2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer :
>> > >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a
>> > >> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The
>> > >> paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
>> > >> *any* human concept is *eliminab
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:21, Flammarion wrote:
>
> Where he says computation can happen without any physicial process at
> all. I don't see any evidence for that
I am explaining this right now.
> Only Bruno thinks computation trancends matter.
The notion of computation and computability have be
2009/8/19 Flammarion :
>
>
>
> On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
>> is a posteriori compressed - for example into 'computational' language
>> - then this demands that it be *capable* of prior justification by
>> rigorou
2009/8/19 Flammarion :
>> >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a
>> >> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The
>> >> paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
>> >> *any* human concept is *eliminable*
>>
>>
2009/8/19 Bruno Marchal :
>> 1) What motivates the assumption of different theoretical postulates
>> of primitiveness, contingency and necessity?
>
> Is that question really important? It is a bit a private question.
> Typical motivation for comp, are that it is very plausible under a
> large spe
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:59, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 19 Aug, 15:20, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman wrote:
>>
Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e.
CTM
and PM are
2009/8/19 Jesse Mazer :
>> >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a
>> >> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The
>> >> paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
>> >> *any* human concept is *eliminable*
>> >
On 19 Aug 2009, at 23:03, meekerdb @dslextreme.com wrote:
>
> On Wed, Aug 19, 2009 at 12:12 PM, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> Just a reminder, for me, and perhaps some training for you. In
>> preparation to the mathematical discovery of the universal machine.
>>
>> exercises:
> ...
>>
On Wed, Aug 19, 2009 at 12:12 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> Hi,
>
> Just a reminder, for me, and perhaps some training for you. In
> preparation to the mathematical discovery of the universal machine.
>
> exercises:
...
>
>
> 4) Be sure that you have been convinced by Brent that there is a
>
On 19 Aug 2009, at 19:23, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 19 Aug, 16:41, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>> I am sorry Peter, but CTM + PM just does not work, and it is a good
>> news, because if we keep CTM, we get a sort of super generalization
>> of
>> Darwin idea that things evolve.
>
> We still don't h
> Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 13:21:19 -0700
> Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
>
>
>
> On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman wrote:
> > 009/8/19 Flammarion :
> >
> > >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation
Seems like this post didn't go through, so I'll resend it:
> Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 13:21:19 -0700
> Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> From: peterdjo...@yahoo.com
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
>
>
>
> On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman wrote:
> > 009/8/19 Flammarion :
> >
> > >> I com
On 19 Aug, 13:48, David Nyman wrote:
> On 19 Aug, 09:36, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> > > Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
> > > and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
> > > argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's posi
On 19 Aug, 13:35, David Nyman wrote:
> It doesn't. It just has to be *amenable* of spelling out: i.e. if it
> is a posteriori compressed - for example into 'computational' language
> - then this demands that it be *capable* of prior justification by
> rigorous spelling out in physical terms f
On 19 Aug 2009, at 18:41, ronaldheld wrote:
>
> Bruno:
> the Plotinus paper is the first one on your list of publications on
> your website?
Yes.
It is also the "pdf" on my home page, at the right of
A Purely Arithmetical, yet Empirically Falsifiable, Interpretation of
Plotinus’ Theory of Matt
On 19 Aug, 15:20, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman wrote:
>
> >> Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
> >> and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
> >> ar
Hi,
Just a reminder, for me, and perhaps some training for you. In
preparation to the mathematical discovery of the universal machine.
exercises:
1) count the number of bijections from a set A to itself. (= card{x
such that x is bijection from A to A})
2) describe some canonical bijection
On 19 Aug, 13:03, David Nyman wrote:
> 009/8/19 Flammarion :
>
> >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a
> >> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The
> >> paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
> >> *an
> From: david.ny...@gmail.com
> Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 13:03:39 +0100
> Subject: Re: Emulation and Stuff
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
>
>
> 009/8/19 Flammarion :
>
> >> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a
> >> physical process taking place in brains
On 19 Aug, 16:41, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I am sorry Peter, but CTM + PM just does not work, and it is a good
> news, because if we keep CTM, we get a sort of super generalization of
> Darwin idea that things evolve.
We still don't have a definite response from Peter as to whether "CTM
+ PM
Flammarion wrote:
>
>
> On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> David Nyman wrote:
>>> On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,
assuming comp.
