Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 8:47 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 6/25/2018 5:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 1:54 PM, Brent Meeker 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 6/24/2018 6:43 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 3:30 PM, John Clark  wrote:
>>
>>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Jason Resch 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> ​>* ​*
 *The only thing I am asking is:*
 *1) Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.*
 *2) ??? -> Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.*
 *Do we have enough information to decide between the above two
 theories?  Have we really ruled out anything sitting below physics?*

>>>
>>> If I define physics as the thing that can tell the difference between a
>>> correct computation and a incorrect computation and between a corrupted
>>> memory and a uncorrupted memory, and as long as we're at this philosophic
>>> meta level that's not a  b ad definition, then I don't think anything
>>> is below physics.
>>>
>>
>> Physical theories are based on induction from observations and
>> experiences.
>>
>> That process won't give us answers to these famous questions, posed by
>> physicists:
>>
>>1. Leibniz: "*Why is there something rather than nothing?*"
>>
>>   "The reason that there is Something rather than Nothing is that Nothing
>> is unstable."
>>   -- Frank Wilczek, Nobel Laureate, physics 2004
>>
>
> That is perhaps a reasonable analogy for the "quantum vacuum", but not the
> philosophical nothing.  For something with the capacity to decay into
> something else, cannot rightfully be called nothing.
>
>
> As Lawrence Krauss says the vacuum is just the potential for not being
> nothing.  The philosopher's "nothing" is incoherent.
>

I agree the philosopher's nothing is incoherent.  But the quantum vacuum's
appearance is not really an answer to the question of why there is
something rather than nothing.

I think it is a much stronger statement to say "because nothing is
incoherent" or "because nothing is impossible", but even then such
explanations will depend on a logic/law/principal (Perhaps you would call
this *Logos*) that is inherent to the structure of reality.  If logic
governs the necessity of reality, and can give rise to it, how do you see
logic as isolated from true statements about arithmetic?



>
>
>
>>
>>
>>1. Hawking: "*What is it that breathes fire into the equations* and
>>makes a universe for them to describe? The usual approach of science of
>>constructing a mathematical model cannot answer the questions of why there
>>should be a universe for the model to describe. Why does the universe go 
>> to
>>all the bother of existing?"
>>
>> "What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!"
>>  --- Norm Levitt, after Quine
>>
>
> Everything theories can explain away the arbitrariness of the equations.
>
>
> On the contrary, they make everything arbitrary.
>
>
This is only a problem for those theoretical physicists who still dream of
one day deriving a single unique set of physical laws (matching our laws)
directly from logic/mathematics.


>
>
>>
>>
>>1. Feynman: "It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we
>>understand them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of
>>logical operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a
>>region of space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that
>>be going on in that tiny space? *Why should it take an infinite
>>amount of logic to figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going 
>> to
>>do?*"
>>
>>
>> "Because the world is made of physics, not logic."
>> - Brent Meeker
>>
>
> That's circular. You're defining physics as something that inherently
> should have the appearance of infinities, without a justification.  I think
> it is is a mystery in want of an explanation.
>
>
> Oh, and mathematics makes it exist is not a mystery?
>

In terms of providing an explanation from simpler assumptions, it reduces
the mystery, at least on that question.



> I'm not defining anything.  I'm just noting that Feynman's observation, if
> true, is evidence against computationalism.
>
>
Evidence against digital physics, but not against computationalism.


>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>1. Wheeler: "*Why these equations, and not others?*"
>>
>>
>> "These are the ones we invented to describe what we've seen."
>> - Vic Stenger
>>
>>
> That's not what Wheeler is asking.  Of course if physics were different,
> our equations would be too. Wheeler is asking why is physics this way?
>
>
> And Stenger is answering, "Because these equations work and others don't."
>


Work for what?  What makes this set of physical laws one that works (vs.
some other possible arrangement, which you think does not work)?


>
>
>
>> If we're to answer these questions, we may need some kind of
>> *metaphysical* theory.  Preferably one that is simple, and can
>> explain/predict our observations.
>> The existence 

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

[John Clark]

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 8:04 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

*​>​Study what diophantine equations are capable of (for example, considers
> the examples I provided in my original post), and you will see they possess
> an unlimited working memory.*
>

I did and I'll be damned if I understand how all the Diophantine equations
in the world put together can store one bit of information, much less a
unlimited amount,  you certainly never said how on earth they could do it,
and the scientists at Intel can't figure out how to do it either that's why
they're still using silicon.


> ​> ​
> *I also recommend reading Gregory Chaitin's book*
>

Gregory Chaitin is on record saying that he doesn't think the Real Numbers
exist, and his book describes calculations but it can't make calculations
any better than the books Bruno recommends.

​> ​
> Special relativity strongly suggests that our physical existence is
> similarly timeless, it is unchanging and unchangeable, a static
> four-dimensional block universe.
>

If we're talking about consciousness its irrelevant what things are like
from a objective viewpoint because subjectively time is the single most
important characteristic of existence.

*​>​If, as you say, anything goes, why are the only solutions to the
> Fibonacci yielding Diophantine equation I posted, only crank out the
> correct answers?*
>

Those equations don't crank out anything unless there is matter to form a
crank and energy to turn the crank, otherwise the equations just sit on the
printed page inert and dead.

​>​
> Why does the Deep-Blue equation, only crank out the correct chess move
> that Deep Blue would make?
>

​The Deep-Blue equation doesn't crank out anything either unless its put
into Deep Blue machine. And even then nothing will happen unless the
machine is connected to the electrical power grid.   ​



> ​>​
> *Recursive functions often have the property of slightly permuting the
> input with each invocation. *
>


​And ​
each invocation
​ requires matter and each ​
invocation
​ requires energy.

​>​
> John Conway's game of life exists in the world of pure numbers
>

No it does not. Conway invented the game using hos physical brain. And the
like pattern remains static unless it's run on a computer or laboriously
computed by a human and played by hand. Hawking asked "What is it that
breathes fire into the equations?", the answer is matter and energy.
​

John K Clark​

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Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 5:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 1:54 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/24/2018 6:43 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 3:30 PM, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Jason Resch
mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>wrote:

​>/​/
/The only thing I am asking is:/
/1) Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc./
/2) ??? -> Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc./
/Do we have enough information to decide between the
above two theories?  Have we really ruled out anything
sitting below physics?/


If I define physics as the thing that can tell the difference
between a correct computation and a incorrect computation and
between a corrupted memory and a uncorrupted memory, and as
long as we're at this philosophic meta level that's not a  b
ad definition, then I don't think anything is below physics.


Physical theories are based on induction from observations and
experiences.

That process won't give us answers to these famous questions,
posed by physicists:

 1. Leibniz: "*Why is there something rather than nothing?*"


  "The reason that there is Something rather than Nothing is that
Nothing is unstable."
  -- Frank Wilczek, Nobel Laureate, physics 2004


That is perhaps a reasonable analogy for the "quantum vacuum", but not 
the philosophical nothing.  For something with the capacity to decay 
into something else, cannot rightfully be called nothing.


As Lawrence Krauss says the vacuum is just the potential for not being 
nothing.  The philosopher's "nothing" is incoherent.





 1. Hawking: "*What is it that breathes fire into the equations*
and makes a universe for them to describe? The usual approach
of science of constructing a mathematical model cannot answer
the questions of why there should be a universe for the model
to describe. Why does the universe go to all the bother of
existing?"


"What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!"
 --- Norm Levitt, after Quine


Everything theories can explain away the arbitrariness of the equations.


On the contrary, they make everything arbitrary.




 1. Feynman: "It always bothers me that, according to the laws as
we understand them today, it takes a computing machine an
infinite number of logical operations to figure out what goes
on in no matter how tiny a region of space, and no matter how
tiny a region of time. How can all that be going on in that
tiny space? *Why should it take an infinite amount of logic
to figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?*"



"Because the world is made of physics, not logic."
        - Brent Meeker


That's circular. You're defining physics as something that inherently 
should have the appearance of infinities, without a justification.  I 
think it is is a mystery in want of an explanation.


Oh, and mathematics makes it exist is not a mystery?  I'm not defining 
anything.  I'm just noting that Feynman's observation, if true, is 
evidence against computationalism.






 1. Wheeler: "*Why these equations, and not others?*"



"These are the ones we invented to describe what we've seen."
        - Vic Stenger


That's not what Wheeler is asking.  Of course if physics were 
different, our equations would be too. Wheeler is asking why is 
physics this way?


And Stenger is answering, "Because these equations work and others don't."


If we're to answer these questions, we may need some kind of
/metaphysical/ theory.  Preferably one that is simple, and can
explain/predict our observations.
The existence of all possible computations may be one possible
avenue for this.


How would that be any better or worse than "all possible set theory"


Set's by themselves don't compute anything,


So what.  They include things.  So they could include all observations.

and so are insufficient to explain observations under a computational 
theory of mind.


or "all possible phsyics"


That could work, if you define what is meant by a possible physics.  
With computations at least, we have a clearly defined notion of all 
possible computations.


No, you don't.  It's supposedly uncountably infinite.  Do you have a 
clear notion of that?



or "all possible novels"?


Novels by themselves don't compute anything, and so are insufficient 
to explain observations under a computational theory of mind.


You keep saying "don't compute anything" as though it were a given that 
computationalism is right.  If you allow me to assume physicalism is 
right I can prove computationalism is wrong.







So far, it is not ruled out, and might even be considered to be

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 4:29 PM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 9:43 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> >* Leibniz: "Why is there something rather than nothing?"*
>
>
> ​
> By "nothing" Leibniz meant a vacuum, today we know far more about the
> vacuum than he did. Nothing, that is to say zero, is far too precise a
> number for quantum mechanics, it permits a violation of the law of
> conservation of energy and mass but only for a very short time. Empty space
> is not empty, it is a sea of virtual particles popping into and out of
> existence. This may seem like a theologian talking about how many angels
> can dance on the head of a pin but it is not because it can be detected
> experimentally. And if you have an infinite amount of time to play around
> with even some jaw droppingly unlikely things will happen, maybe even the
> Big Bang.
>

The quantum vacuum (an absence of non-virtual particles) is not "nothing".

It has an energy, mass, dimensionality, curvature, does it not?  How can
nothing have mass energy or dimensionality?


