Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
Brent: I wonder if I can make a readable sense of this rather convoluted mix of posts? I suggest the original should be at hand, I copy only the parts I reflect to. My previous post quoted remarks go by a plain JM, the present (new) inclusions as JMnow paragraphs. John M - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2007 11:51 PM Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases John M wrote (previously): Interleaving in* bold*(*-* John - Original Message - *From:* Stathis Papaioannou *Sent:* Monday, January 08, 2007 4:55 AM *Subject:* RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief) Tom Caylor writes: ---SKIP Stathis Papaioannou (SP:): People disagree on lots of things, but they also agree on lots of things, many of which are on the face of it either incredible or unpleasant - because the /_evidence_ / leaves them no choice. On matters of values and religion, however, they disagree far more frequently. In the case of values this is because they are not actually disgreeing about any empirical or logical fact: JM: --*who's empiria and who's logic? Are YOU the ultimate authority?--* skip. --*Doesn't everybody. including yourself?--* SP: In the case of religion, people disagree because they are selective in the evidence they accept because they want to believe something. JM: --*Everybody's prerogative.--* BM: I'm not so sure. Of course it is everyone's *political* right to base their beliefs on selective evidence - the institutions of government in liberal Western democracies recognize autonomy of thought. But isn't there an ethical duty base one's beliefs on all, or at least an unbiased sample, of the available evidence? If you don't rationally base your decisions that affect society, then I'd say you are a bad citizen - just as a person who sells his vote is a bad citizen. I think we are too tolerant of religious irrationality; in a way that we do not tolerate irrationality in any other field. Historically this is because we want to allow freedom of conscious; we mistrust government to enforce right thought. But just because we want to protect personal beliefs it doesn't follow that we should be tolerant of those beliefs when they are presented as a basis for public action. -JMnow:- Ethical duty base? I consider it culture-based and changing from society-type to historical circumstances all over. See nelow a remark on the nature of what we call 'ethics'/'morality'. Upon your: ...an unbiased sample, of the available evidence? is showing. Who is unbiased? We all live in our mindset (belief system) and call it true, etc. Available is the 'evidence' we so consider. I think we are too tolerant of religious irrationality;... and they say the same thing about the 'infidel' - and kill us. All in THEIR rationality. In their intolerance. Do we want to be similar? down to 'their' level? SP: Jews believe that God spoke to Moses, but they don't believe that God spoke to Muhammed. I don't think there is evidence that God spoke to either of them, but if your standards of evidence are much lower than mine JM:*who (else) told you which one is lower? Different, maybe.* and you accept one, you are being inconsistent if you don't accept the other. That is, if you think the sort of evidence presented in holy books, reports of miracles, religious experience, strength of faith in followers etc. is convincing, then pretty well every religion is equally convincing. JM:*Logical flaw: different religions accept different 'holy' books (their own, that is). You are in the joke when two people meet at the railroad station and one sais: I am making a trip to a distant foreign country and the other sais: me too, so why are we not traveling together?* BM: Your seem to imply that religions and their different teachings are just personal choices - like where to go on vacation. But in fact each one teaches that their holy books are objectively true and the values in those books (as interpreted by the appropriate religious authorities) are not subjective, but are mandated by god(s) for everyone. ---JMnow:--- Seeing people changing their religions it is not mere implication. Not many people keep their early childhood pristine faith (in whatever religion) into later years of a hardened self. And none of the religions teaches the 'holiness' of the OTHER religion's 'holy' books - different from their own. SP: That is not the case if you compare the evidence for a flat Earth versus a spherical Earth, for example. JM: *(Watch out: Einstein reopened the scientific allowance for not only
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis: wise words. (I find your Elvis - Jesus parable exaggerated). Values, like ethics or morale is culture related - mostly anti-natural. The natural way of life is eat the prey, animal and/or plant, kick out a competitor from your territory, once the lion killed the weaker male: eat his litter, to protect HIS own genes. We find in 'groups' some 'societal' degeneration for group-survival, which went over to more sophisticated (human?) society as tribal etc. self-defense philosophy. Developmental factors colored that into diverse belief systems (religions etc.) Values are derived from such. Credibility is also a belief-system consequence: who would have believed in 1000AD that all the angels dancing on a pin can be wiped away by a human-made atomic bomb? Or would have Plato believed in a quark? (Not more ridiculous than your stabbing me with Santa). With friendship John - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 6:01 PM Subject: RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief) John, We need to have some sort of system for sorting the wrong beliefs from the less-likely-to-be-wrong ones. This is what science tries to do, although of course it can never arrive at ultimate truth precisely because it has to be open to new evidence should it come along. But we have to have some basic standards for evidence, and if we are honest we should apply that standard consistently. If someone believes that Elvis is alive because lots of people have seen him then, IMHO, that person's standards of evidence are too low. But if someone believes that Jesus rose from the dead because it says in the Bible that people saw him, but not that Elvis is alive, then not only is that person's standards of evidence too low, he is also being inconsistent. If you believe the incredible things it says in one holy book then you have forfeited your reasons for disbelieving all sorts of other incredible things. As for values, once we have ironed out our disagreements on empirical matters on which our values depend, then all we can say is, I think this and you think that: there is no basis for saying one of us is right and the other wrong. Oh, and the atheist/ agnostic thing: are you atheistic or agnostic about Santa Claus? Stathis Papaioannou From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2007 09:19:08 -0500 Interleaving in bold John - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannoumailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.commailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 4:55 AM Subject: RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief) Tom Caylor writes: ---SKIP Stathis Papaioannou: People disagree on lots of things, but they also agree on lots of things, many of which are on the face of it either incredible or unpleasant - because the evidence leaves them no choice. On matters of values and religion, however, they disagree far more frequently. In the case of values this is because they are not actually disgreeing about any empirical or logical fact: --who's empiria and who's logic? Are YOU the ultimate authority?-- they are just saying this is the way I wish to live my life, this is what I hold to be good or important, this is what I would like other people to hold good or important. --Doesn't everybody. including yourself?-- In the case of religion, people disagree because they are selective in the evidence they accept because they want to believe something. --Everybody's prerogative.-- Jews believe that God spoke to Moses, but they don't believe that God spoke to Muhammed. I don't think there is evidence that God spoke to either of them, but if your standards of evidence are much lower than mine --who (else) told you which one is lower? Different, maybe. -- and you accept one, you are being inconsistent if you don't accept the other. That is, if you think the sort of evidence presented in holy books, reports of miracles, religious experience, strength of faith in followers etc. is convincing, then pretty well every religion is equally convincing. --Logical flaw: different religions accept different 'holy' books (their own, that is) you are in the joke when two people meet at the railroad station and one sais: I am making a trip to a distant foreign country and the other sais: me too, so why are we not traveling together? -- That is not the case if you compare the evidence for a flat Earth versus a spherical Earth, for example. (Watch out: Einstein reopened the scientific allowance for not only a heliocentric, but a geocentric world with his NO preference
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
John M wrote: Stathis: wise words. (I find your Elvis - Jesus parable exaggerated). Values, like ethics or morale is culture related - mostly anti-natural. There are no cultures in which people do not love their children, cooperate with relatives, seek both security and stimulation. The natural way of life is eat the prey, animal and/or plant, kick out a competitor from your territory, once the lion killed the weaker male: eat his litter, to protect HIS own genes. What's natural for lions isn't natural for wolves or dolphins or humans. We find in 'groups' some 'societal' degeneration for group-survival, which went over to more sophisticated (human?) society as tribal etc. self-defense philosophy. Developmental factors colored that into diverse belief systems (religions etc.) Values are derived from such. Values existed longer before humans. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Jone Mikes writes: Stathis: wise words. (I find your Elvis - Jesus parable exaggerated). Not really: the people who claim they saw Elvis after his alleged death are more numerous and more credible than the second-hand (at best) Biblical accounts of Jesus being sighted after his crucifixion. When I have put this to Christians they answer that Elvis did not claim to be God etc. Well, if he had done, would that make a difference? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
John M wrote: Interleaving in* bold* John - Original Message - *From:* Stathis Papaioannou mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] *To:* everything-list@googlegroups.com mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com *Sent:* Monday, January 08, 2007 4:55 AM *Subject:* RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief) Tom Caylor writes: ---SKIP Stathis Papaioannou: People disagree on lots of things, but they also agree on lots of things, many of which are on the face of it either incredible or unpleasant - because the /_evidence_ /leaves them no choice. On matters of values and religion, however, they disagree far more frequently. In the case of values this is because they are not actually disgreeing about any empirical or logical fact: --*who's empiria and who's logic? Are YOU the ultimate authority?--* they are just saying this is the way I wish to live my life, this is what I hold to be good or important, this is what I would like other people to hold good or important. --*Doesn't everybody. including yourself?--* In the case of religion, people disagree because they are selective in the evidence they accept because they want to believe something. --*Everybody's prerogative.--* I'm not so sure. Of course it is everyone's *political* right to base their beliefs on selective evidence - the institutions of government in liberal Western democracies recognize autonomy of thought. But isn't there an ethical duty base one's beliefs on all, or at least an unbiased sample, of the available evidence? If you don't rationally base your decisions that affect society, then I'd say you are a bad citizen - just as a person who sells his vote is a bad citizen. I think we are too tolerant of religious irrationality; in a way that we do not tolerate irrationality in any other field. Historically this is because we want to allow freedom of conscious; we mistrust government to enforce right thought. But just because we want to protect personal beliefs it doesn't follow that we should be tolerant of those beliefs when they are presented as a basis for public action. Jews believe that God spoke to Moses, but they don't believe that God spoke to Muhammed. I don't think there is evidence that God spoke to either of them, but if your standards of evidence are much lower than mine --*who (else) told you which one is lower? Different, maybe. --* and you accept one, you are being inconsistent if you don't accept the other. That is, if you think the sort of evidence presented in holy books, reports of miracles, religious experience, strength of faith in followers etc. is convincing, then pretty well every religion is equally convincing. --*Logical flaw: different religions accept different 'holy' books (their own, that is) you are in the joke when two people meet at the railroad station and one sais: I am making a trip to a distant foreign country and the other sais: me too, so why are we not traveling together? --* Your seem to imply that religions and their different teachings are just personal choices - like where to go on vacation. But in fact each one teaches that their holy books are objectively true and the values in those books (as interpreted by the appropriate religious authorities) are not subjective, but are mandated by god(s) for everyone. That is not the case if you compare the evidence for a flat Earth versus a spherical Earth, for example. *(Watch out: Einstein reopened the scientific allowance for not only a heliocentric, but a geocentric world with his NO preference in a relative world (math would be complicated)* But Einstein didn't allow for a flat Earth. As for the Problem of Evil, that's easy: there is no evidence that there is a God; if there is a God, there is no evidence that he cares what happens to us; if he does care what happens to us there is no evidence that he intervenes in our lives; if he does intervene there is no evidence that things are any better than they would be if he didn't intervene. --*Again, you consider YOUR evidence in YOUR logic. You have the right to do so, but so has a religious person to his own ways. * *I am not an atheist, because an a-theist needs a god (theos) ** to deny and in my belief system (based on those natural sciences I was brainwashed into at college) I do not condone IN NATURE any SUPERNATURAL ideas. I just wondered why the 'god-designers' made their idol(s) with all those human fallibilities (vain, seek adoration, pick favorites, no criticism allowed, are vengeful, irate, not impartial, influenceable, cruel, punishing even unjustly (punishing for things by creational flaws etc.) **and assigning this world
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 08-janv.-07, à 05:36, Tom Caylor a écrit : Do you recognize the problem of evil, and if so, what do you believe is the solution? Do you think that the MWI is the key to the solution? What or who is Jesus in the MWI? Is Jesus described by a quantum wave function? If yes, did God send his Son in all parallel worlds? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Interleaving in bold John - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 4:55 AM Subject: RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief) Tom Caylor writes: ---SKIP Stathis Papaioannou: People disagree on lots of things, but they also agree on lots of things, many of which are on the face of it either incredible or unpleasant - because the evidence leaves them no choice. On matters of values and religion, however, they disagree far more frequently. In the case of values this is because they are not actually disgreeing about any empirical or logical fact: --who's empiria and who's logic? Are YOU the ultimate authority?-- they are just saying this is the way I wish to live my life, this is what I hold to be good or important, this is what I would like other people to hold good or important. --Doesn't everybody. including yourself?-- In the case of religion, people disagree because they are selective in the evidence they accept because they want to believe something. --Everybody's prerogative.-- Jews believe that God spoke to Moses, but they don't believe that God spoke to Muhammed. I don't think there is evidence that God spoke to either of them, but if your standards of evidence are much lower than mine --who (else) told you which one is lower? Different, maybe. -- and you accept one, you are being inconsistent if you don't accept the other. That is, if you think the sort of evidence presented in holy books, reports of miracles, religious experience, strength of faith in followers etc. is convincing, then pretty well every religion is equally convincing. --Logical flaw: different religions accept different 'holy' books (their own, that is) you are in the joke when two people meet at the railroad station and one sais: I am making a trip to a distant foreign country and the other sais: me too, so why are we not traveling together? -- That is not the case if you compare the evidence for a flat Earth versus a spherical Earth, for example. (Watch out: Einstein reopened the scientific allowance for not only a heliocentric, but a geocentric world with his NO preference in a relative world (math would be complicated) As for the Problem of Evil, that's easy: there is no evidence that there is a God; if there is a God, there is no evidence that he cares what happens to us; if he does care what happens to us there is no evidence that he intervenes in our lives; if he does intervene there is no evidence that things are any better than they would be if he didn't intervene. --Again, you consider YOUR evidence in YOUR logic. You have the right to do so, but so has a religious person to his own ways. I am not an atheist, because an a-theist needs a god (theos) to deny and in my belief system (based on those natural sciences I was brainwashed into at college) I do not condone IN NATURE any SUPERNATURAL ideas. I just wondered why the 'god-designers' made their idol(s) with all those human fallibilities (vain, seek adoration, pick favorites, no criticism allowed, are vengeful, irate, not impartial, influenceable, cruel, punishing even unjustly (punishing for things by creational flaws etc.) and assigning this world to a creator with such flaws... And yes, I am an agnostic, because I am not convinced about the superiority of MY ideas over the ideas of others. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.410 / Virus Database: 268.16.7/619 - Release Date: 1/7/2007 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
John, We need to have some sort of system for sorting the wrong beliefs from the less-likely-to-be-wrong ones. This is what science tries to do, although of course it can never arrive at ultimate truth precisely because it has to be open to new evidence should it come along. But we have to have some basic standards for evidence, and if we are honest we should apply that standard consistently. If someone believes that Elvis is alive because lots of people have seen him then, IMHO, that person's standards of evidence are too low. But if someone believes that Jesus rose from the dead because it says in the Bible that people saw him, but not that Elvis is alive, then not only is that person's standards of evidence too low, he is also being inconsistent. If you believe the incredible things it says in one holy book then you have forfeited your reasons for disbelieving all sorts of other incredible things. As for values, once we have ironed out our disagreements on empirical matters on which our values depend, then all we can say is, I think this and you think that: there is no basis for saying one of us is right and the other wrong. Oh, and the atheist/ agnostic thing: are you atheistic or agnostic about Santa Claus? Stathis Papaioannou From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief) Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2007 09:19:08 -0500 Interleaving in bold John - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannoumailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.commailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, January 08, 2007 4:55 AM Subject: RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief) Tom Caylor writes: ---SKIP Stathis Papaioannou: People disagree on lots of things, but they also agree on lots of things, many of which are on the face of it either incredible or unpleasant - because the evidence leaves them no choice. On matters of values and religion, however, they disagree far more frequently. In the case of values this is because they are not actually disgreeing about any empirical or logical fact: --who's empiria and who's logic? Are YOU the ultimate authority?-- they are just saying this is the way I wish to live my life, this is what I hold to be good or important, this is what I would like other people to hold good or important. --Doesn't everybody. including yourself?-- In the case of religion, people disagree because they are selective in the evidence they accept because they want to believe something. --Everybody's prerogative.-- Jews believe that God spoke to Moses, but they don't believe that God spoke to Muhammed. I don't think there is evidence that God spoke to either of them, but if your standards of evidence are much lower than mine --who (else) told you which one is lower? Different, maybe. -- and you accept one, you are being inconsistent if you don't accept the other. That is, if you think the sort of evidence presented in holy books, reports of miracles, religious experience, strength of faith in followers etc. is convincing, then pretty well every religion is equally convincing. --Logical flaw: different religions accept different 'holy' books (their own, that is) you are in the joke when two people meet at the railroad station and one sais: I am making a trip to a distant foreign country and the other sais: me too, so why are we not traveling together? -- That is not the case if you compare the evidence for a flat Earth versus a spherical Earth, for example. (Watch out: Einstein reopened the scientific allowance for not only a heliocentric, but a geocentric world with his NO preference in a relative world (math would be complicated) As for the Problem of Evil, that's easy: there is no evidence that there is a God; if there is a God, there is no evidence that he cares what happens to us; if he does care what happens to us there is no evidence that he intervenes in our lives; if he does intervene there is no evidence that things are any better than they would be if he didn't intervene. --Again, you consider YOUR evidence in YOUR logic. You have the right to do so, but so has a religious person to his own ways. I am not an atheist, because an a-theist needs a god (theos) to deny and in my belief system (based on those natural sciences I was brainwashed into at college) I do not condone IN NATURE any SUPERNATURAL ideas. I just wondered why the 'god-designers' made their idol(s) with all those human fallibilities (vain, seek adoration, pick favorites, no criticism allowed, are vengeful, irate, not impartial, influenceable, cruel, punishing even unjustly (punishing for things by creational flaws etc.) and assigning this world to a creator with such flaws... And yes, I am an agnostic, because I am not convinced about the superiority of MY ideas over the ideas of others. Stathis Papaioannou
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Tom Caylor writes: So you believe that the Qur'an is the literal word of God? What I was hoping is that you would say Muhammed was deluded or lying, so that the Qur'an is at best an impressive piece of literature with some interesting moral teachings: i.e., what atheists say about the Bible. Stathis Papioannou No, I was just answering your question. I'm going out on a limb (not referring to Shirley McLane ;) but I think that the belief in Islam about the Qur'an is that it fulfills the role of the 2nd/3rd hypostates, instead of the person of Jesus. It is eternal and spans the infinite gap between God and man. For the Christian, Jesus fulfills this role. (Also, Jesus, being a person, solves the problem of the infinite relationship gap between us and God in a from-God-to-us direction rather than the from-us-to-God direction of good works. Good works are only finite.) So as I see it the Christian has a different belief about the Bible than does the Muslim about the Qur'an. There are plenty of good sources about the Christian's belief about the Bible, and evidence to support those beliefs, so I don't want to get into a long discussion about it on this List. I'll just say that I believe that a non-Christian can read the Bible, and about the Bible, to try to find out something in a rational way, just like reading any other book. Sure, the Bible contains some historical facts, some moral teachings, some great literature, as does the Qur'an. But there are literal conflicts between the Bible and the Qur'an, eg. Muslims believe that Jesus was just another prophet, not God in human form [if that concept is even coherent], while Christians do not believe that Muhammed actually took dictation from God. But in terms of empirical evidence, general plausibility, or even strength of conviction in believers, there isn't much to choose between the two faiths. Why do Christians and Muslims agree on certain incredible-sounding things of which they generally have no direct experience, such as the Earth being spherical, but strongly disagree on other things such as the status of Jesus and whether he really rose from the dead? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor writes: So you believe that the Qur'an is the literal word of God? What I was hoping is that you would say Muhammed was deluded or lying, so that the Qur'an is at best an impressive piece of literature with some interesting moral teachings: i.e., what atheists say about the Bible. Stathis Papioannou No, I was just answering your question. I'm going out on a limb (not referring to Shirley McLane ;) but I think that the belief in Islam about the Qur'an is that it fulfills the role of the 2nd/3rd hypostates, instead of the person of Jesus. It is eternal and spans the infinite gap between God and man. For the Christian, Jesus fulfills this role. (Also, Jesus, being a person, solves the problem of the infinite relationship gap between us and God in a from-God-to-us direction rather than the from-us-to-God direction of good works. Good works are only finite.) So as I see it the Christian has a different belief about the Bible than does the Muslim about the Qur'an. There are plenty of good sources about the Christian's belief about the Bible, and evidence to support those beliefs, so I don't want to get into a long discussion about it on this List. I'll just say that I believe that a non-Christian can read the Bible, and about the Bible, to try to find out something in a rational way, just like reading any other book. Sure, the Bible contains some historical facts, some moral teachings, some great literature, as does the Qur'an. But there are literal conflicts between the Bible and the Qur'an, eg. Muslims believe that Jesus was just another prophet, not God in human form [if that concept is even coherent], while Christians do not believe that Muhammed actually took dictation from God. But in terms of empirical evidence, general plausibility, or even strength of conviction in believers, there isn't much to choose between the two faiths. Why do Christians and Muslims agree on certain incredible-sounding things of which they generally have no direct experience, such as the Earth being spherical, but strongly disagree on other things such as the status of Jesus and whether he really rose from the dead? Stathis Papaioannou People disagree on lots of things, especially if it touches on ultimate questions, for instance as I mentioned about the Christians' belief that Jesus is the solution to the problem of evil (from-God-to-us) and Muslims' (and all other belief systems that recognize the problem of evil) belief that the solution depends on our good works (or something similar, from-us-to-God/Good). Do you recognize the problem of evil, and if so, what do you believe is the solution? Do you think that the MWI is the key to the solution? Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
