>
The constant, unfortunately, is infinity! What is true is that the
complexity of two strings x and y will differ by no more than a
constant independent of the strings x and y when measured by two
different machines.
But the reverse case is where the strings x and y are fixed, and the
machines variables. For any two strings x, y, it is possible to find
machines U & V that give different answers to the question K(x) > K(y).
Consequently, the universal prior is not absolute, but dependent on a
chosen U.
>
>
>
> > The dovetailing provides the simpler ensemble from which the specific
> > computation is selected. This is right there in the first
> > [Schmidhuber] paper.
>
> I don't see it.
>
Its right there on the second line of page 2 of his 1997 paper:
"Computing all universes. One way of sequentially computing all
computable universes is dove-tailing. A_1 ..."
So he does use the term dovetailer. He doesn't qualify it with
"universal", mind you I'm not entirely sure it isn't universal. Its
hard to read everything into one single line of prose. However, you
certainly have published on the UD prior to this.
>
>
> > In the second paper, the dovetailing is assumed to run on an actual
> > resource limited computer - hence the speed prior.
>
>
> But that dovetailing is not related to the universal one. Which is all
> normal given that Schmidhuber does not base his reasoning on the 1-3
> distinction. His ensemble or his "great programmer" is thus enough for
> his purpose.
>
> Bruno
>
He talks about the dovetailer on page 28 on that paper, and it is
running every possible program. He also notes that Li and Vitanyi
introduce such an algorithm (which they call SIMPLE) in Lemma 7.5.1 on
page 503.
How are these algorithms not "universal"?
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Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Then we, who are in his image, can recognize that "There is...". The
purest form of this recognition, I believe, is mathematics. Of course
I'm a mathematician, so I'm biased. :)
Tom
Tom Caylor wrote:
> Stephen,
>
> I wrote the following before you wrote this post, but I think it
> addresses it somewhat.
>
> My two cents is again to say that mathematics is about invariance.
> Platonia is about invariance. Invariance is even more fundamental than
> number. Numbers are defined by invariance. The number 3 is the
> invariant attribute of all sets of 3.
>
> I take it that Bruno's existence is just the "interference pattern" of
> computations, as I think he sometimes puts it. According to him, I
> think the ether that we swim in (exist in) is computations, an ether of
> consistency. John Barrow in his book "Pi in the Sky" brought up
> the possibility that we are part of Platonia, but he concluded that
> this didn't make sense. My opinion is that it doesn't make sense
> if Platonia is only numbers, i.e. computation. This is for the very
> reason you bring up, Stephen. An interference pattern requires a
> particular point of view. But if all points of view are equally
> unspecial (modulo consistency), then we are back to the "why
> something instead of nothing?" problem ("why this particular point
> of view that I am experiencing, rather than another point of view?").
> Something has to break the symmetry of the zero information pool.
> "Interference patterns" are not sufficient to break the symmetry.
> (Along the same line of reasoning, even an anthropic principle is not
> sufficient.) Summing the interference patterns over all points-of-view
> results in zero. I've taken my answer to this from somewhere outside
> myself. There has to be someone with universal power to say "Let
> there be...".
>
> Tom
>
> Stephen Paul King wrote:
> > Hi Tom,
> >
> > I think that you are bring up a good point but I must ask about the
> > nature of "invariance"! The notion of invariance involves a subject to which
> > the invariance obtains. If there is no such an subject, what meaning does
> > the notion of a invariance have?
> >
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invariant_%28mathematics%29
> >
> >
> > Onward!
> >
> > Stephen
> >
> > - Original Message -
> > From: "Tom Caylor" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> > To: "Everything List"
> > Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 12:13 PM
> > Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
> >
> >
> > snip
> >
> > I've been thinking about Platonia lately. I've just finished reading
> > John Barrow's "Pi in the Sky" book, and he seems to have gotten wrapped
> > around the axle in regard to mathematics and Platonia. I think that
> > mathematics is not primarily about numbers. Mathematics is about
> > invariance. Invariance is not about any *thing* (existence)
> > specifically. Perhaps this thought can shed light on this somehow?
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Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Stephen,
I wrote the following before you wrote this post, but I think it
addresses it somewhat.
My two cents is again to say that mathematics is about invariance.
Platonia is about invariance. Invariance is even more fundamental than
number. Numbers are defined by invariance. The number 3 is the
invariant attribute of all sets of 3.
I take it that Bruno's existence is just the "interference pattern" of
computations, as I think he sometimes puts it. According to him, I
think the ether that we swim in (exist in) is computations, an ether of
consistency. John Barrow in his book "Pi in the Sky" brought up
the possibility that we are part of Platonia, but he concluded that
this didn't make sense. My opinion is that it doesn't make sense
if Platonia is only numbers, i.e. computation. This is for the very
reason you bring up, Stephen. An interference pattern requires a
particular point of view. But if all points of view are equally
unspecial (modulo consistency), then we are back to the "why
something instead of nothing?" problem ("why this particular point
of view that I am experiencing, rather than another point of view?").
Something has to break the symmetry of the zero information pool.
"Interference patterns" are not sufficient to break the symmetry.
(Along the same line of reasoning, even an anthropic principle is not
sufficient.) Summing the interference patterns over all points-of-view
results in zero. I've taken my answer to this from somewhere outside
myself. There has to be someone with universal power to say "Let
there be...".
Tom
Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Hi Tom,
>
> I think that you are bring up a good point but I must ask about the
> nature of "invariance"! The notion of invariance involves a subject to which
> the invariance obtains. If there is no such an subject, what meaning does
> the notion of a invariance have?
