Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2007-01-10 Thread John M
Brent:
I wonder if I can make a readable sense of this rather convoluted mix of posts? 
I suggest the original should be at hand, I copy only the parts I reflect to. 
My previous post quoted remarks go by a plain JM, the present (new) inclusions 
as  JMnow paragraphs.
John M
  - Original Message - 
  From: Brent Meeker 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 11:51 PM
  Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases



  John M wrote (previously):
   Interleaving in* bold*(*-*
   John
   
   - Original Message -
   *From:* Stathis Papaioannou 
   *Sent:* Monday, January 08, 2007 4:55 AM
   *Subject:* RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order  Belief)
   
   Tom Caylor writes:
   ---SKIP
 
Stathis Papaioannou (SP:):
   People disagree on lots of things, but they also agree on lots 
of  things, many of which are on the face
   of it either incredible or unpleasant - because 
the /_evidence_  / leaves them no choice. On matters of values and 
religion, however, they disagree far more frequently. In the 
case of  values this is because they are not actually disgreeing about 
any empirical or logical fact:
  JM: --*who's empiria and who's logic? Are YOU the ultimate authority?--*
  skip.
   --*Doesn't everybody. including yourself?--*
  SP: 
   In the case of religion, people disagree because they are selective
   in the evidence they accept because they
   want to believe something.
  JM: --*Everybody's prerogative.--*


  BM:
  I'm not so sure.  Of course it is everyone's *political* right to base their 
beliefs on selective evidence - the institutions of government in liberal 
Western democracies recognize autonomy of thought.  But isn't there an ethical 
duty base one's beliefs on all, or at least an unbiased sample, of the 
available evidence?  If you don't rationally base your decisions that affect 
society, then I'd say you are a bad citizen - just as a person who sells his 
vote is a bad citizen.  I think we are too tolerant of religious irrationality; 
in a way that we do not tolerate irrationality in any other field.   
Historically this is because we want to allow freedom of conscious; we mistrust 
government to enforce right thought.  But just because we want to protect 
personal beliefs it doesn't follow that we should be tolerant of those beliefs 
when they are presented as a basis for public action.

  -JMnow:-
  Ethical duty base? I consider it culture-based and changing from 
society-type to historical circumstances all over. See nelow a remark on the 
nature of what we call 'ethics'/'morality'. 
  Upon your:
  ...an unbiased sample, of the available evidence?  is showing. 
  Who is unbiased? We all live in our mindset (belief system) and call it 
true, etc. Available is the 'evidence' we so consider. 
  I think we are too tolerant of religious irrationality;... and they say 
the same thing about the 'infidel' - and kill us. All in THEIR rationality. In 
their intolerance. Do we want to be similar? down to 'their' level?

  SP: Jews believe that God spoke to Moses, but they don't believe that 
God spoke to Muhammed. I don't think there is evidence that God spoke to either 
of them, but if your standards of evidence are much lower than mine
  JM:*who (else) told you which one is lower? Different, maybe.* 
and you accept one, you are being inconsistent if you don't accept the 
other. That is,
   if you think the sort of evidence presented in holy books, reports of 
miracles, religious experience, strength of
   faith in followers etc. is convincing, then pretty well every
   religion is equally convincing.
  JM:*Logical flaw: different religions accept different 'holy' books  (their 
own, that is). 
  You are in the joke when two people meet at the railroad station and one 
sais: I am making a trip to a distant foreign country and the other sais: me 
too, so why are we not
  traveling  together?*

  BM:
  Your seem to imply that religions and their different teachings are just 
personal choices - like where to go on vacation.  But in fact each one teaches 
that their holy books are objectively true and the values in those books (as 
interpreted by the appropriate religious authorities) are not subjective, but 
are mandated by god(s) for everyone.

  ---JMnow:---
  Seeing people changing their religions it is not mere implication.
   Not many people keep their early childhood pristine faith (in whatever 
religion) into later years of a hardened self. And none of the religions 
teaches the 'holiness' of the OTHER religion's 'holy' books - different from 
their own. 

  SP:
That is not the case if you compare the evidence for a flat Earth 
versus a spherical Earth, for example.
  JM: *(Watch out: Einstein reopened the scientific allowance for not only

Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-10 Thread John M
Stathis: wise words. (I find your Elvis - Jesus parable exaggerated).
Values, like ethics or morale is culture related - mostly anti-natural. The 
natural way of life is eat the prey, animal and/or plant, kick out a 
competitor from your territory, once the lion killed the weaker male: eat his 
litter, to protect HIS own genes. We find in 'groups' some 'societal' 
degeneration for group-survival, which went over to more sophisticated (human?) 
society as tribal etc. self-defense philosophy. Developmental factors colored 
that into diverse belief systems (religions etc.) Values are derived from 
such. 
Credibility is also a belief-system consequence: who would have believed in 
1000AD that all the angels dancing on a pin can be wiped away by a human-made 
atomic bomb?  Or would have Plato believed in a quark? 
(Not more ridiculous than your stabbing me with Santa).

With friendship

John
  - Original Message - 
  From: Stathis Papaioannou 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 6:01 PM
  Subject: RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order  Belief)


  John, 

  We need to have some sort of system for sorting the wrong beliefs from the 
less-likely-to-be-wrong 
  ones. This is what science tries to do, although of course it can never 
arrive at ultimate truth precisely 
  because it has to be open to new evidence should it come along. But we have 
to have some basic standards 
  for evidence, and if we are honest we should apply that standard 
consistently. If someone believes that Elvis is alive 
  because lots of people have seen him then, IMHO, that person's standards of 
evidence are too low. But if someone 
  believes that Jesus rose from the dead because it says in the Bible that 
people saw him, but not that Elvis is alive, 
  then not only is that person's standards of evidence too low, he is also 
being inconsistent. If you believe the incredible 
  things it says in one holy book then you have forfeited your reasons for 
disbelieving all sorts of other incredible things. 

  As for values, once we have ironed out our disagreements on empirical matters 
on which our values depend, then all 
  we can say is, I think this and you think that: there is no basis for saying 
one of us is right and the other wrong.

  Oh, and the atheist/ agnostic thing: are you atheistic or agnostic about 
Santa Claus?

  Stathis Papaioannou


  
   From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
   Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order  Belief)
   Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2007 09:19:08 -0500
   
   Interleaving in bold
   John
   - Original Message -
   From: Stathis Papaioannoumailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
   To: 
everything-list@googlegroups.commailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com
   Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 4:55 AM
   Subject: RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order  Belief)
   Tom Caylor writes:
   ---SKIP
   
Stathis Papaioannou:
   People disagree on lots of things, but they also agree on lots of things, 
many of which are on the face
   of it either incredible or unpleasant - because the evidence leaves them no 
choice. On matters of values and
   religion, however, they disagree far more frequently. In the case of values 
this is because they are not
   actually disgreeing about any empirical or logical fact:
   --who's empiria and who's logic? Are YOU the ultimate authority?--
they are just saying this is the way I wish to live my
   life, this is what I hold to be good or important, this is what I would 
like other people to hold good or important.
   --Doesn't everybody. including yourself?--
   In the case of religion, people disagree because they are selective in the 
evidence they accept because they
   want to believe something.
   --Everybody's prerogative.--
   Jews believe that God spoke to Moses, but they don't believe that God spoke 
to Muhammed. I don't think there is evidence that God spoke to either of them, 
but if your standards of evidence are much lower than mine
   --who (else) told you which one is lower? Different, maybe. --
and you accept one, you are being inconsistent if you don't accept the 
other. That is,
   if you think the sort of evidence presented in holy books, reports of 
miracles, religious experience, strength of
   faith in followers etc. is convincing, then pretty well every religion is 
equally convincing.
   --Logical flaw: different religions accept different 'holy' books (their 
own, that is) you are in the joke when two people meet at the railroad station 
and one sais: I am making a trip to a distant foreign country and the other 
sais: me too, so why are we not traveling  together? --
That is not the case if you compare the evidence for a flat Earth versus a 
spherical Earth, for example.
   (Watch out: Einstein reopened the scientific allowance for not only a 
heliocentric, but a geocentric world with his NO preference

Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2007-01-10 Thread Brent Meeker

John M wrote:
 Stathis: wise words. (I find your Elvis - Jesus parable exaggerated).
 Values, like ethics or morale is culture related - mostly anti-natural. 

There are no cultures in which people do not love their children, cooperate 
with relatives, seek both security and stimulation.

 The natural way of life is eat the prey, animal and/or plant, kick out 
 a competitor from your territory, once the lion killed the weaker male: 
 eat his litter, to protect HIS own genes. 

What's natural for lions isn't natural for wolves or dolphins or humans.

We find in 'groups' some 
 'societal' degeneration for group-survival, which went over to more 
 sophisticated (human?) society as tribal etc. self-defense philosophy. 
 Developmental factors colored that into diverse belief systems 
 (religions etc.) Values are derived from such.

Values existed longer before humans.

Brent Meeker


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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-10 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


Jone Mikes writes:

 Stathis: wise words. (I find your Elvis - Jesus parable exaggerated).

Not really: the people who claim they saw Elvis after his alleged death are 
more 
numerous and more credible than the second-hand (at best) Biblical accounts of 
Jesus being sighted after his crucifixion. When I have put this to Christians 
they 
answer that Elvis did not claim to be God etc. Well, if he had done, would that 
make a difference?

Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2007-01-09 Thread Brent Meeker

John M wrote:
 Interleaving in* bold*
 John
 
 - Original Message -
 *From:* Stathis Papaioannou mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
 *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com
 mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com
 *Sent:* Monday, January 08, 2007 4:55 AM
 *Subject:* RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order  Belief)
 
 
 
 Tom Caylor writes:
 ---SKIP
   
  Stathis Papaioannou:
 People disagree on lots of things, but they also agree on lots of
 things, many of which are on the face
 of it either incredible or unpleasant - because the /_evidence_
 /leaves them no choice. On matters of values and
 religion, however, they disagree far more frequently. In the case of
 values this is because they are not
 actually disgreeing about any empirical or logical fact:
 --*who's empiria and who's logic? Are YOU the ultimate authority?--*
  they are just saying this is the way I wish to live my
 life, this is what I hold to be good or important, this is what I
 would like other people to hold good or important.
 --*Doesn't everybody. including yourself?--*
 
 In the case of religion, people disagree because they are selective
 in the evidence they accept because they
 want to believe something.
 --*Everybody's prerogative.--*

I'm not so sure.  Of course it is everyone's *political* right to base their 
beliefs on selective evidence - the institutions of government in liberal 
Western democracies recognize autonomy of thought.  But isn't there an ethical 
duty base one's beliefs on all, or at least an unbiased sample, of the 
available evidence?  If you don't rationally base your decisions that affect 
society, then I'd say you are a bad citizen - just as a person who sells his 
vote is a bad citizen.  I think we are too tolerant of religious irrationality; 
in a way that we do not tolerate irrationality in any other field.   
Historically this is because we want to allow freedom of conscious; we mistrust 
government to enforce right thought.  But just because we want to protect 
personal beliefs it doesn't follow that we should be tolerant of those beliefs 
when they are presented as a basis for public action.

 Jews believe that God spoke to Moses, but they don't believe that
 God spoke to Muhammed. I don't think there is evidence that God
 spoke to either of them, but if your standards of evidence are much
 lower than mine
 --*who (else) told you which one is lower? Different, maybe. --*
  and you accept one, you are being inconsistent if you don't accept
 the other. That is,
 if you think the sort of evidence presented in holy books, reports
 of miracles, religious experience, strength of
 faith in followers etc. is convincing, then pretty well every
 religion is equally convincing.
 --*Logical flaw: different religions accept different 'holy' books
 (their own, that is) you are in the joke when two people meet at the
 railroad station and one sais: I am making a trip to a distant
 foreign country and the other sais: me too, so why are we not
 traveling  together? --*

Your seem to imply that religions and their different teachings are just 
personal choices - like where to go on vacation.  But in fact each one teaches 
that their holy books are objectively true and the values in those books (as 
interpreted by the appropriate religious authorities) are not subjective, but 
are mandated by god(s) for everyone.

  That is not the case if you compare the evidence for a flat Earth
 versus a spherical Earth, for example.
 *(Watch out: Einstein reopened the scientific allowance for not only
 a heliocentric, but a geocentric world with his NO preference in a
 relative world (math would be complicated)*

But Einstein didn't allow for a flat Earth.

 
 As for the Problem of Evil, that's easy: there is no evidence that
 there is a God; if there is a God, there is no
 evidence that he cares what happens to us; if he does care what
 happens to us there is no evidence that he intervenes in our lives;
 if he does intervene there is no evidence that things are any better
 than they would be if he didn't intervene.
 --*Again, you consider YOUR evidence in YOUR logic. You have the
 right to do so, but so has a religious person to his own ways. *
 *I am not an atheist, because an a-theist needs a god (theos) ** to
 deny and in my belief system (based on those natural sciences I was
 brainwashed into at college) I do not condone IN NATURE any
 SUPERNATURAL ideas. I just wondered why the 'god-designers' made
 their idol(s) with all those human fallibilities (vain, seek
 adoration, pick favorites, no criticism allowed, are vengeful,
 irate, not impartial, influenceable, cruel, punishing even unjustly
 (punishing for things by creational flaws etc.) **and assigning this
 world

Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-08 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 08-janv.-07, à 05:36, Tom Caylor a écrit :


Do you recognize the problem of evil,
and if so, what do you believe is the solution?  Do you think that the
MWI is the key to the solution?



What or who is Jesus in the MWI? Is Jesus described by a quantum wave 
function? If yes, did God send his Son in all parallel worlds?


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-08 Thread John M

Interleaving in bold
John
 - Original Message - 
 From: Stathis Papaioannou 
 To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
 Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 4:55 AM

 Subject: RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order  Belief)




 Tom Caylor writes:
 ---SKIP
  
  Stathis Papaioannou:
 People disagree on lots of things, but they also agree on lots of things, many of which are on the face 
 of it either incredible or unpleasant - because the evidence leaves them no choice. On matters of values and 
 religion, however, they disagree far more frequently. In the case of values this is because they are not 
 actually disgreeing about any empirical or logical fact:

 --who's empiria and who's logic? Are YOU the ultimate authority?--
  they are just saying this is the way I wish to live my 
 life, this is what I hold to be good or important, this is what I would like other people to hold good or important. 
 --Doesn't everybody. including yourself?--


 In the case of religion, people disagree because they are selective in the evidence they accept because they 
 want to believe something. 
 --Everybody's prerogative.--

 Jews believe that God spoke to Moses, but they don't believe that God spoke to 
Muhammed. I don't think there is evidence that God spoke to either of them, but 
if your standards of evidence are much lower than mine
 --who (else) told you which one is lower? Different, maybe. --
  and you accept one, you are being inconsistent if you don't accept the other. That is, 
 if you think the sort of evidence presented in holy books, reports of miracles, religious experience, strength of 
 faith in followers etc. is convincing, then pretty well every religion is equally convincing.

 --Logical flaw: different religions accept different 'holy' books (their own, 
that is) you are in the joke when two people meet at the railroad station and 
one sais: I am making a trip to a distant foreign country and the other sais: 
me too, so why are we not traveling  together? --
  That is not the case if you compare the evidence for a flat Earth versus a spherical Earth, for example. 
 (Watch out: Einstein reopened the scientific allowance for not only a heliocentric, but a geocentric world with his NO preference in a relative world (math would be complicated)


 As for the Problem of Evil, that's easy: there is no evidence that there is a God; if there is a God, there is no 
 evidence that he cares what happens to us; if he does care what happens to us there is no evidence that he intervenes in our lives; if he does intervene there is no evidence that things are any better than they would be if he didn't intervene. 
 --Again, you consider YOUR evidence in YOUR logic. You have the right to do so, but so has a religious person to his own ways. 
 I am not an atheist, because an a-theist needs a god (theos)  to deny and in my belief system (based on those natural sciences I was brainwashed into at college) I do not condone IN NATURE any SUPERNATURAL ideas. I just wondered why the 'god-designers' made their idol(s) with all those human fallibilities (vain, seek adoration, pick favorites, no criticism allowed, are vengeful, irate, not impartial, influenceable, cruel, punishing even unjustly (punishing for things by creational flaws etc.) and assigning this world to a creator with such flaws...  And yes, I am an agnostic, because I am not convinced about the superiority of MY ideas over the ideas of others. 
 

 Stathis Papaioannou


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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-08 Thread Stathis Papaioannou




John, 

We need to have some sort of system for sorting the wrong beliefs from the less-likely-to-be-wrong 
ones. This is what science tries to do, although of course it can never arrive at ultimate truth precisely 
because it has to be open to new evidence should it come along. But we have to have some basic standards 
for evidence, and if we are honest we should apply that standard consistently. If someone believes that Elvis is alive 
because lots of people have seen him then, IMHO, that person's standards of evidence are too low. But if someone 
believes that Jesus rose from the dead because it says in the Bible that people saw him, but not that Elvis is alive, 
then not only is that person's standards of evidence too low, he is also being inconsistent. If you believe the incredible 
things it says in one holy book then you have forfeited your reasons for disbelieving all sorts of other incredible things. 

As for values, once we have ironed out our disagreements on empirical matters on which our values depend, then all 
we can say is, I think this and you think that: there is no basis for saying one of us is right and the other wrong.


Oh, and the atheist/ agnostic thing: are you atheistic or agnostic about Santa 
Claus?

Stathis Papaioannou




From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order  Belief)
Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2007 09:19:08 -0500

Interleaving in bold
John
- Original Message -
From: Stathis Papaioannoumailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.commailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 4:55 AM
Subject: RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order  Belief)
Tom Caylor writes:
---SKIP

 Stathis Papaioannou:
People disagree on lots of things, but they also agree on lots of things, many 
of which are on the face
of it either incredible or unpleasant - because the evidence leaves them no 
choice. On matters of values and
religion, however, they disagree far more frequently. In the case of values 
this is because they are not
actually disgreeing about any empirical or logical fact:
--who's empiria and who's logic? Are YOU the ultimate authority?--
 they are just saying this is the way I wish to live my
life, this is what I hold to be good or important, this is what I would like 
other people to hold good or important.
--Doesn't everybody. including yourself?--
In the case of religion, people disagree because they are selective in the 
evidence they accept because they
want to believe something.
--Everybody's prerogative.--
Jews believe that God spoke to Moses, but they don't believe that God spoke to 
Muhammed. I don't think there is evidence that God spoke to either of them, but 
if your standards of evidence are much lower than mine
--who (else) told you which one is lower? Different, maybe. --
 and you accept one, you are being inconsistent if you don't accept the other. 
That is,
if you think the sort of evidence presented in holy books, reports of miracles, 
religious experience, strength of
faith in followers etc. is convincing, then pretty well every religion is 
equally convincing.
--Logical flaw: different religions accept different 'holy' books (their own, 
that is) you are in the joke when two people meet at the railroad station and 
one sais: I am making a trip to a distant foreign country and the other sais: 
me too, so why are we not traveling  together? --
 That is not the case if you compare the evidence for a flat Earth versus a 
spherical Earth, for example.
(Watch out: Einstein reopened the scientific allowance for not only a 
heliocentric, but a geocentric world with his NO preference in a relative world 
(math would be complicated)
As for the Problem of Evil, that's easy: there is no evidence that there is a 
God; if there is a God, there is no
evidence that he cares what happens to us; if he does care what happens to us 
there is no evidence that he intervenes in our lives; if he does intervene 
there is no evidence that things are any better than they would be if he didn't 
intervene.
--Again, you consider YOUR evidence in YOUR logic. You have the right to do so, 
but so has a religious person to his own ways.
I am not an atheist, because an a-theist needs a god (theos)  to deny and in my 
belief system (based on those natural sciences I was brainwashed into at 
college) I do not condone IN NATURE any SUPERNATURAL ideas. I just wondered why 
the 'god-designers' made their idol(s) with all those human fallibilities 
(vain, seek adoration, pick favorites, no criticism allowed, are vengeful, 
irate, not impartial, influenceable, cruel, punishing even unjustly (punishing 
for things by creational flaws etc.) and assigning this world to a creator with 
such flaws...  And yes, I am an agnostic, because I am not convinced about the 
superiority of MY ideas over the ideas of others.

Stathis Papaioannou

RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-07 Thread Stathis Papaioannou






Tom Caylor writes:


 So you believe that the Qur'an is the literal word of God? What I was hoping 
is that
 you would say Muhammed was deluded or lying, so that the Qur'an is at best an
 impressive piece of literature with some interesting moral teachings: i.e., 
what atheists
 say about the Bible.

 Stathis Papioannou

No, I was just answering your question.  I'm going out on a limb (not
referring to Shirley McLane ;) but I think that the belief in Islam
about the Qur'an is that it fulfills the role of the 2nd/3rd
hypostates, instead of the person of Jesus.  It is eternal and spans
the infinite gap between God and man.  For the Christian, Jesus
fulfills this role.  (Also, Jesus, being a person, solves the problem
of the infinite relationship gap between us and God in a from-God-to-us
direction rather than the from-us-to-God direction of good works. Good
works are only finite.)  So as I see it the Christian has a different
belief about the Bible than does the Muslim about the Qur'an.  There
are plenty of good sources about the Christian's belief about the
Bible, and evidence to support those beliefs, so I don't want to get
into a long discussion about it on this List.  I'll just say that I
believe that a non-Christian can read the Bible, and about the Bible,
to try to find out something in a rational way, just like reading any
other book.


Sure, the Bible contains some historical facts, some moral teachings, some great literature, 
as does the Qur'an. But there are literal conflicts between the Bible and the Qur'an, eg. 
Muslims believe that Jesus was just another prophet, not God in human form [if that concept 
is even coherent], while Christians do not believe that Muhammed actually took dictation from 
God. But in terms of empirical evidence, general plausibility, or even strength of conviction in 
believers, there isn't much to choose between the two faiths. Why do Christians and Muslims 
agree on certain incredible-sounding things of which they generally have no direct experience, 
such as the Earth being spherical, but strongly disagree on other things such as the status of 
Jesus and whether he really rose from the dead?


Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-07 Thread Tom Caylor


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Tom Caylor writes:

  So you believe that the Qur'an is the literal word of God? What I was 
hoping is that
  you would say Muhammed was deluded or lying, so that the Qur'an is at best 
an
  impressive piece of literature with some interesting moral teachings: i.e., 
what atheists
  say about the Bible.
 
  Stathis Papioannou

 No, I was just answering your question.  I'm going out on a limb (not
 referring to Shirley McLane ;) but I think that the belief in Islam
 about the Qur'an is that it fulfills the role of the 2nd/3rd
 hypostates, instead of the person of Jesus.  It is eternal and spans
 the infinite gap between God and man.  For the Christian, Jesus
 fulfills this role.  (Also, Jesus, being a person, solves the problem
 of the infinite relationship gap between us and God in a from-God-to-us
 direction rather than the from-us-to-God direction of good works. Good
 works are only finite.)  So as I see it the Christian has a different
 belief about the Bible than does the Muslim about the Qur'an.  There
 are plenty of good sources about the Christian's belief about the
 Bible, and evidence to support those beliefs, so I don't want to get
 into a long discussion about it on this List.  I'll just say that I
 believe that a non-Christian can read the Bible, and about the Bible,
 to try to find out something in a rational way, just like reading any
 other book.

Sure, the Bible contains some historical facts, some moral teachings, some 
great literature,
as does the Qur'an. But there are literal conflicts between the Bible and the 
Qur'an, eg.
Muslims believe that Jesus was just another prophet, not God in human form [if 
that concept
is even coherent], while Christians do not believe that Muhammed actually took 
dictation from
God. But in terms of empirical evidence, general plausibility, or even strength 
of conviction in
believers, there isn't much to choose between the two faiths. Why do Christians 
and Muslims
agree on certain incredible-sounding things of which they generally have no 
direct experience,
such as the Earth being spherical, but strongly disagree on other things such 
as the status of
Jesus and whether he really rose from the dead?

Stathis Papaioannou


People disagree on lots of things, especially if it touches on ultimate
questions, for instance as I mentioned about the Christians' belief
that Jesus is the solution to the problem of evil (from-God-to-us) and
Muslims' (and all other belief systems that recognize the problem of
evil) belief that the solution depends on our good works (or something
similar, from-us-to-God/Good).  Do you recognize the problem of evil,
and if so, what do you believe is the solution?  Do you think that the
MWI is the key to the solution?

Tom


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2007-01-07 Thread Brent Meeker


Tom Caylor wrote:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Tom Caylor writes:

  So you believe that the Qur'an is the literal word of God? What I 
was hoping is that
  you would say Muhammed was deluded or lying, so that the Qur'an is 
at best an
  impressive piece of literature with some interesting moral 
teachings: i.e., what atheists

  say about the Bible.
 
  Stathis Papioannou

 No, I was just answering your question.  I'm going out on a limb (not
 referring to Shirley McLane ;) but I think that the belief in Islam
 about the Qur'an is that it fulfills the role of the 2nd/3rd
 hypostates, instead of the person of Jesus.  It is eternal and spans
 the infinite gap between God and man.  For the Christian, Jesus
 fulfills this role.  (Also, Jesus, being a person, solves the problem
 of the infinite relationship gap between us and God in a from-God-to-us
 direction rather than the from-us-to-God direction of good works. Good
 works are only finite.)  So as I see it the Christian has a different
 belief about the Bible than does the Muslim about the Qur'an.  There
 are plenty of good sources about the Christian's belief about the
 Bible, and evidence to support those beliefs, so I don't want to get
 into a long discussion about it on this List.  I'll just say that I
 believe that a non-Christian can read the Bible, and about the Bible,
 to try to find out something in a rational way, just like reading any
 other book.

Sure, the Bible contains some historical facts, some moral teachings, 
some great literature,
as does the Qur'an. But there are literal conflicts between the Bible 
and the Qur'an, eg.
Muslims believe that Jesus was just another prophet, not God in human 
form [if that concept
is even coherent], while Christians do not believe that Muhammed 
actually took dictation from
God. But in terms of empirical evidence, general plausibility, or even 
strength of conviction in
believers, there isn't much to choose between the two faiths. Why do 
Christians and Muslims
agree on certain incredible-sounding things of which they generally 
have no direct experience,
such as the Earth being spherical, but strongly disagree on other 
things such as the status of

Jesus and whether he really rose from the dead?

Stathis Papaioannou


People disagree on lots of things, especially if it touches on ultimate
questions, for instance as I mentioned about the Christians' belief
that Jesus is the solution to the problem of evil (from-God-to-us) and
Muslims' (and all other belief systems that recognize the problem of
evil) belief that the solution depends on our good works (or something
similar, from-us-to-God/Good).  Do you recognize the problem of evil,
and if so, what do you believe is the solution?  Do you think that the
MWI is the key to the solution?