Tom Caylor wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor writes: So you believe that the Qur'an is the literal word of God? What I was hoping is that you would say Muhammed was deluded or lying, so that the Qur'an is at best an impressive piece of literature with some interesting moral teachings: i.e., what atheists say about the Bible. Stathis Papioannou No, I was just answering your question. I'm going out on a limb (not referring to Shirley McLane ;) but I think that the belief in Islam about the Qur'an is that it fulfills the role of the 2nd/3rd hypostates, instead of the person of Jesus. It is eternal and spans the infinite gap between God and man. For the Christian, Jesus fulfills this role. (Also, Jesus, being a person, solves the problem of the infinite relationship gap between us and God in a from-God-to-us direction rather than the from-us-to-God direction of good works. Good works are only finite.) So as I see it the Christian has a different belief about the Bible than does the Muslim about the Qur'an. There are plenty of good sources about the Christian's belief about the Bible, and evidence to support those beliefs, so I don't want to get into a long discussion about it on this List. I'll just say that I believe that a non-Christian can read the Bible, and about the Bible, to try to find out something in a rational way, just like reading any other book. Sure, the Bible contains some historical facts, some moral teachings, some great literature, as does the Qur'an. But there are literal conflicts between the Bible and the Qur'an, eg. Muslims believe that Jesus was just another prophet, not God in human form [if that concept is even coherent], while Christians do not believe that Muhammed actually took dictation from God. But in terms of empirical evidence, general plausibility, or even strength of conviction in believers, there isn't much to choose between the two faiths. Why do Christians and Muslims agree on certain incredible-sounding things of which they generally have no direct experience, such as the Earth being spherical, but strongly disagree on other things such as the status of Jesus and whether he really rose from the dead? Stathis Papaioannou People disagree on lots of things, especially if it touches on ultimate questions, for instance as I mentioned about the Christians' belief that Jesus is the solution to the problem of evil (from-God-to-us) and Muslims' (and all other belief systems that recognize the problem of evil) belief that the solution depends on our good works (or something similar, from-us-to-God/Good). Do you recognize the problem of evil, and if so, what do you believe is the solution? Do you think that the MWI is the key to the solution? Tom The problem of evil is the contradiction between the theory that there is an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God and the observed fact that there is great suffering and evil in the world. The obvious solution is that the putative existence of the the tri-omni God is false. I don't see how Jesus or good works are even relevant to this problem. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us and who we really are meant to be. Since we were made in the image of the personal God, then with the G(Logos) we can be brought into relationship with Him again. This is the core to the solution of evil. Now this does not automatically imply that evil is immediately solved down in the 5th through 8th hypostases, i.e. the concrete problem of evil. But the solution to evil must first start at the level of our human persons. I want to correct myself when I said the solution to evil must first start at the level of our human persons. It starts with the personal God. I was just saying that personal redemption/healing comes before physical redemption/healing. Romans 8 actually addresses this matter too in verses 18-22. Tom What does the Qur'an say about the matter? After all, every word in that document was written down precisely as dictated by God in the original Arabic, and it is more recent than the Old or New Testament. Stathis Papaioannou This is sort of a contingent question for this List, since you could look it up for yourself if you really wanted to know. Tom Sura 14:48 The day will come when this earth will be substituted with a new earth, and also the heavens, and everyone will be brought before GOD, the One, the Supreme. So you believe that the Qur'an is the literal word of God? What I was hoping is that you would say Muhammed was deluded or lying, so that the Qur'an is at best an impressive piece of literature with some interesting moral teachings: i.e., what atheists say about the Bible. Stathis Papioannou No, I was just answering your question. I'm going out on a limb (not referring to Shirley McLane ;) but I think that the belief in Islam about the Qur'an is that it fulfills the role of the 2nd/3rd hypostates, instead of the person of Jesus. It is eternal and spans the infinite gap between God and man. For the Christian, Jesus fulfills this role. (Also, Jesus, being a person, solves the problem of the infinite relationship gap between us and God in a from-God-to-us direction rather than the from-us-to-God direction of good works. Good works are only finite.) So as I see it the Christian has a different belief about the Bible than does the Muslim about the Qur'an. There are plenty of good sources about the Christian's belief about the Bible, and evidence to support those beliefs, so I don't want to get into a long discussion about it on this List. I'll just say that I believe that a non-Christian can read the Bible, and about the Bible, to try to find out something in a rational way, just like reading any other book. Also, not to get into a discussion about the terms atheist vs. agnostic, I'll just say that I'm glad you said atheists because an agnostic would leave it open about whether the Bible really has something to say to us from God. In a way I am agnostic in the sense that I will always doubt, since in this unglorified finite body I will always only see through a glass darkly with respect to my particular current frame of reference a finite piece of the infinite that I have hope/faith in. Just like we always have a little doubt about the findings of science. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. Now, if you accept, if only just for the sake of the argument, the mechanist hypothesis, then you will see there could be an explanation why you feel necessary to postulate such a personal God. But then I must agree this explanation is more coherent with theories/philosophies in which that God is so much *personal* that it looks like the first person canonically associated to the machine. In that case your personal God would be the machine third hypostase or Plotinus universal soul. It is the unameable self (re)defined by Bpp. If we are limiting ourselves to some finite machine or person, say myself, and thus the third hypostase is simply my first person experience, that is not the same as my personal God. However, if we are talking about the largest person possible, then the third hypostase (Bp p) is based on the first hypostase (p) where p is ALL TRUTH. Then if we take the first hypostase to be the impersonal Arithmetic Truth, or any impersonal truth, then the third hypostase based on that (Bp p) seems to be akin to the World Soul of pantheism mentioned my Smullyan in Who Knows? p. 20. I presume this is akin to the universal soul that is sometimes referred to in MWI discussions about all of us belonging ultimately to the same person, since we all eventually have every experience. However, this is not the same as the personal God's Soul, or what I mapped to the Holy Spirit. The third hypostase I referred to in my Christian interpretation of the hypostases was based on the first hypostase corresponding to God the Father, or I am that I am, or Yahweh. (more on naming below) This is the personal God, not an impersonal god. Without a personal God at the top (by definition!) there is no impetus for downward emanation. Numbers don't care about us and our plight with evil! With only numbers or other impersonal things, we are forever stuck with evil. If someone wants to research the historical record sufficiently to convince themselves one way or another about the Bible or Jesus' resurrection, that's great, and I can give them some sources, but it's probably too contingent for this List. Perhaps. The problem is that I just cannot take an expression like Jesus is the Son of God as a scientific proposition. It could be true, it could be false without me seeing a way to resolve it. On the contrary, I can find in the talk by Jesus general pattern which makes sense, and, indeed, 2/3 of Christian theology is probably compatible with the comp hyp. Somehow, any literal interpretation of *any* text (even PA's axioms !) should be considered with systematic suspicion. Notice that I used the word convince themselves rather than proof. (I used proof later on, but that was a mistake when talking with you, because I wasn't using it in the sense of a mathematical logic proof, like an inference from axioms.) The reality of the personal God in His three Persons fulfilling the first four hypostases is obviously greater than any truth that is accessible within the realm of mathematical provability (G) of finite persons or machines. You can see that through your statement that goodness is based on truth, so in a sense the personal God is even bigger than all Arithmetical Truth. This makes sense also from my statement that you need more than truth at the core, but also love and communication. So trying to prove God in some logical inference sense would not only be harder than trying to prove all Arithmetical Truth, it's even a category error since that wouldn't address love and communication. Trying to prove God in this step-by-step way is actually equivalent to trying to become God. Not only will we be forever short of seeing God, but we will be missing the love and communication aspect. So in a sense, putting our hope in just numerical truth is like hoping in only one dimension when more are required. The word convince is meant to convey something akin to convincing ourselves of the truth of Church's Thesis. It is like a machine at level G convincing itself of truth at the G* level. It is like the circumstantial evidence that Smullyan refers to (p. 5). The great thing is this: Say p=(all that the personal God is). Then Bp is the Logos, which has both the divine level, say G*(Logos), and the human level, say G(Logos), so that G(Logos) is the Word that became flesh and dwelt among us, the Son of God. Now let G(Tom) = all of the truth that I can prove. Now of course this is not as big as G(Logos), and probably (I'm sure!) isn't even as big as G(Bruno). However, you can help me to discover areas of G(Tom) that I'm not aware of. In fact, the G(Tom(half asleep)) or the G(Tom(before Bruno helped me)) may not be as big as the G(Tom(awake)) or G(Tom(after Bruno helped me)). So G(Tom(awake)) contains some of G*(Tom(half asleep)) minus G(Tom(half asleep)). (Actually, sometimes it's the inverse where I realize something when I'm half asleep, and then when I wake up I
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Tom Caylor wrote: So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us and who we really are meant to be. Since we were made in the image of the personal God, then with the G(Logos) we can be brought into relationship with Him again. This is the core to the solution of evil. Now this does not automatically imply that evil is immediately solved down in the 5th through 8th hypostases, i.e. the concrete problem of evil. But the solution to evil must first start at the level of our human persons. I want to correct myself when I said the solution to evil must first start at the level of our human persons. It starts with the personal God. I was just saying that personal redemption/healing comes before physical redemption/healing. Romans 8 actually addresses this matter too in verses 18-22. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Tom, It seems you are doing to the arithmetical hypostases what Augustin did to Plotinus's hypostases, including a relation between the three primary hypostases and trinity (criticized by many scholars, note). Roughly speaking, I can agree, except that I cannot put any singular name in a theoretical frame (except for reference on previous work). I must go, and I will elaborate this later. Bruno Le 05-janv.-07, à 10:01, Tom Caylor a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: OK. Now, if you accept, if only just for the sake of the argument, the mechanist hypothesis, then you will see there could be an explanation why you feel necessary to postulate such a personal God. But then I must agree this explanation is more coherent with theories/philosophies in which that God is so much *personal* that it looks like the first person canonically associated to the machine. In that case your personal God would be the machine third hypostase or Plotinus universal soul. It is the unameable self (re)defined by Bpp. If we are limiting ourselves to some finite machine or person, say myself, and thus the third hypostase is simply my first person experience, that is not the same as my personal God. However, if we are talking about the largest person possible, then the third hypostase (Bp p) is based on the first hypostase (p) where p is ALL TRUTH. Then if we take the first hypostase to be the impersonal Arithmetic Truth, or any impersonal truth, then the third hypostase based on that (Bp p) seems to be akin to the World Soul of pantheism mentioned my Smullyan in Who Knows? p. 20. I presume this is akin to the universal soul that is sometimes referred to in MWI discussions about all of us belonging ultimately to the same person, since we all eventually have every experience. However, this is not the same as the personal God's Soul, or what I mapped to the Holy Spirit. The third hypostase I referred to in my Christian interpretation of the hypostases was based on the first hypostase corresponding to God the Father, or I am that I am, or Yahweh. (more on naming below) This is the personal God, not an impersonal god. Without a personal God at the top (by definition!) there is no impetus for downward emanation. Numbers don't care about us and our plight with evil! With only numbers or other impersonal things, we are forever stuck with evil. If someone wants to research the historical record sufficiently to convince themselves one way or another about the Bible or Jesus' resurrection, that's great, and I can give them some sources, but it's probably too contingent for this List. Perhaps. The problem is that I just cannot take an expression like Jesus is the Son of God as a scientific proposition. It could be true, it could be false without me seeing a way to resolve it. On the contrary, I can find in the talk by Jesus general pattern which makes sense, and, indeed, 2/3 of Christian theology is probably compatible with the comp hyp. Somehow, any literal interpretation of *any* text (even PA's axioms !) should be considered with systematic suspicion. Notice that I used the word convince themselves rather than proof. (I used proof later on, but that was a mistake when talking with you, because I wasn't using it in the sense of a mathematical logic proof, like an inference from axioms.) The reality of the personal God in His three Persons fulfilling the first four hypostases is obviously greater than any truth that is accessible within the realm of mathematical provability (G) of finite persons or machines. You can see that through your statement that goodness is based on truth, so in a sense the personal God is even bigger than all Arithmetical Truth. This makes sense also from my statement that you need more than truth at the core, but also love and communication. So trying to prove God in some logical inference sense would not only be harder than trying to prove all Arithmetical Truth, it's even a category error since that wouldn't address love and communication. Trying to prove God in this step-by-step way is actually equivalent to trying to become God. Not only will we be forever short of seeing God, but we will be missing the love and communication aspect. So in a sense, putting our hope in just numerical truth is like hoping in only one dimension when more are required. The word convince is meant to convey something akin to convincing ourselves of the truth of Church's Thesis. It is like a machine at level G convincing itself of truth at the G* level. It is like the circumstantial evidence that Smullyan refers to (p. 5). The great thing is this: Say p=(all that the personal God is). Then Bp is the Logos, which has both the divine level, say G*(Logos), and the human level, say G(Logos), so that G(Logos) is the Word that became flesh and dwelt among us, the Son of God. Now let G(Tom) = all of the truth that I can prove. Now of course this is not as big as G(Logos), and probably
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Tom Caylor wrote: So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us and who we really are meant to be. Since we were made in the image of the personal God, then with the G(Logos) we can be brought into relationship with Him again. This is the core to the solution of evil. Now this does not automatically imply that evil is immediately solved down in the 5th through 8th hypostases, i.e. the concrete problem of evil. But the solution to evil must first start at the level of our human persons. I want to correct myself when I said the solution to evil must first start at the level of our human persons. It starts with the personal God. I was just saying that personal redemption/healing comes before physical redemption/healing. Romans 8 actually addresses this matter too in verses 18-22. Tom What does the Qur'an say about the matter? After all, every word in that document was written down precisely as dictated by God in the original Arabic, and it is more recent than the Old or New Testament. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us and who we really are meant to be. Since we were made in the image of the personal God, then with the G(Logos) we can be brought into relationship with Him again. This is the core to the solution of evil. Now this does not automatically imply that evil is immediately solved down in the 5th through 8th hypostases, i.e. the concrete problem of evil. But the solution to evil must first start at the level of our human persons. I want to correct myself when I said the solution to evil must first start at the level of our human persons. It starts with the personal God. I was just saying that personal redemption/healing comes before physical redemption/healing. Romans 8 actually addresses this matter too in verses 18-22. Tom What does the Qur'an say about the matter? After all, every word in that document was written down precisely as dictated by God in the original Arabic, and it is more recent than the Old or New Testament. Stathis Papaioannou This is sort of a contingent question for this List, since you could look it up for yourself if you really wanted to know. Tom Sura 14:48 The day will come when this earth will be substituted with a new earth, and also the heavens, and everyone will be brought before GOD, the One, the Supreme. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Tom Caylor wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us and who we really are meant to be. Since we were made in the image of the personal God, then with the G(Logos) we can be brought into relationship with Him again. This is the core to the solution of evil. Now this does not automatically imply that evil is immediately solved down in the 5th through 8th hypostases, i.e. the concrete problem of evil. But the solution to evil must first start at the level of our human persons. I want to correct myself when I said the solution to evil must first start at the level of our human persons. It starts with the personal God. I was just saying that personal redemption/healing comes before physical redemption/healing. Romans 8 actually addresses this matter too in verses 18-22. Tom What does the Qur'an say about the matter? After all, every word in that document was written down precisely as dictated by God in the original Arabic, and it is more recent than the Old or New Testament. Stathis Papaioannou This is sort of a contingent question for this List, since you could look it up for yourself if you really wanted to know. Tom Sura 14:48 The day will come when this earth will be substituted with a new earth, and also the heavens, and everyone will be brought before GOD, the One, the Supreme. Stathis, I apologize for my words of irritation. That was wrong. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: So the solution to the problem of evil *starts* with the theological solution, as I said above, the solution to the separation between us and who we really are meant to be. Since we were made in the image of the personal God, then with the G(Logos) we can be brought into relationship with Him again. This is the core to the solution of evil. Now this does not automatically imply that evil is immediately solved down in the 5th through 8th hypostases, i.e. the concrete problem of evil. But the solution to evil must first start at the level of our human persons. I want to correct myself when I said the solution to evil must first start at the level of our human persons. It starts with the personal God. I was just saying that personal redemption/healing comes before physical redemption/healing. Romans 8 actually addresses this matter too in verses 18-22. Tom What does the Qur'an say about the matter? After all, every word in that document was written down precisely as dictated by God in the original Arabic, and it is more recent than the Old or New Testament. Stathis Papaioannou This is sort of a contingent question for this List, since you could look it up for yourself if you really wanted to know. Tom Sura 14:48 The day will come when this earth will be substituted with a new earth, and also the heavens, and everyone will be brought before GOD, the One, the Supreme. So you believe that the Qur'an is the literal word of God? What I was hoping is that you would say Muhammed was deluded or lying, so that the Qur'an is at best an impressive piece of literature with some interesting moral teachings: i.e., what atheists say about the Bible. Stathis Papioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 29-déc.-06, à 16:41, Jef Allbright a écrit : Bruno - It appears that you and I have essential agreement on our higher-level epistemology. It is possible. Note that in general those who appreciates the hypotheses I build on, does not like so much the conclusion, and vice versa, those who like the conclusion does not like the way I got them ... But I don't know much about your comp so I'll begin reading. Comp is the old mechanist philosophy (Question to Milinda, Plato, Descartes, Hobbes) revisited after the creative explosion: the discovery of the universal turing machine and the computer theoretical laws they obey. I propose also a reasoning (the Universal Dovetailer Argument (UDA)) showing that, contrary to a widespread belief (since the closure of Plato Academy in 525 after JC), digital mechanism is epistemologically incompatible with the belief that the mind emerges from some primary substantial matter, but on the contrary the appearances of matter emerges globally from an internal view of the number theoretical reality. The UDA necessitates only a passive understanding of Church thesis. Then I translate UDA in the language of a Universal Machine, and thanks to the work of Post, Markov, Godel, Boolos, Goldblatt, Visser etc. I show constructively how to derive the particular case of certainties on the observation results (= more or less the probability one bearing on our computational extensions) and I have shown that those probability one gives arithmetical interpretation of some quantum logic. I am working now to show why nature look like a *quantum* computer in our immediate accessible neighborhood. I 'm stuck on some mathematical difficulties and the progress are slow. With increasing context of self-awareness, subjective values increasingly resemble principles of the physical universe. Apparently you are even more optimistic than me. I just wish you are correct here. It is fuzzy because the term resemble is fuzzy. Yes, I was writing in broad strokes, just to give you the pattern, but not the detail that has been mentioned earlier. Humanity certainly could be within an evolutionary cul de sac. Yes. snip Since all events are the result of interactions following the laws of the physical universe, Hmmm... It is out of topic, but I don't believe this at all. Better I can show to you that if I (or You) are turing-emulable, then all events, including the apparition and the development of the physical laws are the result of the relation between numbers. For the sake of my argument I might better have said that all interactions seem to follow a consistent set of rules (which we see as the laws of the physical universe. It seems that you have some theory of a more fundamental layer having to do with numbers. Yes. I have many reasons to believe the laws of physics emerges from the laws of numbers. My basic belief in this relies on computer science/ cognitive science and quantum mechanics. But since the last years I got independent evidences for this from knot theory, prime number theory, integer partition theory. What is funny (and still mysterious but less and less when looking in the details) is the presence of the number 24 (or of its divisors) each time a deep relation appears between number theory and physics. I will send an easy illustration soon or later. Happy 2007, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 29-déc.-06, à 10:57, Tom Caylor a écrit : Just to clear this up, my above statement was not meant to be an argument. I purposefully used the word entail rather than imply. I wasn't saying that you cannot believe in some kind of truth without believing in the personal God. However is makes sense *from my perspective* (of belief in the personal God) that you do not have a basis for any truth on which personhood can be based, which *from my perspective* (which I *have* been arguing for in general) needs more than the impersonal core. OK. Now, if you accept, if only just for the sake of the argument, the mechanist hypothesis, then you will see there could be an explanation why you feel necessary to postulate such a personal God. But then I must agree this explanation is more coherent with theories/philosophies in which that God is so much *personal* that it looks like the first person canonically associated to the machine. In that case your personal God would be the machine third hypostase or Plotinus universal soul. It is the unameable self (re)defined by Bpp. The card records facts. To judge them historical is already beyond my competence. Why the bible? Why not the question of king Milinda ? My approach on the Everything List has been to argue for the necessity of the personal God as the ultimate basis for Everything. See just above. If someone wants to research the historical record sufficiently to convince themselves one way or another about the Bible or Jesus' resurrection, that's great, and I can give them some sources, but it's probably too contingent for this List. Perhaps. The problem is that I just cannot take an expression like Jesus is the Son of God as a scientific proposition. It could be true, it could be false without me seeing a way to resolve it. On the contrary, I can find in the talk by Jesus general pattern which makes sense, and, indeed, 2/3 of Christian theology is probably compatible with the comp hyp. Somehow, any literal interpretation of *any* text (even PA's axioms !) should be considered with systematic suspicion. But I do have response to your comment on universal-ness below. snip I agree I was too loose in my use of hypercomputation as an analogy. Actually the direction of the spanning was downward, going from G* (celestial) to G terrestial, described by the Greek work kenosis (emptying). This does not mean that God the Father (the personal fulfillment of the first hypostase), or the Holy Spirit (...second hypostase) discontinued to exist, but that the Logos became flesh and dwelt among us, so that we could see his grace and truth. Again, this does not mean that we cannot believe and seek truth, and have a feeling that we are on the right track, without a relationship with the personal God. This means that the ultimate source of all truth made himself known to us on a human level and solved the problem of evil. Again this can have some symbolic sense. Literaly it is enough I know just one suffering Dog to feel uneasy with the idea that the concrete (not the theological) problem of evil is solved. Death itself is the ultimate effect of evil: separation/isolation from everything and everyone. Jesus proved his divinity by raising *himself* from the dead. A very big advance in modern and serious parapsychology is that humans are easily fooled by humans. How could you say Jesus has proved something? Even if someone appear and can change water in wine and makes miracles etc. I would not take this as a proof. Remember I even think there is just no proofs concerning any reality. Proofs belongs to theories. Facts does not prove. Facts confirms or refute beliefs (theories). For any belief I have I try to figure out if I would have had that belief in completely different context. Jesus or Nagarjuna does not survive such a test. For example I would not have believed in Jesus in the case I would have born in the time of Plato, nor would I believed in Euler would I have born on a different planet, but it make sense that I would have believed in the content of their message. This forces us to make the argument the most universal possible, the less culturally influenced. I am not saying that God's communication is an exhaustive communication of all truth, i.e. all facts (scientific, historic, etc.) that it is possible for us to know. It was a message saying, I am here. I love you. I am your source of meaning. Here is my hand to rescue you from darkness/meaninglessness and death/isolation. Your meaning/relationships are actually, ultimately, based on something: Me. But how could I know if jesus was not refering to the universal me, in which case I can make sense of what he said both relatively to Plato or Plotinus theory and with the comp hyp. If Jesus meant literally himself, then, well I wait someone can even address a theory in which such literal truth can
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Brent Meeker wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy. If there is something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted me to address, just bring it back up. Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 26-d c.-06, 19:54, Tom Caylor a crit : On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 25-d c.-06, 01:13, Tom Caylor a crit : The crux is that he is not symbolic... I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the fact that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to their parents wishful thinking. If you are not sure of any clear meaning of the personal God being the source of everything, including of course truth, this entails not knowing the other things too. Is that not an authoritative argument? What if I ask to my student an exam question like give me an argument why the square root of 3 is irrationnal. Suppose he gives me the correct and convincing usual (mathematical) proof. I could give him a bad note for not adding: and I know that is the truth because truth is a gift by God. Cute, I can directly give bad notes to all my students, and this will give me more time to find a falsity in your way to reason ... Just to clear this up, my above statement was not meant to be an argument. I purposefully used the word entail rather than imply. I wasn't saying that you cannot believe in some kind of truth without believing in the personal God. However is makes sense *from my perspective* (of belief in the personal God) that you do not have a basis for any truth on which personhood can be based, which *from my perspective* (which I *have* been arguing for in general) needs more than the impersonal core. The card records facts. To judge them historical is already beyond my competence. Why the bible? Why not the question of king Milinda ? My approach on the Everything List has been to argue for the necessity of the personal God as the ultimate basis for Everything. If someone wants to research the historical record sufficiently to convince themselves one way or another about the Bible or Jesus' resurrection, that's great, and I can give them some sources, but it's probably too contingent for this List. But I do have response to your comment on universal-ness below. My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and we are left with despair, Speak for yourself. My above statement is in the context of an a long explanation I've put forth in previous posts regarding the conclusions of modern philosophy. I explain below that I am referring to nihilism when I use the word despair. This is not my own fabrication, but comes from the wording used by the modern existentialist philosophers. unless we lie to ourselves against the absence of hope. So are you lying to yourself because otherwise you would despair? Again, this is in the context of what I've said before about reductionism and existentialism. The lie refers to having to act as if (originated with Kant) certain things like free will are real even though we know they are not, in order to avoid nihilism. Again, some examples are of people who maintain a view along these lines are Marvin Minsky (Society of Mind), Steven Pinker (How The Mind Works), Dennett (who holds that language about purpose, intention, feelings does not belong to science, but is indispensable to ordinary discourse), and even eliminative materialists (Searle; Daniel Wegner's The Illusion of Conscious Will) concede that a concept of self remains a convenient fiction that in practice we can't do without. These examples were given in Nancy Pearcey's book Total Truth, although I don't agree with everything she says. Tom Here Stathis already give a genuine comment. You are just admitting your argument is wishful thinking. I was being too poetic ;) By despair I meant nihilism, the belief that there ultimately is no meaning. I am arguing that the ultimate source of meaning has to be personal. I'm just saything that my argument is of the form, If meaning is not ultimately based on the personal God, then there is no true meaning, because... If meaning is personal, and I'm a person, then I create meaning. To postulate a personal God to supply ultimate personal meaning seems otiose. It's like the first-cause argument for God. If God can exist uncaused then why not stop the regress with an uncaused universe - which has the additional advantage of obviously existing. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
Tom Caylor wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy. If there is something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted me to address, just bring it back up. Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 26-d c.-06, 19:54, Tom Caylor a crit : On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 25-d c.-06, 01:13, Tom Caylor a crit : The crux is that he is not symbolic... I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the fact that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to their parents wishful thinking. If you are not sure of any clear meaning of the personal God being the source of everything, including of course truth, this entails not knowing the other things too. Is that not an authoritative argument? What if I ask to my student an exam question like give me an argument why the square root of 3 is irrationnal. Suppose he gives me the correct and convincing usual (mathematical) proof. I could give him a bad note for not adding: and I know that is the truth because truth is a gift by God. Cute, I can directly give bad notes to all my students, and this will give me more time to find a falsity in your way to reason ... Just to clear this up, my above statement was not meant to be an argument. I purposefully used the word entail rather than imply. I wasn't saying that you cannot believe in some kind of truth without believing in the personal God. However is makes sense *from my perspective* (of belief in the personal God) that you do not have a basis for any truth on which personhood can be based, which *from my perspective* (which I *have* been arguing for in general) needs more than the impersonal core. The card records facts. To judge them historical is already beyond my competence. Why the bible? Why not the question of king Milinda ? My approach on the Everything List has been to argue for the necessity of the personal God as the ultimate basis for Everything. If someone wants to research the historical record sufficiently to convince themselves one way or another about the Bible or Jesus' resurrection, that's great, and I can give them some sources, but it's probably too contingent for this List. But I do have response to your comment on universal-ness below. My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and we are left with despair, Speak for yourself. My above statement is in the context of an a long explanation I've put forth in previous posts regarding the conclusions of modern philosophy. I explain below that I am referring to nihilism when I use the word despair. This is not my own fabrication, but comes from the wording used by the modern existentialist philosophers. unless we lie to ourselves against the absence of hope. So are you lying to yourself because otherwise you would despair? Again, this is in the context of what I've said before about reductionism and existentialism. The lie refers to having to act as if (originated with Kant) certain things like free will are real even though we know they are not, in order to avoid nihilism. Again, some examples are of people who maintain a view along these lines are Marvin Minsky (Society of Mind), Steven Pinker (How The Mind Works), Dennett (who holds that language about purpose, intention, feelings does not belong to science, but is indispensable to ordinary discourse), and even eliminative materialists (Searle; Daniel Wegner's The Illusion of Conscious Will) concede that a concept of self remains a convenient fiction that in practice we can't do without. These examples were given in Nancy Pearcey's book Total Truth, although I don't agree with everything she says. But none of those people are nihilists. They just deny that there are values independent of individual's values. And Dennett has defended a compatibilist free will in at least two books. Tom Here Stathis already give a genuine comment. You are just admitting your argument is wishful thinking. I was being too poetic ;) By despair I meant nihilism, the belief that there ultimately is no meaning. But your argument still is an appeal to wishful thinking. I am arguing that the ultimate source of meaning has to be personal. I'm just saything that my argument is of the form, If meaning is not ultimately based on the personal God, then there is no true meaning, because... If meaning is personal, and I'm a person, then I create meaning. To postulate a personal God to supply ultimate personal meaning seems otiose. It's like the first-cause
