Re: [Fis] Fwd: Unpleasant answer ? From Bruno Marchal Request for Aid in Translation

[Jerry LR Chandler]

FISers:

In response to the message posted below, I received the following response :

liugang-...@cass.org.cn

谢谢，我将尽快答复你的电子邮件！

In order to facilitate communication of information, a translation of the 
message would be helpful.

Cheers

jerry 


> On Mar 17, 2017, at 4:29 PM, Jerry LR Chandler  
> wrote:
> 
> 
> List, Bruno:
> 
> (My response to theMarch 13 message are interwoven in a red font.)
> 
>  While I appreciate the flow of concepts emerging from Bruno’s “poetry”, its 
> guidance appears to exclude chemistry and biology.
> 
> We have something like:
> 
> Number(with + and *) => Number's dreams statistics => Physics => human biology
> 
> 
> Thus, Bruno’s  associations are not so clear to me.  
> 
> This provides evidence you have a sane mind :)
> 
> So, I will be a “spoil sport” and look toward a more “life-friendly” flow of 
> both symbols and numbers with only a tad of poetry. 
>  
> On Mar 3, 2017, at 11:51 AM, Bruno Marchal  <mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:
> 
> The tensions between the computational natures of discrete and the 
> “continuous” numbers haunts  any attempt to make mathematical sense out of 
> scientific hypotheses. I am uncertain as to the logical implication of the 
> “computationalist’s hypothesis" in this context.
> 
> 
> If you are aware of the notion of first person indeterminacy, it is not so 
> difficult to understand how the appearance of the continuum can be explained 
> to be unavoidable in the digital-mechanist frame. The physical reality will 
> emerge from a statistics on infinities of computations (including many with 
> Oracles). Amazingly, in the digitalist frame, it is the digital which remains 
> hard to understand a priori, but the mathematics of self-reference gives 
> important clue.
> 
> In my view, this is philosophy not related to the logic of the physics of the 
> atomic numbers. 
> Each atomic number has an identity.
> That identity infers both mass and electricity and the corresponding set of 
> predicates that respect the attributes of the individual form of matter.
> The computational logic of the chemical sciences is based on the coherence of 
> the relations that couple these physical attributes into the metrology of 
> chemical sciences. 
> The success of chemical computations on the atomic numbers is based on 
> compositions of atomic numbers (generating functions) and the metrology of 
> the emergence molecules, cells, organisms, human individuals. 
> 
> Bruno: How do you relate your methods of calculations to your identity?  Can 
> you construct a clear narrative that states the necessary premisses? 
> propositions? consequences?  Causal pathways? 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Is the reference grounded in Curry’s combinatorial logic or otherwise? 
> 
> It does not. The reasoning is independent of any basic universal theory 
> chosen. 
> 
> Both chemistry and biology are based on the chemical table of elements and 
> the combinatorial compositions. 
> 
> 
> Provably so if we assume mechanism. Contrarily to a widely spread opinion: 
> mechanism is not compatible with even quite weak form of materialism, or 
> physicalism.
> 
> The connotations of the term “mechanism” varies widely from discipline to 
> discipline.
> The sense of “mechanism” in chemistry infers an electrical path among the 
> discrete paths of  illations that “glue” the parts into a whole.  By 
> sublation, this same sense is used in molecular biology and the biomedical 
> sciences. 
> 
> 
> Bruno, could you expand on your usage in this context?  
> 
> 
> Mechanism, as I use it, is the hypothesis that a level of digital 
> substitution exist…
> 
> The events and processes of the chemical sciences are based on the atomic 
> numbers.
> The “digits” of the atomic numbers are NOT substitutable for one another. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> How do the senses of “computationism" and “mechanism” refer to the material 
> world, if at all?
> 
> 
> The notion of computation is born in pure mathematics,
> 
> Historically, it was just the opposite - computations gave rise to (im)pure 
> mathematics?
> 
>  The "universal dovetailer argument" ---that you can found here for example:
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 
> <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html>
> 
> explains how the appearance of the material world has to emerge from all 
> relative computations. 
> 
> This explanation is not extensible to chemistry and biology because of the 
> perplexity of Coulomb’s Law. 
> 
> 
> God created the natural numbers, and saw that it was good.

