RE: evidence blindness

2006-08-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Colin Hales writes: the fact that intelligent behaviour is third person observable but consciousness is not. Stathis Papaioannou OK. Let me get this straight. Scientist A stares at something, say X, with consciousness. A sees X. Scientist A posits evidence of X from a third

Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...

2006-08-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it up, tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up then maybe it is just

Re: evidence blindness

2006-08-27 Thread Benjamin Udell
Colin, list, I've looked back over your previous posts. It seems like scientists (I'm not one) talk about consciousness in two different senses, in two different roles -- consciousness for clear and sure apprehension of logic evidence, and consciousness as a phenomenon, an appearance. It's

Re: evidence blindness

2006-08-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Colin Hales wrote: Most of the time I'm observing something else. When I try to observe consciouness, I find I am instead thinking of this or that particular thing, and not consciousness itself. Consciousness can only be consciousness *of* something. Got that? Brent Meeker Absolutely.

RE: evidence blindness

2006-08-27 Thread Colin Geoffrey Hales
(a) I know I'm conscious (b) I know that you are intelligent, unless my senses are tricking me (c) I assume that you are conscious but I don't know this, even if I can be sure my senses are not tricking me, in the same way as I know (a) and (b). To give another example, we know that many

Re: evidence blindness

2006-08-27 Thread Colin Geoffrey Hales
culture and discipline blindness. Is seeing visible? What does it look like? Brent Meeker Seeing. Keep trying...you'll 'see it' It'll sink in eventually! It took a long time for me and I'm nowhere near as bright as all you folks. Colin Hales

Re: evidence blindness

2006-08-27 Thread Colin Geoffrey Hales
Colin, list, huge snip But, past a certain point, going over all these generalities stops advancing the point and makes me sound fuddy-duddy. It sounds like you have some further, and more-specific, ideas, which are the real energy source behind your argument. Best, Ben Udell Wow! Can

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-08-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Russell Standish writes: On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true random number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the former could possibly be

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-08-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Russell Standish): This may be coincidental, but I think not. Your PC is engineered to avoid the effects of chaos to prevent this very thing occurring. Why wouldn't nature do the same thing unless it were deliberately trying to exploit randomness? In

RE: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...

2006-08-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Brent Meeker writes: Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is just a working assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out that if we dig into quarks very deeply there is nothing substantial there at all, but solid

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 25-août-06, à 02:31, 1Z a écrit : Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate. It follows from the UDA that you cannot do that, unless you put explicitly actual infinite in the bare substrate, an then attach your mind to it (how?). If it were impossible to attach

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 25-août-06, à 10:09, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : You would if it were the non-miraculous branches that were selectively pruned, although I guess that it is just this sort of pruning people would be asking of God (you would hardly need to pray that your coffee remain coffee).

Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'

2006-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
John, Interesting, but from the point of view of the interview, this would be cheating. If such sophisticated form of comp is justified, then by the UDA reasoning, it has to be justified by the lobian machine. If it is the case that such move is proposed by the lobian machine, I will let you

Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...

2006-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 25-août-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit : AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence of the UD. It is you who come up with a notion of real existence. You are reifying I don't know which theory. AR as a

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 26-août-06, à 14:01, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Peter Jones writes: That doesn't follow. Comutationalists don't have to believe any old programme is conscious. It might be the case that only an indeterministic one will do. A deterministic programme could be exposed as a programme

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 26-août-06, à 16:35, 1Z a écrit : And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily complex way, because any physical system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate mapping rules, That is not a fact. It would make sense, indeed, only if the map

Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...

2006-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 26-août-06, à 22:44, Brent Meeker a écrit : I understand Peters objection to regarding a mere bundle of properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a propertyless substrate. Why not just say that some bundles of properties are instantiated and some aren't. I

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-08-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
Le 26-août-06, à 17:39, Russell Standish a écrit : A non-computationalist will believe that the Multiverse contains conscious processes (if they believe in a Multiverse at all). However, they may disagree that the Multiverse is Turing emulable. No. A computaionalist has no reason to

Re: evidence blindness

2006-08-27 Thread jamikes
I have the feeling that we are discussing words. Everybody tries how to 'make sense' of them, in a personal taste. Colin expressed it in his usual sophisticated ways, Ben more comprehensively, in many more words. The fact is: we observe the observer (ourselves) and want to describe it to others.