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 27-déc.-06, à 23:40, Jef Allbright a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:10, Jef Allbright a écrit : All meaning is necessarily within context. OK, but all context could make sense only to some universal meaning. I mean I don't know, it is difficult. But this can be seen in a very consistent way. The significance of an event is proportional to the scope of its effect relative to the values of the observer. I can agree (could depend about the meaning of significance). With increasing context of self-awareness, subjective values increasingly resemble principles of the physical universe. Apparently you are even more optimistic than me. I just wish you are correct here. It is fuzzy because the term resemble is fuzzy. Why? Because making basic choices against the way the universe actually works would be a losing strategy, becoming increasingly obvious with increasing context of awareness. OK. I think I do agree with this from some global context. But machine and nature can make terrible detour and as I said it would be presomptuous from my part to say I am sure life or physical universe are not such a detour. I don't believe this, but I cannot be sure of remnant wishful thinking. Since all events are the result of interactions following the laws of the physical universe, Hmmm... It is out of topic, but I don't believe this at all. Better I can show to you that if I (or You) are turing-emulable, then all events, including the apparition and the development of the physical laws are the result of the relation between numbers. the difference between events and values decreases with increasing context of awareness, thus the significance, or meaningfulness of events also decreases. Except that by incompleteness the gap remains always infinite. No worry for the disparition of meaningfulness, thus. (Actually this shows that the number question is perhaps less out of topic than I want it to be for the moral threads). With an ultimate, god's eye view of the universe, there would be no meaning at all. Unless that God is personal (cf Tom Caylor), or just deeply inaccessible (cf consequence of comp). Things would simply be as they are. Yes. That is an argument for the zero-person aspect of the big wholeness. I do agree with you on this (but diverge from Tom exactly on this). From the point of view of an agent undergoing long-term development within the universe, its values would increasingly converge on what works, i.e. principles of effective interaction with the physical world, while the expression of those values would become increasingly diverse in a fractal manner, optimizing for robust ongoing growth. A named God hides another One, and a Physical Universe, conceived as an explanation per se is just a Name for a God. I hope and think plausible that we have indeed the power to make what you say largely true, but the devil hides in the details ... Further, there's a great deal of empirical evidence showing that the subjective experience that people report is full of distortions, gaps, fabrications, and confabulations. But this is almost a consequence of the self-referential ability of machine, they can distort their own view, and even themselves. I talk about universal machine *after Godel* (and Post, Turing,.. I'm in interesting in following up on this line of thought given available time. Thanks for telling. No problem. You can find papers in my URL, when you have the time. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Jef Allbright writes: My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms, will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no effect on the physical world. I don't know about no effect on the external world. If the mental supervenes on certain physical processes, that means that without these physical processes there can be no mental, and without the mental there can be no physical processes. It works both ways. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy. If there is something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted me to address, just bring it back up. Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 26-d c.-06, 19:54, Tom Caylor a crit : On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 25-d c.-06, 01:13, Tom Caylor a crit : The crux is that he is not symbolic... I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the fact that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to their parents wishful thinking. If you are not sure of any clear meaning of the personal God being the source of everything, including of course truth, this entails not knowing the other things too. Is that not an authoritative argument? What if I ask to my student an exam question like give me an argument why the square root of 3 is irrationnal. Suppose he gives me the correct and convincing usual (mathematical) proof. I could give him a bad note for not adding: and I know that is the truth because truth is a gift by God. Cute, I can directly give bad notes to all my students, and this will give me more time to find a falsity in your way to reason ... Just to clear this up, my above statement was not meant to be an argument. I purposefully used the word entail rather than imply. I wasn't saying that you cannot believe in some kind of truth without believing in the personal God. However is makes sense *from my perspective* (of belief in the personal God) that you do not have a basis for any truth on which personhood can be based, which *from my perspective* (which I *have* been arguing for in general) needs more than the impersonal core. The card records facts. To judge them historical is already beyond my competence. Why the bible? Why not the question of king Milinda ? My approach on the Everything List has been to argue for the necessity of the personal God as the ultimate basis for Everything. If someone wants to research the historical record sufficiently to convince themselves one way or another about the Bible or Jesus' resurrection, that's great, and I can give them some sources, but it's probably too contingent for this List. But I do have response to your comment on universal-ness below. My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the absence of hope. Here Stathis already give a genuine comment. You are just admitting your argument is wishful thinking. I was being too poetic ;) By despair I meant nihilism, the belief that there ultimately is no meaning. I am arguing that the ultimate source of meaning has to be personal. I'm just saything that my argument is of the form, If meaning is not ultimately based on the personal God, then there is no true meaning, because... By these words I was referring to the John quote from the Bible. The actual fulfillment was Jesus (the Word/Logos). He spanned the infinite gap, like you said above, perhaps analogous to hypercomputation,...all in one step. Note that most notion of hypercomputation does not make it possible to escape the G/G* logics, and when they do escape it, the price is the abandon of personhood. This is a general argument which is independent of the comp hypothesis: to escape the G/G* (and the related hypostases) you have to abandon your self or the person-hood (personal-ness I would like to say). I agree I was too loose in my use of hypercomputation as an analogy. Actually the direction of the spanning was downward, going from G* (celestial) to G terrestial, described by the Greek work kenosis (emptying). This does not mean that God the Father (the personal fulfillment of the first hypostase), or the Holy Spirit (...second hypostase) discontinued to exist, but that the Logos became flesh and dwelt among us, so that we could see his grace and truth. Again, this does not mean that we cannot believe and seek truth, and have a feeling that we are on the right track, without a relationship with the personal God. This means that the ultimate source of all truth made himself known to us on a human level and solved the problem of evil. This is why Jesus was the Word, the Logos. God simply shouting words out of the sky or something would have this problem. This is why I said that the incarnation was primary in God's communication to us. OK, but why not Nagarjuna instead? What is so special about Jesus (beside our culture) ? Death itself is the ultimate effect of evil: separation/isolation from everything and everyone. Jesus proved his divinity by raising *himself* from the dead. For any belief I have
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Tom Caylor writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): [TC] My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the absence of hope. [BM] Here Stathis already give a genuine comment. You are just admitting your argument is wishful thinking. [TC] I was being too poetic ;) By despair I meant nihilism, the belief that there ultimately is no meaning. I am arguing that the ultimate source of meaning has to be personal. I'm just saything that my argument is of the form, If meaning is not ultimately based on the personal God, then there is no true meaning, because... I realised when I was about 12 or 13 years old that there could not be any ultimate meaning. I was very pleased and excited with this discovery, and ran around trying to explain it to people (mostly drawing blank looks, as I remember). It seemed to me just another interesting fact about the world, like scientific and historical facts. It inspired me to start reading philosophy, looking up words like nihilism in the local library. It also encouraged me to question rules, laws and moral edicts handed down with no justification other than tradition or authority, where these were in conflict with my own developing value system. Overall, I think the realisation that there was no ultimate meaning was one of the more positive experiences in my life. But even if it hadn't been, and threw me into a deep depression, does that have any bearing on whether or not it is true? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Hi Jef, Please, don't hesitate to skip the remarks you could find a bit too technical, but which could help others who know perhaps a bit more on G and G*, which are theories which I use to tackle many questions in this list. You can come back on those remarks if ever you got time and motivation to do so. Le 28-déc.-06, à 21:14, Jef Allbright a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective. Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought: Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid. We now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any subjective construct. When we are aware that there is fundamental bias, it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting everything. All this makes sense to me. I can interpret your terms in the (post-godelian) mechanist theory of mind/matter. The bias is given by our body itself, or our godel number or any correct 3-person description of ourselves (like the artificial digital body proposed by the digital computationalist doctor). When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is classically thought, ... before Godel Co. Classical philosophy is different before and after Turing, Post, Church, Godel, Markov, Uspenski, Kolmogorov, etc. but at some indistinct offset determined by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment. Here there is a technical problem because there is just no real environment; but it could be easily resolved by replacing real environment by relatively most probable computational histories. This is more coherent with both the comp hyp and quantum mechanics. Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual identities leading to meaningless absolutes. I am not sure which meaningless absolutes you refer too. In the comp theory many simple truth can be considered as absolute and indeed communicably so (like arithmetical truth, piece of set theoretical truth, ...). Also the first person (which admit some precise definition) is related to some absolutes. This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the idea of a subjective center. Hmmm here I think you are a bit quick. But I have no problem with many philosophical paradoxes, although the theory solves them with different degree of quality. Free-will is due in part to the availability, for enough rich universal machine, of its ignorance space. Somehow I am free to choose going to the movie or to the theater because ... I don't know what I want Once I know what I want, I remain free in the sense of being self-determinate about my (future) action. For the modalist: The 3-description of that difference space is given by G* (truth about the self-referential ability of the machine) and G (what the machine can prove about its self-referential ability). But G* minus G admit modal variants, so that the ignorance space, like the whole of arithmetical truth differentiates with the change of point of view. This indeed shed light on many paradoxes (and, BTW, can also be used to show invalid many reasonings in cognitive computer science). If you want (like David and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute (but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt on any content of that consciousness, but that is different. We can doubt having been conscious in some past, but we cannot doubt being conscious here and now, whatever that means. ... The truth here bears on the existence of the experience, and has nothing to do with anything which could be reported by the experiencer. On this basis I understand your point, and as long as we are very careful about conveying which particular meaning of knowing, certainty, and truth we are referring to, then there will be little confusion. OK. But such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self, from which there's no objective (and thus workable) basis for any claim. Here I disagree. The only risk I see, is the confusion between the 3-self
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 28-déc.-06, à 21:54, Brent Meeker a écrit : (to Jef) I think objective should just be understood as denoting subjective agreement from different viewpoints. Curiosuly enough perhaps I could agree if you were saying physically objective can be understood as denoting subjective agreement. But frankly I do not believe that 17 is prime depends on any agreement between different viewpoints (but the definition of 17 and prime of course). But about physics I agree. And I know that you know how Vic Stenger extracts a big deal of physics from invariance for change of referential systems. I'd say experience is always direct, an adjective which really adds nothing. An experience just is. If it has to be interpreted *then* you've fallen into an infinite regress: who experiences the interpretation. I can understand why 1-experience seems direct, but I am not sure this really make sense. As I said to Jef, infinite regression in computer science can be solved. To call it an illusion goes too far. I'd say the self is a model or an abstract construct - but it models something, it has predictive power. If you start to call things like that illusions then everything is an illusion and the word has lost its meaning. OK. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno - It appears that you and I have essential agreement on our higher-level epistemology. But I don't know much about your comp so I'll begin reading. - Jef Bruno Marchal wrote: With increasing context of self-awareness, subjective values increasingly resemble principles of the physical universe. Apparently you are even more optimistic than me. I just wish you are correct here. It is fuzzy because the term resemble is fuzzy. Yes, I was writing in broad strokes, just to give you the pattern, but not the detail that has been mentioned earlier. Humanity certainly could be within an evolutionary cul de sac. snip Since all events are the result of interactions following the laws of the physical universe, Hmmm... It is out of topic, but I don't believe this at all. Better I can show to you that if I (or You) are turing-emulable, then all events, including the apparition and the development of the physical laws are the result of the relation between numbers. For the sake of my argument I might better have said that all interactions seem to follow a consistent set of rules (which we see as the laws of the physical universe. It seems that you have some theory of a more fundamental layer having to do with numbers. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ I'll take a look. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 29-déc.-06, à 10:57, Tom Caylor a écrit : I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy. If there is something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted me to address, just bring it back up. No problem, Tom. In fact I will print your post and read it comfortably at home and comment tomorrow or Monday. Happy New Year! Bruno --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jef Allbright writes: My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms, will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no effect on the physical world. I don't know about no effect on the external world. If the mental supervenes on certain physical processes, that means that without these physical processes there can be no mental, and without the mental there can be no physical processes. It works both ways. But to claim that it works both ways would seem to invalidate the claim of the absolute primacy of the subjective experience. This is a slippery concept, made more difficult due to the evolutionary imperative to protect the Self (at least long enough to successfully propagate the genes), and consequentially reinforced by our language and culture. I've enjoyed your thoughtful and good-natured comments, and at this point, having nothing further to add, I'll step back and try to read and work through Bruno's comp. Best regards, - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I realised when I was about 12 or 13 years old that there could not be any ultimate meaning. I was very pleased and excited with this discovery, and ran around trying to explain it to people (mostly drawing blank looks, as I remember). It seemed to me just another interesting fact about the world, like scientific and historical facts. It inspired me to start reading philosophy, looking up words like nihilism in the local library. It also encouraged me to question rules, laws and moral edicts handed down with no justification other than tradition or authority, where these were in conflict with my own developing value system. Overall, I think the realisation that there was no ultimate meaning was one of the more positive experiences in my life. But even if it hadn't been, and threw me into a deep depression, does that have any bearing on whether or not it is true? It's encouraging when one sees that one is not entirely alone in breaking free of the patterns of popular thought. I came to a similar realization at a similarly young age, and when I tried to share my wonderful and powerful new idea I received not just blank looks, but reactions of concern that I intended to abandon all morality. At that point I learned that I had better not discuss these ideas, but continued to read and think with the belief that while there was no absolute meaning, at least the scientific method could provide explanation. It took me until my early twenties to realize that science was also fundamentlly incomplete. I then had an experience I call passing through the void and coming out the other side seeing that everything is just as before despite lacking any absolute means of support or justification. It was intensly and profoundly liberating. I saw clearly that I could never know any absolutes, but being an inherently subjective being, my subjective awareness was absolutely appropriate. Since then, paradoxes of self, personal identity, free-will and morality became clearly resolved, extending to a theory of collaborative social decision-making that becomes increasingly moral as it promotes converging values over diverging scope. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Thanks Bruno. Much of your terminology at this point escapes me. I do see that a small part of our differences below are simply due to the imprecision of language (and my somewhat sloppy writing.) I also sense that at the core of much of this discussion is the idea that, although we are subjective agents, we do create objective effects within any practical context. If I intend to swat a fly, my sensing of the fly's position is incomplete and contingent and my motor control is subject to error, but I act, and the fly is objectively dead, within any reasonable degree of certainty. I find that the concept of context is essential at all levels and extends in the Godelian sense that we are fundamentally limited to operating within a limited but expanding context. Perhaps your terminology states this more elegantly, I can't tell. Time for me to go do some reading from your site. - Jef Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi Jef, Please, don't hesitate to skip the remarks you could find a bit too technical, but which could help others who know perhaps a bit more on G and G*, which are theories which I use to tackle many questions in this list. You can come back on those remarks if ever you got time and motivation to do so. Le 28-déc.-06, à 21:14, Jef Allbright a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective. Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought: Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid. We now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any subjective construct. When we are aware that there is fundamental bias, it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting everything. All this makes sense to me. I can interpret your terms in the (post-godelian) mechanist theory of mind/matter. The bias is given by our body itself, or our godel number or any correct 3-person description of ourselves (like the artificial digital body proposed by the digital computationalist doctor). When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is classically thought, ... before Godel Co. Classical philosophy is different before and after Turing, Post, Church, Godel, Markov, Uspenski, Kolmogorov, etc. but at some indistinct offset determined by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment. Here there is a technical problem because there is just no real environment; but it could be easily resolved by replacing real environment by relatively most probable computational histories. This is more coherent with both the comp hyp and quantum mechanics. Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual identities leading to meaningless absolutes. I am not sure which meaningless absolutes you refer too. In the comp theory many simple truth can be considered as absolute and indeed communicably so (like arithmetical truth, piece of set theoretical truth, ...). Also the first person (which admit some precise definition) is related to some absolutes. This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the idea of a subjective center. Hmmm here I think you are a bit quick. But I have no problem with many philosophical paradoxes, although the theory solves them with different degree of quality. Free-will is due in part to the availability, for enough rich universal machine, of its ignorance space. Somehow I am free to choose going to the movie or to the theater because ... I don't know what I want Once I know what I want, I remain free in the sense of being self-determinate about my (future) action. For the modalist: The 3-description of that difference space is given by G* (truth about the self-referential ability of the machine) and G (what the machine can prove about its self-referential ability). But G* minus G admit modal variants, so that the ignorance space, like the whole of arithmetical truth differentiates with the change of point of view. This indeed shed light on many paradoxes (and, BTW, can also be used to show invalid many reasonings in cognitive computer science). If you
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jef Allbright writes: My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms, will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no effect on the physical world. Like quarks it's unobservable, but it is in the ontology of a model that has good empirical support. Detection and measure are often indirect. I don't know about no effect on the external world. If the mental supervenes on certain physical processes, that means that without these physical processes there can be no mental, and without the mental there can be no physical processes. It works both ways. Right. Zombies may well be impossible. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Tom Caylor wrote: I tried to address everything but ran out of time/energy. If there is something I deleted from a previous post that I cut out that you wanted me to address, just bring it back up. Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 26-d c.-06, 19:54, Tom Caylor a crit : On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 25-d c.-06, 01:13, Tom Caylor a crit : The crux is that he is not symbolic... I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the fact that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to their parents wishful thinking. If you are not sure of any clear meaning of the personal God being the source of everything, including of course truth, this entails not knowing the other things too. Is that not an authoritative argument? What if I ask to my student an exam question like give me an argument why the square root of 3 is irrationnal. Suppose he gives me the correct and convincing usual (mathematical) proof. I could give him a bad note for not adding: and I know that is the truth because truth is a gift by God. Cute, I can directly give bad notes to all my students, and this will give me more time to find a falsity in your way to reason ... Just to clear this up, my above statement was not meant to be an argument. I purposefully used the word entail rather than imply. I wasn't saying that you cannot believe in some kind of truth without believing in the personal God. However is makes sense *from my perspective* (of belief in the personal God) that you do not have a basis for any truth on which personhood can be based, which *from my perspective* (which I *have* been arguing for in general) needs more than the impersonal core. The card records facts. To judge them historical is already beyond my competence. Why the bible? Why not the question of king Milinda ? My approach on the Everything List has been to argue for the necessity of the personal God as the ultimate basis for Everything. If someone wants to research the historical record sufficiently to convince themselves one way or another about the Bible or Jesus' resurrection, that's great, and I can give them some sources, but it's probably too contingent for this List. But I do have response to your comment on universal-ness below. My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and we are left with despair, Speak for yourself. unless we lie to ourselves against the absence of hope. So are you lying to yourself because otherwise you would despair? Here Stathis already give a genuine comment. You are just admitting your argument is wishful thinking. I was being too poetic ;) By despair I meant nihilism, the belief that there ultimately is no meaning. I am arguing that the ultimate source of meaning has to be personal. I'm just saything that my argument is of the form, If meaning is not ultimately based on the personal God, then there is no true meaning, because... If meaning is personal, and I'm a person, then I create meaning. To postulate a personal God to supply ultimate personal meaning seems otiose. It's like the first-cause argument for God. If God can exist uncaused then why not stop the regress with an uncaused universe - which has the additional advantage of obviously existing. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): [TC] My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the absence of hope. [BM] Here Stathis already give a genuine comment. You are just admitting your argument is wishful thinking. [TC] I was being too poetic ;) By despair I meant nihilism, the belief that there ultimately is no meaning. I am arguing that the ultimate source of meaning has to be personal. I'm just saything that my argument is of the form, If meaning is not ultimately based on the personal God, then there is no true meaning, because... I realised when I was about 12 or 13 years old that there could not be any ultimate meaning. I was very pleased and excited with this discovery, and ran around trying to explain it to people (mostly drawing blank looks, as I remember). It seemed to me just another interesting fact about the world, like scientific and historical facts. It inspired me to start reading philosophy, looking up words like nihilism in the local library. It also encouraged me to question rules, laws and moral edicts handed down with no justification other than tradition or authority, where these were in conflict with my own developing value system. Overall, I think the realisation that there was no ultimate meaning was one of the more positive experiences in my life. But even if it hadn't been, and threw me into a deep depression, does that have any bearing on whether or not it is true? Right! Until you realize there is no ultimate or absolute values you worry that your values might be in conflict with those absolute values. I was nineteen when I realized it - I was old enough to realize that most other people were not going be pleased to hear about my discovery. :-) Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 27-déc.-06, à 20:11, Jef Allbright a écrit : Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jef Allbright writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more. Thanks for the compliments about my writing. I meant that what we should believe does not necessarily have to be the same as what is true, but I think that unless there are special circumstances, it ought to be the case. I agree within the context you intended. My point was that we can never be certain of truth, so we should be careful in our speech and thinking not to imply that such truth is even available to us for the kind of comparisons being discussed here. We can know that some patterns of action work better than others, but the only truth we can assess is always within a specific context. I think we agree. Those context are always theoretical, with a large sense for theory. It could be an explicit theory, like quantum mechanics, ... or an implicit build in belief like our instinctive inference that our neighborhood exists or make sense. This last is a theory, which according to a more explicit one (Darwin) is a many millenia relative (and thus contextual) construct. Brent Meeker made a similar point: if someone is dying of a terminal illness, maybe it is better that he believe he has longer to live than the medical evidence suggests, but that would have to be an example of special circumstances. There are plenty of examples of self-deception providing benefits within the scope of the individual, and leading to increasingly effective models of reality for the group. Here's a recent article on this topic: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/26/science/26lying.html? pagewanted=print Thanks for this interesting reference. In the context of the theory I suggest, it is still an open problem if life itself is a logical descendant of a lie. Actually, although there are evidences to the contrary, even appearance of the physical universe could be a self-deception. This is a stronger statement than the one I am used to say, which is that the primitive character of the physical laws are self-deception (but this is only a consequence of taking the computationalist hypothesis seriously enough and is strictly speaking out of the present topic. If he had said something like our main criterion for what to believe should be what works, what seems to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had made a direct reference to Occam's Razor, I would be comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this point. But I've seen this stumbling block arise so many times and so many places that I'm very curious to learn something of its source. The question of what is the truth is a separate one, but one criterion I would add to those you mention above is that it should come from someone able to put aside his own biases and wishes where these might influence his assessment of the evidence. I agree, but would point out that by definition, one can not actually set aside one's one biases because to do so would require an objective view of oneself. But two observers can agree on some common context, so that some objective view of oneself can be done (although probably not recognize as such ...). So a second observer can, in some situation helps a first one to be less biased. Rather, one can be aware that such biases exist in general, and implement increasingly effective principles (e.g. scientific method) to minimize them. I agree with this. We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever we fancy. Here it's a smaller point, and I agree with the main thrust of the statement, but it leaves a door open for the possibility that we might actually be justifiably certain of the truth in *some* case, and I'm wonder where that open door is intended to lead. I said might because there is one case where I am certain of the truth, which is that I am having the present experience. Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective. If you want (like David and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute (but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt on any
