subject:"Re\: Sean Carroll gets past \"Step 3\" of the UDA"



On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 2:24:05 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
>
> On Tue, Sep 24, 2019 at 4:06 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
> *> According to Brent, Laplace was aware that due to inherent measurement 
>> inaccuracies we cannot know the exact configuation of the universe at any 
>> time, so in fact we can't predict its past and future with any accuracy 
>> (only for relatively short durations). But this is what Carroll omitted in 
>> his use of Laplace *
>
>
> Alan, for god's sake, your digging yourself into a deeper and deeper hole! 
> Read the man's damn book before you do any more pontificating about Carroll 
> unless you enjoy publicly making a fool of yourself.
>
>   John K Clark
>

It's core claim is crap for the masses, so I won't waste my time. Enjoy 
your fantasy. AG 

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

On Tue, Sep 24, 2019 at 4:06 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

*> According to Brent, Laplace was aware that due to inherent measurement
> inaccuracies we cannot know the exact configuation of the universe at any
> time, so in fact we can't predict its past and future with any accuracy
> (only for relatively short durations). But this is what Carroll omitted in
> his use of Laplace *


Alan, for god's sake, your digging yourself into a deeper and deeper hole!
Read the man's damn book before you do any more pontificating about Carroll
unless you enjoy publicly making a fool of yourself.

  John K Clark


>

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA



On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 12:32:13 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Sep 24, 2019 at 2:27 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 12:19:40 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 11:59 AM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> >>  Sean Carroll:
>
> So Isaac Newton came up with the rules of classical mechanics in the 
> 1600s, but it wasn't until Laplace around the year 1800 that this 
> implication of classical mechanics was realized.
> It's a clockwork universe.  That the way classical mechanics works is 
> if you tell me the state of a system right now at one moment by which in 
> classical mechanics you would mean the position and the velocity of every 
> part, and you knew the laws of physics and you had arbitrarily large 
> computational capacity, 
> Laplace said of vast intelligence okay then to that vast intelligence 
> the past and future would be as determined and known as the present was 
> because that's the clockwork universe is deterministic everything is 
> fixed 
> once you know the present moment.
>
>  
 *> But Laplace was wrong in one very important respect. One can never 
 know the exact position and momentum of any particle, let alone the entire 
 universe. There are no perfect measurements! Further, the situation is 
 further aggravated by the Uncertainty Principle. In sum, using classical 
 mechanics the future is NOT determined by its present, imprecise 
 configuration. Not only is Laplace mistaken, but Carroll as well, who 
 should know better. AG *

>>>
>>> Oh for christ sake! That remark is as stupid as your crap about the 
>>> flying saucer people in New Mexico. Do you really think Sean Carroll, a 
>>> professor of physics at one of the best universities in the world, 
>>> doesn't know that?!  
>>>
>>> John K Clark
>>>
>>
>> *> Before you shoot your mouth off, read what I wrote in response to 
>> Brent. Sean DOES know better, but he deliberately twisted Laplace's view to 
>> fit his foolish agenda. Not very honest. As for flying saucers, they're 
>> really much more probable than* [...]
>>
>
> You sir are an ass.
>
> John K Clark
>

I will also note your dishonesty, or shall we say cowardice, in trucating 
my comment. AG 

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA



On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 12:32:13 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tue, Sep 24, 2019 at 2:27 PM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 12:19:40 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>>
>>> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 11:59 AM Alan Grayson  
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> >>  Sean Carroll:
>
> So Isaac Newton came up with the rules of classical mechanics in the 
> 1600s, but it wasn't until Laplace around the year 1800 that this 
> implication of classical mechanics was realized.
> It's a clockwork universe.  That the way classical mechanics works is 
> if you tell me the state of a system right now at one moment by which in 
> classical mechanics you would mean the position and the velocity of every 
> part, and you knew the laws of physics and you had arbitrarily large 
> computational capacity, 
> Laplace said of vast intelligence okay then to that vast intelligence 
> the past and future would be as determined and known as the present was 
> because that's the clockwork universe is deterministic everything is 
> fixed 
> once you know the present moment.
>
>  
 *> But Laplace was wrong in one very important respect. One can never 
 know the exact position and momentum of any particle, let alone the entire 
 universe. There are no perfect measurements! Further, the situation is 
 further aggravated by the Uncertainty Principle. In sum, using classical 
 mechanics the future is NOT determined by its present, imprecise 
 configuration. Not only is Laplace mistaken, but Carroll as well, who 
 should know better. AG *

>>>
>>> Oh for christ sake! That remark is as stupid as your crap about the 
>>> flying saucer people in New Mexico. Do you really think Sean Carroll, a 
>>> professor of physics at one of the best universities in the world, 
>>> doesn't know that?!  
>>>
>>> John K Clark
>>>
>>
>> *> Before you shoot your mouth off, read what I wrote in response to 
>> Brent. Sean DOES know better, but he deliberately twisted Laplace's view to 
>> fit his foolish agenda. Not very honest. As for flying saucers, they're 
>> really much more probable than* [...]
>>
>
> You sir are an ass.
>
> John K Clark
>

According to Brent, Laplace was aware that due to inherent measurement 
inaccuracies we cannot know the exact configuation of the universe at any 
time, so in fact we can't predict its past and future with any accuracy 
(only for relatively short durations). But this is what Carroll omitted in 
his use of Laplace and the alleged predictable universe under CM, which was 
undone by QM.  AG

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

On Tue, Sep 24, 2019 at 2:27 PM Alan Grayson  wrote:

>
>
> On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 12:19:40 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>>
>> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 11:59 AM Alan Grayson 
>> wrote:
>>
>> >>  Sean Carroll:

 So Isaac Newton came up with the rules of classical mechanics in the
 1600s, but it wasn't until Laplace around the year 1800 that this
 implication of classical mechanics was realized.
 It's a clockwork universe.  That the way classical mechanics works is
 if you tell me the state of a system right now at one moment by which in
 classical mechanics you would mean the position and the velocity of every
 part, and you knew the laws of physics and you had arbitrarily large
 computational capacity,
 Laplace said of vast intelligence okay then to that vast intelligence
 the past and future would be as determined and known as the present was
 because that's the clockwork universe is deterministic everything is fixed
 once you know the present moment.

>>> *> But Laplace was wrong in one very important respect. One can never
>>> know the exact position and momentum of any particle, let alone the entire
>>> universe. There are no perfect measurements! Further, the situation is
>>> further aggravated by the Uncertainty Principle. In sum, using classical
>>> mechanics the future is NOT determined by its present, imprecise
>>> configuration. Not only is Laplace mistaken, but Carroll as well, who
>>> should know better. AG *
>>>
>>
>> Oh for christ sake! That remark is as stupid as your crap about the
>> flying saucer people in New Mexico. Do you really think Sean Carroll, a
>> professor of physics at one of the best universities in the world,
>> doesn't know that?!
>>
>> John K Clark
>>
>
> *> Before you shoot your mouth off, read what I wrote in response to
> Brent. Sean DOES know better, but he deliberately twisted Laplace's view to
> fit his foolish agenda. Not very honest. As for flying saucers, they're
> really much more probable than* [...]
>

You sir are an ass.