Tom


The problem of evil is the contradiction between the theory that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God and the observed fact that there is great suffering and evil in the world.  The obvious solution is that the putative existence of the the tri-omni God is false.  


I don't see how Jesus or good works are even relevant to this problem.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-06 Thread Tom Caylor


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
   Tom Caylor wrote:
So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological
solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us
and who we really are meant to be.  Since we were made in the image of
the personal God, then with the G(Logos) we can be brought into
relationship with Him again.  This is the core to the solution of evil.
 Now this does not automatically imply that evil is immediately solved
down in the 5th through 8th hypostases, i.e. the concrete problem of
evil.  But the solution to evil must first start at the level of our
human persons.
   
  
   I want to correct myself when I said the solution to evil must first
   start at the level of our human persons.  It starts with the personal
   God.  I was just saying that personal redemption/healing comes before
   physical redemption/healing.  Romans 8 actually addresses this
   matter too in verses 18-22.
  
   Tom
 
  What does the Qur'an say about the matter? After all, every word in that
  document was written down precisely as dictated by God in the original
  Arabic, and it is more recent than the Old or New Testament.
 
  Stathis Papaioannou

 This is sort of a contingent question for this List, since you could
 look it up for yourself if you really wanted to know.

 Tom

 Sura 14:48
 The day will come when this earth will be substituted with a new
 earth, and also the heavens, and everyone will be brought before GOD,
 the One, the Supreme.

So you believe that the Qur'an is the literal word of God? What I was hoping is 
that
you would say Muhammed was deluded or lying, so that the Qur'an is at best an
impressive piece of literature with some interesting moral teachings: i.e., 
what atheists
say about the Bible.

Stathis Papioannou


No, I was just answering your question.  I'm going out on a limb (not
referring to Shirley McLane ;) but I think that the belief in Islam
about the Qur'an is that it fulfills the role of the 2nd/3rd
hypostates, instead of the person of Jesus.  It is eternal and spans
the infinite gap between God and man.  For the Christian, Jesus
fulfills this role.  (Also, Jesus, being a person, solves the problem
of the infinite relationship gap between us and God in a from-God-to-us
direction rather than the from-us-to-God direction of good works. Good
works are only finite.)  So as I see it the Christian has a different
belief about the Bible than does the Muslim about the Qur'an.  There
are plenty of good sources about the Christian's belief about the
Bible, and evidence to support those beliefs, so I don't want to get
into a long discussion about it on this List.  I'll just say that I
believe that a non-Christian can read the Bible, and about the Bible,
to try to find out something in a rational way, just like reading any
other book.

Also, not to get into a discussion about the terms atheist vs.
agnostic, I'll just say that I'm glad you said atheists because an
agnostic would leave it open about whether the Bible really has
something to say to us from God.  In a way I am agnostic in the sense
that I will always doubt, since in this unglorified finite body I will
always only see through a glass darkly with respect to my particular
current frame of reference a finite piece of the infinite that I have
hope/faith in.  Just like we always have a little doubt about the
findings of science.

Tom


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-05 Thread Tom Caylor


Bruno Marchal wrote:


OK. Now, if you accept, if only just for the sake of the argument, the
mechanist hypothesis, then you will see there could be an explanation
why you feel necessary to postulate such a personal God. But then I
must agree this explanation is more coherent with
theories/philosophies in which that God is so much *personal* that
it looks like the first person canonically associated to the machine.
In that case your personal God would be the machine third hypostase
or Plotinus universal soul. It is the unameable self (re)defined by
Bpp.



If we are limiting ourselves to some finite machine or person, say
myself, and thus the third hypostase is simply my first person
experience, that is not the same as my personal God.

However, if we are talking about the largest person possible, then
the third hypostase (Bp  p) is based on the first hypostase (p) where
p is ALL TRUTH.  Then if we take the first hypostase to be the
impersonal Arithmetic Truth, or any impersonal truth, then the third
hypostase based on that (Bp  p) seems to be akin to the World Soul of
pantheism mentioned my Smullyan in Who Knows? p. 20.  I presume this
is akin to the universal soul that is sometimes referred to in MWI
discussions about all of us belonging ultimately to the same person,
since we all eventually have every experience.

However, this is not the same as the personal God's Soul, or what I
mapped to the Holy Spirit.  The third hypostase I referred to in my
Christian interpretation of the hypostases was based on the first
hypostase corresponding to God the Father, or I am that I am, or
Yahweh.  (more on naming below)  This is the personal God, not an
impersonal god.  Without a personal God at the top (by definition!)
there is no impetus for downward emanation.  Numbers don't care about
us and our plight with evil!  With only numbers or other impersonal
things, we are forever stuck with evil.


 If someone
 wants to research the historical record sufficiently to convince
 themselves one way or another about the Bible or Jesus' resurrection,
 that's great, and I can give them some sources, but it's probably too
 contingent for this List.

Perhaps. The problem is that I just cannot take an expression like
Jesus is the Son of God as a scientific proposition. It could be
true, it could be false without me seeing a way to resolve it. On the
contrary, I can find in the talk by Jesus general pattern which makes
sense, and, indeed, 2/3 of Christian theology is probably compatible
with the comp hyp. Somehow, any literal interpretation of *any* text
(even PA's axioms !) should be considered with systematic suspicion.



Notice that I used the word convince themselves rather than proof.
(I used proof later on, but that was a mistake when talking with you,
because I wasn't using it in the sense of a mathematical logic proof,
like an inference from axioms.)  The reality of the personal God in His
three Persons fulfilling the first four hypostases is obviously greater
than any truth that is accessible within the realm of mathematical
provability (G) of finite persons or machines.  You can see that
through your statement that goodness is based on truth, so in a sense
the personal God is even bigger than all Arithmetical Truth.  This
makes sense also from my statement that you need more than truth at the
core, but also love and communication.  So trying to prove God in
some logical inference sense would not only be harder than trying to
prove all Arithmetical Truth, it's even a category error since that
wouldn't address love and communication.  Trying to prove God in this
step-by-step way is actually equivalent to trying to become God.  Not
only will we be forever short of seeing God, but we will be missing the
love and communication aspect.  So in a sense, putting our hope in just
numerical truth is like hoping in only one dimension when more are
required.

The word convince is meant to convey something akin to convincing
ourselves of the truth of Church's Thesis.  It is like a machine at
level G convincing itself of truth at the G* level.  It is like the
circumstantial evidence that Smullyan refers to (p. 5).  The great
thing is this:  Say p=(all that the personal God is).  Then Bp is the
Logos, which has both the divine level, say G*(Logos), and the human
level, say G(Logos), so that G(Logos) is the Word that became flesh
and dwelt among us, the Son of God.  Now let G(Tom) = all of the truth
that I can prove.  Now of course this is not as big as G(Logos), and
probably (I'm sure!) isn't even as big as G(Bruno).  However, you can
help me to discover areas of G(Tom) that I'm not aware of.  In fact,
the G(Tom(half asleep)) or the G(Tom(before Bruno helped me)) may not
be as big as the G(Tom(awake)) or G(Tom(after Bruno helped me)).  So
G(Tom(awake)) contains some of G*(Tom(half asleep)) minus G(Tom(half
asleep)).  (Actually, sometimes it's the inverse where I realize
something when I'm half asleep, and then when I wake up I 

Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-05 Thread Tom Caylor


Tom Caylor wrote:

So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological
solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us
and who we really are meant to be.  Since we were made in the image of
the personal God, then with the G(Logos) we can be brought into
relationship with Him again.  This is the core to the solution of evil.
 Now this does not automatically imply that evil is immediately solved
down in the 5th through 8th hypostases, i.e. the concrete problem of
evil.  But the solution to evil must first start at the level of our
human persons.



I want to correct myself when I said the solution to evil must first
start at the level of our human persons.  It starts with the personal
God.  I was just saying that personal redemption/healing comes before
physical redemption/healing.  Romans 8 actually addresses this
matter too in verses 18-22.

Tom


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


Tom,

It seems you are doing to the arithmetical hypostases what Augustin did 
to Plotinus's hypostases, including a relation between the three 
primary hypostases and trinity (criticized by many scholars, note).
Roughly speaking, I can agree, except that I cannot put any singular 
name in a theoretical frame (except for reference on previous work).

I must go, and I will elaborate this later.

Bruno


Le 05-janv.-07, à 10:01, Tom Caylor a écrit :



Bruno Marchal wrote:


OK. Now, if you accept, if only just for the sake of the argument, the
mechanist hypothesis, then you will see there could be an explanation
why you feel necessary to postulate such a personal God. But then I
must agree this explanation is more coherent with
theories/philosophies in which that God is so much *personal* that
it looks like the first person canonically associated to the 
machine.
In that case your personal God would be the machine third 
hypostase

or Plotinus universal soul. It is the unameable self (re)defined by
Bpp.



If we are limiting ourselves to some finite machine or person, say
myself, and thus the third hypostase is simply my first person
experience, that is not the same as my personal God.

However, if we are talking about the largest person possible, then
the third hypostase (Bp  p) is based on the first hypostase (p) where
p is ALL TRUTH.  Then if we take the first hypostase to be the
impersonal Arithmetic Truth, or any impersonal truth, then the third
hypostase based on that (Bp  p) seems to be akin to the World Soul of
pantheism mentioned my Smullyan in Who Knows? p. 20.  I presume this
is akin to the universal soul that is sometimes referred to in MWI
discussions about all of us belonging ultimately to the same person,
since we all eventually have every experience.

However, this is not the same as the personal God's Soul, or what I
mapped to the Holy Spirit.  The third hypostase I referred to in my
Christian interpretation of the hypostases was based on the first
hypostase corresponding to God the Father, or I am that I am, or
Yahweh.  (more on naming below)  This is the personal God, not an
impersonal god.  Without a personal God at the top (by definition!)
there is no impetus for downward emanation.  Numbers don't care about
us and our plight with evil!  With only numbers or other impersonal
things, we are forever stuck with evil.


 If someone
 wants to research the historical record sufficiently to convince
 themselves one way or another about the Bible or Jesus' 
resurrection,
 that's great, and I can give them some sources, but it's probably 
too

 contingent for this List.

Perhaps. The problem is that I just cannot take an expression like
Jesus is the Son of God as a scientific proposition. It could be
true, it could be false without me seeing a way to resolve it. On the
contrary, I can find in the talk by Jesus general pattern which makes
sense, and, indeed, 2/3 of Christian theology is probably compatible
with the comp hyp. Somehow, any literal interpretation of *any* text
(even PA's axioms !) should be considered with systematic suspicion.



Notice that I used the word convince themselves rather than proof.
(I used proof later on, but that was a mistake when talking with you,
because I wasn't using it in the sense of a mathematical logic proof,
like an inference from axioms.)  The reality of the personal God in His
three Persons fulfilling the first four hypostases is obviously greater
than any truth that is accessible within the realm of mathematical
provability (G) of finite persons or machines.  You can see that
through your statement that goodness is based on truth, so in a sense
the personal God is even bigger than all Arithmetical Truth.  This
makes sense also from my statement that you need more than truth at the
core, but also love and communication.  So trying to prove God in
some logical inference sense would not only be harder than trying to
prove all Arithmetical Truth, it's even a category error since that
wouldn't address love and communication.  Trying to prove God in this
step-by-step way is actually equivalent to trying to become God.  Not
only will we be forever short of seeing God, but we will be missing the
love and communication aspect.  So in a sense, putting our hope in just
numerical truth is like hoping in only one dimension when more are
required.

The word convince is meant to convey something akin to convincing
ourselves of the truth of Church's Thesis.  It is like a machine at
level G convincing itself of truth at the G* level.  It is like the
circumstantial evidence that Smullyan refers to (p. 5).  The great
thing is this:  Say p=(all that the personal God is).  Then Bp is the
Logos, which has both the divine level, say G*(Logos), and the human
level, say G(Logos), so that G(Logos) is the Word that became flesh
and dwelt among us, the Son of God.  Now let G(Tom) = all of the truth
that I can prove.  Now of course this is not as big as G(Logos), and
probably 

RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou





Tom Caylor wrote:
 So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological
 solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us
 and who we really are meant to be.  Since we were made in the image of
 the personal God, then with the G(Logos) we can be brought into
 relationship with Him again.  This is the core to the solution of evil.
  Now this does not automatically imply that evil is immediately solved
 down in the 5th through 8th hypostases, i.e. the concrete problem of
 evil.  But the solution to evil must first start at the level of our
 human persons.


I want to correct myself when I said the solution to evil must first
start at the level of our human persons.  It starts with the personal
God.  I was just saying that personal redemption/healing comes before
physical redemption/healing.  Romans 8 actually addresses this
matter too in verses 18-22.

Tom


What does the Qur'an say about the matter? After all, every word in that 
document was written down precisely as dictated by God in the original 
Arabic, and it is more recent than the Old or New Testament. 


Stathis Papaioannou
_
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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-05 Thread Tom Caylor


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 Tom Caylor wrote:
  So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological
  solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us
  and who we really are meant to be.  Since we were made in the image of
  the personal God, then with the G(Logos) we can be brought into
  relationship with Him again.  This is the core to the solution of evil.
   Now this does not automatically imply that evil is immediately solved
  down in the 5th through 8th hypostases, i.e. the concrete problem of
  evil.  But the solution to evil must first start at the level of our
  human persons.
 

 I want to correct myself when I said the solution to evil must first
 start at the level of our human persons.  It starts with the personal
 God.  I was just saying that personal redemption/healing comes before
 physical redemption/healing.  Romans 8 actually addresses this
 matter too in verses 18-22.

 Tom

What does the Qur'an say about the matter? After all, every word in that
document was written down precisely as dictated by God in the original
Arabic, and it is more recent than the Old or New Testament.

Stathis Papaioannou


This is sort of a contingent question for this List, since you could
look it up for yourself if you really wanted to know.

Tom

Sura 14:48
The day will come when this earth will be substituted with a new
earth, and also the heavens, and everyone will be brought before GOD,
the One, the Supreme.


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-05 Thread Tom Caylor


Tom Caylor wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  Tom Caylor wrote:
   So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological
   solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us
   and who we really are meant to be.  Since we were made in the image of
   the personal God, then with the G(Logos) we can be brought into
   relationship with Him again.  This is the core to the solution of evil.
Now this does not automatically imply that evil is immediately solved
   down in the 5th through 8th hypostases, i.e. the concrete problem of
   evil.  But the solution to evil must first start at the level of our
   human persons.
  
 
  I want to correct myself when I said the solution to evil must first
  start at the level of our human persons.  It starts with the personal
  God.  I was just saying that personal redemption/healing comes before
  physical redemption/healing.  Romans 8 actually addresses this
  matter too in verses 18-22.
 
  Tom

 What does the Qur'an say about the matter? After all, every word in that
 document was written down precisely as dictated by God in the original
 Arabic, and it is more recent than the Old or New Testament.

 Stathis Papaioannou

This is sort of a contingent question for this List, since you could
look it up for yourself if you really wanted to know.

Tom

Sura 14:48
The day will come when this earth will be substituted with a new
earth, and also the heavens, and everyone will be brought before GOD,
the One, the Supreme.


Stathis,

I apologize for my words of irritation.  That was wrong.

Tom


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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-05 Thread Stathis Papaioannou





Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
  Tom Caylor wrote:
   So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological
   solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us
   and who we really are meant to be.  Since we were made in the image of
   the personal God, then with the G(Logos) we can be brought into
   relationship with Him again.  This is the core to the solution of evil.
Now this does not automatically imply that evil is immediately solved
   down in the 5th through 8th hypostases, i.e. the concrete problem of
   evil.  But the solution to evil must first start at the level of our
   human persons.
  
 
  I want to correct myself when I said the solution to evil must first
  start at the level of our human persons.  It starts with the personal
  God.  I was just saying that personal redemption/healing comes before
  physical redemption/healing.  Romans 8 actually addresses this
  matter too in verses 18-22.
 
  Tom

 What does the Qur'an say about the matter? After all, every word in that
 document was written down precisely as dictated by God in the original
 Arabic, and it is more recent than the Old or New Testament.

 Stathis Papaioannou

This is sort of a contingent question for this List, since you could
look it up for yourself if you really wanted to know.

Tom

Sura 14:48
The day will come when this earth will be substituted with a new
earth, and also the heavens, and everyone will be brought before GOD,
the One, the Supreme.


So you believe that the Qur'an is the literal word of God? What I was hoping is that 
you would say Muhammed was deluded or lying, so that the Qur'an is at best an 
impressive piece of literature with some interesting moral teachings: i.e., what atheists 
say about the Bible. 


Stathis Papioannou
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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-01 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 29-déc.-06, à 16:41, Jef Allbright a écrit :



Bruno -

It appears that you and I have essential agreement on our higher-level
epistemology.


It is possible. Note that in general those who appreciates the 
hypotheses I build on, does not like so much the conclusion, and vice 
versa, those who like the conclusion does not like the way I got them 
...







But I don't know much about your comp so I'll begin reading.



Comp is the old mechanist philosophy (Question to Milinda, Plato, 
Descartes, Hobbes) revisited after the creative explosion: the 
discovery of the universal turing machine and the computer 
theoretical laws they obey.
I propose also a reasoning (the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA)) 
showing that, contrary to a widespread belief (since the closure of 
Plato Academy in 525 after JC), digital mechanism is epistemologically 
incompatible with the belief that the mind emerges from some primary 
substantial matter, but on the contrary the appearances of matter 
emerges globally from an internal view of the number theoretical 
reality. The UDA necessitates only a passive understanding of Church 
thesis. Then I translate UDA in the language of a Universal Machine, 
and thanks to the work of Post, Markov, Godel, Boolos, Goldblatt, 
Visser etc. I show constructively how to derive the particular case of 
certainties on the observation results (= more or less the 
probability one bearing on our computational extensions) and I have 
shown that those probability one gives arithmetical interpretation of 
some quantum logic. I am working now to show why nature look like a 
*quantum* computer in our immediate accessible neighborhood. I 'm stuck 
on some mathematical difficulties and the progress are slow.






 With increasing context of self-awareness, subjective values  
increasingly resemble principles of the physical universe.
Apparently you are even more optimistic than me. I just wish you are 
correct here. It is fuzzy because the term resemble is fuzzy.


Yes, I was writing in broad strokes, just to give you the pattern, but
not the detail that has been mentioned earlier.  Humanity certainly
could be within an evolutionary cul de sac.



Yes.




snip




Since all events are the result of interactions following

the laws of the physical universe,
Hmmm... It is out of topic, but I don't believe this at all. Better I 
can show to you that if I (or You) are turing-emulable, then all 
events, including the apparition and the development of the physical 
laws are the result of the relation between numbers.


For the sake of my argument I might better have said that all
interactions seem to follow a consistent set of rules (which we see as
the laws of the physical universe.  It seems that you have some theory
of a more fundamental layer having to do with numbers.



Yes. I have many reasons to believe the laws of physics emerges from 
the laws of numbers. My basic belief in this relies on computer 
science/ cognitive science and quantum mechanics. But since the last 
years I got independent evidences for this from knot theory, prime 
number theory, integer partition theory. What is funny (and still 
mysterious but less and less when looking in the details) is the 
presence of the number 24 (or of its divisors) each time a deep 
relation appears between number theory and physics. I will send an easy 
illustration soon or later.


Happy 2007,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2007-01-01 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 29-déc.-06, à 10:57, Tom Caylor a écrit :



Just to clear this up, my above statement was not meant to be an
argument. I purposefully used the word entail rather than imply.  I
wasn't saying that you cannot believe in some kind of truth without
believing in the personal God.  However is makes sense *from my
perspective* (of belief in the personal God) that you do not have a
basis for any truth on which personhood can be based, which *from my
perspective* (which I *have* been arguing for in general) needs more
than the impersonal core.



OK. Now, if you accept, if only just for the sake of the argument, the  
mechanist hypothesis, then you will see there could be an explanation  
why you feel necessary to postulate such a personal God. But then I  
must agree this explanation is more coherent with  
theories/philosophies in which that God is so much *personal* that  
it looks like the first person canonically associated to the machine.  
In that case your personal God would be the machine third hypostase  
or Plotinus universal soul. It is the unameable self (re)defined by  
Bpp.








The card records facts. To judge them historical is already beyond my
competence. Why the bible? Why not the question of king Milinda ?



My approach on the Everything List has been to argue for the necessity
of the personal God as the ultimate basis for Everything.



See just above.




If someone
wants to research the historical record sufficiently to convince
themselves one way or another about the Bible or Jesus' resurrection,
that's great, and I can give them some sources, but it's probably too
contingent for this List.



Perhaps. The problem is that I just cannot take an expression like  
Jesus is the Son of God as a scientific proposition. It could be  
true, it could be false without me seeing a way to resolve it. On the  
contrary, I can find in the talk by Jesus general pattern which makes  
sense, and, indeed, 2/3 of Christian theology is probably compatible  
with the comp hyp. Somehow, any literal interpretation of *any* text  
(even PA's axioms !) should be considered with systematic suspicion.







But I do have response to your comment on
universal-ness below.
snip
I agree I was too loose in my use of hypercomputation as an analogy.
Actually the direction of the spanning was downward, going from G*
(celestial) to G terrestial, described by the Greek work kenosis
(emptying).  This does not mean that God the Father (the personal
fulfillment of the first hypostase), or the Holy Spirit (...second
hypostase) discontinued to exist, but that the Logos became flesh and
dwelt among us, so that we could see his grace and truth.  Again, this
does not mean that we cannot believe and seek truth, and have a feeling
that we are on the right track, without a relationship with the
personal God.  This means that the ultimate source of all truth made
himself known to us on a human level and solved the problem of evil.



Again this can have some symbolic sense. Literaly it is enough I know  
just one suffering Dog to feel uneasy with the idea that the concrete  
(not the theological) problem of evil is solved.







Death itself is the ultimate effect of evil: separation/isolation from
everything and everyone.  Jesus proved his divinity by raising
*himself* from the dead.



A very big advance in modern and serious parapsychology is that humans  
are easily fooled by humans. How could you say Jesus has proved  
something? Even if someone appear and can change water in wine and  
makes miracles etc. I would not take this as a proof. Remember I even  
think there is just no proofs concerning any reality. Proofs belongs to  
theories. Facts does not prove. Facts confirms or refute beliefs  
(theories).









For any belief I have I try to figure out if I would have had that
belief in completely different context. Jesus or Nagarjuna does  
not

survive such a test. For example I would not have believed in Jesus in
the case I would have born in the time of Plato, nor would I believed
in Euler would I have born on a different planet, but it make sense
that I would have believed in the content of their message. This  
forces

us to make the argument the most universal possible, the less
culturally influenced.



I am not saying that God's communication is an exhaustive communication
of all truth, i.e. all facts (scientific, historic, etc.) that it is
possible for us to know.  It was a message saying, I am here. I love
you. I am your source of meaning. Here is my hand to rescue you from
darkness/meaninglessness and death/isolation.  Your
meaning/relationships are actually, ultimately, based on something:
Me.



But how could I know if jesus was not refering to the universal me,  
in which case I can make sense of what he said both relatively to Plato  
or Plotinus theory and with the comp hyp. If Jesus meant literally  
himself, then, well I wait someone can even address a theory in which  
such literal truth can 

Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-30 Thread Tom Caylor


Brent Meeker wrote:

Tom Caylor wrote:

 I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy.  If there is
 something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted
 me to address, just bring it back up.

 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Le 26-d c.-06,   19:54, Tom Caylor a  crit :

 
  On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  Le 25-d c.-06,   01:13, Tom Caylor a  crit :
 
   The crux is that he is not symbolic...
 
 
  I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no
  evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of
  any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an
  assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification
  criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the
  fact
  that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to
  their parents wishful thinking.
 
 
  If you are not sure of any clear meaning of the personal God being the
  source of everything, including of course truth, this entails not
  knowing the other things too.


 Is that not an authoritative argument?
 What if I ask to my student an exam question like give me an argument
 why the square root of 3 is irrationnal. Suppose he gives me the
 correct and convincing usual (mathematical) proof. I could give him a
 bad note for not adding: and I know that is the truth because truth is
 a gift by God.
 Cute, I can directly give bad notes to all my students, and this will
 give me more time to find a falsity in your way to reason ...


 Just to clear this up, my above statement was not meant to be an
 argument. I purposefully used the word entail rather than imply.  I
 wasn't saying that you cannot believe in some kind of truth without
 believing in the personal God.  However is makes sense *from my
 perspective* (of belief in the personal God) that you do not have a
 basis for any truth on which personhood can be based, which *from my
 perspective* (which I *have* been arguing for in general) needs more
 than the impersonal core.


 The card records facts. To judge them historical is already beyond my
 competence. Why the bible? Why not the question of king Milinda ?


 My approach on the Everything List has been to argue for the necessity
 of the personal God as the ultimate basis for Everything.  If someone
 wants to research the historical record sufficiently to convince
 themselves one way or another about the Bible or Jesus' resurrection,
 that's great, and I can give them some sources, but it's probably too
 contingent for this List.  But I do have response to your comment on
 universal-ness below.


  My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and
  we are left with despair,

Speak for yourself.



My above statement is in the context of an a long explanation I've put
forth in previous posts regarding the conclusions of modern philosophy.
I explain below that I am referring to nihilism when I use the word
despair.  This is not my own fabrication, but comes from the wording
used by the modern existentialist philosophers.



 unless we lie to ourselves against the
  absence of hope.

So are you lying to yourself because otherwise you would despair?



Again, this is in the context of what I've said before about
reductionism and existentialism.  The lie refers to having to act as
if (originated with Kant) certain things like free will are real even
though we know they are not, in order to avoid nihilism.  Again, some
examples are of people who maintain a view along these lines are Marvin
Minsky (Society of Mind), Steven Pinker (How The Mind Works), Dennett
(who holds that language about purpose, intention, feelings does not
belong to science, but is indispensable to ordinary discourse), and
even eliminative materialists (Searle; Daniel Wegner's The Illusion of
Conscious Will) concede that a concept of self remains a convenient
fiction that in practice we can't do without.  These examples were
given in Nancy Pearcey's book Total Truth, although I don't agree with
everything she says.

Tom




 Here Stathis already give a genuine comment. You are just admitting
 your argument is wishful thinking.


 I was being too poetic ;)  By despair I meant nihilism, the belief
 that there ultimately is no meaning.  I am arguing that the ultimate
 source of meaning has to be personal.  I'm just saything that my
 argument is of the form, If meaning is not ultimately based on the
 personal God, then there is no true meaning, because...