Flammarion wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Aug, 18:26, Brent Meeker wrote:
>> Flammarion wrote:
>
>>> Single-universe thinking is a different game from everythingism. It is
>>> not about
>>> explaining everything from logical first priciples. It accepts
>>> contingency as the price
>>> paid for parsimony.
Bruno:
the Plotinus paper is the first one on your list of publications on
your website?
Ronald
On Aug 18, 10:46 am, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Ronald,
>
> On 18 Aug 2009, at 14:14, ronaldheld wrote:
>
>
>
> > I have heard of Octonians but have not used them.
> > I do not know anyth
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:58, Flammarion wrote:
> I think *you* believe in magic. You believe that
> if you write down hypothetical truths about what
> an immaterial machine would believe, you can conclude
> that everything has been conjured up by an immaterial machine.
I don't proceed in that way
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:36, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman wrote:
>
>> Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
>> and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
>> argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's posi
On 19 Aug 2009, at 10:33, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
> On 19 Aug, 08:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct
argumentation that you are material,
On 19 Aug, 09:36, Flammarion wrote:
> > Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
> > and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
> > argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think
> > is that 1) and 2) are both false (or
2009/8/19 Flammarion :
>> Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's
>> the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism "the class of
>> consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with any proper
>> subset of the class of computational processes". Physic
009/8/19 Flammarion :
>> I completely agree that **assuming primary matter** computation is "a
>> physical process taking place in brains and computer hardware". The
>> paraphrase argument - the one you said you agreed with - asserts that
>> *any* human concept is *eliminable*
>
> No, reducible,
2009/8/19 Flammarion :
>> > That is never going to get you further than mathematical existence.
>> > You still need the futher step of showing mathematical existence is
>> > ontological RITISAR existence.
>>
>> So you would accept to be turned into a program as long as you're
>> running on a physi
On 19 Aug, 10:28, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> 2009/8/19 Flammarion :
>
> > There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have
> > my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is.
>
> And you saying so doesn't prove there isn't.
>
>
>
> >> >> So to save a role to matter, you wi
On 18 Aug, 22:46, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/18 Flammarion :
> Yes, of course, this is precisely my point, for heaven's sake. Here's
> the proposal, in your own words: assuming physicalism "the class of
> consciousness-causing processes might not coincide with any proper
> subset of the clas
2009/8/19 Flammarion :
> There is no immaterial existence at all, and my agreeign to have
> my brain physcially replicated doesn't prove there is.
And you saying so doesn't prove there isn't.
>
>> >> So to save a role to matter, you will have to make your
>> >> "consciousness
>> >> of primitive
On 18 Aug, 22:46, David Nyman wrote:
> 2009/8/18 Flammarion :
>
>
>
> >> >> The "paraphrase" condition means, for example, that instead of adopting
> >> >> a statement like "unicorns have one horn" as a true statement about
> >> >> reality and thus being forced to accept the existence of unic
On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 18 Aug 2009, at 22:43, Flammarion wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > On 18 Aug, 11:25, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >> On 18 Aug 2009, at 10:55, Flammarion wrote:
>
> >>> Any physcial theory is distinguished from an
> >>> Everythingis theory by maintaining the contingen
On 19 Aug, 01:29, David Nyman wrote:
> Bruno's position is that only one of the above can be true (i.e. CTM
> and PM are incompatible) as shown by UDA-8 (MGA/Olympia). I've also
> argued this, in a somewhat different form. Peter's position I think
> is that 1) and 2) are both false (or in a
On 19 Aug, 08:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
> > Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >> This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct
> >> argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us
> >> is material, then th
On 19 Aug, 01:51, Brent Meeker wrote:
> David Nyman wrote:
> > On 19 Aug, 00:20, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> >> Note that I have never said that matter does not exist. I have no
> >> doubt it exists. I am just saying that matter cannot be primitive,
> >> assuming comp. Matter is more or less
On 18 Aug, 18:26, Brent Meeker wrote:
> Flammarion wrote:
> > Single-universe thinking is a different game from everythingism. It is
> > not about
> > explaining everything from logical first priciples. It accepts
> > contingency as the price
> > paid for parsimony. Pasimony and lack of arbitr
On 19 Aug 2009, at 02:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
>
> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> This is not the point. The point is that if you develop a correct
>> argumentation that you are material, and that what we "see" around us
>> is material, then the arithmetical P. Jone(s) will also find a
>> correct
>>
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