John K Clark

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA



On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 12:19:40 PM UTC-6, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 11:59 AM Alan Grayson  > wrote:
>
> >>  Sean Carroll:
>>>
>>> So Isaac Newton came up with the rules of classical mechanics in the 
>>> 1600s, but it wasn't until Laplace around the year 1800 that this 
>>> implication of classical mechanics was realized.
>>> It's a clockwork universe.  That the way classical mechanics works is if 
>>> you tell me the state of a system right now at one moment by which in 
>>> classical mechanics you would mean the position and the velocity of every 
>>> part, and you knew the laws of physics and you had arbitrarily large 
>>> computational capacity, 
>>> Laplace said of vast intelligence okay then to that vast intelligence 
>>> the past and future would be as determined and known as the present was 
>>> because that's the clockwork universe is deterministic everything is fixed 
>>> once you know the present moment.
>>>
>>>  
>> *> But Laplace was wrong in one very important respect. One can never 
>> know the exact position and momentum of any particle, let alone the entire 
>> universe. There are no perfect measurements! Further, the situation is 
>> further aggravated by the Uncertainty Principle. In sum, using classical 
>> mechanics the future is NOT determined by its present, imprecise 
>> configuration. Not only is Laplace mistaken, but Carroll as well, who 
>> should know better. AG *
>>
>
> Oh for christ sake! That remark is as stupid as your crap about the flying 
> saucer people in New Mexico. Do you really think Sean Carroll, a professor 
> of physics at one of the best universities in the world, doesn't know 
> that?!  
>
> John K Clark
>

Before you shoot your mouth off, read what I wrote in response to Brent. 
Sean DOES know better, but he deliberately twisted Laplace's view to fit 
his foolish agenda. Not very honest. As for flying saucers, they're really 
much more probable than believing that some fool who does a double slit 
experiment can create possibly uncountable worlds replete with stars, 
galaxies, and living being; or nothing at all like that. I call it hubris 
on steroids, but to some who are misguided, it seems quite normal. AG 

>
>
>
>  
>
>>
>>> Now quantum mechanics comes along and throws a spanner into the works a 
>>> little bit if you're a many-worlds person Laplace is demon is still 
>>> possible.
>>> So if you know the wave function of the universe exactly and you have 
>>> infinite calculational capacity you could predict the past and the future 
>>> with perfect accuracy.
>>> But! what you're predicting is all of the branches of the wavefunction 
>>> so any individual person inside the wavefunction still experiences 
>>> apparently random events.
>>>
>>> Right, so *you can't predict what will happen to you even if you can 
>>> predict what will happen to the entire universe*.
>>>
>>>
>>> This is the essence of Step 3 of the UDA.  In an experiment involving 
>>> duplication of persons, apparent randomness emerges.  There is no actual 
>>> randomness in the complete system, but individual experiences will have the 
>>> characteristic of randomness, in the sense of not being able to make 
>>> definite predictions concerning their experiences.  Sean Carroll gets 
>>> this.  Max Tegmark gets this.  You got it at least once 6 years ago on this 
>>> list when you agreed that a forking computer process containing AIs could 
>>> not predict which process they would end up in.  This is enough for you to 
>>> proceed to the next step, which adds only a time delay to one of the 
>>> duplicates.  You are almost there.
>>>
>>> Jason
>>>  
>>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>> Now quantum mechanics comes along and throws a spanner into the works a 
>>> little bit if you're a many-worlds person Laplace is demon is still 
>>> possible.
>>> So if you know the wave function of the universe exactly and you have 
>>> infinite calculational capacity you could predict the past and the future 
>>> with perfect accuracy.
>>> But! what you're predicting is all of the branches of the wavefunction 
>>> so any individual person inside the wavefunction still experiences 
>>> apparently random events.
>>>
>>> Right, so *you can't predict what will happen to you even if you can 
>>> predict what will happen to the entire universe*.
>>>
>>>
>>> This is the essence of Step 3 of the UDA.  In an experiment involving 
>>> duplication of persons, apparent randomness emerges.  There is no actual 
>>> randomness in the complete system, but individual experiences will have the 
>>> characteristic of randomness, in the sense of not being able to make 
>>> definite predictions concerning their experiences.  Sean Carroll gets 
>>> this.  Max Tegmark gets this.  You got it at least once 6 years ago on this 
>>> list when you agreed that a forking computer process containing AIs could 
>>> not predict which process they would end up in.  This is enough for you to 
>>> proceed to the next step,

Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 11:59 AM Alan Grayson 
wrote:

>>  Sean Carroll:
>>
>> So Isaac Newton came up with the rules of classical mechanics in the
>> 1600s, but it wasn't until Laplace around the year 1800 that this
>> implication of classical mechanics was realized.
>> It's a clockwork universe.  That the way classical mechanics works is if
>> you tell me the state of a system right now at one moment by which in
>> classical mechanics you would mean the position and the velocity of every
>> part, and you knew the laws of physics and you had arbitrarily large
>> computational capacity,
>> Laplace said of vast intelligence okay then to that vast intelligence the
>> past and future would be as determined and known as the present was because
>> that's the clockwork universe is deterministic everything is fixed once you
>> know the present moment.
>>
>>
> *> But Laplace was wrong in one very important respect. One can never know
> the exact position and momentum of any particle, let alone the entire
> universe. There are no perfect measurements! Further, the situation is
> further aggravated by the Uncertainty Principle. In sum, using classical
> mechanics the future is NOT determined by its present, imprecise
> configuration. Not only is Laplace mistaken, but Carroll as well, who
> should know better. AG *
>

Oh for christ sake! That remark is as stupid as your crap about the flying
saucer people in New Mexico. Do you really think Sean Carroll, a professor
of physics at one of the best universities in the world, doesn't know
that?!

John K Clark





>
>> Now quantum mechanics comes along and throws a spanner into the works a
>> little bit if you're a many-worlds person Laplace is demon is still
>> possible.
>> So if you know the wave function of the universe exactly and you have
>> infinite calculational capacity you could predict the past and the future
>> with perfect accuracy.
>> But! what you're predicting is all of the branches of the wavefunction so
>> any individual person inside the wavefunction still experiences apparently
>> random events.
>>
>> Right, so *you can't predict what will happen to you even if you can
>> predict what will happen to the entire universe*.
>>
>>
>> This is the essence of Step 3 of the UDA.  In an experiment involving
>> duplication of persons, apparent randomness emerges.  There is no actual
>> randomness in the complete system, but individual experiences will have the
>> characteristic of randomness, in the sense of not being able to make
>> definite predictions concerning their experiences.  Sean Carroll gets
>> this.  Max Tegmark gets this.  You got it at least once 6 years ago on this
>> list when you agreed that a forking computer process containing AIs could
>> not predict which process they would end up in.  This is enough for you to
>> proceed to the next step, which adds only a time delay to one of the
>> duplicates.  You are almost there.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
>
>
>>
>> Now quantum mechanics comes along and throws a spanner into the works a
>> little bit if you're a many-worlds person Laplace is demon is still
>> possible.
>> So if you know the wave function of the universe exactly and you have
>> infinite calculational capacity you could predict the past and the future
>> with perfect accuracy.
>> But! what you're predicting is all of the branches of the wavefunction so
>> any individual person inside the wavefunction still experiences apparently
>> random events.
>>
>> Right, so *you can't predict what will happen to you even if you can
>> predict what will happen to the entire universe*.
>>
>>
>> This is the essence of Step 3 of the UDA.  In an experiment involving
>> duplication of persons, apparent randomness emerges.  There is no actual
>> randomness in the complete system, but individual experiences will have the
>> characteristic of randomness, in the sense of not being able to make
>> definite predictions concerning their experiences.  Sean Carroll gets
>> this.  Max Tegmark gets this.  You got it at least once 6 years ago on this
>> list when you agreed that a forking computer process containing AIs could
>> not predict which process they would end up in.  This is enough for you to
>> proceed to the next step, which adds only a time delay to one of the
>> duplicates.  You are almost there.
>>
>> Jason
>>
>>
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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 7:23 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

>> I think you need to indicate how, out of the set of all computations,
>> you can pick the correct ones from the incorrect ones without the help of
>> matter that obeys the laws of physics.
>>
>
> *> How do you suppose the laws of physics pick out the correct physical
> outcomes from among all possibilities? *
>

You don't have to explain why a phenomena works the way it does to prove it
does in fact work that way. I don't need to explain how physical law gained
the ability to tell the difference between things that work and things that
don't because I have concrete (pun intended) proof that it does in fact
have that ability. If physical law says a bridge will not collapse under a
given load then it won't collapse, if it says it will then you'd better not
go on that bridge. That's why bridge engineers study physics and not p-adic
arithmetic.

> > *You presume there is a physical world governed by physical laws.*
>

Yes.

>   > *But you deny an arithmetical world governed by arithmetical laws. *
>

I don't deny that at all, but there are a infinite number of self
consistent arithmetical worlds, including the 3-adic world where 300 is
smaller than 8/45 because in that world 300 is only 1/3 distance units from
zero but 8/45 is 9 units. However out of that infinite number of ways
distance along the number line could be measured one of them is unique, it
stands out for only one reason, it is the only one that is consistent with
physical law, and that is the reason we teach that one and only that one to
our children, and that is the reason first graders say 2+2=4 and the reason
third graders say 300 is larger than 8/45.

