Re: Multisolipsism
On 07/02/11 21:28, Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Andrew, On 07 Feb 2011, at 19:22, Andrew Soltau wrote: Hi Bruno The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points: 1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that I published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this in the seventies). Many academics have criticize this, but their argument have been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it at the ASSC4. 2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first person indeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step four). 3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has been more developed in my thesis, long and short version are in my web page). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of place), but is developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the 1998 short version, recently published). 4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from virtual implementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye, and it is a comp version of the old dream argument in the greek chinese and indian antic literature). Step six. In particular indeterminacy and non locality does not depend on the real or virtual nature of the computation. All good so far. Step seven itself shows the reversal between physics and arithmetic (or any first order theory of any universal system in post Church Turing sense) in case the physical universe exists primitively and is sufficiently big. Because? Because if you universe is as big as running a UD, and containing UD*, if by luck you were here and now in a physical universe, at the next instant you are in the UD* with any reasonable measure of first person uncertainty. Even multiplied by 2^aleph_0. If, and only if, you *assume* existence without needing a physical universe! But this is what you are trying to demonstrate. In what sense does step seven demonstrate the reversal between physics and arithmetic a priori, as opposed to a working assumption? So UDA1-7 is the one of the main result of the thesis. A theory which want to explain and unify quanta and qualia, and respect comp, has to derive quanta and qualia without postulating them. Yes So you agree we cannot postulate the quanta? We cannot postulate the physical ? That's the point. NO. I agree that "A theory which want to explain and unify quanta and qualia, and respect comp, has to derive quanta and qualia without postulating them.", which is, of course, the tricky bit! -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Are our brains in that VAT? Yep.
On Tue, Feb 8, 2011 at 3:40 AM, John Mikes wrote: > Stathis, > > my imagination does not run that high. If I imagine myself as an alien > scientist, I would be self centered (pretentious?) enough to imagine that I > know more about those stupid humans and don't have to experiment on computer > - THEN on the real stuff, to LEARN how they are. I would know. > I don't 'imagine' myself such a stupid alien scientist (ha ha). > The fact that such an 'alien scientist' (a-sc) LEARNED about humans - and we > just imagine such (a-sc) - is proof enough that THEY are above us in mental > capabilities. So it sounds weird to me to 'imagine' a smarter mind for > ourselves how it would appraise us. The alien scientist example was to eliminate any preconceptions about mind. The scientist is technically competent and is merely attempting to model the behaviour of the brain - the trajectories of the atoms within it. I assume you think that such an attempt would fail, that although some processes in the brain such as chemistry and the behaviour of electric fields can be modelled, there are other processes that can't be modelled. What processes are these, and what evidence do you have that they exist? > ANother question: do you find it reasonable that such (a-sc) will condone > all those figments of our human existence which we live with (e.g. food, > human logical questions/answers, etc.)? even our material-figmented physical > world? They may or they may not. I am assuming for the sake of this example that they do not consider such questions at all, but only the mechanics of human behaviour. Like us trying to understand the behaviour of a cyclone, which is separate from the question of whether the cyclone has good or bad effects or indeed whether the cyclone has some sort of mind. > We, humans, are a peculiar kind, in our so far evolved mini-solipsism of the > world we are even less informed that possible, closed in into our 'mindset' > of yesterday (I think we agreed on that on this list) and our imagination > can work also only WITHIN. (With few very slowly achievable > extensions/expansions that will be added to 'yesterday's' inventory.) > > Even if we pretend to free-up and step beyond - as in 'fantastic' sci-fi. > > John M -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On Feb 7, 6:29 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > Peter, > > Everything is fine. You should understand the reasoning by using only > the formal definition of "arithmetical realism", You reasoning *cannot* be both valid and ontologically neutral because it has ontological conclusions. .which is that a > machine is arithmetical realist if she believes in the axiom of > elementary arithmetic *with* (the realist part) the principle of the > third excluded middle (allowing non constructive reasoning, as usual). What machine? Show me one! > And with AUDA you get a conversation with a machine, and a quasi > correct explanation why she is not a machine? How could a formalist > not love that > > Gödel is not just the discovery of the provability limitations of > formalisms and machines, Godel has no impact on "game playing" formalism. > it is also the discovery by the formalisms > and by the machines of their own limitations. And of the rich geometry > and topology of those limitations. > > Bruno > > On 07 Feb 2011, at 17:06, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > > > > On 06 Feb 2011, at 22:20, 1Z wrote: > > On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical > > Realism). > > Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth). > > >>> Actually, comp needs only, for the ontology, the quite tiny complete > >>> Sigma_1 truth. > > >> As I have stated many times, it doesn;t matter in the least > >> how many or few immaterial objects you attribute existence to. > >> It's like saying pixies exist, but only a few > > > What? > > It is always better to make a theory precise. > > >>> Please don't put metaphysics where there is only > >>> religion > > >> Believing in what is not proven is religion. I can > >> argue for anti realism. > > > I argue in favor of nothing. That's philosophy. You force me to be > > explicit on this; I do science. I am a logician, and I show that > > rational agent believing in comp believe that ... etc. I don't know > > about the truth. > > >>> (saying yes to the admittedly betting doctor). > > >> Saying yes to the doctor will not guarantee your > >> immaterial existence if there is no immaterial existence. > > > But there is immaterial existence. I recall you that I say in the > > ontological context that something exist if Ex (bla-bla-bla x) is > > true in the standard model of arithmetic. I use the standard meaning > > of existence of numbers, etc. > > >> AR/Platonism is a separate assumption to yes Dr. > > > I have drop out AR. You need AR (in which everyone believes except > > the ultrafinitists and the bad faith philosophers) to understand the > > term "digital" used by the doctor. > > >> >>> it is math, indeed, even (full, above Sigma_1 arithmetic. > >>> Arithmetical realism is what you need to apply the excluded middle > >>> in > >>> computer science and in arithmetic. > > >> The excluded middle is a much of a formal rule as > >> anthing else. Formalists can apply it, so it is compatible > >> with anti realism. > > > The theory admits a formal study. You don't act like a formalist at > > all. The term "Formalism" makes not an atom of sense without > > arithmetical realism. In philosophy arithmetical realism is the > > weaker of all possible realism, except again for the ultrafinitists. > > > If you are formalist