date:20171127



On Tuesday, November 28, 2017 at 2:59:33 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 8:57:41 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
>   wrote:
>
> > 
> >>
>  As for collapse, it's easily seen in the double slit experiment. The 
> electron, say, moves
>  
> through space as a wave -- which explains the interference effects due to 
> splitting into 
> t
> wo waves, each emanating from one of the slits
>
>  
>
> >> 
> Then after it passes the double slit and that electron hits the 
> photographic 
> plate 
> why does it always produce one and only one spot, not a smudge as one wave 
> should and not a interference pattern as as 2 waves should?  
>
>
> > 
> It probably is a smudge, consistent with the UP. 
>
>
> NO! The electron NEVER produces a smudge on that 
> photographic
>  plate regardless of if it went through one slit or 2 slits or no slit 
> at all. 
>
>
> Three strikes as follows: If it produced a mathematical point, it could 
> never be observed. It can't do what you claim without violating the UP. 
> Moreover, you fail to take into account the finite width of the electron.  
> AG
>  
>
> It ALWAYS produces a localized spot unless there is information on which 
> slot the electron went through. 
>
>
> It always produces a localized spot. Period. AG
>  
>
> And even if there is which way information if that information is erased 
> after it passed the slits but before it hits the photographic plate there 
> will be a interference pattern. Think about that for a minute, its in the 
> past, the electron either went through a slit or it didn't and if the arrow 
> of time is real then there is nothing you can do about it now, 
> but apparently you can. Many Worlds can explain this without the future 
> changing the past, Copenhagen can't. 
>
>
> The interference effect is manifest in the distribution of the ensemble. I 
> don't what what your complaint is here. AG
>
>
>> and is ALWAYS observed as localized in space, aka a PARTICLE. 
>
>
> But that particle is NEVER localized at the two slits,
>  
> it's only localized at the photographic plate,
>  
> so "observation" made it localized. And as they can't say how observation 
> does this, what qualifications it takes to be considered a legitimate 
> observer, or even explain exactly what "observation" is
> ,
> Copenhagen might just as well say magic made it localized.   
>  
>
> > 
> That is, the wave collapses 
>  
> into a particle! 
>
>
> And it does this because of a thing called "observation" aka magic.
>  
>
> > 
> There is no other reasonable interpretation of results of the double slit 
> experiment, 
>
>
> There are no reasonable interpretations of the
>  double slit experiment
> ! Nature is nuts, you may not like it but that's the way it is.
>
> >> 
> So tell me exactly what this *observer* thing is.   Exactly what is it 
> about observation that allows it to collapse the wave particle?
>
>  
>
>  
> >
> Dunno.  
>
>
> I've noticed. 
>  
>
>
> There's a huge difference between our approach to this problem. I know 
> what I don't know. You don't know what you don't know.  AG
>
>
> > 
> But using MWI without collapse, why do we get some particular value and 
> not others?
>
>
> A version of John Clark sees that particle have every value that doesn't 
> violate the laws of physics. T
> he reason any particular John Clark sees only one value is because when 
> the particle splits at the 2 slits John Clark splits too.
>  
>
> >> 
> those infinite number of observers are indistinguishable from only one, 
> and that's pretty simple.  
>
>  
>
> > 
> As simple as a woman who gives birth to twins, millions of times over and 
> then some?
>
>
> I have no idea what that question means, but I do know that a billion or 
> even a infinite number of identical universes is 
> indistinguishable from only one, both objectively and subjectively.   
>
>
> I meant to illustrate that you have no clue as to what you don't know, 
> even though I have laid it out numerous.times. What you call "pretty 
> simple" is as much or more of a mystery than the collapse. You have invoked 
> a form of magic based on a misguided interpretation of the wf, but you fail 
> to see that magic. AG 
>
> 
>  
>
> >> 
> Amongst the "Yes, I think MWI is true" crowd listed are Stephen Hawking 
> and Nobel Laureates Murray Gell-Mann andRichard Feynman. Gell-Mann and 
> Hawking recorded reservations with the name "many-worlds", but not with the 
> theory's content. Nobel Laureate Steven Weinberg is also mentioned as a 
> many-worlder "  
>
>
> > 
> Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit, 
> but NOT the MWI,
>
>
> Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? 
>
>
> Google "Steven Weinberg, Many Worlds "repellent". If you can't find it, 
> let me know. AG
>  
>
> And how can you have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds 
> without a multiverse? 
>  
>
>
> You kee

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

mana

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 8:57:41 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
>
>   wrote:
>
> > 
> >>
>  As for collapse, it's easily seen in the double slit experiment. The 
> electron, say, moves
>  
> through space as a wave -- which explains the interference effects due to 
> splitting into 
> t
> wo waves, each emanating from one of the slits
>
>  
>
> >> 
> Then after it passes the double slit and that electron hits the 
> photographic 
> plate 
> why does it always produce one and only one spot, not a smudge as one wave 
> should and not a interference pattern as as 2 waves should?  
>
>
> > 
> It probably is a smudge, consistent with the UP. 
>
>
> NO! The electron NEVER produces a smudge on that 
> photographic
>  plate regardless of if it went through one slit or 2 slits or no slit 
> at all. 
>

Three strikes as follows: If it produced a mathematical point, it could 
never be observed. It can't do what you claim without violating the UP. 
Moreover, you fail to take into account the finite width of the electron.  
AG
 

> It ALWAYS produces a localized spot unless there is information on which 
> slot the electron went through. 
>

It always produces a localized spot. Period. AG
 

> And even if there is which way information if that information is erased 
> after it passed the slits but before it hits the photographic plate there 
> will be a interference pattern. Think about that for a minute, its in the 
> past, the electron either went through a slit or it didn't and if the arrow 
> of time is real then there is nothing you can do about it now, 
> but apparently you can. Many Worlds can explain this without the future 
> changing the past, Copenhagen can't. 
>

The interference effect is manifest in the distribution of the ensemble. I 
don't what what your complaint is here. AG

>
>> and is ALWAYS observed as localized in space, aka a PARTICLE. 
>
>
> But that particle is NEVER localized at the two slits,
>  
> it's only localized at the photographic plate,
>  
> so "observation" made it localized. And as they can't say how observation 
> does this, what qualifications it takes to be considered a legitimate 
> observer, or even explain exactly what "observation" is
> ,
> Copenhagen might just as well say magic made it localized.   
>  
>
> > 
> That is, the wave collapses 
>  
> into a particle! 
>
>
> And it does this because of a thing called "observation" aka magic.
>  
>
> > 
> There is no other reasonable interpretation of results of the double slit 
> experiment, 
>
>
> There are no reasonable interpretations of the
>  double slit experiment
> ! Nature is nuts, you may not like it but that's the way it is.
>
> >> 
> So tell me exactly what this *observer* thing is.   Exactly what is it 
> about observation that allows it to collapse the wave particle?
>
>  
>
>  
> >
> Dunno.  
>
>
> I've noticed. 
>  
>

There's a huge difference between our approach to this problem. I know what 
I don't know. You don't know what you don't know.  AG

>
> > 
> But using MWI without collapse, why do we get some particular value and 
> not others?
>
>
> A version of John Clark sees that particle have every value that doesn't 
> violate the laws of physics. T
> he reason any particular John Clark sees only one value is because when 
> the particle splits at the 2 slits John Clark splits too.
>  
>
> >> 
> those infinite number of observers are indistinguishable from only one, 
> and that's pretty simple.  
>
>  
>
> > 
> As simple as a woman who gives birth to twins, millions of times over and 
> then some?
>
>
> I have no idea what that question means, but I do know that a billion or 
> even a infinite number of identical universes is 
> indistinguishable from only one, both objectively and subjectively.   
>

I meant to illustrate that you have no clue as to what you don't know, even 
though I have laid it out numerous.times. What you call "pretty simple" is 
as much or more of a mystery than the collapse. You have invoked a form of 
magic based on a misguided interpretation of the wf, but you fail to see 
that magic. AG 

> 
>  
>
> >> 
> Amongst the "Yes, I think MWI is true" crowd listed are Stephen Hawking 
> and Nobel Laureates Murray Gell-Mann andRichard Feynman. Gell-Mann and 
> Hawking recorded reservations with the name "many-worlds", but not with the 
> theory's content. Nobel Laureate Steven Weinberg is also mentioned as a 
> many-worlder "  
>
>
> > 
> Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit, 
> but NOT the MWI,
>
>
> Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? 
>

Google "Steven Weinberg, Many Worlds "repellent". If you can't find it, let 
me know. AG
 

> And how can you have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds 
> without a multiverse? 
>  
>

You keep making the same error as Brent pointed out earlier -- and as I 
have numerous times. The Multiverse of String theory, aka the Lands

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On Tuesday, November 28, 2017 at 12:22:04 AM UTC, Russell Standish wrote:
>
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 03:57:37PM -0500, John Clark wrote: 
> >   wrote: 
> > 
> > > 
> > > >  
> > > Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have 
> merit, 
> > > but NOT the MWI, 
> > 
> > 
> > Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? And how can you 
> > have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without a 
> multiverse?  
>
> Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string 
> landscape. Note this usage contravenes the usage of Multiverse by 
> everybody else here, which normally is as David Deutsch originally 
> intended by 
> the term, the multiple universes of the MWI, or sometimes even more 
> generally as any of the Tegmarkian ensembles. 
>
> Alan, please bear that in mind, and qualify your statement with string 
> landscape or similar to indicate you are using the term differently to 
> everybody 
> else on this list, and prevent these sorts of stupid confusions. 
>
> Cheers 
>

As I distinctly recall, Weinberg uses "Multiverse" to refer to the string 
theory landscape, and he laments that if it exists, there will be no way to 
find a theory which explains quark masses. And Yes, I have made it clear 
several times here that when I use the term "Multiverse", I am referring to 
the landscape of string theory. AG 

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM




On 11/27/2017 6:14 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 05:09:13PM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote:


On 11/27/2017 4:17 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 03:57:37PM -0500, John Clark wrote:

wrote:


> 
Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit,
but NOT the MWI,

Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? And how can you
have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without a multiverse? 

Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string
landscape. Note this usage contravenes the usage of Multiverse by
everybody else here, which normally is as David Deutsch originally intended by
the term, the multiple universes of the MWI, or sometimes even more
generally as any of the Tegmarkian ensembles.

I think we should use "multiverse" to refer to the cosmological multiplicity
per Tegmark and use "multiple worlds" to refer to the quantum multiplicity
of Everett (so it's consistent with the abbreviation MWI).