> > *Yet, assuming an arithmetical world governed by arithmetical laws, you
> can derive the appearance of a physical universe governed by physical laws.*
>

Baloney! There is no way somebody can start with nothing but arithmetic and
derive the laws of Newton Einstein and Quantum Mechanics without also
deriving a infinite number of other physical laws that do NOT conform with
experimental observation. No way.

>> I'm very surprised that as soon as you mentioned the Planck Time in the
>> above you didn't realize you had left the world of pure dimensionless number
>> s and was talking numbers with physical units associated with them, like
>> measures of time and space and mass and energy and electrical charge.
>>
>
> *> If you think physical laws are computable,*
>

I think physical laws can make computations, and if a clever programer has
access to a physical Turing Machine he can use a few simple physical laws
to predict what will happen when a huge number of those simple laws
interact in astronomically complex ways. That's what a meteorologist does
when he makes a computer model of a hurricane.

> * > then time, space, mass, etc. can all be reduced to computation (and
> computation is the manipulation of pure numbers).*
>

There is no way pure arithmetic can come up with the Planck Time, it can't
find anything special about the number 5.39245 *10^-44 *seconds* because it
is *not* a pure number, there is no way pure arithmetic can know what the
hell a second is, or time in general, or space, or electrical charge, or
angular momentum or...

John K Clark

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

2019-09-24 Thread Philip Thrift



On Tuesday, September 24, 2019 at 8:40:57 AM UTC-5, John Clark wrote:
>
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 4:22 PM Jason Resch  > wrote:
>
> > *This Halloween will mark 6 years since you agreed with Step 3,*
>
>
> *BULLSHIT! *
>
> This is the entire post and even though 6 years has passed I stand by 
> every word and wouldn't change anything:
>
> On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch  > wrote:
>
> *>  A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 
>> 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball 
>> changing color*
>
>
> Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until 
> there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a 
> red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they 
> fork. It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the 
> simulation to make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls 
> that created 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision 
> made outside the simulation would be indistinguishable from being random, 
> that is to say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure 
> out what that decision would be.  
>
> *>  B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number 
>> generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether 
>> the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times Then the AI 
>> (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred 
>> first.*
>
>
> Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it 
> is going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are 
> not needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that 
> in A lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but 
> as the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of 
> itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original 
> or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true.
>
> So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A 
> was true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no 
> difference.  
>
> *> I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all, 
>> and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from 
>> all the views, the conclusion is the same.*
>
>
> Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound 
> conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's 
> grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as 
> dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big 
> buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually.
>
>   John K Clark
>  
>
>> >> important it's crystal clear exactly what the correct prediction would 
>>> have turned out to be.  
>>>
>>
>> > I did a few days ago, but you didn't respond.  I'll post it again:
>>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> *First, consider this experiment:Imagine there is a conscious AI (or 
>> uploaded mind) inside a virtual environment (an open field)Inside that 
>> virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and next to the 
>> ball is a note which reads:"At noon (when the virtual sun is directly 
>> overhead) the protocol will begin.  In the protocol, the process containing 
>> this simulation will fork (split in two), after the fork, the color of the 
>> ball will change to red for the parent process and it will change to blue 
>> in the child process (forking duplicates a process into two identical 
>> copies, with one called the parent and the other the child). A second after 
>> the color of the ball is set, another fork will happen.  This will happen 8 
>> times leading to 256 processes, after which the simulation will end."Now, 
>> with the understanding of that experiment, consider the following:If the AI 
>> (or all of them) went through two tests, test A, and test B*
>
>  *A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 
>> 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball 
>> changing color*
>
>  *B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number 
>> generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether 
>> the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times*
>
> *Then the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test 
>> B occurred first.*
>
> *Do you agree that it is impossible for any entity within the simulation 
>> to determine whether test A was executed first, or whether test B was 
>> executed first, with higher than a 50% probability?*
>
>
> Yes of course I agree with that, but that doesn't mean Bruno's "question 
> isn't gibberish as is his "proof"!  Unlike Bruno's thought experiment you 
> did not use any personal pronouns and I congratulate you for that, although 
> why you made it so convoluted is a mystery to me.

Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 4:22 PM Jason Resch  wrote:

> *This Halloween will mark 6 years since you agreed with Step 3,*

*BULLSHIT! *

This is the entire post and even though 6 years has passed I stand by every
word and wouldn't change anything:

On Thu, Oct 31, 2013 at 2:12 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

*>  A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and
> 256 copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball
> changing color*

Duplicating a brain is not enough, the intelligence has NOT forked until
there is something different about them, such as one remembering seeing a
red ball and the other remember seeing a green ball, only then do they
fork. It was the decision made by somebody or something outside the
simulation to make sure all 256 saw a difference sequence of colored balls
that created 256 distinct minds. And to a simulated physicist a decision
made outside the simulation would be indistinguishable from being random,
that is to say the simulated laws of physics could not be used to figure
out what that decision would be.

*>  B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number
> generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether
> the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times Then the AI
> (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B occurred
> first.*

Both A and B are identical in that the intelligence doesn't know what it is
going to see next; but increasingly convoluted thought experiments are not
needed to demonstrate that everyday fact. The only difference is that in A
lots of copies are made of the intelligence and in B they are not; but as
the intelligence would have no way of knowing if a copy had been made of
itself or not nor would it have any way of knowing if it was the original
or the copy, subjectively it doesn't matter if A or B is true.

So yes, subjectively the intelligence would have no way of knowing if A was
true or B, or to put it another way subjectively it would make no
difference.

*> I reformulated the UDA in a way that does not use any pronouns at all,
> and it doesn't matter if you consider the question from one view or from
> all the views, the conclusion is the same.*

Yes, the conclusion is the same, and that is the not very profound
conclusion that you never know what you're going to see next, and Bruno's
grand discovery of First Person Indeterminacy is just regular old dull as
dishwater indeterminacy first discovered by Og the caveman. After the big
buildup it's a bit of a letdown actually.

  John K Clark

> >> important it's crystal clear exactly what the correct prediction would
>> have turned out to be.
>>
>
> > I did a few days ago, but you didn't respond.  I'll post it again:
>

>
>
>
>
> *First, consider this experiment:Imagine there is a conscious AI (or
> uploaded mind) inside a virtual environment (an open field)Inside that
> virtual environment is a ball, which the AI is looking at and next to the
> ball is a note which reads:"At noon (when the virtual sun is directly
> overhead) the protocol will begin.  In the protocol, the process containing
> this simulation will fork (split in two), after the fork, the color of the
> ball will change to red for the parent process and it will change to blue
> in the child process (forking duplicates a process into two identical
> copies, with one called the parent and the other the child). A second after
> the color of the ball is set, another fork will happen.  This will happen 8
> times leading to 256 processes, after which the simulation will end."Now,
> with the understanding of that experiment, consider the following:If the AI
> (or all of them) went through two tests, test A, and test B*

 *A) The test described where the simulation process forks 8 times and 256
> copies are created and they each see a different pattern of the ball
> changing color*

 *B) A test where the AI is not duplicated but instead a random number
> generator (controlled entirely outside the simulation) determines whether
> the ball changes to red or blue with 50% probability 8 times*

*Then the AI (or AIs) could not say whether test A occurred first or test B
> occurred first.*

*Do you agree that it is impossible for any entity within the simulation to
> determine whether test A was executed first, or whether test B was executed
> first, with higher than a 50% probability?*

Yes of course I agree with that, but that doesn't mean Bruno's "question
isn't gibberish as is his "proof"!  Unlike Bruno's thought experiment you
did not use any personal pronouns and I congratulate you for that, although
why you made it so convoluted is a mystery to me. And unlike Bruno you
didn't demand predictions of events where the veracity of the predictions
could never be judged, not even long after the events in question were
over. Because of Quantum Indeterminacy you can't say for certain if a atom
of Uranium will decay tomorrow but at least

Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

> On 24 Sep 2019, at 03:33, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 9/23/2019 4:23 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> Yet, assuming an arithmetical world governed by arithmetical laws, you can 
>> derive the appearance of a physical universe governed by physical laws.
> 
> If only it were so.  So far it's hand waving aspiration.