>
> You could argue that all modern science has done is prove the vacuum is
> not nothing and although Leibniz was wrong about that the question remains
> valid, but I would say expecting science to explain how a nothing that is
> so nothing that it doesn't even have the potential of ever becoming
> something is unreasonable. Even a omnipotent omniscient God couldn't do
> that, it would be like asking Him to make a rock so heavy he can't lift it.
>

This is giving up.  I think we can, and have explained why there is
something rather than nothing.  Even if no *thing* existed, there would
still be a difference between "1 = 0" and "0 = 0". There would still be a
difference between "7 is composite" and "7 is prime", and you can continue
this up to far less trivial truths about much bigger numbers, such as
solutions to the Diophantine equation that simulates the time evolution of
the Schrodinger equation for all possible initial conditions, and the
solutions to that equation contain the entire evolution of our Hubble
volume, and the Milk way, and solar system, earth, you and me.  There is
something rather than nothing because nothing is impossible, something had
to be, as a consequence of uncaused, eternal, immutable, transcendent,
infinite truth.

"the primary cause caused to be" ―The first sentence of Genesis in the
Septuagint (early Greek bible)
“What really interests me is whether God had any choice in the creation of
the World.” ― Albert Einstein


>
>
>> >
>> *Hawking: "What is it that breathes fire into the equations​?​*
>
>
> The equations are a description of how the physical world reacts in
> certain specific situations written in the language of mathematics and
> contain no fire.
>

I think Hawking was asking "What makes the machinery of physics run?"

Computationalism can explain this.  Consider the first person views of
conscious gliders in Conway's Game of Life. From their point of view, the
evolution of their game moves forward, according to discrete and simple
rules. But they would wonder why.  The answer is their brain states are
being updated along with the same computation that yields successive states
of the evolution of the game.  Each successive state has the memories of
the previous states, and so on. At each point in time, they consider the
game to be evolving forward.



>
>
> ​> ​
>> *Feynman: "It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we
>> understand them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of
>> logical operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a
>> region of space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that
>> be going on in that tiny space? Why should it take an infinite amount of
>> logic to figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?"*
>
>
>  That is exactly why I think the field of Quantum Computers has such
> enormous potential.
>


But can you explain it?

Computationalism can, as the infinite set of computations that realize your
mind, all of which exist platonically at a level of finer detail than is
relevant/necessary for the implementation of your mind.


>
>
>> *​>​Wheeler: "Why these equations, and not others?"*
>>
>
> Like the English language both fiction and nonfiction can be written in
> the Mathematical language and both can be grammatically correct,
> mathematicians are interested in both but physicists are only interested in
> the nonfiction stories,
>
>
>> ​> ​
>> *The existence of all possible computations may be one possible avenue
>> for this. *
>>
>
> That's not the answer that's the problem. How can you pick out the one
> correct calculation from the infinite number of incorrect calculations if
> you don't have physics to help you?
>


If there is only correct calculation to be found, was it out there before I
built the machine to help me identify it?

Do you think the 10^(10^120)th binary digit of Pi has a definite, but yet
unknown value?

If 

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 1:54 PM, Brent Meeker  wrote:

>
>
> On 6/24/2018 6:43 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 3:30 PM, John Clark  wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Jason Resch 
>> wrote:
>>
>> ​>* ​*
>>> *The only thing I am asking is:*
>>> *1) Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.*
>>> *2) ??? -> Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc.*
>>> *Do we have enough information to decide between the above two
>>> theories?  Have we really ruled out anything sitting below physics?*
>>>
>>
>> If I define physics as the thing that can tell the difference between a
>> correct computation and a incorrect computation and between a corrupted
>> memory and a uncorrupted memory, and as long as we're at this philosophic
>> meta level that's not a  b ad definition, then I don't think anything
>> is below physics.
>>
>
> Physical theories are based on induction from observations and experiences.
>
> That process won't give us answers to these famous questions, posed by
> physicists:
>
>1. Leibniz: "*Why is there something rather than nothing?*"
>
>   "The reason that there is Something rather than Nothing is that Nothing
> is unstable."
>   -- Frank Wilczek, Nobel Laureate, physics 2004
>

That is perhaps a reasonable analogy for the "quantum vacuum", but not the
philosophical nothing.  For something with the capacity to decay into
something else, cannot rightfully be called nothing.


>
>
>1. Hawking: "*What is it that breathes fire into the equations* and
>makes a universe for them to describe? The usual approach of science of
>constructing a mathematical model cannot answer the questions of why there
>should be a universe for the model to describe. Why does the universe go to
>all the bother of existing?"
>
> "What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!"
>  --- Norm Levitt, after Quine
>

Everything theories can explain away the arbitrariness of the equations.


>
>
>1. Feynman: "It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we
>understand them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of
>logical operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a
>region of space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that
>be going on in that tiny space? *Why should it take an infinite amount
>of logic to figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?*
>"
>
>
> "Because the world is made of physics, not logic."
> - Brent Meeker
>

That's circular. You're defining physics as something that inherently
should have the appearance of infinities, without a justification.  I think
it is is a mystery in want of an explanation.


>
>
>
>1. Wheeler: "*Why these equations, and not others?*"
>
>
> "These are the ones we invented to describe what we've seen."
> - Vic Stenger
>
>
That's not what Wheeler is asking.  Of course if physics were different,
our equations would be too. Wheeler is asking why is physics this way?


> If we're to answer these questions, we may need some kind of
> *metaphysical* theory.  Preferably one that is simple, and can
> explain/predict our observations.
> The existence of all possible computations may be one possible avenue for
> this.
>
>
> How would that be any better or worse than "all possible set theory"
>

Set's by themselves don't compute anything, and so are insufficient to
explain observations under a computational theory of mind.


> or "all possible phsyics"
>

That could work, if you define what is meant by a possible physics.  With
computations at least, we have a clearly defined notion of all possible
computations.


> or "all possible novels"?
>

Novels by themselves don't compute anything, and so are insufficient to
explain observations under a computational theory of mind.



>
>
> So far, it is not ruled out, and might even be considered to be partially
> confirmed.  It has the power to answer questions 2, 3 and 4.  And for
> anyone who accepts arithmetical realism/no-cause needed for arithmetical
> truth, then it can answer 1 as well.
>
>
> All your questions are number 1.
>

(It looks like your e-mail client changed them when you separated them)


> However, I would point out that Feynman's question implies that
> computationalism must be false.
>

No, this would be a consequence of computationalism as predicted by Bruno
in his UDA.  It is a confirmatiom, rather than a refutation, of
computationalism.


>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>> ​>>​
 Then why is brain damage a big deal? Why do I need my brain to think?

>>>
>>> ​>* ​*
>>> *The base computations that implement your brain may be sub-routines of
>>> a larger computation,*
>>>
>>
>> If true then that is an example of something physics can do but
>> mathematics can not. And I have to say that is a mighty damn important
>> sub-routine!
>>
>
> It's not truly doing something math is not, if you take the view that math
> is what is ultimately "doing physics".
>
>
> 

Re: are black holes actually misunderstood wormholes?

['Chris de Morsella' via Everything List]

Thanks for your comments, Sci-fi fans will be disappointed. 
I was intrigued by the mention of these potential echoes contained within the 
off the scale intense ring down phase of a merger and also by what that would 
imply, if echoes are actually discovered to exist within the final moments of 
these extreme events.
Gravitational wave astronomy is in it's infancy and as instruments improve, my 
hope is that it can help speed forward movement in the quest for a unified 
theory. After all gravity waves are a direct sensing of the primary evolving 
dynamics of extreme systems in which our current best theories fall apart and 
begin spitting out infinities.
Chris 
 
  On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 3:51 PM, Lawrence 
Crowell wrote:   My tendency is to say that 
wormholes do not exist. There are problems with these types of solutions. The 
biggest is they requires a source term that has negative energy or T^{00} < 0. 
This would mean the quantum field that defines this source is not bounded 
below. This means an infinite well spring of radiation can exist. 
These types of spacetimes have other oddities. A wormhole can have one of its 
openings boosted or accelerated out and then accelerated back so the wormhole 
has closed timelike curves. This means a quantum state could be sent into the 
wormhole and it would return prior to then. This means a quantum state is 
duplicated. This is a non-unitary process forbidden by quantum mechanics. So I 
see this as another obstruction to the idea of wormholes.

The ring down, and I think as well the peak, of gravitational radiation may 
carry information about the quantum nature of black holes. Certainly if 
wormholes collide the quantum information of the wormhole would be contained in 
these signals or ring down. These types of data will likely require a 
spacebased system such as e-LISA in order to capture so called gravitational 
memory. This is where the configuration of test masses is different after the 
passage of the gravitational wave. The earliest projected launch date ESA will 
loft this system is 2034. We have a bit of a wait.
LC

On Saturday, June 23, 2018 at 3:01:53 PM UTC-5, cdemorsella wrote:
As LIGO increases its sensitivity it is entering a domain in which its 
instruments should be able to detect theorized ring down phase echoes (this is 
the very last portion of a merging event of massive bodies that produces a 
rapidly increasing frequency of waves that lead up to the moment of merging, as 
the two merging objects undergo a final increasingly tight cycle of rapidly 
narrowing orbits right before merging)  
This increased sensitivity shouldd enable it to discoverif these hypothetical 
echoes if they actually are being produced by the observed event.
If such echoes are discovered in these signals that would have major 
implications for cosmology and would be evidence for the actual existence of 
wormholes in our universe.
 Quoting some selected paragraphs, from a Scientific American article: 
"When two wormholes collide, they could produce ripples in space-time that 
ricochet off themselves. Future instruments could detect these gravitational 
“echoes,” providing evidence that these hypothetical tunnels through space-time 
actually exist, a new paper suggests
To resolve this so-called black hole information paradox, some physicists have 
suggested that event horizons don’t exist. Instead of abysses from which 
nothing can return, black holes actually could be a host of speculative 
black-hole-like objects that lack event horizons, such as boson stars, 
gravastars, fuzzballs and even wormholes, which were theorized by Albert 
Einstein and physicist Nathan Rosen decades ago.