Tegmark uses "multiverse" to refer to any of his parallel universe
classes, including the many worlds. This wikipedia article also takes
the same view https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse

In my book, I use Multiverse consistently to refer to the quantum many
worlds, following David Deutsch, who I believe(d) introduced the term, and
Plenitude to refer to Tegmark's level 4. I don't have nicknames for
the other two Tegmarkian "multiverses".

PS - according to Wikipedia, the actual term was coined by William
James in 1895!

It is just terminology, and terminology should be allowed to evolve,
just so long as everybody is clear about what is being discussed. I
appreciate that it appears these days that multiverse can refer to any parallel
universe theory, a la Tegmark, so that's how we should be using it,
and qualify (eg quantum multiverse) where needed.


It's shorter and clearer to MWI for Everett/Deutsch multiplicity.

Brent






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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM




On 11/27/2017 6:09 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 7:17 PM, Russell Standish 
mailto:li...@hpcoders.com.au>>wrote:


> 
Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string

landscape. 



And I think think the string theory Multiverse is related to the 
inflation theory Multiverse and both are related to the  Everett

/
D
eutsch Multiverse. When 3 different theories independently point in 
the same direction nature may be trying to tell you something.


They don't point in the same direction.  The string theory and inflation 
theory multiverse posits different universes with different physical 
parameters due to random symmetry breaking. Everett/Deutsch assume the 
same physics and universes that are only approximately orthogonal.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

2017-11-27 Thread Russell Standish

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 05:09:13PM -0800, Brent Meeker wrote:
> 
> 
> On 11/27/2017 4:17 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> > On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 03:57:37PM -0500, John Clark wrote:
> > >wrote:
> > > 
> > > > > 
> > > > Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have 
> > > > merit,
> > > > but NOT the MWI,
> > > 
> > > Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? And how can you
> > > have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without a 
> > > multiverse? 
> > Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string
> > landscape. Note this usage contravenes the usage of Multiverse by
> > everybody else here, which normally is as David Deutsch originally intended 
> > by
> > the term, the multiple universes of the MWI, or sometimes even more
> > generally as any of the Tegmarkian ensembles.
> 
> I think we should use "multiverse" to refer to the cosmological multiplicity
> per Tegmark and use "multiple worlds" to refer to the quantum multiplicity
> of Everett (so it's consistent with the abbreviation MWI).
> 

Tegmark uses "multiverse" to refer to any of his parallel universe
classes, including the many worlds. This wikipedia article also takes
the same view https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiverse

In my book, I use Multiverse consistently to refer to the quantum many
worlds, following David Deutsch, who I believe(d) introduced the term, and
Plenitude to refer to Tegmark's level 4. I don't have nicknames for
the other two Tegmarkian "multiverses".

PS - according to Wikipedia, the actual term was coined by William
James in 1895!

It is just terminology, and terminology should be allowed to evolve,
just so long as everybody is clear about what is being discussed. I
appreciate that it appears these days that multiverse can refer to any parallel
universe theory, a la Tegmark, so that's how we should be using it,
and qualify (eg quantum multiverse) where needed.

-- 

Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 7:17 PM, Russell Standish 
wrote:

> 
> Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string
> 
> landscape.

And I think think the string theory Multiverse is related to the inflation
theory Multiverse and both are related to the  Everett
/
D
eutsch Multiverse. When 3 different theories independently point in the
same direction nature may be trying to tell you something.

 John K Clark

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM




On 11/27/2017 4:17 PM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 03:57:37PM -0500, John Clark wrote:

   wrote:


> 
Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit,
but NOT the MWI,


Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? And how can you
have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without a multiverse? 

Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string
landscape. Note this usage contravenes the usage of Multiverse by
everybody else here, which normally is as David Deutsch originally intended by
the term, the multiple universes of the MWI, or sometimes even more
generally as any of the Tegmarkian ensembles.


I think we should use "multiverse" to refer to the cosmological 
multiplicity per Tegmark and use "multiple worlds" to refer to the 
quantum multiplicity of Everett (so it's consistent with the 
abbreviation MWI).


Brent



Alan, please bear that in mind, and qualify your statement with string
landscape or similar to indicate you are using the term differently to everybody
else on this list, and prevent these sorts of stupid confusions.

Cheers




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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

2017-11-27 Thread Bruce Kellett


On 28/11/2017 11:17 am, Russell Standish wrote:

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 03:57:37PM -0500, John Clark wrote:

   wrote:


> 
Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit,
but NOT the MWI,


Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? And how can you
have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without a multiverse? 

Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string
landscape. Note this usage contravenes the usage of Multiverse by
everybody else here, which normally is as David Deutsch originally intended by
the term, the multiple universes of the MWI, or sometimes even more
generally as any of the Tegmarkian ensembles.

Alan, please bear that in mind, and qualify your statement with string
landscape or similar to indicate you are using the term differently to everybody
else on this list, and prevent these sorts of stupid confusions.


I think this is non-standard usage. De Witt introduced the term "many 
worlds" for the Everettian relative states. That has stuck almost 
universally. "Multiverse" is used to denote the multiple universes of 
eternal inflation, the string theory landscape, or Tegmark's  "all 
mathematical structures". If the usage is different on this list, then 
it is non standard -- just as non-standard as Deutsch's understanding of 
MWI.


Bruce

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Dreamless Sleep?

2017-11-27 Thread David Nyman

https://www.sciencealert.com/your-consciousness-does-not-switch-off-during-a-dreamless-sleep-say-scientists

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

2017-11-27 Thread Russell Standish

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 03:57:37PM -0500, John Clark wrote:
>   wrote:
> 
> >
> > > 
> > Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit,
> > but NOT the MWI,
> 
> 
> Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? And how can you
> have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without a multiverse? 

Alan deliberately uses the term "Multiverse" to refer to the string
landscape. Note this usage contravenes the usage of Multiverse by
everybody else here, which normally is as David Deutsch originally intended by
the term, the multiple universes of the MWI, or sometimes even more
generally as any of the Tegmarkian ensembles.

Alan, please bear that in mind, and qualify your statement with string
landscape or similar to indicate you are using the term differently to everybody
else on this list, and prevent these sorts of stupid confusions.

Cheers

-- 

Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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Re: Is AI really a threat to mankind?

On 11/27/2017 2:35 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 11:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

I think there might be two ways of interpreting this, each with different
answers.

The first question: Does AI create more threats that never existed before?

I think the answer is most definitely yes. Some examples:
- Large scale unemployment/disempowerment of people who cannot compete with
increasing machine intelligence
- Algorithms that identify and wipe out dissent / control opposition
- New and terrifying weapons (e.g.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HipTO_7mUOw )
- More infrastructure and systems that can be hacked or introduce defects
(air traffic control systems, self-driving cars, etc.)

The second question: Will super intelligence ultimately decide to eliminate
us (as meaningless, redundant, to make room for more computation, etc.)?

This question is more interesting. I tend to fall in the camp that we
exercise little control over the ultimate decision made by such a super
intelligence, but I am optimistic that a super intelligence will, during the
course of its ascension, discover and formalize a system of ethics, and this
may lead to it deciding not to wipe out other life forms. For example, it
might discover the same ideas expressed here (
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Arnold_Zuboff/publication/233329805_One_Self_The_Logic_of_Experience/links/54adcdb60cf2213c5fe419ec/One-Self-The-Logic-of-Experience.pdf
) and therefore determine something like the golden rule is rationally
justified.

Consider how we treat cattle.

Or dogs.

Brent

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Re: Is AI really a threat to mankind?

2017-11-27 Thread Lawrence Crowell

On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 4:09:36 PM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
> I think there might be two ways of interpreting this, each with different 
> answers.
>
> The first question: Does AI create more threats that never existed before?
>
> I think the answer is most definitely yes. Some examples:
> - Large scale unemployment/disempowerment of people who cannot compete 
> with increasing machine intelligence
> - Algorithms that identify and wipe out dissent / control opposition
> - New and terrifying weapons (e.g. 
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HipTO_7mUOw )
> - More infrastructure and systems that can be hacked or introduce defects 
> (air traffic control systems, self-driving cars, etc.)
>

There is a website  http://autonomousweapons.org/ where you can sign a 
support for a ban on these weapons. The slaughterbots seem almost 
inevitable and I suspect the best we might do is to delay their 
implementation. There though might be a fashion line of clothing which 
might protect you against this:


or if you want to go retro you could try this


I foresee a huge market for protectobots. We will have packs on us that 
release anti-slaughterbots when they appear. These are then a sort of 
miniature THAAD or Patriot antidrone system that takes these out before 
they take you out.

To me the biggest issue is whether AI systems become increasingly 
interlinked with the human brain. I would not be at all surprised if the 
major nodes on the internet are not computers by cyborg-linked brains. We 
humans seem already growing inward with our devices, where the picture 
below says it all. We are well on the path in this direction already.

LC





> The second question: Will super intelligence ultimately decide to 
> eliminate us (as meaningless, redundant, to make room for more computation, 
> etc.)?
>
> This question is more interesting. I tend to fall in the camp that we 
> exercise little control over the ultimate decision made by such a super 
> intelligence, but I am optimistic that a super intelligence will, during 
> the course of its ascension, discover and formalize a system of ethics, and 
> this may lead to it deciding not to wipe out other life forms.  For 
> example, it might discover the same ideas expressed here ( 
> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Arnold_Zuboff/publication/233329805_One_Self_The_Logic_of_Experience/links/54adcdb60cf2213c5fe419ec/One-Self-The-Logic-of-Experience.pdf
>  
> ) and therefore determine something like the golden rule is rationally 
> justified.
>
> Jason
>

 

>
>
>
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 3:32 PM, > 
> wrote:
>
>> IIRC, this is the view of Hawking and Musk.
>>
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Re: Is AI really a threat to mankind?




On 11/27/2017 2:09 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
I think there might be two ways of interpreting this, each with 
different answers.


The first question: Does AI create more threats that never existed before?

I think the answer is most definitely yes. Some examples:
- Large scale unemployment/disempowerment of people who cannot compete 
with increasing machine intelligence

- Algorithms that identify and wipe out dissent / control opposition
- New and terrifying weapons (e.g. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HipTO_7mUOw )
- More infrastructure and systems that can be hacked or introduce 
defects (air traffic control systems, self-driving cars, etc.)


The second question: Will super intelligence ultimately decide to 
eliminate us (as meaningless, redundant, to make room for more 
computation, etc.)?