Not all. We get first that a physical universe has to be perceive by the 
numbers, that explains why we believe in a physical universe, without 
ontological commitment. Only that is far better than an extrapolation from an 
ostentatious exhibit.

Secondly, the proof is constructive. It says physics is given by those precise 
modes of self-reference. 

Thirdly, we get the full quantum logic, with testable difference (the 
arithmetical quantum logic has been shown richer than most physical quantum 
one).

Fourthly, we get a theory of qualia and consciousness coherent with the 
prediction on pur first person experience, where physicalism, when rigorous, 
has to eliminate or dismiss qualia and consciousness.

Physicalism has never work, except by denying the mind, but with Digital 
Mechanism, we know why, and we know how to improve/correct it.

The real trouble are for those who defend both Mechanism and 
Materialism/Physicalism, be it with one world or many.

Bruno

> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA


> On 24 Sep 2019, at 00:43, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 11:41 AM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> 
> Jason thinks I must be suffering from buyer's remorse because I "spent 
> $80,000 when he is already saved by arithmetic" he concludes this because on 
> December 26 2012 at 12:34 PM I said " A better question is do the natural 
> numbers need a reason to exist? I don't know the answer to that but my hunch 
> is no". However in another post on December 26 2012 at 1:26 PM, less than 2 
> hours later I said "it is a fact that thinking of information as something 
> physical has over the last century proven itself to be remarkably fertile and 
> has led to the discovery of new knowledge, while thinking of information as 
> ethereal was found to be sterile and has led to nowhere and nothing".
> 
> The existence of the natural numbers may or may not be a brute fact, but it 
> is certainly NOT a brute fact that we teach our children the particular 
> metric to measure the distance a natural number is from zero that yields 
> results such as 2+2=4 and not one of the infinite number of other self 
> consistent ones that the P-adic metric can provide. It is not a brute fact 
> because there is a reason for it, we teach that one and only that one to 
> children because it is the only one that is consistent with the physical 
> world. And because that one is far more intuitive than any P-adic one. And it 
> is more intuitive precisely because it is consistent with the physical world 
> we see around us and P-adic is not.
>  
> > However he uses the static nature of arithmetical truth to presume that it 
> > cannot represent "real computations". 
> 
> There is a easy way to tell a "real computation" from the other sort. Your 
> computer can make one sort of computation without a battery or a AC power 
> outlet, but for the other sort your computer needs electricity.  And you can 
> *do* something with one sort of calculation, but you can't *do* anything with 
> the other sort of "calculation". 
> 
> > But he has not indicated why fundamental change (which I take to mean 
> > successive creation and destruction of states) should be necessary to 
> > computation,
> 
> Do I really need to indicate why you can't create or destroy something 
> without making a change? I don't think so. But I think you need to indicate 
> how, out of the set of all computations, you can pick the correct ones from 
> the incorrect ones without the help of matter that obeys the laws of physics. 
>  
> 
> I think meaning needs contrast. Michelangelo's David was carved from a single 
> huge block of marble that was a 100 million years old, but it would be silly 
> to say David was 100 million years old and Michelangelo did nothing but 
> unpack it from the marble that was not part of David. And to make a real 
> calculation rather than a pretend toy one you have to differentiate the 
> correct from the incorrect, you not only have to mention the correct answer 
> you have to make it clear that all the other answers, and there are a 
> infinite number of them, are wrong. And for that you need a physical machine.
> 
>  > I think John has also argued against philosophical zombies.
> 
> I have indeed.

But then you accept infinitely many zombie in arithmetic, or deny the theorem 
in arithmetic sating that the computations exist (and *are* computation).



>  
> > John's theory that fundamental change is required leads to an infinity of 
> > philosophical zombies existing within the arithmetical computations,
> 
> My theory is NOTHING exists within arithmetical computations because 
> arithmetical computations don't exist

False with exist taken in the same sense as in “their exists no biggest prime 
number”.



> (existence being defined as stuff that can *do* things),

In metaphysics or theology when done with the scientific attitude, this invoke 
your personal ontological commitment.

That is as funny as the drawing of the guy doing a proof and invoking a miracle.

That is not even religion, but pseudo-religion or pseudo-science.





> but physical computations certainly exist and can *do" all sorts of things.


That is like the priest of the institutionalised religion. You talk like if you 
knew the truth. That is automatically invalid.

Bruno 




>  
> > 1. Can the time evolution of John Clark's brain be described by the 
> > solutions to a particular Diophantine equation? (e.g. an equation with 
> > variables t and s, where t = number of Plank times since start of 
> > emulation, and s = the wave function describing all the particles in your 
> > skull)
> 
> It can unless physics needs Real Numbers and it probably doesn't. Yes  
> Schrodinger's equation uses Real Numbers because it assumes space and time 
> are continuous, but that is probably only approximately true.  And there are 
> a infinite number of equations and mathematically there is absolutely nothing 
> special about Schrodinger's

Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA


> On 23 Sep 2019, at 17:59, Alan Grayson  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 9:23:29 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
> 
> 
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 5:51 AM John Clark > 
> wrote:
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 6:31 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > if you think that Carroll’s got it right, you do accept step 3, (as Carroll 
> > accept it, according to Jason) 
> 
> If Jason thinks Carroll accepts it then Jason is full of shit. And I've read 
> Carroll's book, you haven't. You two should actually read the book, then 
> we'll talk.
> 
> 
> I guess you never clicked the link I provided at the start of this thread.  
> I'll transcribe it for those who can't access the video:
> 
> Sean Carroll:
> So Isaac Newton came up with the rules of classical mechanics in the 1600s, 
> but it wasn't until Laplace around the year 1800 that this implication of 
> classical mechanics was realized.
> It's a clockwork universe.  That the way classical mechanics works is if you 
> tell me the state of a system right now at one moment by which in classical 
> mechanics you would mean the position and the velocity of every part, and you 
> knew the laws of physics and you had arbitrarily large computational 
> capacity, 
> Laplace said of vast intelligence okay then to that vast intelligence the 
> past and future would be as determined and known as the present was because 
> that's the clockwork universe is deterministic everything is fixed once you 
> know the present moment.
>  
> But Laplace was wrong in one very important respect. One can never know the 
> exact position and momentum of any particle, let alone the entire universe.

Like in arithmetic. We can never know-for-sure which machine we are, nor which 
computations “run” us. 

That does not make arithmetic non deterministic. Likewise, quantum mechanics is 
a purely deterministic theory, independently that we, from inside, cannot use 
it to predict our future 1p (plural) experiments.




> There are no perfect measurements! Further, the situation is further 
> aggravated by the Uncertainty Principle. In sum, using classical mechanics 
> the future is NOT determined by its present, imprecise configuration. Not 
> only is Laplace mistaken, but Carroll as well, who should know better. AG 


Laplace is mistaken with respect to the quantum theory.

Carroll is just incomplete with respect to Mechanism (and with respect to the 
problem of qualia, consciousness, which is not his domain of investigation.