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-08-27 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 25-août-06, à 02:31, 1Z a écrit : Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate. It follows from the UDA that you cannot do that, unless you put explicitly actual infinite in the bare substrate, I don't see why. an then attach your mind to it

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-08-27 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Russell Standish writes: On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true random number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the

Re: evidence blindness

2006-08-27 Thread 1Z
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: a) The belief in a fictional 'objective view'. This is a view that is never had by anyone. I don't think the view metaphior is very helpful. There are more or less objective beliefs. What is subjective about 2+2=4 ?

Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...

2006-08-27 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent meeker writes: But even existence can be defined as a bundle of properties. If I am wondering whether the pencil on my desk exists I can look at it, pick it up, tap it and so on. If my hand passes through it when I try to pick it up then maybe

Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...

2006-08-27 Thread 1Z
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is just a working assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out that if we dig into quarks very deeply there is nothing substantial

Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...

2006-08-27 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 26-août-06, à 22:44, Brent Meeker a écrit : I understand Peters objection to regarding a mere bundle of properties as existent. But I don't understand why one needs a propertyless substrate. Why not just say that some bundles of properties are instantiated

Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...

2006-08-27 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 25-août-06, à 23:24, 1Z a écrit : AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence of the UD. It is you who come up with a notion of real existence. I am starting with the reality my

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-08-27 Thread 1Z
Russell Standish wrote: On Fri, Aug 25, 2006 at 04:48:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: The UD is quite possibly enough to emulate the full Multiverse (this is sort of where Bruno's partail results are pointing), which we know contain conscious processes. Of course a

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-08-27 Thread 1Z
Bruno Marchal wrote: Come on, I have already insist on this. Understanding what really means surviving through the yes doctor = understanding that, in *that* case, we survive without doctor. Without the doctor is computationalism+Platonism, not computationalism.

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-08-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes (quoting Russell Standish): This may be coincidental, but I think not. Your PC is engineered to avoid the effects of chaos to prevent this very thing occurring. Why wouldn't nature do the same thing unless it were deliberately trying to exploit

Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...

2006-08-27 Thread Brent Meeker
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Saying that there is a material substrate which has certain properties is just a working assumption to facilitate thinking about the real world. It may turn out that if we dig into quarks very deeply there is nothing substantial there at

Re: evidence blindness

2006-08-27 Thread jamikes
- Original Message - From: 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 12:14 PM Subject: Re: evidence blindness Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: a) The belief in a fictional 'objective view'. This is a view that is never

Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...

2006-08-27 Thread jamikes
- Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Brent Meeker everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 7:52 AM Subject: RE: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really... Brent Meeker writes: Saying that there is a material substrate which has

Re: Rép: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...

2006-08-27 Thread David Nyman
1Z wrote: AR as a claim about truth is implied by comoputationalism, and is not enough to support the real (=as real as I am) existence of the UD. It is you who come up with a notion of real existence. I am starting with the reality my own existence. That is an *empirical*

Re: evidence blindness

2006-08-27 Thread 1Z
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: - Original Message - From: 1Z [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Sunday, August 27, 2006 12:14 PM Subject: Re: evidence blindness Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: a) The belief in a fictional 'objective

Re: evidence blindness

2006-08-27 Thread David Nyman
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: We all (excuse me to use 1st pers form) are well educated smart people and can say something upon everything. It is a rarity to read: I was wrong you are right - period. John You're right! Every time I post on these topics I *know* I'm wrong: I just don't know how

Re: computationalism and supervenience

2006-08-27 Thread Russell Standish
On Sun, Aug 27, 2006 at 09:31:15PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious is assumed to be preposterous, for no good reason. I believe that I could have acted differently even with identical environmental inputs, which is

A question about the Uncertainty Measure

2006-08-27 Thread Stephen Paul King
Hi Folks, I have been reading Bruno's wonderful Elsavier paper and have been wondering about this notion of a Uncertainty measure. Does not the existence of such a measure demand the existence of a breaking of the perfect symmetry that is obvious in a situation when all possible outcomes

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-08-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno Marchal writes: Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true random number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the former could possibly be conscious? I suppose it is possible, but I see no reason to believe that it

RE: computationalism and supervenience

2006-08-27 Thread Stathis Papaioannou
Bruno marchal writes: Le 26-août-06, à 16:35, 1Z a écrit : And since the computer may be built and programmed in an arbitrarily complex way, because any physical system can be mapped onto any computation with the appropriate mapping rules, That is not a fact. It would