This question is more interesting. I tend to fall in the camp that we 
exercise little control over the ultimate decision made by such a 
super intelligence, but I am optimistic that a super intelligence 
will, during the course of its ascension, discover and formalize a 
system of ethics, and this may lead to it deciding not to wipe out 
other life forms.  For example, it might discover the same ideas 
expressed here ( 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Arnold_Zuboff/publication/233329805_One_Self_The_Logic_of_Experience/links/54adcdb60cf2213c5fe419ec/One-Self-The-Logic-of-Experience.pdf 
) and therefore determine something like the golden rule is rationally 
justified.


Marvin Minsky said, "I'm on the side of greater intelligence."

Brent

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Re: Is AI really a threat to mankind?

2017-11-27 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 11:09 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
> I think there might be two ways of interpreting this, each with different
> answers.
>
> The first question: Does AI create more threats that never existed before?
>
> I think the answer is most definitely yes. Some examples:
> - Large scale unemployment/disempowerment of people who cannot compete with
> increasing machine intelligence
> - Algorithms that identify and wipe out dissent / control opposition
> - New and terrifying weapons (e.g.
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HipTO_7mUOw )
> - More infrastructure and systems that can be hacked or introduce defects
> (air traffic control systems, self-driving cars, etc.)
>
> The second question: Will super intelligence ultimately decide to eliminate
> us (as meaningless, redundant, to make room for more computation, etc.)?
>
> This question is more interesting. I tend to fall in the camp that we
> exercise little control over the ultimate decision made by such a super
> intelligence, but I am optimistic that a super intelligence will, during the
> course of its ascension, discover and formalize a system of ethics, and this
> may lead to it deciding not to wipe out other life forms.  For example, it
> might discover the same ideas expressed here (
> https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Arnold_Zuboff/publication/233329805_One_Self_The_Logic_of_Experience/links/54adcdb60cf2213c5fe419ec/One-Self-The-Logic-of-Experience.pdf
> ) and therefore determine something like the golden rule is rationally
> justified.

Consider how we treat cattle.

Telmo.

> Jason
>
>
>
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 3:32 PM,  wrote:
>>
>> IIRC, this is the view of Hawking and Musk.
>>
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Re: Is AI really a threat to mankind?


Scary video...because it's nearly true.

http://autonomousweapons.org/

Brent

On 11/27/2017 1:32 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:

IIRC, this is the view of Hawking and Musk.


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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM




On 11/27/2017 1:05 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:08:47 PM UTC, Brent wrote:



On 11/26/2017 10:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:54, >
wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp
wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:25, 
wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC,
stathisp wrote:



On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,
 wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound
gorilla in the room; introducing Many
Worlds creates hugely more complications
than it purports to do away with;
multiple, indeed infinite observers with
the same memories and life histories for
example. Give me a break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which
everything is duplicated to an arbitrary
level of detail, including the Earth and its
inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is
the bizarreness of this idea an argument for
a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit
of what we can see?


--stathis Papaioannou


FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite,
expanding hypersphere, meaning in any direction,
if go far enough, you return to your starting
position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and
thus infinite; not asymptotically flat and
therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot
distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy
the former since they also concede it is finite
in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would
likely be infinite in space and time, with
erupting BB universes, some like ours, most
definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG


OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with
multiple copies of everything *in itself* an argument
against it?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse
implies infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved
that? AG


If there are uncountable possibilities for different
universes, why should there be any repetitions? I don't think
infinite repetitions has been proven, and I don't believe it. AG

If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then
every finite subset should repeat. It might not; for example,
from a radius of 10^100 m out it might be just be vacuum forever,
or Donald Trump dolls.


If there is a repetition, is it really a different universe?


Yes, because it would be located in a different position in the 
multiverse. AG



Position relative to what?  And don't answer relative to it's duplicate, 
because duplicate means the same in relation to everything too.


Brent



What happened to Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles?

Brent

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Re: Is AI really a threat to mankind?

2017-11-27 Thread Jason Resch

I think there might be two ways of interpreting this, each with different
answers.

The first question: Does AI create more threats that never existed before?

I think the answer is most definitely yes. Some examples:
- Large scale unemployment/disempowerment of people who cannot compete with
increasing machine intelligence
- Algorithms that identify and wipe out dissent / control opposition
- New and terrifying weapons (e.g.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HipTO_7mUOw )
- More infrastructure and systems that can be hacked or introduce defects
(air traffic control systems, self-driving cars, etc.)

The second question: Will super intelligence ultimately decide to eliminate
us (as meaningless, redundant, to make room for more computation, etc.)?

This question is more interesting. I tend to fall in the camp that we
exercise little control over the ultimate decision made by such a super
intelligence, but I am optimistic that a super intelligence will, during
the course of its ascension, discover and formalize a system of ethics, and
this may lead to it deciding not to wipe out other life forms.  For
example, it might discover the same ideas expressed here (
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Arnold_Zuboff/publication/233329805_One_Self_The_Logic_of_Experience/links/54adcdb60cf2213c5fe419ec/One-Self-The-Logic-of-Experience.pdf
) and therefore determine something like the golden rule is rationally
justified.

Jason

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 3:32 PM,  wrote:

> IIRC, this is the view of Hawking and Musk.
>
> --
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Re: Feynman and the Everything

On Sun, Nov 26, 2017 at 10:04 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

> 
> Richard Feynman in "The Character of Physical Law" Chapter 2 wrote:
>
> "It always bothers me that according to the laws as we understand them
> today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of logical
> operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a region of
> space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that be going
> on in that tiny space? Why should it take an infinite amount of logic to
> figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?"
>

Obviously infinite logic is not required unless infinite precision is also
required, but sometimes (and protein folding

would be a good example of this) an astronomically huge number of
calculations are required for even a

very

modest approximation

of what is happening in a tiny piece of spacetime, and yet nature can do it
with great precision in a fraction of a second. How come? Feynman himself
took the first first tentative steps toward answering that question just
before he died, as far as I know he was the first person to introduce the
idea of a quantum computer.

> > 
> Does computationalism provide the answer to this question,

No natural phenomenon has ever been found where nature has solved a
NP-hard problem in polynomial time.
Quantum Computer expert
 Scott Aaronson actually
tested this
 and this is what he
found
:

*" taking two glass plates with pegs between them, and dipping the
resulting contraption into a tub of soapy water. The idea is that the soap
bubbles that form between the pegs should trace out the minimum Steiner
tree — that is, the minimum total length of line segments connecting the
pegs, where the segments can meet at points other than the pegs themselves.
Now, this is known to be an NP-hard optimization problem. So, it looks like
Nature is solving NP-hard problems in polynomial time!Long story short, I
went to the hardware store, bought some glass plates, liquid soap, etc.,
and found that, while Nature does often find a minimum Steiner tree with 4
or 5 pegs, it tends to get stuck at local optima with larger numbers of
pegs. Indeed, often the soap bubbles settle down to a configuration which
is not even a tree (i.e. contains “cycles of soap”), and thus provably
can’t be optimal.*

*The situation is similar for protein folding. Again, people have said that
Nature seems to be solving an NP-hard optimization problem in every cell of
your body, by letting the proteins fold into their minimum-energy
configurations. But there are two problems with this claim. The first
problem is that proteins, just like soap bubbles, sometimes get stuck in
suboptimal configurations — indeed, it’s believed that’s exactly what
happens with Mad Cow Disease. The second problem is that, to the extent
that proteins do usually fold into their optimal configurations, there’s an
obvious reason why they would: natural selection! If there were a protein
that could only be folded by proving the Riemann Hypothesis, the gene that
coded for it would quickly get weeded out of the gene pool." *
For
 more I highly recommend
 Aaronson's book *"Quantum Computing since Democritus".*

 John K Clark

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM




On 11/27/2017 10:19 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

The formal modal formula is B(Bp -> p) -> Bp.

It looks also like wishful thinking. If you succeed in convincing a 
Löbian entity (whose beliefs are close for the Löb rule, or having 
Löb's theorem for its bewesibar predicate) that if she ever believes 
that some medication will work, then it work, then she will believe 
the medication works!


But that's equivocating on "B".  In the formula it means beweisbar=prove 
not "believes".  I think that is obfuscation.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

2017-11-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Tue, 28 Nov 2017 at 7:41 am,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 3:28:20 PM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>>
>> On Mon, 27 Nov 2017 at 6:23 pm,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:12:09 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>


 On 27 November 2017 at 17:54,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
>>> wrote:



 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC,
>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
>>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than 
>>> it purports
>>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the 
>>> same memories
>>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
>> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth 
>> and its
>> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of 
>> this idea
>> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of 
>> what we can
>> see?
>>
>>
>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding
> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you 
> return to your
> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus 
> infinite; not
> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
> cannot
> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since 
> they also
> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that 
> would
> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
> some like
> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG
>

 OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple
 copies of everything *in itself* an argument against it?

 --
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies
>>> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG
>>>
>>
>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes,
>> why should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite 
>> repetitions has
>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG
>>
>>

> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
> finite
> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 
> 10^100 m
> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of
 possible universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to 
 think
 the parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random
 process. AG

>>>
>>> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number
>>> on the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic 
>>> to
>>> the real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number
>>> representing our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>>>
>>
>> But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I
>> am the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my
>> body that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal 
>> place
>> of some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not 
>> on a
>> real number.
>>
>>
>>

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM




On 11/27/2017 9:10 AM, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 8:29:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Nov 2017, at 15:59, Lawrence Crowell wrote:


On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 5:53:14 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:

On 24/11/2017 10:15 am, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno
Marchal wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:


You clearly have not grasped the implications of my
argument. The idea that "MWI replaces all nonsensical
weirdness by one fact (many histories)" does not work,
and is not really an explanation at all -- you are
simply evading the issue.


Without collapse, the apparent correlations are
explained by the linear evolution, and the linear tensor
products only. I have not yet seen one proof that some
action at a distance are at play in quantum mechanics,
although I agree that would be the case if the outcome
where unique, as EPER/BELL show convincingly.

Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they
find action at a distance astonishing, but are unaware
of the many-worlds, or just want to dismiss it directly
as pure science fiction. But after Aspect, the choice is
really between deterministic and local QM + many worlds,
or one world and 3p indeterminacy and non locality. Like
Maudlin said, choose your poison.


Bruno


Bruce



I am new to this list and have not followed all the
arguments here. In weighing in here I might be making an
error of not addressing things properly.

Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two
spin 1/2 particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we
really do not have the two spin particles. The entanglement
state is all that is identifiable. The degrees of freedom
for the two spins are replaced with those of the
entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about
the individual spin particles existing. If the observer
makes a measurement that results in a measurement the
entanglement state is "violently" lost, the entanglement
phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus,
and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the
entanglement.