In a 2016 study in the journal Physical Review Letters, physicists hypothesized 
that if two wormholes collided, they would produce gravitational waves very 
similar to those generated from merging black holes. The only difference in the 
signal would be in the last phase of the merger, called the ringdown, when the 
newly combined black hole or wormhole relaxes into its final state

In the paper, published in January in the journal Physical Review D, the team 
of physicists from Belgium and Spain analyzed wormholes that rotate, which are 
more realistic than the non-spinning variety studied in the 2016 work. They 
calculated what the resulting gravitational-wave signal would look like if the 
wormholes merged.

Because the strength of the signal drops during the ringdown, that section of 
the signal would be too weak for LIGO’s current configuration to detect. But 
that could change in the future, as researchers continue to upgrade and 
fine-tune the instrument, the researchers said.



“By the time we are running at full design sensitivity, I believe it may be 
possible to resolve the ringdown phase where these echoes are predicted to be,” 
said Stuver, who’s also a member of the LIGO team."





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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Russell Standish]

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 09:56:46AM -0700, Brent Meeker wrote:
> 
> I'm not using magic.  I'm asking for help.  Does anyone else understand how
> physics is "explained by the inability of the universal machine to see the
> equivalence between between []p <->([]p & p) and ([]p & <>p)  and ([]p & <>p
> & p) with p (p sigma-1)."

I would guess that the idea is that there are different logics
applicable to different types of knowledge, and these are enumerated
by his 8 hypostases. He presumes that one of these corresponds to
observations, and consequently is a logic of empirical knowledge.

That this is so, seems vaguely plausible, built as it were on the
ideas of Theatetus. That it exhaustively captures all of empirical
science is decidedly less plausible IMHO, but there you go.

Cheers
-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

[Jason Resch]

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 9:05 AM, John Clark  wrote:

> On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 5:35 AM, Russell Standish 
> wrote:
>
> *>​> ​* If I define physics as the thing that can tell the difference
>>> between a  correct computation and a incorrect computation and between a
>>> corrupted  memory and a uncorrupted memory, and as long as we're at this
>>> philosophic  meta level that's not a  b ad definition, then I don't think
>>> anything  is below physics.
>>
>>
>> *​> ​If you define physics that way, then you are using the term
>> differently to Bruno, for whom physics is very definitely phenomenology -
>> tables, chairs, billiard balls, electrons and such.*
>
>
>
> Phenomenology is about direct experience and consciousness, if that is not
> the result of the soul and be beyond the scientific method then it must be
> produced by a calculation, and a very big one too. Big calculations are
> made of lots of smaller calculations, but how can pure numbers have a
> working memory that can remember what the answer to the small calculation
> is?
>

Study what diophantine equations are capable of (for example, considers the
examples I provided in my original post), and you will see they possess an
unlimited working memory.

I also recommend reading Gregory Chaitin's book (it's free on archive.org,
linked in my original post). In it he he describes how variables in the
equation are used to implement registers, and memories.



> Matter can remember things because an electron in an atom can be in
> different orbitals and be in different states and that property can be used
> to record information, but pure numbers are unchanging and unchangeable.
>

Special relativity strongly suggests that our physical existence is
similarly timeless, it is unchanging and unchangeable, a static
four-dimensional block universe.

One need not "unrealize" past points in time, or previous states of the
machine in order to "realize" a computation.


> How can the integer "7" be in a different state? You could claim the
> correct answer to the big calculation already exists in Plato's etherial
> universe so it doesn't need to actually calculate it, but if so incorrect
> answers exist in that world too and the are an infinite number of incorrect
> answers and only one correct one. Physics simply won't let you do some
> things so you can use that fact to arrange matter in such a way that it is
> incapable of making an incorrect calculation and has no alternative but to
> crank out the correct one. But with pure numbers anything goes and that is
> not a good thing if you’re looking for one needle in a infinitely large
> haystack.
>

If, as you say, anything goes, why are the only solutions to the Fibonacci
yielding Diophantine equation I posted, only crank out the correct answers?

Why does the Deep-Blue equation, only crank out the correct chess move that
Deep Blue would make?


>
> > *The real point is that with computationalism (in particular the
>> CT thesis), it doesn't matter what the computers are made of*
>
> A computer can be made of any thing but it must be made of some thing. And
> by "thing" I mean an object with the ability to exist in more than one
> state and yet still be recognizable. If an atom of silicon absorbs a photon
> we can tell that something has happened to it because its electron has
> moved to a different orbital in a excited state that is measurably
> different from its ground state. The atom has in a sense remembered what
> has happened to it, and yet the atom has not changed so much that it is
> unrecognizable, we can still tell its an atom of silicon and know that’s
> where to look to find one bit of information. But there is nothing
> comparable to that in the world of pure numbers, the integer “8” can’t
> interrogate the integer “7” and measure what state its in and deduce what
> happened to it yesterday because nothing can happen to the integer “7”, it
> can only be in one state.
>

Recursive functions often have the property of slightly permuting the input
with each invocation.  Consider the recursive function that gives you
Conway's game of life.

John Conway's game of life exists in the world of pure numbers, as
solutions to Diophantine's equation.  That is, there is a number relation,
involving two integers, X and Y which is only satisfied when Y is the (T+1)
time step of X under the rules of John Conway's game of life.

Jason

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Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

[John Clark]

On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 9:43 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

>* Leibniz: "Why is there something rather than nothing?"*


​
By "nothing" Leibniz meant a vacuum, today we know far more about the
vacuum than he did. Nothing, that is to say zero, is far too precise a
number for quantum mechanics, it permits a violation of the law of
conservation of energy and mass but only for a very short time. Empty space
is not empty, it is a sea of virtual particles popping into and out of
existence. This may seem like a theologian talking about how many angels
can dance on the head of a pin but it is not because it can be detected
experimentally. And if you have an infinite amount of time to play around
with even some jaw droppingly unlikely things will happen, maybe even the
Big Bang.

You could argue that all modern science has done is prove the vacuum is not
nothing and although Leibniz was wrong about that the question remains
valid, but I would say expecting science to explain how a nothing that is
so nothing that it doesn't even have the potential of ever becoming
something is unreasonable. Even a omnipotent omniscient God couldn't do
that, it would be like asking Him to make a rock so heavy he can't lift it.


> >
> *Hawking: "What is it that breathes fire into the equations​?​*


The equations are a description of how the physical world reacts in certain
specific situations written in the language of mathematics and contain no
fire.

​> ​
> *Feynman: "It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we
> understand them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite number of
> logical operations to figure out what goes on in no matter how tiny a
> region of space, and no matter how tiny a region of time. How can all that
> be going on in that tiny space? Why should it take an infinite amount of
> logic to figure out what one tiny piece of space/time is going to do?"*


 That is exactly why I think the field of Quantum Computers has such
enormous potential.


> *​>​Wheeler: "Why these equations, and not others?"*
>

Like the English language both fiction and nonfiction can be written in the
Mathematical language and both can be grammatically correct, mathematicians
are interested in both but physicists are only interested in the nonfiction
stories,


> ​> ​
> *The existence of all possible computations may be one possible avenue for
> this. *
>

That's not the answer that's the problem. How can you pick out the one
correct calculation from the infinite number of incorrect calculations if
you don't have physics to help you?


> ​>* ​*
> *It's not truly doing something math is not, if you take the view that
> math is what is ultimately "doing physics".*
>

As you point out, the answer a Turing Machine spite out depends on its
program not what its made of, you can make one with silicon or vacuum tubes
or mechanical gears or even Lego blocks, but you can't make one out of pure
numbers, it you could be Intel wouldn't need silicon, and it does.


> ​
>> ​>>​
>> Definitions are made for our convenience, they do not create physical
>> objects.
>>
>
> ​>​
> Physical theories are also made for our convenience and they do not tell
> physical objects what to do.
>

​Yes, but physical theories do tell **us** what those physical objects will
do under a certain range of conditions, outside of that range we ned to
find a better theory.


> ​>>​
>> there are an infinite number of ways integers and the relations between
>> them could have been defined,
>>
>
> *​>​If they were defined differently, they wouldn't be the integers, but
> some other thing.*
>

​
But why did mathematicians pick that definition instead of one of the
infinite number of alternative ones it could have chosen? Because physics
told them that was the most eloquent one to use in writing nonfiction
stories about the world. There is nothing wrong with with fiction, it has
its charms, but that was not the sheep herder 10,000 ago who invented
numbers was thinking about, he just wanted to manage his flock and be able
to determine if one was missing. And physicists have decided to concentrate
on the nonfiction and let mathematicians get on with their literary
pursuits and weave their beautiful fictional tales .

​*>​*
> *Is reality not "kicking back", when:​ ​It tells us there are things that
> are true about the integers which are not part of our starting definitions?*
>

Godel discovered that reality is telling us that if our mathematical tale
contains no plot holes then there is no way to expand the story so that it
includes everything all the characters are doing when they are off stage.
As for determining if the story is fiction or nonfiction that can only be
determined by physical experiment

*​>​If arithmetical law breaks down, and 0 starts to equal 1, then a Turing
> machine will do something very different than what would otherwise be
> predicted.*
>

​
Arithmetic doesn't tell matter what to do, matter tells mathematicians the
best way to construct arithmetic.

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/24/2018 6:43 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Fri, Jun 22, 2018 at 3:30 PM, John Clark > wrote:


On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:09 PM, Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>>wrote:

​>/​/
/The only thing I am asking is:/
/1) Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc./
/2) ??? -> Physics -> Brains, Cars, Atoms, Etc./
/Do we have enough information to decide between the above two
theories?  Have we really ruled out anything sitting below
physics?/


If I define physics as the thing that can tell the difference
between a correct computation and a incorrect computation and
between a corrupted memory and a uncorrupted memory, and as
long as we're at this philosophic meta level that's not a  b ad
definition, then I don't think anything is below physics.


Physical theories are based on induction from observations and 
experiences.


That process won't give us answers to these famous questions, posed by 
physicists:


 1. Leibniz: "*Why is there something rather than nothing?*"

  "The reason that there is Something rather than Nothing is that 
Nothing is unstable."

  -- Frank Wilczek, Nobel Laureate, physics 2004


 1. Hawking: "*What is it that breathes fire into the equations* and
makes a universe for them to describe? The usual approach of
science of constructing a mathematical model cannot answer the
questions of why there should be a universe for the model to
describe. Why does the universe go to all the bother of existing?"


