Re: Yes Doctor circularity

2012-02-22 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
On Thu, Feb 23, 2012 at 4:42 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > On Feb 22, 6:10 pm, Pierz wrote: >> 'Yes doctor' is merely an establishment of the assumption of comp. >> Saying yes means you are a computationalist. If you say no the you are >> not one, and one cannot proceed with the argument that follo

Re: Yes Doctor circularity

2012-02-22 Thread Craig Weinberg
On Feb 22, 6:10 pm, Pierz wrote: > 'Yes doctor' is merely an establishment of the assumption of comp. > Saying yes means you are a computationalist. If you say no the you are > not one, and one cannot proceed with the argument that follows - > though then the onus will be on you to explain *why* y

Re: Yes Doctor circularity

2012-02-22 Thread Pierz
'Yes doctor' is merely an establishment of the assumption of comp. Saying yes means you are a computationalist. If you say no the you are not one, and one cannot proceed with the argument that follows - though then the onus will be on you to explain *why* you don't believe a computer can substitute

Re: UD* and consciousness

2012-02-22 Thread Terren Suydam
On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 12:29 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 22 Feb 2012, at 15:49, Terren Suydam wrote: >> Hey Bruno, >> >> I seem to remember reading a while back that you were saying that the >> 1p consciousness arises necessarily from the many paths in the UD. I'm >> glad to clear up my misun

Re: The free will function

2012-02-22 Thread acw
On 2/22/2012 17:17, marty684 wrote: Bruno, If everything is made of numbers (as in COMP) which can express states to an arbitrary degree of precision, is there any room for chance or probability? And if so, how do they arise? (If you've been over this before, please refer me to th

Re: UD* and consciousness

2012-02-22 Thread acw
On 2/22/2012 14:49, Terren Suydam wrote: However I don't understand how Mary could have anything but a single continuation given the determinism of the sim. How could a counterfactual arise in this thought experiment? Can you give a "concrete" example? Mary's brain/SIM implementation is determini

Re: UD* and consciousness

2012-02-22 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 22 Feb 2012, at 15:49, Terren Suydam wrote: On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 9:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 21 Feb 2012, at 18:05, meekerdb wrote: But is it really either-or? Isn't it likely there are different kinds and degrees of consciousness. I'm not clear on what Bruno's theory says

Re: The free will function

2012-02-22 Thread marty684
Bruno, If everything is made of numbers (as in COMP) which can express states to an arbitrary degree of precision, is there any room for chance or probability? And if so, how do they arise?   (If you've been over this before, please refer me to the relevant posts, thanks.)  mart

Re: The free will function

2012-02-22 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 21 Feb 2012, at 19:26, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/21/2012 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 20 Feb 2012, at 17:02, 1Z wrote: On Feb 20, 3:32 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: Now comp makes almost all (not any) UMs' physics identical. That is not a weak assumption. In CTM, there is j

Re: UD* and consciousness

2012-02-22 Thread Terren Suydam
On Wed, Feb 22, 2012 at 9:27 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 21 Feb 2012, at 18:05, meekerdb wrote: > >> But is it really either-or?  Isn't it likely there are different kinds and >> degrees of consciousness.  I'm not clear on what Bruno's theory says about >> this.  On the one hand he says all Lo

Re: UD* and consciousness

2012-02-22 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 21 Feb 2012, at 18:05, meekerdb wrote: On 2/21/2012 8:32 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: Bruno and others, Here's a thought experiment that for me casts doubt on the notion that consciousness requires 1p indeterminacy. Imagine that we have scanned my friend Mary so that we have a complete

Re: COMP theology

2012-02-22 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 21 Feb 2012, at 17:55, meekerdb wrote: On 2/21/2012 8:16 AM, John Clark wrote: > it is important to conceive that comp might be false. Why? If it's false I don't see how there could be a way to prove it false, and as we can not function unless we assumeit's true it would se

Re: The free will function

2012-02-22 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 21 Feb 2012, at 17:53, meekerdb wrote: On 2/21/2012 7:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Negative amplitude of probability comes from the formula p->[]<>p satisfied by the sigma_1 arithmetical sentences (that is the UD). How does that work? By using a theorem of Goldblatt which shows that:

Re: UD* and consciousness

2012-02-22 Thread Bruno Marchal
On 21 Feb 2012, at 21:34, Terren Suydam wrote: On Tue, Feb 21, 2012 at 12:05 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/21/2012 8:32 AM, Terren Suydam wrote: So if Mary is not conscious in the deterministic scenario, she is a zombie. The only way to be consistent with this conclusion is to insist that the su

Support for Panexperientialism

2012-02-22 Thread Craig Weinberg
Could a rock have consciousness? Good answer from someone on Quora: http://www.quora.com/Could-a-rock-have-consciousness "Yes, obviously. Why obviously? Well, first of all, where is the “disconnect” and what is it made of? Specifically, the disconnect that must occur if some parts of

Re: UD* and consciousness

2012-02-22 Thread Quentin Anciaux
2012/2/21 Terren Suydam > Bruno and others, > > Here's a thought experiment that for me casts doubt on the notion that > consciousness requires 1p indeterminacy. > > Imagine that we have scanned my friend Mary so that we have a complete > functional description of her brain (down to some substitu