and anti realist on the numbers you are in > > contradiction, or, once and for all, just replace numbers by the > > following formal expression 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. + the axioms I > > just sent to Andrew, etc. > > > AUDA provides more than a formalism, it provides an arithmetisation, > > which is a *weakening* of formalism, made possible by AR. Gödel > > already exploited this. > > >>> To understand the fundamental > >>> consequences of Church thesis you need to accept that some program > >>> computes function despite we have no means to know if it is total or > >>> partial, or that a program will stop or not. > > >> And I can accept that by positing LEM as a formal rule. I don;t > >> have to posit an immaterial Plato's heaven > > > I make clear that the immaterial Plato Heaven for the machine is > > just the truth of arithmletical proposition. It is an non > > arithmetical notion, union of the entire Kleene-Mostowki > > arithmetical hierarchy, and well know non controversal mathematical > > object in the field of logic. > > I use the "immaterial Plato heaven" terminology, either as poetical > > shortcut, or as a point in the arithmetical representation of some > > term in Plotinus theory. > > I explained this already to you, but you keep adding metaphysical > > stuff which don't exist. > > >>> Only ultrafinitist denies AR. > > >> Wrong. Anti realists deny it. I have pointed this out many > >> times. You think the only debate is about the minimal > >> set of mathematical objects, and that is not the only debate. Anti > >> realists > >> can accept a maximal
Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On Feb 7, 4:06 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 06 Feb 2011, at 22:20, 1Z wrote: > > > > >>> On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical > Realism). > > >>> Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth). > > >> Actually, comp needs only, for the ontology, the quite tiny complete > >> Sigma_1 truth. > > > As I have stated many times, it doesn;t matter in the least > > how many or few immaterial objects you attribute existence to. > > It's like saying pixies exist, but only a few > > What? > It is always better to make a theory precise. The theory that some precise number of pixies exist is just as wrong as the theory that some indeterminate number exists. Mathematical anti realists hold that *no* mathematical objects exist. And they still accept CT and all the rest. > >> Please don't put metaphysics where there is only > >> religion > > > Believing in what is not proven is religion. I can > > argue for anti realism. > > I argue in favor of nothing. You argue that some subset of mathematics has immaterial existence. >That's philosophy. You force me to be > explicit on this; I do science. I am a logician, and I show that > rational agent believing in comp believe that ... etc. I don't know > about the truth. > > > > >> (saying yes to the admittedly betting doctor). > > > Saying yes to the doctor will not guarantee your > > immaterial existence if there is no immaterial existence. > > But there is immaterial existence. To be fair, that's an unargued claim, not an argument. > I recall you that I say in the > ontological context that something exist if Ex (bla-bla-bla x) is true > in the standard model of arithmetic. Utterly wrong. In the *mathematical* context something exists if there is a true backwards-E statement asserting it, but the whole point of anti realism is that that is merely game playing and does NOT imply RITSIAR ontological existence. >I use the standard meaning of > existence of numbers, etc. As I have told you many times, there is no standard meaning. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics > > AR/Platonism is a separate assumption to yes Dr. > > I have drop out AR. You need AR (in which everyone believes except the > ultrafinitists and the bad faith philosophers) to understand the term > "digital" used by the doctor. No you don't. Mathematical anti realists can understand "digital computer" > > > > >> it is math, indeed, even (full, above Sigma_1 arithmetic. > >> Arithmetical realism is what you need to apply the excluded middle in > >> computer science and in arithmetic. > > > The excluded middle is a much of a formal rule as > > anthing else. Formalists can apply it, so it is compatible > > with anti realism. > > The theory admits a formal study. You don't act like a formalist at > all. The term "Formalism" makes not an atom of sense without > arithmetical realism. Formalism is a major variety kind of anti realism. > In philosophy arithmetical realism is the weaker > of all possible realism, except again for the ultrafinitists. The weakest kind is NONE WHATSOEVERno pixies. Zip. Nada. > If you are formalist and anti realist on the numbers you are in > contradiction, What contradiction? > or, once and for all, just replace numbers by the > following formal expression 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. + the axioms I just > sent to Andrew, etc. Yep. Formalism says you have rules, and you manipulate them and certain things seem to move around a change, and we call those sets and numbersand they don't really exist. When you switch off your PC there is no more Supermario, and when you stop doing maths there are no more numbers. > AUDA provides more than a formalism, I don;t mean "a formalism"=" a mechanisable system for applying rules" I mean "formalism"="the claim that mathematics is a game played according to various sets of rules and is not 'about' any real entity". I have pointed out the distinction to you many times >it provides an arithmetisation, > which is a *weakening* of formalism, made possible by AR. Gödel > already exploited this. > > > > >> To understand the fundamental > >> consequences of Church thesis you need to accept that some program > >> computes function despite we have no means to know if it is total or > >> partial, or that a program will stop or not. > > > And I can accept that by positing LEM as a formal rule. I don;t > > have to posit an immaterial Plato's heaven > > I make clear that the immaterial Plato Heaven for the machine is just > the truth of arithmletical proposition. Truth is not existence. >It is an non arithmetical > notion, union of the entire Kleene-Mostowki arithmetical hierarchy, > and well know non controversal mathematical object in the field of > logic. Sighh.to anti-realists, all immaterial existence is controversial > I use the "immaterial Plato heaven" terminology, either as poetical > shortcut, We
Re: Multisolipsism
Hi Andrew, On 07 Feb 2011, at 19:22, Andrew Soltau wrote: Hi Bruno The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points: 1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that I published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this in the seventies). Many academics have criticize this, but their argument have been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it at the ASSC4. 2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first person indeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step four). 3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has been more developed in my thesis, long and short version are in my web page). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of place), but is developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the 1998 short version, recently published). 