"What is there?  Everything! So what isn't there?  Nothing!"
 --- Norm Levitt, after Quine


 1. Feynman: "It always bothers me that, according to the laws as we
understand them today, it takes a computing machine an infinite
number of logical operations to figure out what goes on in no
matter how tiny a region of space, and no matter how tiny a region
of time. How can all that be going on in that tiny space? *Why
should it take an infinite amount of logic to figure out what one
tiny piece of space/time is going to do?*"



"Because the world is made of physics, not logic."
        - Brent Meeker


 1. Wheeler: "*Why these equations, and not others?*"



"These are the ones we invented to describe what we've seen."
        - Vic Stenger

If we're to answer these questions, we may need some kind of 
/metaphysical/ theory.  Preferably one that is simple, and can 
explain/predict our observations.
The existence of all possible computations may be one possible avenue 
for this.


How would that be any better or worse than "all possible set theory" or 
"all possible phsyics"  or "all possible novels"?


So far, it is not ruled out, and might even be considered to be 
partially confirmed.  It has the power to answer questions 2, 3 and 
4.  And for anyone who accepts arithmetical realism/no-cause needed 
for arithmetical truth, then it can answer 1 as well.


All your questions are number 1.  However, I would point out that 
Feynman's question implies that computationalism must be false.




​>>​
Then why is brain damage a big deal? Why do I need my
brain to think?


​>/​/
/The base computations that implement your brain may be
sub-routines of a larger computation,/


If true then that is an example of something physics can do but
mathematics can not. And I have to say that is a mighty damn
important sub-routine!


It's not truly doing something math is not, if you take the view that 
math is what is ultimately "doing physics".


Sure, and it's not truly doing something that music is not, if you take 
the view that music is what is ultimately "doing physics".



​>>​
Without physics 2+2=3 would work just as well as 2+2=4 and
insisting the answer is 4 would just be an arbitrary
convention of no more profundity than the rules that tell
us when to say "who" and when to say "whom".

​> ​
/For any computation to make sense, you need to be working
under some definitions of integers and relations between them. /


​Definitions are made for our convenience, they do not create
physical objects.


Physical theories are also made for our convenience and they do not 
tell physical objects what to do.
Instead we study physical objects, and try to reason about what laws 
make sense and describe the phenomenon we observe.


It is no different with mathematical theories (a.k.a. axioms and 
theorems).  Mathematicians study mathematical objects, and reason 
about what laws make sense to describe the phenomenon we observe.  
When they find sufficient justification, they can amend or extend the 
fundamental theories (axioms), or even throw them out altogether.


And there are an infinite number of ways integers and
the relations between them could have been defined,


If they were 

Re: Primary matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 8:06 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

I don't think that's the case.  C seems to me to be capable to explaining
anything (e.g. we're living in the Matrix).  The theories of M are certainly
incomplete, but if there is empirical data inconsistent with those theories
it just shows they have limited domain. If there is empirical data that is
impossible to include in M how would we know; how could we be sure that it
could not be included?

I don't see how that fact that I am conscious and have a first person
experience of reality could be explained by M.

I suggest you should think about what you accept as good explanations of 
other phenomenon.


Brent
"A good answer is one that doesn't spoil the question."
 -- P. T. Bridgeport (character in Walt Kelly's "Pogo")

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Re: Primary matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 7:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

If not, mechanism is refuted (or we are in a malevolent simulation, which is 
better to never assume, as this can again explains everything, like super 
determinism or epiphenomenalism (as you said at the relevant place to Brent).


Does no one else see the irony of a theory being rejected on this list 
because it "explains everything"?


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 5:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Jun 2018, at 08:02, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/20/2018 9:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:47 PM, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Most of these objections to CI are answered by
decoherence theory.


I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse
theory.


You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density
matrix that is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and
then you declare it is exactly diagonal and cut the other
"worlds" loose.



What's the point of that last step, when decoherence explains why we 
don't see those other branches?


But decoherence didn't quite explain it.  You have to take the trace 
over the environment in order to justify making the reduced density 
matrix exactly diagonal (instead of FAPP diagonal) and that step is 
not unitary evolution per the SE, it's using a projection operator.


But the projection, with the MWI, is not due to a physical collapse, 
but just of a self-localisation procedure.


But I don't see "self-localisation" as one of the unitary operators in 
the Schroedinger equation.


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 5:03 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Do our minds impose a preferred basis?


No. But our material brain does, and it needs to do that to become a 
classical machine, or to behave classically in some branch of the 
wave. The classicality is imposed by the fact that the key notion (the 
universal machine) is a classical concept, like all concept in 
theoretical science.




and why should different minds agree on it?


To make sense of any conversation.


A teleological "explanation" = magic

Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 4:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
What is the mechanism in the block universe model?  What is the 
mechanism for the UD to produce the physical world?


The UD, or simply the sigma_1 arithmetical reality generates all 
dreams (where a dream is a computation supporting a Löbian machine) 
and the physical appearances are explained by the relative statistics 
on those dreams, due to that first person indeterminacy (that no 
digital machine can avoid). That is constructive, so we can test the 
theory, and up to now, it is not refuted, at the place were 
physicalism + mechanism is refuted.


It's not refuted because  "the physical appearances are explained by the 
relative statistics on those dreams" is merely aspirational. It's one of 
those things that "must be true"...else the theory fails.


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 4:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But then you recognize that the physical world is a necessary 
component and must exist to make computationalism meaningful.


But that is exactly what happen. The physical reality is 
phenomenologically explained by the inability of the universal 
machine to see the equivalence between between []p <->([]p & p) and 
([]p & <>p)  and ([]p & <>p & p) with p (p sigma-1). The existence 
of the observable is explainable by the some modes of self-reference.


You'll excuse me if I don't see that as an explanation of physical 
reality.  Maybe somebody else on the list does and can explain it.


This should be already obvious at step 7. You are the one using the 
magic here. I am the one asking you a question. With the UDA we know 
that physics has to be a statistics on many computations. To 
understand that this actually works until now, you need to be familiar 
with the logic of machine self-reference, and study the observable modes.


You often use the phrase, "...we know that X has to be..." as an invalid 
argument; invalid because the unstated premise is "...has to be if my 
theory is to be proven right."  It's is your theory that is in question.



I'm not using magic.  I'm asking for help.  Does anyone else understand 
how physics is "explained by the inability of the universal machine to 
see the equivalence between between []p <->([]p & p) and ([]p & <>p)  
and ([]p & <>p & p) with p (p sigma-1)."


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 4:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 6/24/2018 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:19, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 6/21/2018 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:



On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.

I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.

You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix that is diagonal 
FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you declare it is exactly diagonal and cut 
the other "worlds" loose.

But why adding that last steps? Why to make the diagonal exact if not to cut 
the other worlds?

Because if you don't, a further evolution may undo the measurement/perception.

I know it looks sad, but that is not an argument. In fact undoing some 
measurement/perception might be required for overall consistency, and is also a 
useful quantum gate.

The squared amplitudes can be asymptotical, and get the number zero is not 
always possible, but all what counts is to be relatively small to have enough 
determinism to keep the partial control.

And how much is that?

Enough to get two or three decimals right, like in all sciences. Enough to get 
a man on the moon, and build electronic microscope. In nanotechnology we might 
need more decimals correct, and what counts is the probability that the client 
is satisfied, or the patient cured. Only in metaphysics, we have to reject a 
theory if the 100^1000th decimal is wrong. Metaphysics has not the notion of 
“FAPP”, because the purpose is not practical at all. It concerns a possible 
knowledge only.


Right.  And I thought you claimed to be doing metaphysics, not 
engineering.  Hence the need to get zeroes on the off-diagonal.


Brent

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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 4:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:26, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/24/2018 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/21/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:28, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote:


​> ​
/Another universe comes into existence when Joe the
Plumber performs, say, a spin measurement./


But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not 
need to be made and there is nothing special about Joe, if 
Everett is right the same thing happens every time an electron 
in Joe's skin encounters a photon, or for that matter whenever 
an electron anywhere encounters anything.


That's where MWI gets fuzzy.


Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of 
the universe wave. But such world will be “world” only as part 
of a personal history. Everett disagrees, but his “relative 
state” is a better wording than “many-worlds” which is often 
confusing.




Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic 
difference create different worlds? That can't be right because 
"worlds" are classical things.  So the Heisenberg but problem 
seems to reappear in different form.


Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate 
from our perspective when they make difference for us, like when 
they can no more interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum 
wave (in the Schroedinger picture) and relative state related to 
macroscopic irreversibility, which needs only the classical 
chaos to be irreversible FAPP. Histories are internal things, 
already a form of first person plural notion.


Right.  But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in 
order that it constitutes a conscious distinct state?  That's how 
the Heisenberg cut problem reappears at a different level.


Very quickly, like when you mix milk in the coffee. Pure 
statistics theory provides the numbers, like when we can use Gauss 
e^(-x^2) instead of Pascal triangle. You don’t need 0 on the 
diagonal, only tiny numbers.


I think you mean OFF the diagonal.


Indeed.



But how do you know you only need tiny numbers, and how tiny?  I 
have thought that perhaps there should be a smallest non-zero unit 
of probability; but it has been pointed out that even tiny numbers 
may add up when the density matrix is transformed to some other basis.


It is just that the numbers are tiny only from your (3p) personal 
points of view. You brain needs to be enough of a mixture for 
consciousness to differentiate into universal machine (relative) 
state. In the case (which I doubt) that the brain is a quantum 
computer, we would be able to exploit the numbers which are not tiny 
in the relevant base to exploit quantum computing ability.








You don’t need purely orthogonal state, the big numbers and 
classical chaos will lead to the right quasi classical phenomenology,


So you say.  But that requires a theory of "phenomenology", i.e. a 
theory of how perception is realized.


But I extract the quantum from such a phenomenology. Perception is 
mainly [a]p with [a] designing a variant of the logic of 
self-reference G, or G*.


It is provably realised in all models of the consistent extensions 
of very elementary arithmetic.


(You might need to study some books on self-reference (the 
provability logic) to get the point).


So you're claiming that you have derived QM from perception (as 
described by provability).



No, my main claim, and oldest result, is that IF mechanism is true 
THEN physics must be extracted in a very special way. You don’t need 
to see the derivation of physics to understand that physicalism does 
not work with Mechanism. But the point is to do the test before.