We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence
of the entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;"
it is blind to any idea there is some "geography" associated
with the individual spins. There in fact really is no such
thing as the individual spins. The loss of the entangled
state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is
no "metric" specifying where the spins are before the
measurement there is no sense to ideas of any causal action
that ties the two resulting spins.

This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is
because we are thinking in classical terms. There are two
ways of thinking about our problem with understanding
whether quantum mechanics is ontic or epistemic. It could be
that we are a bit like dogs with respect to the quantum
world. I have several dogs and one thing that is clear is
they do not understand spatial relationships well; they get
leashes and chains all tangled up and if they get wrapped up
around a pole they simply can't figure out how to get out of
it. In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power
and will never be able to understand QM in some way that has
a completeness with respect to causality, reality and
nonlocality. There is also a far more radical possibility.
It is that a measurement of a quantum system is ultimately a
set of quantum states that are encoding information about
quantum states. This is the a quantum form of Turing's
Universal Turing Machine that emulates other Turing
machines, or a sort of Goedel self-referential process. If
this is the case we may be faced with the prospect there
can't ever be a complete understanding of the ontic and
epistemic nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some sense
not knowable by any axiomatic structure.


Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have
come here to avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
The issue that we have been discussing with EPR pairs is
whether many worlds avoids the implications of Bell's
theorem, so that a purely local understanding of EPR is
available in Everettian models. I have argued that this is
not the case -- that n

Is AI really a threat to mankind?

IIRC, this is the view of Hawking and Musk.

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 4:05 PM,  wrote:

>> 
>> If there is a repetition, is it really a different universe?
>>
>>
> > 
> Yes, because it would be located in a different position in the multiverse.
>

How do you even know they are is a different position, what does
"different" even mean in this context?
If the position of 2 

identical people is instantaneously exchanged there in 2 identical
universes there is no way anything or anyone could notice a difference, not
objectively and not subjectively either.I would maintain that if there is
no objective difference and there is no subjective difference then there is
just no difference.

 John K Clark   

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM




On 11/27/2017 7:28 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


On Mon, 27 Nov 2017 at 6:23 pm, > wrote:




On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:12:09 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 17:54,  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp
wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM
UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,
 wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at
5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at
5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,
 wrote:



On Monday, November 27,
2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC,
stathisp wrote:



On 26 November 2017 at
13:33,

wrote:

You keep ignoring
the obvious 800
pound gorilla in
the room;
introducing Many
Worlds creates
hugely more
complications than
it purports to do
away with;
multiple, indeed
infinite observers
with the same
memories and life
histories for
example. Give me a
break. AG


What about a single,
infinite world in
which everything is
duplicated to an
arbitrary level of
detail, including the
Earth and its
inhabitants, an
infinite number of
times? Is the
bizarreness of this
idea an argument for a
finite world, ending
perhaps at the limit
of what we can see?


--stathis Papaioannou


FWIW, in my view we live
in huge, but finite,
expanding hypersphere,
meaning in any direction,
if go far enough, you
return to your starting
position. Many
cosmologists say it's flat
and thus infinite; not
asymptotically flat and
therefore spatially
finite. Measurements
cannot distinguish the two
possibilities. I don't buy
the former since they also
concede it is finite in
age. A Multiverse might

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM




On 11/27/2017 6:45 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


I think your distaste with MWI comes from an incorrect view of
how splitting occurs. Shooting a photon of at a slit doesn't
instantly create millions or infinite numbers of universes.


*But that's NOT what the enthusiasts of the MWI claim. They say
all possible results are realized, that is measured, in other
universes, which come into existence when a measurement is made in
this universe. AG*


Does this mean you are OK with the description of QM as I have 
provided below?


Your description assumes the measurement is just right-v-left.  In the 
canonical form of the two-slit experiment the detection is a spot on a 
film.  So the possible outcomes are on the order of the number of silver 
halide atoms on the film...not infinite, but not just two either.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:08:47 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/26/2017 10:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54, > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote: 



 On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote: 
>>
>>
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
>>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
>>> purports 
>>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
>>> memories 
>>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated 
>> to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its 
>> inhabitants, 
>> an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument 
>> for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>>
>>
>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding hypersphere, 
> meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return to your starting 
> position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not 
> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements cannot 
> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also 
> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would 
> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, some 
> like 
> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>

 OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies of 
 everything *in itself* an argument against it? 

 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies infinite 
>>> copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 
>>>
>>
>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
>> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has 
>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>>
> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every finite 
> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m 
> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>
>
> If there is a repetition, is it really a different universe? 
>
>
Yes, because it would be located in a different position in the multiverse. 
AG
 

> What happened to Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles?
>
> Brent
>

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Consistency of Postulates of QM

  wrote:

>
>>> >>
>>>  As for collapse, it's easily seen in the double slit experiment. The
>>> electron, say, moves
>>>  
>>> through space as a wave -- which explains the interference effects due
>>> to splitting into
>>> t
>>> wo waves, each emanating from one of the slits
>>
>>
>
> >> 
>> Then after it passes the double slit and that electron hits the
>> photographic
>> plate 
>> why does it always produce one and only one spot, not a smudge as one
>> wave should and not a interference pattern as as 2 waves should?
>
>
> > 
> It probably is a smudge, consistent with the UP.

NO! The electron NEVER produces a smudge on that
photographic
 plate regardless of if it went through one slit or 2 slits or no slit at
all. It ALWAYS produces a localized spot unless there is information on
which slot the electron went through. And even if there is which way
information if that information is erased after it passed the slits but
before it hits the photographic plate there will be a interference pattern.
Think about that for a minute, its in the past, the electron either went
through a slit or it didn't and if the arrow of time is real then there is
nothing you can do about it now, but apparently you can. Many Worlds
can explain this without the future changing the past, Copenhagen can't.

   > and is ALWAYS observed as localized in space, aka a PARTICLE.

But that particle is NEVER localized at the two slits,

it's only localized at the photographic plate,

so "observation" made it localized. And as they can't say how observation
does this, what qualifications it takes to be considered a legitimate
observer, or even explain exactly what "observation" is
,
Copenhagen might just as well say magic made it localized.

> > 
> That is, the wave collapses
>  
> into a particle!

And it does this because of a thing called "observation" aka magic.

> 
> There is no other reasonable interpretation of results of the double slit
> experiment,

There are no reasonable interpretations of the
 double slit experiment
! Nature is nuts, you may not like it but that's the way it is.

>> 
>> So tell me exactly what this *observer* thing is.   Exactly what is it
>> about observation that allows it to collapse the wave particle?
>
>

> >
> Dunno.

I've noticed. 

> 
> But using MWI without collapse, why do we get some particular value and
> not others?

A version of John Clark sees that particle have every value that doesn't
violate the laws of physics. T
he reason any particular John Clark sees only one value is because when the
particle splits at the 2 slits John Clark splits too.

>> 
>> those infinite number of observers are indistinguishable from only one,
>> and that's pretty simple.
>>
>
>
> 
> As simple as a woman who gives birth to twins, millions of times over and
> then some?

I have no idea what that question means, but I do know that a billion or
even a infinite number of identical universes is
indistinguishable from only one, both objectively and subjectively.   

>> 
>> Amongst the "Yes, I think MWI is true" crowd listed are Stephen Hawking
>> and Nobel Laureates Murray Gell-Mann andRichard Feynman. Gell-Mann and
>> Hawking recorded reservations with the name "many-worlds", but not with the
>> theory's content. Nobel Laureate Steven Weinberg is also mentioned as a
>> many-worlder "
>
>
> > 
> Your source is fact-challenged. Weinberg thinks MULTIVERSE may have merit,
> but NOT the MWI,

Then give me some facts! Where does Weinberg say that? And how can you
have a multiverse without many worlds or many worlds without a multiverse? 

> > 
> which he characterized as "repellent".

He said it was repellent, he did not say it was untrue, Weinberg also
said *"The
more the universe seems comprehensible, the more it also seems pointless"*;
I'm sure he doesn't like pointlessness but he wasn't implying that the
universe didn't exist. And Weinberg admits that repellent or not he doesn't
have a better idea. You didn't supply Weinberg's entire quote so I guess
I'll have to:

*"the measuring apparatus and the physicist are presumably also governed
by quantum mechanics, so ultimately we need interpretive postulates that do
not distinguish apparatus or physicists from the rest of the world, and
from which the usual postulates like the Born rule can be deduced. This
effort seems to lead to something like a "many worlds" interpretation,
which I find repellent. Alternatively, one can try to modify quantum
mechanics so that the wavefunction does describe reality, and collapses
stochastically and nonlinearly, but this seems to open up the possibility
of instantaneous communication. I work on the interpretation of quantum
mechanics from time to time, but have gotten nowhere."*

Richard
 Feynman felt much the same way, he wasn't happy with Many Worlds but he
had nothing better:

"*The *
*many-world picture says that the wave function ψ is what's real, and damn

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:56:39 PM UTC, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 11/26/2017 9:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>> On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, > wrote: 
>>
>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; introducing 
>>> Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it purports to do away 
>>> with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same memories and life 
>>> histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>>>
>>
>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is duplicated to 
>> an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants, an 
>> infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a 
>> finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?
>>
>>
>> That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular 
>> assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you justify that 
>> assumption?
>>
>
> The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the 
> universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe. Maybe it's 
> false; but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level I multiverse an 
> *argument* for its falseness? 
>
>
> A multiverse is not a strange hypothesis.  If the universe arose from some 
> physical process, then it is natural to suppose that same process could 
> operate to produce multiple universes.  This is true even for supernatural 
> creation: even if a god or gods created the universe they might very well 
> create many.
>
> Brent
>

Agreed. The subject is entirely speculative with zero evidence AFAICT. I 
don't believe in infinite repeats, and I offered a thought experiment to 
show a scenario with no repeats. AG 

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 3:28:20 PM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
> On Mon, 27 Nov 2017 at 6:23 pm, > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:12:09 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:54,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:

>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, 
> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>
> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
>> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than 
>> it purports 
>> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the 
>> same memories 
>> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 
>>
>
> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is 
> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth 
> and its 
> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of 
> this idea 
> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of 
> what we can 
> see?
>
>
> --stathis Papaioannou
>

 FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding 
 hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you 
 return to your 
 starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus 
 infinite; not 
 asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
 cannot 
 distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since 
 they also 
 concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that 
 would 
 likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
 some like 
 ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 