>
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invariant_%28mathematics%29
>
>
> Onward!
>
> Stephen
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "Tom Caylor" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "Everything List"
> Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 12:13 PM
> Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
>
>
> snip
>
> I've been thinking about Platonia lately. I've just finished reading
> John Barrow's "Pi in the Sky" book, and he seems to have gotten wrapped
> around the axle in regard to mathematics and Platonia. I think that
> mathematics is not primarily about numbers. Mathematics is about
> invariance. Invariance is not about any *thing* (existence)
> specifically. Perhaps this thought can shed light on this somehow?
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Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Stephen Stephen Paul King wrote: Since information is observer-dependent (Shannon) this issue brings us back to the observer. I think that eventually all observables will have to be traced back to the observer who is in fact at the nexus of the mind-body problem. [SPK] I agree! What is an Observer? If we are to use an axiomatic formulation of a TOE then the observer should be an axiom or even "The Axiom": ala Descartes "I think" and possibly more precisely and reflexively "I think what I think" with all the implied logical meaning and/or axiomatic system: This should cut through the Gordian Knot of the mind-body problem. We'll have to refer to Bruno's work to flesh out this idea in a formal fashion. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Hal, - Original Message - From: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 10:55 PM Subject: RE: Re: Only Existence is necessary? > > "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: snip >> Now, if any >> computation is implemented by any physical process, then if one physical >> process exists, then all possible computations are implemented. I'll stop >> at this point, although it is tempting to speculate that if all it takes >> for every computation to be implemented is a single physical process - >> a rock, a single subatomic particle, the idle passage of time in an >> otherwise empty universe - perhaps this is not far from saying that the >> physical process is superfluous, and all computations are implemented >> by virtue of their existence as platonic objects. > > Yes, I think this is close to Moravec's view. He believes in the platonic > existence of all conscious experiences, and sees the role of physical > implementation as just to allow us to interact with those other entities > who are instantiated in our universe. [SPK] Ok, I am happy to see Moravec idea here, as it is similar to my own, but does it not seem strange that interactions "between" entities leads to the existence of a structure that we somehow are perpetually lead to believe somehow exists independent of the interactions themselves? Onward! Stephen --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Tom, I think that you are bring up a good point but I must ask about the nature of "invariance"! The notion of invariance involves a subject to which the invariance obtains. If there is no such an subject, what meaning does the notion of a invariance have? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invariant_%28mathematics%29 Onward! Stephen - Original Message - From: "Tom Caylor" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Everything List" Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 12:13 PM Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary? snip I've been thinking about Platonia lately. I've just finished reading John Barrow's "Pi in the Sky" book, and he seems to have gotten wrapped around the axle in regard to mathematics and Platonia. I think that mathematics is not primarily about numbers. Mathematics is about invariance. Invariance is not about any *thing* (existence) specifically. Perhaps this thought can shed light on this somehow? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Bruno, Ok, but my question is: How is the set of relations between the "computations" embedded/encoded in Platonia such that a comparison *between* them is possible? We seem to be tacitly reintroducing a "distinguisher" that is somehow *outside* of Platonia... This is a familiar notion that I thought we are trying to banish! If all that there *is* (Exists) is Platonia, there is no place for a means or mechanism or process that distinguishes one computation from another to exist! Thus if such can not exist, then it inevitably follows that any notion that requires the act of distinguishing one Platonic "object" from another is logically inconsistent and thus needs to be relegated to the scrap heap of absurd notions. Onward! Stephen - Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 9:59 AM Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary? Dear Stephen, What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate. Now "implementation" is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be just a relative computations (as those living in Platonia. Bruno --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Stathis, The paper is found here: http://consc.net/papers/rock.html - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 9:55 PM Subject: RE: Re: Only Existence is necessary? Stephen, I am reminded of David Chalmer's paper recently mentioned by Hal Finney, "Does a Rock Implement Every Finite State Automaton?", which looks at the idea that any physical state such as the vibration of atoms in a rock can be mapped onto any computation, if you look at it the right way. Usually when this idea is brought up (Hilary Putnam, John Searle, the aforementioned Chalmers paper) it is taken as self-evidently wrong. However, I have not seen any argument to convince me that this is so; it just seems people think it *ought* to be so, then look around for a justification having already made up their minds. Now, if any computation is implemented by any physical process, then if one physical process exists, then all possible computations are implemented. I'll stop at this point, although it is tempting to speculate that if all it takes for every computation to be implemented is a single physical process - a rock, a single subatomic particle, the idle passage of time in an otherwise empty universe - perhaps this is not far from saying that the physical process is superfluous, and all computations are implemented by virtue of their existence as platonic objects. Stathis Papaioannou Ok, if I am following your argument here, it seems that we are required to have a non-circular explanation for the existence of a *single* physical process, not an excuse to ignore the explanatory gap between this requirement and the claim that none exist. Again, How is an implementation, which is an obvios process, considered to be identical to the existence of a Platonic object? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existence Frankly, I am wondering why we have such unquestioned faith in the entire theory of Platonic Forms given the plethora of unanswered questions that it leads one to! Onward! Stephen --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA
Bruno raises a lot of good points, but I will just focus on a couple of them. The first notion that I am using in this analysis is the assumption that a first-person stream of consciousness exists as a Platonic object. My aim is then to estimate the measure of such objects. I don't know whether people find this plausible or not, so I won't try to defend it yet. The second part, which I know is more controversial, is that it is possible to represent this object as a bit string, or as some similar, concrete representation. I think there are a couple of challenges here. The first is how to turn something as amorphous and intangible as consciousness into a concrete representation. But I assume that subsequent development of cognitive sciences will eventually give us a good handle on this problem and allow us to diagram, graph and represent streams of consciousness in a meaningful way. As one direction to pursue, we know that brain activity creates consciousness, hence a sufficiently compressed representation of brain activity should be a reasonable starting point as a representation of first-person experience. Another issue that many people have objected to is the role of time. Consciousness, it is said, is a process, not a static structure such as might be represented by a bit string. IMO this can be dealt with by interpreting the bit string as a multidimensional object, and treating one of the dimensions as time. See, for example, one of Wolfram's 1-D cellular automaton outputs: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:CA_rule30s.png We see something that can alternatively be interpreted as a pure bit string; as a two-dimensional array of bits; or as a one-dimensional bit string evolving in time. In the same way we can capture temporal evolution of consciousness by interpreting the bit string as having a time dimension. An important point is that although there may be many alternative ways and notations to represent consciousness, they should all be isomorphic, and only a relatively short program should be necessary to map from one to another. Hence, the measure computed for all of these representations will be about the same, and therefore it is meaningful to speak of this as the measure of the experience as a platonic entity. Bruno also questioned my use of a physical universe in my analysis. I am not assuming that physical universes exist as the basis of reality. I only expressed the analysis in that form because we were given a particular situation to analyze, and that situation was expressed as events in a single universe. The Universal Dovetailer does not play a principle role in my analysis, because it does not play such a role in Kolmogorov complexity. At most, the Universal Dovetailer can be used as a heuristic device to explain what it might mean to "run all computatations" in order to explain K complexity. I think one difference between K complexity and Bruno's reasoning with the Universal Dovetailer is that the former focuses on sizes of programs while Bruno seems to work more in terms of run time. In the K complexity view, the measure of an information object is (roughly) 1/2^L, where L is the size of the shortest program which outputs that object. Equivalently, the measure of an information object is the fraction of all programs which output that object, where programs are sampled uniformly from all bit strings (or from whatever the input alphabet is for the UTM). This does not have anything to do with run time. Some bit patterns may have short programs that take a very long run time to output them. Such bit patterns are considered to have low complexity and high measure, despite the long run time needed. I think Bruno has sometimes said that the Universal Dovetailer makes some things have higher measure than others because they get more run time. I'm not sure how this would work, but it is a difference from the Kolmogorov complexity (aka Universal Distribution) view that I am using. Okay, those are some of the foundational questions and assumptions that I think are raised by Bruno's analysis. The rest of it goes through as I have described many times. Hal --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Dear Lee, - Original Message - From: "Lee Corbin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 9:55 PM Subject: RE: Only Existence is necessary? Stephen writes (BTW, thanks for using plain text :-) > I keep reading this claim that "only the existence of the algorithm > itself is necessary" and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned for > mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an implementation > in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of that > can > be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have. > > AFAIK, this claim is that mere existence necessarily entails any > property, including properties that involve some notion of chance. What properties do you have in mind that pure platonic algorithms seem to lack? Anything, that is, besides *time* itself? How about an explanation as to how an "illusion" of time obtains (assuming the theory of Platonic forms if correct)? Onward! Stephen --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Dear George, It seems that we are wandering off into the thicket of semantics and thus I need to try to be more precise in my terminology. ;-) Interleaving. - Original Message - From: "George Levy" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 8:53 PM Subject: Re: Only Existence is necessary? > > Hi Stephen > > Stephen Paul King wrote: > >>Dear Quentin et al, >> >>I keep reading this claim that "only the existence of the algorithm >>itself is necessary" and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned for >>mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an implementation >>in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of that >>can >>be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have. >> >> > [GL] > Is the world fundamentally physical or can it be reduced to ideas? This > is an interesting issue. If a TOE exists then it would have to explain > the physics and the objects. [SPK] I hold that the question of whether the world is fundamentally physical or reducible to ideas is based on a false assumption: that there are no alternatives to the choice between the monisms of Matter (the world is physical) or Idea (the world is idea). A fascinating arguement has been made by V. Pratt that a duality can be had, a duality that is based on the mathematical duality that exist between logical algebras and vector spaces. http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/bridge.pdf But I digress, if we claim that a TOE exists then we have to consider the issues of completeness of such a TOE! For example: 1) Does such a TOE encode all possible versions of itself? This leads to a pathological regress! If it only codes one version of itself, then we can easily show that it is imcomplete and thus it is not a TOE. 2) How is this particular TOE distinguished from the space of all possible TOEs? I can see that we could use some argument involving the Kolmogorov aspect of the TOE, i.e. the TOE that has the "shortest" bit string that faithfully represents/implements *all* possible observations that could obtain of our universe; but this inevitably requies that we consider the comutational complexity of finding said bit string. It seems to me that Chaitin's work on Omega shows that the measure of such a bit is uncomputable. http://www.daviddarling.info/encyclopedia/C/Chaitins_constant.html Thus if the TOE can neither code its own existence not can be found via a computable search, how is it that we continue to use such an absurd notion? > [GL] > This reminds me of the Ether controversy. Is there a need for the Ether > for waves to propagate? The most up-to-date answer is that waves carry > their own "physical substrate." They can be waves and/or particles. > Similarly there should be equivalence between information and > matter/energy. Thus a process or algorithm should have inherently within > itself its own physical substrate. [SPK] It is interesting that you bring up the notion of an ether! For those that try to follow the latest ideas in Quantum Gravity, we find many notion that are merely sophisticated version of ether, ala some kind of a priori existing subtrate into and onto which we fiber/embed some dynamic/dimensional structure that encodes the particular set of fields that we associate with particles. Frankly, it seems to me that this is merely a hold over from the assumption of a fundamental monistic structure. > > Since information is observer-dependent (Shannon) this issue brings us > back to the observer. I think that eventually all observables will have > to be traced back to the observer who is in fact at the nexus of the > mind-body problem. [SPK] I agree! What is an Observer? Onward! Stephen --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