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Brent Meeker writes: It's a strange quality of delusions that psychotic people are even more certain of their truth than non-deluded people are certain of things which have reasonable empirical evidence in their favour. Yet this seems understandable. The psychotic person is believing things because of some physical malfunction in his brain. So it is easy to see how it might be incorrigble. The normal persons is believing things because of perception, hearsay, and logic. But he knows that all of those can be deceptive; and so he is never certain. Sure, it's a defect in the brain chemistry, but the delusional person will give you his reasons for his belief: Someone entered my home while I was out yesterday and shifted a CD from the desk to the coffee table. Is it possible that you moved it yourself and forgot? No, I'm certain I didn't move it myself. Was there any sign of someone breakung in? No, they must have had keys. Had you given anyone the keys? No, but they might have copied them without my knowledge, or maybe they're just good at picking locks. Was anything else taken or disturbed? Not that I could tell, but I can't be certain. Why would anyone do such a strange thing? I agree it's strange, and I have no idea why anyone would go to such lengths to annoy me. There are some crazy people out there, you know! Would anything convince you that you had made a mistake? For example, if you had video evidence showing that nothing strange had happened on the day of the incident? I'm absolutely certain the CD was moved, and I don't believe in ghosts! Someone who went to such lengths to annoy me would probably be able to alter video recordings, so no, that wouldn't convince me I was crazy, as you seem to be implying. This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief. The difference is that these people do not change their way of thinking in response to antipsychotic medication. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
On Fri, 2006-12-29 at 00:37 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Sure, it's a defect in the brain chemistry, but the delusional person will give you his reasons for his belief: [...] This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief. I do wonder how many non-religious beliefs are the same way, i.e., incorrigible in spite of the absence of evidence, or even contrary to evidence, simply because they are convenient or permeate one's surrounding culture. The difference is that these people do not change their way of thinking in response to antipsychotic medication. Which is fascinating to behold, as I have witnessed this very same, in both directions, on many occasions, as patients have gone on and off their medication. They will also go to great lengths to justify their change in belief structure when it's obvious it's the effect of the chemical on their disease process. There is a subtlety to the religious qualification you make above, however. There are indeed religious-oriented delusions which go away on medication, but they tend to be ones that were only acquired through the course of the patient's illness. Those acquired through detailed indoctrination in youth tend to be unaffected, as you mention. -Johnathan --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: ... This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief. The difference is that these people do not change their way of thinking in response to antipsychotic medication. Have you tried it? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
On 12/28/06, Johnathan Corgan [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Fri, 2006-12-29 at 00:37 +1100, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Sure, it's a defect in the brain chemistry, but the delusional person will give you his reasons for his belief: [...] This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief. I do wonder how many non-religious beliefs are the same way, i.e., incorrigible in spite of the absence of evidence, or even contrary to evidence, simply because they are convenient or permeate one's surrounding culture. The difference is that these people do not change their way of thinking in response to antipsychotic medication. Which is fascinating to behold, as I have witnessed this very same, in both directions, on many occasions, as patients have gone on and off their medication. They will also go to great lengths to justify their change in belief structure when it's obvious it's the effect of the chemical on their disease process. There is a subtlety to the religious qualification you make above, however. There are indeed religious-oriented delusions which go away on medication, but they tend to be ones that were only acquired through the course of the patient's illness. Those acquired through detailed indoctrination in youth tend to be unaffected, as you mention. -Johnathan -- to Johnathan's I do wonder how many non-religious beliefs are the same way, i.e., incorrigible in spite of the absence of evidence, or even contrary to evidence, simply because they are convenient or permeate one's surrounding culture. JM: Evidence is tricky. An acceptance may be controlled by personal experience, but also by one's belief system. FOR ANOTHER INDIVIDUALITY (included: belief system) some 'hard evidence' may sound silly, and vice versa in an argument. Convenience is a good point IMO. This is in my opinion the futility of discussions (like this one here) about argumentation between different belief systems. Chemicals work on the strength of connecting parts (polarity change?) and so whatever looked unshakable, seems by those 'chemicals', in the changed connectivity volatile (and vice versa). (Chemicals don't 'make' thoughts - they work on the conveying tools). --~~--~--~--- --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective. Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought: Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid. We now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any subjective construct. When we are aware that there is fundamental bias, it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting everything. When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is classically thought, but at some indistinct offset determined by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment. Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual identities leading to meaningless absolutes. This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the idea of a subjective center. If you want (like David and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute (but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt on any content of that consciousness, but that is different. We can doubt having been conscious in some past, but we cannot doubt being conscious here and now, whatever that means. ... The truth here bears on the existence of the experience, and has nothing to do with anything which could be reported by the experiencer. On this basis I understand your point, and as long as we are very careful about conveying which particular meaning of knowing, certainty, and truth we are referring to, then there will be little confusion. But such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self, from which there's no objective (and thus workable) basis for any claim. My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms, will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no effect on the physical world. It is virtually impossible for many people to see that even IF the 1st person experience actually exists, it can't be described, even by that person, except from a third person perspective. That voice in your own mind, those images in your imagination, none can be said to be experienced without being interpreted. The idea of direct experience is incoherent. It always carries the implication that there's some other process there to have the experience. It's turtles all the way down. The essence of Buddhist training is to accept this non-existence of Self at a deep level. It is very rare, but not impossible to achieve such an understanding, and while still experiencing the illusion, to see it as an illusion, with no actual boundary to distinguish an imagined self from the rest of nature. I think that a machine intelligence, while requiring a model of self, would have no need of this illusion which is a result of our evolutionary development. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Jef Allbright wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective. Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought: Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid. We now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any subjective construct. When we are aware that there is fundamental bias, it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting everything. When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is classically thought, but at some indistinct offset determined by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment. Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual identities leading to meaningless absolutes. That sounds good, but could you give some concrete examples. Talk of bias and offset seems to imply that there really is an absolute center - which I think is a very dubious proposition. This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the idea of a subjective center. If you want (like David and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute (but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt on any content of that consciousness, but that is different. We can doubt having been conscious in some past, but we cannot doubt being conscious here and now, whatever that means. ... The truth here bears on the existence of the experience, and has nothing to do with anything which could be reported by the experiencer. On this basis I understand your point, and as long as we are very careful about conveying which particular meaning of knowing, certainty, and truth we are referring to, then there will be little confusion. But such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self, from which there's no objective (and thus workable) basis for any claim. I think objective should just be understood as denoting subjective agreement from different viewpoints. My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms, will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no effect on the physical world. It is virtually impossible for many people to see that even IF the 1st person experience actually exists, it can't be described, even by that person, except from a third person perspective. That voice in your own mind, those images in your imagination, none can be said to be experienced without being interpreted. The idea of direct experience is incoherent. It always carries the implication that there's some other process there to have the experience. It's turtles all the way down. That sounds like a simple contradiction to me!?? I'd say experience is always direct, an adjective which really adds nothing. An experience just is. If it has to be interpreted *then* you've fallen into an infinite regress: who experiences the interpretation. The essence of Buddhist training is to accept this non-existence of Self at a deep level. It is very rare, but not impossible to achieve such an understanding, and while still experiencing the illusion, to see it as an illusion, with no actual boundary to distinguish an imagined self from the rest of nature. I think that a machine intelligence, while requiring a model of self, would have no need of this illusion which is a result of our evolutionary development. To call it an illusion goes too far. I'd say the self is a model or an abstract construct - but it models something, it has predictive power. If you start to call things like that illusions then everything is an illusion and the word has lost its meaning. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Brent Meeker wrote: Jef Allbright wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective. Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought: Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid. We now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any subjective construct. When we are aware that there is fundamental bias, it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting everything. When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is classically thought, but at some indistinct offset determined by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment. Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual identities leading to meaningless absolutes. That sounds good, but could you give some concrete examples. Talk of bias and offset seems to imply that there really is an absolute center - which I think is a very dubious proposition. I don't know what other examples to give at this point, other than the comparison with the Copernican model. Knowing the actual center of our highly multidimensional basis of thought, even if it were possible, is not necessary--just as we don't need to know our exact physical location in the universe to know that we should no longer build theories around the assumption that we're at the center, with the unique properties that would imply. This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the idea of a subjective center. If you want (like David and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute (but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt on any content of that consciousness, but that is different. We can doubt having been conscious in some past, but we cannot doubt being conscious here and now, whatever that means. ... The truth here bears on the existence of the experience, and has nothing to do with anything which could be reported by the experiencer. On this basis I understand your point, and as long as we are very careful about conveying which particular meaning of knowing, certainty, and truth we are referring to, then there will be little confusion. But such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self, from which there's no objective (and thus workable) basis for any claim. I think objective should just be understood as denoting subjective agreement from different viewpoints. Yes, although we can say that a particular point of view is completely objective within a specified context. For example we can have completely objective proofs in mathematics as long as we agree on the underlying number theory. In our everyday affairs we can never achieve complete objectivity, but I agree with you that multiple points of view, in communication with each other, constitute an intersubjective point of view that increasingly approaches objectivity. My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms, will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no effect on the physical world. It is virtually impossible for many people to see that even IF the 1st person experience actually exists, it can't be described, even by that person, except from a third person perspective. That voice in your own mind, those images in your imagination, none can be said to be experienced without being interpreted. The idea of direct experience is incoherent. It always carries the implication that there's some other process there to have the experience. It's turtles all the way down. That sounds like a simple contradiction to me!?? I'd say experience is always direct, an adjective which really adds nothing. An experience just is. If it has to be interpreted *then* you've fallen into an infinite regress: who experiences the interpretation.
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
Jef Allbright wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: Jef Allbright wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Because we cannot doubt it. It is the real message, imo, of Descartes diagonal argument: it is the fixed point of doubt. If we decide to doubt everything, we will find ourselves, at some stage, doubting we doubt of everything. The same for relativization: we cannot relativize everything without an absolute base on which that relativization is effective. Here is a subtle, and non-traditional thought: Classical philosophy always put the Reasoner at the center of the structure of reasoning. But with our more developed awareness of evolution, evolutionary psychology, cognitive science, it is becoming clearer that this pure Copernican view of reasoning is invalid. We now can see that every Reasoner is embedded within some a priori framework such that there is an intrinsic bias or offset to any subjective construct. When we are aware that there is fundamental bias, it is clear that one can not validly reason to the point of doubting everything. When all that is in doubt is removed, we don't arrive at zero as is classically thought, but at some indistinct offset determined by our very nature as a reasoner embedded in a real environment. Understanding this eliminates the pressure to deal with conceptual identities leading to meaningless absolutes. That sounds good, but could you give some concrete examples. Talk of bias and offset seems to imply that there really is an absolute center - which I think is a very dubious proposition. I don't know what other examples to give at this point, other than the comparison with the Copernican model. Knowing the actual center of our highly multidimensional basis of thought, even if it were possible, is not necessary--just as we don't need to know our exact physical location in the universe to know that we should no longer build theories around the assumption that we're at the center, with the unique properties that would imply. This understanding also helps resolve other philosophical paradoxes such as solipsism, meaning of life, free-will and others hinging on the idea of a subjective center. If you want (like David and George) consciousness is our criteria of absolute (but not 3-communicable) truth. I don't think we can genuinely doubt we are conscious, although we can doubt on any content of that consciousness, but that is different. We can doubt having been conscious in some past, but we cannot doubt being conscious here and now, whatever that means. ... The truth here bears on the existence of the experience, and has nothing to do with anything which could be reported by the experiencer. On this basis I understand your point, and as long as we are very careful about conveying which particular meaning of knowing, certainty, and truth we are referring to, then there will be little confusion. But such dual usage leaves us at risk of our thinking repeatedly falling into the singularity of the self, from which there's no objective (and thus workable) basis for any claim. I think objective should just be understood as denoting subjective agreement from different viewpoints. Yes, although we can say that a particular point of view is completely objective within a specified context. For example we can have completely objective proofs in mathematics as long as we agree on the underlying number theory. In our everyday affairs we can never achieve complete objectivity, but I agree with you that multiple points of view, in communication with each other, constitute an intersubjective point of view that increasingly approaches objectivity. My personal experience is that there's no paradox at all if one is willing to fully accept that within any framework of description there is absolutely no difference at all between a person and a zombie, but even the most philosophically cognizant, being evolved human organisms, will snap back to defending the existence of a 1st person point of view even though it isn't detectable or measurable and has absolutely no effect on the physical world. It is virtually impossible for many people to see that even IF the 1st person experience actually exists, it can't be described, even by that person, except from a third person perspective. That voice in your own mind, those images in your imagination, none can be said to be experienced without being interpreted. The idea of direct experience is incoherent. It always carries the implication that there's some other process there to have the experience. It's turtles all the way down. That sounds like a simple contradiction to me!?? I'd say experience is always direct, an adjective which really adds nothing. An experience just is. If it has to be interpreted *then* you've fallen into an infinite regress: who experiences
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Brent Meeker writes: This is very similar to the arguments of people with religious convictions, who will cite evidence in support of their beliefs up to a point, but it soon becomes clear that no matter how paltry this evidence is shown to be, they will still maintain their belief. The difference is that these people do not change their way of thinking in response to antipsychotic medication. Have you tried it? The local Mental Health Act forbids involuntary treatment of someone for their religious beliefs, but there are grey areas, for example in cases of religious conversion, where the family claims the patient has gone mad but the patient and his new friends insist he is just exercising freedom of worship. I have to admit, in all such cases I can recall the family is correct, even when there are no other obvious signs of mental illness, and the patient continues to deteriorate unless treated. I guess the family pick up on subtle changes in personality in addition to the religious conversion. But where a patient is started on an antipsychotic and has an incidental, long-standing religious (or other odd) belief, the medication seems to make no difference to that belief. Functionally, a (primary) delusion seems to bypass the mechanism whereby we take in empirical evidence, process it logically, and arrive at a conclusion or belief: that is, delusions create a ready-made belief, in the same way as hallucinations create a ready-made perception in the absence of a sensory stimulus. Normally acquired religious beliefs differ in that there is empirical evidence which is logically processed, even if that evidence is that it says so in the Bible and your parents taught you that the Bible doesn't lie. We have drugs for psychosis but there is no drug that stops you being gullible. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Jef Allbright writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would express this belief of his in the form of a tautology. I've observed that he is generally both thoughtful and precise in his writing, so I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more. Thanks for the compliments about my writing. I meant that what we should believe does not necessarily have to be the same as what is true, but I think that unless there are special circumstances, it ought to be the case. Brent Meeker made a similar point: if someone is dying of a terminal illness, maybe it is better that he believe he has longer to live than the medical evidence suggests, but that would have to be an example of special circumstances. If he had said something like our main criterion for what to believe should be what works, what seems to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had made a direct reference to Occams's Razor, I would be comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this point. But I've seen this stumbling block arise so many times and so many places that I'm very curious to learn something of its source. The question of what is the truth is a separate one, but one criterion I would add to those you mention above is that it should come from someone able to put aside his own biases and wishes where these might influence his assessment of the evidence. We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever we fancy. Here it's a smaller point, and I agree with the main thrust of the statement, but it leaves a door open for the possibility that we might actually be justifiably certain of the truth in *some* case, and I'm wonder where that open door is intended to lead. I said might because there is one case where I am certain of the truth, which is that I am having the present experience. Everything else, including the existence of a physical world and my own existence as a being with a past, can be doubted. However, for everyday living this doubt troubles me much less than the possibility that I may be struck by lightning. Stathis Papaioannou --- In response to John Mikes: Yes, I consider my thinking about truth to be pragmatic, within an empirical framework of open-ended possibility. Of course, ultimately this too may be considered a matter of faith, but one with growth that seems to operate in a direction opposite from the faith you express. - Jef _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Tom Caylor writes (in response to Marvin Minsky): Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the existence of freedom of will, is false? That's easy: it's logically impossible. When I make a decision, although I take all the evidence into account, and I know I am more likely to decide one way rather than another due to my past experiences and due to the way my brain works, ultimately I feel that I have the freedom to overcome these factors and decide freely. But neither do I feel that this free decision will be something random: I'm not mentally tossing a coin, but choosing according to my beliefs and values. Do you see the contradiction here? EITHER my decision is determined by my past experiences, acquired beliefs and values etc., OR it is not, and if it is not, it is by definition random and unpredictable. (You can also have random but with a certain weighting according to determined factors, like a weighted roulette wheel, but that is a variation on random.) So my feeling that my free will is nother has to be wrong. Still, I'm very attached to that feeling, just as I'm very attached to certain moral values, and life itself, despite knowing that these are ultimately meaningless. However, the belief in freedom of will seems to be a belief that is rather constant, so there seem to be some beliefs that provide evidence for an invariant reality and truth, not necessarily freedom of will, but something. And I think that looking for ultimate sources would be circular (as you've said on the Atheist List) only if there were no ultimate source that we could find. Do you agree with this statement? Ultimate sources are also a logical impossibility. Suppose we discover that God exists. Well, what's the purpose of God? Where did he get his moral rules and why should we accept them as good? Who made him? Of course, you will answer that the buck stops with God, no-one made him, he is the ultimate good and the ultimate purpose. But you can't just *define* something to stop the circularity because it makes you dizzy. If you could, you may as well just stop at the universe itself, sans God. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Tom Caylor): Dr. Minsky, In your book, Society of Mind, you talk about a belief in freedom of will: The physical world provides no room for freedom of will...That concept is essential to our models of the mental realm. Too much of our psychology is based on it for us to ever give it up. We're virtually forced to maintain that belief, even though we know it's false. Whether it is false depends on what you mean by free will. Dennett argues persuasively in Elbow Room that we have all the freedom of will that matters. Our actions arise out of who we are. If you conceive yourself comprehensively, all your memories, values, knowledge, etc. then you are the author of your action. If you conceive yourself as small enough, you can escape all responsibility. We have the freedom of will that matters, but we don't have the freedom of will that we think we have, namely that we don't have to act according to our biology and environment, and moreover that if we flout these it is not by just choosing to act randomly. That is what I *feel* my freedom consists in, but rationally I know it is impossible. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor writes (in response to Marvin Minsky): Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the existence of freedom of will, is false? That's easy: it's logically impossible. When I make a decision, although I take all the evidence into account, and I know I am more likely to decide one way rather than another due to my past experiences and due to the way my brain works, ultimately I feel that I have the freedom to overcome these factors and decide freely. But neither do I feel that this free decision will be something random: I'm not mentally tossing a coin, but choosing according to my beliefs and values. Do you see the contradiction here? Yes, but it's a contrived contradiction. You have taken free to mean independent of you where you refers to your past experience, the way your brain works, etc. As Dennett says, that's not a free will worth having. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 26-déc.-06, à 23:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single self that maintains beliefs. Is this not a bit self-defeating? It has the form of a belief. Now I can still agree, it depends of the meaning of single self. A more realistic view is that each person is constantly switching among various different ways to think in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep changing their status, etc. In that case I can completely agree. Even by modeling a machine's belief by formal provability Bp by that machine, in the ideal case of the self-referentially correct machine, like Peano Arithmetic, it will follow that the ontically equivalent modalities Bp p, Bp Dp, etc. obeys different logics so that they embodies different epistemological status (and they are easy to confuse). Now, when we are building a (meta)theory of belief we have to stick on some possible sharable belief (in number theory, computer science, perhaps physics: all that will depend on the hypotheses we accept) and build from it. If not we could fall in exaggerated relativism. Accordingly our sets of beliefs can include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending on one's current priorities, etc. OK. I would say that if someone can acknowledge the existence of a conflict between beliefs, then he/she/it does acknowledge implicitly that he/she/it bets on some *self*-consistency. If not he/she/it could just accept its contradictory beliefs without further thoughts. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 27-déc.-06, à 01:52, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever we fancy. This is a key statement. There is a big difference between knowing what truth is, and believing in truth. I am not sure the term belief can make sense for someone who does not believe in (some) truth, quite independently of us knowing what truth is. We hope our belief are true. We even believe that people believe in their belief, and that means believe that their belief are true by default. We would not lie to an old sick person about its health if we were not connecting belief and truth (even wrongly like in such a gentle lie). The very reason why we can (and should!) say that our beliefs are always tentative is that we can guess some truth (or falsity) behind them. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit : Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would express this belief of his in the form of a tautology. I've observed that he is generally both thoughtful and precise in his writing, so I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more. I don't see any tautology in Stathis writing so I guess I miss something. If he had said something like our main criterion for what to believe should be what works, what seems to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had made a direct reference to Occams's Razor, I would be comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this point. This would mean you disagree with Stathis's tautology, but then how could not believe in a tautology? But I've seen this stumbling block arise so many times and so many places that I'm very curious to learn something of its source. From your working criteria I guess you favor a pragmatic notion of belief, but personally I conceive science as a search for knowledge and thus truth (independently of the fact that we can never *know* it as truth, except perhaps in few basic things like I am conscious or I am convinced there is a prime number etc.). To talk like Stathis, this is why science is by itself always tentative. A scientist who says Now we know ... is only a dishonest theologian (or a mathematician in hurry ...). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 26-déc.-06, à 19:54, Tom Caylor a écrit : On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit : The crux is that he is not symbolic... I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the fact that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to their parents wishful thinking. If you are not sure of any clear meaning of the personal God being the source of everything, including of course truth, this entails not knowing the other things too. Is that not an authoritative argument? What if I ask to my student an exam question like give me an argument why the square root of 3 is irrationnal. Suppose he gives me the correct and convincing usual (mathematical) proof. I could give him a bad note for not adding: and I know that is the truth because truth is a gift by God. Cute, I can directly give bad notes to all my students, and this will give me more time to find a falsity in your way to reason ... For a personal God, taking on our form (incarnation), especially if we were made in the image of God in the first place, and showing through miracles, and rising from the dead..., his dual nature (Godman, celestialterrestial, G*G) seems to make a lot more sense than something like a cross in earth orbit. For example, giving a hug is a more personal (and thus a more appropriate) way of expressing love, than giving a card, even though a card is more verifiable in a third person sense, especially after the hug is finished. But we do have the card too: God's written Word, even though this is not sufficient, the incarnate hug was the primary proof, the card was just the historical record of it. The card records facts. To judge them historical is already beyond my competence. Why the bible? Why not the question of king Milinda ? There can be no upward emanation unless/until a sufficient downward emanation is provided. In Christianity, the downward emanation is God loves us, and then the upward emanation is We love God. Plotinus insists a lot on the two ways: downward emanation and upward emanation. The lobian machine theology is coherent with this, even if negatively. It is coherent with Jef idea that pure theological imperatives can only be addressed by adapted story telling and examples, like jurisprudence in the application of laws. But then there is a proviso: none of the stories should be taken literally. I agree with the use of stories. Jesus used stories almost exclusively to communicate. Either the hearers got it or not. But this does not imply that stories are the only form of downward emanation. Of course not. Real stories and personal experiences, and collective experiences and experiments ... All this can help the downward emanation. The incarnation was the primary means. Otherwise, who would have been the story-teller? What good are stories if the story is not teaching you truth? Look, I cannot take for granted even most mathematical theories although their relation with a notion of truth is much more easy than any text in natural language. Stories can be good in giving example of behavior in some situation, or they can help anxious children to sleep. Stories are not written with the idea of truth. The bibles contains many contradiction. And, if really you want take a sacred text as a theory of everything, there is a definite lack of precision. How do we know that the ultimate source of stories is a good source. Jef and Brent and others seem to be basing their truth on really nothing more than pragmatism. Jef perhaps. I am not sure for Brent which seems to admit some form of realism (even physical realism). This is not poetry. Heidegger said to listen to the poet, not to the content, but just to the fact that there is a poet, which gives us hope that there is meaning. However, unfulfilled hope does not provide meaning. Hope is something purely first-personal, if I can say. So I have no clue how hope does not provide meaning. Even little (and fortunately locally fulfillable hope) like hope in a cup of coffee, can provide meaning. Bigger (and hard to express) hopes can provide genuine bigger meaning, it seems to me. I am not opposed to some idea of ultimate meaning although both personal reasons and reflection on lobianity make me doubt that communicating such hopes can make any sense (worse, the communication would most probably betrays the possible meaning of what is attempted to be communicated, and could even lead to the contrary). Even poetry must be based eventually on some meaning. Even minimalism or the Theatre of the Absurd is based on some form to
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit : Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more. I don't see any tautology in Stathis writing so I guess I miss something. Apparently something subtle is happening here. It seems to me that when people say believe, they mean hold true or consider to be true. Therefore, I parse the statement as equivalent to ...criterion for what to hold true should be what is true... I suppose I should have said that the statement is circular, rather than tautological since the verbs are different. If he had said something like our main criterion for what to believe should be what works, what seems to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had made a direct reference to Occam's Razor, I would be comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this point. This would mean you disagree with Stathis's tautology, but then how could not believe in a tautology? If someone states A=A, then there is absolutely no information content, and thus nothing in the statement itself with which to agree or disagree. I can certainly agree with the validity of the form within symbolic logic, but that's a different (larger) context. Similarly, I was not agreeing or disagreeing with the meaning of Stahis' statement, but rather the form which seems to me to contain a piece of circular reasoning, implying perhaps that the structure of the thought was incoherent within a larger context. From your working criteria I guess you favor a pragmatic notion of belief, but personally I conceive science as a search for knowledge and thus truth (independently of the fact that we can never *know* it as truth, Yes, I favor a pragmatic approach to belief, but I distinguish my thinking from that of (capital P) Pragmatists in that I see knowledge (and the knower) as firmly grounded in a reality that can never be fully known but can be approached via an evolutionary process of growth tending toward an increasingly effective model of what works within an expanding scope of interaction within a reality that appears to be effectively open-ended in its potential complexity. Whereas many Pragmatists see progress as fundamentally illusory, I see progress, or growth, as essential to an effective world-view for any intentional agent. except perhaps in few basic things like I am conscious or I am convinced there is a prime number etc.) To talk like Stathis, this is why science is by itself always tentative. A scientist who says Now we know ... is only a dishonest theologian (or a mathematician in hurry ...). I agree with much of your thinking, but I take exception to exceptions (!) such as the ones you mentioned above. All meaning is necessarily within context. The existence of prime numbers is not an exception, but the context is so broad that we tend to think of prime numbers as (almost) fundamentally real, similarly to the existence of gravity, another very deep regularity of our interactions with reality. The statement I am conscious, as usually intended to mean that one can be absolutely certain of one's subjective experience, is not an exception, because it's not even coherent. It has no objective context at all. It mistakenly assumes the existence of an observer somehow in the privileged position of being able to observe itself. Further, there's a great deal of empirical evidence showing that the subjective experience that people report is full of distortions, gaps, fabrications, and confabulations. If instead you mean that you know you are conscious in the same sense that you know other people are conscious, then that is not an exception, but just a reasonable inference, meaningful within quite a large context. If Descartes had said, rather than Je pense, donc je suis, something like I think, therefore *something* exists, then I would agree with him. Cartesian dualism has left western philosophy with a large quagmire into which thinking on consciousness, personal identity, free-will and morality easily and repeatedly get stuck in paradox. Paradox is always a case of insufficient context. In the bigger picture all the pieces must fit. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 26-déc.-06, à 19:54, Tom Caylor a écrit : On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit : The crux is that he is not symbolic... I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the fact that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to their parents wishful thinking. If you are not sure of any clear meaning of the personal God being the source of everything, including of course truth, this entails not knowing the other things too. Is that not an authoritative argument? What if I ask to my student an exam question like give me an argument why the square root of 3 is irrationnal. Suppose he gives me the correct and convincing usual (mathematical) proof. I could give him a bad note for not adding: and I know that is the truth because truth is a gift by God. Cute, I can directly give bad notes to all my students, and this will give me more time to find a falsity in your way to reason ... For a personal God, taking on our form (incarnation), especially if we were made in the image of God in the first place, and showing through miracles, and rising from the dead..., his dual nature (Godman, celestialterrestial, G*G) seems to make a lot more sense than something like a cross in earth orbit. For example, giving a hug is a more personal (and thus a more appropriate) way of expressing love, than giving a card, even though a card is more verifiable in a third person sense, especially after the hug is finished. But we do have the card too: God's written Word, even though this is not sufficient, the incarnate hug was the primary proof, the card was just the historical record of it. The card records facts. To judge them historical is already beyond my competence. Why the bible? Why not the question of king Milinda ? There can be no upward emanation unless/until a sufficient downward emanation is provided. In Christianity, the downward emanation is God loves us, and then the upward emanation is We love God. Plotinus insists a lot on the two ways: downward emanation and upward emanation. The lobian machine theology is coherent with this, even if negatively. It is coherent with Jef idea that pure theological imperatives can only be addressed by adapted story telling and examples, like jurisprudence in the application of laws. But then there is a proviso: none of the stories should be taken literally. I agree with the use of stories. Jesus used stories almost exclusively to communicate. Either the hearers got it or not. But this does not imply that stories are the only form of downward emanation. Of course not. Real stories and personal experiences, and collective experiences and experiments ... All this can help the downward emanation. The incarnation was the primary means. Otherwise, who would have been the story-teller? What good are stories if the story is not teaching you truth? Look, I cannot take for granted even most mathematical theories although their relation with a notion of truth is much more easy than any text in natural language. Stories can be good in giving example of behavior in some situation, or they can help anxious children to sleep. Stories are not written with the idea of truth. The bibles contains many contradiction. And, if really you want take a sacred text as a theory of everything, there is a definite lack of precision. How do we know that the ultimate source of stories is a good source. Jef and Brent and others seem to be basing their truth on really nothing more than pragmatism. Jef perhaps. I am not sure for Brent which seems to admit some form of realism (even physical realism). I do infer from experience that there is some reality. Sometime ago, Bruno wrote: Hence a Reality, yes. But not necessarily a physical reality. Here is the logical dependence: NUMBERS - MACHINE DREAMS - PHYSICAL - HUMANS - PHYSICS - NUMBERS. Maybe my interpretation of this is different than Bruno's, but I take it to mean our explanations can start anywhere in this loop and work all the way around. So numbers can be explained in terms of physics (c.f. William S. Cooper) and physical reality can be explained in terms of numbers (c.f. Bruno Marchal?). These explanations are all models, representations we create. They are tested against experience, so they are not arbitrary. They must be logical since otherwise self-contradiction will render them ambiguous. Whether any these, or which one, is really real is, I think, a meaningless question. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jef Allbright writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more. Thanks for the compliments about my writing. I meant that what we should believe does not necessarily have to be the same as what is true, but I think that unless there are special circumstances, it ought to be the case. I agree within the context you intended. My point was that we can never be certain of truth, so we should be careful in our speech and thinking not to imply that such truth is even available to us for the kind of comparisons being discussed here. We can know that some patterns of action work better than others, but the only truth we can assess is always within a specific context. Brent Meeker made a similar point: if someone is dying of a terminal illness, maybe it is better that he believe he has longer to live than the medical evidence suggests, but that would have to be an example of special circumstances. There are plenty of examples of self-deception providing benefits within the scope of the individual, and leading to increasingly effective models of reality for the group. Here's a recent article on this topic: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/26/science/26lying.html?pagewanted=print If he had said something like our main criterion for what to believe should be what works, what seems to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had made a direct reference to Occam's Razor, I would be comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this point. But I've seen this stumbling block arise so many times and so many places that I'm very curious to learn something of its source. The question of what is the truth is a separate one, but one criterion I would add to those you mention above is that it should come from someone able to put aside his own biases and wishes where these might influence his assessment of the evidence. I agree, but would point out that by definition, one can not actually set aside one's one biases because to do so would require an objective view of oneself. Rather, one can be aware that such biases exist in general, and implement increasingly effective principles (e.g. scientific method) to minimize them. We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever we fancy. Here it's a smaller point, and I agree with the main thrust of the statement, but it leaves a door open for the possibility that we might actually be justifiably certain of the truth in *some* case, and I'm wonder where that open door is intended to lead. I said might because there is one case where I am certain of the truth, which is that I am having the present experience. Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Further, how can you claim certainty of the truth of subjective experience when there is so much experimental and clinical evidence that self-reported experience consists largely of distortions, gaps, time delays and time out of sequence, fabrications and confabulations? I realize that people can acknowledge all that I've just said, but still claim the validity of their internal experience to be privileged on the basis that only they can judge, but then how can they legitimately contradict themselves a moment later about factual matters, e.g. when the drugs wear off, the probe is removed from their brain, the brain tumor is removed, the mob has dispersed, the hypnotist is finished, the fight is over, the adrenaline rush has subsided, the pain has stopped, the oxytocin flush has declined... What kind of truth could this be? Of course the subjective self is the only one able to report on subjective experience, but how can it *justifiably* claim to be infallible? To be certain of the truth of something implies being able to see it objectively, right? Or does it equally imply no questions asked? - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
Jef Allbright wrote: ... The statement I am conscious, as usually intended to mean that one can be absolutely certain of one's subjective experience, is not an exception, because it's not even coherent. It has no objective context at all. It mistakenly assumes the existence of an observer somehow in the privileged position of being able to observe itself. Further, there's a great deal of empirical evidence showing that the subjective experience that people report is full of distortions, gaps, fabrications, and confabulations. If instead you mean that you know you are conscious in the same sense that you know other people are conscious, then that is not an exception, but just a reasonable inference, meaningful within quite a large context. If Descartes had said, rather than Je pense, donc je suis, something like I think, therefore *something* exists, then I would agree with him. Bertrand Russell wrote that Descartes should only have said, There's thinking. I is an inference. :-) Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Jef Allbright wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jef Allbright writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more. Thanks for the compliments about my writing. I meant that what we should believe does not necessarily have to be the same as what is true, but I think that unless there are special circumstances, it ought to be the case. I agree within the context you intended. My point was that we can never be certain of truth, so we should be careful in our speech and thinking not to imply that such truth is even available to us for the kind of comparisons being discussed here. We can know that some patterns of action work better than others, but the only truth we can assess is always within a specific context. Brent Meeker made a similar point: if someone is dying of a terminal illness, maybe it is better that he believe he has longer to live than the medical evidence suggests, but that would have to be an example of special circumstances. There are plenty of examples of self-deception providing benefits within the scope of the individual, and leading to increasingly effective models of reality for the group. Here's a recent article on this topic: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/26/science/26lying.html?pagewanted=print I read recently that almost everyone overestimates their abilities. The people who most accurately assess themselves are the clinically depressed. Brent Meeker I consider myself an average man, except for the fact that I consider myself an average man. --- Michel de Montaigne --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:10, Jef Allbright a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 27-déc.-06, à 02:46, Jef Allbright a écrit : Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more. I don't see any tautology in Stathis writing so I guess I miss something. Apparently something subtle is happening here. It seems to me that when people say believe, they mean hold true or consider to be true. OK then, and it makes sense which what follows. Our disagreement concerns vocabulary (and perhaps machine). Your notion of pragmatism is coherent with the idea of truth as the intended purpose of belief. Therefore, I parse the statement as equivalent to ...criterion for what to hold true should be what is true... I suppose I should have said that the statement is circular, rather than tautological since the verbs are different. If he had said something like our main criterion for what to believe should be what works, what seems to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had made a direct reference to Occam's Razor, I would be comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this point. This would mean you disagree with Stathis's tautology, but then how could not believe in a tautology? If someone states A=A, then there is absolutely no information content, and thus nothing in the statement itself with which to agree or disagree. I can certainly agree with the validity of the form within symbolic logic, but that's a different (larger) context. Similarly, I was not agreeing or disagreeing with the meaning of Stahis' statement, but rather the form which seems to me to contain a piece of circular reasoning, implying perhaps that the structure of the thought was incoherent within a larger context. From your working criteria I guess you favor a pragmatic notion of belief, but personally I conceive science as a search for knowledge and thus truth (independently of the fact that we can never *know* it as truth, Yes, I favor a pragmatic approach to belief, but I distinguish my thinking from that of (capital P) Pragmatists in that I see knowledge (and the knower) as firmly grounded in a reality that can never be fully known but can be approached via an evolutionary process of growth tending toward an increasingly effective model of what works within an expanding scope of interaction within a reality that appears to be effectively open-ended in its potential complexity. Whereas many Pragmatists see progress as fundamentally illusory, I see progress, or growth, as essential to an effective world-view for any intentional agent. except perhaps in few basic things like I am conscious or I am convinced there is a prime number etc.) To talk like Stathis, this is why science is by itself always tentative. A scientist who says Now we know ... is only a dishonest theologian (or a mathematician in hurry ...). I agree with much of your thinking, but I take exception to exceptions (!) such as the ones you mentioned above. All meaning is necessarily within context. OK, but all context could make sense only to some universal meaning. I mean I don't know, it is difficult. The existence of prime numbers is not an exception, but the context is so broad that we tend to think of prime numbers as (almost) fundamentally real, Well, here I must say I take them as very real ... similarly to the existence of gravity, another very deep regularity of our interactions with reality. I think gravity is a consequence of the prime number (but this is presently out-topic), but ok, gravity is quite important ... The statement I am conscious, as usually intended to mean that one can be absolutely certain of one's subjective experience, is not an exception, because it's not even coherent. It has no objective context at all. It mistakenly assumes the existence of an observer somehow in the privileged position of being able to observe itself. Machine have many self-referential abilities. I can develop or give references (I intend to make some comments on such book later). Further, there's a great deal of empirical evidence showing that the subjective experience that people report is full of distortions, gaps, fabrications, and confabulations. But this is almost a consequence of the self-referential ability of machine, they can distort their own view, and even themselves. I talk about universal machine *after Godel* (and Post, Turing,.. If instead you mean that you know you are conscious in the same sense that you know other people are conscious, then that is not an exception, but just a reasonable inference, meaningful within quite a large context. No. But I confess that when I say I know I am conscious (here and now) I hope you understand it as I assume
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Brent Meeker writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor writes (in response to Marvin Minsky): Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the existence of freedom of will, is false? That's easy: it's logically impossible. When I make a decision, although I take all the evidence into account, and I know I am more likely to decide one way rather than another due to my past experiences and due to the way my brain works, ultimately I feel that I have the freedom to overcome these factors and decide freely. But neither do I feel that this free decision will be something random: I'm not mentally tossing a coin, but choosing according to my beliefs and values. Do you see the contradiction here? Yes, but it's a contrived contradiction. You have taken free to mean independent of you where you refers to your past experience, the way your brain works, etc. As Dennett says, that's not a free will worth having. Indeed, but it's how people often think of free will. It's even how I think of it, without reflecting on its impossibility. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 27-déc.-06, à 19:10, Jef Allbright a écrit : All meaning is necessarily within context. OK, but all context could make sense only to some universal meaning. I mean I don't know, it is difficult. But this can be seen in a very consistent way. The significance of an event is proportional to the scope of its effect relative to the values of the observer. With increasing context of self-awareness, subjective values increasingly resemble principles of the physical universe. Why? Because making basic choices against the way the universe actually works would be a losing strategy, becoming increasingly obvious with increasing context of awareness. Since all events are the result of interactions following the laws of the physical universe, the difference between events and values decreases with increasing context of awareness, thus the significance, or meaningfulness of events also decreases. With an ultimate, god's eye view of the universe, there would be no meaning at all. Things would simply be as they are. From the point of view of an agent undergoing long-term development within the universe, its values would increasingly converge on what works, i.e. principles of effective interaction with the physical world, while the expression of those values would become increasingly diverse in a fractal manner, optimizing for robust ongoing growth. The statement I am conscious, as usually intended to mean that one can be absolutely certain of one's subjective experience, is not an exception, because it's not even coherent. It has no objective context at all. It mistakenly assumes the existence of an observer somehow in the privileged position of being able to observe itself. Machine have many self-referential abilities. I can develop or give references (I intend to make some comments on such book later). Further, there's a great deal of empirical evidence showing that the subjective experience that people report is full of distortions, gaps, fabrications, and confabulations. But this is almost a consequence of the self-referential ability of machine, they can distort their own view, and even themselves. I talk about universal machine *after Godel* (and Post, Turing,.. I'm in interesting in following up on this line of thought given available time. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Jef Allbright writes: I said might because there is one case where I am certain of the truth, which is that I am having the present experience. Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Further, how can you claim certainty of the truth of subjective experience when there is so much experimental and clinical evidence that self-reported experience consists largely of distortions, gaps, time delays and time out of sequence, fabrications and confabulations? I realize that people can acknowledge all that I've just said, but still claim the validity of their internal experience to be privileged on the basis that only they can judge, but then how can they legitimately contradict themselves a moment later about factual matters, e.g. when the drugs wear off, the probe is removed from their brain, the brain tumor is removed, the mob has dispersed, the hypnotist is finished, the fight is over, the adrenaline rush has subsided, the pain has stopped, the oxytocin flush has declined... What kind of truth could this be? Of course the subjective self is the only one able to report on subjective experience, but how can it *justifiably* claim to be infallible? I can't be certain that my present subjective state has anything to do with reality. I can't even be certain that having a thought necessitates a thinker (as Bertrand Russell pointed out in considering Descarte's cogito). However, I can be certain that I am having a thought. To be certain of the truth of something implies being able to see it objectively, right? Or does it equally imply no questions asked? It's a strange quality of delusions that psychotic people are even more certain of their truth than non-deluded people are certain of things which have reasonable empirical evidence in their favour. This is also the case with religious beliefs, which the formal psychiatric definition excludes from being called delusions because they are consistent with a particular culture, i.e. the believer did not come up with them on his own. So it would seem that certainty does not always have much to do with objectivity. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jef Allbright writes: I said might because there is one case where I am certain of the truth, which is that I am having the present experience. Although we all share the illusion of a direct and immediate sense of consciousness, on what basis can you claim that it actually is real? Further, how can you claim certainty of the truth of subjective experience when there is so much experimental and clinical evidence that self-reported experience consists largely of distortions, gaps, time delays and time out of sequence, fabrications and confabulations? I realize that people can acknowledge all that I've just said, but still claim the validity of their internal experience to be privileged on the basis that only they can judge, but then how can they legitimately contradict themselves a moment later about factual matters, e.g. when the drugs wear off, the probe is removed from their brain, the brain tumor is removed, the mob has dispersed, the hypnotist is finished, the fight is over, the adrenaline rush has subsided, the pain has stopped, the oxytocin flush has declined... What kind of truth could this be? Of course the subjective self is the only one able to report on subjective experience, but how can it *justifiably* claim to be infallible? I can't be certain that my present subjective state has anything to do with reality. I can't even be certain that having a thought necessitates a thinker (as Bertrand Russell pointed out in considering Descarte's cogito). However, I can be certain that I am having a thought. To be certain of the truth of something implies being able to see it objectively, right? Or does it equally imply no questions asked? It's a strange quality of delusions that psychotic people are even more certain of their truth than non-deluded people are certain of things which have reasonable empirical evidence in their favour. Yet this seems understandable. The psychotic person is believing things because of some physical malfunction in his brain. So it is easy to see how it might be incorrigble. The normal persons is believing things because of perception, hearsay, and logic. But he knows that all of those can be deceptive; and so he is never certain. Brent Meeker This is also the case with religious beliefs, which the formal psychiatric definition excludes from being called delusions because they are consistent with a particular culture, i.e. the believer did not come up with them on his own. So it would seem that certainty does not always have much to do with objectivity. I'd say that certainty excludes objectivity. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit : It looks like I might have timed out. Hopefully this doesn't appear two times. On Dec 24, 8:55 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 24-déc.-06, à 09:48, Tom Caylor a écrit : Bruno, ... I believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself. Hmmm Perhaps in some symbolical way. The crux is that he is not symbolic... I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the fact that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to their parents wishful thinking. The Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who is personal. As I've said before, without a personal core, the word personal has lost its meaning. In the context nowadays of impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something like without rational basis. Of course that *is* a pity. It is bad, for human, to develop such self-eliminating belief. It is not rational either. I agree. cf my examples (Skinner...) in response to Stathis. But how do *you* define rationality and persons? A richer lobian machine (like ZF) can define those notions with respect to a simpler lobian machine (like PA), and then lift the theology of the simpler machine to themselves (a third lobian machine or entity, richer than ZF, can justified such induction. Then rationality can be defined by relative provability or representability in some shared theories. This leaves open the interpretations of those theories which ask for us implicit faith in our own consistency or relative correctness. The notion of persons are defined by each hypostases (third person = Bp, first person = Bp p, etc.). You also seem to reduce it, to numbers. It is a reduction only if you already defend a reductionist conception of numbers, and this can be considered as doubtful from the study of numbers, especially from the things that can emerge from their collective behaviors (arithmetical relations). I think the sophistication of incompleteness simply hides the fact that it is still a castle in the sky. Like any falsifiable but not yet falsified theory. By the direction of replacement I didn't mean chronologically, like Plato replaces Aristotle. ... in Plotinus, ok. I meant that the impersonal core replaced the real personal core, independent of Aristotle's views. You have said before that the Christians emphasize matter more than mind, as opposed to the Platonists and neo-Platonists. There may have been a few Christians who reclaimed a belief in nature, like Thomas Aquinas, when the mind/grace was being emphasized too much. But, as can be seen in the Christian interpretation of the Greek hypostases, the core of Christianity, being rooted in the Hebrew God who is the source of all things/persons, is really first of all a downward emanation, like the neo-Platonists thought. There can be no upward emanation unless/until a sufficient downward emanation is provided. In Christianity, the downward emanation is God loves us, and then the upward emanation is We love God. Plotinus insists a lot on the two ways: downward emanation and upward emanation. The lobian machine theology is coherent with this, even if negatively. It is coherent with Jef idea that pure theological imperatives can only be addressed by adapted story telling and examples, like jurisprudence in the application of laws. But then there is a proviso: none of the stories should be taken literally. He (the Holy Spirit) fills in the gaps when we cannot find words to talk to him. Like G* minus G does for any self-referentially classical machine. (The lobian machine). Yes. By the way, you said to Brent that you know that you are lobian. How do you know? OK, sorry, I was assuming (weaker-)comp. Any machine or even larger non godlike entity believing in a sufficient amount of arithmetical truth is lobian. Actually a lobian machine, as I have define it, is just a universal machines knowing that she is universal (more precisely such a machine/entity can prove that if p is accessible by its own local provability ability, then she can prove that fact. I can take this as a poetical description of the relation between the internal modalities or the hypostases. This is not poetry. Heidegger said to listen to the poet, not to the content, but just to the fact that there is a poet, which gives us hope that there is meaning. However, unfulfilled hope does not provide meaning. Hope is something purely first-personal, if I can say. So I have no clue how hope does