>>>
>>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple 
>>> copies of everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
>> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 
>>
>
> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, 
> why should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite 
> repetitions has 
> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>
>  
>>>
 If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
 configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
 finite 
 subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 
 10^100 m 
 out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
 -- 
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of 
>>> possible universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to 
>>> think 
>>> the parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random 
>>> process. AG 
>>>
>>
>> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number 
>> on the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic 
>> to 
>> the real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number 
>> representing our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>>
>
> But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I 
> am the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my 
> body that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal 
> place 
> of some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on 
> a 
> real number.
>  
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of 
 our universe won

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:13:32 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 4:48:12 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 24 Nov 2017, at 21:58, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, November 24, 2017 at 12:15:46 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 22 Nov 2017, at 22:51, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> * >  I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the 
 MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in 
 some 
 world.   **I see no reason for this assumption other than an 
 insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".*

>>>
>>> The MWI people don't have to assume anything because 
>>> there is absolutely nothing in t
>>> he Schrodinger 
>>> Wave E
>>> quation 
>>>  about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume 
>>> that somehow it does. 
>>>
>>>
>>> It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone 
>>> didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>
>> *Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name 
>> indicates, based on the assumption that all possible measurements MUST 
>> be 
>> measured, in this case in other worlds. *
>>
>>
>> That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the 
>> waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the 
>> assumption 
>> that the wave does not apply to the observer: they assumed QM was wrong 
>> for 
>> the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the conscious mind (Wigner, von 
>> Neumann) depending where you put the cut.
>>
>
> *CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results of 
> measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement will be 
> realized.*
>
> What do you mean by realize? 
>

  *Realized = Measured. AG*



 Measured by who? 

>>>
>>> Doesn't this same question come up in MWI, and with Many Worlds the 
>>> problem seems to metastasize. AG
>>>  
>>>
 More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the wave 
 is A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the particles. The waves 
 evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down. Are you OK to say that a 
 measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says that the measurement gives 
 either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but that NEVER occurs once we abandon 
 the collapse. So without collapse, a measurement is a first person 
 experience. In this case, it is arguably the same as the experience of 
 being duplicated.

>>>
>>> If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state 
>>> (without the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be able to 
>>> evaluate your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ). For example, I am 
>>> not clear how you apply linearly.Does each term in the sum represent a 
>>> tensor product? TIA AG
>>>
>>>
>>> I was just explaining that a measurement is any memorable interaction, 
>>> which is simplest to illustrate with a tensor product of Alice (|A>)and a 
>>> simple superposition. In your notation: |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> 
>>> |DN> .
>>>
>>
>> *Before the measurement Alice is NOT entangled with the entangled pair 
>> since it is isolated; *
>>
>>
>> Well, there is not entangled pair here. As I said, I was coming on the 
>> very basic: the linearity of the tensor product on superposition.
>>
>>
>>
>> *nor afterward since the system being measured is now NOT in a 
>> superposition of states. *
>>
>>
>> Assuming a collapse, which I don't. Without collapse, you can never 
>> eliminate a superposition. 
>>
>>
>>
>> * So your tensor addition is based on fallacies, *
>>
>>
>> ? Be explicit, please.
>>
>
> When you write  |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> |DN> , on left side 
> you're assuming Alice is entangled with the entangled pair. But she is NOT 
> since the entangled pair is assumed to be isolated before the measurement. 
> AG
>

Correction:
Since the right term on LHS is NOT the state of the entangled pair before 
measurement, it must be after measurement.  How can Alice be entangled wit

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM




On 11/26/2017 11:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 1:18 AM, > wrote:




On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:54:13 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC,
stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,
 wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM
UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at
5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,
 wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017
at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp
wrote:



On 26 November 2017 at
13:33,
 wrote:

You keep ignoring the
obvious 800 pound
gorilla in the room;
introducing Many
Worlds creates hugely
more complications
than it purports to do
away with; multiple,
indeed infinite
observers with the
same memories and life
histories for example.
Give me a break. AG


What about a single,
infinite world in which
everything is duplicated
to an arbitrary level of
detail, including the
Earth and its inhabitants,
an infinite number of
times? Is the bizarreness
of this idea an argument
for a finite world, ending
perhaps at the limit of
what we can see?


--stathis Papaioannou


FWIW, in my view we live in
huge, but finite, expanding
hypersphere, meaning in any
direction, if go far enough,
you return to your starting
position. Many cosmologists
say it's flat and thus
infinite; not asymptotically
flat and therefore spatially
finite. Measurements cannot
distinguish the two
possibilities. I don't buy the
former since they also concede
it is finite in age. A
Multiverse might exist, and
that would likely be infinite
in space and time, with
erupting BB universes, some
like ours, most definitely
not. Like I said, FWIW. AG


OK, but is the *strangeness* of a
multiverse with multiple copies of
everything *in itself* an argument
against it?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an
infini

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM




On 11/26/2017 10:45 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 17:36, > wrote:




On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC,
stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,
 wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM
UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,
 wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800
pound gorilla in the room;
introducing Many Worlds creates
hugely more complications than it
purports to do away with;
multiple, indeed infinite
observers with the same memories
and life histories for example.
Give me a break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in
which everything is duplicated to an
arbitrary level of detail, including
the Earth and its inhabitants, an
infinite number of times? Is the
bizarreness of this idea an argument
for a finite world, ending perhaps at
the limit of what we can see?


--stathis Papaioannou


FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but
finite, expanding hypersphere, meaning in
any direction, if go far enough, you
return to your starting position. Many
cosmologists say it's flat and thus
infinite; not asymptotically flat and
therefore spatially finite. Measurements
cannot distinguish the two possibilities.
I don't buy the former since they also
concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse
might exist, and that would likely be
infinite in space and time, with erupting
BB universes, some like ours, most
definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG


OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse
with multiple copies of everything *in itself*
an argument against it?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite
multiverse implies infinite copies of everything.
Has anyone proved that? AG


If there are uncountable possibilities for different
universes, why should there be any repetitions? I
don't think infinite repetitions has been proven, and
I don't believe it. AG

If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite
number of configurations and the Cosmological Principle is
correct, then every finite subset should repeat. It might
not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 m out it might
be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of
possible universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no
reason to think the parameters characterizing our universe
will come again in a random process. AG


Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some
number on the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something
isomorphic to the real line, what's the chance of the dart landing
on the number representing our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG


But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I 
am the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in 
my body that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth 
decimal place of some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land 
on a blob, not on a real number.


Right.  And a "universe" is not a well defin

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 4:48:12 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Nov 2017, at 21:58, agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, November 24, 2017 at 12:15:46 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 22 Nov 2017, at 22:51, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:


 On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



 On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> * >  I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of the 
>>> MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be realized in 
>>> some 
>>> world.   **I see no reason for this assumption other than an 
>>> insistence to fully reify the wf in order to avoid "collapse".*
>>>
>>
>> The MWI people don't have to assume anything because 
>> there is absolutely nothing in t
>> he Schrodinger 
>> Wave E
>> quation 
>>  about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have to assume that 
>> somehow it does. 
>>
>>
>> It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone 
>> didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>
> *Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name 
> indicates, based on the assumption that all possible measurements MUST be 
> measured, in this case in other worlds. *
>
>
> That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the 
> waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the assumption 
> that the wave does not apply to the observer: they assumed QM was wrong 
> for 
> the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the conscious mind (Wigner, von 
> Neumann) depending where you put the cut.
>

 *CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results of 
 measurements. They don't assert that every possible measurement will be 
 realized.*

 What do you mean by realize? 

>>>
>>>  *Realized = Measured. AG*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Measured by who? 
>>>
>>
>> Doesn't this same question come up in MWI, and with Many Worlds the 
>> problem seems to metastasize. AG
>>  
>>
>>> More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the wave 
>>> is A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the particles. The waves 
>>> evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down. Are you OK to say that a 
>>> measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says that the measurement gives 
>>> either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but that NEVER occurs once we abandon 
>>> the collapse. So without collapse, a measurement is a first person 
>>> experience. In this case, it is arguably the same as the experience of 
>>> being duplicated.
>>>
>>
>> If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state (without 
>> the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be able to evaluate 
>> your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ). For example, I am not clear 
>> how you apply linearly.Does each term in the sum represent a tensor 
>> product? TIA AG
>>
>>
>> I was just explaining that a measurement is any memorable interaction, 
>> which is simplest to illustrate with a tensor product of Alice (|A>)and a 
>> simple superposition. In your notation: |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> 
>> |DN> .
>>
>
> *Before the measurement Alice is NOT entangled with the entangled pair 
> since it is isolated; *
>
>
> Well, there is not entangled pair here. As I said, I was coming on the 
> very basic: the linearity of the tensor product on superposition.
>
>
>
> *nor afterward since the system being measured is now NOT in a 
> superposition of states. *
>
>
> Assuming a collapse, which I don't. Without collapse, you can never 
> eliminate a superposition. 
>
>
>
> * So your tensor addition is based on fallacies, *
>
>
> ? Be explicit, please.
>

When you write  |A> (|UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> |DN> , on left side 
you're assuming Alice is entangled with the entangled pair. But she is NOT 
since the entangled pair is assumed to be isolated before the measurement. 
AG


> Bruno
>
>
>
> *which I infer permeates your general analysis of this situation. BTW, 
> please see my last post where I raised additional issues. TY, AG*
>
>>
>> In the case of the singlet state, it is more subtle, as  |UP>|DN> - 
>> |DN>|UP> describes a many-worlds with Alice having a spin in any direction, 
>> and Bob, too but the opposite relatively to each others (the notation is 
>> misleading). We

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM




On 11/26/2017 10:20 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:54, > wrote:




On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC,
agrays...@gmail.com  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC,
stathisp wrote:



On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,
 wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound
gorilla in the room; introducing Many Worlds
creates hugely more complications than it
purports to do away with; multiple, indeed
infinite observers with the same memories and
life histories for example. Give me a break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which
everything is duplicated to an arbitrary level of
detail, including the Earth and its inhabitants,
an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of
this idea an argument for a finite world, ending
perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


--stathis Papaioannou


FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite,
expanding hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go
far enough, you return to your starting position. Many
cosmologists say it's flat and thus infinite; not
asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite.
Measurements cannot distinguish the two possibilities.
I don't buy the former since they also concede it is
finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that
would likely be infinite in space and time, with
erupting BB universes, some like ours, most definitely
not. Like I said, FWIW. AG


OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple
copies of everything *in itself* an argument against it?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse
implies infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG


If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes,
why should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite
repetitions has been proven, and I don't believe it. AG

If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
finite subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius 
of 10^100 m out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.