[Fis] Fwd: Unpleasant answer ? From Bruno Marchal

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Bruno:

(My response to theMarch 13 message are interwoven in a red font.)

 While I appreciate the flow of concepts emerging from Bruno’s “poetry”, its 
guidance appears to exclude chemistry and biology.

We have something like:

Number(with + and *) => Number's dreams statistics => Physics => human biology


Thus, Bruno’s  associations are not so clear to me.  

This provides evidence you have a sane mind :)

So, I will be a “spoil sport” and look toward a more “life-friendly” flow of 
both symbols and numbers with only a tad of poetry. 
 
On Mar 3, 2017, at 11:51 AM, Bruno Marchal mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:

The tensions between the computational natures of discrete and the “continuous” 
numbers haunts  any attempt to make mathematical sense out of scientific 
hypotheses. I am uncertain as to the logical implication of the 
“computationalist’s hypothesis" in this context.


If you are aware of the notion of first person indeterminacy, it is not so 
difficult to understand how the appearance of the continuum can be explained to 
be unavoidable in the digital-mechanist frame. The physical reality will emerge 
from a statistics on infinities of computations (including many with Oracles). 
Amazingly, in the digitalist frame, it is the digital which remains hard to 
understand a priori, but the mathematics of self-reference gives important clue.

In my view, this is philosophy not related to the logic of the physics of the 
atomic numbers. 
Each atomic number has an identity.
That identity infers both mass and electricity and the corresponding set of 
predicates that respect the attributes of the individual form of matter.
The computational logic of the chemical sciences is based on the coherence of 
the relations that couple these physical attributes into the metrology of 
chemical sciences. 
The success of chemical computations on the atomic numbers is based on 
compositions of atomic numbers (generating functions) and the metrology of the 
emergence molecules, cells, organisms, human individuals. 

Bruno: How do you relate your methods of calculations to your identity?  Can 
you construct a clear narrative that states the necessary premisses? 
propositions? consequences?  Causal pathways? 




Is the reference grounded in Curry’s combinatorial logic or otherwise? 

It does not. The reasoning is independent of any basic universal theory chosen. 

Both chemistry and biology are based on the chemical table of elements and the 
combinatorial compositions. 


Provably so if we assume mechanism. Contrarily to a widely spread opinion: 
mechanism is not compatible with even quite weak form of materialism, or 
physicalism.

The connotations of the term “mechanism” varies widely from discipline to 
discipline.
The sense of “mechanism” in chemistry infers an electrical path among the 
discrete paths of  illations that “glue” the parts into a whole.  By sublation, 
this same sense is used in molecular biology and the biomedical sciences. 


Bruno, could you expand on your usage in this context?  


Mechanism, as I use it, is the hypothesis that a level of digital substitution 
exist…

The events and processes of the chemical sciences are based on the atomic 
numbers.
The “digits” of the atomic numbers are NOT substitutable for one another. 




How do the senses of “computationism" and “mechanism” refer to the material 
world, if at all?


The notion of computation is born in pure mathematics,

Historically, it was just the opposite - computations gave rise to (im)pure 
mathematics?

 The "universal dovetailer argument" ---that you can found here for example:

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html 


explains how the appearance of the material world has to emerge from all 
relative computations. 

This explanation is not extensible to chemistry and biology because of the 
perplexity of Coulomb’s Law. 


God created the natural numbers, and saw that it was good.

Would it be more accurate to that “"God" created the internal creativity of the 
atomic numbers."


I was just saying, albeit poetically indeed,  that  the "theory of everything", 
(still in the frame of the digital mechanist hypothesis), can't assume more 
than classical logic + the following axioms:

0 ≠ (x + 1)
((x + 1) = (y + 1))  -> x = y
x = 0 v Ey(x = y + 1)


Together with (just below):



Then she said: add yourself, and saw that is was good.


x + 0 = x
x + (y + 1) = (x + y) + 1

And:


Then she said: multiply yourself.


x * 0 = 0
x * (y + 1) = (x * y) + x

And nothing else.