So it seems we've just had a definition problem only... Quentin Le Jeudi 22 Juin 2006 19:05, Bruno Marchal a écrit : > Hi Quentin, > > Le 22-juin-06, à 16:16, Quentin Anciaux a écrit : > > Hi Bruno, > > > > Le jeudi 22 juin 2006 15:59, Bruno Marchal a écrit : > >> Dear Stephen, > >> > >> What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is > >> a > >> predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate. > >> Now "implementation" is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be > >> just a relative computations (as those living in Platonia. > > > > Either we have a definition problem or I do not understand. For me > > relative > > computations in platonia are not instantiated by definition as they > > are in > > platonia. Being in platonia just means it exists, hence existence is > > sufficient. If not could you please define what you mean by > > instantiated. > > Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism. Numbers and their > additive structure, and their multiplicative structure and the whole > mess you get with both of them at once, making *all* theories > (generable set of sentences) incomplete with respect to number > theoretical truth. The UD lives there under the form of all true > arithmetical (Sigma1) sentences, which, and this is eventually > justified from the first person point of view, codes the universal > dovetailing. So *all* computations, the finite and the infinite one, > with their weighting redundancies, exist or better are instantiated > under the form of an infinity of (purely) number theoretical relations. > By comp, those many computations instantiate, well, wanting to be short > I will just say all possible number's or machine's dreams. > Those machine's dream obeys to the law of computer science, they > differentiates, they overlaps, they get entangled rising parallelism, > etc. They get rise to many internal interpretations. > Computer Science, is in many different and interesting sense a branch > of number theory. > To sum up: the dreams are instantiated in the DU-computations, > themselves instantiated by the (platonic) number theoretical relations. > The invariant and the symmetry (and geometry, and physics) should > emerge from them from inside (assuming comp). > > (I'm afraid Tom just did say sort of opposite. No offense Tom ;-) > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA
"Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > OK, I think I'm clear on what you're saying now. But suppose I argue > that I will not survive the next hour, because the matter making up my > synapses will have turned over in this time. To an outside observer the > person taking my place would seem much the same, and if you ask him, he > will share my memories and he will believe he is me. However, he won't > be me, because I will by then be dead. Is this a valid analysis? My view > is that there is a sense in which it *is* valid, but that it doesn't > matter. What matters to me in survival is that there exist a person in > an hour from now who by the usual objective and subjective criteria we > use identifies as being me. The problem is that there seems to be no basis for judging the validity of this kind of analysis. Do we die every instant? Do we survive sleep but not being frozen? Do we live on in our copies? Does our identity extend to all conscious entities? There are so many questions like this, but they seem unanswerable. And behind all of them lurks our evolutionary conditioning forcing us to act as though we have certain beliefs, and tricking us into coming up with logical rationalizations for false but survival-promoting beliefs. I am attracted to the UD+ASSA framework in part because it provides answers to these questions, answers which are in principle approximately computable and quantitative. Of course, it has assumptions of its own. But modelling a subjective lifespan as a computation, and asking how much measure the universe adds to that computation, seems to me to be a reasonable way to approach the problem. > Even if it were possible to imagine another way of living my life which > did not entail dying every moment, for example if certain significant > components in my brain did not turn over, I would not expend any effort > to bring this state of affairs about, because if it made no subjective > or objective difference, what would be the point? Moreover, there would > be no reason for evolution to favour this kind of neurophysiology unless > it conferred some other advantage, such as greater metabolic efficiency. Right, so there are two questions here. One is whether there could be reasons to prefer a circumstance which seemingly makes no objective or subjective difference. I'll say more about this later, but for now I'll just note that it is often impossible to know whether some change would make a subjective difference. The other question is whether we could or should even try to overcome our evolutionary programming. If evolution doesn't care if we die once we have reproduced, should we? If evolution tells us to sacrifice ourselves to save two children, eight cousins, or 16 great-great uncles, should we? In the long run, we might be forced to obey the instincts built into us by genes. But it still is interesting to consider the deeper philosophical issues, and how we might hypothetically behave if we were free of evolutionary constraints. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Quentin, Le 22-juin-06, à 16:16, Quentin Anciaux a écrit : > > Hi Bruno, > > Le jeudi 22 juin 2006 15:59, Bruno Marchal a écrit : >> Dear Stephen, >> >> What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is >> a >> predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate. >> Now "implementation" is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be >> just a relative computations (as those living in Platonia. > > Either we have a definition problem or I do not understand. For me > relative > computations in platonia are not instantiated by definition as they > are in > platonia. Being in platonia just means it exists, hence existence is > sufficient. If not could you please define what you mean by > instantiated. Remember that comp relies on arithmetical platonism. Numbers and their additive structure, and their multiplicative structure and the whole mess you get with both of them at once, making *all* theories (generable set of sentences) incomplete with respect to number theoretical truth. The UD lives there under the form of all true arithmetical (Sigma1) sentences, which, and this is eventually justified from the first person point of view, codes the universal dovetailing. So *all* computations, the finite and the infinite one, with their weighting redundancies, exist or better are instantiated under the form of an infinity of (purely) number theoretical relations. By comp, those many computations instantiate, well, wanting to be short I will just say all possible number's or machine's dreams. Those machine's dream obeys to the law of computer science, they differentiates, they overlaps, they get entangled rising parallelism, etc. They get rise to many internal interpretations. Computer Science, is in many different and interesting sense a branch of number theory. To sum up: the dreams are instantiated in the DU-computations, themselves instantiated by the (platonic) number theoretical relations. The invariant and the symmetry (and geometry, and physics) should emerge from them from inside (assuming comp). (I'm afraid Tom just did say sort of opposite. No offense Tom ;-) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > Hi Bruno, > > Le jeudi 22 juin 2006 15:59, Bruno Marchal a écrit : > > Dear Stephen, > > > > What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a > > predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate. > > Now "implementation" is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be > > just a relative computations (as those living in Platonia. > > Either we have a definition problem or I do not understand. For me relative > computations in platonia are not instantiated by definition as they are in > platonia. Being in platonia just means it exists, hence existence is > sufficient. If not could you please define what you mean by instantiated. > > Thanks, > Quentin I've been thinking about Platonia lately. I've just finished reading John Barrow's "Pi in the Sky" book, and he seems to have gotten wrapped around the axle in regard to mathematics and Platonia. I think that mathematics is not primarily about numbers. Mathematics is about invariance. Invariance is not about any *thing* (existence) specifically. Perhaps this thought can shed light on this somehow? Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: *THE* PUZZLE (was: ascension, Smullyan, ...)