If there is a repetition, is it really a different universe?  What 
happened to Leibniz's identity of indiscernibles?


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM




On 11/26/2017 9:48 PM, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:25, >
wrote:



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the
room; introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more
complications than it purports to do away with;
multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same
memories and life histories for example. Give me a
break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the
Earth and its inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is
the bizarreness of this idea an argument for a finite
world, ending perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


--stathis Papaioannou


FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding
hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you
return to your starting position. Many cosmologists say it's
flat and thus infinite; not asymptotically flat and therefore
spatially finite. Measurements cannot distinguish the two
possibilities. I don't buy the former since they also concede
it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that would
likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB
universes, some like ours, most definitely not. Like I said,
FWIW. AG


OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies
of everything *in itself* an argument against it?

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou



FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG


I think it depends on assumptions about what kind of infinities are 
involved.  Is spacetime a continuum?  Is the universe spacially finite?  
Does the Planck scale imply the universe has only countably many 
possibilities?  Nobody proves anything in science; and in this case it's 
hard to get any empirical evidence.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM




On 11/26/2017 9:39 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On 27 November 2017 at 16:19, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


On 27/11/2017 4:06 pm, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On 26 November 2017 at 13:33, mailto:agrayson2...@gmail.com>> wrote:

You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications
than it purports to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite
observers with the same memories and life histories for
example. Give me a break. AG


What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth
and its inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the
bizarreness of this idea an argument for a finite world, ending
perhaps at the limit of what we can see?


That conclusion for the Level I multiverse depends on a particular
assumption about the initial probability distribution. Can you
justify that assumption?


The assumption is the Cosmological Principle, that the part of the 
universe that we can see is typical of the rest of the universe. Maybe 
it's false; but my question is, is the strangeness of a Level I 
multiverse an *argument* for its falseness?


A multiverse is not a strange hypothesis.  If the universe arose from 
some physical process, then it is natural to suppose that same process 
could operate to produce multiple universes.  This is true even for 
supernatural creation: even if a god or gods created the universe they 
might very well create many.


Brent

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On 26 Nov 2017, at 21:56, Lawrence Crowell wrote:


On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 8:22:37 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Nov 2017, at 00:15, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here.  
In weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing  
things properly.


Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin  
1/2 particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do  
not have the two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that  
is identifiable. The degrees of freedom for the two spins are  
replaced with those of the entanglement state. It really makes no  
sense to talk about the individual spin particles existing. If the  
observer makes a measurement that results in a measurement the  
entanglement state is "violently" lost, the entanglement phase is  
transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, and the  
individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement.


We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the  
entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to  
any idea there is some "geography" associated with the individual  
spins. There in fact really is no such thing as the individual  
spins. The loss of the entangled state replaces that with the two  
spin states. Since there is no "metric" specifying where the spins  
are before the measurement there is no sense to ideas of any causal  
action that ties the two resulting spins.


I agree. But we can trace out locally the prediction possible, and  
this explains locally the results in the MW view, not so in the mono- 
universe view which requires some (incomprehensible) action at a  
distance. That is why I took the Aspect confirmation that QM violate  
Bell's inequality (well the CHSH's one) as a confirmation of the  
physical existence of the parallel computations/worlds, and not of  
action at a distance.


The MWI has worlds in superposition, which as you say is preferable  
to the idea of some action at a distance. I have had many email  
battles with people over this, but this idea of action at a distance  
or its space plus time version of retrocausality keeps coming up. It  
is like shooting ducks in a carnival shooting gallery; you can shoot  
them down but the damned things keep popping back up. This does not  
mean I am a convert to the MWI interpretation. In many ways M-theory  
of D-branes is more friendly to the Copenhagen Interpretation, where  
D-branes are condensates of strings that form a classical(like)  
structure that act in ways as decoherence systems on strings. The ψ- 
epistemic viewpoint has some merits with respect to looking at the  
classical world as a way that information or Bayesian updates can be  
made on quantum systems. The problem of course with this is it leads  
into a sort of quantum solipsism  The converse ψ-ontological  
perspective avoids this classical-quantum dichotomy, but I have  
always found problems with the issue of contextuality. This goes  
back to my pointing out how MWI fails to indicate how an observer is  
"pushed" into a particular eigenbranch of the world and how this  
occurs at a given time. With the lack of simultaneity in special  
relativity and spacetime in general what is the spatial surface at  
which the world wave function appears to split according to an  
observer?


Such question needs in fine a quantum theory of space-time/gravitation.

I am personally convinced that EPR-BELL violation + a mono-universe +  
minimal physical realism do lead to action at a distance. But I do  
think such action disappear when seen in the big wave or matrix picture.











This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we  
are thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking  
about our problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is  
ontic or epistemic. It could be that we are a bit like dogs with  
respect to the quantum world. I have several dogs and one thing  
that is clear is they do not understand spatial relationships well;  
they get leashes and chains all tangled up and if they get wrapped  
up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to get out of it.  
In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power and will  
never be able to understand QM in some way that has a completeness  
with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality. There is also a  
far more radical possibility. It is that a measurement of a quantum  
system is ultimately a set of quantum states that are encoding  
information about quantum states. This is the a quantum form of  
Turing's Universal Turing Machine that emulates other Turing  
machines, or a sort of Goedel self-referential process. If this is  
the case we may be faced with the prospect there can't ever be a  
complete understanding of the ontic and epistemic nature of quantum  
mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by any axiomatic  
stru

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

On 25 Nov 2017, at 19:16, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:

On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 3:39:00 PM UTC, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Nov 23, 2017 at 4:08 PM,  wrote:

>>> Do you really think that when you pull a slot machine  
and get some outcome, the 10 million other possible outcomes occur  
in 10 million other universe?

>> I could be wrong but that would be my best guess.

> Is the slot machine duplicated in those 10 million new  
universes?

If the Schrodinger Wave Equation really means what it says  
then the answer can only be yes.

Since your conclusions seem immensely more bizarre than collapse of  
the wf, your interpretation of what the SE means must be in error. AG

"finding bizarre" is a personal opinion, which is not valid in an  
definitive argument, but it can be used to justify or not a new axiom.

What we have with the SWE is a theory which predicts bifurcating and  
fusing histories/computation. By linearity you can start from many  
histories, and consider that there is only differentiation (on first  
person content of memory of experiences).

It is already provable in very weak fragments of arithmetic that all  
pieces of computations, halting of not, exists in Arithmetic and are  
emulated infinitely often by infinitely many universal machine/number.

So the many worlds/histories aspect of reality is to be expected for a  
mechanist/cartesian philosopher/inquirer. It is "one universe" which  
would be weird.

Now, to avoid that histories-proliferation, and contemplate oneself in  
the mirror feeling to be unique, the founders of QM added to the SWE  
the collapse postulate, which lead to the measurement problem: which  
is just the problem of explaining what is that collapse. It leads to  
third person (3p) indeterminacy, and 3p influence at a distance, and  
this with ten thousand of incompatible incompatible theories, most of  
them refuted by experiences (from Borh's idea that QM worked only on  
the microscopic scale, to Wigner's idea that consciousness was  
responsible for the cut (which is the only one theory  
undistinguishable from Everett phenomenologically, except for Bohm  
hidden variables which simulates the whole wave to interact at a  
distance unusable information to give to primitively material  
particles the ability to select consciousness in the many histories,  
and this leads to infinitely many weird creature, looking like p- 
zombies, but lacking consciousness and material particles (yet having  
some role in the absence or presence of light on my computer screen.  
If that is not bizarre,

At some level, the error of adding the collapse, is the same error  
done by Aristotle to Plato, adding a "real universe" in the Ocean of  
Ideas proposed by Plato. That has lead to the Mind-Body problem, which  
is the same as the problem of the foundation of Theology (What is the  
Mind? What is Matter? and how are they related). The quantum  
measurement problem is a sort of toy version of the Mind-Body problem,  
and its solution consists (and has to consist if we assume digital  
Mechanism) in extracting physics from a measure on first person  
(hopefully plural) from a relative state statistics on all  
computations. We have to justify what the quantum computations win in  
the first person limit, in arithmetic.

Monism imposes to embed the knower in the picture. Newton would have  
agreed that a physicist of mass m1 attracts a physicist of mass m2  
following the law of gravitation, and many accept the idea that  
physics applies on physicists, and that is only what Everett did.
Now, with Gödel's 1931 technic we can embed the mathematicians (or an  
approximation, without Mechanism) in arithmetic, and we can see that  
the monist and mechanist mind-body problem reduces into justifying  
physics from the experiences available in arithmetic of the universal  
(Turing) Machine. We keep monism, and get a very simple conceptual  
realm or reality, and then explains the experience by the lawfulness  
of arithmetic, as seen from inside using Gödel's definition of  
"belief" and its many intensional arithmetical or non arithmetical  
variants.

Bruno

  The Copenhagen people felt that was just too  
strange so they stuck stuff into their theory that the mathematics  
alone didn't say, as a result they got rid of one form of weirdness,  
the multiverse, but inadvertently created two new forms of  
weirdness: the future can effect the past and things only exist when  
you look at them. There is just no way to stamp out the weird from  
the quantum world and be consistent with experiment.

> And the gambler cranking it? And the casino? And the city  
where the casino is resident? And Andromeda, and beyond, up to and  
including the BB?