4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from virtual implementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye, and it is a comp version of the old dream argument in the greek chinese and indian antic literature). Step six. In particular indeterminacy and non locality does not depend on the real or virtual nature of the computation. All good so far. Step seven itself shows the reversal between physics and arithmetic (or any first order theory of any universal system in post Church Turing sense) in case the physical universe exists primitively and is sufficiently big. Because? Because if you universe is as big as running a UD, and containing UD*, if by luck you were here and now in a physical universe, at the next instant you are in the UD* with any reasonable measure of first person uncertainty. Even multiplied by 2^aleph_0. You might think you can conceive a physical universe capable of beating the UD in its redundancy, but even then, you will have to attach your mind to some of its non turing emulable part for preventing to be swallowed by the UD and its random oracle, and this reduce physics (in case you are turing emulable), in the computer science theoretical UD* white rabbit hunting. It might be that some particular universal dovetailing win in the limit, like I think quantum computation does, but that remains to be explained from inside, without postulating this at the start. And besides, step 8 prevent the use of primitive matter for singularizing consciousness. In the paper and book preceding sane04, I present the step 8, before the UD, it helps against physical dovetailer competition. So UDA1-7 is the one of the main result of the thesis. A theory which want to explain and unify quanta and qualia, and respect comp, has to derive quanta and qualia without postulating them. Yes So you agree we cannot postulate the quanta? We cannot postulate the physical ? That's the point. You have also that comp + ~solipsisme entails first person plural MW. Normally comp should imply ~solipsisme, but as I explain this part is not yet solved in the concrete. ? Now most people (among interested) understand UDA1-7, that is, that comp + *very big* universe entails the reversal. If you have no problem with the first person indeterminacy, with the invariance for reconstitution delays, with the inability of first persons to distinguish (in short time) real and virtual, I don't see what you miss in the step seven. 7 is a direct consequence of 4,5,6. Because? Because if you agree that P = 1/2 for the WM duplication. If you agree that an iteration of self-duplication is a Bernouilli experience leading to a normal distribution, you see that in front of the UD you are in front of an iterated self-duplication. Come one, if the physical universe mulitplies more the normal words than the UD, then you have to take into accoun that it will mulitply more its own UD. That is wahy you can say that the proba is 1/2 (say) for a WM duplication, because we duplicate relatively to the normal worlds. You if you say yes to the doctor nin our normal worlds, you already know that you are already driven by the normal UD worlds, so that even the laws of your superuniverse have to be deduced by the UD structure, that is arithmetic as seen from inside. These simply show that the structure of information / algorithm / computation defining the mind of the observer is simultaneously present in a very large number of different physical instantiations. "physical" has no usable meaning here. Eventually you have to define it as a (hopefully plural) first person view. I say that this means that the effective physical environment of this observer is the simultaneity of all of those physical environments. This is the concept I call 'universe superposition'. Quantum vacuum will do, but why the quantum? What is an observer? What do you mean by 'simultaneity'? The result applies equally to a
Re: CTM and ALG
Many thanks you for your points 1) to 4) below. Now I am finding it much easier to see what you are saying. By 'first person indeterminacy' in 1 below, I am reading this as the indeterminacy regarding the actual location and thus physical context / instantiation of this observer. I would include this as an automatic concomitant of the mind being a computation ( dynamic structure of information) i.e. ALG. By 2 below I understand you to be saying that just as the observer can be, and in fact in some circumstances must be, existent simultaneously at two different locations in space at the same time, the observer is similarly existent simultaneously at two different locations in time 'at the same time'. I would also include this as an automatic concomitant with ALG. Point 3 seems to be a direct implication of point 2, the mind is non-local. The observer as mind (as structure of information / algorithm) exists ubiquitously in all physical environments If above you accept arithmetical, you make treachery to invoke the physical here. All right, call it all quantum mechanical environments, meaning simply the mathematical form of quantum mechanics, instantiated as physical or arithmetical environments. It is a bit like some one defend the theory of evolution up to the apes, and then say and God appears an creates man. Nice one! LOL! [ this evolution rubbish isn't getting anywhere. Let's have some real people to watch / talk to / wind up / be god to ...] Once you accept that at some level you are Turing emulable, you somehow disperse yourself in infinities of variants, and the physical is some sum on all those variants. Yes, no problem here. Exactly what I hold as 'universe superposition'. So a physical body is, despite the appearance, a bad locus for instantiating a mind. Why 'bad'? The physical body is one of many possible instantiations, *no more no less* in my view. The mind, even individual is more associated to a continuum of possible bodies/projection. I would not say 'more'. It is not only associate with a continuum of possible bodies/projection, it is instantiated, given aritmetic and algorithmic form, in continuum of possible bodies/projection. All exist. All are aspects of the arithmetic totality. It is instantiated, simultaneously, in all environments, simulated or physical (simulated physical if you like), in which this mind is formulated. The effective environment of this mind is the simultanetiy of all such possible bodies/projection. This does not mean that the whole thing is not instantiated in the physical. It is true that it need not be instantiated in a physical reality, but, in my opinion, we still have not made any particular progress towards that point! In fine it depends on the math, the comp physical logic still lacks (a bit laike quantum logic) a good tensor product. My strategy is top down, I work from hypothesis toward constrains. That is all very well and good, but we know the physical explanation works. Quantum mechanics *does* explain the observed results of experiments. If we are going to supersede it, we need a powerful logic which not only does the same thing, fully and completely, without requiring an underlying physical reality. I stay tuned. where it is instantiated. Again, I would include this as an automatic concomitant with ALG. You still miss the point that if ALG is correct then the physical has to be derived and cannot be used to singularize a conscious experience. These are two very different points, and, by your statement here, it is clear that you conflate them. But I have as yet no rationale or evidence for this conflation. If ALG is correct, this simply means that the mind is an instantiated algorithm. This directly implies that the physical "cannot be used to singularize a conscious experience.". But this *does not* mean that the physical has to be derived. It means that the *effective physical environment of this observer* has to be derived from the algorithm. It says nothing about anything else. Aha. Now I see it. Now I see why you keep claiming that steps 1-7 show inversion of physical and arithmetic. The logic you use in steps 1-7 are very much the same as I use in establishing universe superposition, I think that they are the same thing, or very similar. (What a surprise, addressing the same specific aspect of reality we come to the same conclusion!) Given that the mind is defined by a structure and or a process of information, it is necessarily instantiated in a very large number of physical situations. Point 4 as you say is well known, and it obviously goes with ALG in my view. The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points: 1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that I published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this in the seventies). Many academics have critic
list leave
Thank you all for fine conversations, readings and ideas over the years. I must take my leave; please remove my eaddrs from list delivery. Thank you. James Rose 2/7/2011 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
The propositions of comp?