These sorts of “computations” are not possible with atomic numbers because the 
atomic  have a tri-partite semantic meaning.  “zero” is not defined.  “1” is 
hydrogen. Physical conservation laws negate the possibility of multiplication 
of 6*8 = 48  (Carbon related to oxygen as carbon monoxide.) 


I think these counter-arguments are sufficient to ju

Re: [Fis] [FIS] A Curious Story

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Dear  Otto: 

> On Jan 11, 2017, at 5:05 AM, Otto E. Rossler  > wrote:
> 
> But as convincing as this may be, it is still not my main point. My main and 
> real point is: CERN refuses to update its official safety report LSAG for 
> exactly as long.
> 
> But there is an even more disturbing point. IF an organization openly refuses 
> to contradict evidence of committing a crime (even the biggest of history), 
> it is very very strange in my own eyes at least that no one in the world, 
> from the media to the profession, from Europe to Africa to America to Asia, 
> is even able to spot this fact as deserving to be alleviated or at least 
> publicly discussed. 
> 
> Can anyone in this illustrious round offer an excuse or explanation for this 
> historically unique phenomenon? 
> (Understanding is sometimes more important than surviving -- right? Forgive 
> me the pun.)
> 
> I am very grateful for the discussion,
> take care, everyone,
> Otto

I will offer some opinions that are related to the  “public” philosophy of 
science policy.  At the end, I will raise a question about the philosophy of 
epistemic mathematics as it manifests itself in the epistemology of physical 
“models” of natural phenomenological events.

My personal experience with the interface between “doing” experimental 
molecular biology and “doing” legally-enforcable public health standards lasted 
over a decade during my service in the US  Public Health Service.  

The vast gaps between specific experimental evidence and the subsequent 
emission of a public statements by senior government officials necessarily 
require a shift from the study of nature to the projections of future social 
behaviors.  The simple example of what I speak is the biological evidence for a 
physical-chemical structure to cause cancer in animals and the removal of that 
particular physical-chemical structure from commerce.  Vinyl chloride is one of 
many such examples where the professional communities preformed a “Risk 
Analysis” that resulted in restricting Vinyl Chloride usage.  In the early 
1980’s I was one of the founding members of the Society for Risk Analysis which 
seeks to illuminate the murky areas between scientific information and public 
policy.   

see: http://www.sra.org  
Risk analysis is broadly defined to include risk assessment, risk 
characterization, risk communication, risk management, and policy relating to 
risk. Our interests include risks to human health and the environment, both 
built and natural. We consider threats from physical, chemical, and biological 
agents and from a variety of human activities as well as natural events. We 
analyze risks of concern to individuals, to public- and private-sector 
organizations, and to society at various geographic scales. Our membership is 
multidisciplinary and international.

Of course, the biological example is remote from the issues of risk analysis 
for CERN experiments, but many parallels exist.   The SRA journal articles may 
provide you deeper insights into "what is going on" behind the public facades.

With regard to your specific concern 
> Can anyone in this illustrious round offer an excuse or explanation for this 
> historically unique phenomenon?

I suggest that at least three principle possibilities exist:

1. Senior CERN officials have evaluated you assertions and rejected them as 
implausible. 

2. Senior CERN officials have evaluated your assertions and accepted the 
mathematical truths but consider the risk to be so minuscule that this risk 
(and your logic) can be ignored.

3. Senior CERN officials have evaluated your assertions and accepted your 
conclusions and have no plausible counter-arguments to the calculated levels of 
risk. Therefore, silence.

I would note that as public officials, senior CERN officials are keenly aware 
of the potential of a detailed risk analysis of experiments could endanger the 
continued public funding of CERN.

The reason the situation is “curious”, as you so adroitly express the current 
stalemate, is because of the deep, deep, deep traditions of the scientific 
community to insist upon the free thought, free speech, free discussions on 
matter of public policy, public risk analysis, …

Thus, I see this “curious” behavior as a political problem that can be 
addressed by seeking a political solution that respects scientific traditions 
and hence, to motivate senior CERN officials to act honorably in the best 
interests of all.