If meaning is personal, and I'm a person, then I create meaning.  To postulate a personal 
God to supply ultimate personal meaning seems otiose.  It's like the 
first-cause argument for God.  If God can exist uncaused then why not stop the regress 
with an uncaused universe - which has the additional advantage of obviously existing.

Brent Meeker



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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2006-12-30 Thread Brent Meeker


Tom Caylor wrote:


Brent Meeker wrote:

Tom Caylor wrote:

 I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy.  If there is
 something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted
 me to address, just bring it back up.

 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 Le 26-d c.-06,   19:54, Tom Caylor a  crit :

 
  On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
  Le 25-d c.-06,   01:13, Tom Caylor a  crit :
 
   The crux is that he is not symbolic...
 
 
  I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no
  evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be 
sure of

  any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an
  assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper 
falsification

  criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the
  fact
  that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more 
often to

  their parents wishful thinking.
 
 
  If you are not sure of any clear meaning of the personal God 
being the

  source of everything, including of course truth, this entails not
  knowing the other things too.


 Is that not an authoritative argument?
 What if I ask to my student an exam question like give me an argument
 why the square root of 3 is irrationnal. Suppose he gives me the
 correct and convincing usual (mathematical) proof. I could give him a
 bad note for not adding: and I know that is the truth because 
truth is

 a gift by God.
 Cute, I can directly give bad notes to all my students, and this will
 give me more time to find a falsity in your way to reason ...


 Just to clear this up, my above statement was not meant to be an
 argument. I purposefully used the word entail rather than imply.  I
 wasn't saying that you cannot believe in some kind of truth without
 believing in the personal God.  However is makes sense *from my
 perspective* (of belief in the personal God) that you do not have a
 basis for any truth on which personhood can be based, which *from my
 perspective* (which I *have* been arguing for in general) needs more
 than the impersonal core.


 The card records facts. To judge them historical is already beyond my
 competence. Why the bible? Why not the question of king Milinda ?


 My approach on the Everything List has been to argue for the necessity
 of the personal God as the ultimate basis for Everything.  If someone
 wants to research the historical record sufficiently to convince
 themselves one way or another about the Bible or Jesus' resurrection,
 that's great, and I can give them some sources, but it's probably too
 contingent for this List.  But I do have response to your comment on
 universal-ness below.


  My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out 
and

  we are left with despair,

Speak for yourself.



My above statement is in the context of an a long explanation I've put
forth in previous posts regarding the conclusions of modern philosophy.
I explain below that I am referring to nihilism when I use the word
despair.  This is not my own fabrication, but comes from the wording
used by the modern existentialist philosophers.



 unless we lie to ourselves against the
  absence of hope.

So are you lying to yourself because otherwise you would despair?



Again, this is in the context of what I've said before about
reductionism and existentialism.  The lie refers to having to act as
if (originated with Kant) certain things like free will are real even
though we know they are not, in order to avoid nihilism.  Again, some
examples are of people who maintain a view along these lines are Marvin
Minsky (Society of Mind), Steven Pinker (How The Mind Works), Dennett
(who holds that language about purpose, intention, feelings does not
belong to science, but is indispensable to ordinary discourse), and
even eliminative materialists (Searle; Daniel Wegner's The Illusion of
Conscious Will) concede that a concept of self remains a convenient
fiction that in practice we can't do without.  These examples were
given in Nancy Pearcey's book Total Truth, although I don't agree with
everything she says.


But none of those people are nihilists.  They just deny that there are values 
independent of individual's values.  And Dennett has defended a compatibilist 
free will in at least two books.



Tom




 Here Stathis already give a genuine comment. You are just admitting
 your argument is wishful thinking.


 I was being too poetic ;)  By despair I meant nihilism, the belief
 that there ultimately is no meaning.  


But your argument still is an appeal to wishful thinking.


I am arguing that the ultimate
 source of meaning has to be personal.  I'm just saything that my
 argument is of the form, If meaning is not ultimately based on the
 personal God, then there is no true meaning, because...

If meaning is personal, and I'm a person, then I create meaning.  To 
postulate a personal God to supply ultimate personal meaning seems 
otiose.  It's like the first-cause 

Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-29 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 27-déc.-06, à 23:40, Jef Allbright a écrit :



Bruno Marchal wrote:


Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:10, Jef Allbright a écrit :



All meaning is necessarily within context.

OK, but all context could make sense only to
some universal meaning. I mean I don't know,
it is difficult.


But this can be seen in a very consistent way.  The significance of an 
event is proportional to the scope of its effect relative to the 
values of the observer.




I can agree (could depend about the meaning of significance).





With increasing context of self-awareness, subjective values 
increasingly resemble principles of the physical universe.




Apparently you are even more optimistic than me. I just wish you are 
correct here. It is fuzzy because the term resemble is fuzzy.







Why? Because making basic choices against the way the universe 
actually works would be a losing strategy, becoming increasingly 
obvious with increasing context of awareness.



OK. I think I do agree with this from some global context. But machine 
and nature can make terrible detour and as I said it would be 
presomptuous from my part to say I am sure life or physical universe 
are not such a detour. I don't believe this, but I cannot be sure of 
remnant wishful thinking.







Since all events are the result of interactions following the laws of 
the physical universe,



Hmmm... It is out of topic, but I don't believe this at all. Better I 
can show to you that if I (or You) are turing-emulable, then all 
events, including the apparition and the development of the physical 
laws are the result of the relation between numbers.





the difference between events and values decreases with increasing 
context of awareness, thus the significance, or meaningfulness of 
events also decreases.



Except that by incompleteness the gap remains always infinite. No worry 
for the disparition of meaningfulness, thus. (Actually this shows that 
the number question is perhaps less out of topic than I want it to be 
for the moral threads).






With an ultimate, god's eye view of the universe, there would be no 
meaning at all.



Unless that God is personal (cf Tom Caylor), or just deeply 
inaccessible (cf consequence of comp).






Things would simply be as they are.



Yes. That is an argument for the zero-person aspect of the big 
wholeness. I do agree with you on this (but diverge from Tom exactly on 
this).






From the point of view of an agent undergoing long-term development 
within the universe, its values would increasingly converge on what 
works, i.e. principles of effective interaction with the physical 
world, while the expression of those values would become increasingly 
diverse in a fractal manner, optimizing for robust ongoing growth.



A named God hides another One, and a Physical Universe, conceived as 
an explanation per se is just a Name for a God. I hope and think 
plausible that we have indeed the power to make what you say largely 
true, but the devil hides in the details ...






Further, there's a great deal of empirical evidence
showing that the subjective experience that people
report is full of distortions, gaps, fabrications,
and confabulations.

But this is almost a consequence of the self-referential
ability of machine, they can distort their own view, and
even themselves. I talk about universal machine
*after Godel* (and Post, Turing,..


I'm in interesting in following up on this line of thought given 
available time.



Thanks for telling. No problem.  You can find papers in my URL, when 
you have the time.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-29 Thread Stathis Papaioannou






Jef Allbright writes:


My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is
willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there
is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but
even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms,
will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view
even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no
effect on the physical world. 


I don't know about no effect on the external world. If the mental supervenes 
on certain physical processes, that means that without these physical processes 
there can be no mental, and without the mental there can be no physical processes. 
It works both ways.


Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-29 Thread Tom Caylor


I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy.  If there is
something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted
me to address, just bring it back up.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Le 26-d c.-06,   19:54, Tom Caylor a  crit :


 On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Le 25-d c.-06,   01:13, Tom Caylor a  crit :

  The crux is that he is not symbolic...


 I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no
 evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of
 any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an
 assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification
 criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the
 fact
 that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to
 their parents wishful thinking.


 If you are not sure of any clear meaning of the personal God being the
 source of everything, including of course truth, this entails not
 knowing the other things too.


Is that not an authoritative argument?
What if I ask to my student an exam question like give me an argument
why the square root of 3 is irrationnal. Suppose he gives me the
correct and convincing usual (mathematical) proof. I could give him a
bad note for not adding: and I know that is the truth because truth is
a gift by God.
Cute, I can directly give bad notes to all my students, and this will
give me more time to find a falsity in your way to reason ...



Just to clear this up, my above statement was not meant to be an
argument. I purposefully used the word entail rather than imply.  I
wasn't saying that you cannot believe in some kind of truth without
believing in the personal God.  However is makes sense *from my
perspective* (of belief in the personal God) that you do not have a
basis for any truth on which personhood can be based, which *from my
perspective* (which I *have* been arguing for in general) needs more
than the impersonal core.



The card records facts. To judge them historical is already beyond my
competence. Why the bible? Why not the question of king Milinda ?



My approach on the Everything List has been to argue for the necessity
of the personal God as the ultimate basis for Everything.  If someone
wants to research the historical record sufficiently to convince
themselves one way or another about the Bible or Jesus' resurrection,
that's great, and I can give them some sources, but it's probably too
contingent for this List.  But I do have response to your comment on
universal-ness below.



 My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and
 we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the
 absence of hope.

Here Stathis already give a genuine comment. You are just admitting
your argument is wishful thinking.



I was being too poetic ;)  By despair I meant nihilism, the belief
that there ultimately is no meaning.  I am arguing that the ultimate
source of meaning has to be personal.  I'm just saything that my
argument is of the form, If meaning is not ultimately based on the
personal God, then there is no true meaning, because...




 By these words I was referring to the John quote from the Bible.  The
 actual fulfillment was Jesus (the Word/Logos).  He spanned the infinite
 gap, like you said above, perhaps analogous to hypercomputation,...all
 in one step.

Note that most notion of hypercomputation does not make it possible to
escape the G/G* logics, and when they do escape it, the price is the
abandon of personhood.
This is a general argument which is independent of the comp hypothesis:
to escape the G/G* (and the related hypostases) you have to abandon
your self or the person-hood (personal-ness I would like to say).



I agree I was too loose in my use of hypercomputation as an analogy.
Actually the direction of the spanning was downward, going from G*
(celestial) to G terrestial, described by the Greek work kenosis
(emptying).  This does not mean that God the Father (the personal
fulfillment of the first hypostase), or the Holy Spirit (...second
hypostase) discontinued to exist, but that the Logos became flesh and
dwelt among us, so that we could see his grace and truth.  Again, this
does not mean that we cannot believe and seek truth, and have a feeling
that we are on the right track, without a relationship with the
personal God.  This means that the ultimate source of all truth made
himself known to us on a human level and solved the problem of evil.



 This is why Jesus was the Word, the Logos.  God simply shouting words
 out of the sky or something would have this problem.  This is why I
 said that the incarnation was primary in God's communication to us.

OK, but why not Nagarjuna instead? What is so special about Jesus
(beside our culture) ?



Death itself is the ultimate effect of evil: separation/isolation from
everything and everyone.  Jesus proved his divinity by raising
*himself* from the dead.


For any belief I have 

RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-29 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



Tom Caylor writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):

[TC]

  My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and
  we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the
  absence of hope.


[BM]

 Here Stathis already give a genuine comment. You are just admitting
 your argument is wishful thinking.


[TC]

I was being too poetic ;)  By despair I meant nihilism, the belief
that there ultimately is no meaning.  I am arguing that the ultimate
source of meaning has to be personal.  I'm just saything that my
argument is of the form, If meaning is not ultimately based on the
personal God, then there is no true meaning, because...


I realised when I was about 12 or 13 years old that there could not be any 
ultimate meaning. I was very pleased and excited with this discovery, and ran 
around trying to explain it to people (mostly drawing blank looks, as I remember). 
It seemed to me just another interesting fact about the world, like scientific and 
historical facts. It inspired me to start reading philosophy, looking up words like 
nihilism in the local library. It also encouraged me to question rules, laws and 
moral edicts handed down with no justification other than tradition or authority, 
where these were in conflict with my own developing value system. Overall, I 
think the realisation that there was no ultimate meaning was one of the more 
positive experiences in my life. But even if it hadn't been, and threw me into a 
deep depression, does that have any bearing on whether or not it is true?


Stathis Papaioannou
_
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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-29 Thread Bruno Marchal


Hi Jef,

Please, don't hesitate to skip the remarks you could find a bit too 
technical, but which could help others who know perhaps a bit more on G 
and G*, which are theories which I use to tackle many questions in this 
list. You can come back on those remarks if ever

you got time and motivation to do so.

Le 28-déc.-06, à 21:14, Jef Allbright a écrit :



Bruno Marchal wrote:

Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense 
of consciousness, on what basis can

you claim that it actually is real?

 Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message,
imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the
fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything,
we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt
of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot
relativize everything without an absolute base on which
that relativization is effective.


Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought:

Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the
structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of
evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming
clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid.  We
now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori
framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any
subjective construct.  When we are aware that there is fundamental 
bias,

it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting
everything.


All this makes sense to me. I can interpret your terms in the 
(post-godelian) mechanist theory of mind/matter. The bias is given by 
our body itself, or our godel number or any correct 3-person 
description of ourselves (like the artificial digital body proposed by 
the digital computationalist doctor).





When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at
zero as is classically thought,



... before Godel  Co. Classical philosophy is different before and 
after Turing, Post, Church, Godel, Markov, Uspenski, Kolmogorov, etc.





but at some indistinct offset determined
by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment.



Here there is a technical problem because there is just no real 
environment; but it could be easily resolved by replacing real 
environment by relatively most probable computational histories.

This is more coherent with both the comp hyp and quantum mechanics.




Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual
identities leading to meaningless absolutes.



I am not sure which meaningless absolutes you refer too. In the comp 
theory many simple truth can be considered as absolute and indeed 
communicably so (like arithmetical truth, piece of set theoretical 
truth, ...). Also the first person (which admit some precise 
definition) is related to some absolutes.






This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes
such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the
idea of a subjective center.



Hmmm here I think you are a bit quick. But I have no problem with many 
philosophical paradoxes, although the theory solves them with different 
degree of quality. Free-will is due in part to the availability, for 
enough rich universal machine, of its ignorance space. Somehow I am 
free to choose going to the movie or to the theater because ... I don't 
know what I want  Once I know what I want, I remain free in the 
sense of being self-determinate about my (future) action.
For the modalist: The 3-description of that difference space is given 
by G* (truth about the self-referential ability of the machine) and G 
(what the machine can prove about its self-referential ability). But G* 
minus G admit modal variants, so that the ignorance space, like the 
whole of arithmetical truth differentiates with the change of point of 
view. This indeed shed light on many paradoxes (and, BTW, can also be 
used to show invalid many reasonings in cognitive computer science).







If you want (like David
and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute
(but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can
genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt
on any content of that consciousness, but that is different.
We can doubt having been conscious in some past, but we cannot doubt 
being conscious here and now, whatever that means.

...
The truth here bears on the existence of the experience, and has  
nothing to do with anything which could be reported by the 
experiencer.


On this basis I understand your point, and as long as we are very
careful about conveying which particular meaning of knowing,
certainty, and truth we are referring to, then there will be little
confusion.



OK.





But such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking
repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self, from which there's
no objective (and thus workable) basis for any claim.



Here I disagree. The only risk I see, is the confusion between the 
3-self 

Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-29 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 28-déc.-06, à 21:54, Brent Meeker a écrit :  (to Jef)

I think objective should just be understood as denoting subjective 
agreement from different viewpoints.



Curiosuly enough perhaps I could agree if you were saying physically 
objective can be understood as denoting subjective agreement.
But frankly I do not believe that 17 is prime depends on any agreement 
between different viewpoints (but the definition of 17 and prime of 
course).
But about physics I agree. And I know that you know how Vic Stenger 
extracts a big deal of physics from invariance for change of 
referential systems.



 I'd say experience is always direct, an adjective which really adds 
nothing.  An experience just is.  If it has to be interpreted *then* 
you've fallen into an infinite regress: who experiences the 
interpretation.



I can understand why 1-experience seems direct, but I am not sure this 
really make sense. As I said to Jef, infinite regression in computer 
science can be solved.



To call it an illusion goes too far.  I'd say the self is a model or 
an abstract construct - but it models something, it has predictive 
power.  If you start to call things like that illusions then 
everything is an illusion and the word has lost its meaning.


OK.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-29 Thread Jef Allbright


Bruno -

It appears that you and I have essential agreement on our higher-level
epistemology.

But I don't know much about your comp so I'll begin reading.

- Jef  


Bruno Marchal wrote:


 With increasing context of self-awareness, subjective values 
 increasingly resemble principles of the physical universe.




Apparently you are even more optimistic than me. I just wish 
you are correct here. It is fuzzy because the term resemble 
is fuzzy.


Yes, I was writing in broad strokes, just to give you the pattern, but
not the detail that has been mentioned earlier.  Humanity certainly
could be within an evolutionary cul de sac.

snip



Since all events are the result of interactions following 

the laws of the physical universe,


Hmmm... It is out of topic, but I don't believe this at all. Better I 
can show to you that if I (or You) are turing-emulable, then all 
events, including the apparition and the development of the physical 
laws are the result of the relation between numbers.


For the sake of my argument I might better have said that all
interactions seem to follow a consistent set of rules (which we see as
the laws of the physical universe.  It seems that you have some theory
of a more fundamental layer having to do with numbers.



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


I'll take a look.

- Jef 


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-29 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 29-déc.-06, à 10:57, Tom Caylor a écrit :


I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy.  If there is
something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted
me to address, just bring it back up.



No problem, Tom. In fact I will print your post and read it comfortably 
at home and comment tomorrow or Monday.


Happy New Year!

Bruno


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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-29 Thread Jef Allbright


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


Jef Allbright writes:

My personal experience is that there's no paradox 
at all if one is willing to fully accept that within

any framework of description there is absolutely
no difference at all between a person and a 
zombie, but even the most philosophically cognizant,

being evolved human organisms, will snap back to
defending the existence of a 1st person point of
view even though it isn't detectable or measurable
and has absolutely no effect on the physical world.


I don't know about no effect on the external world. If the 
mental supervenes on certain physical processes, that means 
that without these physical processes there can be no mental, 
and without the mental there can be no physical processes. 
It works both ways.


But to claim that it works both ways would seem to invalidate the claim
of the absolute primacy of the subjective experience.

This is a slippery concept, made more difficult due to the evolutionary
imperative to protect the Self (at least long enough to successfully
propagate the genes), and consequentially reinforced by our language and
culture.

I've enjoyed your thoughtful and good-natured comments, and at this
point, having nothing further to add, I'll step back and try to read and
work through Bruno's comp.

Best regards,

- Jef


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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-29 Thread Jef Allbright


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
I realised when I was about 12 or 13 years old that there 
could not be any ultimate meaning. I was very pleased and 
excited with this discovery, and ran around trying to explain 
it to people (mostly drawing blank looks, as I remember). 
It seemed to me just another interesting fact about the 
world, like scientific and historical facts. It inspired me 
to start reading philosophy, looking up words like nihilism 
in the local library. It also encouraged me to question 
rules, laws and moral edicts handed down with no 
justification other than tradition or authority, where these 
were in conflict with my own developing value system. 
Overall, I think the realisation that there was no ultimate 
meaning was one of the more positive experiences in my life. 
But even if it hadn't been, and threw me into a deep 
depression, does that have any bearing on whether or not it is true?


It's encouraging when one sees that one is not entirely alone in
breaking free of the patterns of popular thought.  


I came to a similar realization at a similarly young age, and when I
tried to share my wonderful and powerful new idea I received not just
blank looks, but reactions of concern that I intended to abandon all
morality. At that point I learned that I had better not discuss these
ideas, but continued to read and think with the belief that while there
was no absolute meaning, at least the scientific method could provide
explanation.  


It took me until my early twenties to realize that science was also
fundamentlly incomplete. I then had an experience I call passing
through the void and coming out the other side seeing that everything
is just as before despite lacking any absolute means of support or
justification.  It was intensly and profoundly liberating.  I saw
clearly that I could never know any absolutes, but being an inherently
subjective being, my subjective awareness was absolutely appropriate.

Since then, paradoxes of self, personal identity, free-will and morality
became clearly resolved, extending to a theory of collaborative social
decision-making that becomes increasingly moral as it promotes
converging values over diverging scope.

- Jef

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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-29 Thread Jef Allbright


Thanks Bruno.  Much of your terminology at this point escapes me.

I do see that a small part of our differences below are simply due to the 
imprecision of language (and my somewhat sloppy writing.)

I also sense that at the core of much of this discussion is the idea that, although we are 
subjective agents, we do create objective effects within any practical context.  If I intend to 
swat a fly, my sensing of the fly's position is incomplete and contingent and my motor control is 
subject to error, but I act, and the fly is objectively dead, within any reasonable 
degree of certainty.  I find that the concept of context is essential at all levels and 
extends in the Godelian sense that we are fundamentally limited to operating within a limited but 
expanding context.

Perhaps your terminology states this more elegantly, I can't tell.

Time for me to go do some reading from your site.

- Jef







Bruno Marchal wrote:


Hi Jef,

Please, don't hesitate to skip the remarks you could find a 
bit too technical, but which could help others who know 
perhaps a bit more on G and G*, which are theories which I 
use to tackle many questions in this list. You can come back 
on those remarks if ever you got time and motivation to do so.


Le 28-déc.-06, à 21:14, Jef Allbright a écrit :


 Bruno Marchal wrote:

 Although we all share the illusion of a direct and 
immediate sense 
 of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is 
 real?
  Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of 
 Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of 
doubt. If we 
 decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, 
 doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we 
 cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on 
which that 
 relativization is effective.


 Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought:

 Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the 
 structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of 
 evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it 
is becoming 
 clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is 
invalid.  We 
 now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori 
 framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any 
 subjective construct.  When we are aware that there is fundamental 
 bias, it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of 
 doubting everything.


All this makes sense to me. I can interpret your terms in the
(post-godelian) mechanist theory of mind/matter. The bias 
is given by our body itself, or our godel number or any 
correct 3-person description of ourselves (like the 
artificial digital body proposed by the digital 
computationalist doctor).




 When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is 
 classically thought,



... before Godel  Co. Classical philosophy is different 
before and after Turing, Post, Church, Godel, Markov, 
Uspenski, Kolmogorov, etc.




 but at some indistinct offset determined
 by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment.


Here there is a technical problem because there is just no real 
environment; but it could be easily resolved by replacing real 
environment by relatively most probable computational histories.

This is more coherent with both the comp hyp and quantum mechanics.



 Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual
 identities leading to meaningless absolutes.


I am not sure which meaningless absolutes you refer too. In 
the comp 
theory many simple truth can be considered as absolute and indeed 
communicably so (like arithmetical truth, piece of set theoretical 
truth, ...). Also the first person (which admit some precise 
definition) is related to some absolutes.





 This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical 
paradoxes
 such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others 
hinging on the

 idea of a subjective center.


Hmmm here I think you are a bit quick. But I have no problem 
with many 
philosophical paradoxes, although the theory solves them with 
different 
degree of quality. Free-will is due in part to the 
availability, for 
enough rich universal machine, of its ignorance space. Somehow I am 
free to choose going to the movie or to the theater because 
... I don't 
know what I want  Once I know what I want, I remain free in the 
sense of being self-determinate about my (future) action.
For the modalist: The 3-description of that difference space is given 
by G* (truth about the self-referential ability of the machine) and G 
(what the machine can prove about its self-referential 
ability). But G* 
minus G admit modal variants, so that the ignorance space, like the 
whole of arithmetical truth differentiates with the change of 
point of 
view. This indeed shed light on many paradoxes (and, BTW, can also be 
used to show invalid many reasonings in cognitive computer science).





 If you 

Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-29 Thread Brent Meeker


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:






Jef Allbright writes:


My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is
willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there
is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but
even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms,
will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view
even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no
effect on the physical world. 


Like quarks it's unobservable, but it is in the ontology of a model that has good empirical support.  Detection and measure are often indirect. 



I don't know about no effect on the external world. If the mental 
supervenes on certain physical processes, that means that without these 
physical processes there can be no mental, and without the mental there 
can be no physical processes. It works both ways.


Right.  Zombies may well be impossible.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-29 Thread Brent Meeker


Tom Caylor wrote:


I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy.  If there is
something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted
me to address, just bring it back up.

Bruno Marchal wrote:

Le 26-d c.-06,   19:54, Tom Caylor a  crit :


 On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Le 25-d c.-06,   01:13, Tom Caylor a  crit :

  The crux is that he is not symbolic...


 I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no
 evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of
 any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an
 assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification
 criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the
 fact
 that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to
 their parents wishful thinking.


 If you are not sure of any clear meaning of the personal God being the
 source of everything, including of course truth, this entails not
 knowing the other things too.


Is that not an authoritative argument?
What if I ask to my student an exam question like give me an argument
why the square root of 3 is irrationnal. Suppose he gives me the
correct and convincing usual (mathematical) proof. I could give him a
bad note for not adding: and I know that is the truth because truth is
a gift by God.
Cute, I can directly give bad notes to all my students, and this will
give me more time to find a falsity in your way to reason ...



Just to clear this up, my above statement was not meant to be an
argument. I purposefully used the word entail rather than imply.  I
wasn't saying that you cannot believe in some kind of truth without
believing in the personal God.  However is makes sense *from my
perspective* (of belief in the personal God) that you do not have a
basis for any truth on which personhood can be based, which *from my
perspective* (which I *have* been arguing for in general) needs more
than the impersonal core.



The card records facts. To judge them historical is already beyond my
competence. Why the bible? Why not the question of king Milinda ?



My approach on the Everything List has been to argue for the necessity
of the personal God as the ultimate basis for Everything.  If someone
wants to research the historical record sufficiently to convince
themselves one way or another about the Bible or Jesus' resurrection,
that's great, and I can give them some sources, but it's probably too
contingent for this List.  But I do have response to your comment on
universal-ness below.



 My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and
 we are left with despair, 


Speak for yourself.


unless we lie to ourselves against the
 absence of hope.


So are you lying to yourself because otherwise you would despair?



Here Stathis already give a genuine comment. You are just admitting
your argument is wishful thinking.



I was being too poetic ;)  By despair I meant nihilism, the belief
that there ultimately is no meaning.  I am arguing that the ultimate
source of meaning has to be personal.  I'm just saything that my
argument is of the form, If meaning is not ultimately based on the
personal God, then there is no true meaning, because...


If meaning is personal, and I'm a person, then I create meaning.  To postulate a personal God to supply ultimate personal meaning seems otiose.  It's like the first-cause argument for God.  If God can exist uncaused then why not stop the regress with an uncaused universe - which has the additional advantage of obviously existing. 


Brent Meeker

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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-29 Thread Brent Meeker


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



Tom Caylor writes (quoting Bruno Marchal):

[TC]

  My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and
  we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the
  absence of hope.


[BM]

 Here Stathis already give a genuine comment. You are just admitting
 your argument is wishful thinking.


