>
> (a) I know I'm conscious
> (b) I know that you are intelligent, unless my senses are tricking me
(c) I assume that you are conscious but I don't know this, even if I can
be sure
> my senses are not tricking me, in the same way as I know (a) and (b).
>
> To give another example, we know that ma
>> culture and discipline blindness.
>
> Is seeing visible? What does it look like?
>
> Brent Meeker
>
Seeing.
Keep trying...you'll 'see it' It'll sink in eventually! It took a long
time for me and I'm nowhere near as bright as all you folks.
Colin Hales
--~--~-~--~~
>
> Colin, list,
>
>
> But, past a certain point, going over all these generalities stops
advancing the point and makes me sound fuddy-duddy. It sounds like you
have some further, and more-specific, ideas, which are the real energy
source behind your argument.
>
> Best, Ben Udell
Wow! Can you
Russell Standish writes:
> On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true
> > random
> > number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the
> > former
> > could possibly
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Russell Standish):
> > This may be coincidental, but I think not. Your PC is engineered to
> > avoid the effects of chaos to prevent this very thing occurring. Why
> > wouldn't nature do the same thing unless it were deliberately trying
> > to exploit randomness?
>
>
Brent Meeker writes:
> > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
> > just a working
> > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> > that if we dig into
> > quarks very deeply there is nothing "substantial" there at all, but sol
Le 25-août-06, à 02:31, 1Z a écrit :
> Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate.
It follows from the UDA that you cannot do that, unless you put
explicitly actual infinite in the "bare substrate", an then attach your
mind to it (how?).
> If it
> were impossible to at
Le 25-août-06, à 10:09, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> You would if it were the non-miraculous branches that were selectively
> pruned, although I guess that it is just this sort of pruning people
> would
> be asking of God (you would hardly need to pray that your coffee remain
> coffee). Neve
John,
Interesting, but from the point of view of the interview, this would be
cheating. If such sophisticated form of comp is justified, then by the
UDA reasoning, it has to be justified by the lobian machine. If it is
the case that such move is proposed by the lobian machine, I will let
you
Le 25-août-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit :
> AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
> not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
> of the UD.
It is you who come up with a notion of real existence. You are reifying
I don't know which theory.
>
> AR as a
Le 26-août-06, à 14:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
>
> Peter Jones writes:
>
That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't
have to believe any old programme is conscious.
It might be the case that only an indeterministic
one will do. A deterministic programme could
be e
Le 26-août-06, à 16:35, 1Z a écrit :
>
>> And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily
>> complex way, because any physical
>> system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate
>> mapping rules,
>
> That is not a fact.
It would make sense, indeed, only if
Le 26-août-06, à 22:44, Brent Meeker a écrit :
> I understand Peters objection to regarding a "mere bundle" of
> properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a
> propertyless
> substrate. Why not just say that some bundles of properties are
> instantiated and
> some aren't.
Le 26-août-06, à 17:39, Russell Standish a écrit :
> A non-computationalist will believe that the Multiverse contains
> conscious processes (if they believe in a Multiverse at all). However,
> they may disagree that the Multiverse is Turing emulable.
No. A computaionalist has no reason to bel
I have the feeling that we are discussing words. Everybody tries how to
'make sense' of them, in a personal "taste".
Colin expressed it in his usual sophisticated ways, Ben more
comprehensively, in many more words. The fact is: we observe the observer
(ourselves) and want to describe it to others.
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 25-août-06, à 02:31, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate.
>
> It follows from the UDA that you cannot do that, unless you put
> explicitly actual infinite in the "bare substrate",
I don't see why.
> an then attach your
> m
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Russell Standish writes:
>
> > On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > > Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a
> > > true random
> > > number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, on
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> a) The belief in a fictional 'objective view'. This is a view that is
> never had by anyone.
I don't think the "view" metaphior is very helpful.
There are more or less objective beliefs. What is
subjective about "2+2=4" ?
--~--~-~--~~~
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent meeker writes:
>
> > > But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am
> > > wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it
> > > up,
> > > tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up
>
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
> > > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
> > > just a working
> > > assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out
> > > that if we dig into
> > > quarks very deeply there is noth
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 26-août-06, à 22:44, Brent Meeker a écrit :
>
> > I understand Peters objection to regarding a "mere bundle" of
> > properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a
> > propertyless
> > substrate. Why not just say that some bundles of properties are
> >
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 25-août-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit :
>
> > AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
> > not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
> > of the UD.
>
>
> It is you who come up with a notion of real existence.
I am starting with the r
Russell Standish wrote:
> On Fri, Aug 25, 2006 at 04:48:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> > > The UD is
> > > quite possibly enough to emulate the full Multiverse (this is sort of
> > > where
> > > Bruno's partail results are pointing), which we know contain conscious
> > > processes.
> >
>
Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Come on, I have already insist on this. Understanding what really means
> "surviving through the yes doctor" = understanding that, in *that*
> case, we survive without doctor.
"Without the doctor" is computationalism+Platonism, not
computationalism.
--~--~-~--~
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes (quoting Russell Standish):
>
>
>>>This may be coincidental, but I think not. Your PC is engineered to
>>>avoid the effects of chaos to prevent this very thing occurring. Why
>>>wouldn't nature do the same thing unless it were deliberately trying
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>
>
>>>Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is
>>>just a working
>>>assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out that
>>>if we dig into
>>>quarks very deeply there is nothing "subst
- Original Message -
From: "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Everything List"
Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 12:14 PM
Subject: Re: evidence blindness
>
>
> Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
>
> > a) The belief in a fictional 'objective view'. This is a view that is
> > never had by anyone.
>
Pete
- Original Message -
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "Brent Meeker"
Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 7:52 AM
Subject: RE: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker writes:
> > Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties
is just a w
1Z wrote:
> > > AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is
> > > not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence
> > > of the UD.
> >
> >
> > It is you who come up with a notion of real existence.
>
> I am starting with the reality my own existence.
>
> That is
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> - Original Message -
> From: "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: "Everything List"
> Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 12:14 PM
> Subject: Re: evidence blindness
>
>
> >
> >
> > Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
> >
> > > a) The belief in a fictional 'objective view'. This is
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> We all (excuse me to use 1st pers form) are well educated smart people and
> can say something upon everything. It is a rarity to read:
> I was wrong you are right - period.
John
You're right! Every time I post on these topics I *know* I'm wrong: I
just don't know how
On Sun, Aug 27, 2006 at 09:31:15PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious is
> assumed to be
> preposterous, for no good reason. I believe that I could have acted
> differently even with
> identical environmental inputs, whic
Hi Folks,
I have been reading Bruno's wonderful Elsavier paper and have been
wondering about this notion of a "Uncertainty measure". Does not the
existence of such a measure demand the existence of a breaking of the
perfect symmetry that is obvious in a situation when all possible outcomes
Bruno Marchal writes:
> > Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a
> > true random
> > number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only
> > the former
> > could possibly be conscious? I suppose it is possible, but I see no
> > reason to believe
Bruno marchal writes:
> Le 26-août-06, à 16:35, 1Z a écrit :
>
> >
> >> And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily
> >> complex way, because any physical
> >> system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate
> >> mapping rules,
> >
> > That is not a fact
Bruno wrote...
>
> > KURTZ S. A., 1983, On the Random Oracle Hypothesis, Information and
> > Control, 57, pp. 40-47.
> >
I recall reading this paper, and the followup entitled "The Random
Oracle Hypothesis is False" by Chang et al.
>From recollection though, the claim was of superior algorit
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