Then it took me 30 years to make the test, and I showed that when we 
derive physics in that very special way, we get the first evidence 
that mechanism is correct, as we get the right logic. If we did not, 
Mechanism would be refuted.






But how does it then follow that perception is classical?


That is the easy part. Because the universal machine is a classical 
notion; like arithmetic, and … quantum computer science, or the 
multiverse. It is part of our assumption: a machine stops or does not 
stop.


As I understand your theory, you only get the indeterminancy and the 
superposition of states by invoking the infinite threads fo the UD.






Also that doesn't solve the problem of small  off-diagonal terms not 
being small when written in a different basis.


It does, we just do not use those bases, because they would evacuate 
the results we need to act in a world which has made us with classical 
brain, or at least, a classical reality. The “observable” are not 

Re: Primary matter

[Brent Meeker]

On 6/25/2018 3:32 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 23 Jun 2018, at 08:03, Brent Meeker > wrote:




On 6/22/2018 4:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

This does not mean that a conscious machine is necessarily more efficacious on 
all task,

What is the added undecideable sentence implied by consciousness?

“I am conscious”.


What does that speed up?  Does the speed up from adding an undeciable 
sentence suffer from Goodheart's curse?




Not sure what you mean. I would say “no”, in theory “I am not 
conscious” can also bring a speed-up, despite being obviously 
consistent, like PA with “I am inconsistent”. The speed-up is proved 
by constructive diagonalisation, and is thus non-intuitive, except we 
can imagine than being aware of one’s consciousness might help to 
planning, especially in an environment habited by conscious entities.
Consciousness is *the* speed-up mechanism. It makes us thinking using 
model, semantic, meaning, instead of living the syntactical relation 
at some low level. Meaning is easier than proof, even if it can be 
misleading for individuals, it gives sense to sense, and priorities to 
higher goal, like surviving.


That all sounds like wishful thinking and hand-waving.  As I pointed out 
earlier, if you try to play tennis consciously you will lose because you 
will be slow.  Conscious thought no doubt helps in planning, but it also 
allows depression and suicide.  Dogs don't commit suicide.


Brent




Bruno





Brent


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Re: Primary matter

[Telmo Menezes]

On 21 June 2018 at 22:52, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>
>
> On 6/21/2018 3:55 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>> On 21 June 2018 at 00:53, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 6/20/2018 4:51 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

 Hi Bruno,

>> I follow your reasoning, from one of your recent articles. This leaves
>> me dissatisfied, but if I try to verbalize this dissatisfaction I feel
>> stuck in a loop. Perhaps this illustrates your point.
>
>
> We might need to do some detour about what it would mean to explain
> consciousness, or matter.
> I might ask myself if you are not asking too much, perhaps. Eventually,
> something has to remain unexplainable for reason of self-consisteny. I
> suspect it will be just where our intuition of numbers or combinators,
> or of
> the distinction finite/infinite comes from (assuming mechanism), or
> just why
> we trust the doctor!

 I thought about it for some time. It seems that at a meta level, we
 are always stuck in this situation of "give me one miracle for free
 and everything else becomes explainable". The miracle can be matter,
 or consciousness, or arithmetic.
>>>
>>>
>>> Do you see that is just another form of my circle of virtuous
>>> explanation.
>>> Start wherever you understand or accept the starting point and then you
>>> can
>>> go around the circle and get to everything else.
>>
>> I see your point and even concede that it might be the wise approach
>> for many things, but I don't think one can "get to everything else"
>> this way.
>>
>> The problem with my analogy with heliocentrism/geocentrism is that
>> these are, in the end, compatible -- but the same doesn't seem to
>> apply to materialism/computationalism. I think that Bruno proves
>> convincingly that the two are incompatible. I'm not sure if you are
>> convinced by the UDA argument or not. Are you?
>>
>> If one takes this incompatibility seriously, things become a bit more
>> tricky. In this case, and to expand on what I was suggesting:
>>
>> - There is a set of beliefs M that are consistent with materialism;
>> - There is a set of beliefs C that are consistent with computationalism;
>> - The intersection between M and C, let's call it A, is non-empty but;
>
>
> In the virtuous circle theory you could start with M and explain C or vice
> versa.  At least if C is a comprehensive theory as proposed.  So A=C=M.
>
>> - There are justified true beliefs that belong to C if one starts from
>> comp, but not to A, let's say C*
>
>
> Justified how?  By logical inference from Peano's axioms?

By direct experience: "I am conscious" or just "I am".

> Note that C and M
> proceed to produce explanations in different ways and M doesn't aim to
> produce beliefs, only theories.  I realize that Bruno uses "belief" as
> shorthand for a relation between computable and some ideal machine.  So it's
> not clear to me that "belief" means the same thing in C and M.
>
>> - There are justified true beliefs that belong to M if one starts from
>> materialism, but not to A, let's say M*
>> - Furthermore, there is empirical data that fits C* and not M*, and
>> vice-versa.
>
>
> I don't think that's the case.  C seems to me to be capable to explaining
> anything (e.g. we're living in the Matrix).  The theories of M are certainly
> incomplete, but if there is empirical data inconsistent with those theories
> it just shows they have limited domain. If there is empirical data that is
> impossible to include in M how would we know; how could we be sure that it
> could not be included?

I don't see how that fact that I am conscious and have a first person
experience of reality could be explained by M.

>>
>> Most people nowadays live only within A. It used to be the case that
>> people lived with A + R (R is some set of religious beliefs), and that
>> is more or less what enabled us to build civilization. R might be
>> wrong, but it is clearly useful (and also has a very dark side, of
>> course). A-only-living is the domain of mid-life crisis, existential
>> despair, hating Mondays and scientific utilitarianism.
>
>
> Get a grip, Telmo.  A is the best place to live.

Easy for you to say, now that you will be rolling in cash from your
gambling operation!

>> M* is the
>> domain of the emergentist project of neuroscience, and I would argue
>> is the proto-religion of many contemporary scientists, and especially
>> militant atheists. C* is the domain of neoplatonism. Not surprisingly,
>> it irritates M* people, and vice-versa.
>
>
> And it's the domain of the pseudo-science mystic who, feeling the loss of R,
> longs to recover that world view that puts them at the center of everything.

I think this goes to the core of the emotions underlying the debate. I
agree with you that desiring to be the center of everything is a
common form of egotistical delusion. I will add -- an you will not
like this one -- that standing in awe at "how small we are compared to
the universe, 

Re: Primary matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Jun 2018, at 13:57, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
> 
> On 22 June 2018 at 13:31, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>> 
>>> On 20 Jun 2018, at 13:51, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
>>> 
>>> Hi Bruno,
>>> 
> I follow your reasoning, from one of your recent articles. This leaves
> me dissatisfied, but if I try to verbalize this dissatisfaction I feel
> stuck in a loop. Perhaps this illustrates your point.
 
 
 We might need to do some detour about what it would mean to explain 
 consciousness, or matter.
 I might ask myself if you are not asking too much, perhaps. Eventually, 
 something has to remain unexplainable for reason of self-consisteny. I 
 suspect it will be just where our intuition of numbers or combinators, or 
 of the distinction finite/infinite comes from (assuming mechanism), or 
 just why we trust the doctor!
>>> 
>>> I thought about it for some time. It seems that at a meta level, we
>>> are always stuck in this situation of "give me one miracle for free
>>> and everything else becomes explainable". The miracle can be matter,
>>> or consciousness, or arithmetic. I believe I have to accept this state
>>> of affairs for the reason of self-consistency that you express above,
>>> but I'm human and I still feel the curiosity. Epistemic limits are
>>> hard to accept.
>>> 
>>> Could it even be that it doesn't make sense to say that materialism is
>>> true or false, or that idealism is true or false and so on? I mean in
>>> the same sense that the sun is not really the center of the solar
>>> system (the center is just a human mental model), but assuming it
>>> makes it simpler to describe the orbits. Perhaps assuming materialism
>>> makes it easier to describe certain aspects of nature, while assuming
>>> comp makes it easier to describe others, but in the end we always have
>>> to sacrifice something. Model realism at the meta level…
>> 
>> 
>> We have to sacrifice something. But the point is that if the Brain or the 
>> body is Turing emulable, then we have to sacrifice materialism.
>> FAPP we lost nothing, unless we lose the appearance of matter, in which case 
>> the observation of matter refutes comp, but up to now we don’t loss them, 
>> and at least we have a rather simple explanation of consciousness, which has 
>> to be sacrificed if we want to keep matter in the ontology, but then I am 
>> still waiting for any non mechanist theory of consciousness (beyond the 
>> fairy tales).
> 
> I agree that comp and materialism are incompatible, you convinced me a
> long time ago.

OK.


> 
> My point is that, in certain extreme circumstances -- that Brent likes
> to point out -- we are bound to act as-if materialism is true.

I am not sure. We have to believe in the physical laws, and in physical 
objects. But don’t need to believe that the physical laws are primary, not that 
some primary matter exists primitively. 

Brent accused me recently of taking physics for granted, at the start of the 
UDA, but that is what all rational empiricist do. I would not have consecrated 
a so long time making mechanism experimentally refutable if I did not believe 
in a physical universe or reality. What is not taking for granted is the 
Metaphysical Theory asserting that a physical universe exists fundamentally. 
With mechanism, the fact that brain or classical computer exists must be 
explained from addition and multiplication only.




> Surgeries, for example. I don't believe that consciousness is an
> emergent property of brain activity, but at the same time I would
> prefer my surgeon to assume that.

Like the computationalist doctor. 

The doctor bets that your brain is a physical computer, and that the 
preservation of its functioning, at some level of description, assure that your 
consciousness will remains intact with respect to most computations supporting 
you, that is, with respect to the normal worlds, with measure close to 1, in 
arithmetic. But this works only if the “observable modes” gives physics. If 
not, mechanism is refuted (or we are in a malevolent simulation, which is 
better to never assume, as this can again explains everything, like super 
determinism or epiphenomenalism (as you said at the relevant place to Brent).




> This is a strange situation. I am
> not inclined toward hyper-relativistic ideas XX century
> post-modernism-style -- that seems like giving up on science and
> truth.

Sure. Post-Modernism style of pseudo-philosophy is non sensical relativism. 
Relativism, like positivism is self-defeating. You need some absolute to be 
able to doubt of anything. If you relativize everything, even “relativity” lost 
its meaning.