Bruno





> 
> Now quantum mechanics comes along and throws a spanner into the works a 
> little bit if you're a many-worlds person Laplace is demon is still possible.
> So if you know the wave function of the universe exactly and you have 
> infinite calculational capacity you could predict the past and the future 
> with perfect accuracy.
> But! what you're predicting is all of the branches of the wavefunction so any 
> individual person inside the wavefunction still experiences apparently random 
> events.
> 
> Right, so you can't predict what will happen to you even if you can predict 
> what will happen to the entire universe.
> 
> This is the essence of Step 3 of the UDA.  In an experiment involving 
> duplication of persons, apparent randomness emerges.  There is no actual 
> randomness in the complete system, but individual experiences will have the 
> characteristic of randomness, in the sense of not being able to make definite 
> predictions concerning their experiences.  Sean Carroll gets this.  Max 
> Tegmark gets this.  You got it at least once 6 years ago on this list when 
> you agreed that a forking computer process containing AIs could not predict 
> which process they would end up in.  This is enough for you to proceed to the 
> next step, which adds only a time delay to one of the duplicates.  You are 
> almost there.
> 
> Jason
>  
>  
> 
> Now quantum mechanics comes along and throws a spanner into the works a 
> little bit if you're a many-worlds person Laplace is demon is still possible.
> So if you know the wave function of the universe exactly and you have 
> infinite calculational capacity you could predict the past and the future 
> with perfect accuracy.
> But! what you're predicting is all of the branches of the wavefunction so any 
> individual person inside the wavefunction still experiences apparently random 
> events.
> 
> Right, so you can't predict what will happen to you even if you can predict 
> what will happen to the entire universe.
> 
> This is the essence of Step 3 of the UDA.  In an experiment involving 
> duplication of persons, apparent randomness emerges.  There is no actual 
> randomness in the complete system, but individual experiences will have the 
> characteristic of randomness, in the sense of not being able to make definite 
> predictions concerning their experiences.  Sean Carroll gets this.  Max 
> Tegmark gets this.  You got it at least once 6 years ago on this list when 
> you agreed that a forking computer

Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA


> On 23 Sep 2019, at 17:41, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 5:31 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
>> On 22 Sep 2019, at 11:43, John Clark > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 6:41 AM Jason Resch > > wrote:
>> 
>> > Perhaps Carroll's explanation might help others who've struggled to get 
>> > past Step 3.
>> 
>> If Jason Resch reads Carroll's book as John Clark has done then Jason Resch 
>> will find that Carroll goes into considerable detail explaining what the 
>> personal pronoun "you" could mean when there are multiple copies of "you". 
>> And that is something John Clark has done many times on this list, and that 
>> is something Bruno has never done and is what makes step 3 not just wrong 
>> but silly. 
> 
> On the contrary, each time I have used the nuances (1p, 3p, 1-plural-p)  to 
> explain step 3, all your critics have suppress the nuances, usually using 
> mockery and semantic play, without any argument understoodd by any on this 
> list.
> 
> Then, if you think that Carroll’s got it right, you do accept step 3, (as 
> Carroll accept it, according to Jason) and it is even more weird why you have 
> not yet move to step 4.
> 
> Of course, we know that you will have a problem with step 7, as you believe 
> that a computation is ream only off implemented in an assumed physical 
> reality, but this contradict a century of computer science.
> 
> 
> 
> Perhaps it is a manifestation of "buyer's remorse" (he spent $80,000 when he 
> is already saved by arithmetic).

I am not sure. The saving in arithmetic might be close to the Indian Nirvana 
idea. Technological immortality is for those who want save their ego, their 
local memories, and somehow procrastinate the Nirvana, and pursue the Samsara.

Saying “yes” ti the doctor is rather vain, if the goal is only to prolongate 
existence, but it can be sensefull if the goal is being able to see the next 
soccer cup.




> 
> While he might have a problem with step 7, it appears John Clark does support 
> arithmetical realism:

Clark is like my early opponent. They mocked it quite loudly and publicly 
before studying the argument, just because they see word like “consciousness” 
or “reality”, and when they understand there is a reasoning, a theory, means of 
testing it, they do not want to admit they were wrong.

Some people cannot change their mind.

It is sad that people open to the MW shows difficulties for the simpler and 
more obvious (provable) “many-computation” in arithmetic.

Now Clark seems also to have some more genuine  difficulties in mathematical 
logic, as he confused theory and models regularly. To his discharge, 
mathematical logic is poorly taught, when taught.



> 
> John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com>> 12/26/12
> to everything-list
> On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 11:05 AM, Telmo Menezes  > wrote:
> > Why do the natural numbers exist?
> A better question is do the natural numbers need a reason to exist? I don't 
> know the answer to that but my hunch is no.
>  
> However he uses the static nature of arithmetical truth to presume that it 
> cannot represent "real computations".  But he has not indicated why 
> fundamental change (which I take to mean successive creation and destruction 
> of states) should be necessary to computation, while the indexical eternal 
> existence of each successive computational state won't do. John's theory that 
> fundamental change is required leads to an infinity of philosophical zombies 
> existing within the arithmetical computations, but I think John has also 
> argued against philosophical zombies.  I would like him to answer the 
> following questions:
> 
> 1. Can the time evolution of John Clark's brain be described by the solutions 
> to a particular Diophantine equation? (e.g. an equation with variables t and 
> s, where t = number of Plank times since start of emulation, and s = the wave 
> function describing all the particles in your skull)
> 2. Are those brain states found in the collection of solutions to that 
> equation reflective of a philosophical zombie? (e.g. could we build a John 
> Clark robot that behaved exactly as John Clark would by searching for 
> solutions to this equation, which would not be conscious)

I let people guess what John Clark could say, above his taking granted a 
fundamental primary time (like Prigogine) or a fundamental primary physical 
universe (like the Aristotelians).

Bruno 



> 
> Jason
> 
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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA


> On 23 Sep 2019, at 12:50, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 6:31 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > if you think that Carroll’s got it right, you do accept step 3, (as Carroll 
> > accept it, according to Jason) 
> 
> If Jason thinks Carroll accepts it then Jason is full of shit.

Easy, gross and .. not a valid argument.


> And I've read Carroll's book, you haven't. You two should actually read the 
> book, then we'll talk.

More than one people told you since long that QM many-worlds use the first 
person indeterminacy more or less explicitly.

Bruno




> 
> John K Clark
> 
> 
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> .

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

2019-09-23 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List





On 9/23/2019 4:23 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
Yet, assuming an arithmetical world governed by arithmetical laws, you 
can derive the appearance of a physical universe governed by physical 
laws.


If only it were so.  So far it's hand waving aspiration.

Brent

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 5:44 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 11:41 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> Jason thinks I must be suffering from buyer's remorse because I "spent
> $80,000 when he is already saved by arithmetic" he concludes this because
> on December 26 2012 at 12:34 PM I said " *A better question is do the
> natural numbers need a reason to exist? I don't know the answer to that but
> my hunch is no*". However in another post on December 26 2012 at 1:26 PM,
> less than 2 hours later I said "*it is a fact that thinking of
> information as something physical has over the last century proven itself
> to be remarkably fertile and has led to the discovery of new knowledge,
> while thinking of information as ethereal was found to be sterile and has
> led to nowhere and nothing*".
>
> The existence of the natural numbers may or may not be a brute fact, but
> it is certainly NOT a brute fact that we teach our children the particular
> metric to measure the distance a natural number is from zero that yields
> results such as 2+2=4 and not one of the infinite number of other self
> consistent ones that the P-adic metric can provide. It is not a brute fact
> because there is a reason for it, we teach that one and only that one to
> children because it is the only one that is consistent with the physical
> world. And because that one is far more intuitive than any P-adic one. And
> it is more intuitive precisely because it is consistent with the physical
> world we see around us and P-adic is not.
>
>
>> > *However he uses the static nature of arithmetical truth to presume
>> that it cannot represent "real computations". *
>>
>
> There is a easy way to tell a "real computation" from the other sort.
> Your computer can make one sort of computation without a battery or a AC
> power outlet, but for the other sort your computer needs electricity.  And you
> can *do* something with one sort of calculation, but you can't *do*
> anything with the other sort of "calculation".
>
> *> But he has not indicated why fundamental change (which I take to mean
>> successive creation and destruction of states) should be necessary to
>> computation,*
>>
>
> Do I really need to indicate why you can't create or destroy something
> without making a change? I don't think so. But I think you need to indicate
> how, out of the set of all computations, you can pick the correct ones from
> the incorrect ones without the help of matter that obeys the laws of
> physics.
>

How do you suppose the laws of physics pick out the correct physical
outcomes from among all possibilities?  You presume there is a physical
world governed by physical laws.  But you deny an arithmetical world
governed by arithmetical laws.  Yet, assuming an arithmetical world
governed by arithmetical laws, you can derive the appearance of a physical
universe governed by physical laws.


