John,
On 06 Mar 2011, at 22:10, John Mikes wrote:
Andrew and Bruno:
(Re: Andrew's discussion below): according to what I pretend to
understand of Bruno's position, the math' universe (numbers and
what they 'build' as the 'world') is more fundamental than the
application we call
Hi John,
On 06 Mar 2011, at 22:27, John Mikes wrote:
On Sun, Mar 6, 2011 at 3:53 PM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.net
wrote:
Is the causes word even necessary? Would it not be accurate to
say that a change in information = a change in our description,
unless you are assuming
On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any
world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not
conscious
at all in our terms. It could, provided enough environment and
On 06 Mar 2011, at 16:16, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I suspect we all may.
Wong states that, important as a grand unified theory might be,
...
But if most histories are equally likely, and most of them are random and
unpredictable
and weird in the sense that suddenly crocodiles fly by, then why can we predict
rather
reliably that none of those weird histories will happen?
From: marc...@ulb.ac.be
To:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 10:47, Digital Physics wrote:
But if most histories are equally likely, and most of them are
random and unpredictable
and weird in the sense that suddenly crocodiles fly by, then why can
we predict rather
reliably that none of those weird histories will happen?
From:
On Mar 6, 7:21 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any
world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious
at all in our terms. It could, provided enough
On Mar 7, 9:30 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 16:16, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com wrote:
I suspect we all may.
Wong
You write white rabbits (flying crocodiles) are not random structures. They
are aberrant
consistent extensions, a bit like in our nocturnal dreams. I agree that white
rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random structures. But you
also claim that most will consider their histories
On 07 Mar 2011, at 15:10, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 9:30 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 16:16, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 5:49 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
On 04 Mar 2011, at 17:31, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 4, 2:20 pm, Andrew Soltau andrewsol...@gmail.com
On Mar 7, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You haven;t explained why they should be dealing with
consc. in the first place. Surely it is prima facie psychology.
There is no human observation without consciousness.
There can be no observations without sense organs,
but it
On 07 Mar 2011, at 15:26, Digital Physics wrote:
You write white rabbits (flying crocodiles) are not random
structures. They are aberrant
consistent extensions, a bit like in our nocturnal dreams. I agree
that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random
structures.
On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:12, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
You haven;t explained why they should be dealing with
consc. in the first place. Surely it is prima facie psychology.
There is no human observation without consciousness.
There can be no
On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:41, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 07 Mar 2011, at 16:12, 1Z wrote:
Reduction is not elimination
Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
reduction, but it does entail ontological reduction.
Please read:
Ontological reduction does not
I agree that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those of random
structures.
It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.
You mean the short program that computes the entire set! But this is irrelevant
here: to predict a concrete individual history, we
On 07 Mar 2011, at 17:26, Digital Physics wrote:
I agree that white rabbits have programs much shorter than those
of random structures.
It depends. Very short programs can generate all random structures.
You mean the short program that computes the entire set! But this is
irrelevant
On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any
world except the virtual world of the MG, which is to say not conscious
at all in our terms. It
On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
The way I see it the MG consciousness would not be conscious of any
world except the virtual
On 3/7/2011 12:01 PM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
The way I see it the MG consciousness
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Reduction is not elimination
snip
Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
*elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*.
Bruno, this is what I was trying to say some time ago to Peter. Why
On Mar 7, 8:48 pm, David Nyman da...@davidnyman.com wrote:
On 7 March 2011 15:56, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:
Reduction is not elimination
snip
Ontological reduction does not necessarily entail epistemological
*elimination*, but it does entail ontological *elimination*.
On Mar 7, 8:28 pm, Brent Meeker meeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/7/2011 12:01 PM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011, at 20:21, Brent Meeker wrote:
On 3/6/2011 5:07 AM, 1Z wrote:
On 3/7/2011 4:15 PM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 8:28 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.com wrote:
On 3/7/2011 12:01 PM, 1Z wrote:
On Mar 7, 6:29 pm, Brent Meekermeeke...@dslextreme.comwrote:
On 3/7/2011 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 06 Mar 2011,
On 8 March 2011 00:11, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote:
It's rather well known that reductivism and eliminativism are
not equivalent positions, for instance.
snip
And reductive identity theorists say mind is a bunch
of micro physical goings-on, whereas their eliminativist
opponents say mind
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