On 07/02/11 19:42, Bruno Marchal wrote: Many would agree that mind might be related to the execution of an algorithm on some physical machine, as I like to explore that idea, but this is at the starting point of the reasoning, and is not, then, related to the fact that physical machines appears as relatively stable products of some unknown number of algorithm too, and that this is already not just described in arithmetic, but emulated in arithmetical truth. This is the starting point I am trying to agree between the two of us. PROPOSITION 1 The mind is related to the execution of an algorithm -- for instance, on some physical machine. Then, we propose, we go beyond the concept of the physical machine, and simply suppose that: PROPOSITION 2 The mind is the execution of an algorithm, an algorithm which simply exists, without the requirement for any physical instantiation, or any physical universe / multiverse in actuality. In other words, the algorithm simply exists, and simply runs, and the subjective experience of this algorithm: Looks exactly like Feels exactly like Sounds exactly like Smells and tastes exactly like a real physical, relativistic, quantum mechanical reality. The first proposition, that the mind is / is related to the execution of an algorithm, I have no problem with whatsoever. This is what I see emphasised in your steps 1-7, with examples of displacement of the observer in space, and then time, and then replacement, and then duplication in space and time. This all makes perfect sense. I think of this as tautological. Equally, there is no problem, of course, that in the context of the execution of the algorithm, "physical machines appears as relatively stable products of some unknown number of algorithm too". But The *obvious* implication is that the physical machines *are* relatively stable products of some unknown number of algorithm, specifically, the algorithm instantiated in the physical quantum mechanical universe. And that "physical machines appears as relatively stable products of some unknown number of algorithm too", in the virtual reality each observer generates between the ears, as Deutsch describes. Now Going on from that starting point We are philosophically interested in showing that this execution of the algorithm may be taking place in such a way as to give the appearance of the physical quantum mechanical universe, without there having to be an actual physical quantum mechanical universe. I am delighted to entertain this possibility. However, I have not to date understood the basis on which you are claiming you have found support for it. I'm sure I'll get there! It is hard for me to believe in any of this, but I just follow a theory toward its logical consequences. I know exactly what you mean about this. For years, after I had I deduced the extraordinary implications of Everett's formulation, I acknowledged that very peculiar properties of the transtemporal experiential reality were implied, but I could not really take them as real and actual, let alone make them part of my personal epistemology. (Eventually, however, quite recently, these implications began to become real for me. This, I can report, is a wildly exciting, terrifying, and totally all consuming transition!) I have titled the reply to your email as The propositions of comp? In this thread I would like to be crystal clear simply about what the propositions are, then I know exactly what we are discussing in subsequent / parallel threads. Andrew -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: CTM and ALG
On 07 Feb 2011, at 19:19, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Feb 2011, at 23:15, Andrew Soltau wrote: Hi Bruno I will attempt to define the terms in a manner satisfactory to both of us, and maybe we will understand each other this way. CTM Computational Theory of Mind is the concept that "the mind literally is a digital computer ... and that thought literally is a kind of computation." from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ I understand your steps one to seven to be making this point. I have no difficulty with this point. Which point? This point. that "the mind literally is a digital computer ... and that thought literally is a kind of computation." This point being what I understand your steps one to seven to be making. ? No it is the contrary. If I survive at some level, both mind and matter (and some weird non nameable divine (non machine) entityies), are not computable. The first person from the first person point of view is not a machine. I am not sure you get the indeterminacy point in front of the UD. However, I am very happy to settle for "Mind is an algorithm and / or a structure of information of some kind. An arithmetical process.". So instead of CTM, I will use ALG I understand your steps one to seven to be making this point, ALG, the mind is an algorithm and / or a stucture of information. An arithmetical process. Many thanks you for your points 1) to 4) below. Now I am finding it much easier to see what you are saying. By 'first person indeterminacy' in 1 below, I am reading this as the indeterminacy regarding the actual location and thus physical context / instantiation of this observer. I would include this as an automatic concomitant of the mind being a computation ( dynamic structure of information) i.e. ALG. By 2 below I understand you to be saying that just as the observer can be, and in fact in some circumstances must be, existent simultaneously at two different locations in space at the same time, the observer is similarly existent simultaneously at two different locations in time 'at the same time'. I would also include this as an automatic concomitant with ALG. Point 3 seems to be a direct implication of point 2, the mind is non- local. The observer as mind (as structure of information / algorithm) exists ubiquitously in all physical environments If above you accept arithmetical, you make treachery to invoke the physical here. It is a bit like some one defend the theory of evolution up to the apes, and then say and God appears an creates man. Once you accept that at some level you are Turing emulable, you somehow disperse yourself in infinities of variants, and the physical is some sum on all those variants. So a physical body is, despite the appearance, a bad locus for instantiating a mind. The mind, even individual is more associated to a continuum of possible bodies/ projection. In fine it depends on the math, the comp physical logic still lacks (a bit laike quantum logic) a good tensor product. My strategy is top down, I work from hypothesis toward constrains. where it is instantiated. Again, I would include this as an automatic concomitant with ALG. You still miss the point that if ALG is correct then the physical has to be derived and cannot be used to singularize a conscious experience. Point 4 as you say is well known, and it obviously goes with ALG in my view. The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points: 1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that I published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this in the seventies). Many academics have criticize this, but their argument have been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it at the ASSC4. 2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first person indeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step four). 3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has been more developed in my thesis, long and short version are in my web page). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of place), but is developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the 1998 short version, recently published). 4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from virtual implementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye, and it is a comp version of the old dream argument in the greek chinese and indian antic literature). Step six. In particular indeterminacy and non locality does not depend on the real or virtual nature of the computation. All good so far. Nice. Not yet sure you really get the point. You still seems to travel from radically new to thats what I say. But if you are OK that any first order specification of any universal system is enough for the ontology, and that we cannot use
The relative point of view
How do you define the relative point of view? Do you know Gödel's provability predicate? The points of view are defined by intensional variants of the current provability predicate of the machine with or without some oracle. There are 8 basic points of view p (truth), Bp (provability/believability), Bp & p (knowability), Bp & Dp (observability), Bp & Dp & p (sensibility/feelability). Three of them inherits the G/G* splitting, making a total of 8. It is really 4 + 4*infinity, because the 'material points of view' (with Dp) admits themselves graded variants. I know *about* Gödel's provability predicate! (Is the 'intensional' referred to here the 'attach' you used in another email?) I am still no clearer about how you define the machine, "with or without some oracle", and what defines the relative point of view. Given that you are defining 8 basic points of view in the abstract, applied to " intensional variants of the current provability predicate of the machine with or without some oracle", it sounds a bit, well, abstract. Could you be a bit more specific? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Observers and Church/Turing