Yes, and that raises another question, how can the MWI produce  
finite probabilities if infinite numbers are involved? To make  
matters even worse the infinite numbers involved are not even

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

2017-11-27 Thread Lawrence Crowell

On Sunday, November 26, 2017 at 8:29:22 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 24 Nov 2017, at 15:59, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 5:53:14 PM UTC-6, Bruce wrote:
>>
>> On 24/11/2017 10:15 am, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 9:37:48 AM UTC-6, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
>>>
>>>
>>> On 20 Nov 2017, at 23:04, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> You clearly have not grasped the implications of my argument. The idea 
>>> that "MWI replaces all nonsensical weirdness by one fact (many histories)" 
>>> does not work, and is not really an explanation at all -- you are simply 
>>> evading the issue.
>>>
>>>
>>> Without collapse, the apparent correlations are explained by the linear 
>>> evolution, and the linear tensor products only. I have not yet seen one 
>>> proof that some action at a distance are at play in quantum mechanics, 
>>> although I agree that would be the case if the outcome where unique, as 
>>> EPER/BELL show convincingly.
>>>
>>> Aspect experience was a shock for many, because they find action at a 
>>> distance astonishing, but are unaware of the many-worlds, or just want to 
>>> dismiss it directly as pure science fiction. But after Aspect, the choice 
>>> is really between deterministic and local QM + many worlds, or one world 
>>> and 3p indeterminacy and non locality. Like Maudlin said, choose your 
>>> poison.
>>>
>>>
>>> Bruno
>>>
>>> Bruce
>>>
>>>
>> I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here. In 
>> weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing things 
>> properly. 
>>
>> Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin 1/2 
>> particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not have the 
>> two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is identifiable. The 
>> degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced with those of the 
>> entanglement state. It really makes no sense to talk about the individual 
>> spin particles existing. If the observer makes a measurement that results 
>> in a measurement the entanglement state is "violently" lost, the 
>> entanglement phase is transmitted to the needle states of the apparatus, 
>> and the individual spin degrees of freedom replace the entanglement. 
>>
>> We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the 
>> entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to any idea 
>> there is some "geography" associated with the individual spins. There in 
>> fact really is no such thing as the individual spins. The loss of the 
>> entangled state replaces that with the two spin states. Since there is no 
>> "metric" specifying where the spins are before the measurement there is no 
>> sense to ideas of any causal action that ties the two resulting spins. 
>>
>> This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we are 
>> thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking about our 
>> problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is ontic or epistemic. 
>> It could be that we are a bit like dogs with respect to the quantum world. 
>> I have several dogs and one thing that is clear is they do not understand 
>> spatial relationships well; they get leashes and chains all tangled up and 
>> if they get wrapped up around a pole they simply can't figure out how to 
>> get out of it. In this sense we human are simply limited in brain power and 
>> will never be able to understand QM in some way that has a completeness 
>> with respect to causality, reality and nonlocality. There is also a far 
>> more radical possibility. It is that a measurement of a quantum system is 
>> ultimately a set of quantum states that are encoding information about 
>> quantum states. This is the a quantum form of Turing's Universal Turing 
>> Machine that emulates other Turing machines, or a sort of Goedel 
>> self-referential process. If this is the case we may be faced with the 
>> prospect there can't ever be a complete understanding of the ontic and 
>> epistemic nature of quantum mechanics. It is in some sense not knowable by 
>> any axiomatic structure.
>>
>>
>> Hi Lawrence, and welcome to the 'everything' list. I have come here to 
>> avoid the endless politics on the 'avoid' list.
>> The issue that we have been discussing with EPR pairs is whether many 
>> worlds avoids the implications of Bell's theorem, so that a purely local 
>> understanding of EPR is available in Everettian models. I have argued that 
>> this is not the case -- that non-locality is inherent in the entangled 
>> singlet state, and many worlds does not avoid this non-locality. I think 
>> from what you say above that you might well agree with this position.
>>
>> Bruce
>>
>
> Of course MWI can do nothing of the sort. MWI suffers from much the same 
> problem all quantum interpretations suffer from. 
>
>
> I don't see this. the MW theory (that is the WWE without the collapse 
> axiom) explains the violation

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On 25 Nov 2017, at 18:55, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Saturday, November 25, 2017 at 3:06:50 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell  
wrote:
On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 9:21:14 PM UTC-6,  
agrays...@gmail.com wrote:



On Thursday, November 23, 2017 at 11:15:40 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell  
wrote:



I am new to this list and have not followed all the arguments here.  
In weighing in here I might be making an error of not addressing  
things properly.


Consider quantum entanglements, say the entanglements of two spin  
1/2 particles. In the singlet state |+>|-> + |->|+> we really do not  
have the two spin particles. The entanglement state is all that is  
identifiable. The degrees of freedom for the two spins are replaced  
with those of the entanglement state. It really makes no sense to  
talk about the individual spin particles existing. If the observer  
makes a measurement that results in a measurement the entanglement  
state is "violently" lost, the entanglement phase is transmitted to  
the needle states of the apparatus, and the individual spin degrees  
of freedom replace the entanglement.


We have some trouble understanding this, for the decoherence of the  
entangled state occurs with that state as a "unit;" it is blind to  
any idea there is some "geography" associated with the individual  
spins. There in fact really is no such thing as the individual  
spins. The loss of the entangled state replaces that with the two  
spin states. Since there is no "metric" specifying where the spins  
are before the measurement there is no sense to ideas of any causal  
action that ties the two resulting spins.


This chaffs our idea of physical causality, but this is because we  
are thinking in classical terms. There are two ways of thinking  
about our problem with understanding whether quantum mechanics is  
ontic or epistemic.


The fact that probability waves evolve and interfere with each  
other, and effect ensembles but not individual members, is  
inherently baffling. So the wf can't be completely epistemic since  
it modifies physical reality. That is, It must be ontic in some  
respect, but in ways that defy rational analysis. AG


I think you are falling into a trap that David Hume warns against.  
Causality gives rise to correlation, but correlation is not  
necessarily the result of causality. There is no effect or some  
causal principle at work with either individual wave functions or  
wave functions in an ensemble of experiments. The ensemble of  
experiments, the classic case being the two slit experiment, is  
meant to deduces the wave nature of the quantum physics. It is not  
there to deduce some causal influence underlying quantum nonlocality.


LC

Applying deBroglie's formula, a change in p changes the wave length,  
and thus the distribution on the screen. That is, the ensemble  
responds to changes in the wave length due to interference. I  
therefore deduce that the wave length has a physical effect on the  
ensemble, but not on individual outcomes. AG


But then how do you explain that there a parts of the screen where we  
can predict that no photon at all will get there, even when sent  
individually?


Bruno




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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On 24 Nov 2017, at 21:58, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:




On Friday, November 24, 2017 at 12:15:46 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 22 Nov 2017, at 22:51, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Wednesday, November 22, 2017 at 5:24:48 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 22 Nov 2017, at 09:55, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Tuesday, November 21, 2017 at 12:43:05 PM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 20 Nov 2017, at 20:40, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Monday, November 20, 2017 at 6:56:52 AM UTC-7, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:


On 18 Nov 2017, at 21:32, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:




On Saturday, November 18, 2017 at 1:17:25 PM UTC-7, Brent wrote:


On 11/18/2017 8:58 AM, John Clark wrote:
>  I think "must" is unwarranted, certainly in the case of  
the MWI. Rather, it ASSUMES all possible measurements must be  
realized in some world.   I see no reason for this  
assumption other than an insistence to fully reify the wf in  
order to avoid "collapse".


The MWI people don't have to assume anything because there is  
absolutely nothing in t he Schrodinger Wave E  
quation  about collapsing, its the Copenhagen people who have  
to assume that somehow it does. 


It's not just an assumption.  It's an observation.  The SE alone  
didn't explain the observation, hence the additional ideas.


Brent

Moreover, MWI DOES make additional assumptions, as its name  
indicates, based on the assumption that all possible  
measurements MUST be measured, in this case in other worlds.


That is not an assumption. It is the quasi-literal reading of the  
waves. It is Copenhagen who added an assumption, basically the  
assumption that the wave does not apply to the observer: they  
assumed QM was wrong for the macroscopic world (Bohr) or for the  
conscious mind (Wigner, von Neumann) depending where you put the  
cut.


CMIIAW, but I see it, the postulates tell us the possible results  
of measurements. They don't assert that every possible  
measurement will be realized.

What do you mean by realize?

 Realized = Measured. AG



Measured by who?

Doesn't this same question come up in MWI, and with Many Worlds the  
problem seems to metastasize. AG


More precisely, if Alice look at a particle is state up+down: the  
wave is A(up + down) = A up + A down. Then A looks at the  
particles. The waves evolves into A-saw-up up + A-saw-down down.  
Are you OK to say that a measurement has occurred? Copenhagen says  
that the measurement gives either A-saw-up up or A-saw-up down, but  
that NEVER occurs once we abandon the collapse. So without  
collapse, a measurement is a first person experience. In this case,  
it is arguably the same as the experience of being duplicated.


If you could revise your reply using the wf of the singlet state  
(without the normalizing factor) in the following form, I might be  
able to evaluate your analysis; namely, ( |UP>|DN> - |DN>|UP> ).  
For example, I am not clear how you apply linearly.Does each term  
in the sum represent a tensor product? TIA AG


I was just explaining that a measurement is any memorable  
interaction, which is simplest to illustrate with a tensor product  
of Alice (|A>)and a simple superposition. In your notation: |A> (| 
UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> |DN> .


Before the measurement Alice is NOT entangled with the entangled  
pair since it is isolated;


Well, there is not entangled pair here. As I said, I was coming on the  
very basic: the linearity of the tensor product on superposition.




nor afterward since the system being measured is now NOT in a  
superposition of states.


Assuming a collapse, which I don't. Without collapse, you can never  
eliminate a superposition.





So your tensor addition is based on fallacies,


? Be explicit, please.

Bruno



which I infer permeates your general analysis of this situation.  
BTW, please see my last post where I raised additional issues. TY, AG


In the case of the singlet state, it is more subtle, as  |UP>|DN> - | 
DN>|UP> describes a many-worlds with Alice having a spin in any  
direction, and Bob, too but the opposite relatively to each others  
(the notation is misleading). We must keep in mind the rotational  
invariance of the spin. So we the Alice Bob situation is more  
intricate and tedious to describe.
Sometimes I referred to the simple account of this in the Everett  
FAQ by Michael Clive Price, but it seems not available since some  
times. We have copied the relevant details in previous discussions  
though, so you might try to find it in the archives with the key  
word "Michael", or something. I have unfortunately not the time  
"here and now".  Later perhaps. With Everett, it is important to  
reason independently of the bases in between the measurements.


I guess you see that violation of the BI leads to "action at a  
distance" if we assume a collapse, or a mono-world theory.  I don't  
see Bell' argument applying in the MW context, though.


Bruno





Without collapse, the measureme

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On 24 Nov 2017, at 20:32, Jason Resch wrote:




On Fri, Nov 24, 2017 at 1:15 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:



I was just explaining that a measurement is any memorable  
interaction, which is simplest to illustrate with a tensor product  
of Alice (|A>)and a simple superposition. In your notation: |A> (| 
UP> + |DN>) = |A> |UP>  + |A> |DN> .