[TC]

I was being too poetic ;)  By despair I meant nihilism, the belief
that there ultimately is no meaning.  I am arguing that the ultimate
source of meaning has to be personal.  I'm just saything that my
argument is of the form, If meaning is not ultimately based on the
personal God, then there is no true meaning, because...


I realised when I was about 12 or 13 years old that there could not be 
any ultimate meaning. I was very pleased and excited with this 
discovery, and ran around trying to explain it to people (mostly drawing 
blank looks, as I remember). It seemed to me just another interesting 
fact about the world, like scientific and historical facts. It inspired 
me to start reading philosophy, looking up words like nihilism in the 
local library. It also encouraged me to question rules, laws and moral 
edicts handed down with no justification other than tradition or 
authority, where these were in conflict with my own developing value 
system. Overall, I think the realisation that there was no ultimate 
meaning was one of the more positive experiences in my life. But even if 
it hadn't been, and threw me into a deep depression, does that have any 
bearing on whether or not it is true?


Right!  Until you realize there is no ultimate or absolute values you worry 
that your values might be in conflict with those absolute values.  I was 
nineteen when I realized it - I was old enough to realize that most other 
people were not going be pleased to hear about my discovery. :-)

Brent Meeker


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-28 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 27-déc.-06, à 20:11, Jef Allbright a écrit :



Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Jef Allbright writes:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?

I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple
lack of precision, or something more.
Thanks for the compliments about my writing. I meant that what we  
should believe does not necessarily have to be the same as what is  
true, but I think that unless there are special circumstances, it  
ought to be the case.


I agree within the context you intended.  My point was that we can  
never

be certain of truth, so we should be careful in our speech and thinking
not to imply that such truth is even available to us for the kind of
comparisons being discussed here.  We can know that some patterns of
action work better than others, but the only truth we can assess is
always within a specific context.



I think we agree. Those context are always theoretical, with a  
large sense for theory. It could be an explicit theory, like quantum  
mechanics, ... or an implicit build in belief like our instinctive  
inference that our neighborhood exists or make sense. This last is a  
theory, which according to a more explicit one (Darwin) is a many  
millenia relative (and thus contextual) construct.








Brent Meeker made a similar point: if someone is dying of a terminal  
illness, maybe it is better that he believe he has longer to live  
than the medical evidence suggests, but that would have to be an  
example of special circumstances.


There are plenty of examples of self-deception providing benefits  
within

the scope of the individual, and leading to increasingly effective
models of reality for the group.  Here's a recent article on this
topic:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/26/science/26lying.html? 
pagewanted=print



Thanks for this interesting reference. In the context of the theory I  
suggest, it is still an open problem if life itself is a logical  
descendant of a lie. Actually, although there are evidences to the  
contrary, even appearance of the physical universe could be a  
self-deception. This is a stronger statement than the one I am used to  
say, which is that the primitive character of the physical laws are  
self-deception (but this is only a consequence of taking the  
computationalist hypothesis seriously enough and is strictly speaking  
out of the present topic.










If he had said something like our main criterion
for what to believe should be what works, what seems
to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had
made a direct reference to Occam's Razor, I would be comfortable  
knowing that we're thinking alike on this point.  But I've seen this  
stumbling block arise so many

times and so many places that I'm very curious to learn
something of its source.
The question of what is the truth is a separate one, but one  
criterion I would add to those you mention above is that it should  
come from someone able to put aside his own biases and wishes where  
these might influence his assessment of the evidence.


I agree, but would point out that by definition, one can not actually
set aside one's one biases because to do so would require an objective
view of oneself.



But two observers can agree on some common context, so that some  
objective view of oneself can be done (although probably not recognize  
as such ...). So a second observer can, in some situation helps a first  
one to be less biased.





Rather, one can be aware that such biases exist in
general, and implement increasingly effective principles (e.g.
scientific method) to minimize them.



I agree with this.






  We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should  
always   be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe  
whatever we   fancy.
  Here it's a smaller point, and I agree with the main thrust of  
the  statement, but it leaves a door open for the possibility that  
we might  actually be justifiably certain of the truth in *some*  
case, and I'm  wonder where that open door is intended to lead.
I said might because there is one case where I am certain of the  
truth, which is that I am having the present experience.


Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of
consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real?



Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes  
diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to  
doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we  
doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize  
everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is  
effective. If you want (like David and George) consciousness is our  
criteria of absolute (but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we  
can genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt on any  

RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-28 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



Brent Meeker writes:

 It's a strange quality of delusions that psychotic people are even more 
 certain of their truth than non-deluded people are certain of things 
 which have reasonable empirical evidence in their favour. 


Yet this seems understandable.  The psychotic person is believing things 
because of some physical malfunction in his brain.  So it is easy to see how it 
might be incorrigble.  The normal persons is believing things because of 
perception, hearsay, and logic.  But he knows that all of those can be 
deceptive; and so he is never certain.


Sure, it's a defect in the brain chemistry, but the delusional person will give 
you his reasons for his belief: 

Someone entered my home while I was out yesterday and shifted a CD from 
the desk to the coffee table.


Is it possible that you moved it yourself and forgot?

No, I'm certain I didn't move it myself.

Was there any sign of someone breakung in?

No, they must have had keys.

Had you given anyone the keys?

No, but they might have copied them without my knowledge, or maybe they're 
just good at picking locks.


Was anything else taken or disturbed?

Not that I could tell, but I can't be certain.

Why would anyone do such a strange thing?

I agree it's strange, and I have no idea why anyone would go to such lengths 
to annoy me. There are some crazy people out there, you know!


Would anything convince you that you had made a mistake? For example, if you 
had video evidence showing that nothing strange had happened on the day of the 
incident?


I'm absolutely certain the CD was moved, and I don't believe in ghosts! Someone 
who went to such lengths to annoy me would probably be able to alter video recordings, 
so no, that wouldn't convince me I was crazy, as you seem to be implying. 

This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious convictions, who will cite 
evidence in support of their beliefs up to a point, but it soon becomes clear that no 
matter how paltry this evidence is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief. 
The difference is that these people do not change their way of thinking in response to 
antipsychotic medication.


Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-28 Thread Johnathan Corgan


On Fri, 2006-12-29 at 00:37 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Sure, it's a defect in the brain chemistry, but the delusional person will give 
you his reasons for his belief: 


[...]

This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious convictions, who will cite 
evidence in support of their beliefs up to a point, but it soon becomes clear that no 
matter how paltry this evidence is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief. 


I do wonder how many non-religious beliefs are the same way, i.e.,
incorrigible in spite of the absence of evidence, or even contrary to
evidence, simply because they are convenient or permeate one's
surrounding culture.

The difference is that these people do not change their way of thinking in response to 
antipsychotic medication.


Which is fascinating to behold, as I have witnessed this very same, in
both directions, on many occasions, as patients have gone on and off
their medication.  They will also go to great lengths to justify their
change in belief structure when it's obvious it's the effect of the
chemical on their disease process.

There is a subtlety to the religious qualification you make above,
however.  There are indeed religious-oriented delusions which go away on
medication, but they tend to be ones that were only acquired through the
course of the patient's illness.  Those acquired through detailed
indoctrination in youth tend to be unaffected, as you mention.

-Johnathan


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-28 Thread Brent Meeker


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
...
This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious 
convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a 
point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence 
is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief. The difference is 
that these people do not change their way of thinking in response to 
antipsychotic medication.


Have you tried it?

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-28 Thread John Mikes

On 12/28/06, Johnathan Corgan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:



On Fri, 2006-12-29 at 00:37 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 Sure, it's a defect in the brain chemistry, but the delusional person
will give
 you his reasons for his belief:

[...]

 This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious
convictions, who will cite
 evidence in support of their beliefs up to a point, but it soon becomes
clear that no
 matter how paltry this evidence is shown to be, they will still maintain
their belief.

I do wonder how many non-religious beliefs are the same way, i.e.,
incorrigible in spite of the absence of evidence, or even contrary to
evidence, simply because they are convenient or permeate one's
surrounding culture.

 The difference is that these people do not change their way of thinking
in response to
 antipsychotic medication.

Which is fascinating to behold, as I have witnessed this very same, in
both directions, on many occasions, as patients have gone on and off
their medication.  They will also go to great lengths to justify their
change in belief structure when it's obvious it's the effect of the
chemical on their disease process.

There is a subtlety to the religious qualification you make above,
however.  There are indeed religious-oriented delusions which go away on
medication, but they tend to be ones that were only acquired through the
course of the patient's illness.  Those acquired through detailed
indoctrination in youth tend to be unaffected, as you mention.

-Johnathan



--

to Johnathan's
 I do wonder how many non-religious beliefs are the same way, i.e.,
incorrigible in spite of the absence of evidence, or even contrary to
evidence, simply because they are convenient or permeate one's
surrounding culture.

JM:
Evidence is tricky. An acceptance may be controlled by personal
experience, but also by one's belief system. FOR ANOTHER INDIVIDUALITY
(included: belief system) some 'hard evidence' may sound silly, and vice
versa in an argument. Convenience is a good point IMO. This is in my opinion
the futility of discussions (like this one here) about argumentation between
different belief systems.
Chemicals work on the strength of connecting parts (polarity change?) and so
whatever looked unshakable, seems by those 'chemicals', in the changed
connectivity volatile (and vice versa). (Chemicals don't 'make' thoughts -
they work on the conveying tools).

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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-28 Thread Jef Allbright


Bruno Marchal wrote:

Although we all share the illusion of a direct and 
immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can

you claim that it actually is real?
 
Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message,

imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the
fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything,
we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt
of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot
relativize everything without an absolute base on which
that relativization is effective. 


Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought:

Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the
structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of
evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming
clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid.  We
now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori
framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any
subjective construct.  When we are aware that there is fundamental bias,
it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting
everything.  When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at
zero as is classically thought, but at some indistinct offset determined
by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment.
Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual
identities leading to meaningless absolutes.

This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes
such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the
idea of a subjective center.


If you want (like David
and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute
(but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can
genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt
on any content of that consciousness, but that is different.
We can doubt having been conscious in some past, but we 
cannot doubt being conscious here and now, whatever that means.

...
The truth here bears on the existence of the experience, and has  
nothing to do with anything which could be reported by the 
experiencer.  


On this basis I understand your point, and as long as we are very
careful about conveying which particular meaning of knowing,
certainty, and truth we are referring to, then there will be little
confusion.  But such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking
repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self, from which there's
no objective (and thus workable) basis for any claim. 


My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is
willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there
is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but
even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms,
will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view
even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no
effect on the physical world. 


It is virtually impossible for many people to see that even IF the 1st
person experience actually exists, it can't be described, even by that
person, except from a third person perspective. That voice in your own
mind, those images in your imagination, none can be said to be
experienced without being interpreted.  The idea of direct experience is
incoherent.  It always carries the implication that there's some other
process there to have the experience.  It's turtles all the way down.

The essence of Buddhist training is to accept this non-existence of Self
at a deep level.  It is very rare, but not impossible to achieve such an
understanding, and while still experiencing the illusion, to see it as
an illusion, with no actual boundary to distinguish an imagined self
from the rest of nature. I think that a machine intelligence, while
requiring a model of self, would have no need of this illusion which is
a result of our evolutionary development.

- Jef

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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-28 Thread Brent Meeker


Jef Allbright wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of 
consciousness, on what basis can

you claim that it actually is real?
 
Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message,

imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the
fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything,
we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt
of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot
relativize everything without an absolute base on which
that relativization is effective. 


Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought:

Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the
structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of
evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming
clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid.  We
now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori
framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any
subjective construct.  When we are aware that there is fundamental bias,
it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting
everything.  When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at
zero as is classically thought, but at some indistinct offset determined
by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment.
Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual
identities leading to meaningless absolutes.


That sounds good, but could you give some concrete examples.  Talk of bias and 
offset seems to imply that there really is an absolute center - which I think is a very 
dubious proposition.


This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes
such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the
idea of a subjective center.


If you want (like David
and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute
(but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can
genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt
on any content of that consciousness, but that is different.
We can doubt having been conscious in some past, but we cannot doubt 
being conscious here and now, whatever that means.

...
The truth here bears on the existence of the experience, and has  
nothing to do with anything which could be reported by the experiencer.  


On this basis I understand your point, and as long as we are very
careful about conveying which particular meaning of knowing,
certainty, and truth we are referring to, then there will be little
confusion.  But such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking
repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self, from which there's
no objective (and thus workable) basis for any claim.


I think objective should just be understood as denoting subjective agreement 
from different viewpoints.


My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is
willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there
is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but
even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms,
will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view
even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no
effect on the physical world.
It is virtually impossible for many people to see that even IF the 1st
person experience actually exists, it can't be described, even by that
person, except from a third person perspective. That voice in your own
mind, those images in your imagination, none can be said to be
experienced without being interpreted.  The idea of direct experience is
incoherent.  It always carries the implication that there's some other
process there to have the experience.  It's turtles all the way down.


That sounds like a simple contradiction to me!??  I'd say experience is always 
direct, an adjective which really adds nothing.  An experience just is.  If 
it has to be interpreted *then* you've fallen into an infinite regress: who experiences 
the interpretation.



The essence of Buddhist training is to accept this non-existence of Self
at a deep level.  It is very rare, but not impossible to achieve such an
understanding, and while still experiencing the illusion, to see it as
an illusion, with no actual boundary to distinguish an imagined self
from the rest of nature. I think that a machine intelligence, while
requiring a model of self, would have no need of this illusion which is
a result of our evolutionary development.



To call it an illusion goes too far.  I'd say the self is a model or an abstract 
construct - but it models something, it has predictive power.  If you start to call 
things like that illusions then everything is an illusion and the word has 
lost its meaning.

Brent Meeker

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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-28 Thread Jef Allbright


Brent Meeker wrote:


Jef Allbright wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

Although we all share the illusion of a direct 
and immediate sense of consciousness, on what

basis can you claim that it actually is real?
 
Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message,

imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the
fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt
everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, 
doubting we doubt of everything. The same for

relativization: we cannot relativize everything
without an absolute base on which that 
relativization is effective.


Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought:

Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at
the center of the structure of reasoning. But with
our more developed awareness of evolution,
evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it 
is becoming clearer that this pure Copernican

view of reasoning is invalid.  We now can see that
every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori 
framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or

offset to any subjective construct.  When we are
aware that there is fundamental bias, it is clear
that one can not validly reason to the point of 
doubting everything.  When all that is in doubt

is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is
classically thought, but at some indistinct 
offset determined by our very nature as a reasoner

embedded in a real environment. Understanding this
eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual 
identities leading to meaningless absolutes.


That sounds good, but could you give some concrete
examples. Talk of bias and offset seems to
imply that there really is an absolute center -
which I think is a very dubious proposition.
 
I don't know what other examples to give at this point, other than the

comparison with the Copernican model.  Knowing the actual center of our
highly multidimensional basis of thought, even if it were possible, is
not necessary--just as we don't need to know our exact physical location
in the universe to know that we should no longer build theories around
the assumption that we're at the center, with the unique properties that
would imply.



This understanding also helps resolve other
philosophical paradoxes such as solipsism,
meaning of life, free-will and others hinging
on the idea of a subjective center.


If you want (like David and George) consciousness
is our criteria of absolute (but not 
3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can

genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can
doubt on any content of that consciousness, but that
is different. We can doubt having been conscious in
some past, but we cannot doubt being conscious here
and now, whatever that means.

...

The truth here bears on the existence of the
experience, and has nothing to do with anything which
could be reported by the experiencer.


On this basis I understand your point, and as long as
we are very careful about conveying which particular
meaning of knowing, certainty, and truth we are
referring to, then there will be little confusion.  But
such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking
repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self,
from which there's no objective (and thus workable)
basis for any claim.


I think objective should just be understood as denoting 
subjective agreement from different viewpoints.


Yes, although we can say that a particular point of view is completely
objective within a specified context.  For example we can have
completely objective proofs in mathematics as long as we agree on the
underlying number theory.  In our everyday affairs we can never achieve
complete objectivity, but I agree with you that multiple points of view,
in communication with each other, constitute an intersubjective point of
view that increasingly approaches objectivity.



My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all
if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework
of description there is absolutely no difference at all
between a person and a zombie, but even the most
philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms,
will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person 
point of view even though it isn't detectable or measurable

and has absolutely no effect on the physical world.
It is virtually impossible for many people to see that even 
IF the 1st person experience actually exists, it can't be

described, even by that person, except from a third person
perspective. That voice in your own mind, those images in
your imagination, none can be said to be experienced without
being interpreted.  The idea of direct experience is incoherent.
It always carries the implication that there's some other
process there to have the experience.  It's turtles all
the way down.


That sounds like a simple contradiction to me!??  I'd say 
experience is always direct, an adjective which really adds 
nothing.  An experience just is.  If it has to be interpreted 
*then* you've fallen into an infinite regress: who 
experiences the interpretation.



Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2006-12-28 Thread Brent Meeker


Jef Allbright wrote:


Brent Meeker wrote:


Jef Allbright wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense 
of consciousness, on what

basis can you claim that it actually is real?
 
Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message,

imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the
fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt
everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt 
of everything. The same for

relativization: we cannot relativize everything
without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective.


Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought:

Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at
the center of the structure of reasoning. But with
our more developed awareness of evolution,
evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming clearer 
that this pure Copernican

view of reasoning is invalid.  We now can see that
every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori framework such that 
there is an intrinsic bias or

offset to any subjective construct.  When we are
aware that there is fundamental bias, it is clear
that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting everything.  
When all that is in doubt

is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is
classically thought, but at some indistinct offset determined by our 
very nature as a reasoner

embedded in a real environment. Understanding this
eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual identities leading to 
meaningless absolutes.


That sounds good, but could you give some concrete
examples. Talk of bias and offset seems to
imply that there really is an absolute center -
which I think is a very dubious proposition.
 
I don't know what other examples to give at this point, other than the

comparison with the Copernican model.  Knowing the actual center of our
highly multidimensional basis of thought, even if it were possible, is
not necessary--just as we don't need to know our exact physical location
in the universe to know that we should no longer build theories around
the assumption that we're at the center, with the unique properties that
would imply.



This understanding also helps resolve other
philosophical paradoxes such as solipsism,
meaning of life, free-will and others hinging
on the idea of a subjective center.


If you want (like David and George) consciousness
is our criteria of absolute (but not 3-communicable) truth. I 
don't think we can

genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can
doubt on any content of that consciousness, but that
is different. We can doubt having been conscious in
some past, but we cannot doubt being conscious here
and now, whatever that means.

...

The truth here bears on the existence of the
experience, and has nothing to do with anything which
could be reported by the experiencer.


On this basis I understand your point, and as long as
we are very careful about conveying which particular
meaning of knowing, certainty, and truth we are
referring to, then there will be little confusion.  But
such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking
repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self,
from which there's no objective (and thus workable)
basis for any claim.


I think objective should just be understood as denoting subjective 
agreement from different viewpoints.


Yes, although we can say that a particular point of view is completely
objective within a specified context.  For example we can have
completely objective proofs in mathematics as long as we agree on the
underlying number theory.  In our everyday affairs we can never achieve
complete objectivity, but I agree with you that multiple points of view,
in communication with each other, constitute an intersubjective point of
view that increasingly approaches objectivity.



My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all
if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework
of description there is absolutely no difference at all
between a person and a zombie, but even the most
philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms,
will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of 
view even though it isn't detectable or measurable

and has absolutely no effect on the physical world.
It is virtually impossible for many people to see that even IF the 
1st person experience actually exists, it can't be

described, even by that person, except from a third person
perspective. That voice in your own mind, those images in
your imagination, none can be said to be experienced without
being interpreted.  The idea of direct experience is incoherent.
It always carries the implication that there's some other
process there to have the experience.  It's turtles all
the way down.


That sounds like a simple contradiction to me!??  I'd say experience 
is always direct, an adjective which really adds nothing.  An 
experience just is.  If it has to be interpreted *then* you've fallen 
into an infinite regress: who experiences 

RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-28 Thread Stathis Papaioannou





Brent Meeker writes:

 This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious 
 convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a 
 point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence 
 is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief. The difference is 
 that these people do not change their way of thinking in response to 
 antipsychotic medication.


Have you tried it?


The local Mental Health Act forbids involuntary treatment of someone for their 
religious beliefs, but there are grey areas, for example in cases of religious 
conversion, where the family claims the patient has gone mad but the patient 
and his new friends insist he is just exercising freedom of worship. I have to 
admit, in all such cases I can recall the family is correct, even when there are 
no other obvious signs of mental illness, and the patient continues to deteriorate 
unless treated. I guess the family pick up on subtle changes in personality in 
addition to the religious conversion. But where a patient is started on an 
antipsychotic and has an incidental, long-standing religious (or other odd) 
belief, the medication seems to make no difference to that belief. 

Functionally, a (primary) delusion seems to bypass the mechanism whereby 
we take in empirical evidence, process it logically, and arrive at a conclusion 
or belief: that is, delusions create a ready-made belief, in the same way as 
hallucinations create a ready-made perception in the absence of a sensory 
stimulus. Normally acquired religious beliefs differ in that there is empirical 
evidence which is logically processed, even if that evidence is that it says 
so in the Bible and your parents taught you that the Bible doesn't lie. We 
have drugs for psychosis but there is no drug that stops you being gullible. 


Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



Jef Allbright writes:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

 But our main criterion for what to believe should be
 what is true, right? 


I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in
communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would express
this belief of his in the form of a tautology.  I've observed that he is
generally both thoughtful and precise in his writing, so I'm very
interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, his
transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more.


Thanks for the compliments about my writing. I meant that what we should 
believe does not necessarily have to be the same as what is true, but I think 
that unless there are special circumstances, it ought to be the case. Brent 
Meeker made a similar point: if someone is dying of a terminal illness, maybe 
it is better that he believe he has longer to live than the medical evidence 
suggests, but that would have to be an example of special circumstances. 


If he had said something like our main criterion for what to believe
should be what works, what seems to work, what passes the tests of time,
etc. or had made a direct reference to Occams's Razor, I would be
comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this point.  But I've
seen this stumbling block arise so many times and so many places that
I'm very curious to learn something of its source.


The question of what is the truth is a separate one, but one criterion I would 
add to those you mention above is that it should come from someone able to 
put aside his own biases and wishes where these might influence his assessment 
of the evidence. 

 We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should 
 always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe 
 whatever we fancy.


Here it's a smaller point, and I agree with the main thrust of the
statement, but it leaves a door open for the possibility that we might
actually be justifiably certain of the truth in *some* case, and I'm
wonder where that open door is intended to lead.


I said might because there is one case where I am certain of the truth, which 
is that I am having the present experience. Everything else, including the existence 
of a physical world and my own existence as a being with a past, can be doubted. 
However, for everyday living this doubt troubles me much less than the possibility that 
I may be struck by lightning.


Stathis Papaioannou


---

In response to John Mikes:  


Yes, I consider my thinking about truth to be pragmatic, within an
empirical framework of open-ended possibility.  Of course, ultimately
this too may be considered a matter of faith, but one with growth that
seems to operate in a direction opposite from the faith you express.

- Jef



 


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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



Tom Caylor writes (in response to Marvin Minsky):


Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea
of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is
no truth that we can discover.  But on the other hand, if there is no
discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the
existence of freedom of will, is false?


That's easy: it's logically impossible. When I make a decision, although I take all 
the evidence into account, and I know I am more likely to decide one way rather 
than another due to my past experiences and due to the way my brain works, 
ultimately I feel that I have the freedom to overcome these factors and decide 
freely. But neither do I feel that this free decision will be something random: 
I'm not mentally tossing a coin, but choosing according to my beliefs and values. 
Do you see the contradiction here? EITHER my decision is determined by my 
past experiences, acquired beliefs and values etc., OR it is not, and if it is not, 
it is by definition random and unpredictable. (You can also have random but with a 
certain weighting according to determined factors, like a weighted roulette wheel, 
but that is a variation on random.) So my feeling that my free will is nother has to 
be wrong. Still, I'm very attached to that feeling, just as I'm very attached to 
certain moral values, and life itself, despite knowing that these are ultimately 
meaningless. 


However, the belief in freedom of will seems to be a belief that is
rather constant, so there seem to be some beliefs that provide evidence
for an invariant reality and truth, not necessarily freedom of will,
but something.  And I think that looking for ultimate sources would be
circular (as you've said on the Atheist List) only if there were no
ultimate source that we could find.  Do you agree with this statement?


Ultimate sources are also a logical impossibility. Suppose we discover that God exists. 
Well, what's the purpose of God? Where did he get his moral rules and why should 
we accept them as good? Who made him? Of course, you will answer that the buck 
stops with God, no-one made him, he is the ultimate good and the ultimate purpose. 
But you can't just *define* something to stop the circularity because it makes you 
dizzy. If you could, you may as well just stop at the universe itself, sans God.


Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2006-12-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



Brent Meeker writes (quoting Tom Caylor):


 Dr. Minsky,
 
 In your book, Society of Mind, you talk about a belief in freedom of

 will:
 
 The physical world provides no room for freedom of will...That concept

 is essential to our models of the mental realm. Too much of our
 psychology is based on it for us to ever give it up. We're virtually
 forced to maintain that belief, even though we know it's false.

Whether it is false depends on what you mean by free will.  Dennett argues persuasively 
in Elbow Room that we have all the freedom of will that matters.  Our actions 
arise out of who we are.  If you conceive yourself comprehensively, all your memories, 
values, knowledge, etc. then you are the author of your action.  If you conceive yourself 
as small enough, you can escape all responsibility.


We have the freedom of will that matters, but we don't have the freedom of 
will that we think we have, namely that we don't have to act according to our 
biology and environment, and moreover that if we flout these it is not by just 
choosing to act randomly. That is what I *feel* my freedom consists in, but 
rationally I know it is impossible. 


Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-27 Thread Brent Meeker


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



Tom Caylor writes (in response to Marvin Minsky):


Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea
of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is
no truth that we can discover.  But on the other hand, if there is no
discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the
existence of freedom of will, is false?


That's easy: it's logically impossible. When I make a decision, although 
I take all the evidence into account, and I know I am more likely to 
decide one way rather than another due to my past experiences and due to 
the way my brain works, ultimately I feel that I have the freedom to 
overcome these factors and decide freely. But neither do I feel that 
this free decision will be something random: I'm not mentally tossing a 
coin, but choosing according to my beliefs and values. Do you see the 
contradiction here? 


Yes, but it's a contrived contradiction.  You have taken free to mean independent of 
you where you refers to your past experience, the way your brain works, etc.  As 
Dennett says, that's not a free will worth having.