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
On Dec 26, 9:51 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 25-déc.-06, à 01:13, Tom Caylor a écrit : The crux is that he is not symbolic... I respect your belief or faith, but I want to be frank, I have no evidences for the idea that Jesus is truth, nor can I be sure of any clear meaning such an assertion could have, or how such an assertion could be made scientific, even dropping Popper falsification criteria. I must say I have evidences on the contrary, if only the fact that humans succumb often to wishful thinking, and still more often to their parents wishful thinking. If you are not sure of any clear meaning of the personal God being the source of everything, including of course truth, this entails not knowing the other things too. For a personal God, taking on our form (incarnation), especially if we were made in the image of God in the first place, and showing through miracles, and rising from the dead..., his dual nature (Godman, celestialterrestial, G*G) seems to make a lot more sense than something like a cross in earth orbit. For example, giving a hug is a more personal (and thus a more appropriate) way of expressing love, than giving a card, even though a card is more verifiable in a third person sense, especially after the hug is finished. But we do have the card too: God's written Word, even though this is not sufficient, the incarnate hug was the primary proof, the card was just the historical record of it. There can be no upward emanation unless/until a sufficient downward emanation is provided. In Christianity, the downward emanation is God loves us, and then the upward emanation is We love God. Plotinus insists a lot on the two ways: downward emanation and upward emanation. The lobian machine theology is coherent with this, even if negatively. It is coherent with Jef idea that pure theological imperatives can only be addressed by adapted story telling and examples, like jurisprudence in the application of laws. But then there is a proviso: none of the stories should be taken literally. I agree with the use of stories. Jesus used stories almost exclusively to communicate. Either the hearers got it or not. But this does not imply that stories are the only form of downward emanation. The incarnation was the primary means. Otherwise, who would have been the story-teller? What good are stories if the story is not teaching you truth? How do we know that the ultimate source of stories is a good source. Jef and Brent and others seem to be basing their truth on really nothing more than pragmatism. This is not poetry. Heidegger said to listen to the poet, not to the content, but just to the fact that there is a poet, which gives us hope that there is meaning. However, unfulfilled hope does not provide meaning. Hope is something purely first-personal, if I can say. So I have no clue how hope does not provide meaning. Even little (and fortunately locally fulfillable hope) like hope in a cup of coffee, can provide meaning. Bigger (and hard to express) hopes can provide genuine bigger meaning, it seems to me. I am not opposed to some idea of ultimate meaning although both personal reasons and reflection on lobianity make me doubt that communicating such hopes can make any sense (worse, the communication would most probably betrays the possible meaning of what is attempted to be communicated, and could even lead to the contrary). Even poetry must be based eventually on some meaning. Even minimalism or the Theatre of the Absurd is based on some form to attempt to communicate meaninglessness. I am glad that your aren't opposed to some idea of ultimate meaning. My whole argument is that without it our hope eventually runs out and we are left with despair, unless we lie to ourselves against the absence of hope. The content of these words speak of the *actual* fulfillment of the hopes of the Greeks expressed in their hypostases.? Are you talking about mystical enlightening experiences. Like losing any remaining doubts about immortality because you have already seen the whole of the eternal tergiversations all at once ? By these words I was referring to the John quote from the Bible. The actual fulfillment was Jesus (the Word/Logos). He spanned the infinite gap, like you said above, perhaps analogous to hypercomputation,...all in one step. We have seen his glory, the glory of the One and Only, who came from the Father, full of grace and truth. (John 3:1,2,3,14) So the particular finite form that we have, God somehow took on that same form. It is the ultimate irony that Jesus was taken to be blaspheming when he said he was one with the Father and before Abraham was, I AM, for no one can say that they are God. the mistake is the missing phrase at the end: ...except God. OK. I mean, here, that we can agree on an important disagreement, making both of us quite coherent with respect to my faith in comp and your faith in
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single self that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each person is constantly switching among various different ways to think in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep changing their status, etc. Accordingly our sets of beliefs can include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending on one's current priorities, etc. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single self that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each person is constantly switching among various different ways to think in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep changing their status, etc. Accordingly our sets of beliefs can include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending on one's current priorities, etc. I'm not sure what you're thinking of. Do you think of beliefs as all-or-nothing? Can you give some examples? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief) Date: Tue, 26 Dec 2006 14:59:17 -0800 I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single self that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each person is constantly switching among various different ways to think in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep changing their status, etc. Accordingly our sets of beliefs can include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending on one's current priorities, etc. But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever we fancy. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: But our main criterion for what to believe should be what is true, right? I find it fascinating, as well as consistent with some difficulties in communication about the most basic concepts, that Stathis would express this belief of his in the form of a tautology. I've observed that he is generally both thoughtful and precise in his writing, so I'm very interested in whether the apparent tautology is my misunderstanding, his transparent belief, a simple lack of precision, or something more. If he had said something like our main criterion for what to believe should be what works, what seems to work, what passes the tests of time, etc. or had made a direct reference to Occams's Razor, I would be comfortable knowing that we're thinking alike on this point. But I've seen this stumbling block arise so many times and so many places that I'm very curious to learn something of its source. We might never be certain of the truth, so our beliefs should always be tentative, but that doesn't mean we should believe whatever we fancy. Here it's a smaller point, and I agree with the main thrust of the statement, but it leaves a door open for the possibility that we might actually be justifiably certain of the truth in *some* case, and I'm wonder where that open door is intended to lead. --- In response to John Mikes: Yes, I consider my thinking about truth to be pragmatic, within an empirical framework of open-ended possibility. Of course, ultimately this too may be considered a matter of faith, but one with growth that seems to operate in a direction opposite from the faith you express. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
On Dec 26, 3:59 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single self that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each person is constantly switching among various different ways to think in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep changing their status, etc. Accordingly our sets of beliefs can include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending on one's current priorities, etc. Dr. Minsky, In your book, Society of Mind, you talk about a belief in freedom of will: The physical world provides no room for freedom of will...That concept is essential to our models of the mental realm. Too much of our psychology is based on it for us to ever give it up. We're virtually forced to maintain that belief, even though we know it's false. Are you saying that we must use an unsound idea (belief)? Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the existence of freedom of will, is false? However, the belief in freedom of will seems to be a belief that is rather constant, so there seem to be some beliefs that provide evidence for an invariant reality and truth, not necessarily freedom of will, but something. And I think that looking for ultimate sources would be circular (as you've said on the Atheist List) only if there were no ultimate source that we could find. Do you agree with this statement? Tom Caylor --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
Tom Caylor wrote: On Dec 26, 3:59 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single self that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each person is constantly switching among various different ways to think in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep changing their status, etc. Accordingly our sets of beliefs can include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending on one's current priorities, etc. Dr. Minsky, In your book, Society of Mind, you talk about a belief in freedom of will: The physical world provides no room for freedom of will...That concept is essential to our models of the mental realm. Too much of our psychology is based on it for us to ever give it up. We're virtually forced to maintain that belief, even though we know it's false. Whether it is false depends on what you mean by free will. Dennett argues persuasively in Elbow Room that we have all the freedom of will that matters. Our actions arise out of who we are. If you conceive yourself comprehensively, all your memories, values, knowledge, etc. then you are the author of your action. If you conceive yourself as small enough, you can escape all responsibility. Are you saying that we must use an unsound idea (belief)? Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the existence of freedom of will, is false? However, the belief in freedom of will seems to be a belief that is rather constant, so there seem to be some beliefs that provide evidence for an invariant reality and truth, not necessarily freedom of will, but something. And I think that looking for ultimate sources would be circular (as you've said on the Atheist List) only if there were no ultimate source that we could find. Do you agree with this statement? It would be futile - but not circular. It is circular to argue that belief is evidence for the thing believed. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
On Dec 26, 7:53 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Tom Caylor wrote: On Dec 26, 3:59 pm, [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I regard the idea of believing to be unsound, because it is a pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a single self that maintains beliefs. A more realistic view is that each person is constantly switching among various different ways to think in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep changing their status, etc. Accordingly our sets of beliefs can include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending on one's current priorities, etc. Dr. Minsky, In your book, Society of Mind, you talk about a belief in freedom of will: The physical world provides no room for freedom of will...That concept is essential to our models of the mental realm. Too much of our psychology is based on it for us to ever give it up. We're virtually forced to maintain that belief, even though we know it's false. Whether it is false depends on what you mean by free will. Dennett argues persuasively in Elbow Room that we have all the freedom of will that matters. Our actions arise out of who we are. If you conceive yourself comprehensively, all your memories, values, knowledge, etc. then you are the author of your action. If you conceive yourself as small enough, you can escape all responsibility. Are you saying that we must use an unsound idea (belief)? Regarding Stathis' question to you about truth, your calling the idea of believing unsound seems to imply that you are assuming that there is no truth that we can discover. But on the other hand, if there is no discoverable truth, then how can we know that something, like the existence of freedom of will, is false? However, the belief in freedom of will seems to be a belief that is rather constant, so there seem to be some beliefs that provide evidence for an invariant reality and truth, not necessarily freedom of will, but something. And I think that looking for ultimate sources would be circular (as you've said on the Atheist List) only if there were no ultimate source that we could find. Do you agree with this statement? It would be futile - but not circular. It is circular to argue that belief is evidence for the thing believed. Brent Meeker I was providing a belief as evidence not for free will but for some invariant reality/truth, e.g. the source of actions in your words, who we are. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
Tom Caylor wrote: This looks like Tarski's trick to me. It is an act of faith any time we take what we say as truth. On 12/24/06, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: When I take what I say to be true based on evidence it is not a matter of faith JM: it is based on your faith in your evidence and its truth. A religious person accepts as evidence God said so - of course it is based on HIS faith, and so are physicists evidencing by collapse of wave function, .by calculations on the inflation after the BB, and other kind of 'scientists' (believing) in the tenets of their (today's) science, just as (in Ptolemy-time) on the flatness of the Earth. Tom Caylor wrote: This is unsupported without an ultimate Person who gives the ultimate source of bringing truth into existence through words. BM: This is pure magic mongering - as though some special ultimate person can bring something into existence by words. JM: Unless you have 'faith' in that ultimate personG - I take Brent's side here. * BM: Critics of reductionism ignore the contrary process of synthesis. Physics does not *just* reduce things to atoms, it also shows how things are synthesized from atoms and their relations. JM: relations is a big word (Do you have a good meaning for it?) IMO it includes the impredicative - non computable interrelatedness of the totality we cannot include into our limited reductionist models. Nor can physics consider all of it in a 'synthetic' opposite. I consider Stathis's words on his chemistry as his domain-concept of relations between people etc., otherwise I would have argued (on my turf) about chemistry's occurrence vs our figment how to depict and explain into patterns (even drawn into 2D formulation upon the atomic illusions in chem. science) the figment we have about certain primitively observed phenomena. All in the sense of physical edifice-evidence we have FAITH in. * BM: Brent Meeker * JM: John Mikes --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno, I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases, and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases. There is a lot to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last post on this. On Dec 11, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. With that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, and of course those light are of the platonic-plotinus type where the notion of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I say more below. The discussions over the last two weeks on Evil, and just how to define good and bad, underscore how puzzling this problem can be. I agree that at the base of this is the question, What is Truth? I am not satisfied with the Theaetetus definition, or Tarski's trick. I believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself. The Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who is personal. As I've said before, without a personal core, the word personal has lost its meaning. In the context nowadays of impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something like without rational basis. But when the personal IS the basis, not an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis for truth, personality, rationality, good... Note also that the major critics by the neoplatonists on Aristotle, besides their diverging opinions on the nature of matter, is the non-person character of the big unnameable, but then for Plotinus the second God (the second primary hypostase is personal), and indeed G* has a personal aspect from the point of view of the machine. I agree (comp agree) with Plotinus that the big first cannot be a person. The second one can. To be sure Plotinus is not always completely clear on that point (especially on his chapter on free-will). None of Plotinus' hypostases are both personal and free from evil (as well as infinite, which we agree is needed (but not sufficient, I maintain!) for the problem of meaning). It is a key point. I agree. None of Plotinus hypostases are both personal and free from evil/good. Finding an arithmetical interpretation of the hypostases could then give a hope toward an explanation of goodness and evil. Please note that 7/8 of the hypostases are personal-views. I'll just deal with the first 4 hypostases, since this is the basis of the rest, even though my John quote below addresses the others also. Perhaps the neo-Platonists couldn't see how the core could be personal (even though Plato called it the Good). It is hard to accept that the core could be both infinite and personal (and good), since our view of personality is finite (and flawed). But the infinite personal core, God the Father, which replaces the neo-Platonist ONE or 0-person (of course I maintain that the replacing was in the other direction :), answers the big question of the origin of all other persons (and consciousness). You mentioned to Brent that perhaps invoking the second-person is a way of explaining the origin of personal aspects. In a way this is true, in that our earthly fathers/mothers and others take part as persons in developing us as persons. But there has to be an ultimate source. And in the Christian interpretation the ultimate source of all first-person level experience (neo-Platonist ALL-SOUL or UNIVERSAL-SOUL) could be said to be God the Holy Spirit. He fills in the gaps when we cannot find words to talk to him. Then, the real clincher is the third person point of view, the neo-Platonist INTELLECT. The personal God did not stay silent and keep all of this personhood stuff at a purely theoretical level which we would have to take with blind faith. Instead the hopes of the neo-Platonists were fulfilled in the Christ (Messiah) whose name was Emmanuel which means God with us, who was the wisdom and power of God. In the beginning was the Word (Logos), and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was with God in the beginning. Through him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been made. In him was life, and that life was the light of men. The light shines in the darkness, but the darkness has not understood it... The Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us. We have seen his glory, the glory of the One and Only, who came from the Father, full of grace and truth. (John 3:1,2,3,14) So the particular finite form that we have, God somehow took on that same form. In this way God showed us (who are in his image) true truth about himself in a way which we can understand (just as a father tells
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Tom Caylor writes: Bruno, I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases, and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases. There is a lot to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last post on this. On Dec 11, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. With that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, and of course those light are of the platonic-plotinus type where the notion of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I say more below. The discussions over the last two weeks on Evil, and just how to define good and bad, underscore how puzzling this problem can be. I agree that at the base of this is the question, What is Truth? I am not satisfied with the Theaetetus definition, or Tarski's trick. I believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself. The Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who is personal. As I've said before, without a personal core, the word personal has lost its meaning. In the context nowadays of impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something like without rational basis. But when the personal IS the basis, not an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis for truth, personality, rationality, good... I'm not sure that this is what you meant, but there is in a sense an objective basis to the personal or subjective, which is simply that when I say I feel or desire something, this is an empirical statement: either I do feel it or I am lying. Also, there is an objective explanation for why I have the feeling in terms of neurophysiology, evolution and so on. But this is not enough for some people and they think, for example, that there must be more to love than just particular feelings and the scientific basis for these feelings. But this mysterious love-substance would appear to make no difference whatsoever. The evidence is that if certain chemical reactions occur, the love feeling also occurs, and these chemical reactions occur because they have evolved that way to assist bonding with family, community and so on. That explanation covers everything, and the love-substance remains superfluous and undetectable, inviting Occam's Razor to cut it down. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 23-déc.-06, à 15:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Bruno marchal writes: Even if it is presented as good for society, the child may accept that because of feelings of empathy for others. OK. Note that such an empathy is hard wired in our biological constitution. Many mammals seems to have it at some degree. Some form of autism are described by pathological loss of that empathy. Perhaps Stathis could say more. Autism, psychopathy and psychotic illnesses like schizophrenia can all involve a loss of empathy. It is sometimes said that autistic children lack a theory of mind so that they can see others as being like themselves, with a similar view of the world to themselves. As they grow up, they realise intellectually that other people are like them but it seems that they lack the intuitive grasp of this fact that non- -autistic individuals have. People with schizophrenia can develop a blunting of affect, which perhaps is a different process but can have the same effect. They may be able to compare their feelings to when they were well and may say things like, I can longer feel things like I used to, I know I ought to feel happy when others around me are happy and sad when something sad happens, but I feel nothing, I just register the facts. Psychopaths are different again in that they usually have a full range of affect, understand that others may suffer as they do, but don't care and can't understand why they should care, other than to keep the legal authorities happy. Young children are all psychopathic: they refrain from behaving badly only because they might get punished. As they grow up, they internalise the good and bad behaviour paterns so that they seem to have these characteristics intrinsically. Autism and schizophrenia are almost always dysfunctional conditions, but intelligent psychopaths often do very well, in business and politics for example, because they can lie and manipulate people without compunction. In fact, they often seem unusually charming and likable when you first meet them, because they have learned to act the way that will best serve their selfish purposes. It is conceivable that an entire society of psychopaths might be able to function with rules of conduct similar to the moral rules that most normal societies live by, but arrived at in a practical and dispassionate manner. That is, thieves are punished because it is expedient to do so in the same way as it is expedient to take an umbrella with you if expecting rain, and saying theft is wrong is like saying rain is wrong. Thanks for the explanations. I am astonished about all children being psychopathic: I guess you mean very young one? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 24-déc.-06, à 09:48, Tom Caylor a écrit : Bruno, I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases, and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases. There is a lot to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last post on this. On Dec 11, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. With that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, and of course those light are of the platonic-plotinus type where the notion of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I say more below. The discussions over the last two weeks on Evil, and just how to define good and bad, underscore how puzzling this problem can be. It certainly is. I agree that at the base of this is the question, What is Truth? I am not satisfied with the Theaetetus definition, or Tarski's trick. We can come back to this. I believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself. Hmmm Perhaps in some symbolical way. The Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who is personal. As I've said before, without a personal core, the word personal has lost its meaning. In the context nowadays of impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something like without rational basis. Of course that *is* a pity. It is bad, for human, to develop such self-eliminating belief. It is not rational either. But when the personal IS the basis, not an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis for truth, personality, rationality, good... So you are emphasizing the third hypostase = the first person = the ALL-SOUL = the universal knower. This is akin to David Lymann and George Levy. It is not incompatible with your view if you accept the idea that we are all God(s). Cf Alan Watts for example and most mystical insight. Note also that the major critics by the neoplatonists on Aristotle, besides their diverging opinions on the nature of matter, is the non-person character of the big unnameable, but then for Plotinus the second God (the second primary hypostase is personal), and indeed G* has a personal aspect from the point of view of the machine. I agree (comp agree) with Plotinus that the big first cannot be a person. The second one can. To be sure Plotinus is not always completely clear on that point (especially on his chapter on free-will). None of Plotinus' hypostases are both personal and free from evil (as well as infinite, which we agree is needed (but not sufficient, I maintain!) for the problem of meaning). It is a key point. I agree. None of Plotinus hypostases are both personal and free from evil/good. Finding an arithmetical interpretation of the hypostases could then give a hope toward an explanation of goodness and evil. Please note that 7/8 of the hypostases are personal-views. I'll just deal with the first 4 hypostases, since this is the basis of the rest, even though my John quote below addresses the others also. Perhaps the neo-Platonists couldn't see how the core could be personal (even though Plato called it the Good). It is hard to accept that the core could be both infinite and personal (and good), since our view of personality is finite (and flawed). But the infinite personal core, God the Father, which replaces the neo-Platonist ONE or 0-person (of course I maintain that the replacing was in the other direction :), It looks you seem really to be an Aristotelician answers the big question of the origin of all other persons (and consciousness). You mentioned to Brent that perhaps invoking the second-person is a way of explaining the origin of personal aspects. I was just saying that the second person or some collective intimacy can explain utterance of uncommunicable things. Some ethical scientific truth can be said in the coffee room, not at any congress ... In a way this is true, in that our earthly fathers/mothers and others take part as persons in developing us as persons. But there has to be an ultimate source. Yes. To be a realist is to bet there is one, but from a scientist (third person) pov, it is an open question as to know if such ultimate thing is personal. Comp is going in the Plotinus direction where the ultimate reality is not personal. And in the Christian interpretation the ultimate source of all first-person level experience (neo-Platonist ALL-SOUL or UNIVERSAL-SOUL) could be said to be God the Holy Spirit. I can agree with that hypothesis. It is consistent with computationalism. There is