Hi Andrew, On 07 Feb 2011, at 19:13, Andrew Soltau wrote: Hi Bruno So you can see that comp, as defined in sane04, is a weaker version of CTM. (And thus all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM). Certainly it is clear that your yes doctor hypothesis subsumes CTM. Not after step seven. The UD, or UD*, makes the reasoning independent of the level. The "yes doctor" *image* is an help for the first six steps (indeterminacy, non locality, delays invariance). I let open the question of identity between the biological brain and the generalized brain. But since it is a broader proposition, I fail to see why "all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM". Because if you can deduce a proposition independently of the choice of a level, all what is proved will get on for all theories narrowing the level. One could adopt CTM and yet still debate comp - I doubt so, frankly. though I have no interest in doing so. Above all, why should CTM inherit the second of your three comp sub-hypotheses: Church Thesis and Arithmetical Realism? Ah! OK. If you want Church thesis out, I am OK. If this is the difference with CTM? Church thesis is really the key and the pointer on theoretical computer science (and diagonalizations) for the fundamental thing. And you can drop out Arithmetical Realism, and replace it by the assumption of believing in enough arithmetical relations to provide a sense to Church thesis. By which I mean the original classical logical thesis by Church, and proposed with different form but provably equivalent meaning, by Post, Markov, Kleene (actually the one who creates the "Church thesis". For Church it was a definition). But then that is why I define what I mean by comp: it is Church thesis and the "yes doctor", but where "yes doctor" is a memo for "It exist a level such that my consciousness is invariant for digital functional substitutions. At step seven, the level don't depend on the high level, CTM like, chosen for the ease of the first six steps. Expression like "mind is a digital computer" are category error, and is also ambiguous. I am happy to settle with something much more abstract, such as "mind is an algorithm of some kind" if that helps. But you mind still be guilty of a forbidden identity ! A guilty of fuzziness which might prevent you to understand the nuance in the movie graph reasoning, or in Olympia. Many would agree that mind might be related to the execution of an algorithm on some physical machine, as I like to explore that idea, but this is at the starting point of the reasoning, and is not, then, related to the fact that physical machines appears as relatively stable products of some unknown number of algorithm too, and that this is already not just described in arithmetic, but emulated in arithmetical truth. It is hard for me to believe in any of this, but I just follow a theory toward its logical consequences. It relates also on the identity thesis in the philosophy of mind, which is actually incompatible with comp (and thus with CTM). I wonder what you consider to be the "identity thesis in the philosophy of mind" It is long to describe, especially that its foprmulatiosn might depend on the choice of basic ontology. But simply said, the identity mind id the mind-brain identity. It goes from the trivial (and in my opinion incorrect) literal identification, that the mind is the brain, or is the brain activity, to some epiphenomenal one-one association. With DM, I argue that if you can reasonably ascribe a mind to a machine, the machine's mind itself cannot ascribe its mind to its body and is indeed something else. The first person views depend on non formal truth, which change the logic of the "& p" arithmetical nuances. I think that it is also incompatible with QM, but that is out of topic. No. Chalmers state categorically this concept is compatible with physics. I read that defense of dualism in the context of Everett, which I see as a progress in monism. Also "X state categoricallly" is never convincing. Now the mind-body problem is not solved, neither in DM, nor in QM. Nor is the problem of what is matter, in both DM, and QM, especially QM + gravitation. So I doubt any X can be categorical on this, and serious at the same time. Chalmers stopped at step 3, if you have the slides. He did not accept the first step indeterminacy and leaves the place. But you seem more ... courageous? Taking comp seriously is like taking the quantum seriously, it leads to shocking possibilities. With comp you can associate a mind to the execution of a computer, but you cannot attach a computer to a mind. I am not sure of the point you are making here. What do you mean by 'attach'? Imagine a robot working in some fields, and imagine it equipped with a complex computer, so that it makes a lot of decision including many cons
A collapse aside
An aside, concerning what actually requires simulation / arithmetic
explanation.
The algorithm of the collapse dynamics itself operates in a domain meta
to the physical, and in this regard there is a reversal of causality
with respect to the physical and the arithmetic. But I don't think this
is what Bruno'spaper The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations is
driving at. The process of the collapse dynamics is deeply interwoven
with the physical time evolution of quantum systems in the linear
dynamics, and even if we agree that the collapse dynamics is primarily
arithmetical, and even prior to the physical, this does not say anything
about the nature of the linear dynamics.
As Everett explains, the functional identity of the observer is the
record of observations. It is this definition which resolves the
fundamental difficulties in the interpretation of quantum theory. It is
only this identity to which there is the appearance of collapse. The
collapse dynamics is the change to the linear dynamics, and is therefore
of different logical type. It is to the linear dynamics as acceleration
is to velocity.
As Everett explains, the algorithm of the linear dynamics runs as time
passes, and the perceptual point of view / frame of reference passes
along the linear time dimension of space-time. That is the algorithm of
the body-mind that produces the contents of the sensorium. At the point
in time along the linear time dimension of space-time, at which the new
observation is formulated in the sensorium, and thus added to the record
of observations, the functional identity of the observer, the functional
identity of the observer changes. This new version of the observer
exists in a different version of the four dimensional space-time
universe, defined by a different quantum state.
I would point out that these two different algorithms are being
implemented at different levels of logical type, and this too has to be
inherent simulation. Time passes as the simulation exercises a specific
linear dynamics, a specific time evolution of the position and state of
matter and energy in the virtual environment observed by the observer. A
new observation is formulated as part of this process. But upon the
making of each observation, the algorithm itself changes. This is what
experiments show, so this has to be formulated in arithmetic. Thus the
arithmetic requires two different levels of logical type, just as a
physical reality must if it is to account for the observed phenomena.
All this is what has to be simulated in a simulation, all of which is
perfectly feasible. I have written the dual algorithmic form of the
computation in C Language which I append here in case anyone is interested.
But just because it can all be simulated, this does not in my view imply
'the reversal between physics and arithmetic'.
But I am entirely open about this.
Andrew
Appendix
Here the logical form of the standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation of
quantum mechanics operational for the functional identity of the
observer as defined by Everett is presented as pseudocode in C language.
If variables ?, observation, and observables[], and function
get_sensorium_contents() were instantiated in suitably coherent memory
of a quantum computer, such a program would produce the subjective
realities of all possible functional identities of an observer, in the
form of Everett's branching tree of memory configurations.
So the running of this algorithm, and ? the unitary quantum state,is all
we have to explain in order to explain our experience of physical
reality. As Russell points out in Theory of Nothing page 5 " There is a
mathematical equivalence between the Everything, as represented by this
collection of all possible descriptions and Nothing, a state of no
information.". Since Nothing is equivalent to Everything, ?, which
explains the existence of the algorithm, there is nothing to explain
except the running of the algorithm!