Brent Meeker


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 26-déc.-06, à 23:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :



I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a
pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single
self that maintains beliefs.



Is this not a bit self-defeating? It has the form of a belief. Now I 
can still agree, it depends of the meaning of single self.






A more realistic view is that each
person is constantly switching among various different ways to think
in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep
changing their status, etc.



In that case I can completely agree. Even by modeling a machine's 
belief by formal provability Bp by that machine, in the ideal case of 
the self-referentially correct machine, like Peano Arithmetic, it will 
follow that the ontically equivalent modalities Bp  p, Bp  Dp, etc. 
obeys different logics so that they embodies different epistemological 
status (and they are easy to confuse).
Now, when we are building a (meta)theory of belief we have to stick 
on some possible sharable belief (in number theory, computer science, 
perhaps physics: all that will depend on the hypotheses we accept) and 
build from it. If not we could fall in exaggerated relativism.





Accordingly our sets of beliefs can
include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those
inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending
on one's current priorities, etc.



OK. I would say that if someone can acknowledge the existence of a 
conflict between beliefs, then he/she/it  does acknowledge implicitly 
that he/she/it bets on some *self*-consistency. If not he/she/it could 
just accept its contradictory beliefs without further thoughts.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 27-déc.-06, à 01:52, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, 
right? We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should 
always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever 
we fancy.



This is a key statement. There is a big difference between knowing what 
truth is, and believing in truth. I am not sure the term belief can 
make sense for someone who does not believe in (some) truth, quite 
independently of us knowing what truth is.
We hope our belief are true. We even believe that people believe in 
their belief, and that means believe that their belief are true by 
default. We would not lie to an old sick person about its health if we 
were not connecting belief and truth (even wrongly like in such a 
gentle lie).
The very reason why we can (and should!) say that our beliefs are 
always tentative is that we can guess some truth (or falsity) behind 
them.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit :



Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?


I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in
communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would express
this belief of his in the form of a tautology.  I've observed that he 
is

generally both thoughtful and precise in his writing, so I'm very
interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, 
his

transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more.



I don't see any tautology in Stathis writing so I guess I miss 
something.





If he had said something like our main criterion for what to believe
should be what works, what seems to work, what passes the tests of 
time,

etc. or had made a direct reference to Occams's Razor, I would be
comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this point.



This would mean you disagree with Stathis's tautology, but then how 
could not believe in a tautology?





But I've
seen this stumbling block arise so many times and so many places that
I'm very curious to learn something of its source.


From your working criteria I guess you favor a pragmatic notion of 
belief, but personally I conceive science as a search for knowledge and 
thus truth (independently of the fact that we can never *know* it as 
truth, except perhaps in few basic things like I am conscious or I 
am convinced there is a prime number etc.).
To talk like Stathis, this is why science is by itself always 
tentative. A scientist who says Now we know ... is only a dishonest 
theologian (or a mathematician in hurry ...).


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 26-déc.-06, à 19:54, Tom Caylor a écrit :



On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit :

 The crux is that he is not symbolic...




I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no
evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of
any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an
assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification
criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the 
fact

that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to
their parents wishful thinking.



If you are not sure of any clear meaning of the personal God being the
source of everything, including of course truth, this entails not
knowing the other things too.



Is that not an authoritative argument?
What if I ask to my student an exam question like give me an argument 
why the square root of 3 is irrationnal. Suppose he gives me the 
correct and convincing usual (mathematical) proof. I could give him a 
bad note for not adding: and I know that is the truth because truth is 
a gift by God.
Cute, I can directly give bad notes to all my students, and this will 
give me more time to find a falsity in your way to reason ...





For a personal God, taking on our form
(incarnation), especially if we were made in the image of God in the
first place, and showing through miracles, and rising from the dead...,
his dual nature (Godman, celestialterrestial, G*G) seems to make a
lot more sense than something like a cross in earth orbit.  For
example, giving a hug is a more personal (and thus a more appropriate)
way of expressing love, than giving a card, even though a card is more
verifiable in a third person sense, especially after the hug is
finished.  But we do have the card too: God's written Word, even
though this is not sufficient, the incarnate hug was the primary proof,
the card was just the historical record of it.


The card records facts. To judge them historical is already beyond my 
competence. Why the bible? Why not the question of king Milinda ?







 There can be no upward
 emanation unless/until a sufficient downward emanation is provided. 
 In

 Christianity, the downward emanation is God loves us, and then the
 upward emanation is We love God.




Plotinus insists a lot on the two ways: downward emanation and upward
emanation. The lobian machine theology is coherent with this, even if
negatively. It is coherent with Jef idea that pure theological
imperatives can only be addressed by adapted story telling and
examples, like jurisprudence in the application of laws. But then 
there

is a proviso: none of the stories should be taken literally.



I agree with the use of stories.  Jesus used stories almost exclusively
to communicate.  Either the hearers got it or not.  But this does not
imply that stories are the only form of downward emanation.


Of course not. Real stories and personal experiences,  and collective 
experiences and experiments ... All this can help the downward 
emanation.




The
incarnation was the primary means.  Otherwise, who would have been the
story-teller?  What good are stories if the story is not teaching you
truth?


Look, I cannot take for granted even most mathematical theories 
although their relation with a notion of truth is much more easy than 
any text in natural language. Stories can be good in giving example of 
behavior in some situation, or they can help anxious children to sleep. 
Stories are not written with the idea of truth. The bibles contains 
many contradiction. And, if really you want take a sacred text as a 
theory of everything, there is a definite lack of precision.






How do we know that the ultimate source of stories is a good
source.  Jef and Brent and others seem to be basing their truth on
really nothing more than pragmatism.



Jef perhaps. I am not sure for Brent which seems to admit some form of 
realism (even physical realism).





 This is not poetry.  Heidegger said to listen to the poet, not to 
the
 content, but just to the fact that there is a poet, which gives us 
hope

 that there is meaning.  However, unfulfilled hope does not provide
 meaning.

Hope is something purely first-personal, if I can say. So I have no
clue how hope does not provide meaning. Even little (and fortunately
locally fulfillable hope) like hope in a cup of coffee, can provide
meaning. Bigger (and hard to express) hopes can provide genuine bigger
meaning, it seems to me. I am not opposed to some idea of ultimate
meaning although both personal reasons and reflection on lobianity 
make

me doubt that communicating such hopes can make any sense (worse, the
communication would most probably betrays the possible meaning of what
is attempted to be communicated, and could even lead to the contrary).



Even poetry must be based eventually on some meaning.  Even minimalism
or the Theatre of the Absurd is based on some form to 

RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-27 Thread Jef Allbright


Bruno Marchal wrote:


Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit :


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


But our main criterion for what to believe should
be what is true, right?


I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple
lack of precision, or something more.



I don't see any tautology in Stathis writing so I guess I 
miss something.



Apparently something subtle is happening here.

It seems to me that when people say believe, they mean hold true or consider to 
be true.

Therefore, I parse the statement as equivalent to ...criterion for what to hold true should be what is true... 


I suppose I should have said that the statement is circular, rather than 
tautological since the verbs are different.



If he had said something like our main criterion
for what to believe should be what works, what seems
to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had
made a direct reference to Occam's Razor, I would be
comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this
point.



This would mean you disagree with Stathis's tautology, but then how 
could not believe in a tautology?


If someone states A=A, then there is absolutely no information content, and 
thus nothing in the statement itself with which to agree or disagree. I can certainly 
agree with the validity of the form within symbolic logic, but that's a different 
(larger) context.

Similarly, I was not agreeing or disagreeing with the meaning of Stahis' 
statement, but rather the form which seems to me to contain a piece of circular 
reasoning, implying perhaps that the structure of the thought was incoherent 
within a larger context.



 From your working criteria I guess you favor a pragmatic
notion of belief, but personally I conceive science as a
search for knowledge and thus truth (independently of the
fact that we can never *know* it as truth,


Yes, I favor a pragmatic approach to belief, but I distinguish my thinking from that of (capital P) 
Pragmatists in that I see knowledge (and the knower) as firmly grounded in a reality that can never be 
fully known but can be approached via an evolutionary process of growth tending toward an increasingly 
effective model of what works within an expanding scope of interaction within a reality that appears to be effectively 
open-ended in its potential complexity. Whereas many Pragmatists see progress as fundamentally illusory, I 
see progress, or growth, as essential to an effective world-view for any intentional agent.


except perhaps
in few basic things like I am conscious or I am convinced
there is a prime number etc.)
To talk like Stathis, this is why science is by itself always 
tentative. A scientist who says Now we know ... is only a

dishonest theologian (or a mathematician in hurry ...).


I agree with much of your thinking, but I take exception to exceptions (!) such as the ones you mentioned above. 


All meaning is necessarily within context.

The existence of prime numbers is not an exception, but the context is so broad that we 
tend to think of prime numbers as (almost) fundamentally real, similarly to the existence 
of gravity, another very deep regularity of our interactions with reality.

The statement I am conscious, as usually intended to mean that one can be absolutely certain of one's subjective experience, is not an exception, because it's not even coherent.  It has no objective context at all.  It mistakenly assumes the existence of an observer somehow in the privileged position of being able to observe itself.  Further, there's a great deal of empirical evidence showing that the subjective experience that people report is full of distortions, gaps, fabrications, and confabulations. 

If instead you mean that you know you are conscious in the same sense that you know other people are conscious, then that is not an exception, but just a reasonable inference, meaningful within quite a large context. 


If Descartes had said, rather than Je pense, donc je suis, something like I 
think, therefore *something* exists, then I would agree with him. Cartesian dualism has left 
western philosophy with a large quagmire into which thinking on consciousness, personal identity, 
free-will and morality easily and repeatedly get stuck in paradox.

Paradox is always a case of insufficient context.  In the bigger picture all 
the pieces must fit.

- Jef

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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2006-12-27 Thread Brent Meeker


Bruno Marchal wrote:



Le 26-déc.-06, à 19:54, Tom Caylor a écrit :



On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit :


The crux is that he is not symbolic...




I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no
 evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be
sure of any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how
such an assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper
falsification criteria. I must say I have evidences on the
contrary, if only the fact that humans succumb often to wishful
thinking, and still more often to their parents wishful thinking.




If you are not sure of any clear meaning of the personal God being
the source of everything, including of course truth, this entails
not knowing the other things too.



Is that not an authoritative argument? What if I ask to my student an
exam question like give me an argument why the square root of 3 is
irrationnal. Suppose he gives me the correct and convincing usual
(mathematical) proof. I could give him a bad note for not adding:
and I know that is the truth because truth is a gift by God. Cute,
I can directly give bad notes to all my students, and this will give
me more time to find a falsity in your way to reason ...




For a personal God, taking on our form (incarnation), especially if
we were made in the image of God in the first place, and showing
through miracles, and rising from the dead..., his dual nature
(Godman, celestialterrestial, G*G) seems to make a lot more
sense than something like a cross in earth orbit.  For example,
giving a hug is a more personal (and thus a more appropriate) way
of expressing love, than giving a card, even though a card is more 
verifiable in a third person sense, especially after the hug is 
finished.  But we do have the card too: God's written Word, even 
though this is not sufficient, the incarnate hug was the primary

proof, the card was just the historical record of it.


The card records facts. To judge them historical is already beyond my
 competence. Why the bible? Why not the question of king Milinda ?







There can be no upward emanation unless/until a sufficient
downward emanation is provided.

In

Christianity, the downward emanation is God loves us, and
then the upward emanation is We love God.




Plotinus insists a lot on the two ways: downward emanation and
upward emanation. The lobian machine theology is coherent with
this, even if negatively. It is coherent with Jef idea that pure
theological imperatives can only be addressed by adapted story
telling and examples, like jurisprudence in the application of
laws. But then there is a proviso: none of the stories should be
taken literally.



I agree with the use of stories.  Jesus used stories almost
exclusively to communicate.  Either the hearers got it or not.
But this does not imply that stories are the only form of downward
emanation.


Of course not. Real stories and personal experiences,  and collective
 experiences and experiments ... All this can help the downward
emanation.



The incarnation was the primary means.  Otherwise, who would have
been the story-teller?  What good are stories if the story is not
teaching you truth?


Look, I cannot take for granted even most mathematical theories
although their relation with a notion of truth is much more easy than
any text in natural language. Stories can be good in giving example
of behavior in some situation, or they can help anxious children to
sleep. Stories are not written with the idea of truth. The bibles
contains many contradiction. And, if really you want take a sacred
text as a theory of everything, there is a definite lack of
precision.




How do we know that the ultimate source of stories is a good 
source.  Jef and Brent and others seem to be basing their truth on 
really nothing more than pragmatism.



Jef perhaps. I am not sure for Brent which seems to admit some form
of realism (even physical realism).


I do infer from experience that there is some reality.  Sometime ago, Bruno wrote: 


Hence a Reality, yes. But not necessarily a physical reality. Here is the 
logical dependence:
NUMBERS - MACHINE DREAMS - PHYSICAL - HUMANS - PHYSICS - NUMBERS.

Maybe my interpretation of this is different than Bruno's, but I take it to mean our 
explanations can start anywhere in this loop and work all the way around.  So numbers can 
be explained in terms of physics (c.f. William S. Cooper) and physical reality can be 
explained in terms of numbers (c.f. Bruno Marchal?).  These explanations are all models, 
representations we create.  They are tested against experience, so they are not 
arbitrary. They must be logical since otherwise self-contradiction will render them 
ambiguous.  Whether any these, or which one, is really real is, I think, a 
meaningless question.

Brent Meeker


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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-27 Thread Jef Allbright


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


Jef Allbright writes:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?


I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple
lack of precision, or something more.


Thanks for the compliments about my writing. I meant that 
what we should believe does not necessarily have to be the 
same as what is true, but I think that unless there are 
special circumstances, it ought to be the case.


I agree within the context you intended.  My point was that we can never
be certain of truth, so we should be careful in our speech and thinking
not to imply that such truth is even available to us for the kind of
comparisons being discussed here.  We can know that some patterns of
action work better than others, but the only truth we can assess is
always within a specific context.


Brent Meeker 
made a similar point: if someone is dying of a terminal 
illness, maybe it is better that he believe he has longer to 
live than the medical evidence suggests, but that would have 
to be an example of special circumstances. 


There are plenty of examples of self-deception providing benefits within
the scope of the individual, and leading to increasingly effective
models of reality for the group.  Here's a recent article on this
topic:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/26/science/26lying.html?pagewanted=print




 

If he had said something like our main criterion
for what to believe should be what works, what seems
to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had
made a direct reference to Occam's Razor, I would 
be comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this 
point.  But I've seen this stumbling block arise so many

times and so many places that I'm very curious to learn
something of its source.


The question of what is the truth is a separate one, but one 
criterion I would add to those you mention above is that it 
should come from someone able to put aside his own biases and 
wishes where these might influence his assessment of the evidence. 


I agree, but would point out that by definition, one can not actually
set aside one's one biases because to do so would require an objective
view of oneself.  Rather, one can be aware that such biases exist in
general, and implement increasingly effective principles (e.g.
scientific method) to minimize them.


  We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs 
should always 
  be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever we 
  fancy.
 
 Here it's a smaller point, and I agree with the main thrust of the 
 statement, but it leaves a door open for the possibility 
that we might 
 actually be justifiably certain of the truth in *some* 
case, and I'm 
 wonder where that open door is intended to lead.


I said might because there is one case where I am certain 
of the truth, which is that I am having the present 
experience.


Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of
consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real?

Further, how can you claim certainty of the truth of subjective
experience when there is so much experimental and clinical evidence that
self-reported experience consists largely of distortions, gaps, time
delays and time out of sequence, fabrications and confabulations?

I realize that people can acknowledge all that I've just said, but still
claim the validity of their internal experience to be privileged on the
basis that only they can judge, but then how can they legitimately
contradict themselves a moment later about factual matters, e.g. when
the drugs wear off, the probe is removed from their brain, the brain
tumor is removed, the mob has dispersed, the hypnotist is finished, the
fight is over, the adrenaline rush has subsided, the pain has stopped,
the oxytocin flush has declined... What kind of truth could this be?

Of course the subjective self is the only one able to report on
subjective experience, but how can it *justifiably* claim to be
infallible?

To be certain of the truth of something implies being able to see it
objectively, right? Or does it equally imply no questions asked?

- Jef

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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2006-12-27 Thread Brent Meeker


Jef Allbright wrote:
...
The statement I am conscious, as usually intended to mean that one can 
be absolutely certain of one's subjective experience, is not an 
exception, because it's not even coherent.  It has no objective context 
at all.  It mistakenly assumes the existence of an observer somehow in 
the privileged position of being able to observe itself.  Further, 
there's a great deal of empirical evidence showing that the subjective 
experience that people report is full of distortions, gaps, 
fabrications, and confabulations.
If instead you mean that you know you are conscious in the same sense 
that you know other people are conscious, then that is not an exception, 
but just a reasonable inference, meaningful within quite a large context.
If Descartes had said, rather than Je pense, donc je suis, something 
like I think, therefore *something* exists, then I would agree with 
him. 


Bertrand Russell wrote that Descartes should only have said, There's thinking.  
I is an inference.  :-)

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-27 Thread Brent Meeker


Jef Allbright wrote:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


Jef Allbright writes:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right?


I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple
lack of precision, or something more.


Thanks for the compliments about my writing. I meant that what we 
should believe does not necessarily have to be the same as what is 
true, but I think that unless there are special circumstances, it 
ought to be the case.


I agree within the context you intended.  My point was that we can never
be certain of truth, so we should be careful in our speech and thinking
not to imply that such truth is even available to us for the kind of
comparisons being discussed here.  We can know that some patterns of
action work better than others, but the only truth we can assess is
always within a specific context.


Brent Meeker made a similar point: if someone is dying of a terminal 
illness, maybe it is better that he believe he has longer to live than 
the medical evidence suggests, but that would have to be an example of 
special circumstances. 


There are plenty of examples of self-deception providing benefits within
the scope of the individual, and leading to increasingly effective
models of reality for the group.  Here's a recent article on this
topic:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/26/science/26lying.html?pagewanted=print


I read recently that almost everyone overestimates their abilities.  The people 
who most accurately assess themselves are the clinically depressed.

Brent Meeker
I consider myself an average man, except for the fact that I consider myself an 
average man.
--- Michel de Montaigne

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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-27 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:10, Jef Allbright a écrit :



Bruno Marchal wrote:


Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit :

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


But our main criterion for what to believe should
be what is true, right?


I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology
is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple
lack of precision, or something more.
I don't see any tautology in Stathis writing so I guess I miss 
something.

Apparently something subtle is happening here.

It seems to me that when people say believe, they mean hold true 
or consider to be true.





OK then, and it makes sense which what follows. Our disagreement 
concerns vocabulary (and perhaps machine). Your notion of pragmatism is 
coherent with the idea of truth as the intended purpose of belief.







Therefore, I parse the statement as equivalent to ...criterion for 
what to hold true should be what is true...
I suppose I should have said that the statement is circular, rather 
than tautological since the verbs are different.




If he had said something like our main criterion
for what to believe should be what works, what seems
to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had
made a direct reference to Occam's Razor, I would be
comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this
point.
This would mean you disagree with Stathis's tautology, but then how 
could not believe in a tautology?


If someone states A=A, then there is absolutely no information 
content, and thus nothing in the statement itself with which to agree 
or disagree. I can certainly agree with the validity of the form 
within symbolic logic, but that's a different (larger) context.


Similarly, I was not agreeing or disagreeing with the meaning of 
Stahis' statement, but rather the form which seems to me to contain a 
piece of circular reasoning, implying perhaps that the structure of 
the thought was incoherent within a larger context.



 From your working criteria I guess you favor a pragmatic
notion of belief, but personally I conceive science as a
search for knowledge and thus truth (independently of the
fact that we can never *know* it as truth,


Yes, I favor a pragmatic approach to belief, but I distinguish my 
thinking from that of (capital P) Pragmatists in that I see knowledge 
(and the knower) as firmly grounded in a reality that can never be 
fully known but can be approached via an evolutionary process of 
growth tending toward an increasingly effective model of what works 
within an expanding scope of interaction within a reality that appears 
to be effectively open-ended in its potential complexity. Whereas many 
Pragmatists see progress as fundamentally illusory, I see progress, 
or growth, as essential to an effective world-view for any intentional 
agent.



except perhaps
in few basic things like I am conscious or I am convinced
there is a prime number etc.)
To talk like Stathis, this is why science is by itself always 
tentative. A scientist who says Now we know ... is only a

dishonest theologian (or a mathematician in hurry ...).


I agree with much of your thinking, but I take exception to exceptions 
(!) such as the ones you mentioned above.

All meaning is necessarily within context.



OK, but all context could make sense only to some universal meaning. I 
mean I don't know, it is difficult.





The existence of prime numbers is not an exception, but the context is 
so broad that we tend to think of prime numbers as (almost) 
fundamentally real,



Well, here I must say I take them as very real ...




similarly to the existence of gravity, another very deep regularity of 
our interactions with reality.



I think gravity is a consequence of the prime number (but this is 
presently out-topic), but ok, gravity is quite important ...





The statement I am conscious, as usually intended to mean that one 
can be absolutely certain of one's subjective experience, is not an 
exception, because it's not even coherent.  It has no objective 
context at all.  It mistakenly assumes the existence of an observer 
somehow in the privileged position of being able to observe itself.


Machine have many self-referential abilities. I can develop or give 
references (I intend to make some comments on such book later).



Further, there's a great deal of empirical evidence showing that the 
subjective experience that people report is full of distortions, gaps, 
fabrications, and confabulations.


But this is almost a consequence of the self-referential ability of 
machine, they can distort their own view, and even themselves. I talk 
about universal machine *after Godel* (and Post, Turing,..




If instead you mean that you know you are conscious in the same sense 
that you know other people are conscious, then that is not an 
exception, but just a reasonable inference, meaningful within quite a 
large context.




No. But I confess that when I say I know I am conscious (here and now) 
I hope you understand it as I assume 

RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



Brent Meeker writes:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
 
 
 Tom Caylor writes (in response to Marvin Minsky):
 
 Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea

 of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is
 no truth that we can discover.  But on the other hand, if there is no
 discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the
 existence of freedom of will, is false?
 
 That's easy: it's logically impossible. When I make a decision, although 
 I take all the evidence into account, and I know I am more likely to 
 decide one way rather than another due to my past experiences and due to 
 the way my brain works, ultimately I feel that I have the freedom to 
 overcome these factors and decide freely. But neither do I feel that 
 this free decision will be something random: I'm not mentally tossing a 
 coin, but choosing according to my beliefs and values. Do you see the 
 contradiction here? 


Yes, but it's a contrived contradiction.  You have taken free to mean independent of 
you where you refers to your past experience, the way your brain works, etc.  As 
Dennett says, that's not a free will worth having.


Indeed, but it's how people often think of free will. It's even how I think of 
it, without reflecting on its impossibility.


Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-27 Thread Jef Allbright


Bruno Marchal wrote:


Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:10, Jef Allbright a écrit :



All meaning is necessarily within context.


OK, but all context could make sense only to
some universal meaning. I mean I don't know,
it is difficult. 


But this can be seen in a very consistent way.  The significance of an event is proportional to the scope of its effect relative to the values of the observer.  


With increasing context of self-awareness, subjective values increasingly 
resemble principles of the physical universe.  Why? Because making basic 
choices against the way the universe actually works would be a losing strategy, 
becoming increasingly obvious with increasing context of awareness.

Since all events are the result of interactions following the laws of the 
physical universe, the difference between events and values decreases with 
increasing context of awareness, thus the significance, or meaningfulness of 
events also decreases.

With an ultimate, god's eye view of the universe, there would be no meaning at 
all.  Things would simply be as they are.

From the point of view of an agent undergoing long-term development within the universe, its values would increasingly converge on what works, i.e. principles of effective interaction with the physical world, while the expression of those values would become increasingly diverse in a fractal manner, optimizing for robust ongoing growth. 




The statement I am conscious, as usually intended
to mean that one can be absolutely certain of one's
subjective experience, is not an exception, because
it's not even coherent.  It has no objective context
at all.  It mistakenly assumes the existence of an
observer somehow in the privileged position of being
able to observe itself.


Machine have many self-referential abilities. I can
develop or give references (I intend to make some
comments on such book later).



Further, there's a great deal of empirical evidence
showing that the subjective experience that people
report is full of distortions, gaps, fabrications,
and confabulations.


But this is almost a consequence of the self-referential
ability of machine, they can distort their own view, and
even themselves. I talk about universal machine
*after Godel* (and Post, Turing,..


I'm in interesting in following up on this line of thought given available time. 


- Jef

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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



Jef Allbright writes:

 I said might because there is one case where I am certain 
 of the truth, which is that I am having the present 
 experience.


Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of
consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real?

Further, how can you claim certainty of the truth of subjective
experience when there is so much experimental and clinical evidence that
self-reported experience consists largely of distortions, gaps, time
delays and time out of sequence, fabrications and confabulations?

I realize that people can acknowledge all that I've just said, but still
claim the validity of their internal experience to be privileged on the
basis that only they can judge, but then how can they legitimately
contradict themselves a moment later about factual matters, e.g. when
the drugs wear off, the probe is removed from their brain, the brain
tumor is removed, the mob has dispersed, the hypnotist is finished, the
fight is over, the adrenaline rush has subsided, the pain has stopped,
the oxytocin flush has declined... What kind of truth could this be?

Of course the subjective self is the only one able to report on
subjective experience, but how can it *justifiably* claim to be
infallible?


I can't be certain that my present subjective state has anything to do with 
reality. I can't even be certain that having a thought necessitates a thinker 
(as Bertrand Russell pointed out in considering Descarte's cogito). However, 
I can be certain that I am having a thought.



To be certain of the truth of something implies being able to see it
objectively, right? Or does it equally imply no questions asked?


It's a strange quality of delusions that psychotic people are even more certain 
of their truth than non-deluded people are certain of things which have reasonable 
empirical evidence in their favour. This is also the case with religious beliefs, which 
the formal psychiatric definition excludes from being called delusions because they 
are consistent with a particular culture, i.e. the believer did not come up with them 
on his own. So it would seem that certainty does not always have much to do with 
objectivity.


Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-27 Thread Brent Meeker


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



Jef Allbright writes:

 I said might because there is one case where I am certain  of the 
truth, which is that I am having the present  experience.


Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of
consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real?

Further, how can you claim certainty of the truth of subjective
experience when there is so much experimental and clinical evidence that
self-reported experience consists largely of distortions, gaps, time
delays and time out of sequence, fabrications and confabulations?