>
> I think meaning needs contrast. Michelangelo's David was carved from a
> single huge block of marble that was a 100 million years old, but it would
> be silly to say David was 100 million years old and Michelangelo did
> nothing but unpack it from the marble that was not part of David. And to
> make a real calculation rather than a pretend toy one you have to
> differentiate the correct from the incorrect, you not only have to
> mention the correct answer you have to make it clear that all the other
> answers, and there are a infinite number of them, are wrong. And for that
> you need a physical machine.
>
> * > I think John has also argued against philosophical zombies.*
>
>
> I have indeed.
>
>>
>
>> > *John's theory that fundamental change is required leads to an
>> infinity of philosophical zombies existing within the arithmetical
>> computations,*
>>
>
> My theory is NOTHING exists within arithmetical computations because
> arithmetical computations don't exist (existence being defined as stuff
> that can *do* things), but physical computations certainly exist and can
> *do" all sorts of things.
>

>
>> *> 1. Can the time evolution of John Clark's brain be described by the
>> solutions to a particular Diophantine equation? (e.g. an equation with
>> variables t and s, where t = number of Plank times since start of
>> emulation, and s = the wave function describing all the particles in your
>> skull)*
>>
>
> It can unless physics needs Real Numbers and it probably doesn't. Yes
> Schrodinger's equation uses Real Numbers because it assumes space and time
> are continuous, but that is probably only approximately true.  And there
> are a infinite number of equations and mathematically there is absolutely
> nothing special about Schrodinger's equation, the only thing special about
> that particular equation is it conforms with our observations of how the
> physical world behaves.
>
> And I'm very surprised that as soon as you mentioned the Planck Time in
> the above you didn't realize you had left the world of pure dimensionless
> numbersand was talking numbers with

Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

2019-09-23 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 11:41 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

Jason thinks I must be suffering from buyer's remorse because I "spent
$80,000 when he is already saved by arithmetic" he concludes this because
on December 26 2012 at 12:34 PM I said " *A better question is do the
natural numbers need a reason to exist? I don't know the answer to that but
my hunch is no*". However in another post on December 26 2012 at 1:26 PM,
less than 2 hours later I said "*it is a fact that thinking of information
as something physical has over the last century proven itself to be
remarkably fertile and has led to the discovery of new knowledge, while
thinking of information as ethereal was found to be sterile and has led to
nowhere and nothing*".

The existence of the natural numbers may or may not be a brute fact, but it
is certainly NOT a brute fact that we teach our children the particular
metric to measure the distance a natural number is from zero that yields
results such as 2+2=4 and not one of the infinite number of other self
consistent ones that the P-adic metric can provide. It is not a brute fact
because there is a reason for it, we teach that one and only that one to
children because it is the only one that is consistent with the physical
world. And because that one is far more intuitive than any P-adic one. And
it is more intuitive precisely because it is consistent with the physical
world we see around us and P-adic is not.

> > *However he uses the static nature of arithmetical truth to presume
> that it cannot represent "real computations". *
>

There is a easy way to tell a "real computation" from the other sort. Your
computer can make one sort of computation without a battery or a AC power
outlet, but for the other sort your computer needs electricity.  And you
can *do* something with one sort of calculation, but you can't *do*
anything with the other sort of "calculation".

*> But he has not indicated why fundamental change (which I take to mean
> successive creation and destruction of states) should be necessary to
> computation,*
>

Do I really need to indicate why you can't create or destroy something
without making a change? I don't think so. But I think you need to indicate
how, out of the set of all computations, you can pick the correct ones from
the incorrect ones without the help of matter that obeys the laws of
physics.

I think meaning needs contrast. Michelangelo's David was carved from a
single huge block of marble that was a 100 million years old, but it would
be silly to say David was 100 million years old and Michelangelo did
nothing but unpack it from the marble that was not part of David. And to
make a real calculation rather than a pretend toy one you have to
differentiate the correct from the incorrect, you not only have to mention
the correct answer you have to make it clear that all the other answers,
and there are a infinite number of them, are wrong. And for that you need a
physical machine.

* > I think John has also argued against philosophical zombies.*

I have indeed.

>

> > *John's theory that fundamental change is required leads to an infinity
> of philosophical zombies existing within the arithmetical computations,*
>

My theory is NOTHING exists within arithmetical computations because
arithmetical computations don't exist (existence being defined as stuff
that can *do* things), but physical computations certainly exist and can
*do" all sorts of things.

> *> 1. Can the time evolution of John Clark's brain be described by the
> solutions to a particular Diophantine equation? (e.g. an equation with
> variables t and s, where t = number of Plank times since start of
> emulation, and s = the wave function describing all the particles in your
> skull)*
>

It can unless physics needs Real Numbers and it probably doesn't. Yes
Schrodinger's equation uses Real Numbers because it assumes space and time
are continuous, but that is probably only approximately true.  And there
are a infinite number of equations and mathematically there is absolutely
nothing special about Schrodinger's equation, the only thing special about
that particular equation is it conforms with our observations of how the
physical world behaves.

And I'm very surprised that as soon as you mentioned the Planck Time in the
above you didn't realize you had left the world of pure dimensionless number
sand was talking numbers with physical units associated with them, like
measures of time and space and mass and energy and electrical charge.

*> 2. Are those brain states found in the collection of solutions to that
> equation reflective of a philosophical zombie?*
>

No.

> *could we build a John Clark robot that behaved exactly as John Clark
> would by searching for solutions to this equation, which would not be
> conscious*
>

No. And it would not behave exactly like John Clark, it would not behave at
all because without physics there would be no way to search through
solutions to that equation or to any other.

John K

Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

2019-09-23 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/23/2019 12:45 PM, Philip Thrift wrote:

On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 2:32:11 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:

On 9/23/2019 8:59 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
> But Laplace was wrong in one very important respect. One can never
> know the exact position and momentum of any particle, let alone the
> entire universe. There are no perfect measurements!

Laplace knew that. His point was that the future (and the past) were
completely determined by the present state of the world.  Even
though we
can't measure it perfectly, Laplace assumed that the variables like
position and  momentum had definite values.  That's what is
fundamentally different about quantum mechanics, they don't have
definite values.

> Further, the situation is further aggravated by the Uncertainty
> Principle. In sum, using classical mechanics the future is NOT
> determined by its present, imprecise configuration.

The uncertainty principle is part of QM not CM.  Just because you
can't
measure it precisely, doesn't mean that the present configuration
is not
precise; it means that we are ignorant of the precise values. This
was
Einstein's idea, that QM was incomplete and its randomness was
just an
expression of our ignorance, as in CM.

> Not only is Laplace mistaken, but Carroll as well, who should know
> better. AG

Neither Laplace nor Carroll is mistaken.

Brent

Both were/are superstitious, basically religiously so, in their 
fear/rejection of probabilities.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laplace%27s_demon#Quantum_mechanical_irreversibility

Did you tell Carroll that?

Brent

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

2019-09-23 Thread Alan Grayson



On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 1:32:11 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/23/2019 8:59 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> > But Laplace was wrong in one very important respect. One can never 
> > know the exact position and momentum of any particle, let alone the 
> > entire universe. There are no perfect measurements! 
>
> Laplace knew that. His point was that the future (and the past) were 
> completely determined by the present state of the world.  Even though we 
> can't measure it perfectly, Laplace assumed that the variables like 
> position and  momentum had definite values.  That's what is 
> fundamentally different about quantum mechanics, they don't have 
> definite values. 
>
> > Further, the situation is further aggravated by the Uncertainty 
> > Principle. In sum, using classical mechanics the future is NOT 
> > determined by its present, imprecise configuration. 
>
> The uncertainty principle is part of QM not CM.  