Now, for a comment about epistemic mathematics.  These thoughts are remote from 
the specific issues regarding the risk of local black holes.  These are generic 
w.r.t. the nature of scientific information its communication through logically 
distinctive symbol systems.

For my research on health risk analysis, I undertook a detailed study of the 
origin of scientific units of measure. By way of background, economic units of 
measure are essential to non-local trade. 

Re: [Fis] Shannonian Mechanics? - Species specific?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

> Your claim that information is SPECIES SPECIFIC is completely at variance 
> with the EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE that I presented in my 3 week session that the 
> minds of different animal species have used the same encoding of gestalt 
> forms for the past 400 million years since the evolution of the amniotes.
> 

Pedro’s assertion that biological information is species specific is amply 
supported by massive amounts of molecular biological evidence.
One of the critical “differences that make a difference” between species is 
that each member of a specific species  has a DNA sequence that is compatible 
with reproduction within the species. (Even though the concept of a species is 
that of homology of individuals, not homogeneity of individuals.)

From a molecular biological perspective, the assertion of “same encoding” of 
information is contrary to fact.

Cheers

jerry



> On Jun 30, 2016, at 11:45 PM, Alex Hankey  wrote:
> 
> Pedro suggested that I send these comments to the whole group, so here they 
> are
> 
> -- Forwarded message --
> From: "Alex Hankey" mailto:alexhan...@gmail.com>>
> Date: 29 Jun 2016 21:20
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Shannonian Mechanics?
> To: "Pedro C. Marijuan"  >
> Cc: 
> 
> Dear Pedro,
> 
> Your claim that information is SPECIES SPECIFIC is completely at variance 
> with the EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE that I presented in my 3 week session that the 
> minds of different animal species have used the same encoding of gestalt 
> forms for the past 400 million years since the evolution of the amniotes.
> 
> Study of response of plants to human intentions has simlar implications 
> related to Rupert Sheldrake's 'Sense of being stared at'. These WELL 
> authenticated phenomena have hugely important implications for our 
> understanding of information in Experience - the topic of my presentation. 
> Best wishes, 
> Alex Hankey
> 
> On 29 Jun 2016 4:24 pm, "Pedro C. Marijuan"  > wrote:
> Dear Marcus, Loet, Bob... and All,
> 
> Again very briefly, your exchanges make clear the limits of the received 
> Shannonian approach and the (narrow?) corridors left for advancement. I find 
> this situation highly reminiscent of what happened with Mechanics long ago: 
> an excellent theory (but of limited scope) was overstretched and used as a 
> paradigm of what All science should be... it contributed well to technology 
> and to some other natural science disciplines, but was far from useful 
> --nefarious?-- for humanities and for the future of psychological and social 
> science studies. 
> 
> The figure from Weaver in Loet's excellent posting leaves a few aspects 
> outside. The why, the what, the how long, the with whom, and other aspects of 
> the information phenomenon do not enter. By doing that we have streamlined 
> the phenomenon... and have left it ready for applying a highly successful 
> theory, in the technological and in many other realms (linguistics, artif. 
> intelligence, neurodynamics, molec. networks, ecol. networks, applied soc. 
> metrics, etc). Pretty big and impressive, but is it enough? Shouldn't we try 
> to go beyond?
> 
> I wonder whether a far wider "phenomenology of information" is needed 
> (reminding what Maxine argued months ago about the whole contemplation of our 
> own movement, or Plamen about the "war on cancer"?). If that inquiry is 
> successful we could find for instance that:
> 
> 1. There are UNIVERSALS of information. Not only in the transmission or in 
> the encoding used, well captured by the present theory, but also in the 
> generation, in the "purpose", the "meaning", the targeted subject/s, in the 
> duration, the cost, the value, the fitness or adaptive "intelligence", etc.
> 
> 2. Those UNIVERSALS are SPECIES' SPECIFIC.
> 
> 3. Those UNIVERSALS would be organized, wrapped, around an ESSENTIAL CORE. It 
> would consist in the tight ingraining of self-production and communication 
> (almost inseparable, and both information based!). In the human special case, 
> it is the whole advancement of our own lives what propels us to engage in 
> endless communication --about the universals of our own species-- but with 
> the terrific advantage of an open-ended communication system, language.
> 
> 4. Those UNIVERSALS would have been streamlined in very different ways and 
> taken as "principles" or starting points for a number of 
> disciplines--remembering the discussion about the four Great Domains of 
> Science. A renewed Information Science should nucleate one of those domains. 
> 
> Best regards to all, 
> (and particular greetings to the new parties joined for this discussion)
> --Pedro
>
> 
> El 27/06/2016 a las 12:43, Marcus Abundis escribió:
>> 
>> Dear Loet,
>> 
>> I hoped to reply to your posts sooner as of all the voices on FIS I 
>> often sense a general kinship with your views. But I also confess I have 
>> difficulty in precisely grasping your views – the reas