I realize that people can acknowledge all that I've just said, but still
claim the validity of their internal experience to be privileged on the
basis that only they can judge, but then how can they legitimately
contradict themselves a moment later about factual matters, e.g. when
the drugs wear off, the probe is removed from their brain, the brain
tumor is removed, the mob has dispersed, the hypnotist is finished, the
fight is over, the adrenaline rush has subsided, the pain has stopped,
the oxytocin flush has declined... What kind of truth could this be?

Of course the subjective self is the only one able to report on
subjective experience, but how can it *justifiably* claim to be
infallible?


I can't be certain that my present subjective state has anything to do 
with reality. I can't even be certain that having a thought necessitates 
a thinker (as Bertrand Russell pointed out in considering Descarte's 
cogito). However, I can be certain that I am having a thought.



To be certain of the truth of something implies being able to see it
objectively, right? Or does it equally imply no questions asked?


It's a strange quality of delusions that psychotic people are even more 
certain of their truth than non-deluded people are certain of things 
which have reasonable empirical evidence in their favour. 


Yet this seems understandable.  The psychotic person is believing things 
because of some physical malfunction in his brain.  So it is easy to see how it 
might be incorrigble.  The normal persons is believing things because of 
perception, hearsay, and logic.  But he knows that all of those can be 
deceptive; and so he is never certain.

Brent Meeker

This is also 
the case with religious beliefs, which the formal psychiatric definition 
excludes from being called delusions because they are consistent with a 
particular culture, i.e. the believer did not come up with them on his 
own. So it would seem that certainty does not always have much to do 
with objectivity.


I'd say that certainty excludes objectivity.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-26 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit :



It looks like I might have timed out.  Hopefully this doesn't appear
two times.

On Dec 24, 8:55 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Le 24-déc.-06, à 09:48, Tom Caylor a écrit :

 Bruno,
 ...
 I believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate 
asked

 Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself.



Hmmm Perhaps in some symbolical way.


The crux is that he is not symbolic...




I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no 
evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of 
any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an 
assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification 
criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the fact 
that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to 
their parents wishful thinking.






 The Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of 
everything, who

 is personal.  As I've said before, without a personal core, the word
 personal has lost its meaning.  In the context nowadays of
 impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something
 like without rational basis.



Of course that *is* a pity. It is bad, for human, to develop such
self-eliminating belief.  It is not rational either.


I agree.  cf my examples (Skinner...) in response to Stathis.  But how
do *you* define rationality and persons?



A richer lobian machine (like ZF) can define those notions with respect 
to a simpler lobian machine (like PA), and then lift the theology of 
the simpler machine to themselves (a third lobian machine or entity, 
richer than ZF, can justified such induction.
Then rationality can be defined by relative provability or 
representability in some shared theories. This leaves open the 
interpretations of those theories which ask for us implicit faith in 
our own consistency or relative correctness.
The notion of persons are defined by each hypostases (third person = 
Bp, first person = Bp  p, etc.).






You also seem to reduce it,
to numbers.



It is a reduction only if you already defend a reductionist conception 
of numbers, and this can be considered as doubtful from the study of 
numbers, especially from the things that can emerge from their 
collective behaviors (arithmetical relations).






I think the sophistication of incompleteness simply hides
the fact that it is still a castle in the sky.



Like any falsifiable but not yet falsified theory.




By the direction of replacement I didn't mean chronologically, like
Plato replaces Aristotle.



... in Plotinus, ok.





I meant that the impersonal core replaced
the real personal core, independent of Aristotle's views.
You have said before that the Christians emphasize matter more than
mind, as opposed to the Platonists and neo-Platonists.  There may have
been a few Christians who reclaimed a belief in nature, like Thomas
Aquinas, when the mind/grace was being emphasized too much.  But, as
can be seen in the Christian interpretation of the Greek hypostases,
the core of Christianity, being rooted in the Hebrew God who is the
source of all things/persons, is really first of all a downward
emanation, like the neo-Platonists thought.   There can be no upward
emanation unless/until a sufficient downward emanation is provided.  In
Christianity, the downward emanation is God loves us, and then the
upward emanation is We love God.



Plotinus insists a lot on the two ways: downward emanation and upward 
emanation. The lobian machine theology is coherent with this, even if 
negatively. It is coherent with Jef idea that pure theological 
imperatives can only be addressed by adapted story telling and 
examples, like jurisprudence in the application of laws. But then there 
is a proviso: none of the stories should be taken literally.







 He (the Holy Spirit) fills in
 the gaps when we cannot find words to talk to him.


Like G* minus G does for any self-referentially classical machine. 
(The

lobian machine).


Yes. By the way, you said to Brent that you know that you are lobian.
How do you know?



OK, sorry, I was assuming (weaker-)comp. Any machine or even larger non 
godlike entity believing in a sufficient amount of arithmetical truth 
is lobian. Actually a lobian machine, as I have define it, is just a 
universal machines knowing that she is universal (more precisely such a 
machine/entity can prove that if p is accessible by its own local 
provability ability, then she can prove that fact.







I can take this as a poetical description of the relation between the
internal modalities or the hypostases.


This is not poetry.  Heidegger said to listen to the poet, not to the
content, but just to the fact that there is a poet, which gives us hope
that there is meaning.  However, unfulfilled hope does not provide
meaning.


Hope is something purely first-personal, if I can say. So I have no 
clue how hope does 

Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-26 Thread Tom Caylor


On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit :

 The crux is that he is not symbolic...




I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no
evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of
any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an
assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification
criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the fact
that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to
their parents wishful thinking.



If you are not sure of any clear meaning of the personal God being the
source of everything, including of course truth, this entails not
knowing the other things too.  For a personal God, taking on our form
(incarnation), especially if we were made in the image of God in the
first place, and showing through miracles, and rising from the dead...,
his dual nature (Godman, celestialterrestial, G*G) seems to make a
lot more sense than something like a cross in earth orbit.  For
example, giving a hug is a more personal (and thus a more appropriate)
way of expressing love, than giving a card, even though a card is more
verifiable in a third person sense, especially after the hug is
finished.  But we do have the card too: God's written Word, even
though this is not sufficient, the incarnate hug was the primary proof,
the card was just the historical record of it.



 There can be no upward
 emanation unless/until a sufficient downward emanation is provided.  In
 Christianity, the downward emanation is God loves us, and then the
 upward emanation is We love God.




Plotinus insists a lot on the two ways: downward emanation and upward
emanation. The lobian machine theology is coherent with this, even if
negatively. It is coherent with Jef idea that pure theological
imperatives can only be addressed by adapted story telling and
examples, like jurisprudence in the application of laws. But then there
is a proviso: none of the stories should be taken literally.



I agree with the use of stories.  Jesus used stories almost exclusively
to communicate.  Either the hearers got it or not.  But this does not
imply that stories are the only form of downward emanation.   The
incarnation was the primary means.  Otherwise, who would have been the
story-teller?  What good are stories if the story is not teaching you
truth?  How do we know that the ultimate source of stories is a good
source.  Jef and Brent and others seem to be basing their truth on
really nothing more than pragmatism.


 This is not poetry.  Heidegger said to listen to the poet, not to the
 content, but just to the fact that there is a poet, which gives us hope
 that there is meaning.  However, unfulfilled hope does not provide
 meaning.

Hope is something purely first-personal, if I can say. So I have no
clue how hope does not provide meaning. Even little (and fortunately
locally fulfillable hope) like hope in a cup of coffee, can provide
meaning. Bigger (and hard to express) hopes can provide genuine bigger
meaning, it seems to me. I am not opposed to some idea of ultimate
meaning although both personal reasons and reflection on lobianity make
me doubt that communicating such hopes can make any sense (worse, the
communication would most probably betrays the possible meaning of what
is attempted to be communicated, and could even lead to the contrary).



Even poetry must be based eventually on some meaning.  Even minimalism
or the Theatre of the Absurd is based on some form to attempt to
communicate meaninglessness.

I am glad that your aren't opposed to some idea of ultimate meaning.
My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and
we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the
absence of hope.


 The content of these words speak of the *actual* fulfillment
 of the hopes of the Greeks expressed in their hypostases.?   Are you talking 
about mystical enlightening experiences. Like
losing any remaining doubts about immortality because you have already
seen the whole of the eternal tergiversations all at once ?



By these words I was referring to the John quote from the Bible.  The
actual fulfillment was Jesus (the Word/Logos).  He spanned the infinite
gap, like you said above, perhaps analogous to hypercomputation,...all
in one step.


  We have seen his
  glory, the glory of the One and Only, who came from the Father,
 full of
  grace and truth. (John 3:1,2,3,14)  So the particular finite form
 that
  we have, God somehow took on that same form.


 It is the ultimate irony that Jesus was taken to be blaspheming when he
 said he was one with the Father and before Abraham was, I AM, for
 no one can say that they are God. the mistake is the missing
 phrase at the end: ...except God.




OK. I mean, here, that we can agree on an important disagreement,
making both of us quite coherent with respect to my faith in comp and
your faith in 

Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-26 Thread [EMAIL PROTECTED]


I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a
pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single
self that maintains beliefs.  A more realistic view is that each
person is constantly switching among various different ways to think
in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep
changing their status, etc.  Accordingly our sets of beliefs can
include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those
inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending
on one's current priorities, etc.


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2006-12-26 Thread Brent Meeker


[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a
pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single
self that maintains beliefs.  A more realistic view is that each
person is constantly switching among various different ways to think
in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep
changing their status, etc.  Accordingly our sets of beliefs can
include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those
inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending
on one's current priorities, etc.


I'm not sure what you're thinking of.  Do you think of beliefs as 
all-or-nothing?  Can you give some examples?

Brent Meeker


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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-26 Thread Stathis Papaioannou










From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order  Belief)
Date: Tue, 26 Dec 2006 14:59:17 -0800


I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a
pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single
self that maintains beliefs.  A more realistic view is that each
person is constantly switching among various different ways to think
in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep
changing their status, etc.  Accordingly our sets of beliefs can
include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those
inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending
on one's current priorities, etc.


But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? 
We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should always be 
tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever we fancy.


Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-26 Thread Jef Allbright


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


But our main criterion for what to believe should be
what is true, right? 


I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in
communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would express
this belief of his in the form of a tautology.  I've observed that he is
generally both thoughtful and precise in his writing, so I'm very
interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, his
transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more.

If he had said something like our main criterion for what to believe
should be what works, what seems to work, what passes the tests of time,
etc. or had made a direct reference to Occams's Razor, I would be
comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this point.  But I've
seen this stumbling block arise so many times and so many places that
I'm very curious to learn something of its source.

We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should 
always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe 
whatever we fancy.


Here it's a smaller point, and I agree with the main thrust of the
statement, but it leaves a door open for the possibility that we might
actually be justifiably certain of the truth in *some* case, and I'm
wonder where that open door is intended to lead.

---

In response to John Mikes:  


Yes, I consider my thinking about truth to be pragmatic, within an
empirical framework of open-ended possibility.  Of course, ultimately
this too may be considered a matter of faith, but one with growth that
seems to operate in a direction opposite from the faith you express.

- Jef



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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-26 Thread Tom Caylor


On Dec 26, 3:59 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:

I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a
pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single
self that maintains beliefs.  A more realistic view is that each
person is constantly switching among various different ways to think
in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep
changing their status, etc.  Accordingly our sets of beliefs can
include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those
inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending
on one's current priorities, etc.


Dr. Minsky,

In your book, Society of Mind, you talk about a belief in freedom of
will:

The physical world provides no room for freedom of will...That concept
is essential to our models of the mental realm. Too much of our
psychology is based on it for us to ever give it up. We're virtually
forced to maintain that belief, even though we know it's false.

Are you saying that we must use an unsound idea (belief)?

Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea
of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is
no truth that we can discover.  But on the other hand, if there is no
discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the
existence of freedom of will, is false?

However, the belief in freedom of will seems to be a belief that is
rather constant, so there seem to be some beliefs that provide evidence
for an invariant reality and truth, not necessarily freedom of will,
but something.  And I think that looking for ultimate sources would be
circular (as you've said on the Atheist List) only if there were no
ultimate source that we could find.  Do you agree with this statement?

Tom Caylor


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2006-12-26 Thread Brent Meeker


Tom Caylor wrote:


On Dec 26, 3:59 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:

I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a
pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single
self that maintains beliefs.  A more realistic view is that each
person is constantly switching among various different ways to think
in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep
changing their status, etc.  Accordingly our sets of beliefs can
include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those
inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending
on one's current priorities, etc.


Dr. Minsky,

In your book, Society of Mind, you talk about a belief in freedom of
will:

The physical world provides no room for freedom of will...That concept
is essential to our models of the mental realm. Too much of our
psychology is based on it for us to ever give it up. We're virtually
forced to maintain that belief, even though we know it's false.


Whether it is false depends on what you mean by free will.  Dennett argues persuasively 
in Elbow Room that we have all the freedom of will that matters.  Our actions 
arise out of who we are.  If you conceive yourself comprehensively, all your memories, 
values, knowledge, etc. then you are the author of your action.  If you conceive yourself 
as small enough, you can escape all responsibility.



Are you saying that we must use an unsound idea (belief)?

Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea
of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is
no truth that we can discover.  But on the other hand, if there is no
discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the
existence of freedom of will, is false?

However, the belief in freedom of will seems to be a belief that is
rather constant, so there seem to be some beliefs that provide evidence
for an invariant reality and truth, not necessarily freedom of will,
but something.  And I think that looking for ultimate sources would be
circular (as you've said on the Atheist List) only if there were no
ultimate source that we could find.  Do you agree with this statement?


It would be futile - but not circular.  It is circular to argue that belief is 
evidence for the thing believed.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2006-12-26 Thread Tom Caylor


On Dec 26, 7:53 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Tom Caylor wrote:

 On Dec 26, 3:59 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 wrote:
 I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a
 pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single
 self that maintains beliefs.  A more realistic view is that each
 person is constantly switching among various different ways to think
 in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep
 changing their status, etc.  Accordingly our sets of beliefs can
 include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those
 inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending
 on one's current priorities, etc.

 Dr. Minsky,

 In your book, Society of Mind, you talk about a belief in freedom of
 will:

 The physical world provides no room for freedom of will...That concept
 is essential to our models of the mental realm. Too much of our
 psychology is based on it for us to ever give it up. We're virtually
 forced to maintain that belief, even though we know it's false.



Whether it is false depends on what you mean by free will.  Dennett argues persuasively 
in Elbow Room that we have all the freedom of will that matters.  Our actions 
arise out of who we are.  If you conceive yourself comprehensively, all your memories, 
values, knowledge, etc. then you are the author of your action.  If you conceive yourself 
as small enough, you can escape all responsibility.



 Are you saying that we must use an unsound idea (belief)?

 Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea
 of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is
 no truth that we can discover.  But on the other hand, if there is no
 discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the
 existence of freedom of will, is false?

 However, the belief in freedom of will seems to be a belief that is
 rather constant, so there seem to be some beliefs that provide evidence
 for an invariant reality and truth, not necessarily freedom of will,
 but something.  And I think that looking for ultimate sources would be
 circular (as you've said on the Atheist List) only if there were no
 ultimate source that we could find.  Do you agree with this statement?



It would be futile - but not circular.  It is circular to argue that belief is 
evidence for the thing believed.

Brent Meeker


I was providing a belief as evidence not for free will but for some
invariant reality/truth, e.g. the source of actions in your words, who
we are.

Tom


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2006-12-25 Thread John Mikes

Tom Caylor wrote:

This looks like Tarski's trick to me.  It is an act of faith any time
we take what we say as truth.

On 12/24/06, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
When I take what I say to be true based on evidence it is not a matter of
faith
JM:
it is based on your faith in your evidence and its truth. A religious person
accepts  as evidence God said so - of course it is based on HIS faith, and
so are physicists evidencing by collapse of wave function, .by calculations
on the inflation after the BB, and other kind of  'scientists' (believing)
in the tenets of their (today's) science, just as (in Ptolemy-time) on the
flatness of the Earth.

Tom Caylor wrote:

This is unsupported without an ultimate
Person who gives the ultimate source of bringing truth into existence
through words.

BM:
This is pure magic mongering - as though some special ultimate person can
bring something into existence by words.
JM:
Unless you have 'faith' in that ultimate personG - I take Brent's side
here.
*
BM:
Critics of reductionism ignore the contrary process of synthesis.  Physics
does not *just* reduce things to atoms, it also shows how things are
synthesized from atoms and their relations.
JM:
relations is a big word (Do you have a good meaning for it?) IMO it
includes the impredicative - non computable interrelatedness of the totality
we cannot include into our limited reductionist  models. Nor can physics
consider all of it in a 'synthetic' opposite. I consider Stathis's words on
his chemistry as his domain-concept of relations between people etc.,
otherwise I would have argued (on my turf) about chemistry's occurrence vs
our figment how to depict and explain into patterns (even drawn into 2D
formulation upon the atomic illusions in chem. science) the figment we have
about certain primitively observed phenomena. All in the sense of physical
edifice-evidence we have FAITH in.
*
BM:



Brent Meeker


*
JM:
John Mikes







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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-24 Thread Tom Caylor


Bruno,

I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases.  There is a lot
to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last post
on this.

On Dec 11, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal

I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. With
that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, and of
course those light are of the platonic-plotinus type where the notion
of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I say more
below.


The discussions over the last two weeks on Evil, and just how to define
good and bad, underscore how puzzling this problem can be.  I agree
that at the base of this is the question, What is Truth?  I am not
satisfied with the Theaetetus definition, or Tarski's trick.  I
believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked
Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself.  The
Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who
is personal.  As I've said before, without a personal core, the word
personal has lost its meaning.  In the context nowadays of
impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something
like without rational basis.  But when the personal IS the basis, not
an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with
man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis
for truth, personality, rationality, good...


 Note also that the major critics by the neoplatonists on Aristotle,
 besides their diverging opinions on the nature of matter, is the
 non-person character of the big unnameable, but then for Plotinus the
 second God (the second primary hypostase is personal), and indeed
 G* has a personal aspect from the point of view of the machine. I
 agree
 (comp agree) with Plotinus  that the big first cannot be a person. The
 second one can. To be sure Plotinus is not always completely clear on
 that point (especially on his chapter on free-will).

 None of Plotinus' hypostases are both personal and free from evil (as
 well as infinite, which we agree is needed (but not sufficient, I
 maintain!) for the problem of meaning).



It is a key point. I agree. None of Plotinus hypostases are both
personal and free from evil/good. Finding an arithmetical
interpretation of the hypostases could then give a hope toward an
explanation of goodness and evil.
Please note that 7/8 of the hypostases are personal-views.



I'll just deal with the first 4 hypostases, since this is the basis of
the rest, even though my John quote below addresses the others also.

Perhaps the neo-Platonists couldn't see how the core could be personal
(even though Plato called it the Good). It is hard to accept that the
core could be both infinite and personal (and good), since our view of
personality is finite (and flawed). But the infinite personal core, God
the Father, which replaces the neo-Platonist ONE or 0-person (of
course I maintain that the replacing was in the other direction :),
answers the big question of the origin of all other persons (and
consciousness).

You mentioned to Brent that perhaps invoking the second-person is a way
of explaining the origin of personal aspects.  In a way this is true,
in that our earthly fathers/mothers and others take part as persons in
developing us as persons.  But there has to be an ultimate source.  And
in the Christian interpretation the ultimate source of all
first-person level experience (neo-Platonist ALL-SOUL or
UNIVERSAL-SOUL) could be said to be God the Holy Spirit.  He fills in
the gaps when we cannot find words to talk to him.

Then, the real clincher is the third person point of view, the
neo-Platonist INTELLECT.  The personal God did not stay silent and
keep all of this personhood stuff at a purely theoretical level which
we would have to take with blind faith.  Instead the hopes of the
neo-Platonists were fulfilled in the Christ (Messiah) whose name was
Emmanuel which means God with us, who was the wisdom and power of
God.  In the beginning was the Word (Logos), and the Word was with
God, and the Word was God. He was with God in the beginning. Through
him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been
made. In him was life, and that life was the light of men. The light
shines in the darkness, but the darkness has not understood it... The
Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us. We have seen his
glory, the glory of the One and Only, who came from the Father, full of
grace and truth. (John 3:1,2,3,14)  So the particular finite form that
we have, God somehow took on that same form.  In this way God showed us
(who are in his image) true truth about himself in a way which we can
understand (just as a father tells 

RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-24 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



Tom Caylor writes:


Bruno,

I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases.  There is a lot
to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last post
on this.

On Dec 11, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal
 I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
 Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
 current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. With
 that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, and of
 course those light are of the platonic-plotinus type where the notion
 of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I say more
 below.

The discussions over the last two weeks on Evil, and just how to define
good and bad, underscore how puzzling this problem can be.  I agree
that at the base of this is the question, What is Truth?  I am not
satisfied with the Theaetetus definition, or Tarski's trick.  I
believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked
Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself.  The
Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who
is personal.  As I've said before, without a personal core, the word
personal has lost its meaning.  In the context nowadays of
impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something
like without rational basis.  But when the personal IS the basis, not
an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with
man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis
for truth, personality, rationality, good...


I'm not sure that this is what you meant, but there is in a sense an objective 
basis to the personal or subjective, which is simply that when I say I feel or 
desire something, this is an empirical statement: either I do feel it or I am 
lying. Also, there is an objective explanation for why I have the feeling in 
terms of neurophysiology, evolution and so on. But this is not enough for some 
people and they think, for example, that there must be more to love than 
just particular feelings and the scientific basis for these feelings. But this 
mysterious love-substance would appear to make no difference whatsoever.  
The evidence is that if certain chemical reactions occur, the love feeling also 
occurs, and these chemical reactions occur because they have evolved that 
way to assist bonding with family, community and so on. That explanation 
covers everything, and the love-substance remains superfluous and undetectable, 
inviting Occam's Razor to cut it down.


Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-24 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 23-déc.-06, à 15:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :




Bruno marchal writes:

 Even if it is presented as good for society, the child may accept 
that  because of feelings of empathy for others.
OK. Note that such an empathy is hard wired in our biological 
constitution. Many mammals seems to have it at some degree. Some form 
of autism are described by pathological loss of that empathy. Perhaps 
Stathis could say more.


Autism, psychopathy and psychotic illnesses like schizophrenia can all 
involve a loss of empathy. It is sometimes said that autistic children 
lack a theory of mind so that they can see others as being like 
themselves, with a similar view of the world to themselves. As they 
grow up, they realise intellectually that other people are like them 
but it seems that they lack the intuitive grasp of this fact that non-

-autistic individuals have.
People with schizophrenia can develop a blunting of affect, which 
perhaps is a different process but can have the same effect. They may 
be able to compare their feelings to when they were well and may say 
things like, I can longer feel things like I used to, I know I ought 
to feel happy when others around me are happy and sad when something 
sad happens, but I feel nothing, I just register the facts.
Psychopaths are different again in that they usually have a full range 
of affect, understand that others may suffer as they do, but don't 
care and can't understand why they should care, other than to keep the 
legal authorities happy. Young children are all psychopathic: they 
refrain from behaving badly only because they might get punished. As 
they grow up, they internalise the good and bad behaviour paterns 
so that they seem to have these characteristics intrinsically.


Autism and schizophrenia are almost always dysfunctional conditions, 
but intelligent psychopaths often do very well, in business and 
politics for example, because they can lie and manipulate people 
without compunction. In fact, they often seem unusually charming and 
likable when you first meet them, because they have learned to act the 
way that will best serve their selfish purposes. It is conceivable 
that an entire society of psychopaths might be able to function with 
rules of conduct similar to the moral rules that most normal societies 
live by, but arrived at in a practical and dispassionate manner. That 
is, thieves are punished because it is expedient to do so in the same 
way as it is expedient to take an umbrella with you if expecting rain, 
and saying theft is wrong is like saying rain is wrong.



Thanks for the explanations. I am astonished about all children being 
psychopathic: I guess you mean very young one?


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-24 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 24-déc.-06, à 09:48, Tom Caylor a écrit :



Bruno,

I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases.  There is a lot
to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last post
on this.

On Dec 11, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal

I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. With
that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, and of
course those light are of the platonic-plotinus type where the 
notion

of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I say more
below.


The discussions over the last two weeks on Evil, and just how to define
good and bad, underscore how puzzling this problem can be.



It certainly is.




I agree
that at the base of this is the question, What is Truth?  I am not
satisfied with the Theaetetus definition, or Tarski's trick.



We can come back to this.




I
believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked
Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself.



Hmmm Perhaps in some symbolical way.




The
Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who
is personal.  As I've said before, without a personal core, the word
personal has lost its meaning.  In the context nowadays of
impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something
like without rational basis.



Of course that *is* a pity. It is bad, for human, to develop such 
self-eliminating belief.

It is not rational either.




But when the personal IS the basis, not
an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with
man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis
for truth, personality, rationality, good...





So you are emphasizing the third hypostase = the first person = the 
ALL-SOUL = the universal knower. This is akin to David Lymann and 
George Levy. It is not incompatible with your view if you accept the 
idea that we are all God(s). Cf Alan Watts for example and most 
mystical insight.







 Note also that the major critics by the neoplatonists on Aristotle,
 besides their diverging opinions on the nature of matter, is the
 non-person character of the big unnameable, but then for Plotinus 
the
 second God (the second primary hypostase is personal), and 
indeed

 G* has a personal aspect from the point of view of the machine. I
 agree
 (comp agree) with Plotinus  that the big first cannot be a person. 
The
 second one can. To be sure Plotinus is not always completely clear 
on

 that point (especially on his chapter on free-will).

 None of Plotinus' hypostases are both personal and free from evil 
(as

 well as infinite, which we agree is needed (but not sufficient, I
 maintain!) for the problem of meaning).



It is a key point. I agree. None of Plotinus hypostases are both
personal and free from evil/good. Finding an arithmetical
interpretation of the hypostases could then give a hope toward an
explanation of goodness and evil.
Please note that 7/8 of the hypostases are personal-views.



I'll just deal with the first 4 hypostases, since this is the basis of
the rest, even though my John quote below addresses the others also.

Perhaps the neo-Platonists couldn't see how the core could be personal
(even though Plato called it the Good). It is hard to accept that the
core could be both infinite and personal (and good), since our view of
personality is finite (and flawed). But the infinite personal core, God
the Father, which replaces the neo-Platonist ONE or 0-person (of
course I maintain that the replacing was in the other direction :),



It looks you seem really to be an Aristotelician 




answers the big question of the origin of all other persons (and
consciousness).

You mentioned to Brent that perhaps invoking the second-person is a way
of explaining the origin of personal aspects.



I was just saying that the second person or some collective intimacy 
can explain utterance of uncommunicable things.
Some ethical scientific truth can be said in the coffee room, not at 
any congress ...