> On the other hand, it seems that we are condemned to some
> amount of relativism.

The relativity of our indexical state. 

 That is the path “Galilee-Einstein-Everett”. It is not much a relativism than 
a de-anthropomorphisation, as well as a bet that not all reality is an 
indexical. 




> Certain questions seem to be 

Re: Do we live within a Diophantine equation?

[John Clark]

On Sun, Jun 24, 2018 at 5:35 AM, Russell Standish 
wrote:

*>​> ​* If I define physics as the thing that can tell the difference
>> between a  correct computation and a incorrect computation and between a
>> corrupted  memory and a uncorrupted memory, and as long as we're at this
>> philosophic  meta level that's not a  b ad definition, then I don't think
>> anything  is below physics.
>
>
> *​> ​If you define physics that way, then you are using the term
> differently to Bruno, for whom physics is very definitely phenomenology -
> tables, chairs, billiard balls, electrons and such.*



Phenomenology is about direct experience and consciousness, if that is not
the result of the soul and be beyond the scientific method then it must be
produced by a calculation, and a very big one too. Big calculations are
made of lots of smaller calculations, but how can pure numbers have a
working memory that can remember what the answer to the small calculation
is? Matter can remember things because an electron in an atom can be in
different orbitals and be in different states and that property can be used
to record information, but pure numbers are unchanging and unchangeable.
How can the integer "7" be in a different state? You could claim the
correct answer to the big calculation already exists in Plato's etherial
universe so it doesn't need to actually calculate it, but if so incorrect
answers exist in that world too and the are an infinite number of incorrect
answers and only one correct one. Physics simply won't let you do some
things so you can use that fact to arrange matter in such a way that it is
incapable of making an incorrect calculation and has no alternative but to
crank out the correct one. But with pure numbers anything goes and that is
not a good thing if you’re looking for one needle in a infinitely large
haystack.

> *The real point is that with computationalism (in particular the
> CT thesis), it doesn't matter what the computers are made of*

A computer can be made of any thing but it must be made of some thing. And
by "thing" I mean an object with the ability to exist in more than one
state and yet still be recognizable. If an atom of silicon absorbs a photon
we can tell that something has happened to it because its electron has
moved to a different orbital in a excited state that is measurably
different from its ground state. The atom has in a sense remembered what
has happened to it, and yet the atom has not changed so much that it is
unrecognizable, we can still tell its an atom of silicon and know that’s
where to look to find one bit of information. But there is nothing
comparable to that in the world of pure numbers, the integer “8” can’t
interrogate the integer “7” and measure what state its in and deduce what
happened to it yesterday because nothing can happen to the integer “7”, it
can only be in one state.


​ ​
John K Clark

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Re: Raddioactive decay states

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 23:56, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> Why don't we observe the pure states, decayed + undecayed, or decayed - 
> undecayed? TIA, AG


We “observe them indirectly” by the interferences, which eventually requires 
some bases corresponding to the one our brain has been implemented in, by a 
long evolutionary process. Mainly the Gaussian means of position and momentum.

Bruno




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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 08:02, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/20/2018 9:50 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:47 PM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.
>> 
>> I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.
>> 
>> You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix that 
>> is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you declare it is 
>> exactly diagonal and cut the other "worlds" loose.
>> 
>> 
>> What's the point of that last step, when decoherence explains why we don't 
>> see those other branches?
> 
> But decoherence didn't quite explain it.  You have to take the trace over the 
> environment in order to justify making the reduced density matrix exactly 
> diagonal (instead of FAPP diagonal) and that step is not unitary evolution 
> per the SE, it's using a projection operator.

But the projection, with the MWI, is not due to a physical collapse, but just 
of a self-localisation procedure. It *is* the quantum version of the first 
person indeterminacy, that Everett called subjective probability. 

Bruno



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> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 07:53, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/20/2018 9:42 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:17 PM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/19/2018 6:55 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:16 AM, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/18/2018 4:09 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> It will take a lot of work under his approach, but I am not aware of any 
>>> other system proposed by anyone, which even has a chance at this.
>>> 
>>> Penrose's gravity induced collapse has as good a chance as Bruno's,
>>> 
>>> At least Penrose has drawn a line in the sand, which can be experimentally 
>>> refuted.  Though I don't see any motivation for any collapse base theory 
>>> since Everett provided an account of collapse without having to assume it.  
>>> (Again this is like adding appending motive demon theory, which is entirely 
>>> superfluous and adds whose sole motivation is to preserve the notion of 
>>> collapse as physically real rather than apparent)
>>>  
>>> and a better chance of predicting some surprising but true physics. Some 
>>> version of transactional QM also has a chance. 
>>> 
>>> Transactional QM is another complication of the theory, proposing things we 
>>> have no evidence for to explain things which have already been explained 
>>> from a much simpler theory.
>> 
>> You only think it's simpler because you close your eyes to the last step in 
>> going from a FAPP diagonal reduced density matrix to an actually diagonal 
>> reduced density matrix.  A step that is perfectly equivalent to Bohr and 
>> Heisenberg's collapse postulate, except it tells you where to hide the 
>> collapse.
>> 
>> 
>> Is the appearance of collapse not describable from the other postulates?
> 
> "Appearance" is a psychological concept.  So to decide what that means 
> requires a theory of mind. 

Right. But the MWI needs only mechanism. The collapse needs magic.



> Most advocates of MWI want to say that getting the off-diagonal terms of the 
> reduced density matrix "small enough" is enough to make it "appear" that the 
> wf has collapsed.  But aside from this fuzziness there is the problem that in 
> some other basis the cross-terms may not be small at all; hence the preferred 
> basis problem? 

No, the base are imposed so as to make digital machines able to evolves, and 
apparently, cross terms ahem not been exploited (meaning that our brain are not 
quantum computer). But if our brain is a quantum computer, it might as well 
rotate some bit/qubit, and exploit some cross terms. 




> Do our minds impose a preferred basis? 

No. But our material brain does, and it needs to do that to become a classical 
machine, or to behave classically in some branch of the wave. The classicality 
is imposed by the fact that the key notion (the universal machine) is a 
classical concept, like all concept in theoretical science.


> and why should different minds agree on it?

To make sense of any conversation.

Bruno





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> 
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Re: Primary matter

[Telmo Menezes]

On 22 June 2018 at 13:31, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
>> On 20 Jun 2018, at 13:51, Telmo Menezes  wrote:
>>
>> Hi Bruno,
>>
 I follow your reasoning, from one of your recent articles. This leaves
 me dissatisfied, but if I try to verbalize this dissatisfaction I feel
 stuck in a loop. Perhaps this illustrates your point.
>>>
>>>
>>> We might need to do some detour about what it would mean to explain 
>>> consciousness, or matter.
>>> I might ask myself if you are not asking too much, perhaps. Eventually, 
>>> something has to remain unexplainable for reason of self-consisteny. I 
>>> suspect it will be just where our intuition of numbers or combinators, or 
>>> of the distinction finite/infinite comes from (assuming mechanism), or just 
>>> why we trust the doctor!
>>
>> I thought about it for some time. It seems that at a meta level, we
>> are always stuck in this situation of "give me one miracle for free
>> and everything else becomes explainable". The miracle can be matter,
>> or consciousness, or arithmetic. I believe I have to accept this state
>> of affairs for the reason of self-consistency that you express above,
>> but I'm human and I still feel the curiosity. Epistemic limits are
>> hard to accept.
>>
>> Could it even be that it doesn't make sense to say that materialism is
>> true or false, or that idealism is true or false and so on? I mean in
>> the same sense that the sun is not really the center of the solar
>> system (the center is just a human mental model), but assuming it
>> makes it simpler to describe the orbits. Perhaps assuming materialism
>> makes it easier to describe certain aspects of nature, while assuming
>> comp makes it easier to describe others, but in the end we always have
>> to sacrifice something. Model realism at the meta level…
>
>
> We have to sacrifice something. But the point is that if the Brain or the 
> body is Turing emulable, then we have to sacrifice materialism.
> FAPP we lost nothing, unless we lose the appearance of matter, in which case 
> the observation of matter refutes comp, but up to now we don’t loss them, and 
> at least we have a rather simple explanation of consciousness, which has to 
> be sacrificed if we want to keep matter in the ontology, but then I am still 
> waiting for any non mechanist theory of consciousness (beyond the fairy 
> tales).

I agree that comp and materialism are incompatible, you convinced me a
long time ago.

My point is that, in certain extreme circumstances -- that Brent likes
to point out -- we are bound to act as-if materialism is true.
Surgeries, for example. I don't believe that consciousness is an
emergent property of brain activity, but at the same time I would
prefer my surgeon to assume that. This is a strange situation. I am
not inclined toward hyper-relativistic ideas XX century
post-modernism-style -- that seems like giving up on science and
truth. On the other hand, it seems that we are condemned to some
amount of relativism. Certain questions seem to be forever
undecidable, to steal a phrase. One example is politics: in every
political debate that I know of, both sides have a point.

It seems to me that this eternal dissatisfaction and "yes but"
feelings are part of "the state of affairs" at a very fundamental
level.

> It goes from the rough dissociated universal consciousness of Q to the 
> elaborate self-consciousness of PA or ZF, or us.
>
>
>
>
>
>> Darwinism does not seem to require it.
>
> It does. When the machine opts for <>p in the doubt between p and <>p, if 
> it let it go, in some sense, it transforms itself into a more speedy and 
> more efficacious machine, with respect to its most probable history.
> So, consciousness brings a self-speedable ability, which is quite handy 
> for self-moving being living in between a prey and a predator.

 I'm not convinced. Consider a simple computer simulation where agents
 are controlled by evolving rules. Agents can eat blue or red pills.
 90% of the time blue pills give them energy and red pills cause
 damage. 10% of the time the opposite happens. It is not possible to
 know before eating a pill. Let's say the rule system evolves to make
 the agents always eat blue pills and never red pills. Most of the time
 this helps the agents, precisely because it assumes the most probable
 histories. This is a simplified version of the sort of "decisions"
 that evolution makes, and I would say that it is reasonable to assume
 that our own evolutionary story consists of the accumulation of a
 great number of such decisions. I still don't see how consciousness
 makes a difference in such a mechanism.
>>>
>>> The reason why consciousness makes the difference is not related to the 
>>> environment, but is intrinsic to the machine itself.
>>>
>>> I am aware to be quick on this, but the reason is a bit mathematically 
>>> involved, and again, depends 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 07:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/20/2018 9:41 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:14 PM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/19/2018 6:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:01 AM, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/18/2018 3:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
 Block time plus MWI means universes aren't created, they're all already 
 there.
 