void transtemporal_reality () {
/* Initialisation */
Boolean new_observation = true;
Observation observation = LIGHT;
Functional_Identity observer = 1;
World world_hologram = NO_OBSERVATIONS;
Correlations_Record observables[];
Quantum_State ?;
Elapsed_Time t = 0;
int c = 0;
while (observer != 0) {
/* Process 1 -- Quantum time -- The exercise of the collapse dynamics -
Change of quantum mechanical frame of reference */
if ( new_observation ) {
world_hologram = world_hologram + observation;
display (world_hologram);
observer = observer + observation;
observables[c++] = observation;
? = quantum_state_defined_by (observables)
new_observation = false;
}
/* Process 2 -- Space-time time -- The exercise of the linear dynamics -
Change of inertial frame of reference */
else {
t = t + PLANCK_TIME
new_observation = compute_neural_state (?, t);
if ( new_observation)
observation = get_sensorium_contents();
break;
}
}
}
--
You received this me
Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
Peter, Everything is fine. You should understand the reasoning by using only the formal definition of "arithmetical realism", which is that a machine is arithmetical realist if she believes in the axiom of elementary arithmetic *with* (the realist part) the principle of the third excluded middle (allowing non constructive reasoning, as usual). And with AUDA you get a conversation with a machine, and a quasi correct explanation why she is not a machine? How could a formalist not love that Gödel is not just the discovery of the provability limitations of formalisms and machines, it is also the discovery by the formalisms and by the machines of their own limitations. And of the rich geometry and topology of those limitations. Bruno On 07 Feb 2011, at 17:06, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Feb 2011, at 22:20, 1Z wrote: On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical Realism). Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth). Actually, comp needs only, for the ontology, the quite tiny complete Sigma_1 truth. As I have stated many times, it doesn;t matter in the least how many or few immaterial objects you attribute existence to. It's like saying pixies exist, but only a few What? It is always better to make a theory precise. Please don't put metaphysics where there is only religion Believing in what is not proven is religion. I can argue for anti realism. I argue in favor of nothing. That's philosophy. You force me to be explicit on this; I do science. I am a logician, and I show that rational agent believing in comp believe that ... etc. I don't know about the truth. (saying yes to the admittedly betting doctor). Saying yes to the doctor will not guarantee your immaterial existence if there is no immaterial existence. But there is immaterial existence. I recall you that I say in the ontological context that something exist if Ex (bla-bla-bla x) is true in the standard model of arithmetic. I use the standard meaning of existence of numbers, etc. AR/Platonism is a separate assumption to yes Dr. I have drop out AR. You need AR (in which everyone believes except the ultrafinitists and the bad faith philosophers) to understand the term "digital" used by the doctor. it is math, indeed, even (full, above Sigma_1 arithmetic. Arithmetical realism is what you need to apply the excluded middle in computer science and in arithmetic. The excluded middle is a much of a formal rule as anthing else. Formalists can apply it, so it is compatible with anti realism. The theory admits a formal study. You don't act like a formalist at all. The term "Formalism" makes not an atom of sense without arithmetical realism. In philosophy arithmetical realism is the weaker of all possible realism, except again for the ultrafinitists. If you are formalist and anti realist on the numbers you are in contradiction, or, once and for all, just replace numbers by the following formal expression 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. + the axioms I just sent to Andrew, etc. AUDA provides more than a formalism, it provides an arithmetisation, which is a *weakening* of formalism, made possible by AR. Gödel already exploited this. To understand the fundamental consequences of Church thesis you need to accept that some program computes function despite we have no means to know if it is total or partial, or that a program will stop or not. And I can accept that by positing LEM as a formal rule. I don;t have to posit an immaterial Plato's heaven I make clear that the immaterial Plato Heaven for the machine is just the truth of arithmletical proposition. It is an non arithmetical notion, union of the entire Kleene-Mostowki arithmetical hierarchy, and well know non controversal mathematical object in the field of logic. I use the "immaterial Plato heaven" terminology, either as poetical shortcut, or as a point in the arithmetical representation of some term in Plotinus theory. I explained this already to you, but you keep adding metaphysical stuff which don't exist. Only ultrafinitist denies AR. Wrong. Anti realists deny it. I have pointed this out many times. You think the only debate is about the minimal set of mathematical objects, and that is not the only debate. Anti realists can accept a maximal set of objects, with the proviso that their existence is fictive and not real existence I am agnostic on all notion of existence. All, except my own consciousness here and now. I suggest a theory, and derive consequences in that theory. AR+, the idea that we don't need more than AR, in this setting, is a consequence of the math. From 'outside' the tiny effective universal sigma_1 complete set is enough. from inside, even mathematicalism is not enough (it is more 'theologicalism'). The ontological status of mathematical objects is a area of contention in me
Multisolipsism
Hi Bruno The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points: 1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that I published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this in the seventies). Many academics have criticize this, but their argument have been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it at the ASSC4. 2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first person indeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step four). 3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has been more developed in my thesis, long and short version are in my web page). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of place), but is developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the 1998 short version, recently published). 4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from virtual implementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye, and it is a comp version of the old dream argument in the greek chinese and indian antic literature). Step six. In particular indeterminacy and non locality does not depend on the real or virtual nature of the computation. All good so far. Step seven itself shows the reversal between physics and arithmetic (or any first order theory of any universal system in post Church Turing sense) in case the physical universe exists primitively and is sufficiently big. Because? So UDA1-7 is the one of the main result of the thesis. A theory which want to explain and unify quanta and qualia, and respect comp, has to derive quanta and qualia without postulating them. Yes You have also that comp + ~solipsisme entails first person plural MW. Normally comp should imply ~solipsisme, but as I explain this part is not yet solved in the concrete. ? Now most people (among interested) understand UDA1-7, that is, that comp + *very big* universe entails the reversal. If you have no problem with the first person indeterminacy, with the invariance for reconstitution delays, with the inability of first persons to distinguish (in short time) real and virtual, I don't see what you miss in the step seven. 7 is a direct consequence of 4,5,6. Because? These simply show that the structure of information / algorithm / computation defining the mind of the observer is simultaneously present in a very large number of different physical instantiations. I say that this means that the effective physical environment of this observer is the simultaneity of all of those physical environments. This is the concept I call 'universe superposition'. The result applies equally to a reality basically physical or arithmetic. The result is personal parallel physical realities for each and every observer, which I find very interesting and exciting. This is because, in each such reality, the effective physical environment (quantum mechanical, or arithmetically simulated quantum mechanical) is determinate only where observed. Thus each observer is in a very special position in their reality, in that all the other observers are effectively icons in this reality, of other parallel realities. So the difference between me and others in my reality suggests solipsism - only I am real and fully defined in my reality. At the same time, we are all in the same situation, which is why I call it multisolipsism. Naturally, all this applies irrespective of whether the basis of reality is physical or arithmetic. But I don't see why any of that implies 'the reversal between physics and arithmetic'. It does imply that the determinacy of the effective physical environment of the observer is defined by, and only by, the structure of information defining the observer, as held in many-minds theories. This is all part of the universe superposition concept. But we still require a physical reality for all this to be instantiated in. Now, you can postulate that this physical reality itself is simulated, or purely arithmetic. And I have no problem with that. But I do not see how this is shown to be the case. To do that, you would have to show that the appearance of all of this going on is the natural result of arithmetical processes in the absence of physical instantiation. This is what I am all agog to have explained to me! Andrew -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