 In a way this is true,
in that our earthly fathers/mothers and others take part as persons in
developing us as persons.  But there has to be an ultimate source.



Yes. To be a realist is to bet there is one, but from a scientist 
(third person) pov, it is an open question as to know if such ultimate 
thing is personal. Comp is going in the Plotinus direction where the 
ultimate reality is not personal.






And
in the Christian interpretation the ultimate source of all
first-person level experience (neo-Platonist ALL-SOUL or
UNIVERSAL-SOUL) could be said to be God the Holy Spirit.


I can agree with that hypothesis. It is consistent with 
computationalism. There is 

Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-24 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 24-déc.-06, à 11:49, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

I'm not sure that this is what you meant, but there is in a sense an 
objective basis to the personal or subjective, which is simply that 
when I say I feel or desire something, this is an empirical statement: 
either I do feel it or I am lying. Also, there is an objective 
explanation for why I have the feeling in terms of neurophysiology, 
evolution and so on. But this is not enough for some people and they 
think, for example, that there must be more to love than just 
particular feelings and the scientific basis for these feelings. But 
this mysterious love-substance would appear to make no difference 
whatsoever.  The evidence is that if certain chemical reactions occur, 
the love feeling also occurs, and these chemical reactions occur 
because they have evolved that way to assist bonding with family, 
community and so on. That explanation covers everything, and the 
love-substance remains superfluous and undetectable, inviting Occam's 
Razor to cut it down.



I can agree completely but as you expect I will ask you to cut *any* 
substance once you bet on comp. Not just love-substance, but 
neuron-substance as well.


(Or explain me at which step of the UDA reasoning you feel unconvinced, 
thanks ;-)


... of course we can believe in neurons and ... love. No need of any 
substances ... (more exactly, with comp, substances can't help).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-24 Thread Tom Caylor


On Dec 24, 3:49 am, Stathis Papaioannou
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Tom Caylor writes:
 Bruno,

 I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
 Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
 and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases.  There is a lot
 to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last post
 on this.

 On Dec 11, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal
  I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
  Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
  current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. With
  that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, and of
  course those light are of the platonic-plotinus type where the notion
  of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I say more
  below.

 The discussions over the last two weeks on Evil, and just how to define
 good and bad, underscore how puzzling this problem can be.  I agree
 that at the base of this is the question, What is Truth?  I am not
 satisfied with the Theaetetus definition, or Tarski's trick.  I
 believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked
 Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself.  The
 Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who
 is personal.  As I've said before, without a personal core, the word
 personal has lost its meaning.  In the context nowadays of
 impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something
 like without rational basis.  But when the personal IS the basis, not
 an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with
 man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis
 for truth, personality, rationality, good...



I'm not sure that this is what you meant, but there is in a sense an objective
basis to the personal or subjective, which is simply that when I say I feel or
desire something, this is an empirical statement: either I do feel it or I am
lying.


This looks like Tarski's trick to me.  It is an act of faith any time
we take what we say as truth.  This is unsupported without an ultimate
Person who gives the ultimate source of bringing truth into existence
through words.


Also, there is an objective explanation for why I have the feeling in
terms of neurophysiology, evolution and so on. But this is not enough for some
people and they think, for example, that there must be more to love than
just particular feelings and the scientific basis for these feelings. But this
mysterious love-substance would appear to make no difference whatsoever.  
The evidence is that if certain chemical reactions occur, the love feeling also

occurs, and these chemical reactions occur because they have evolved that
way to assist bonding with family, community and so on. That explanation
covers everything, and the love-substance remains superfluous and undetectable,
inviting Occam's Razor to cut it down.

Stathis Papaioannou


Reducing everything to particulars results in the loss of meaning.
Schaeffer describes this process as nature eating up grace.
Reductionism has resulted in cutting out the basis for knowledge.
Knowledge has to be personal, as shown by the epistemologist Michael
Polanyi, particularly in his book Personal Knowledge.  Of course
Bruno maintains that after Godel we have gone beyond reductionism, but
I don't think so.  I will say more in response to his post.

I don't have my notes with me, but a few examples of what happens with
reductionism are:  Jacques Monods (?) in his Chance and Necessity
reducing everything basically to the roll of the dice - B.F. Skinner,
eliminating freedom and dignity of man, and saying farewell to man qua
man.  The result: the rule of the elite.  I had the privilege of
hearing a guest lecture by Skinner at UCLA in the '80s, and the
question  answer section was pretty lively, with agnostics defending
freedom and dignity as if they really believed in it.  Marvin Minsky
and his colleague (don't recall his name) at MIT, saying that basically
we have to act as if we have free will, even though we know that we
don't.  Talk about a loss of the concept of truth.

Tom


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-24 Thread Tom Caylor


It looks like I might have timed out.  Hopefully this doesn't appear
two times.

On Dec 24, 8:55 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Le 24-déc.-06, à 09:48, Tom Caylor a écrit :

 Bruno,
 ...
 I believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked
 Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself.



Hmmm Perhaps in some symbolical way.


The crux is that he is not symbolic...


 The Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who
 is personal.  As I've said before, without a personal core, the word
 personal has lost its meaning.  In the context nowadays of
 impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something
 like without rational basis.



Of course that *is* a pity. It is bad, for human, to develop such
self-eliminating belief.  It is not rational either.


I agree.  cf my examples (Skinner...) in response to Stathis.  But how
do *you* define rationality and persons?  You also seem to reduce it,
to numbers.  I think the sophistication of incompleteness simply hides
the fact that it is still a castle in the sky.


 But when the personal IS the basis, not
 an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with
 man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis
 for truth, personality, rationality, good...



So you are emphasizing the third hypostase = the first person = the
ALL-SOUL = the universal knower. This is akin to David Lymann and
George Levy. It is not incompatible with your view if you accept the
idea that we are all God(s). Cf Alan Watts for example and most
mystical insight.


I think later down you see that I am addressing all of the hypostases.


 I'll just deal with the first 4 hypostases, since this is the basis of
 the rest, even though my John quote below addresses the others also.

 Perhaps the neo-Platonists couldn't see how the core could be personal
 (even though Plato called it the Good). It is hard to accept that the
 core could be both infinite and personal (and good), since our view of
 personality is finite (and flawed). But the infinite personal core, God
 the Father, which replaces the neo-Platonist ONE or 0-person (of
 course I maintain that the replacing was in the other direction :)



It looks you seem really to be an Aristotelician 


By the direction of replacement I didn't mean chronologically, like
Plato replaces Aristotle.  I meant that the impersonal core replaced
the real personal core, independent of Aristotle's views.
You have said before that the Christians emphasize matter more than
mind, as opposed to the Platonists and neo-Platonists.  There may have
been a few Christians who reclaimed a belief in nature, like Thomas
Aquinas, when the mind/grace was being emphasized too much.  But, as
can be seen in the Christian interpretation of the Greek hypostases,
the core of Christianity, being rooted in the Hebrew God who is the
source of all things/persons, is really first of all a downward
emanation, like the neo-Platonists thought.   There can be no upward
emanation unless/until a sufficient downward emanation is provided.  In
Christianity, the downward emanation is God loves us, and then the
upward emanation is We love God.


 In a way this is true,
 in that our earthly fathers/mothers and others take part as persons in
 developing us as persons.  But there has to be an ultimate source.



Yes. To be a realist is to bet there is one, but from a scientist
(third person) pov, it is an open question as to know if such ultimate
thing is personal. Comp is going in the Plotinus direction where the
ultimate reality is not personal.


As you saw, I addressed the third person pov below.


 He (the Holy Spirit) fills in
 the gaps when we cannot find words to talk to him.



Like G* minus G does for any self-referentially classical machine. (The
lobian machine).


Yes. By the way, you said to Brent that you know that you are lobian.
How do you know?


 Then, the real clincher is the third person point of view, the
 neo-Platonist INTELLECT.  The personal God did not stay silent and
 keep all of this personhood stuff at a purely theoretical level which
 we would have to take with blind faith.  Instead the hopes of the
 neo-Platonists were fulfilled in the Christ (Messiah) whose name was
 Emmanuel which means God with us, who was the wisdom and power of
 God.  In the beginning was the Word (Logos), and the Word was with
 God, and the Word was God. He was with God in the beginning. Through
 him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been
 made. In him was life, and that life was the light of men. The light
 shines in the darkness, but the darkness has not understood it... The
 Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us.



I can take this as a poetical description of the relation between the
internal modalities or the hypostases.


This is not poetry.  Heidegger said to listen to the poet, not to the
content, but just to the fact that 

RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-24 Thread Stathis Papaioannou




Thanks for the explanations. I am astonished about all children being 
psychopathic: I guess you mean very young one?


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


To be fair that term isn't normally used for children due to its pejorative 
connotations, but I think it is close to the truth. Infants lack not only a 
moral sense, they also lack an understanding of consequences of their 
actions. Older children act to gain rewards and avoid punishment. Older 
children still act for all the above reasons but also to gain approval from 
authority figures - to be a good boy or a good girl, whatever that takes. 
The final stage involves internalising moral values, so that good and 
bad take on a separate meaning, not just what has positive or negative 
consequences or what other people think of as good and bad. 


These roughly correspond to Kohlberg's stages of moral development:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kohlberg's_stages_of_moral_development

Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2006-12-24 Thread Brent Meeker


Tom Caylor wrote:


On Dec 24, 3:49 am, Stathis Papaioannou
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

Tom Caylor writes:
 Bruno,

 I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
 Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
 and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases.  There is a lot
 to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last post
 on this.

 On Dec 11, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal
  I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
  Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
  current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. With
  that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, and of
  course those light are of the platonic-plotinus type where the 
notion
  of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I say 
more

  below.

 The discussions over the last two weeks on Evil, and just how to define
 good and bad, underscore how puzzling this problem can be.  I agree
 that at the base of this is the question, What is Truth?  I am not
 satisfied with the Theaetetus definition, or Tarski's trick.  I
 believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked
 Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself.  The
 Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who
 is personal.  As I've said before, without a personal core, the word
 personal has lost its meaning.  In the context nowadays of
 impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something
 like without rational basis.  But when the personal IS the basis, not
 an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with
 man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis
 for truth, personality, rationality, good...


I'm not sure that this is what you meant, but there is in a sense an 
objective
basis to the personal or subjective, which is simply that when I say I 
feel or
desire something, this is an empirical statement: either I do feel it 
or I am

lying.


This looks like Tarski's trick to me.  It is an act of faith any time
we take what we say as truth.  


When I take what I say to be true based on evidence it is not a matter of faith.


This is unsupported without an ultimate
Person who gives the ultimate source of bringing truth into existence
through words.


This is pure magic mongering - as though some special ultimate person can 
bring something into existence by words.


Also, there is an objective explanation for why I have the feeling in
terms of neurophysiology, evolution and so on. But this is not enough 
for some
people and they think, for example, that there must be more to love 
than
just particular feelings and the scientific basis for these feelings. 
But this
mysterious love-substance would appear to make no difference 
whatsoever.  The evidence is that if certain chemical reactions occur, 
the love feeling also

occurs, and these chemical reactions occur because they have evolved that
way to assist bonding with family, community and so on. That explanation
covers everything, and the love-substance remains superfluous and 
undetectable,

inviting Occam's Razor to cut it down.

Stathis Papaioannou


Reducing everything to particulars results in the loss of meaning.


A strawman. No one has tried to reduce everything to particulars.  Stathis 
refers to generalities, like chemical reactions, families, and love.


Schaeffer describes this process as nature eating up grace.


Which is apparently intended as a profound metaphor for something.


Reductionism has resulted in cutting out the basis for knowledge.
Knowledge has to be personal, as shown by the epistemologist Michael
Polanyi, particularly in his book Personal Knowledge.  Of course
Bruno maintains that after Godel we have gone beyond reductionism, but
I don't think so.  I will say more in response to his post.


Critics of reductionism ignore the contrary process of synthesis.  Physics does 
not *just* reduce things to atoms, it also shows how things are synthesized 
from atoms and their relations.



I don't have my notes with me, but a few examples of what happens with
reductionism are:  Jacques Monods (?) in his Chance and Necessity
reducing everything basically to the roll of the dice - B.F. Skinner,
eliminating freedom and dignity of man, and saying farewell to man qua
man.  The result: the rule of the elite.  


You mean like the divine right of kings?


I had the privilege of
hearing a guest lecture by Skinner at UCLA in the '80s, and the
question  answer section was pretty lively, with agnostics defending
freedom and dignity as if they really believed in it.  


It's only theists who imagine that some god is necessary to give them freedom, dignity, and purpose in their lives.  


Brent Meeker

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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-24 Thread Stathis Papaioannou






Tom Caylor writes:


On Dec 24, 3:49 am, Stathis Papaioannou
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Tom Caylor writes:
  Bruno,

  I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the
  Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases,
  and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases.  There is a lot
  to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last post
  on this.

  On Dec 11, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal
   I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of
   Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
   current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. With
   that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, and of
   course those light are of the platonic-plotinus type where the notion
   of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I say more
   below.

  The discussions over the last two weeks on Evil, and just how to define
  good and bad, underscore how puzzling this problem can be.  I agree
  that at the base of this is the question, What is Truth?  I am not
  satisfied with the Theaetetus definition, or Tarski's trick.  I
  believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked
  Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself.  The
  Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who
  is personal.  As I've said before, without a personal core, the word
  personal has lost its meaning.  In the context nowadays of
  impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something
  like without rational basis.  But when the personal IS the basis, not
  an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with
  man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis
  for truth, personality, rationality, good...

 I'm not sure that this is what you meant, but there is in a sense an objective
 basis to the personal or subjective, which is simply that when I say I feel or
 desire something, this is an empirical statement: either I do feel it or I am
 lying.

This looks like Tarski's trick to me.  It is an act of faith any time
we take what we say as truth.  This is unsupported without an ultimate
Person who gives the ultimate source of bringing truth into existence
through words.


Have you considered the possibility that we can never know the ultimate truth? I 
can't even be certain that I had a particular thought a moment ago; I believe I did, 
and all the evidence suggests that I did, but I can't be *absolutely certain*. This 
seems obvious to me and I am quite comfortable with it, but even if I weren't, that 
is no reason to create ex nihilo a source of ultimate truth (if such a thing were even 
logically possible, which it is not).



 Also, there is an objective explanation for why I have the feeling in
 terms of neurophysiology, evolution and so on. But this is not enough for some
 people and they think, for example, that there must be more to love than
 just particular feelings and the scientific basis for these feelings. But this
 mysterious love-substance would appear to make no difference whatsoever.  
 The evidence is that if certain chemical reactions occur, the love feeling also

 occurs, and these chemical reactions occur because they have evolved that
 way to assist bonding with family, community and so on. That explanation
 covers everything, and the love-substance remains superfluous and 
undetectable,
 inviting Occam's Razor to cut it down.

 Stathis Papaioannou

Reducing everything to particulars results in the loss of meaning.
Schaeffer describes this process as nature eating up grace.
Reductionism has resulted in cutting out the basis for knowledge.
Knowledge has to be personal, as shown by the epistemologist Michael
Polanyi, particularly in his book Personal Knowledge.  Of course
Bruno maintains that after Godel we have gone beyond reductionism, but
I don't think so.  I will say more in response to his post.

I don't have my notes with me, but a few examples of what happens with
reductionism are:  Jacques Monods (?) in his Chance and Necessity
reducing everything basically to the roll of the dice - B.F. Skinner,
eliminating freedom and dignity of man, and saying farewell to man qua
man.  The result: the rule of the elite.  I had the privilege of
hearing a guest lecture by Skinner at UCLA in the '80s, and the
question  answer section was pretty lively, with agnostics defending
freedom and dignity as if they really believed in it.  Marvin Minsky
and his colleague (don't recall his name) at MIT, saying that basically
we have to act as if we have free will, even though we know that we
don't.  Talk about a loss of the concept of truth.


It seems to me that you go one step further than Marvin Minsky and say that 
not only must we behave as if we have free will, we must *believe* that we 
have free will. You have skirted around this question without really answering 
it 

RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-24 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



Tom Caylor writes:


It is the ultimate irony that Jesus was taken to be blaspheming when he
said he was one with the Father and before Abraham was, I AM, for
no one can say that they are God. the mistake is the missing
phrase at the end: ...except God.


Yes, but what if Jesus was not God? He would then have been lying or 
deluded, and blaspheming as well in the eyes of Jews, Muslims etc. I have 
met many peopel who thought they were Jesus. Once, we had two Jesuses 
on the ward at the same time. We thought they might get into a fight, but 
in an appropriately holy manner they both walked around smiling and blessing 
everyone. They even forgave the staff for disbelieving and giving them 
medication. I have to admit, they were nice people, and others could learn 
from their example. But they were deluded.


Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-24 Thread Brent Meeker


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:






Tom Caylor writes:


On Dec 24, 3:49 am, Stathis Papaioannou
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
 Tom Caylor writes:
  Bruno,

  I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts 
on the
  Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist 
hypostases,

  and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases.  There is a lot
  to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last 
post

  on this.

  On Dec 11, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal
   I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent 
problem of

   Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two
   current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. 
With
   that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, 
and of
   course those light are of the platonic-plotinus type where the 
notion
   of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I 
say more

   below.

  The discussions over the last two weeks on Evil, and just how to 
define

  good and bad, underscore how puzzling this problem can be.  I agree
  that at the base of this is the question, What is Truth?  I am not
  satisfied with the Theaetetus definition, or Tarski's trick.  I
  believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate 
asked

  Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself.  The
  Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, 
who

  is personal.  As I've said before, without a personal core, the word
  personal has lost its meaning.  In the context nowadays of
  impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something
  like without rational basis.  But when the personal IS the 
basis, not

  an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with
  man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis
  for truth, personality, rationality, good...

 I'm not sure that this is what you meant, but there is in a sense an 
objective
 basis to the personal or subjective, which is simply that when I say 
I feel or
 desire something, this is an empirical statement: either I do feel 
it or I am

 lying.

This looks like Tarski's trick to me.  It is an act of faith any time
we take what we say as truth.  This is unsupported without an ultimate
Person who gives the ultimate source of bringing truth into existence
through words.


Have you considered the possibility that we can never know the ultimate 
truth? I can't even be certain that I had a particular thought a moment 
ago; I believe I did, and all the evidence suggests that I did, but I 
can't be *absolutely certain*. This seems obvious to me and I am quite 
comfortable with it, but even if I weren't, that is no reason to create 
ex nihilo a source of ultimate truth (if such a thing were even 
logically possible, which it is not).


And what does ultimate truth even mean?  Does it mean complete and accurate description of 
everything?  Does it mean the set of all true propositions; where true means...what?, 
in accordance with observation?, provable in some axiomatic system?, referring to a fact?


 Also, there is an objective explanation for why I have the feeling in
 terms of neurophysiology, evolution and so on. But this is not 
enough for some
 people and they think, for example, that there must be more to 
love than
 just particular feelings and the scientific basis for these 
feelings. But this
 mysterious love-substance would appear to make no difference 
whatsoever.   The evidence is that if certain chemical reactions 
occur, the love feeling also
 occurs, and these chemical reactions occur because they have evolved 
that
 way to assist bonding with family, community and so on. That 
explanation
 covers everything, and the love-substance remains superfluous and 
undetectable,

 inviting Occam's Razor to cut it down.

 Stathis Papaioannou

Reducing everything to particulars results in the loss of meaning.
Schaeffer describes this process as nature eating up grace.
Reductionism has resulted in cutting out the basis for knowledge.
Knowledge has to be personal, as shown by the epistemologist Michael
Polanyi, particularly in his book Personal Knowledge.  Of course
Bruno maintains that after Godel we have gone beyond reductionism, but
I don't think so.  I will say more in response to his post.

I don't have my notes with me, but a few examples of what happens with
reductionism are:  Jacques Monods (?) in his Chance and Necessity
reducing everything basically to the roll of the dice - B.F. Skinner,
eliminating freedom and dignity of man, and saying farewell to man qua
man.  The result: the rule of the elite.  I had the privilege of
hearing a guest lecture by Skinner at UCLA in the '80s, and the
question  answer section was pretty lively, with agnostics defending
freedom and dignity as if they really believed in it.  Marvin Minsky
and his colleague (don't recall his name) at MIT, saying that basically
we have to act as if we have free 

Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-24 Thread Brent Meeker


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



Tom Caylor writes:


It is the ultimate irony that Jesus was taken to be blaspheming when he
said he was one with the Father and before Abraham was, I AM, for
no one can say that they are God. the mistake is the missing
phrase at the end: ...except God.


Yes, but what if Jesus was not God? He would then have been lying or 
deluded, and blaspheming as well in the eyes of Jews, Muslims etc. I 
have met many peopel who thought they were Jesus. Once, we had two 
Jesuses on the ward at the same time. We thought they might get into a 
fight, but in an appropriately holy manner they both walked around 
smiling and blessing everyone. They even forgave the staff for 
disbelieving and giving them medication. I have to admit, they were nice 
people, and others could learn from their example. But they were deluded.


Or at least one of them was. :-)

Brent Meeker
And Jesus said unto them, And whom do you say that I am?
They replied, You are the eschatological manifestation of
the ground of our being, the ontological foundation of
the context of our very selfhood revealed.
And Jesus replied, What??

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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-24 Thread Jef Allbright


Brent Meeker wrote:
That raises a fundamental question - should we believe what's 
true?  Of course in general we don't know what's true and we 
never know it with certainity.  But we do know some things, 
in the scientific, provisional sense.  And we also have 
certain values which, as Jef says, are the basis of our 
action and our judgement of good and bad.  So what happens 
when we know X and believing X is *not* conducive to 
realizing our values?  

Of course you could argue that this can never happen; that 
it's always best (in the values sense) to believe what's 
true.  But I think this is doubtful.  For example, person who 
is certainly dying of cancer (and we're all dying of 
something) may realize more of his values by believing that 
he will live for much longer than justified by the evidence.  

On the other hand you could argue that one can't just believe 
this or that as an act of will and so it is impossible to 
know X, even in the provisional scientific sense, and also 
believe not-X.  


Tell me Human, what is this Self you speak of, somehow apart from its
own value-system, somehow able to observe and comment on its own
subjective experience?

But seriously, the values that matter most are generally below conscious
awareness and can only be inferred.  This is why I suggested that
story-telling might be among the most effective methods for collecting
sets of values for further analysis and distillation.  It would be more
accurate to say that our values drive our self rather than belong to our
self.

Evidence abounds of memories (and thus experience of self) being subject
to a great deal of distortion, fabrication, and revision, and the human
capacity for cognitive dissonance and confabulation answers loudly your
question in regard to the handling of conflicting values and beliefs.

- Jef

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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2006-12-24 Thread Brent Meeker


Jef Allbright wrote:


Brent Meeker wrote:
That raises a fundamental question - should we believe what's true?  
Of course in general we don't know what's true and we never know it 
with certainity.  But we do know some things, in the scientific, 
provisional sense.  And we also have certain values which, as Jef 
says, are the basis of our action and our judgement of good and bad.  
So what happens when we know X and believing X is *not* conducive to 
realizing our values? 
Of course you could argue that this can never happen; that it's always 
best (in the values sense) to believe what's true.  But I think this 
is doubtful.  For example, person who is certainly dying of cancer 
(and we're all dying of something) may realize more of his values by 
believing that he will live for much longer than justified by the 
evidence. 
On the other hand you could argue that one can't just believe this or 
that as an act of will and so it is impossible to know X, even in the 
provisional scientific sense, and also believe not-X.  


Tell me Human, what is this Self you speak of, somehow apart from its
own value-system, somehow able to observe and comment on its own
subjective experience?


I don't think I said anything about self, much less that it is separate from 
a value system.



But seriously, the values that matter most are generally below conscious
awareness and can only be inferred.  This is why I suggested that
story-telling might be among the most effective methods for collecting
sets of values for further analysis and distillation.  


An interesting idea.  I'd say that action has to be the real test of values.  
Has there been any study of the correlation between stories told and actual 
behavior?


It would be more
accurate to say that our values drive our self rather than belong to our
self.


That's fine with me.  I'd say the self is nothing but an abstraction to 
collect values, memories, thoughts, etc.


Evidence abounds of memories (and thus experience of self) being subject
to a great deal of distortion, fabrication, and revision, and the human
capacity for cognitive dissonance and confabulation answers loudly your
question in regard to the handling of conflicting values and beliefs.


So you observe that people commonly believe things they know are false.  Do you also 
conclude that they are generally doing this to maximize the projection of their values 
into the future?  Or would they do better if their beliefs and knowledge aligned?  In 
other words, is there a should about belief?

Brent Meeker

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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases

2006-12-24 Thread Jef Allbright


Brent Meeker wrote:


Jef Allbright wrote:
 
 Brent Meeker wrote:
 That raises a fundamental question - should we believe 
what's true?  
 Of course in general we don't know what's true and we 
never know it 
 with certainity.  But we do know some things, in the scientific, 
 provisional sense.  And we also have certain values which, as Jef 
 says, are the basis of our action and our judgement of 
good and bad.
 So what happens when we know X and believing X is *not* 
conducive to 
 realizing our values?
 Of course you could argue that this can never happen; that it's 
 always best (in the values sense) to believe what's true.  But I 
 think this is doubtful.  For example, person who is 
certainly dying 
 of cancer (and we're all dying of something) may realize 
more of his 
 values by believing that he will live for much longer than 
justified 
 by the evidence.
 On the other hand you could argue that one can't just 
believe this or 
 that as an act of will and so it is impossible to know X, 
even in the 
 provisional scientific sense, and also believe not-X.
 
Tell me Human, what is this Self you speak of, somehow 
apart from its own value-system, somehow able to observe

and comment on its own subjective experience?


I don't think I said anything about self, much less that it 
is separate from a value system.


 

But seriously, the values that matter most are generally
below conscious awareness and can only be inferred.  This
is why I suggested that story-telling might be among the
most effective methods for collecting sets of values for
further analysis and distillation.


An interesting idea.  I'd say that action has to be the real 
test of values.  Has there been any study of the correlation 
between stories told and actual behavior?


Not of which I am aware, although there has been some collecting of
stories in anthropology, and some listing of human universal values in
rough form. 




It would be more accurate to say that our values drive our
self rather than belong to our  self.


That's fine with me.  I'd say the self is nothing but an 
abstraction to collect values, memories, thoughts, etc.


Then I think you're on the right track.



Evidence abounds of memories (and thus experience of self)
being subject to a great deal of distortion, fabrication,
and revision, and the human capacity for cognitive dissonance
and confabulation answers loudly your question in regard to
the handling of conflicting values and beliefs.


So you observe that people commonly believe things they know 
are false.  Do you also conclude that they are generally 
doing this to maximize the projection of their values into 
the future?