Le 20-juin-06, à 06:00, Tom Caylor a écrit (replying to Norman Samish) : > > > Norman Samish wrote: >> Gentlemen: >> >> I've endured this thread long enough! Let's get back to something I >> can understand! >> >> "Why?" you'll ask. >> >> I'll reply, "Because your audience is shrinking! I've plotted the >> Audience vs. Topic, and find that, in 12.63 months, there is a 91% >> probability that, if the topic doesn't become understandable to one >> with an IQ of 120, your audience will be zero, and the only expositor >> will be Bruno. Not that there's anything wrong with that, but we >> must acknowledge that Bruno speaks a language that very few of us can >> understand. Bruno, and probably Russell and a few others, are >> clearly Homo Superior, while the rest of us are mere Homo Sapiens." >> >> You will then say, "Our discourse is meant for Homo Superior. If you >> can't stand the heat, get out of the kitchen." >> >> I'll reply, "Damn! I was hoping to learn something!" >> >> Norman Samish >> > > Norman: > > Even though the other current topic "Calculus of personal identity" has > the word "calculus" in it, I think it's an understandable and > interesting thread. And you can also start a new thread. For me, I'm > hoping to learn something, too, as long as Bruno lasts, and feels like > he's benefiting. This current topic I think is just starting to really > get good, in my view. Or it may evolve to the next level and be less > mathematical and more philosophical. Or maybe someone smarter than I > am will pipe up and make it even more interesting. Who knows what will > happen, but it's up to whoever wants to participate to make it happen. > My thoughts. I appreciate. I will solve the four diagonalization questions later (I recall them below(*). I intend also to make clearer the motivation. I was just trying to help george with Smullyan's FU "heart of the matter" but Norman is right at least on this: I should find a way to explain the general idea without being technical, and then, for those interested, I can explain the technics. It would be better for everyone, though, to ask questions once there is a unclear point. With all my respect for Norman, he reminded me those students who wait for the exams for asking questions! I do think such clarifications could help to clarify nuances between theoretical computer science notions (number, program, function, computation, ...) which are important in many other thread. For example I said recently that Kolmogorov complexity is a well defined notion, that it is a non constructive (nor computable) notion, and that it does not depend on the chosen universal machine except for a constant term. But all that presupposes importantly Church thesis. So it is not a luwe to dig on it a little more. Aarghh... Sorry for that teacher's tone it is June. Exam Month here ... :-( Bruno (*) So the question was: what does diagonalization prove on those following list of functions: 0) r1 r2 r3 r4 r5 r6 r7 r8 ... This is an arbitrary list of functions from N to N (not necessarily computable one); 1) h0 h1 h2 h3 h4 h5 h6 ... This is a list of total computable functions from N to N that we can generate mechanically (I mean we can generate their codes). It means that we can generate the codes of each hi, written in some language, and that, for some reason, we are sure that each hi is total computable. Examples: Caylor last funny enumeration; all the (transfinite collection of) sequences of growing functions we have defined in this thread (since "Smullyan Smullyan ..."); 2) f0 f1 f2 f3 f4 f5 f6 f7 ... This is a list of *all* total computable functions; 3) F0 F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 ... This is the list of all programmable things in some "universal language" like fortran. CT asserts fortran is universal so that the total computable function fi will be dispersed *among* those Fi things, so that a universal machine can really compute all the fi, among other things. Now the same diagonalization argument proves 4 different propositions according to which list we are talking about. Which one? Before answering, I let people muse a little about what are those 4 different consequences, given that the only way to really grasp those propositions consists in rediscovering them by oneself, ... or at least in searching enough so as to be curious listening to the solutions. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hi Bruno, Le jeudi 22 juin 2006 15:59, Bruno Marchal a écrit : > Dear Stephen, > > What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a > predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate. > Now "implementation" is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be > just a relative computations (as those living in Platonia. Either we have a definition problem or I do not understand. For me relative computations in platonia are not instantiated by definition as they are in platonia. Being in platonia just means it exists, hence existence is sufficient. If not could you please define what you mean by instantiated. Thanks, Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Le 22-juin-06, à 03:55, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit (in a reply to Stephen): I am reminded of David Chalmer's paper recently mentioned by Hal Finney, "Does a Rock Implement Every Finite State Automaton?", which looks at the idea that any physical state such as the vibration of atoms in a rock can be mapped onto any computation, if you look at it the right way. Usually when this idea is brought up (Hilary Putnam, John Searle, the aforementioned Chalmers paper) it is taken as self-evidently wrong. However, I have not seen any argument to convince me that this is so; it just seems people think it *ought* to be so, then look around for a justification having already made up their minds. Now, if any computation is implemented by any physical process, then if one physical process exists, then all possible computations are implemented. I'll stop at this point, although it is tempting to speculate that if all it takes for every computation to be implemented is a single physical process - a rock, a single subatomic particle, the idle passage of time in an otherwise empty universe - perhaps this is not far from saying that the physical process is superfluous, and all computations are implemented by virtue of their existence as platonic objects. Nice point! At least those platonic computations are well-defined as such including the counterfactuals. Now, a real rock implements plausibly a particular (not universal) quantum computation, and as such some finite state automaton, but not a universal computation, still less a DU. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Dear Stephen, What makes you think someone (who) asserted (where) that existence is a predicate. I agree with you: existence is not a predicate. Now "implementation" is a *process*. Again I agree. But this could be just a relative computations (as those living in Platonia. Bruno Le 22-juin-06, à 00:50, Stephen Paul King a écrit : > > Dear Quentin et al, > > I keep reading this claim that "only the existence of the algorithm > itself is necessary" and I am still mystified as to how it is reasoned > for > mere existence of a representation of a process, such as an > implementation > in terms of some Platonic Number, is sufficient to give a model of > that can > be used to derive anything like the world of appearences that we have. > > AFAIK, this claim is that mere existence necessarily entails any > property, including properties that involve some notion of chance. > First of > all *existence* is *not* a property of, or a predicate associable > with, an > object as Kant, Frege and Russell, et all argued well. > > http://www.reference.com/browse/wiki/Existence > > > Per the Wiki article, Miller argued that existence is indeed a > predicate > "since it individuates its subject by being its bounds" [from the > above web > reference] but it seems that Miller's claim disallows any kind of > relationship between such things (using that word loosely) as > algorithms and > thus denies us a mean to distinguish one algorithm from another. If > Existence individuates an entity by "being its bounds" then it seems to > follow that any other entity does not *exist* to it and thus no > relationship > between entities can obtain. > I admit that I have not read enough of Miller's work to see if he > deals > with this problem that I see in his reasoning (as applied here), but > nevertheless the basic proposal that existence is sufficient to obtain > anything that is even close to a notion of implementation. > > also see: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/existence/ > > Implementation is a *process*, and as such we have to deal with the > properties that are brought into our thinking on this. > > Onward! > > Stephen > > BTW, Plato never gave an explanation that I have seen of how the Forms > "cast > imperfect shadows" or even why such "shadow casting" was necessary... > > - Original Message - > From: "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: > Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 4:06 PM > Subject: Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA > > > > Hi Hal, > > Le Mercredi 21 Juin 2006 19:31, Hal Finney a écrit : >> What, after all, do these principles mean? They say that the >> implementation substrate doesn't matter. You can implement a person >> using neurons or tinkertoys, it's all the same. But if there is no >> way >> in principle to tell whether a system implements a person, then this >> philosophy is meaningless since its basic assumption has no meaning. >> The MWI doesn't change that. > > That's exactly the point of Bruno I think... What you've shown is that > physicalism is not compatible with computationalism. In the UD vision, > there > is no real "instantiation" even the UD itself does not need to be > instantiated, only the existence of the algorithm itself is necessary. > > Quentin > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA
Hal, Here I agree with everything you say. Functionalism presupposes computationalism, but computationalism makes computationalism false. exit functionnalism. Even maudlin makes the confusion. I repeat that both thought experiments and Godel's incompleteness show that if we are machine then we cannot know which machine we are, nor can we know for sure our substitution level. We can bet empirically (and religiously!) only. We can deduce also that our experiences supervene on the continuum of computational histories appearing below our substitution level (those comp histories that we cannot distinguish). This explain qualitatively quantum facts, i.e. why matter will behave like if it was emerging from an infinity of "parallel" computations. Now I cannot take seriously the Mallah-Chalmers problem of rock instantiating finite state automata, given that with comp consciousness arises from the possible behavior of an infinity of non finite state automata (universal machine). Mallah-Chalmers are adding a naïve "solution of the mind body problem" (where mind are attached to concrete computations) on a naïve, aristotelian, view of matter which already contradict comp (by UDA). Bruno Le 21-juin-06, à 08:11, Hal Finney a écrit : > > Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: >> On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 09:35:12AM -0700, "Hal Finney" wrote: >>> I think that one of the fundamental principles of your COMP >>> hypothesis >>> is the functionalist notion, that it does not matter what kind of >>> system >>> instantiates a computation. However I think this founders on the >>> familiar >>> paradoxes over what counts as an instantiation. In principle we can >>> come up with a continuous range of devices which span the >>> alternatives >>> from non-instantiation to full instantiation of a given computation. >>> Without some way to distinguish these, there is no meaning to the >>> question >>> of when a computation is instantiated; hence functionalism fails. >>> >> >> I don't follow your argument here, but it sounds interesting. Could >> you >> expand on this more fully? My guess is that ultimately it will depend >> on an assumption like the ASSA. > > I am mostly referring to the philosophical literature on the problems > of > what counts as an instantiation, as well as responses considered here > and elsewhere. One online paper is Chalmers' "Does a Rock Implement > Every Finite-State Automaton?", http://consc.net/papers/rock.html. > Jacques Mallah (who seems to have disappeared from the net) discussed > the issue on this list several years ago. > > Now, Chalmers (and Mallah) claimed to have a solution to decide when > a physical system implements a calculation. But I don't think they > work; at least, they admit gray areas. In fact, I think Mallah came > up with the same basic idea I am advocating, that there is a