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 24-déc.-06, à 11:49, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : I'm not sure that this is what you meant, but there is in a sense an objective basis to the personal or subjective, which is simply that when I say I feel or desire something, this is an empirical statement: either I do feel it or I am lying. Also, there is an objective explanation for why I have the feeling in terms of neurophysiology, evolution and so on. But this is not enough for some people and they think, for example, that there must be more to love than just particular feelings and the scientific basis for these feelings. But this mysterious love-substance would appear to make no difference whatsoever. The evidence is that if certain chemical reactions occur, the love feeling also occurs, and these chemical reactions occur because they have evolved that way to assist bonding with family, community and so on. That explanation covers everything, and the love-substance remains superfluous and undetectable, inviting Occam's Razor to cut it down. I can agree completely but as you expect I will ask you to cut *any* substance once you bet on comp. Not just love-substance, but neuron-substance as well. (Or explain me at which step of the UDA reasoning you feel unconvinced, thanks ;-) ... of course we can believe in neurons and ... love. No need of any substances ... (more exactly, with comp, substances can't help). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
On Dec 24, 3:49 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Tom Caylor writes: Bruno, I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases, and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases. There is a lot to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last post on this. On Dec 11, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. With that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, and of course those light are of the platonic-plotinus type where the notion of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I say more below. The discussions over the last two weeks on Evil, and just how to define good and bad, underscore how puzzling this problem can be. I agree that at the base of this is the question, What is Truth? I am not satisfied with the Theaetetus definition, or Tarski's trick. I believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself. The Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who is personal. As I've said before, without a personal core, the word personal has lost its meaning. In the context nowadays of impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something like without rational basis. But when the personal IS the basis, not an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis for truth, personality, rationality, good... I'm not sure that this is what you meant, but there is in a sense an objective basis to the personal or subjective, which is simply that when I say I feel or desire something, this is an empirical statement: either I do feel it or I am lying. This looks like Tarski's trick to me. It is an act of faith any time we take what we say as truth. This is unsupported without an ultimate Person who gives the ultimate source of bringing truth into existence through words. Also, there is an objective explanation for why I have the feeling in terms of neurophysiology, evolution and so on. But this is not enough for some people and they think, for example, that there must be more to love than just particular feelings and the scientific basis for these feelings. But this mysterious love-substance would appear to make no difference whatsoever. The evidence is that if certain chemical reactions occur, the love feeling also occurs, and these chemical reactions occur because they have evolved that way to assist bonding with family, community and so on. That explanation covers everything, and the love-substance remains superfluous and undetectable, inviting Occam's Razor to cut it down. Stathis Papaioannou Reducing everything to particulars results in the loss of meaning. Schaeffer describes this process as nature eating up grace. Reductionism has resulted in cutting out the basis for knowledge. Knowledge has to be personal, as shown by the epistemologist Michael Polanyi, particularly in his book Personal Knowledge. Of course Bruno maintains that after Godel we have gone beyond reductionism, but I don't think so. I will say more in response to his post. I don't have my notes with me, but a few examples of what happens with reductionism are: Jacques Monods (?) in his Chance and Necessity reducing everything basically to the roll of the dice - B.F. Skinner, eliminating freedom and dignity of man, and saying farewell to man qua man. The result: the rule of the elite. I had the privilege of hearing a guest lecture by Skinner at UCLA in the '80s, and the question answer section was pretty lively, with agnostics defending freedom and dignity as if they really believed in it. Marvin Minsky and his colleague (don't recall his name) at MIT, saying that basically we have to act as if we have free will, even though we know that we don't. Talk about a loss of the concept of truth. Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
It looks like I might have timed out. Hopefully this doesn't appear two times. On Dec 24, 8:55 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Le 24-déc.-06, à 09:48, Tom Caylor a écrit : Bruno, ... I believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself. Hmmm Perhaps in some symbolical way. The crux is that he is not symbolic... The Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who is personal. As I've said before, without a personal core, the word personal has lost its meaning. In the context nowadays of impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something like without rational basis. Of course that *is* a pity. It is bad, for human, to develop such self-eliminating belief. It is not rational either. I agree. cf my examples (Skinner...) in response to Stathis. But how do *you* define rationality and persons? You also seem to reduce it, to numbers. I think the sophistication of incompleteness simply hides the fact that it is still a castle in the sky. But when the personal IS the basis, not an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis for truth, personality, rationality, good... So you are emphasizing the third hypostase = the first person = the ALL-SOUL = the universal knower. This is akin to David Lymann and George Levy. It is not incompatible with your view if you accept the idea that we are all God(s). Cf Alan Watts for example and most mystical insight. I think later down you see that I am addressing all of the hypostases. I'll just deal with the first 4 hypostases, since this is the basis of the rest, even though my John quote below addresses the others also. Perhaps the neo-Platonists couldn't see how the core could be personal (even though Plato called it the Good). It is hard to accept that the core could be both infinite and personal (and good), since our view of personality is finite (and flawed). But the infinite personal core, God the Father, which replaces the neo-Platonist ONE or 0-person (of course I maintain that the replacing was in the other direction :) It looks you seem really to be an Aristotelician By the direction of replacement I didn't mean chronologically, like Plato replaces Aristotle. I meant that the impersonal core replaced the real personal core, independent of Aristotle's views. You have said before that the Christians emphasize matter more than mind, as opposed to the Platonists and neo-Platonists. There may have been a few Christians who reclaimed a belief in nature, like Thomas Aquinas, when the mind/grace was being emphasized too much. But, as can be seen in the Christian interpretation of the Greek hypostases, the core of Christianity, being rooted in the Hebrew God who is the source of all things/persons, is really first of all a downward emanation, like the neo-Platonists thought. There can be no upward emanation unless/until a sufficient downward emanation is provided. In Christianity, the downward emanation is God loves us, and then the upward emanation is We love God. In a way this is true, in that our earthly fathers/mothers and others take part as persons in developing us as persons. But there has to be an ultimate source. Yes. To be a realist is to bet there is one, but from a scientist (third person) pov, it is an open question as to know if such ultimate thing is personal. Comp is going in the Plotinus direction where the ultimate reality is not personal. As you saw, I addressed the third person pov below. He (the Holy Spirit) fills in the gaps when we cannot find words to talk to him. Like G* minus G does for any self-referentially classical machine. (The lobian machine). Yes. By the way, you said to Brent that you know that you are lobian. How do you know? Then, the real clincher is the third person point of view, the neo-Platonist INTELLECT. The personal God did not stay silent and keep all of this personhood stuff at a purely theoretical level which we would have to take with blind faith. Instead the hopes of the neo-Platonists were fulfilled in the Christ (Messiah) whose name was Emmanuel which means God with us, who was the wisdom and power of God. In the beginning was the Word (Logos), and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was with God in the beginning. Through him all things were made; without him nothing was made that has been made. In him was life, and that life was the light of men. The light shines in the darkness, but the darkness has not understood it... The Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us. I can take this as a poetical description of the relation between the internal modalities or the hypostases. This is not poetry. Heidegger said to listen to the poet, not to the content, but just to the fact that
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Thanks for the explanations. I am astonished about all children being psychopathic: I guess you mean very young one? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ To be fair that term isn't normally used for children due to its pejorative connotations, but I think it is close to the truth. Infants lack not only a moral sense, they also lack an understanding of consequences of their actions. Older children act to gain rewards and avoid punishment. Older children still act for all the above reasons but also to gain approval from authority figures - to be a good boy or a good girl, whatever that takes. The final stage involves internalising moral values, so that good and bad take on a separate meaning, not just what has positive or negative consequences or what other people think of as good and bad. These roughly correspond to Kohlberg's stages of moral development: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kohlberg's_stages_of_moral_development Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
Tom Caylor wrote: On Dec 24, 3:49 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Tom Caylor writes: Bruno, I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases, and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases. There is a lot to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last post on this. On Dec 11, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. With that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, and of course those light are of the platonic-plotinus type where the notion of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I say more below. The discussions over the last two weeks on Evil, and just how to define good and bad, underscore how puzzling this problem can be. I agree that at the base of this is the question, What is Truth? I am not satisfied with the Theaetetus definition, or Tarski's trick. I believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself. The Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who is personal. As I've said before, without a personal core, the word personal has lost its meaning. In the context nowadays of impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something like without rational basis. But when the personal IS the basis, not an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis for truth, personality, rationality, good... I'm not sure that this is what you meant, but there is in a sense an objective basis to the personal or subjective, which is simply that when I say I feel or desire something, this is an empirical statement: either I do feel it or I am lying. This looks like Tarski's trick to me. It is an act of faith any time we take what we say as truth. When I take what I say to be true based on evidence it is not a matter of faith. This is unsupported without an ultimate Person who gives the ultimate source of bringing truth into existence through words. This is pure magic mongering - as though some special ultimate person can bring something into existence by words. Also, there is an objective explanation for why I have the feeling in terms of neurophysiology, evolution and so on. But this is not enough for some people and they think, for example, that there must be more to love than just particular feelings and the scientific basis for these feelings. But this mysterious love-substance would appear to make no difference whatsoever. The evidence is that if certain chemical reactions occur, the love feeling also occurs, and these chemical reactions occur because they have evolved that way to assist bonding with family, community and so on. That explanation covers everything, and the love-substance remains superfluous and undetectable, inviting Occam's Razor to cut it down. Stathis Papaioannou Reducing everything to particulars results in the loss of meaning. A strawman. No one has tried to reduce everything to particulars. Stathis refers to generalities, like chemical reactions, families, and love. Schaeffer describes this process as nature eating up grace. Which is apparently intended as a profound metaphor for something. Reductionism has resulted in cutting out the basis for knowledge. Knowledge has to be personal, as shown by the epistemologist Michael Polanyi, particularly in his book Personal Knowledge. Of course Bruno maintains that after Godel we have gone beyond reductionism, but I don't think so. I will say more in response to his post. Critics of reductionism ignore the contrary process of synthesis. Physics does not *just* reduce things to atoms, it also shows how things are synthesized from atoms and their relations. I don't have my notes with me, but a few examples of what happens with reductionism are: Jacques Monods (?) in his Chance and Necessity reducing everything basically to the roll of the dice - B.F. Skinner, eliminating freedom and dignity of man, and saying farewell to man qua man. The result: the rule of the elite. You mean like the divine right of kings? I had the privilege of hearing a guest lecture by Skinner at UCLA in the '80s, and the question answer section was pretty lively, with agnostics defending freedom and dignity as if they really believed in it. It's only theists who imagine that some god is necessary to give them freedom, dignity, and purpose in their lives. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Tom Caylor writes: On Dec 24, 3:49 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Tom Caylor writes: Bruno, I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases, and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases. There is a lot to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last post on this. On Dec 11, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. With that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, and of course those light are of the platonic-plotinus type where the notion of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I say more below. The discussions over the last two weeks on Evil, and just how to define good and bad, underscore how puzzling this problem can be. I agree that at the base of this is the question, What is Truth? I am not satisfied with the Theaetetus definition, or Tarski's trick. I believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself. The Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who is personal. As I've said before, without a personal core, the word personal has lost its meaning. In the context nowadays of impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something like without rational basis. But when the personal IS the basis, not an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis for truth, personality, rationality, good... I'm not sure that this is what you meant, but there is in a sense an objective basis to the personal or subjective, which is simply that when I say I feel or desire something, this is an empirical statement: either I do feel it or I am lying. This looks like Tarski's trick to me. It is an act of faith any time we take what we say as truth. This is unsupported without an ultimate Person who gives the ultimate source of bringing truth into existence through words. Have you considered the possibility that we can never know the ultimate truth? I can't even be certain that I had a particular thought a moment ago; I believe I did, and all the evidence suggests that I did, but I can't be *absolutely certain*. This seems obvious to me and I am quite comfortable with it, but even if I weren't, that is no reason to create ex nihilo a source of ultimate truth (if such a thing were even logically possible, which it is not). Also, there is an objective explanation for why I have the feeling in terms of neurophysiology, evolution and so on. But this is not enough for some people and they think, for example, that there must be more to love than just particular feelings and the scientific basis for these feelings. But this mysterious love-substance would appear to make no difference whatsoever. The evidence is that if certain chemical reactions occur, the love feeling also occurs, and these chemical reactions occur because they have evolved that way to assist bonding with family, community and so on. That explanation covers everything, and the love-substance remains superfluous and undetectable, inviting Occam's Razor to cut it down. Stathis Papaioannou Reducing everything to particulars results in the loss of meaning. Schaeffer describes this process as nature eating up grace. Reductionism has resulted in cutting out the basis for knowledge. Knowledge has to be personal, as shown by the epistemologist Michael Polanyi, particularly in his book Personal Knowledge. Of course Bruno maintains that after Godel we have gone beyond reductionism, but I don't think so. I will say more in response to his post. I don't have my notes with me, but a few examples of what happens with reductionism are: Jacques Monods (?) in his Chance and Necessity reducing everything basically to the roll of the dice - B.F. Skinner, eliminating freedom and dignity of man, and saying farewell to man qua man. The result: the rule of the elite. I had the privilege of hearing a guest lecture by Skinner at UCLA in the '80s, and the question answer section was pretty lively, with agnostics defending freedom and dignity as if they really believed in it. Marvin Minsky and his colleague (don't recall his name) at MIT, saying that basically we have to act as if we have free will, even though we know that we don't. Talk about a loss of the concept of truth. It seems to me that you go one step further than Marvin Minsky and say that not only must we behave as if we have free will, we must *believe* that we have free will. You have skirted around this question without really answering it
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Tom Caylor writes: It is the ultimate irony that Jesus was taken to be blaspheming when he said he was one with the Father and before Abraham was, I AM, for no one can say that they are God. the mistake is the missing phrase at the end: ...except God. Yes, but what if Jesus was not God? He would then have been lying or deluded, and blaspheming as well in the eyes of Jews, Muslims etc. I have met many peopel who thought they were Jesus. Once, we had two Jesuses on the ward at the same time. We thought they might get into a fight, but in an appropriately holy manner they both walked around smiling and blessing everyone. They even forgave the staff for disbelieving and giving them medication. I have to admit, they were nice people, and others could learn from their example. But they were deluded. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor writes: On Dec 24, 3:49 am, Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Tom Caylor writes: Bruno, I have been doing a lot of reading/thinking on your former posts on the Hypostases, other reading on Plotinus and the neo-Platonist hypostases, and the Christian interpretation of the hypostases. There is a lot to say, but I'll start by just giving some responses to your last post on this. On Dec 11, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal I agree that the problem of evil (and thus the equivalent problem of Good) is interesting. Of course it is not well addressed by the two current theories of everything: Loop gravity and String theory. With that respect the comp hyp can at least shed some light on it, and of course those light are of the platonic-plotinus type where the notion of goodness necessitates the notion of truth to begin with. I say more below. The discussions over the last two weeks on Evil, and just how to define good and bad, underscore how puzzling this problem can be. I agree that at the base of this is the question, What is Truth? I am not satisfied with the Theaetetus definition, or Tarski's trick. I believe the answer to the question, What is Truth? which Pilate asked Jesus, was standing right in front of Pilate: Jesus himself. The Christian definition of truth goes back to the core of everything, who is personal. As I've said before, without a personal core, the word personal has lost its meaning. In the context nowadays of impersonal-based philosophy, personal has come to mean something like without rational basis. But when the personal IS the basis, not an impersonal concept of personal, but the ultimate Person, and with man being made in the image of that ultimate Person, we have a basis for truth, personality, rationality, good... I'm not sure that this is what you meant, but there is in a sense an objective basis to the personal or subjective, which is simply that when I say I feel or desire something, this is an empirical statement: either I do feel it or I am lying. This looks like Tarski's trick to me. It is an act of faith any time we take what we say as truth. This is unsupported without an ultimate Person who gives the ultimate source of bringing truth into existence through words. Have you considered the possibility that we can never know the ultimate truth? I can't even be certain that I had a particular thought a moment ago; I believe I did, and all the evidence suggests that I did, but I can't be *absolutely certain*. This seems obvious to me and I am quite comfortable with it, but even if I weren't, that is no reason to create ex nihilo a source of ultimate truth (if such a thing were even logically possible, which it is not). And what does ultimate truth even mean? Does it mean complete and accurate description of everything? Does it mean the set of all true propositions; where true means...what?, in accordance with observation?, provable in some axiomatic system?, referring to a fact? Also, there is an objective explanation for why I have the feeling in terms of neurophysiology, evolution and so on. But this is not enough for some people and they think, for example, that there must be more to love than just particular feelings and the scientific basis for these feelings. But this mysterious love-substance would appear to make no difference whatsoever. The evidence is that if certain chemical reactions occur, the love feeling also occurs, and these chemical reactions occur because they have evolved that way to assist bonding with family, community and so on. That explanation covers everything, and the love-substance remains superfluous and undetectable, inviting Occam's Razor to cut it down. Stathis Papaioannou Reducing everything to particulars results in the loss of meaning. Schaeffer describes this process as nature eating up grace. Reductionism has resulted in cutting out the basis for knowledge. Knowledge has to be personal, as shown by the epistemologist Michael Polanyi, particularly in his book Personal Knowledge. Of course Bruno maintains that after Godel we have gone beyond reductionism, but I don't think so. I will say more in response to his post. I don't have my notes with me, but a few examples of what happens with reductionism are: Jacques Monods (?) in his Chance and Necessity reducing everything basically to the roll of the dice - B.F. Skinner, eliminating freedom and dignity of man, and saying farewell to man qua man. The result: the rule of the elite. I had the privilege of hearing a guest lecture by Skinner at UCLA in the '80s, and the question answer section was pretty lively, with agnostics defending freedom and dignity as if they really believed in it. Marvin Minsky and his colleague (don't recall his name) at MIT, saying that basically we have to act as if we have free
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Tom Caylor writes: It is the ultimate irony that Jesus was taken to be blaspheming when he said he was one with the Father and before Abraham was, I AM, for no one can say that they are God. the mistake is the missing phrase at the end: ...except God. Yes, but what if Jesus was not God? He would then have been lying or deluded, and blaspheming as well in the eyes of Jews, Muslims etc. I have met many peopel who thought they were Jesus. Once, we had two Jesuses on the ward at the same time. We thought they might get into a fight, but in an appropriately holy manner they both walked around smiling and blessing everyone. They even forgave the staff for disbelieving and giving them medication. I have to admit, they were nice people, and others could learn from their example. But they were deluded. Or at least one of them was. :-) Brent Meeker And Jesus said unto them, And whom do you say that I am? They replied, You are the eschatological manifestation of the ground of our being, the ontological foundation of the context of our very selfhood revealed. And Jesus replied, What?? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Brent Meeker wrote: That raises a fundamental question - should we believe what's true? Of course in general we don't know what's true and we never know it with certainity. But we do know some things, in the scientific, provisional sense. And we also have certain values which, as Jef says, are the basis of our action and our judgement of good and bad. So what happens when we know X and believing X is *not* conducive to realizing our values? Of course you could argue that this can never happen; that it's always best (in the values sense) to believe what's true. But I think this is doubtful. For example, person who is certainly dying of cancer (and we're all dying of something) may realize more of his values by believing that he will live for much longer than justified by the evidence. On the other hand you could argue that one can't just believe this or that as an act of will and so it is impossible to know X, even in the provisional scientific sense, and also believe not-X. Tell me Human, what is this Self you speak of, somehow apart from its own value-system, somehow able to observe and comment on its own subjective experience? But seriously, the values that matter most are generally below conscious awareness and can only be inferred. This is why I suggested that story-telling might be among the most effective methods for collecting sets of values for further analysis and distillation. It would be more accurate to say that our values drive our self rather than belong to our self. Evidence abounds of memories (and thus experience of self) being subject to a great deal of distortion, fabrication, and revision, and the human capacity for cognitive dissonance and confabulation answers loudly your question in regard to the handling of conflicting values and beliefs. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
Jef Allbright wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: That raises a fundamental question - should we believe what's true? Of course in general we don't know what's true and we never know it with certainity. But we do know some things, in the scientific, provisional sense. And we also have certain values which, as Jef says, are the basis of our action and our judgement of good and bad. So what happens when we know X and believing X is *not* conducive to realizing our values? Of course you could argue that this can never happen; that it's always best (in the values sense) to believe what's true. But I think this is doubtful. For example, person who is certainly dying of cancer (and we're all dying of something) may realize more of his values by believing that he will live for much longer than justified by the evidence. On the other hand you could argue that one can't just believe this or that as an act of will and so it is impossible to know X, even in the provisional scientific sense, and also believe not-X. Tell me Human, what is this Self you speak of, somehow apart from its own value-system, somehow able to observe and comment on its own subjective experience? I don't think I said anything about self, much less that it is separate from a value system. But seriously, the values that matter most are generally below conscious awareness and can only be inferred. This is why I suggested that story-telling might be among the most effective methods for collecting sets of values for further analysis and distillation. An interesting idea. I'd say that action has to be the real test of values. Has there been any study of the correlation between stories told and actual behavior? It would be more accurate to say that our values drive our self rather than belong to our self. That's fine with me. I'd say the self is nothing but an abstraction to collect values, memories, thoughts, etc. Evidence abounds of memories (and thus experience of self) being subject to a great deal of distortion, fabrication, and revision, and the human capacity for cognitive dissonance and confabulation answers loudly your question in regard to the handling of conflicting values and beliefs. So you observe that people commonly believe things they know are false. Do you also conclude that they are generally doing this to maximize the projection of their values into the future? Or would they do better if their beliefs and knowledge aligned? In other words, is there a should about belief? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases
Brent Meeker wrote: Jef Allbright wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: That raises a fundamental question - should we believe what's true? Of course in general we don't know what's true and we never know it with certainity. But we do know some things, in the scientific, provisional sense. And we also have certain values which, as Jef says, are the basis of our action and our judgement of good and bad. So what happens when we know X and believing X is *not* conducive to realizing our values? Of course you could argue that this can never happen; that it's always best (in the values sense) to believe what's true. But I think this is doubtful. For example, person who is certainly dying of cancer (and we're all dying of something) may realize more of his values by believing that he will live for much longer than justified by the evidence. On the other hand you could argue that one can't just believe this or that as an act of will and so it is impossible to know X, even in the provisional scientific sense, and also believe not-X. Tell me Human, what is this Self you speak of, somehow apart from its own value-system, somehow able to observe and comment on its own subjective experience? I don't think I said anything about self, much less that it is separate from a value system. But seriously, the values that matter most are generally below conscious awareness and can only be inferred. This is why I suggested that story-telling might be among the most effective methods for collecting sets of values for further analysis and distillation. An interesting idea. I'd say that action has to be the real test of values. Has there been any study of the correlation between stories told and actual behavior? Not of which I am aware, although there has been some collecting of stories in anthropology, and some listing of human universal values in rough form. It would be more accurate to say that our values drive our self rather than belong to our self. That's fine with me. I'd say the self is nothing but an abstraction to collect values, memories, thoughts, etc. Then I think you're on the right track. Evidence abounds of memories (and thus experience of self) being subject to a great deal of distortion, fabrication, and revision, and the human capacity for cognitive dissonance and confabulation answers loudly your question in regard to the handling of conflicting values and beliefs. So you observe that people commonly believe things they know are false. Do you also conclude that they are generally doing this to maximize the projection of their values into the future? No, most such action is not a result of rational consideration, or even conscious intention. Or would they do better if their beliefs and knowledge aligned? In other words, is there a should about belief? There is no should, but only that what works tends to persist, thus increasing the likelihood of it being assessed as good. Some beliefs, despite being invalid, can be very effective within a limited context but tend eventually to succumb to competition from those with greater effectiveness, generally through more general scope of applicability and with fewer side-effects. We come to think of these principles of increasingly effective action as laws of nature. - Jef --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno marchal writes: Even if it is presented as good for society, the child may accept that because of feelings of empathy for others. OK. Note that such an empathy is hard wired in our biological constitution. Many mammals seems to have it at some degree. Some form of autism are described by pathological loss of that empathy. Perhaps Stathis could say more. Autism, psychopathy and psychotic illnesses like schizophrenia can all involve a loss of empathy. It is sometimes said that autistic children lack a theory of mind so that they can see others as being like themselves, with a similar view of the world to themselves. As they grow up, they realise intellectually that other people are like them but it seems that they lack the intuitive grasp of this fact that non- -autistic individuals have. People with schizophrenia can develop a blunting of affect, which perhaps is a different process but can have the same effect. They may be able to compare their feelings to when they were well and may say things like, I can longer feel things like I used to, I know I ought to feel happy when others around me are happy and sad when something sad happens, but I feel nothing, I just register the facts. Psychopaths are different again in that they usually have a full range of affect, understand that others may suffer as they do, but don't care and can't understand why they should care, other than to keep the legal authorities happy. Young children are all psychopathic: they refrain from behaving badly only because they might get punished. As they grow up, they internalise the good and bad behaviour paterns so that they seem to have these characteristics intrinsically. Autism and schizophrenia are almost always dysfunctional conditions, but intelligent psychopaths often do very well, in business and politics for example, because they can lie and manipulate people without compunction. In fact, they often seem unusually charming and likable when you first meet them, because they have learned to act the way that will best serve their selfish purposes. It is conceivable that an entire society of psychopaths might be able to function with rules of conduct similar to the moral rules that most normal societies live by, but arrived at in a practical and dispassionate manner. That is, thieves are punished because it is expedient to do so in the same way as it is expedient to take an umbrella with you if expecting rain, and saying theft is wrong is like saying rain is wrong. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 20-déc.-06, à 19:06, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 19-déc.-06, à 21:32, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my methodology to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is famous for its many paradoxical thoughts. It is certainly not a reductio against comp, given that we are not arriving at a genuine contradiction. It just happens that goodness is as unnameable as truth. Now, concerning this paradox, it seems to me intuitively comprehensible. If someone saves me from some horrible pain, then that is (arguably) good; but if he does that in the *name* of good, I can understand that this naming depreciates its action. Even if personally I am still benefiting from that situation, the naming could make me uneasy, and who knows what will be done under that or any name. A little uneasiness about what someone might do in the future is hardly enough to transform a good act into a bad one. It seems you are saying that if the good samaritan claimed to have performed his kind act *for any reason whatsoever* it would become a bad act. That sounds like a reductio to me. Not at all. It becomes bad when he refers or justify his act in the *name* of any unnameable virtue. It's not clear what bad refers to in the above. It seems as though you are asserting an absolute standard of bad while claiming there can be no absolute standard of good. Not really. Someone acting in the name of truth, good etc. are bad. But someone acting in the name of bad are bad too. Note that I am considering an ideal situation, and I am lifting provable relations between ideal machines and the notion of truth by appeal to the platonist relastionship between truth and good (and beauty, ...). None of those sentences should be taken literally or what I am saying would be self-defeating. Moral things have to be understood by oneself or taught by examples ... Perhaps this is a place to invoke the second person point of view, which refers to intimate relations between a little number of individuals who can communicate and share first person point of view (but here too normative suggestions can destroy couples and families) in a non public way, and thus can say more without falling in the trap of making things normative. My personal judgment of good or bad would not be so clear cut. If someone does me an act of kindness I consider that good. If he refers it to some unameable virtue, e.g. he says he did it in the name of God or Capitalism, then I may consider it a little less good - but not bad. Locally. Of course I agree. Now with ideal machines there is a sense to say that even good things when made in the name of goods (or worse: imposed in the name of good) could lead to the bad, for those machines, in the long run. I do think that western religion have repeated that error, and this would explain why it is difficult to come back to the questioning which was at the roots of those religion. As animals, humans, like wolves, have developed efficient, but lobian-ethically-wrong recipe of life, of the kind the boss is right ... My approach of moral here is before all theoretical. The funny godel-lobian paradox here is that lobian morality is quasi self-defeating. Summed up and simplified, it like if the wise lobian machine told us Here is a good suggestion: never listen to any good suggestion. It is hard to define those unnanmeable virtue except that true is already one of those and good, just etc. are obvious derivative of true. But I must say that I am talking about some ideal case, and I can imagine context where nuance should be added. You can, for example, give a vaccine to a child. The child is unhappy about that because the vaccine has some distasteful taste or because he is afraid of needles, and you can make short your justification by saying it is for your own good. Here you don't act in the name of good, you just sum up a long explanation based on the idea that a disease is not good for your child. Well even here the complete explanation is better in the case the child has no idea of any relationship between the vaccine and the disease. But even the most complete possible explanation must end at some point with something that is explicitly or implicitly good. I totally agree with you. I think the basic biological rule has been that if Animal A eats Animal B, in *general* this is good for A and bad for B. At the level of species this is probably already false (most animals with predators needs their predators in the long run for reason of ecological equilibrium and/or natural eugenism). We would not be here in case drinking water would have been very painful. But I think we agree that this good, in the explanation, must be something the child accepts as a personal good. For human-goodness, sure. The question are human good is not a
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 19-déc.-06, à 21:32, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my methodology to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is famous for its many paradoxical thoughts. It is certainly not a reductio against comp, given that we are not arriving at a genuine contradiction. It just happens that goodness is as unnameable as truth. Now, concerning this paradox, it seems to me intuitively comprehensible. If someone saves me from some horrible pain, then that is (arguably) good; but if he does that in the *name* of good, I can understand that this naming depreciates its action. Even if personally I am still benefiting from that situation, the naming could make me uneasy, and who knows what will be done under that or any name. A little uneasiness about what someone might do in the future is hardly enough to transform a good act into a bad one. It seems you are saying that if the good samaritan claimed to have performed his kind act *for any reason whatsoever* it would become a bad act. That sounds like a reductio to me. Not at all. It becomes bad when he refers or justify his act in the *name* of any unnameable virtue. It is hard to define those unnanmeable virtue except that true is already one of those and good, just etc. are obvious derivative of true. But I must say that I am talking about some ideal case, and I can imagine context where nuance should be added. You can, for example, give a vaccine to a child. The child is unhappy about that because the vaccine has some distasteful taste or because he is afraid of needles, and you can make short your justification by saying it is for your own good. Here you don't act in the name of good, you just sum up a long explanation based on the idea that a disease is not good for your child. Well even here the complete explanation is better in the case the child has no idea of any relationship between the vaccine and the disease. Although a lobian machine has no idea of what is an absolutely true sentence, she can have genuine approximation of true for restricted set of sentences and I can imagine similar definable restricted notion of good. We can be reflective about one's actions and conclude *for ourselve* that they are good, but lobianity prevents correct machine to communicate it to others *as such*, if only to prevent any normative use of a notion like goodness. It prevents also idolatry toward names or descriptions of good, true, correct. With comp a judge can put a machine in jail, despite its total inability to ever judge the machine deserves jail. OK. That comports with my thought that good/bad are personal. So one can say, I did that because I think it was good to do so. And I can try to persuade you that you should think it good too. It's just wrong to assume that there is a knowable, objective good. Indeed. As far as there is a knowable good, it cannot be objective. As far as there is an objective good, it is not knowable *as such*. (It can be accidentally knowable but then not as an objective good. I guess this is related with the popular belief that Roads to Hell are paved with good intentions (approximate translation from the french). Some buddhist told this in some provocative way: if you really love buddha, kill it. (Not to take literally OC). Recall that once we interview a correct machine, be it Peano-Arithmetic PA, or the far richer Zermelo-Fraenkel, or even the angel Analysis+OmegaRule (which has infinite cognitive abilities), the first interesting thing such machines or entity say is that they will told us some bullshit or that they may told us some bullshit. So am I. Please, don't infer from that that I believe to be such a *correct* machine (that does not follow logically). I know I am lobian, assuming comp or (much) weaker. I don't know (and will never known) if I am consistent and I still less know if I am correct. Bruno Yes, I understand and agree with that. But you are using know in an absolute sense. In the everyday sense of uncertain, but probably correct belief, one can know many things - though of course not that one is consistent. OK. (To be sure I am indeed using know in an absolute sense, even in the theatetical sense: meaning that knowable p = p provable p). To split the hair a bit, if know is used with a nuance of probability we can know our consistency (obvious: we can bet on it), so that in your last assertion I would say you were also using know in the absolute sense. But I think we mainly agree. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 18-déc.-06, à 20:04, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: ... Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other ethical principles or commandments from God: With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp (and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made in the name of God is bad, even saving the planet from some attack by horrible monster ... That seems to be a reductio against comp. I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my methodology to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is famous for its many paradoxical thoughts. It is certainly not a reductio against comp, given that we are not arriving at a genuine contradiction. It just happens that goodness is as unnameable as truth. Now, concerning this paradox, it seems to me intuitively comprehensible. If someone saves me from some horrible pain, then that is (arguably) good; but if he does that in the *name* of good, I can understand that this naming depreciates its action. Even if personally I am still benefiting from that situation, the naming could make me uneasy, and who knows what will be done under that or any name. Witrh comp (and the ideal case of self-referentially correct machine) it is just impossible for a machine to do something good and at the same time telling she is doing something good ... (similar paradoxes are illustrated in taoist and buddhist tales). So one cannot be reflective about one's actions and conclude they are good? That sounds like nonsense. We can be reflective about one's actions and conclude *for ourselve* that they are good, but lobianity prevents correct machine to communicate it to others *as such*, if only to prevent any normative use of a notion like goodness. It prevents also idolatry toward names or descriptions of good, true, correct. With comp a judge can put a machine in jail, despite its total inability to ever judge the machine deserve jail. Some buddhist told this in some provocative way: if you really love buddha, kill it. (Not to take literally OC). Recall that once we interview a correct machine, be it Peano-Arithmetic PA, or the far richer Zermelo-Fraenkel, or even the angel Analysis+OmegaRule (which has infinite cognitive abilities), the first interesting thing such machines or entity say is that they will told us some bullshit or that they may told us some bullshit. So am I. Please, don't infer from that that I believe to be such a *correct* machine (that does not follow logically). I know I am lobian, assuming comp or (much) weaker. I don't know (and will never known) if I am consistent and I still less know if I am correct. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 18-déc.-06, à 20:04, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: ... Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other ethical principles or commandments from God: With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp (and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made in the name of God is bad, even saving the planet from some attack by horrible monster ... That seems to be a reductio against comp. I know it seems a little bit paradoxical, but then it is my methodology to take seriously the interview of the lobian machine, which is famous for its many paradoxical thoughts. It is certainly not a reductio against comp, given that we are not arriving at a genuine contradiction. It just happens that goodness is as unnameable as truth. Now, concerning this paradox, it seems to me intuitively comprehensible. If someone saves me from some horrible pain, then that is (arguably) good; but if he does that in the *name* of good, I can understand that this naming depreciates its action. Even if personally I am still benefiting from that situation, the naming could make me uneasy, and who knows what will be done under that or any name. A little uneasiness about what someone might do in the future is hardly enough to transform a good act into a bad one. It seems you are saying that if the good samaritan claimed to have performed his kind act *for any reason whatsoever* it would become a bad act. That sounds like a reductio to me. Witrh comp (and the ideal case of self-referentially correct machine) it is just impossible for a machine to do something good and at the same time telling she is doing something good ... (similar paradoxes are illustrated in taoist and buddhist tales). So one cannot be reflective about one's actions and conclude they are good? That sounds like nonsense. We can be reflective about one's actions and conclude *for ourselve* that they are good, but lobianity prevents correct machine to communicate it to others *as such*, if only to prevent any normative use of a notion like goodness. It prevents also idolatry toward names or descriptions of good, true, correct. With comp a judge can put a machine in jail, despite its total inability to ever judge the machine deserve jail. OK. That comports with my thought that good/bad are personal. So one can say, I did that because I think it was good to do so. And I can try to persuade you that you should think it good too. It's just wrong to assume that there is a knowable, objective good. Some buddhist told this in some provocative way: if you really love buddha, kill it. (Not to take literally OC). Recall that once we interview a correct machine, be it Peano-Arithmetic PA, or the far richer Zermelo-Fraenkel, or even the angel Analysis+OmegaRule (which has infinite cognitive abilities), the first interesting thing such machines or entity say is that they will told us some bullshit or that they may told us some bullshit. So am I. Please, don't infer from that that I believe to be such a *correct* machine (that does not follow logically). I know I am lobian, assuming comp or (much) weaker. I don't know (and will never known) if I am consistent and I still less know if I am correct. Bruno Yes, I understand and agree with that. But you are using know in an absolute sense. In the everyday sense of uncertain, but probably correct belief, one can know many things - though of course not that one is consistent. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 17-déc.-06, à 03:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Democratic system are more efficient to explore the political landscape and thus more efficient in probability to satisfy soul's natural attraction toward the good. The soul's natural attraction towards the good might be compared to the body's natural attraction to keep dry. OK. You might predict that every society would use umbrellas of some sort. OK. If a society did not use umbrellas, that would be surprising. OK. If they did not use them because they did not believe that rain is wet or because they believed that God in his mercy would make the raindrops miss them, then they would be *wrong*. OK. If they did not use them because they didn't want to despite the discomfort that getting wet causes them then they would be strange and foolish, but they would not be *wrong*. OK. There is a fundamental difference. ?OK. (I don't see the point). The analogous statements are: a1. umbrellas keep you dry a2. feeding the poor reduces their suffering We can agree on the definition of the words and on the facts asserted. If there is disagreement on the definition, for example if you were thinking of a teapot when you heard the term umbrella, then it would be a simple matter to show a picture of an umbrella and a teapot and resolve the misunderstanding. If there is a disagreement on whether umbrellas do in fact keep you dry, or whether feeding starving people reduces their suffering, then we could go out into the rain with and without an umbrella or interview a starving person before and after he has been fed, and reach agreement that way. In contrast, consider: b1. we should use umbrellas when going out in the rain b2. we should feed the poor if they are hungry We might expect that most people would agree with these statements. However, if there is disagreement, there is no way to resolve it. I could say that I don't care if I get wet, despite the discomfort, and I don't care if the poor starve, despite the fact that this will cause them suffering. I could even say that I do care about these things, but as part of my personal ethical system I don't believe it is good to use umbrellas or feed the poor. That last point is an interesting point, but to be sure it is even more going in the direction that there is no normative theory of good/bad. So if we are diverging on something it is perhaps that you believe there is a normative theory of truth ? All we can say is c1. IF you want keep yourself dry and if it is raining here and now then using an umbrella can help you with such or such probability. c2. If you want make that precise poor person less hungry (here and now) then by giving him food you will get success with such or such probability. All right ? (if not elaborate because it would mean I am missing something). Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other ethical principles or commandments from God: With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp (and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made in the name of God is bad, even saving the planet from some attack by horrible monster ... Witrh comp (and the ideal case of self-referentially correct machine) it is just impossible for a machine to do something good and at the same time telling she is doing something good ... (similar paradoxes are illustrate in taoist and buddhist tales). what I feel is what I feel, and that's all there is to it. Sure. You can try to persuade me that I should feel differently, That would be like a dentist asking his patient not to suffer ... but you can't do this by persuading me that I am wrong in my facts, my reasoning, or that we are defining terms differently. OK. If you agree with c1 and c2. (I have added c1 and c2 because the should can be use in the moral way, and then I agree with you; but it can be used in the conditional sense, in which case nuance must be added). I mean you cannot both 1) believe that umbrellas keep you dry, 2) pretend you want to keep yourself dry and then go out without umbrellas (assuming all the default assumptions, for example, don't give a counterexample like the problem is that my umbrella is 42 km high that would make things out of topics. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno Marchal wrote: ... Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other ethical principles or commandments from God: With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp (and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made in the name of God is bad, even saving the planet from some attack by horrible monster ... That seems to be a reductio against comp. Witrh comp (and the ideal case of self-referentially correct machine) it is just impossible for a machine to do something good and at the same time telling she is doing something good ... (similar paradoxes are illustrate in taoist and buddhist tales). So one cannot be reflective about one's actions and conclude they are good? That sounds like nonsense. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Bruno Marchal writes: The analogous statements are: a1. umbrellas keep you dry a2. feeding the poor reduces their suffering We can agree on the definition of the words and on the facts asserted. If there is disagreement on the definition, for example if you were thinking of a teapot when you heard the term umbrella, then it would be a simple matter to show a picture of an umbrella and a teapot and resolve the misunderstanding. If there is a disagreement on whether umbrellas do in fact keep you dry, or whether feeding starving people reduces their suffering, then we could go out into the rain with and without an umbrella or interview a starving person before and after he has been fed, and reach agreement that way. In contrast, consider: b1. we should use umbrellas when going out in the rain b2. we should feed the poor if they are hungry We might expect that most people would agree with these statements. However, if there is disagreement, there is no way to resolve it. I could say that I don't care if I get wet, despite the discomfort, and I don't care if the poor starve, despite the fact that this will cause them suffering. I could even say that I do care about these things, but as part of my personal ethical system I don't believe it is good to use umbrellas or feed the poor. That last point is an interesting point, but to be sure it is even more going in the direction that there is no normative theory of good/bad. So if we are diverging on something it is perhaps that you believe there is a normative theory of truth ? All we can say is c1. IF you want keep yourself dry and if it is raining here and now then using an umbrella can help you with such or such probability. c2. If you want make that precise poor person less hungry (here and now) then by giving him food you will get success with such or such probability. All right ? (if not elaborate because it would mean I am missing something). That's more or less the point I have been getting at. You can turn normative statements into descriptive ones by changing you ought into if you want to... you ought. Moreover, I don't have to justify it in terms of other ethical principles or commandments from God: With (a)comp, you have to NOT justify it in terms of God. With comp (and God = +/- Plotinus'one) we could justify that any *action* made in the name of God is bad, even saving the planet from some attack by horrible monster ... Witrh comp (and the ideal case of self-referentially correct machine) it is just impossible for a machine to do something good and at the same time telling she is doing something good ... (similar paradoxes are illustrate in taoist and buddhist tales). Any internet references for such tales? what I feel is what I feel, and that's all there is to it. Sure. You can try to persuade me that I should feel differently, That would be like a dentist asking his patient not to suffer ... If the feeling is a physical one, yes, but if it an opinion, an ethical belief, even a desire, peopel can be persuaded: that's what advertising and propaganda is about. but you can't do this by persuading me that I am wrong in my facts, my reasoning, or that we are defining terms differently. OK. If you agree with c1 and c2. (I have added c1 and c2 because the should can be use in the moral way, and then I agree with you; but it can be used in the conditional sense, in which case nuance must be added). I mean you cannot both 1) believe that umbrellas keep you dry, 2) pretend you want to keep yourself dry and then go out without umbrellas (assuming all the default assumptions, for example, don't give a counterexample like the problem is that my umbrella is 42 km high that would make things out of topics. OK: the problem is when should stands as an absolute. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Evil ? (was: Hypostases (was: Natural Order Belief)
Le 16-déc.-06, à 03:49, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Bruno Marchal writes: Le 15-déc.-06, à 02:04, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Who says the Nazis are wrong when they assert they are good? I was not saying that they were wrong. I was saying that they were bad. Who says this? All self-referentially correct machine sufficnetly rich to prove elementary theorems in arithmetic. For showing this it is just enough to accept that the notion of goodness is of a type having greater or equal complexity that the notion of consistency or truth (which is intuitively reasonable). To sum up: a lobian machine saying I am true is false. (note that saying I am provable makes it true by ... Lob's theorem itself!). A lobian machine asserting I am consistent is inconsistent (Godel) A lobian machine asserting I am intelligent is stupid, A lobian machine asserting I am stupid is ... stupid too (beginners are often wrong on this). A lobian machine asserting I am good is bad, A lobian machine asserting I am bad is bad (too!) A lobian machine asserting I am virtuous provably lacks virtue. (provably, not probably) Apparently self-referentially correct lobian machine are enough wise for never attributing to themselves any moral quality. They cannot judge their own defect in the matter. This doesn't help us decide what is good or bad though. Indeed. Take it as a good or a bad news (!). With comp there is no theory capable of deciding what is good and what is bad. Never. It is the reason why I say that the comp theory of bad/true is not normative. Like in math we can still apply the theory once we agree on minimal notion of good and bad, through atomic example on the kind: drinking water when thirsty is good, Eating sands when thirsty is bad, etc. Good and bad are just placeholders, like x and y. In third person communication. I *guess* everyone knows the 1-difference (between things like drinking water and eating sands for example). Good is when you say or feel something like whaooh, and bad is when you say something like Ouch!. We could look at a particular incident where capital punishment was proposed, let's say for murder. Everyone might agree on the facts of the crime and the effects of executing the perpetrator, but still strongly disagree about whether it is right or wrong. So of course the capital punishment debate does involve rational discussion and maybe some people will switch sides if appropriate evidence is presented, but in the end you will have a situation where there is just disagreement on an axiom. Again this shows that good/bad is not different from true/false, even just in arithmetic. Why is the consensus on arithmetic so much greater than the consensus on ethics and aesthetics? Because ethics and aesthetics modalities are of an higher order than arithmetic which can be considered as deeper and/or simpler. Classical arithmetical truth obeys classical logic which is the most efficient for describing platonia. Good and bad is related with the infinite self mirroring of an infinity of universal machines: it is infinitely more tricky, and in particular neither classical ethics nor aesthetics should be expected to follow classical logic. Recall the admittedly counterintuitive truth (admitting the consistency of Peano Arithmetic): the new theory obtained by adding to Peano arithmetic the statement that Peano arithmetic is inconsistent, is a consistent theory (albeit probably not reasonable, but what does that mean?). The elementary atoms of good and bad are related to what we have learned since life begun, like drinking water is good, self-burning is bad, or any elementary pleasure/pain qualia in company of some amount of self-referential correctness. You can describe what is pleasant, what is more likely to lead to you continuing to live, what is more likely to lead to the survival of the species, what is more likely to lead to happy lives for most people: I have no problem with that. You can also define good as that which is more likely to bring these things about: that's how I define it personally. NIce. This would mean we agree after all. However, although there may be no disagreement on whether depriving a proportion of the population of food will make them unhappy, even on whether it will bring about the destruction of the species, someone who thinks differently to me could still say that the starvation policy is good. Not if that someone is wise. Someone wise will explain the advantages, compares them to what you ask (so that he will listen too you). He/She will never use the word good. If he believes his idea is good, he will explain it. Only demagogs say my idea are goods, or I am with the truth. Why not God phones me and asks me to tell you that For example, he could say that starvation is noble in a way which outweighs harm to