Yes, and I didn't indicate otherwise. AG 

Just because you can't 
> measure it precisely, doesn't mean that the present configuration is not 
> precise; it means that we are ignorant of the precise values. This was 
> Einstein's idea, that QM was incomplete and its randomness was just an 
> expression of our ignorance, as in CM. 
>

 That's not the mainstream view today IIUC. It's that position and momentum 
as simultaneous values don't exist, not that we can't measure them 
precisely. AG

>
> > Not only is Laplace mistaken, but Carroll as well, who should know 
> > better. AG 
>
> Neither Laplace nor Carroll is mistaken. 
>

Carroll intentionally misstated Laplace's position in an attempt to make 
his reasoning plausible. So IMO he's not only wrong about MW, but dishonest 
as well. AG 

>
> Brent 
>
>
>

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 2:58 PM John Clark  wrote:

> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 11:23 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> *> I guess you never clicked the link I provided at the start of this
>> thread.  *
>
>
> I've done a lot better than click on a link that provides a brief
> synopsis, I've spent hours reading every page in the man's entire book and
> you and Bruno should do the same.
>
> *>You got it at least once 6 years ago on this list when you agreed that a
>> forking computer process containing AIs could not predict which process
>> they would end up in. *
>
>
> I don't know what you're referring to so it's hard to know how to respond, but
> since you can pinpoint the exact time, 6 years ago, you should be able to
> include the exact quote where I said I "got it" and enough context around
> it so it's clear who "they" are that failed to make a prediction, and even
> more important it's crystal clear exactly what the correct prediction would
> have turned out to be.
>

I did a few days ago, but you didn't respond.  I'll post it again:

This Halloween will mark 6 years since you agreed with Step 3, but said it
was a let down (presumably because you thought it so obvious):

https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/5PR1FXp_CSU/73ltRVEHUtQJ
https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/5PR1FXp_CSU/PnuTSn_82PwJ

Should we expect another 6 years before you proceed through the next
steps?  There's no rush, since you are freezing yourself this debate could
go on another 10^100 years.



>
> > quoting Carroll: "*Now quantum mechanics comes along and throws a
>> spanner into the works a little bit if you're a many-worlds person Laplace
>> is demon is still possible*".
>
>
> Yes, if Many Worlds is correct then the Schrodinger Wave Equation of the
> Multiverse is all there is, and it is a 100% deterministic equation, so 
> Laplace's
> demon could solve it and in theory *you* could too. And yet the empirical
> fact remains *you*  can NOT predict the future, at least not always and
> not perfectly. If Many Worlds could not explain this obvious glaring
> discrepancy it would be dead dead dead. But Many Worlds can explain it and
> can do so easily; *you* can't answer the question "*What one and only one
> thing will **you** see tomorrow after the universe splits?*" for exactly
> the same reason *you* can't answer Bruno's question "*What one and only
> one thing will **you*  *see tomorrow after **you** are duplicated and *
> *you* *become two and **you** see two different things?*" The  difference
> is in the Many Worlds case, after the universe splits, if I asked *you* today
> what the correct answer *you* should have given yesterday was:
>
> 1) It would be obvious who the question was directed to.
> 2)  It would obvious what would have been the correct answer.
>
> Neither of these things is true for Bruno's "question".
>

What's so special about duplicating universes?  Perhaps you can explain why
one leads to apparent randomness and the other case does not.


>
> Of course Sean Carroll delves into this issue in far greater detail that
> I have here, and you'd know that if you had read the man's book as I have.
>

Is anything I said about Carroll wrong?  What do you hope I will learn from
reading Caroll's book?

Jason

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

2019-09-23 Thread John Clark

On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 11:23 AM Jason Resch  wrote:

*> I guess you never clicked the link I provided at the start of this
> thread.  *

I've done a lot better than click on a link that provides a brief synopsis,
I've spent hours reading every page in the man's entire book and you and
Bruno should do the same.

*>You got it at least once 6 years ago on this list when you agreed that a
> forking computer process containing AIs could not predict which process
> they would end up in. *

I don't know what you're referring to so it's hard to know how to respond, but
since you can pinpoint the exact time, 6 years ago, you should be able to
include the exact quote where I said I "got it" and enough context around
it so it's clear who "they" are that failed to make a prediction, and even
more important it's crystal clear exactly what the correct prediction would
have turned out to be.

> quoting Carroll: "*Now quantum mechanics comes along and throws a spanner
> into the works a little bit if you're a many-worlds person Laplace is demon
> is still possible*".

Yes, if Many Worlds is correct then the Schrodinger Wave Equation of the
Multiverse is all there is, and it is a 100% deterministic equation,
so Laplace's
demon could solve it and in theory *you* could too. And yet the empirical
fact remains *you*  can NOT predict the future, at least not always and not
perfectly. If Many Worlds could not explain this obvious glaring
discrepancy it would be dead dead dead. But Many Worlds can explain it and
can do so easily; *you* can't answer the question "*What one and only one
thing will **you** see tomorrow after the universe splits?*" for exactly
the same reason *you* can't answer Bruno's question "*What one and only one
thing will **you*  *see tomorrow after **you** are duplicated and
**you* *become
two and **you** see two different things?*" The  difference is in the Many
Worlds case, after the universe splits, if I asked *you* today what the
correct answer *you* should have given yesterday was:

1) It would be obvious who the question was directed to.
2)  It would obvious what would have been the correct answer.

Neither of these things is true for Bruno's "question".

Of course Sean Carroll delves into this issue in far greater detail that I
have here, and you'd know that if you had read the man's book as I have.

John K Clark

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

2019-09-23 Thread Philip Thrift



On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 2:32:11 PM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>
>
> On 9/23/2019 8:59 AM, Alan Grayson wrote: 
> > But Laplace was wrong in one very important respect. One can never 
> > know the exact position and momentum of any particle, let alone the 
> > entire universe. There are no perfect measurements! 
>
> Laplace knew that. His point was that the future (and the past) were 
> completely determined by the present state of the world.  Even though we 
> can't measure it perfectly, Laplace assumed that the variables like 
> position and  momentum had definite values.  That's what is 
> fundamentally different about quantum mechanics, they don't have 
> definite values. 
>
> > Further, the situation is further aggravated by the Uncertainty 
> > Principle. In sum, using classical mechanics the future is NOT 
> > determined by its present, imprecise configuration. 
>
> The uncertainty principle is part of QM not CM.  Just because you can't 
> measure it precisely, doesn't mean that the present configuration is not 
> precise; it means that we are ignorant of the precise values. This was 
> Einstein's idea, that QM was incomplete and its randomness was just an 
> expression of our ignorance, as in CM. 
>
>
> > Not only is Laplace mistaken, but Carroll as well, who should know 
> > better. AG 
>
> Neither Laplace nor Carroll is mistaken. 
>
> Brent 
>
>
>
Both were/are superstitious, basically religiously so, in their 
fear/rejection of probabilities.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Laplace%27s_demon#Quantum_mechanical_irreversibility

@philipthrift

 

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

2019-09-23 Thread 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List

On 9/23/2019 8:59 AM, Alan Grayson wrote:
But Laplace was wrong in one very important respect. One can never
know the exact position and momentum of any particle, let alone the
entire universe. There are no perfect measurements!

Laplace knew that. His point was that the future (and the past) were
completely determined by the present state of the world. Even though we
can't measure it perfectly, Laplace assumed that the variables like
position and momentum had definite values. That's what is
fundamentally different about quantum mechanics, they don't have
definite values.

Further, the situation is further aggravated by the Uncertainty
Principle. In sum, using classical mechanics the future is NOT
determined by its present, imprecise configuration.

The uncertainty principle is part of QM not CM. Just because you can't
measure it precisely, doesn't mean that the present configuration is not
precise; it means that we are ignorant of the precise values. This was
Einstein's idea, that QM was incomplete and its randomness was just an
expression of our ignorance, as in CM.

Not only is Laplace mistaken, but Carroll as well, who should know
better. AG

Neither Laplace nor Carroll is mistaken.