Re: [Fis] "Mechanical Information" in DNA

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John:

Is this just another example of the mis-communication between scientists 
trained in different disciplines?

Is it merely an artifact of the mis-use of terms?

In this case, can the mis-communication can be traced back to the 
mis-understanding of the difference between the semiosis of mass (Newton’s 
laws) and the semiosis of electricity (Coulomb’s Law)? 

So, John, I would ask for your interpretation:

What is the first layer, mass or electricity?
What form of type theory motivates you to select one type over the other type 
as either firstness or secondness?
Is the essential nature of the information in the putative first layer of the 
same essential character as the nature of the information in the putative 
second layer? 

Furthermore, is or is not the second layer quantum mechanical?
Or, is the first layer constrained by quantum chemistry and a second layer 
merely an existential QM-illiterate consequence of the electro-dynamics of 
atomism?

Cheers

Jerry

> On Jun 8, 2016, at 4:10 PM, Hector Zenil  wrote:
> 
>> 2016-06-08 16:40 GMT-03:00 John Collier > >:
>>> 
>>> A previously hypothesized “second layer” of information in DNA may have
>>> been isolated.
> 
> This is not exactly new, possibly the reason this paper didn't make it
> to Nature or Science. See
> http://tinyurl.com/3Dgenomics 
> http://www.cell.com/trends/genetics/abstract/S0168-9525(15)00063-3 
> 
> 
> 
> On Wed, Jun 8, 2016 at 10:40 PM, Moisés André Nisenbaum
> mailto:moises.nisenb...@ifrj.edu.br>> wrote:
>> Also, you usually think "DNA" associated with Biological Sciences, but this
>> research is made at Leiden Institute of Physics! Of course, to work current
>> (complex, innovative) science you must have an interdisciplinary approach.
> 
> Francis Crick was a physicist at the Physics Cavendish Laboratory in
> Cambridge with Watson, Frederick Sanger was a biochemist, etc.
> 
> Best,
> 
> - Hector Zenil
> http://www.hectorzenil.net/ 
> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> http://phys.org/news/2016-06-layer-dna.html
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> John Collier
>>> 
>>> Professor Emeritus and Senior Research Associate
>>> 
>>> University of KwaZulu-Natal
>>> 
>>> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> ___
>>> Fis mailing list
>>> Fis@listas.unizar.es
>>> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> --
>> Moisés André Nisenbaum
>> Doutorando IBICT/UFRJ. Professor. Msc.
>> Instituto Federal do Rio de Janeiro - IFRJ
>> Campus Rio de Janeiro
>> moises.nisenb...@ifrj.edu.br
>> 
>> ___
>> Fis mailing list
>> Fis@listas.unizar.es
>> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
>> 
> 
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es 
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis 
> 
___
Fis mailing list
Fis@listas.unizar.es
http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

[Fis] _ Re: _ Just my two cents worth.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Dear Plamen, List

> On Feb 29, 2016, at 12:40 AM, Dr. Plamen L. Simeonov 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> Dear Jerry, Maxine, Marcus and All,
> 
> I will come back later on discussing this interesting issue because, I have a 
> major project deadline by tomorrow.