 Seems like super-determinism to me. You're making a distinction with no 
 difference. AG
 
 Superdeterminism says you and a remote partner could decide to use the 
 digits of Pi to pseudorandomly select angles of measurement in a Bell 
 experiment, then decide to use the digits of Euler's number. Yet somehow, 
 the universe knew you and your friend had this agreement to use these 
 digits of these constants,
>>> 
>>> You keep anthropomorphizing the universe to make super-determinism sound 
>>> ridiculous.  It's nothing more that taking determinism completely 
>>> seriously, no free will by experimenters.  The choice of you and your 
>>> friend was determined by the past.  That's all determinism means.  
>>> 
>>> 
>>> It's not just me.  The first person who proposed this loophole around Bell 
>>> also immediately discarded it as ridiculous.  If super-determinism means 
>>> the same thing as determinism, why add the "super-" qualifier?
>>> 
>>> Here is a write up 
>>> 
>>>  in scientific american about t'Hooft's idea:
>>> 
>>> The dramatic version is that free will 
>>> 
>>>  is an illusion. Worse, actually. Even regular determinism–without the 
>>> “super”–subverts our sense of free will. Through the laws of physics, you 
>>> can trace every choice you make to the arrangement of matter at the dawn of 
>>> time. Superdeterminism adds a twist of the knife. Not only is everything 
>>> you do preordained, the universe reaches into your brain and stops you from 
>>> doing an experiment that would reveal its true nature. The universe is not 
>>> just set up in advance. It is set up in advance to fool you. As a 
>>> conspiracy theory, this leaves Roswell and the Priory of Sion in the dust.
>> 
>> Yes, they explain that the "super" means Alice and Bob cannot make 
>> independent spacelike decisions because their decisions are the product of 
>> common events in the (distant) past and that product is determined.
>> 
>> 
>> I sometimes can't tell if you're playing devil's advocate or not.
>>  
>> 
>>> 
>>> I've taken it one step further.  By using the digits of Pi or Euler's 
>>> number, it's not just reaching into your brain, since our brain did not 
>>> determine those digits. It requires a universe setup in advance to know the 
>>> digits of Pi,
>> 
>> Why is that a problem? The digits are determined and the choice to use them 
>> is determined.  Bruno's theory requires "the universe to know" the solutions 
>> to sets of Diophantine equations.
>> 
>> 
>> It requires only an independent existence of arithmetical truth.
>>  
>> 
>> 
>>> and to take into account the knowledge that you are using the digits of Pi 
>>> to pseudorandomly set the angles of the measurement devices, and produce 
>>> statistics (that were super determined at the time of the big bang) to fool 
>>> you by reproducing the quantum statistics with super-determined hidden 
>>> variables. 
>> 
>> Again with the anthropomorphizing.  The universe is just following its 
>> deterministic laws; it's not fooling anybody.
>> 
>> It's fooling us into believing in non-locality QM when QM isn't really true.
>> 
>> In that sense super-determinism is self-defeating, to believe it means one 
>> is forced to discard the very theory it is meant to explain.  It is a bit 
>> like epiphenominalism that way.
> 
> You are so invested in MWI you think the purpose of theories is to explain it.
> 
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> 
>>> If you see super-determinism as nothing more than determinism I think you 
>>> are missing something.  This is a pre-established harmony of the highest 
>>> order, requiring a massive information content per particle interaction
>> 
>> No, it certainly requires no more information than required to define a 
>> block universe and potentially much less since all results flow from the 
>> past, and being deterministic means it's reversible, so the information 
>> content is fixed (as it is for SWE).
>> 
>> super-determinism is so ill-defined of a theory it is hardly worth debating.
>>  
>> 
>> 
>>> (each particle has to contain knowledge, presumably up to and including all 
>>> other knowledge about the entire universe up to that point).  For example:
>>> 
>>> 1. Take the deep-field image 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 21 Jun 2018, at 06:41, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:14 PM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On 6/19/2018 6:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:01 AM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/18/2018 3:31 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> Block time plus MWI means universes aren't created, they're all already 
>>> there.
>>> 
>>> Seems like super-determinism to me. You're making a distinction with no 
>>> difference. AG
>>> 
>>> Superdeterminism says you and a remote partner could decide to use the 
>>> digits of Pi to pseudorandomly select angles of measurement in a Bell 
>>> experiment, then decide to use the digits of Euler's number. Yet somehow, 
>>> the universe knew you and your friend had this agreement to use these 
>>> digits of these constants,
>> 
>> You keep anthropomorphizing the universe to make super-determinism sound 
>> ridiculous.  It's nothing more that taking determinism completely seriously, 
>> no free will by experimenters.  The choice of you and your friend was 
>> determined by the past.  That's all determinism means.  
>> 
>> 
>> It's not just me.  The first person who proposed this loophole around Bell 
>> also immediately discarded it as ridiculous.  If super-determinism means the 
>> same thing as determinism, why add the "super-" qualifier?
>> 
>> Here is a write up 
>> 
>>  in scientific american about t'Hooft's idea:
>> 
>> The dramatic version is that free will 
>> 
>>  is an illusion. Worse, actually. Even regular determinism–without the 
>> “super”–subverts our sense of free will. Through the laws of physics, you 
>> can trace every choice you make to the arrangement of matter at the dawn of 
>> time. Superdeterminism adds a twist of the knife. Not only is everything you 
>> do preordained, the universe reaches into your brain and stops you from 
>> doing an experiment that would reveal its true nature. The universe is not 
>> just set up in advance. It is set up in advance to fool you. As a conspiracy 
>> theory, this leaves Roswell and the Priory of Sion in the dust.
> 
> Yes, they explain that the "super" means Alice and Bob cannot make 
> independent spacelike decisions because their decisions are the product of 
> common events in the (distant) past and that product is determined.
> 
> 
> I sometimes can't tell if you're playing devil's advocate or not.
>  
> 
>> 
>> I've taken it one step further.  By using the digits of Pi or Euler's 
>> number, it's not just reaching into your brain, since our brain did not 
>> determine those digits. It requires a universe setup in advance to know the 
>> digits of Pi,
> 
> Why is that a problem? The digits are determined and the choice to use them 
> is determined.  Bruno's theory requires "the universe to know" the solutions 
> to sets of Diophantine equations.
> 
> 
> It requires only an independent existence of arithmetical truth.
>  
> 
> 
>> and to take into account the knowledge that you are using the digits of Pi 
>> to pseudorandomly set the angles of the measurement devices, and produce 
>> statistics (that were super determined at the time of the big bang) to fool 
>> you by reproducing the quantum statistics with super-determined hidden 
>> variables. 
> 
> Again with the anthropomorphizing.  The universe is just following its 
> deterministic laws; it's not fooling anybody.
> 
> It's fooling us into believing in non-locality QM when QM isn't really true.
> 
> In that sense super-determinism is self-defeating, to believe it means one is 
> forced to discard the very theory it is meant to explain.  It is a bit like 
> epiphenominalism that way.


I agree. Super-determinism is like epiphenomenalism, and eventually, it 
“explains" everything without explaining anything. It is also like using the 
metaphysical notion of primary matter, or of god, to hide the conceptual 
problem of a conception of reality. 
Humans do that a lot. It is ratiocination, and it is irrational.

Bruno


> 
>  
> 
> 
>> If you see super-determinism as nothing more than determinism I think you 
>> are missing something.  This is a pre-established harmony of the highest 
>> order, requiring a massive information content per particle interaction
> 
> No, it certainly requires no more information than required to define a block 
> universe and potentially much less since all results flow from the past, and 
> being deterministic means it's reversible, so the information content is 
> fixed (as it is for SWE).
> 
> super-determinism is so ill-defined of a theory it is hardly worth debating.
>  
> 
> 
>> (each particle has to contain knowledge, presumably up to and including all 
>> other knowledge about 

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 25 Jun 2018, at 04:31, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/24/2018 9:07 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 22 Jun 2018, at 02:26, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/21/2018 3:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
 
 
 On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 5:10 PM, Brent Meeker >>> > wrote:
 
 
 On 6/21/2018 7:47 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> 
> 
> On Thu, Jun 21, 2018 at 12:59 AM, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> On 6/20/2018 9:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 5:24 PM, Brent Meeker > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 6/19/2018 7:10 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Tue, Jun 19, 2018 at 12:21 AM, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/18/2018 4:27 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
 
 
 On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 9:57 PM, Brent Meeker >>> > wrote:
 
 
 On 6/17/2018 4:43 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
 On 17 June 2018 at 13:26,  >>> > wrote:
 
 On Sunday, June 17, 2018 at 10:15:05 AM UTC, Jason wrote:
 
 
 On Sun, Jun 17, 2018 at 12:12 AM, >>> > wrote:
 
 
   why do you prefer the MWI compared to the Transactional 
 Interpretation?
 I see both as absurd. so I prefer to assume the wf is just epistemic, 
 and/or
 that we have some holes in the CI which have yet to be resolved. AG
 
 --
 
 
 1. It's the simplest theory: "MWI" is just the Schrodinger equation,
 nothing else. (it doesn't say Schrodinger's equation only applies 
 sometimes,
 or only at certain scales)
 
 2. It explains more while assuming less (it explains the appearance of
 collapse, without having to assume it, thus is preferred by Occam's 
 razor)
 
 3. Like every other successful physical theory, it is linear, 
 reversible
 (time-symmetric), continuous, deterministic and does not require 
 faster than
 light influences nor retrocausalities
 
 4. Unlike single-universe or epistemic interpretations, "WF is real" 
 with
 MWI is the only way we know how to explain the functioning of quantum
 computers (now up to 51 qubits)
 
 5. Unlike copenhagen-type theories, it attributes no special physical
 abilities to observers or measurement devices
 
 6. Most of all, theories of everything that assume a reality containing
 all possible observers and observations lead directly to 
 laws/postulates of
 quantum mechanics (see Russell Standish's Theory of Nothing, Chapter 7 
 and
 Appendix D).
 