Brent

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

2019-09-23 Thread Alan Grayson



On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 9:23:29 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 5:51 AM John Clark  > wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 6:31 AM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>>
>> *> if you think that Carroll’s got it right, you do accept step 3, (as 
>>> Carroll accept it, according to Jason) *
>>
>>
>> If Jason thinks Carroll accepts it then Jason is full of shit. And I've 
>> read Carroll's book, you haven't. You two should actually read the book, 
>> then we'll talk.
>>
>>
> I guess you never clicked the link I provided at the start of this 
> thread.  I'll transcribe it for those who can't access the video:
>
> Sean Carroll:
>
> So Isaac Newton came up with the rules of classical mechanics in the 
> 1600s, but it wasn't until Laplace around the year 1800 that this 
> implication of classical mechanics was realized.
> It's a clockwork universe.  That the way classical mechanics works is if 
> you tell me the state of a system right now at one moment by which in 
> classical mechanics you would mean the position and the velocity of every 
> part, and you knew the laws of physics and you had arbitrarily large 
> computational capacity, 
> Laplace said of vast intelligence okay then to that vast intelligence the 
> past and future would be as determined and known as the present was because 
> that's the clockwork universe is deterministic everything is fixed once you 
> know the present moment.
>
>
*(Indentation fixed).*
*But Laplace was wrong in one very important respect. One can never know 
the exact position and momentum of any particle, let alone the entire 
universe. There are no perfect measurements! Further, the situation is 
further aggravated by the Uncertainty Principle. In sum, using classical 
mechanics the future is NOT determined by its present, imprecise 
configuration. Not only is Laplace mistaken, but Carroll as well, who 
should and does know better. AG*
 

>
> Now quantum mechanics comes along and throws a spanner into the works a 
> little bit if you're a many-worlds person Laplace is demon is still 
> possible.
> So if you know the wave function of the universe exactly and you have 
> infinite calculational capacity you could predict the past and the future 
> with perfect accuracy.
> But! what you're predicting is all of the branches of the wavefunction so 
> any individual person inside the wavefunction still experiences apparently 
> random events.
>
> Right, so *you can't predict what will happen to you even if you can 
> predict what will happen to the entire universe*.
>
>
*The premise is wrong. Based on classical or quantum mechanics, one cannot 
predict the future of the universe, in part or in whole. AG *

>
> This is the essence of Step 3 of the UDA.  In an experiment involving 
> duplication of persons, apparent randomness emerges.  There is no actual 
> randomness in the complete system, but individual experiences will have the 
> characteristic of randomness, in the sense of not being able to make 
> definite predictions concerning their experiences.  Sean Carroll gets 
> this.  Max Tegmark gets this.  You got it at least once 6 years ago on this 
> list when you agreed that a forking computer process containing AIs could 
> not predict which process they would end up in.  This is enough for you to 
> proceed to the next step, which adds only a time delay to one of the 
> duplicates.  You are almost there.
>
> Jason
>  
>

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

2019-09-23 Thread Alan Grayson



On Monday, September 23, 2019 at 9:23:29 AM UTC-6, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 5:51 AM John Clark  > wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 6:31 AM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>>
>> *> if you think that Carroll’s got it right, you do accept step 3, (as 
>>> Carroll accept it, according to Jason) *
>>
>>
>> If Jason thinks Carroll accepts it then Jason is full of shit. And I've 
>> read Carroll's book, you haven't. You two should actually read the book, 
>> then we'll talk.
>>
>>
> I guess you never clicked the link I provided at the start of this 
> thread.  I'll transcribe it for those who can't access the video:
>
> Sean Carroll:
>
> So Isaac Newton came up with the rules of classical mechanics in the 
> 1600s, but it wasn't until Laplace around the year 1800 that this 
> implication of classical mechanics was realized.
> It's a clockwork universe.  That the way classical mechanics works is if 
> you tell me the state of a system right now at one moment by which in 
> classical mechanics you would mean the position and the velocity of every 
> part, and you knew the laws of physics and you had arbitrarily large 
> computational capacity, 
> Laplace said of vast intelligence okay then to that vast intelligence the 
> past and future would be as determined and known as the present was because 
> that's the clockwork universe is deterministic everything is fixed once you 
> know the present moment.
>
>  
But Laplace was wrong in one very important respect. One can never know the 
exact position and momentum of any particle, let alone the entire universe. 
There are no perfect measurements! Further, the situation is further 
aggravated by the Uncertainty Principle. In sum, using classical mechanics 
the future is NOT determined by its present, imprecise configuration. Not 
only is Laplace mistaken, but Carroll as well, who should know better. AG 

>
> Now quantum mechanics comes along and throws a spanner into the works a 
> little bit if you're a many-worlds person Laplace is demon is still 
> possible.
> So if you know the wave function of the universe exactly and you have 
> infinite calculational capacity you could predict the past and the future 
> with perfect accuracy.
> But! what you're predicting is all of the branches of the wavefunction so 
> any individual person inside the wavefunction still experiences apparently 
> random events.
>
> Right, so *you can't predict what will happen to you even if you can 
> predict what will happen to the entire universe*.
>
>
> This is the essence of Step 3 of the UDA.  In an experiment involving 
> duplication of persons, apparent randomness emerges.  There is no actual 
> randomness in the complete system, but individual experiences will have the 
> characteristic of randomness, in the sense of not being able to make 
> definite predictions concerning their experiences.  Sean Carroll gets 
> this.  Max Tegmark gets this.  You got it at least once 6 years ago on this 
> list when you agreed that a forking computer process containing AIs could 
> not predict which process they would end up in.  This is enough for you to 
> proceed to the next step, which adds only a time delay to one of the 
> duplicates.  You are almost there.
>
> Jason
>  
>
 

>
> Now quantum mechanics comes along and throws a spanner into the works a 
> little bit if you're a many-worlds person Laplace is demon is still 
> possible.
> So if you know the wave function of the universe exactly and you have 
> infinite calculational capacity you could predict the past and the future 
> with perfect accuracy.
> But! what you're predicting is all of the branches of the wavefunction so 
> any individual person inside the wavefunction still experiences apparently 
> random events.
>
> Right, so *you can't predict what will happen to you even if you can 
> predict what will happen to the entire universe*.
>
>
> This is the essence of Step 3 of the UDA.  In an experiment involving 
> duplication of persons, apparent randomness emerges.  There is no actual 
> randomness in the complete system, but individual experiences will have the 
> characteristic of randomness, in the sense of not being able to make 
> definite predictions concerning their experiences.  Sean Carroll gets 
> this.  Max Tegmark gets this.  You got it at least once 6 years ago on this 
> list when you agreed that a forking computer process containing AIs could 
> not predict which process they would end up in.  This is enough for you to 
> proceed to the next step, which adds only a time delay to one of the 
> duplicates.  You are almost there.
>
> Jason
>  
>

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA

On Mon, Sep 23, 2019 at 5:31 AM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 22 Sep 2019, at 11:43, John Clark  wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 19, 2019 at 6:41 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> *> Perhaps Carroll's explanation might help others who've struggled to get
>> past Step 3.*
>
>
> If Jason Resch reads Carroll's book as John Clark has done then Jason
> Resch will find that Carroll goes into considerable detail explaining
> what the personal pronoun "you" could mean when there are multiple copies
> of "you". And that is something John Clark has done many times on this
> list, and that is something Bruno has never done and is what makes step 3
> not just wrong but silly.
>
>
> On the contrary, each time I have used the nuances (1p, 3p, 1-plural-p)
>  to explain step 3, all your critics have suppress the nuances, usually
> using mockery and semantic play, without any argument understoodd by any on
> this list.
>
> Then, if you think that Carroll’s got it right, you do accept step 3, (as
> Carroll accept it, according to Jason) and it is even more weird why you
> have not yet move to step 4.
>
> Of course, we know that you will have a problem with step 7, as you
> believe that a computation is ream only off implemented in an assumed
> physical reality, but this contradict a century of computer science.
>
>
>
Perhaps it is a manifestation of "buyer's remorse" (he spent $80,000 when
he is already saved by arithmetic).

While he might have a problem with step 7, it appears John Clark does
support arithmetical realism:

John Clark  12/26/12
to everything-list
On Sat, Dec 22, 2012 at 11:05 AM, Telmo Menezes 
wrote:
> Why do the natural numbers exist?
A better question is do the natural numbers need a reason to exist? I don't
know the answer to that but my hunch is no.

However he uses the static nature of arithmetical truth to presume that it
cannot represent "real computations".  But he has not indicated why
fundamental change (which I take to mean successive creation and
destruction of states) should be necessary to computation, while the
indexical eternal existence of each successive computational state won't
do. John's theory that fundamental change is required leads to an infinity
of philosophical zombies existing within the arithmetical computations, but
I think John has also argued against philosophical zombies.  I would like
him to answer the following questions:

1. Can the time evolution of John Clark's brain be described by the
solutions to a particular Diophantine equation? (e.g. an equation with
variables t and s, where t = number of Plank times since start of
emulation, and s = the wave function describing all the particles in your
skull)
2. Are those brain states found in the collection of solutions to that
equation reflective of a philosophical zombie? (e.g. could we build a John
Clark robot that behaved exactly as John Clark would by searching for
solutions to this equation, which would not be conscious)

Jason

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Re: Sean Carroll gets past "Step 3" of the UDA