I await your response. Has your project deadline past?

> But let me just give you this link to educate you on what Phenomenological 
> Philosophy is really about:
> http://ibiomath.org/on-phenomenological-philosophy/ 
> <http://ibiomath.org/on-phenomenological-philosophy/>

Well, I certainly love to learn.
FIS has a long tradition of learning from one - another (in a collegial 
manner). 
Let’s continue that tradition.
The link you sent is merely an advertisement.  Extraordinarily broad 
generalities.
More Peircian than Husserlian. 
Please send a meaningful link that you personally think will “educate” me on 
your views, particularly your views on logic and mathematical philosophy (as 
related to consciousness.)

> 
> One more thing about Husserl: Have you ever tried to read and understand his 
> over 100 years notes?
> Believe me, no matter how old they are, there is still something to discover 
> there. 
> The same holds for C.S. Pierce, William James and others of that size.
> What is novelty of archaeology and palaeontology then? 
> Just digging in the dust??? All these people are discovering new facts about 
> the past.

These sentences are incoherent.  What is it that you are trying to say?
What is it about archaeology that is relevant to my post? 

BTW, I have been a student of Peirce for nearly two decades.  I find Peircian 
views far more relevant to the modern bio-science than Husserl.  The reason for 
this preference is simple. Peirce deals directly with the logic of relations 
and the role of identity as related to phenomenology.  Peirce’s synthesis of a 
scientifically based phenomenology can be, in my opinion, aligned with the 
natural sciences because he expresses relationships between symbols 
representing the objects of the natural sciences and logic.  Peirce’s logic is 
not drawn from the anonymity of set theory but rather rather propositions 
relating properties and attributes of hypernyms (identities), as well as iconic 
graphs that exhibit his meanings. 

> Even if microbiology was not known at the time of Husserl, it can be seen 
> with other eyes from the perspective of phenomenological philosophy now.

Microbiology is the science of microbes - living organism that than be seen 
only through a microscope.
I used the term “molecular biology” which refers to molecules.  Microbes are 
several orders of magnitude larger than molecules. Microbes  contain  thousand 
of different molecules, most of which are one specific form of a pair of 
optical isomers. Microbes reproduce. Molecules do not reproduce.
Are you confusing the two terms? 
Perhaps this confusion is part of your interpretation of what I wrote.

> Have a nice day.
Thank you.

But I would like to add a word or two about the notion of “Biomathics”.  
Numerous conflicts exist in the white paper in the book.  
Can you give a simple statement of your hypothesis in terms of meaningful logic 
propositions?

Andree generously gifted me with a copy of “Biomathics". After studying 
“Biomathics” in some detail and your essays, I remain un-informed about deeper 
philosophical roots of your thinking.  My intuition and ‘gut-level’ instinct is 
that certain basic notions of the natural sciences are missing from your 
propositions, suggesting that the representation of the logics of nature is 
incomplete/problematic.

It seems to me that the concept of “Biomathics” either emerges or fades on 
finding logical correspondence relations (or illations) between mathematical 
symbols and the biological symbols used by naturalists and physicians. 
Do you agree or disagree with this conjecture?
Finally, do you think that Tarski’s logical construction of meta-languages is 
necessary for the relations of “Biomathics”?

I look forward to developing a meaningful dialogue.

Have a nice day!

Cheers

Jerry




> 
> Best,
> 
> Plamen
>  
> 
> 
> 2015 JPBMB Special Issue on Integral Biomathics: Life Sciences, Mathematics 
> and Phenomenological Philosophy 
> <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00796107/119/3>  
> (note: free access to all articles until July 19th, 2016)
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Mon, Feb 29, 2016 at 12:10 AM, Jerry LR Chandler  <mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com>> wrote:
> Maxine, List:
> 
> Just my two cents worth.
> After puzzling about the potential connections between your interpretations 
> of Husserl and evolutionary biology, I remain uncertain about where this line 
> of reasoning starts and where it leads.
>

[Fis] _ Just my two cents worth.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Maxine, List:

Just my two cents worth.
After puzzling about the potential connections between your interpretations of 
Husserl and evolutionary biology, I remain uncertain about where this line of 
reasoning starts and where it leads.