CTM and ALG
On 07/02/11 15:22, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Feb 2011, at 23:15, Andrew Soltau wrote: Hi Bruno I will attempt to define the terms in a manner satisfactory to both of us, and maybe we will understand each other this way. CTM Computational Theory of Mind is the concept that "the mind literally is a digital computer ... and that thought literally is a kind of computation." from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ I understand your steps one to seven to be making this point. I have no difficulty with this point. Which point? This point. that "the mind literally is a digital computer ... and that thought literally is a kind of computation." This point being what I understand your steps one to seven to be making. However, I am very happy to settle for "Mind is an algorithm and / or a structure of information of some kind. An arithmetical process.". So instead of CTM, I will use ALG I understand your steps one to seven to be making this point, ALG, the mind is an algorithm and / or a stucture of information. An arithmetical process. Many thanks you for your points 1) to 4) below. Now I am finding it much easier to see what you are saying. By 'first person indeterminacy' in 1 below, I am reading this as the indeterminacy regarding the actual location and thus physical context / instantiation of this observer. I would include this as an automatic concomitant of the mind being a computation ( dynamic structure of information) i.e. ALG. By 2 below I understand you to be saying that just as the observer can be, and in fact in some circumstances must be, existent simultaneously at two different locations in space at the same time, the observer is similarly existent simultaneously at two different locations in time 'at the same time'. I would also include this as an automatic concomitant with ALG. Point 3 seems to be a direct implication of point 2, the mind is non-local. The observer as mind (as structure of information / algorithm) exists ubiquitously in all physical environments where it is instantiated. Again, I would include this as an automatic concomitant with ALG. Point 4 as you say is well known, and it obviously goes with ALG in my view. The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points: 1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that I published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this in the seventies). Many academics have criticize this, but their argument have been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it at the ASSC4. 2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first person indeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step four). 3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has been more developed in my thesis, long and short version are in my web page). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of place), but is developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the 1998 short version, recently published). 4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from virtual implementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye, and it is a comp version of the old dream argument in the greek chinese and indian antic literature). Step six. In particular indeterminacy and non locality does not depend on the real or virtual nature of the computation. All good so far. Continued in Multisolipsism -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Observers and Church/Turing
Hi Bruno So you can see that comp, as defined in sane04, is a weaker version of CTM. (And thus all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM). Certainly it is clear that your /yes doctor/ hypothesis subsumes CTM. But since it is a broader proposition, I fail to see why "all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM". One could adopt CTM and yet still debate comp - though I have no interest in doing so. Above all, why should CTM inherit the second of your three comp sub-hypotheses: Church Thesis and Arithmetical Realism? Expression like "mind is a digital computer" are category error, and is also ambiguous. I am happy to settle with something much more abstract, such as "mind is an algorithm of some kind" if that helps. It relates also on the identity thesis in the philosophy of mind, which is actually incompatible with comp (and thus with CTM). I wonder what you consider to be the "identity thesis in the philosophy of mind" I think that it is also incompatible with QM, but that is out of topic. No. Chalmers state categorically this concept is compatible with physics. With comp you can associate a mind to the execution of a computer, but you cannot attach a computer to a mind. I am not sure of the point you are making here. What do you mean by 'attach'? You might attach an infinity of computer executions to a mind. The relation is not one-one. Assuming 'attach' means instantiated, yes, the mind is multiply instantiated. No problem there. This is the basis of my concept multisolipsism - described shortly. That is among other things a consequence of UDA. Now I'm really not sure what you mean by 'attach'. Associate with? Consider instantiated in? Consider supervenient on? Causally dependent on? To say that thought literally is a kind of computation is ambiguous. That might be enough in some context, but the more precise comp is needed to understand the comp (and thus CTM) necessary reduction of body to mind, or of physics to arithmetic (or computer science). And rather than saying that "thought literally is a kind of computation", comp says that ...? Indicating the "necessary reduction of body to mind, or of physics to arithmetic (or computer science)" because ...? I am separating my responses to various parts of your email so I can stay focused on one issue at a time as we exchange our views. My compartmentalised response is continued in email subject: CTM and ALG Andrew -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Are our brains in that VAT? Yep.
Stathis, my imagination does not run that high. If I imagine myself as an alien scientist, I would be self centered (pretentious?) enough to imagine that I know more about those stupid humans and don't have to experiment on computer - THEN on the real stuff, to LEARN how they are. I would know. I don't 'imagine' myself such a stupid alien scientist (ha ha). The fact that such an 'alien scientist' (a-sc) LEARNED about humans - and we just imagine such (a-sc) - is proof enough that THEY are above us in mental capabilities. So it sounds weird to me to 'imagine' a smarter mind for ourselves how it would appraise us. ANother question: do you find it reasonable that such (a-sc) will condone all those figments of our human existence which we live with (e.g. food, human logical questions/answers, etc.)? even our material-figmented physical world? We, humans, are a peculiar kind, in our so far evolved mini-solipsism of the world we are even less informed that possible, closed in into our 'mindset' of yesterday (I think we agreed on that on this list) and our imagination can work also only WITHIN. (With few very slowly achievable extensions/expansions that will be added to 'yesterday's' inventory.) Even if we pretend to free-up and step beyond - as in 'fantastic' sci-fi. John M On Sun, Feb 6, 2011 at 5:51 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Mon, Feb 7, 2011 at 8:53 AM, John Mikes wrote: > > Stathis, > > "upload the human brain?" > > > > I suppose (and hope) you are talking about the wider meaning of "brain", > not > > the physiological tissue (fless) figment the 2002 medical science tackles > > with in our crania. THAT extended brain which is ready to monitor > (report?) > > unexpect(able)ed mental functions, as I wrote: e.g. the difference in > > meaning between "I missed you yesterday" vs. "I hate broccoli". > > Not just mAmp-s and tissue-encephalograms. > > We know so little about our (extendable?) mental functions, every second > may > > bring novelty into it, so where would you draw the line for the 'upload'? > at > > yesterday's inventory? > > Imagine that you are an alien scientist who encounters humans for the > first time and you don't realise that they have minds. You do, > however, notice that the humans behave in complex ways, and that their > behaviour seems to be controlled by electrical impulses originating in > the brain. So you set yourself the task of making a computer model of > the matter in the brain, using your advanced scanning techniques to > determine its precise composition, and your advanced knowledge of > computational chemistry. That model programmed into a computer is > called a brain upload. You can run it and predict what the human would > do in various situations: if you poked him with a sharp stick, if you > asked him a certain question, if you withheld food from him for a > certain period. You would run the model and do the experiment in the > real human to see if they match up. If they don't, then there is a > problem with your model, and you have to examine the brain more > closely or do more research into computational chemistry to rectify > it. > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On 06 Feb 2011, at 22:20, 1Z wrote: On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical Realism). Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth). Actually, comp needs only, for the ontology, the quite tiny complete Sigma_1 truth. As I have stated many times, it doesn;t matter in the least how many or few immaterial objects you attribute existence to. It's like saying pixies exist, but only a few What? It is always better to make a theory precise. Please don't put metaphysics where there is only religion Believing in what is not proven is religion. I can argue for anti realism. I argue in favor of nothing. That's philosophy. You force me to be explicit on this; I do science. I am a logician, and I show that rational agent believing in comp believe that ... etc. I don't know about the truth. (saying yes to the admittedly betting doctor). Saying yes to the doctor will not guarantee your immaterial existence if there is no immaterial existence. But there is immaterial existence. I recall you that I say in the ontological context that something exist if Ex (bla-bla-bla x) is true in the standard model of arithmetic. I use the standard meaning of existence of numbers, etc. AR/Platonism is a separate assumption to yes Dr. I have drop out AR. You need AR (in which everyone believes except the ultrafinitists and the bad faith philosophers) to understand the term "digital" used by the doctor. it is math, indeed, even (full, above Sigma_1 arithmetic. Arithmetical realism is what you need to apply the excluded middle in computer science and in arithmetic. The excluded middle is a much of a formal rule as anthing else. Formalists can apply it, so it is compatible with anti realism. The theory admits a formal study. You don't act like a formalist at all. The term "Formalism" makes not an atom of sense without arithmetical realism. In philosophy arithmetical realism is the weaker of all possible realism, except again for the ultrafinitists. If you are formalist and anti realist on the numbers you are in contradiction, or, once and for all, just replace numbers by the following formal expression 0, s(0), s(s(0)), etc. + the axioms I just sent to Andrew, etc. AUDA provides more than a formalism, it provides an arithmetisation, which is a *weakening* of formalism, made possible by AR. Gödel already exploited this. To understand the fundamental consequences of Church thesis you need to accept that some program computes function despite we have no means to know if it is total or partial, or that a program will stop or not. And I can accept that by positing LEM as a formal rule. I don;t have to posit an immaterial Plato's heaven I make clear that the immaterial Plato Heaven for the machine is just the truth of arithmletical proposition. It is an non arithmetical notion, union of the entire Kleene-Mostowki arithmetical hierarchy, and well know non controversal mathematical object in the field of logic. I use the "immaterial Plato heaven" terminology, either as poetical shortcut, or as a point in the arithmetical representation of some term in Plotinus theory. I explained this already to you, but you keep adding metaphysical stuff which don't exist. Only ultrafinitist denies AR. Wrong. Anti realists deny it. I have pointed this out many times. You think the only debate is about the minimal set of mathematical objects, and that is not the only debate. Anti realists can accept a maximal set of objects, with the proviso that their existence is fictive and not real existence I am agnostic on all notion of existence. All, except my own consciousness here and now. I suggest a theory, and derive consequences in that theory. AR+, the idea that we don't need more than AR, in this setting, is a consequence of the math. From 'outside' the tiny effective universal sigma_1 complete set is enough. from inside, even mathematicalism is not enough (it is more 'theologicalism'). The ontological status of mathematical objects is a area of contention in metaphysics, and not straightforwardly proven by mathematics itself. With comp, you don't need more than the part on which almost everybody agrees: arithmetical realism. Anti realists do not agee on the real existence of any part. There are no pixies at all, not just a few pixies. If you believe in prime numbers, and if you are patient and good willing, I can explain that there are all universal numbers, and why assuming comp that's enough and that's necessary to solve the white rabbit problem. And that postulating physical laws miss the epistemological existence of the qualia. The basic ontology is not important. If you take less than a universal system (like numbers, combinators, ...) you don't have enough for comp, if you take more you miss the qualia. No problem with a formalist interpr
Re: Observers and Church/Turing
On 06 Feb 2011, at 23:15, Andrew Soltau wrote: Hi Bruno I will attempt to define the terms in a manner satisfactory to both of us, and maybe we will understand each other this way. CTM Computational Theory of Mind is the concept that "the mind literally is a digital computer ... and that thought literally is a kind of computation." from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ So you can see that comp, as defined in sane04, is a weaker version of CTM. (And thus all consequences of comp are inherit by CTM). Expression like "mind is a digital computer" are category error, and is also ambiguous. It relates also on the identity thesis in the philosophy of mind, which is actually incompatible with comp (and thus with CTM). I think that it is also incompatible with QM, but that is out of topic. With comp you can associate a mind to the execution of a computer, but you cannot attach a computer to a mind. You might attach an infinity of computer executions to a mind. The relation is not one-one. That is among other things a consequence of UDA. To say that thought literally is a kind of computation is ambiguous. That might be enough in some context, but the more precise comp is needed to understand the comp (and thus CTM) necessary reduction of body to mind, or of physics to arithmetic (or computer science). I understand your steps one to seven to be making this point. I have no difficulty with this point. Which point? The first seven steps of UDA makes the following points: 1) that comp entails the existence of first person indeterminacy in a deterministic context. Step 1-3. This is an original result that I published in 1988 (although I made a dozen of conference on this in the seventies). Many academics have criticize this, but their argument have been debunked. Chalmers did criticize it at the ASSC4. 2) that any measure of uncertainty of the comp first person indeterminacy is independent of the reconstitution delays (step four). 3) that comp entails first person non locality (step this has been more developed in my thesis, long and short version are in my web page). This has been retrieved from sane04 (for reason of place), but is developed in the original 1994 thesis (and in the 1998 short version, recently published). 4) That first person experience does not distinguish real from virtual implementation (this is not original, it is in Galouye, and it is a comp version of the old dream argument in the greek chinese and indian antic literature). Step six. In particular indeterminacy and non locality does not depend on the real or virtual nature of the computation. Step seven itself shows the reversal between physics and arithmetic (or any first order theory of any universal system in post Church Turing sense) in case the physical universe exists primitively and is sufficiently big. So UDA1-7 is the one of the main result of the thesis. A theory which want to explain and unify quanta and qualia, and respect comp, has to derive quanta and qualia without postulating them. You have also that comp + ~solipsisme entails first person plural MW. Normally comp should imply ~solipsisme, but as I explain this part is not yet solved in the concrete. Now most people (among interested) understand UDA1-7, that is, that comp + *very big* universe entails the reversal. If you have no problem with the first person indeterminacy, with the invariance for reconstitution delays, with the inability of first persons to distinguish (in short time) real and virtual, I don't see what you miss in the step seven. 7 is a direct consequence of 4,5,6. Step 8 extends the invariance: it shows that we cannot distinguish virtual reality with arithmetical reality, so we don't need to run physically (and BTW, what would that mean?) a universal dovetailer to get the global first indeterminacy (the one based on a "running" UD). So step 8 just shows that we don't need the assumption of a big universe to get the reversal. I told the list that a scientist thought having find a refutation of UDA. I got it, and it was that: I would have forget that we might live in a little physical universe. My answer is just a reference to step 8. So later he replied with the idea that the movie-graph can think. That's a progress. Now, I have debunked more than once on this list the idea that a movie can think. (It is an error akin to the confusion between a number and a gödel number of a number, a confusion between a description of a computation and a computation, it is a confusion of the type finger and moon (ultrafrequent in the field). Of course, even without step 8, UDA1-7 is already very nice given that it shows the reversal in the case of 'big universe', and in passing shows that digital mechanism (comp) entails indeterminacy, non locality, and non cloning of matter. Of course the white rabbits rem
Re: Observers and Church/Turing
On 05 Feb 2011, at 12:08, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 05/02/11 01:11, David Nyman wrote: Bruno's argument is that if we nail our colours to computation for an explanation of mind, then we should expect any "physics" extracted from it to have just such counter-intuitive characteristics. Hi David Thanks, this too is very helpful. 'Looking at' Father Dougal I now always see Ardall O'Hanlon, whom I consider one of the great comic geniuses of all time. An excellent choice of front! Ah! Father Ted is one of my favorite TV series. And, BTW, here is a good father Ted introduction to the difference between dreams and reality: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5AB7IDw3PNI :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