degree of > instantiation and it is based on the Kolmogorov complexity of a program > that maps between physical states and corresponding computational > states. > > For functionalism to work, though, it seems to me that you really need > to be able to give a yes or no answer to whether something implements a > given calculation. Fuzziness will not do, given that changing the > system > may kill a conscious being! It doesn't make sense to say that someone > is > "sort of" there, at least not in the conventional functionalist view. > > A fertile source of problems for functionalism involves the question > of whether playbacks of passive recordings of brain states would be > conscious. If not (as Chalmers and many others would say, since they > lack the proper counterfactual behavior), this leads to a machine with > a > dial which controls the percentage of time its elements behave > according > to a passive playback versus behaving according to active computational > rules. Now we can turn the knob and have the machine gradually move > from > unconsciousness to full consciousness, without changing its behavior in > any way as we twiddle the knob. This invokes Chalmers' "fading qualia" > paradox and is again fatal for functionalism. > > Maudlin's machines, which we have also mentioned on this list from time > to time, further illustrate the problems in trying to draw a bright > line > between implementations and clever non-implementations of computations. > > In short I view functionalism as being fundamentally broken unless > there > is a much better solution to the implementation question than I am > aware > of. Therefore we cannot assume a priori that a brain implementation > and a > computational implementation of mental states will be inherently the > same. > And I have argued in fact that they could have different properties. > > Hal Finney > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, sen
Re: A calculus of personal identity
Le 21-juin-06, à 08:13, Lee Corbin a écrit : snip > >> BM: In that case I would say there is (at first sight) 999/1000 that >> in >> next minute I will be the one send in the place P, so that in the >> "long >> run", there is almost no chance I continue my normal life. I will be >> upset. > > LC: I would say that you will continue your normal life, and you will > also have a lot (too much) measure in the Martian penal colony. I see what you mean and I agree with you, but now, you were again talking about third person description of the first person point of view (I will write 1-pov, 3-pov, ...). When I am saying there is almost no chance I continue my normal life, I was talking about my expectation for my future first person experience, not about an absolute 3-description of where all my possible 1-pov will be realized. Of course, once the multiplication has been done, then normality resumes. Each morning I am multiplied into a continuum of Bruno Marchal drinking cups of coffee, and by the quantum rule (or just comp actually) there exist 1-pov where my coffee tastes tea. Despite this the relative probability of such personal events are rare, and I don't take them into account in my expectations. > >> BM: Then there is a high objective probability that I will find myself >> subjectively in Hell after some trips, but if you keep interviewing >> the >> one who is reconstituted in Washington, obviously he will tell us >> everything is fine, given that by construction, you interview the >> lucky >> one. Those in Hell knows your reasoning is unconvincing. You are >> doing >> statistic with a biased sample. > > LC: I agree. But on the other hand, if all the others get 72 virgins, > then > that is a favorable outcome for you---or as we would say on this list, > the measure of the favorable observer moments dominates. All right (assuming I am happy with 72 virgins which I think is a bit too much :). In that case the right sample will make me bet, BEFORE the multiplication, that I have a high probability to get the 72 virgins. OK? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A calculus of personal identity
Le 21-juin-06, à 08:04, Lee Corbin a écrit : > What is fain unutterable is that one might be in two > places at the same time, that is, that each is a fully > legitimate continuation of the other. That goes against > our instincts. I would say that what is really unutterable is that one might *feel* to be in two places at once. Of course, the two reconstitutions in W and M are fully legitimate continuations of the one in Brussels (this is even the root if the relative and local/immediate first person indeterminacy). To feel to be in two places at once is against logic, arithmetic, geometry, psychology, evidences, ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA
Le 21-juin-06, à 08:49, Hal Finney a écrit (to Saibal Mitra): snip > and further, since > the UD generates all minds, it means that all minds have equal measure. Never underestimate the "basic fundamental stupidity" of the UD. The UD execution is very redundant and the measure will be relative. Unless you bet on ASSA in this context, but this does not make sense (cf our older discussion). > And from this we conclude that the contribution of a universe to the > measure of a conscious experience is not the universe's measure itself, > but that measure reduced by the measure of the program which outputs > that conscious experience given the universe data as input. As far as I can make sense of the "universe as data" is it not a Relative SSA? > As for the question above about the Universal Dovetailer universe, it > is > easily solved in this framework. The output of the UD is of > essentially > no help in producing the mental state in question, because the ouput is > so enormous I think it is misleading to talk of any output of the UD. I guess you mean the computations or execution (material or not) of the UD. > and we would have no idea where to look. But from the first person point of view there is no need to know where to look. > Hence the UD does > not make a dominant contribution to mental state measure and we avoid > the paradox without any need for ad hoc rules. I would say simply that the UD is just a frame from which internal relative measure occurs. So, indeed the UD itself has no genuine measure attributed to it. This could be otherwise for some internal (perhaps quantum) universal dovetailer. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Only Existence is necessary?
