David,
It is the motivation of Everett to make coherent the wave equation and
the idea that mind is not something substantial acting on matter (like
Copenhagians are obliged to admit in a way or another).
To derive the phenomenology of the collapse, he used only "local
interactions" and loc
On 2 March 2010 16:13, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> I think that you are forgetting the 8th step of the UDA. That is the Movie
> Graph Argument (MGA).
> It shows that, assuming comp, the "physical supervenience" has to be
> abandonned, and should be substituted by the comp supervenience thesis,
> which
On 01 Mar 2010, at 11:58, David Nyman wrote:
On 1 March 2010 08:26, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Everett uses comp, in the usual intuitive way, because he
characterizes the
observer by its crisp memory, and he derives the phenomenology of
the wave
packet reduction, by showing it to appears throug
On 1 March 2010 08:26, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Everett uses comp, in the usual intuitive way, because he characterizes the
> observer by its crisp memory, and he derives the phenomenology of the wave
> packet reduction, by showing it to appears through "physical interaction" in
> the memory/diary
On 28 Feb 2010, at 18:43, David Nyman wrote:
On 28 February 2010 15:45, Bruno Marchal wrote:
UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has to
emerge from
a relative state measure on all computational histories.
The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of the
a
On 28 February 2010 15:45, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> UDA shows that the wave equation (not just the collapse) has to emerge from
> a relative state measure on all computational histories.
> The schroedinger equation has to be itself the result of the abandon of the
> identity thesis.
Bruno, I'm sor
On 27 Feb 2010, at 18:38, David Nyman wrote:
On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal wrote:
The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity
thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the
computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett
Quantum M
On 8 Feb, 14:12, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> The main problem with Tegmark is that he assumes an implicit identity
> thesis mind/observer-state which does not work once we assume the
> computationalist hypothesis, (and thus cannot work with Everett
> Quantum Mechanics either). The weakness of such app
Actually we have already discussed this a lot, and the work I explain
here (uda, auda) can be considered as an answer to Tegmark (or
Schmidhuber), except that it has been published many years before, and
relies on "philosophy of mind/computer science" or machine's "theology".
The main prob
Assuming a 4-level hierarchy of "universe" as posited by Tegmark here...
http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1283v1
Then the universe would be an aggregate of all mathematical structures.
On Tue, Dec 29, 2009 at 6:07 AM, Mindey wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I was just wondering, we are talking so much about univer
On 05 Feb 2010, at 13:13, ronaldheld wrote:
Bruno:
is there a free version of Theoretical computer science and the
natural
sciences?
I have still many preprints. People interested can send me their
addresses out of line.
Oops! I just see the axiom "3)" below is not correct. Please
Bruno:
is there a free version of Theoretical computer science and the
natural
sciences?
Ronald
On Feb 4, 2:45 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 04 Feb 2010, at 15:28, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> > On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 1:47 PM, Bruno Marchal
> > wrote:
>
> > On
On 04 Feb 2010, at 15:28, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 1:47 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 03 Feb 2010, at 15:49, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 03 Feb 2010, at 03:00, Jason Resch wrote:
Is your point that with addition, mu
On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 1:47 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 03 Feb 2010, at 15:49, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>>
>> On 03 Feb 2010, at 03:00, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>> Is your point that with addition, multiplication, and an infinite number
On 03 Feb 2010, at 15:49, Jason Resch wrote:
On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 03 Feb 2010, at 03:00, Jason Resch wrote:
Is your point that with addition, multiplication, and an infinite
number of successive symbols, any computable function can be
constructed?
On Wed, Feb 3, 2010 at 3:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> On 03 Feb 2010, at 03:00, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> Is your point that with addition, multiplication, and an infinite number
> of successive symbols, any computable function can be constructed?
>
>
> You can say so.
> You could also have said
On 03 Feb 2010, at 03:00, Jason Resch wrote:
On Thu, Dec 31, 2009 at 12:38 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
UDA = Universal Dovetailer Argument. It is an argument which is
supposed to show that if we take seriously the idea that "we" are
digitally emulable, then we have to take seriously the
On Thu, Dec 31, 2009 at 12:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> UDA = Universal Dovetailer Argument. It is an argument which is supposed to
> show that if we take seriously the idea that "we" are digitally emulable,
> then we have to take seriously the idea that physics is a branch of number
> theory.
Bruno,
thanks for the answer.
> What do you mean by "universe"? Do you mean, like many, the physical
> universe (or multiverse), or do you mean the ultimate basic reality
> (the third person everything)?
>
By "universe" I mean what we call a "universe" when we talk about universes
on this list,
On 30 Dec 2009, at 17:39, John Mikes wrote:
> Bruno,
> I still wait for the reasoning of the 'primitive' in your:
>
> "...if this physical universe can be captured by a program (a
> number) or even by a mathematical structure. It is not a primitive
> structure. It has a reason linked to a
>
Bruno,* *
I still wait for the reasoning of the 'primitive' in your:
*"...if this physical universe can be captured by a program (a number) or
even by a mathematical structure. It is not a primitive structure. It has a
reason linked to a
statistics on computations.-..."*
What primitive(?) structu
Hi Mindey,
On 29 Dec 2009, at 15:07, Mindey wrote:
> I was just wondering, we are talking so much about universes, but how
> do we define "universe"? Sorry if that question was answered
> somewhere, but after a quick search I didn't find it.
What do you mean by "universe"? Do you mean, like man
> To me it would be that which is contained when you specify a number of
> dimensions. 2d? The universe can be a piece of paper.
But that implies that dimensionality is a fundamental property of
reality. It is conceivable that dimensionality is not fundamental, but
rather emergent.
--
You receiv
On Wed, Dec 30, 2009 at 1:07 AM, Mindey wrote:
> Hello,
>
> I was just wondering, we are talking so much about universes, but how
> do we define "universe"? Sorry if that question was answered
> somewhere, but after a quick search I didn't find it.
To me it would be that which is contained when y
Mindey,
I hurry to reply before some smarter guys do so on this list, so here is MY
opinion:
I consider this OUR universe a part of the Multiverse (unknown, unknowable,
but assumed) with its 'physical' (so far discovered!) built (similarly
assumed) and described as (our) so called 'physical world'
Hello,
I was just wondering, we are talking so much about universes, but how
do we define "universe"? Sorry if that question was answered
somewhere, but after a quick search I didn't find it.
Inyuki
http://www.universians.org
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