I should say at the beginning that I am a hardcore realist and a pragmatist. 
The value of vague philosophies for doing science is problematic, in my 
opinion.  The value of the philosophy of mathematics can be quite useful for 
scientific practice, if the appropriate correspondence relations can be 
symbolized and exploited. The necessity for rigorous symbolic relations between 
the meta-languages of science and logic of the sciences is well known.  (See 
Malatesta, The Primary Logic, 1999?).

Husserl’s (1859-1938)  writings are about a Century old.  What does he bring to 
the table today?

Molecular biology barely existed in his day.  

In this context, the concept of oscillators is proposed as the linkage between 
movement and mathematical modeling.  Yet, the physical basis of the 
mathematical oscillators is Hook’s Law for springs.  The mental image for a two 
dimensional network of oscillators is a the old-fashioned “bed-spring”.  
Admittedly, a hypothetical oscillator model was used for a few decades to model 
the source of epileptic seizures, but it is so crude that it is hardly more 
than a metaphor.  (For a review, NeuroQuantology | June 2006 | Vol. 4 | Issue 2 
| 155-165 155 Velazquez JLP. Coupled oscillators field

 
Molecular biology requires the use of the atomic numbers in arithmetic 
operations. 
It further requires the use of three - dimensional asymmetric structures to 
describe handedness (even for dance!). 

These two facts suggest to me that Husserlian vagueness can be improved upon in 
the modern inquiry into the conceptualization of motion and its relationships 
to evolutionary biology. 

A different line of reasoning concerns the questions raised by Pedro.  That is, 
the cultural roots of the tremendous array of dance movements and the encoding 
of ballad movements into a symbol system.  
This issue raises the far wider issue of the roles of diagrammatic logic in 
relation to dance “logic”.  Has anyone explored how the diagrammatic logic of 
CS Peirce may relate to dance?  Or even Venn diagrams?  Or how are the diagrams 
of chemical logic related to dance symbols, if at all?  Or, should we follow 
Hilbert and simply ignore the role of diagrams in the mathematics of 
evolutionary biology.  (see: Greaves, The Philosophical Status of Diagrams 
(2001))

Another topic worth exploring is the communication among ballad dancers during 
a performance.  The range of emotions exhibited during a ballad performance can 
be truly spectacular.  How is this accomplished from an informational theory 
perspective?

Thus, I would close with a question:
Does the modern state of human communication and information exchange go far 
beyond early 20th Century German Philosophy?  An essay on either Kantian or 
Shelling’s philosophy, as contrasted with Husserl, could be of substantial 
interest to me.

Cheers

Jerry 

Research Professor
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Studies
GMU

Headwater House
On the Banks of the Mississippi










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[Fis] Symbolic Logics and Interconnected life cycles.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Pedro, Bob U., Koichiro:

Once again, Pedro, you bring creative usage of words to address an issue, but 
in doing so, the crucial issues that are fundamental to the conceptualization 
of information are obscured by focusing your message on language as utterances 
within a grammar.  The deficiency shows is the absence of associative premises 
and / or conclusions that lie at the forma linguistic heart of scientific 
communication - the symbolic logic of differentiae and propria. 

Your terminology: 
>  the need to disentangle the two phenomena, biotic communication vs. 
> particulate "excommunication”.
is both picturesque and penetrating.  

Yet, it glosses over the distinction between utterances with the information 
content almost entirely in the connotations and nearly devoid of denotations. 

Your conjecture:
> As some FISers have suggested, maybe a revised conceptualization of the 
> generative phenomena in the quantum could turn out to approach and even to 
> equate the two phenomena.

is problematic, in my opinion.  
Bob U. conjecture of “circular forces” is equally problematic in my opinion, in 
part for the same reason and in part for a different reason.

My discomforts lie on foundational differentiation between utterances (spoken 
sounds) and scientific notations (written artifacts of individual scientific 
disciplines.)