In the case of the singlet state, it is more subtle, as  |UP>|DN> - | 
DN>|UP> describes a many-worlds with Alice having a spin in any  
direction, and Bob, too but the opposite relatively to each others  
(the notation is misleading). We must keep in mind the rotational  
invariance of the spin. So we the Alice Bob situation is more  
intricate and tedious to describe.
Sometimes I referred to the simple account of this in the Everett  
FAQ by Michael Clive Price, but it seems not available since some  
times. We have copied the relevant details in previous discussions  
though, so you might try to find it in the archives with the key  
word "Michael", or something. I have unfortunately not the time  
"here and now".  Later perhaps. With Everett, it is important to  
reason independently of the bases in between the measurements.


I guess you see that violation of the BI leads to "action at a  
distance" if we assume a collapse, or a mono-world theory.  I don't  
see Bell' argument applying in the MW context, though.


Bruno





Is this the Many Worlds FAQ you were referring to? 
http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/manyworlds.html


Yes, that one! Thank you Jason!




I think the parts relevant to EPR, Bell Inequality and Locality (for  
those interested) are Q12 and Q32.


Yes, right, and also its appendices. (Not sure why the page contains  
the whole FAQ in two exemplars).


I am glad it is still available online, as it is, imo, a very good FAQ  
on Everett. I just saw that M. C. Price also recall that Everett gives  
a new theory, not a new interpretation. Good! Usually only logicians  
see this!


Best,

Bruno





Jason

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Re: [foar] Bell's theorem

On 24 Nov 2017, at 03:43, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sat, Jul 20, 2013 at 1:38 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

On 19 Jul 2013, at 20:30, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Jul 19, 2013 at 10:59 AM, Kermit Rose   
wrote:

> Is not the polarization of the photon the hidden variable that  
determines the probability of the photon making it through the  
filter?

That is what most people thought until experiments proved that  
simply cannot be the explanation because Bell's inequality is  
violated. And if that seems like a crazy way for the world to  
operate don't blame me blame God, I sent in a   resume but  
unfortunately Yahweh got the job.

>> Even if Quantum Mechanics is someday proven to be untrue Bell's  
argument is still valid, in fact his original paper had no Quantum  
Mechanics in it;

> Exactly.  This is why I am puzzled, and why I question the  
validity of the Bell inequality.

Bell proved that any system that obeys ANY theory that works by  
hidden variables MUST have certain properties; we find from  
experiment that the world does NOT have those certain properties,  
therefore the world CANNOT work by hidden variables and any theory  
that tries to use them, now or in the future, is going to fail.  
Quantum Mechanics does not work by hidden variables and that is one  
reason it has not failed.

> his point was that any successful theory about the world must  
explain why his inequality is violated.

> Does Quantum Mechanics explain why his inequality is violated?

Nope, it predicts it but doesn't explain it,

Contrary to computationalism which both predict and explain non  
locality, non cloning of matter, and indeterminacy. We will get  
there fter I have explained computability and provability, and the  
intensional nuance brought by incompleteness. But the UDA gives the  
intuition why it would be astonishing to get the Bell inequality not  
violated.

Bruno,

I was wondering if you could shed some light on how the UDA would  
lead one to expect the violation of the Bell inequality.

Hi Jason,

I was alluding to the non-locality inherent in the fact that we (any  
conscious being in virtue of having a brain/computer)  cannot be aware  
of the delays for the reconstitution in the Universal Dovetailing. We  
can expect violation of any criteria of locality, like we could expect  
to be able to travel space at a speed greater than light, by, in some  
spaceship, annihilating us+diary+clock and reconstituting us with some  
large delay of 3p local spaceship-time for example. Note that this  
could even make us expect non-locality in a multiverse,, but this is  
almost trivial as we could a priori (without taking into account the  
constraints of being a machine referring to itself) anything to  
happen, which is another way to present the white rabbit/white noise  
prediction. The locality, and lawful appearance of the physical  
universe seems to contradict the locality and computability of the  
physical laws, which eventually have to be explained by taking all  
computations into account, including facts which might take  
10^(1000^1000) UD-steps in the dovetailing.  The UD itself is local,  
but the first person indeterminacy from which the laws of physics  
emerge is typically not local (and this is similar to what I think  
about the non-locality in one branch of the wave, but not in the whole  
wave).

Then, in the math of the phenomenal observable, Z1*, the problem is  
still open, but you would need a conspiracy (or "bad luck") for not  
having Bell's inequality not violated, given its showing us already a  
quantum highly non boolean aspect. But that is still an open problem  
due to the non tractability of G* for many nested modal boxes.

I hope this helped a little bit. I gave once a similar explanation for  
non-cloning. We could, with the UDA, expect that we cannot clone a  
physical object exactly, because a priori, it is only an appearance  
based on the infinities of computations going through our "actual  
mental state below our susbstitution level.

Best,

Bruno

Jason

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Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

2017-11-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Mon, 27 Nov 2017 at 6:23 pm,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 7:12:09 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:54,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>


 On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

 You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
> purports
> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the 
> same memories
> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>

 What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
 duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth 
 and its
 inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of 
 this idea
 an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of 
 what we can
 see?


 --stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding
>>> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return 
>>> to your
>>> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus 
>>> infinite; not
>>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
>>> cannot
>>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since 
>>> they also
>>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that 
>>> would
>>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
>>> some like
>>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG
>>>
>>
>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies
>> of everything *in itself* an argument against it?
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies
> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG
>

 If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why
 should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has
 been proven, and I don't believe it. AG


>>
>>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
>>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
>>> finite
>>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 
>>> 10^100 m
>>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of
>> possible universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to 
>> think
>> the parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random
>> process. AG
>>
>
> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on
> the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the
> real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number 
> representing
> our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>

 But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am
 the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body
 that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of
 some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a
 real number.


 --
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of
>>> our universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are
>>> uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a
>>> theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single electron at a double slit and
>>> creates an uncountable number of identical universe except for the
>>>

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM

2017-11-27 Thread Jason Resch

On Monday, November 27, 2017,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 8:03:47 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 12:54 AM,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>


 On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:

>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:



 On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:

 You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room;
> introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
> purports
> to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the 
> same memories
> and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG
>

 What about a single, infinite world in which everything is
 duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth 
 and its
 inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of 
 this idea
 an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of 
 what we can
 see?


 --stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding
>>> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return 
>>> to your
>>> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus 
>>> infinite; not
>>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
>>> cannot
>>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since 
>>> they also
>>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that 
>>> would
>>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
>>> some like
>>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG
>>>
>>
>> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies
>> of everything *in itself* an argument against it?
>>
>> --
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies
> infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG
>

 If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why
 should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has
 been proven, and I don't believe it. AG


>>
>>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of
>>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
>>> finite
>>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 
>>> 10^100 m
>>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of
>> possible universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to 
>> think
>> the parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random
>> process. AG
>>
>
> Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on
> the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the
> real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number 
> representing
> our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG
>

 But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am
 the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body
 that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of
 some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a
 real number.


 --
 Stathis Papaioannou

>>>
>>> Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of
>>> our universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are
>>> uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a
>>> theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single electron at a double slit and
>>> creates an uncountable number of identical universe except for the
>>>

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM



On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 8:03:47 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 12:54 AM, > 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:45:43 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 27 November 2017 at 17:36,  wrote:
>>>


 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:30:34 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 6:21:30 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On 27 November 2017 at 16:54,  wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:48:58 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>>> wrote:



 On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:44:25 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>
>
>
> On 27 November 2017 at 16:25,  wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, November 27, 2017 at 5:07:03 AM UTC, stathisp wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 26 November 2017 at 13:33,  wrote:
>>>
>>> You keep ignoring the obvious 800 pound gorilla in the room; 
 introducing Many Worlds creates hugely more complications than it 
 purports 
 to do away with; multiple, indeed infinite observers with the same 
 memories 
 and life histories for example. Give me a break. AG 

>>>
>>> What about a single, infinite world in which everything is 
>>> duplicated to an arbitrary level of detail, including the Earth and 
>>> its 
>>> inhabitants, an infinite number of times? Is the bizarreness of 
>>> this idea 
>>> an argument for a finite world, ending perhaps at the limit of what 
>>> we can 
>>> see?
>>>
>>>
>>> --stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> FWIW, in my view we live in huge, but finite, expanding 
>> hypersphere, meaning in any direction, if go far enough, you return 
>> to your 
>> starting position. Many cosmologists say it's flat and thus 
>> infinite; not 
>> asymptotically flat and therefore spatially finite. Measurements 
>> cannot 
>> distinguish the two possibilities. I don't buy the former since they 
>> also 
>> concede it is finite in age. A Multiverse might exist, and that 
>> would 
>> likely be infinite in space and time, with erupting BB universes, 
>> some like 
>> ours, most definitely not. Like I said, FWIW. AG 
>>
>
> OK, but is the *strangeness* of a multiverse with multiple copies 
> of everything *in itself* an argument against it? 
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou
>

 FWIW, I don't buy the claim that an infinite multiverse implies 
 infinite copies of everything. Has anyone proved that? AG 

>>>
>>> If there are uncountable possibilities for different universes, why 
>>> should there be any repetitions? I don't think infinite repetitions has 
>>> been proven, and I don't believe it. AG 
>>>
>>>  
>
>> If a finite subset of the universe has only a finite number of 
>> configurations and the Cosmological Principle is correct, then every 
>> finite 
>> subset should repeat. It might not; for example, from a radius of 10^100 
>> m 
>> out it might be just be vacuum forever, or Donald Trump dolls.
>> -- 
>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>
>
> Our universe might be finite, but the parameter variations of possible 
> universes might be uncountable. If so, there's no reason to think the 
> parameters characterizing our universe will come again in a random 
> process. 
> AG 
>

 Think of it this way; if our universe is represented by some number on 
 the real line, and you throw darts randomly at something isomorphic to the 
 real line, what's the chance of the dart landing on the number 
 representing 
 our universe?. ANSWER: ZERO. AG

>>>
>>> But the structures we may be interested in are finite. I feel that I am 
>>> the same person from moment to moment despite multiple changes in my body 
>>> that are grossly observable, so changes in the millionth decimal place of 
>>> some parameter won't bother me. The dart has to land on a blob, not on a 
>>> real number.
>>>  
>>>
>>> -- 
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>>>
>>
>> Don't you like thought experiments? I have shown that the parameters of 
>> our universe won't come up in a random process if the possibilities are 
>> uncountable (and possibly even if they're countable).  Maybe you prefer a 
>> theory where Joe the Plumber shoots a single electron at a double slit and 
>> creates an uncountable number of identical universe except for the 
>> variation in outcomes. Does this make more sense to you? AG
>>
>
> I think your distaste with MWI comes from an incorrect view of

Re: Consistency of Postulates of QM