 Given #6, we should revise our view. It is not MWI and QM that should
 convince us of many worlds, but rather the assumption of many worlds 
 (an
 infinite and infinitely varied reality) that gives us, and explains 
 all the
 weirdness of QM. This should overwhelmingly convince us of MWI-type
 everything theories over any single-universe interpretation of quantum
 mechanics, which is not only absurd, but completely devoid of 
 explanation.
 With the assumption of a large reality, QM is made explainable and
 understandable: as a theory of observation within an infinite reality.
 
 Jason
 
 You forgot #7. It asserts multiple, even infinite copies of an 
 observer,
 replete with memories, are created when an observer does a simple 
 quantum
 experiment. So IMO the alleged "cure" is immensely worse than the 
 disease,
 CI, that is, just plain idiotic. AG
 It is important to make the distinction between our intuition and
 common sense and actual formal reasoning. The former can guide the
 latter very successfully, but the history of science teaches us that
 this is not always the case. You don't provide an argument, you just
 present your gut feeling as if it were the same thing as irrefutable
 fact.
 
 I think Scott Aaronson has the right attitude toward this:
 
 https://www.scottaaronson.com/blog/?p=326 
 
 
 
 As such a strong believer in quantum computers (he's staked $100,000 
 of his own money on the future construction of large scale quantum 
 computers), I would love to ask Scott Aaronson what he thinks about 
 running a conscious AI on such a quantum computer.  

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:30, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/24/2018 8:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:19, Brent Meeker  wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/21/2018 2:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:47, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/19/2018 8:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>> Most of these objections to CI are answered by decoherence theory.
>> I have no clue how to interpret decoherence with a collapse theory.
> You use decoherence theory until you get to the reduced density matrix 
> that is diagonal FAPP (or for all conscious purposes) and then you 
> declare it is exactly diagonal and cut the other "worlds" loose.
 But why adding that last steps? Why to make the diagonal exact if not to 
 cut the other worlds?
>>> Because if you don't, a further evolution may undo the 
>>> measurement/perception.
>> I know it looks sad, but that is not an argument. In fact undoing some 
>> measurement/perception might be required for overall consistency, and is 
>> also a useful quantum gate.
>> 
>> The squared amplitudes can be asymptotical, and get the number zero is not 
>> always possible, but all what counts is to be relatively small to have 
>> enough determinism to keep the partial control.
> And how much is that?

Enough to get two or three decimals right, like in all sciences. Enough to get 
a man on the moon, and build electronic microscope. In nanotechnology we might 
need more decimals correct, and what counts is the probability that the client 
is satisfied, or the patient cured. Only in metaphysics, we have to reject a 
theory if the 100^1000th decimal is wrong. Metaphysics has not the notion of 
“FAPP”, because the purpose is not practical at all. It concerns a possible 
knowledge only.

Bruno





> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:26, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/24/2018 8:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 21 Jun 2018, at 22:12, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/21/2018 2:13 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
> On 20 Jun 2018, at 00:28, Brent Meeker  > wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/19/2018 7:25 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 16 Jun 2018, at 22:41, Brent Meeker >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 6/16/2018 10:16 AM, John Clark wrote:
 ​> ​ Another universe comes into existence when Joe the Plumber 
 performs, say, a spin measurement.
 
 But a measurement (whatever in the world that means) does not need to 
 be made and there is nothing special about Joe, if Everett is right 
 the same thing happens every time an electron in Joe's skin encounters 
 a photon, or for that matter whenever an electron anywhere encounters 
 anything.
>>> 
>>> That's where MWI gets fuzzy. 
>> 
>> Not more than QM itself. We can define a world by a branch of the 
>> universe wave. But such world will be “world” only as part of a personal 
>> history. Everett disagrees, but his “relative state” is a better wording 
>> than “many-worlds” which is often confusing.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Do all the submicroscopic events that make to macroscopic difference 
>>> create different worlds?  That can't be right because "worlds" are 
>>> classical things.  So the Heisenberg but problem seems to reappear in 
>>> different form.
>> 
>> Heisenberg cut disappear, it is just that worlds differentiate from our 
>> perspective when they make difference for us, like when they can no more 
>> interfere. There is no cut, only the quantum wave (in the Schroedinger 
>> picture) and relative state related to macroscopic irreversibility, 
>> which needs only the classical chaos to be irreversible FAPP. Histories 
>> are internal things, already a form of first person plural notion. 
> 
> Right.  But how FAPP does it have to be, how irreversible, in order that 
> it constitutes a conscious distinct state?  That's how the Heisenberg cut 
> problem reappears at a different level.
 
 Very quickly, like when you mix milk in the coffee. Pure statistics theory 
 provides the numbers, like when we can use Gauss e^(-x^2) instead of 
 Pascal triangle. You don’t need 0 on the diagonal, only tiny numbers.
>>> 
>>> I think you mean OFF the diagonal. 
>> 
>> Indeed.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> But how do you know you only need tiny numbers, and how tiny?  I have 
>>> thought that perhaps there should be a smallest non-zero unit of 
>>> probability; but it has been pointed out that even tiny numbers may add up 
>>> when the density matrix is transformed to some other basis.
>> 
>> It is just that the numbers are tiny only from your (3p) personal points of 
>> view. You brain needs to be enough of a mixture for consciousness to 
>> differentiate into universal machine (relative) state. In the case (which I 
>> doubt) that the brain is a quantum computer, we would be able to exploit the 
>> numbers which are not tiny in the relevant base to exploit quantum computing 
>> ability.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> 
 You don’t need purely orthogonal state, the big numbers and classical 
 chaos will lead to the right quasi classical phenomenology,
>>> 
>>> So you say.  But that requires a theory of "phenomenology", i.e. a theory 
>>> of how perception is realized.
>> 
>> But I extract the quantum from such a phenomenology. Perception is mainly 
>> [a]p with [a] designing a variant of the logic of self-reference G, or G*.
>> 
>> It is provably realised in all models of the consistent extensions of very 
>> elementary arithmetic.
>> 
>> (You might need to study some books on self-reference (the provability 
>> logic) to get the point).
> 
> So you're claiming that you have derived QM from perception (as described by 
> provability). 


No, my main claim, and oldest result, is that IF mechanism is true THEN physics 
must be extracted in a very special way. You don’t need to see the derivation 
of physics to understand that physicalism does not work with Mechanism. But the 
point is to do the test before.

Then it took me 30 years to make the test, and I showed that when we derive 
physics in that very special way, we get the first evidence that mechanism is 
correct, as we get the right logic. If we did not, Mechanism would be refuted. 




> But how does it then follow that perception is classical?  

That is the easy part. Because the universal machine is a classical notion; 
like arithmetic, and … quantum computer science, or the multiverse. It is part 
of our assumption: a machine stops or does not stop.



> Also that doesn't solve the problem of small  

Re: Is the "bubble multi-verse" and "qm many-worlds" the same thing?

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 24 Jun 2018, at 21:21, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/24/2018 8:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 I agree. To change QM, and getting the correct spin measurement in all 
 directions, you would need to de-linearise slightly the SWE, but this 
 makes the many worlds able to interact (Weinberg showed this, and Plaga in 
 this list a long time ago). Problem: it makes thermodynamical laws wrong. 
 Well, it makes almost all physical laws wrong).
>>> 
>>> "Wrong" comes in degrees.
>> 
>> The Löbian machine agrees with you, like f, []f, [][]f, [][][]f, …. There 
>> are big lies and small lies in the machine’s mind.
>> 
>> 
>>> QM made all physical laws wrong at the time.
>> 
>> Not really. QM on the contrary consolidate them in their scale on more solid 
>> base. QM made only the metaphysical interpretation of those theories wrong.
> 
> I take your point that where classical physics saved the phenomenon so did 
> QM.  But QM did more than that; for example it showed why atoms were stable 
> and had discrete emission spectra.

No problem with this. I agree. Then mechanism explain why we can see physical 
things, and why it can hurt. Physicalism use an identity thesis which simply 
does not work with mechanism, and use some axiom of infinity, never stated 
clearly. In fact, physicalism just dismiss the mind-body problem.



> 
>> The same can be said with computationalism: it should (and seems to give) a 
>> very solid base of the quantum physical laws, with much less ontological 
>> requirement.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> GR made Newtonian gravity and spacetime wrong.
>> 
>> I would not say that. It shows them to be approximation. That’s the 
>> advantage for Platonism: it bets at the start that what we see is not the 
>> real thing, but approximation due to our finite abilities.
> 
> It shows Newtonian gravity is an approximation in a certain domain (the weak 
> field limit).  But it's not even approximately right for a black hole.  The 
> possibility of gravitational waves or a wormhole is a fundamental difference, 
> as is the idea of a dynamic geometry.

I agree.

Bruno




> 
> Brent
> 
>> 
>> 
>>>   So if we reconcile our theories of spacetime and quantum fields the 
>>> result will likely be a theory that makes "all physical laws wrong”.
>> 
>> Yes, as the physical laws have to be deduced from simpler ideas, and with 
>> Mechanism, the physicals arise from the unique measure on computational 
>> histories that we must extracted from a logic of bet on sigma_1 sentences, 
>> which we get with the adjunction of the consistency condition (<>t).
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
> 
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Re: Primary matter

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 Jun 2018, at 08:03, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 6/22/2018 4:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
 This does not mean that a conscious machine is necessarily more 
 efficacious on all task,
>>> What is the added undecideable sentence implied by consciousness?
>> “I am conscious”.
> 
> What does that speed up?  Does the speed up from adding an undeciable 
> sentence suffer from Goodheart's curse?
> 

Not sure what you mean. I would say “no”, in theory “I am not conscious” can 
also bring a speed-up, despite being obviously consistent, like PA with “I am 
inconsistent”. The speed-up is proved by constructive diagonalisation, and is 
thus non-intuitive, except we can imagine than being aware of one’s 
consciousness might help to planning, especially in an environment habited by 
conscious entities.
Consciousness is *the* speed-up mechanism. It makes us thinking using model, 
semantic, meaning, instead of living the syntactical relation at some low 
level. Meaning is easier than proof, even if it can be misleading for 
individuals, it gives sense to sense, and priorities to higher goal, like 
surviving.

Bruno




> Brent
> 
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