Hal, Do you have a reference for Moravec's examination of this idea? Stathis Papaioannou > > Now, if any > > computation is implemented by any physical process, then if one physical > > process exists, then all possible computations are implemented. I'll stop > > at this point, although it is tempting to speculate that if all it takes > > for every computation to be implemented is a single physical process - > > a rock, a single subatomic particle, the idle passage of time in an > > otherwise empty universe - perhaps this is not far from saying that the > > physical process is superfluous, and all computations are implemented > > by virtue of their existence as platonic objects. > > Yes, I think this is close to Moravec's view. He believes in the platonic > existence of all conscious experiences, and sees the role of physical > implementation as just to allow us to interact with those other entities > who are instantiated in our universe. > > Hal Finney _ Try Live.com: where your online world comes together - with news, sports, weather, and much more. http://www.live.com/getstarted --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Teleportation thought experiment and UD+ASSA
Le 20-juin-06, à 08:47, Hal Finney a écrit : > > I'll offer my thoughts on first-person indeterminacy. This is based > on Wei Dai's framework which I have called UD+ASSA. I guess you mean your UDist here. > I am working on > some web pages to summarize the various conclusions I have drawn from > this framework. (Actually, here I am going to in effect use the SSA > rather than the ASSA, i.e. I will work not with observer-moments but > with entire observer lifetimes. But the same principles apply.) Why? How? This is not obvious, and in some context even not consistent. > > Let us consider Bruno's example where you are annihilated in Brussels > and then copies of your final state are materialized in Washington and > Moscow, and allowed to continue to run. What can we say about your > subjective first-person expectations in this experiment? > > Here is how I would approach the problem. It is a very straightforward > computational procedure (in principle). I don't think so. See below. > Consider any hypothetical > subjective, first person stream of consciousness. This would basically > be a record of the thoughts and experiences of a hypothetical observer. > Let us assume that this can be written and recorded in some form. OK. I would add that such a record is annihilated in personal use of teleportation. If not you can no more distinguish it from a third person record. > > Perhaps it is a record of neural firing patterns over the course of the > observer's lifetime, This hides some ambiguity. " neural firing pattern" does not typically belongs to first person experience (unlike pain pleasure ...). > or perhaps a more compressed description based on > such information. ? (such a compression has nothing to do with the experience, so I don't understand). > > The question I would aim to answer is this: for any proposed, > hypothetical > first-person lifetime stream of consciousness, how much measure does > this hypothetical subjective lifetime acquire from the third-person > events in the universe? Which universe? And how do you link first person experience and third person description. You are talking like if the mind body problem was solved. > > The answer is very simple: it is the conditional Kolmogorov measure of > the subjective lifetime record, given the universe as input. (Conditional) Kolmogorov measure is not computable (even in principle) unless you have an oracle for the halting problem. It is well defined, and does not depend on the chosen Universal machine (except for a constant), but it is not computable. Still it is computable "in the limit", but for using that feature, you need to take into account the invariance for delays in "reconstitutions", but this changes the whole frame of reasoning. I am not sure I can figure out what do you mean by "universe" here, nor how could a universe be an input (nor an output actually). > In other > words, consider the shortest program which, given the universe as > input, > produces that precise subjective lifetime record as output; There is no algorithm for finding that shortest programs. (part of the price of Church thesis like in the diagonalization posts). > if the length > of that program is L, then this universe contributes 1/2^L to the > measure > of that subjective lifetime. > > Note that I am not trying to start from the universe and decide what > the > first-person stream of consciousness is; rather, I compute the > numerical > degree to which the universe instantiates any first-person stream of > consciousness. However, this does in effect answer the first question, > since we can consider all possible streams of consciousness, and > determine which one(s) the universe mostly adds measure to. Only with an oracle for the halting problem. Still, I don't understand what you mean (in this context) by "this universe". Also, minimal complexity is a prior akin to ... classical physics. Even quantum mechanician does not really need it, because they can derive such minimization from the quantum phase randomization, as Feynman discovered (see a concise explanation of this in my 2001 paper "Computation, Consciousness and the Quantum" (cf url below)). > These would > be the ones that we would informally say that the universe > instantiates. > > Now, let me illustrate how this would be applied to the situation in > question, and some other thought experiments. Specifically, let us > imagine three hypothetical streams of consciousness: B goes through > life > until the moment the subject is annihilated in Brussels, then stops. > W goes through life as does B but continues with the life experiences > from Washington. And M is like W, going through life until the event > in Brussels but then continuing with the events in Moscow. > > Normally we only consider first-person experiences like M and W when > we discuss this experiment, where the consciousness "jumps" to Moscow > or Wash
Re: *THE* PUZZLE (was: ascension, Smullyan, ...)
Le 20-juin-06, à 01:18, Russell Standish a écrit : > So we a need a name. Bitstrings is too specific, since we could also > be referring to strings from other alphabets. The word description > seems to fit the concept, and wasn't otherwise used in literature. Why not saying just "strings" then? It works on all alphabet. The term "Description" conveys the idea of finiteness, except in explicit infinite formal languages. > Whereas I don't think it does. It can be applied in an absolute way > (such as you refer) or in a relative subjective way (which is how I do > it). In fact I make the point that absolute measures aren't meaningful > - there just isn't an absolutely given UTM. From a recursive or computationalist standpoint there is. In particular "absolute measure" *can* be defined up to a constant. > The dovetailing provides the simpler ensemble from which the specific > computation is selected. This is right there in the first > [Schmidhuber] paper. I don't see it. > In the second paper, the dovetailing is assumed to run on an actual > resource limited computer - hence the speed prior. But that dovetailing is not related to the universal one. Which is all normal given that Schmidhuber does not base his reasoning on the 1-3 distinction. His ensemble or his "great programmer" is thus enough for his purpose. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