No, most such action is not a result of rational consideration, or even
conscious intention.


Or would they do better if their beliefs and 
knowledge aligned?  In other words, is there a should about belief?


There is no should, but only that what works tends to persist, thus
increasing the likelihood of it being assessed as good. Some beliefs,
despite being invalid, can be very effective within a limited context
but tend eventually to succumb to competition from those with greater
effectiveness, generally through more general scope of applicability and
with fewer side-effects. We come to think of these principles of
increasingly effective action as laws of nature.

- Jef

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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-23 Thread Stathis Papaioannou



Bruno marchal writes:

 Even if it is presented as good for society, the child may accept that 
 because of feelings of empathy for others.



OK. Note that such an empathy is hard wired in our biological 
constitution. Many mammals seems to have it at some degree. Some form 
of autism are described by pathological loss of that empathy. Perhaps 
Stathis could say more.


Autism, psychopathy and psychotic illnesses like schizophrenia can all involve 
a loss of empathy. It is sometimes said that autistic children lack a theory of mind 
so that they can see others as being like themselves, with a similar view of the 
world to themselves. As they grow up, they realise intellectually that other people 
are like them but it seems that they lack the intuitive grasp of this fact that non-
-autistic individuals have. 

People with schizophrenia can develop a blunting of affect, which perhaps is a 
different process but can have the same effect. They may be able to compare 
their feelings to when they were well and may say things like, I can longer feel 
things like I used to, I know I ought to feel happy when others around me are 
happy and sad when something sad happens, but I feel nothing, I just register 
the facts. 

Psychopaths are different again in that they usually have a full range of affect, 
understand that others may suffer as they do, but don't care and can't understand 
why they should care, other than to keep the legal authorities happy. Young 
children are all psychopathic: they refrain from behaving badly only because they 
might get punished. As they grow up, they internalise the good and bad 
behaviour paterns so that they seem to have these characteristics intrinsically.


Autism and schizophrenia are almost always dysfunctional conditions, but intelligent 
psychopaths often do very well, in business and politics for example, because they 
can lie and manipulate people without compunction. In fact, they often seem 
unusually charming and likable when you first meet them, because they have learned 
to act the way that will best serve their selfish purposes. It is conceivable that an 
entire society of psychopaths might be able to function with rules of conduct 
similar to the moral rules that most normal societies live by, but arrived at in a practical 
and dispassionate manner. That is, thieves are punished because it is expedient to do 
so in the same way as it is expedient to take an umbrella with you if expecting rain, 
and saying theft is wrong is like saying rain is wrong. 


Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-22 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 20-déc.-06, à 19:06, Brent Meeker a écrit :



Bruno Marchal wrote:

Le 19-déc.-06, à 21:32, Brent Meeker a écrit :

Bruno Marchal wrote:
I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my 
methodology

to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is
famous for its many paradoxical thoughts.
It is certainly not a reductio against comp, given that we are not
arriving at a genuine contradiction. It just happens that 
goodness is

as unnameable as truth.
Now, concerning this paradox, it seems to me intuitively
comprehensible. If someone saves me from some horrible pain, then 
that
is (arguably) good; but if he does that in the *name* of good, I 
can
understand that this naming depreciates its action. Even if 
personally

I am still benefiting from that situation, the naming could make me
uneasy, and who knows what will be done under that or any name.


A little uneasiness about what someone might do in the future is 
hardly enough to transform a good act into a bad one.  It seems you 
are saying that if the good samaritan claimed to have performed his 
kind act *for any reason whatsoever* it would become a bad act.  
That sounds like a reductio to me.
Not at all. It becomes bad when he refers or justify his act in the 
*name* of any unnameable virtue.


It's not clear what bad refers to in the above.  It seems as though 
you are asserting an absolute standard of bad while claiming there 
can be no absolute standard of good.





Not really. Someone acting in the name of truth, good etc. are 
bad. But someone acting in the name of bad are bad too. Note that I 
am considering an ideal situation, and I am lifting provable relations 
between ideal machines and the notion of truth by appeal to the 
platonist relastionship between truth and good (and beauty, ...). 
None of those sentences should be taken literally or what I am saying 
would be self-defeating. Moral things have to be understood by oneself 
or taught by examples ... Perhaps this is a place to invoke the second 
person point of view, which refers to intimate relations between a 
little number of individuals who can communicate and share first person 
point of view (but here too normative suggestions can destroy couples 
and families) in a non public way, and thus can say more without 
falling in the trap of making things normative.







My personal judgment of good or bad would not be so clear cut.  If 
someone does me an act of kindness I consider that good.  If he refers 
it to some unameable virtue, e.g. he says he did it in the name of 
God or Capitalism, then I may consider it a little less good - but not 
bad.




Locally. Of course I agree. Now with ideal machines there is a sense to 
say that even good things when made in the name of goods (or worse: 
imposed in the name of good) could lead to the bad, for those 
machines, in the long run.  I do think that western religion have 
repeated that error, and this would explain why it is difficult to 
come back to the questioning which was at the roots of those 
religion.
As animals, humans, like wolves, have developed efficient, but 
lobian-ethically-wrong recipe of life, of the kind the boss is 
right ...
My approach of moral here is before all theoretical. The funny 
godel-lobian paradox here is that lobian morality is quasi 
self-defeating. Summed up and simplified, it like if the wise lobian 
machine told us Here is a good suggestion: never listen to any good 
suggestion.






It is hard to define those unnanmeable virtue except that true is 
already one of those and good, just etc. are obvious derivative 
of true.  But I must say that I am talking about some ideal case, 
and I can imagine context where nuance should be added. You can, for 
example, give a vaccine to a child. The child is unhappy about that 
because the vaccine has some distasteful taste or because he is 
afraid of needles, and you can make short your justification by 
saying it is for your own good. Here you don't act in the name of 
good, you just sum up a long explanation based on the idea that a 
disease is not good for your child. Well even here the complete 
explanation is better in the case the child has no idea of any 
relationship between the vaccine and the disease.


But even the most complete possible explanation must end at some point 
with something that is explicitly or implicitly good.




I totally agree with you. I think the basic biological rule has been 
that if Animal A eats Animal B, in *general* this is good for A and bad 
for B. At the level of species this is probably already false (most 
animals with predators needs their predators in the long run for reason 
of ecological equilibrium and/or natural eugenism). We would not be 
here in case drinking water would have been very painful.





But I think we agree that this good, in the explanation, must be 
something the child accepts as a personal good.



For human-goodness, sure. The question are human good is not a 

Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-20 Thread Bruno Marchal



Le 19-déc.-06, à 21:32, Brent Meeker a écrit :



Bruno Marchal wrote:
I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my 
methodology

to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is
famous for its many paradoxical thoughts.
It is certainly not a reductio against comp, given that we are not
arriving at a genuine contradiction. It just happens that goodness 
is

as unnameable as truth.
Now, concerning this paradox, it seems to me intuitively
comprehensible. If someone saves me from some horrible pain, then that
is (arguably) good; but if he does that in the *name* of good, I can
understand that this naming depreciates its action. Even if personally
I am still benefiting from that situation, the naming could make me
uneasy, and who knows what will be done under that or any name.


A little uneasiness about what someone might do in the future is 
hardly enough to transform a good act into a bad one.  It seems you 
are saying that if the good samaritan claimed to have performed his 
kind act *for any reason whatsoever* it would become a bad act.  That 
sounds like a reductio to me.



Not at all. It becomes bad when he refers or justify his act in the 
*name* of any unnameable virtue. It is hard to define those 
unnanmeable virtue except that true is already one of those and 
good, just etc. are obvious derivative of true.  But I must say 
that I am talking about some ideal case, and I can imagine context 
where nuance should be added. You can, for example, give a vaccine to a 
child. The child is unhappy about that because the vaccine has some 
distasteful taste or because he is afraid of needles, and you can make 
short your justification by saying it is for your own good. Here you 
don't act in the name of good, you just sum up a long explanation based 
on the idea that a disease is not good for your child. Well even here 
the complete explanation is better in the case the child has no idea of 
any relationship between the vaccine and the disease.
Although a lobian machine has no idea of what is an absolutely true 
sentence, she can have genuine approximation of true for restricted set 
of sentences and I can imagine similar definable restricted notion of 
good.





We can be reflective about one's actions and conclude *for ourselve*
that they are good, but lobianity prevents correct machine to
communicate it to others *as such*,  if only to prevent any normative
use of a notion like goodness. It prevents also idolatry toward 
names
or descriptions of good, true, correct. With comp a judge can 
put

a machine in jail, despite its total inability to ever judge the
machine deserves jail.


OK.  That comports with my thought that good/bad are personal.  So one 
can say, I did that because I think it was good to do so.  And I can 
try to persuade you that you should think it good too.  It's just 
wrong to assume that there is a knowable, objective good.



Indeed. As far as there is a knowable good, it cannot be objective. As 
far as there is an objective good, it is not knowable *as such*. (It 
can be accidentally knowable but then not as an objective good.
I guess this is related with the popular belief that Roads to Hell are 
paved with good intentions (approximate translation from the french).







Some buddhist told this in some provocative way: if you really love
buddha, kill it.   (Not to take literally OC).

Recall that once we interview a correct machine, be it 
Peano-Arithmetic

PA, or the far richer Zermelo-Fraenkel, or even the angel
Analysis+OmegaRule (which has infinite cognitive abilities), the first
interesting thing such machines or entity say is that they will told 
us

some bullshit or that they may told us some bullshit. So am I. Please,
don't infer from that that I believe to be such a *correct* machine
(that does not follow logically). I know I am lobian, assuming comp
or (much) weaker. I don't know (and will never known) if I am
consistent and I still less know if I am correct.

Bruno


Yes, I understand and agree with that.  But you are using know in an 
absolute sense.  In the everyday sense of uncertain, but probably 
correct belief, one can know many things - though of course not that 
one is consistent.



OK. (To be sure I am indeed using know in an absolute sense, even in 
the theatetical sense: meaning that knowable p =  p  provable p).
To split the hair a bit, if know is used with a nuance of 
probability we can know our consistency (obvious: we can bet on 
it), so that in your last assertion I would say you were also using 
know in the absolute sense. But I think we mainly agree.


Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-19 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 18-déc.-06, à 20:04, Brent Meeker a écrit :


 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 ...
 Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other
 ethical principles or commandments from God:


 With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp
 (and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made 
 in
 the name of God is bad, even saving the planet from some attack by
 horrible monster ...

 That seems to be a reductio against comp.


I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my methodology 
to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is 
famous for its many paradoxical thoughts.
It is certainly not a reductio against comp, given that we are not 
arriving at a genuine contradiction. It just happens that goodness is 
as unnameable as truth.
Now, concerning this paradox, it seems to me intuitively 
comprehensible. If someone saves me from some horrible pain, then that 
is (arguably) good; but if he does that in the *name* of good, I can 
understand that this naming depreciates its action. Even if personally 
I am still benefiting from that situation, the naming could make me 
uneasy, and who knows what will be done under that or any name.



 Witrh comp (and the ideal case of self-referentially correct 
 machine)
 it is just impossible for a machine to do something good and at the
 same time telling she is doing something good ... (similar paradoxes
 are illustrated in taoist and buddhist tales).

 So one cannot be reflective about one's actions and conclude they are 
 good? That sounds like nonsense.


We can be reflective about one's actions and conclude *for ourselve* 
that they are good, but lobianity prevents correct machine to 
communicate it to others *as such*,  if only to prevent any normative 
use of a notion like goodness. It prevents also idolatry toward names 
or descriptions of good, true, correct. With comp a judge can put 
a machine in jail, despite its total inability to ever judge the 
machine deserve jail.

Some buddhist told this in some provocative way: if you really love 
buddha, kill it.   (Not to take literally OC).

Recall that once we interview a correct machine, be it Peano-Arithmetic 
PA, or the far richer Zermelo-Fraenkel, or even the angel 
Analysis+OmegaRule (which has infinite cognitive abilities), the first 
interesting thing such machines or entity say is that they will told us 
some bullshit or that they may told us some bullshit. So am I. Please, 
don't infer from that that I believe to be such a *correct* machine 
(that does not follow logically). I know I am lobian, assuming comp 
or (much) weaker. I don't know (and will never known) if I am 
consistent and I still less know if I am correct.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-19 Thread Brent Meeker

Bruno Marchal wrote:
 
 Le 18-déc.-06, à 20:04, Brent Meeker a écrit :
 
 Bruno Marchal wrote:
 ...
 Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other
 ethical principles or commandments from God:

 With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp
 (and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made 
 in
 the name of God is bad, even saving the planet from some attack by
 horrible monster ...
 That seems to be a reductio against comp.
 
 
 I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my methodology 
 to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is 
 famous for its many paradoxical thoughts.
 It is certainly not a reductio against comp, given that we are not 
 arriving at a genuine contradiction. It just happens that goodness is 
 as unnameable as truth.
 Now, concerning this paradox, it seems to me intuitively 
 comprehensible. If someone saves me from some horrible pain, then that 
 is (arguably) good; but if he does that in the *name* of good, I can 
 understand that this naming depreciates its action. Even if personally 
 I am still benefiting from that situation, the naming could make me 
 uneasy, and who knows what will be done under that or any name.

A little uneasiness about what someone might do in the future is hardly enough 
to transform a good act into a bad one.  It seems you are saying that if the 
good samaritan claimed to have performed his kind act *for any reason 
whatsoever* it would become a bad act.  That sounds like a reductio to me.

 
 Witrh comp (and the ideal case of self-referentially correct 
 machine)
 it is just impossible for a machine to do something good and at the
 same time telling she is doing something good ... (similar paradoxes
 are illustrated in taoist and buddhist tales).
 So one cannot be reflective about one's actions and conclude they are 
 good? That sounds like nonsense.
 
 
 We can be reflective about one's actions and conclude *for ourselve* 
 that they are good, but lobianity prevents correct machine to 
 communicate it to others *as such*,  if only to prevent any normative 
 use of a notion like goodness. It prevents also idolatry toward names 
 or descriptions of good, true, correct. With comp a judge can put 
 a machine in jail, despite its total inability to ever judge the 
 machine deserve jail.

OK.  That comports with my thought that good/bad are personal.  So one can say, 
I did that because I think it was good to do so.  And I can try to persuade 
you that you should think it good too.  It's just wrong to assume that there is 
a knowable, objective good.

 
 Some buddhist told this in some provocative way: if you really love 
 buddha, kill it.   (Not to take literally OC).
 
 Recall that once we interview a correct machine, be it Peano-Arithmetic 
 PA, or the far richer Zermelo-Fraenkel, or even the angel 
 Analysis+OmegaRule (which has infinite cognitive abilities), the first 
 interesting thing such machines or entity say is that they will told us 
 some bullshit or that they may told us some bullshit. So am I. Please, 
 don't infer from that that I believe to be such a *correct* machine 
 (that does not follow logically). I know I am lobian, assuming comp 
 or (much) weaker. I don't know (and will never known) if I am 
 consistent and I still less know if I am correct.
 
 Bruno

Yes, I understand and agree with that.  But you are using know in an absolute 
sense.  In the everyday sense of uncertain, but probably correct belief, one 
can know many things - though of course not that one is consistent.

Brent Meeker

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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 17-déc.-06, à 03:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :



 Democratic system are
 more
 efficient to explore the political landscape and thus more efficient
 in
 probability to satisfy soul's natural attraction toward the 
 good.

 The soul's natural attraction towards the good might be compared to
 the body's
 natural attraction to keep dry.

 OK.

 You might predict that every society would use
 umbrellas of some sort.

 OK.

 If a society did not use umbrellas, that would be surprising.

 OK.

 If they did not use them because they did not believe that rain is 
 wet
 or because
 they believed that God in his mercy would make the raindrops miss
 them, then they
 would be *wrong*.

 OK.

 If they did not use them because they didn't want to despite the
 discomfort that getting wet causes them then they would be strange 
 and
 foolish, but
 they would not be *wrong*.

 OK.

 There is a fundamental difference.

 ?OK.   (I don't see the point).

 The analogous statements are:

 a1. umbrellas keep you dry
 a2. feeding the poor reduces their suffering

 We can agree on the definition of the words and on the facts asserted. 
 If
 there is disagreement on the definition, for example if you were 
 thinking of
 a teapot when you heard the term umbrella, then it would be a simple 
 matter
 to show a picture of an umbrella and a teapot and resolve the 
 misunderstanding.
 If there is a disagreement on whether umbrellas do in fact keep you 
 dry, or
 whether feeding starving people reduces their suffering, then we could 
 go out
 into the rain with and without an umbrella or interview a starving 
 person before
 and after he has been fed, and reach agreement that way.

 In contrast, consider:

 b1. we should use umbrellas when going out in the rain
 b2. we should feed the poor if they are hungry

 We might expect that most people would agree with these statements. 
 However,
 if there is disagreement, there is no way to resolve it. I could say 
 that I don't care
 if I get wet, despite the discomfort, and I don't care if the poor 
 starve, despite the
 fact that this will cause them suffering. I could even say that I do 
 care about these
 things, but as part of my personal ethical system I don't believe it 
 is good to use
 umbrellas or feed the poor.

That last point is an interesting point, but to be sure it is even more 
going in the direction that there is no normative theory of good/bad. 
So if we are diverging on something it is perhaps that you believe 
there is a normative theory of truth ?
All we can say is

c1. IF you want keep yourself dry and if it is raining here and now 
then using an umbrella can help you with such or such probability.
c2. If you want make that precise poor person less hungry (here and 
now) then by giving him food you will get success with such or such 
probability.

All right ?  (if not elaborate because it would mean I am missing 
something).




 Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other
 ethical principles or commandments from God:


With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp 
(and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made in 
the name of God is bad, even saving the planet from some attack by 
horrible monster ...
Witrh comp (and the ideal case of self-referentially correct machine) 
it is just impossible for a machine to do something good and at the 
same time telling she is doing something good ... (similar paradoxes 
are illustrate in taoist and buddhist tales).



 what I feel is what I feel, and that's
 all there is to it.

Sure.


 You can try to persuade me that I should feel differently,

That would be like a dentist asking his patient not to suffer ...


 but you
 can't do this by persuading me that I am wrong in my facts, my 
 reasoning, or that
 we are defining terms differently.


OK. If you agree with c1 and c2. (I have added c1 and c2 because the 
should can be use in the moral way, and then I agree with you; but it 
can be used in the conditional sense, in which case nuance must be 
added). I mean you cannot both
1) believe that umbrellas keep you dry, 2) pretend you want to keep 
yourself dry
and then go out without umbrellas (assuming all the default 
assumptions, for example, don't give a counterexample like the problem 
is that my umbrella is 42 km high  that would make things out of 
topics.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-18 Thread Brent Meeker

Bruno Marchal wrote:
... 
 Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other
 ethical principles or commandments from God:
 
 
 With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp 
 (and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made in 
 the name of God is bad, even saving the planet from some attack by 
 horrible monster ...

That seems to be a reductio against comp.

 Witrh comp (and the ideal case of self-referentially correct machine) 
 it is just impossible for a machine to do something good and at the 
 same time telling she is doing something good ... (similar paradoxes 
 are illustrate in taoist and buddhist tales).

So one cannot be reflective about one's actions and conclude they are good? 
That sounds like nonsense.

Brent Meeker

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RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-18 Thread Stathis Papaioannou


Bruno Marchal writes:

  The analogous statements are:
 
  a1. umbrellas keep you dry
  a2. feeding the poor reduces their suffering
 
  We can agree on the definition of the words and on the facts asserted. 
  If
  there is disagreement on the definition, for example if you were 
  thinking of
  a teapot when you heard the term umbrella, then it would be a simple 
  matter
  to show a picture of an umbrella and a teapot and resolve the 
  misunderstanding.
  If there is a disagreement on whether umbrellas do in fact keep you 
  dry, or
  whether feeding starving people reduces their suffering, then we could 
  go out
  into the rain with and without an umbrella or interview a starving 
  person before
  and after he has been fed, and reach agreement that way.
 
  In contrast, consider:
 
  b1. we should use umbrellas when going out in the rain
  b2. we should feed the poor if they are hungry
 
  We might expect that most people would agree with these statements. 
  However,
  if there is disagreement, there is no way to resolve it. I could say 
  that I don't care
  if I get wet, despite the discomfort, and I don't care if the poor 
  starve, despite the
  fact that this will cause them suffering. I could even say that I do 
  care about these
  things, but as part of my personal ethical system I don't believe it 
  is good to use
  umbrellas or feed the poor.
 
 That last point is an interesting point, but to be sure it is even more 
 going in the direction that there is no normative theory of good/bad. 
 So if we are diverging on something it is perhaps that you believe 
 there is a normative theory of truth ?
 All we can say is
 
 c1. IF you want keep yourself dry and if it is raining here and now 
 then using an umbrella can help you with such or such probability.
 c2. If you want make that precise poor person less hungry (here and 
 now) then by giving him food you will get success with such or such 
 probability.
 
 All right ?  (if not elaborate because it would mean I am missing 
 something).

That's more or less the point I have been getting at. You can turn normative 
statements into descriptive ones by changing you ought into if you want 
to... 
you ought. 

  Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other
  ethical principles or commandments from God:
 
 
 With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp 
 (and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made in 
 the name of God is bad, even saving the planet from some attack by 
 horrible monster ...
 Witrh comp (and the ideal case of self-referentially correct machine) 
 it is just impossible for a machine to do something good and at the 
 same time telling she is doing something good ... (similar paradoxes 
 are illustrate in taoist and buddhist tales).

Any internet references for such tales?

  what I feel is what I feel, and that's
  all there is to it.
 
 Sure.
 
 
  You can try to persuade me that I should feel differently,
 
 That would be like a dentist asking his patient not to suffer ...

If the feeling is a physical one, yes, but if it an opinion, an ethical belief, 
even a desire, peopel can be persuaded: that's what advertising and 
propaganda is about.

  but you
  can't do this by persuading me that I am wrong in my facts, my 
  reasoning, or that
  we are defining terms differently.
 
 
 OK. If you agree with c1 and c2. (I have added c1 and c2 because the 
 should can be use in the moral way, and then I agree with you; but it 
 can be used in the conditional sense, in which case nuance must be 
 added). I mean you cannot both
 1) believe that umbrellas keep you dry, 2) pretend you want to keep 
 yourself dry
 and then go out without umbrellas (assuming all the default 
 assumptions, for example, don't give a counterexample like the problem 
 is that my umbrella is 42 km high  that would make things out of 
 topics.

OK: the problem is when should stands as an absolute.

Stathis Papaioannou
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Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)

2006-12-16 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 16-déc.-06, à 03:49, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :



 Bruno Marchal writes:

 Le 15-déc.-06, à 02:04, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

 Who says the Nazis are wrong when they assert they are good?

 I was not saying that they were wrong. I was saying that they were 
 bad.

 Who says this?  All self-referentially correct machine sufficnetly 
 rich
 to prove elementary theorems in arithmetic.

 For showing this it is just enough to accept that the notion of
 goodness is of a type having greater or equal complexity that the
 notion of consistency or truth (which is intuitively reasonable).

 To sum up: a lobian machine saying I am true is false. (note that
 saying I am provable makes it true by ... Lob's theorem itself!).
 A lobian machine asserting I am consistent is inconsistent (Godel)
 A lobian machine asserting I am intelligent is stupid,
 A lobian machine asserting I am stupid is ... stupid too (beginners
 are often wrong on this).
 A lobian machine asserting I am good is bad,
 A lobian machine asserting I am bad is bad (too!)
 A lobian machine asserting I am virtuous provably lacks virtue.
 (provably, not probably)

 Apparently self-referentially correct lobian machine are enough wise
 for never attributing to themselves any moral quality. They cannot
 judge their own defect in the matter.

 This doesn't help us decide what is good or bad though.





Indeed. Take it as a good or a bad news (!). With comp there is no 
theory capable of deciding what is good and what is bad. Never. It is 
the reason why I say that the comp theory of bad/true is not normative. 
Like in math we can still apply the theory once we agree on minimal 
notion of good and bad, through atomic example on the kind: drinking 
water when thirsty is good, Eating sands when thirsty is bad, etc.








  Good and bad
 are just placeholders, like x and y.




In third person communication.
I *guess* everyone knows the 1-difference (between things like drinking 
water and eating sands for example).
Good is when you say or feel something like whaooh, and bad is when 
you say something like Ouch!.







 We could look at a particular incident where capital punishment was
 proposed, let's say
 for murder. Everyone might agree on the facts of the crime and the
 effects of executing
 the perpetrator, but still strongly disagree about whether it is 
 right
 or wrong. So of course
 the capital punishment debate does involve rational discussion and
 maybe some people will
 switch sides if appropriate evidence is presented, but in the end you
 will have a situation
 where there is just disagreement on an axiom.

 Again this shows that good/bad is not different from true/false, even
 just in arithmetic.

 Why is the consensus on arithmetic so much greater than the consensus 
 on ethics
 and aesthetics?






Because ethics and aesthetics modalities are of an higher order than 
arithmetic which can be considered as deeper and/or simpler.
Classical arithmetical truth obeys classical logic which is the most 
efficient for describing platonia. Good and bad is related with the 
infinite self mirroring of an infinity of universal machines: it is 
infinitely more tricky, and in particular neither classical ethics nor 
aesthetics should be expected to follow classical logic.









 Recall the admittedly counterintuitive truth (admitting the 
 consistency
 of Peano Arithmetic): the new theory obtained by adding to Peano
 arithmetic the statement that Peano arithmetic is inconsistent, is a
 consistent theory (albeit probably not reasonable, but what does 
 that
 mean?).

 The elementary atoms of good and bad are related to what we have
 learned since life begun, like drinking water is good, self-burning
 is bad, or any elementary pleasure/pain qualia in company of some
 amount of self-referential correctness.

 You can describe what is pleasant, what is more likely to lead to you 
 continuing
 to live, what is more likely to lead to the survival of the species, 
 what is more likely
 to lead to happy lives for most people: I have no problem with that. 
 You can also
 define good as that which is more likely to bring these things 
 about: that's how
 I define it personally.




NIce. This would mean we agree after all.






 However, although there may be no disagreement on whether
 depriving a proportion of the population of food will make them 
 unhappy, even on
 whether it will bring about the destruction of the species, someone 
 who thinks differently
 to me could still say that the starvation policy is good.




Not if that someone is wise. Someone wise will explain the advantages, 
compares them to what you ask (so that he will listen too you). He/She 
will never use the word good. If he believes his idea is good, he 
will explain it. Only demagogs say my idea are goods, or I am with 
the truth. Why not God phones me and asks me to tell you that 






 For example, he could say that
 starvation is noble in a way which outweighs harm to 

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