Scientific information is expressed in Synthetic Symbol Systems (SSS) (such as 
the System of Units that determine physical logic) or the official IUPAC Units 
for Chemical Notation or the System of Units used for naming genes).  These 
symbol systems categorize differentiae and propria of nature.

The symbolic logics of each of these Synthetic Symbol Systems are well 
differentiated in the pragmatic practices of science, scientific research and 
scientific communication, entangled with mathematical symbolisms.

The truth-denoting usage of these symbol systems are well-established 
traditions in these three disciplines.  In all three cases, the symbolization 
of utterances depends on the corresponding mappings between facts and symbols.  
And these mappings refer to different meanings of number symbols associated 
with the facts and utterances.  (Charles Saunders Peirce recognized this in the 
19 th Century!)

Bob U., how is your usage of the concept of force related to these synthetic 
symbol systems?  Is it merely a conjecture about a possible connotation of 
certain scientific facts or is it more than that? Can you associate it with the 
denotations of ecological differentiae or propria? 

In your conceptualization of “interconnected life cycle”, Pedro, what is the 
nature of the interconnection? Can you give an exposition of the meaning in 
terms of symbol logics of scientific communications? 

Now a personal comment to my long-time friend and colleague, Koichiro. 
Koichiro’s response to my inquiry into the role of symbolic logics in 
communication theory skirts the basic  issue of the role of notation in the 
sciences. After studying his response, I can only conclude that it appears that 
his well-articulated positions invoke a novel form of utterance, 
"Koichiro-speak.”:-)  

Several responders addressed the notion of “communication” between sub-sub 
atomic particles as mathematical entities.  The question is, can these 
assertions and conclusions be shifted outside of mathematical/physical symbol 
systems and into the common vocabulary of utterances about information by 
comparing them to Shannon information?

Cheers

Jerry 







> On Jan 28, 2016, at 10:21 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan  
> wrote:
> 
> Dear Howard and colleagues,
> 
> Once settled most of the dust, the balance seems to favor the need to 
> disentangle the two phenomena, biotic communication vs. particulate 
> "excommunication". As some FISers have suggested, maybe a revised 
> conceptualization of the generative phenomena in the quantum could turn out 
> to approach and even to equate the two phenomena.
> 
> Is it of any importance clearly tying communication to life, to the 
> advancement of the life cycle? I think so. On the one side, we naturalize 
> freewheeling approaches to meaning and to some other informational concepts 
> (signals, adaptation, value, intelligence). On the other side, quite many 
> events of human life (social info flows) either of the technological realm, 
> or economic, legal or political, would receive a more rational grounding or a 
> higher level framework to conceptually adjust. It is the primacy of life, at 
> all levels.
> 
> Even the Lucifer Principle, the leit motif of this New Year Lecture, may be 
> formulated with improved cogency in that way. Both super-organisms and 
> pecking order are direct products of communication phenomena among life 
> cycles, within increasing layers of complexity but surviving the 
> self-maintenance ethos of life and its communication retinue. Memes are 
> different--I think the term is catchy but unproductive (too long to discuss 
> n

[Fis] _ Re: Cho 2016 The social life of quarks

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Koichiro, Bob U., Pedro:

Recent posts here illustrate the fundamental discord between modes of human 
communication.  Pedro’s last post neatly addresses the immediate issue. 

 But, the basic issue goes far, far deeper.

The challenge of communicating our meanings is not restricted to just 
scientific meaning vs. historical meaning.  Nor, communication between the 
general community and, say, the music (operatic and ballad) communities.

Nor, is it merely a matter of definition of terms and re-defining terms as 
“metaphor” in another discipline.

Pedro’s post aims toward the deeper issues, issues that are fairly known and 
understood in the symbolic  logic and chemical communities.  In the chemical 
community, the understanding is at the level of intuition because ordinary 
usage within the discipline requires an intuitive understanding of the way 
symbolic usage manifests itself in different disciplines.  

(For a detailed description of these issues, see, The Primary Logic, 
Instruments for a dialogue between the two Cultures. M. Malatesta, Gracewings, 
Fowler Wright Books, 1997.)

The Polish Logician, A. Tarski, recognized the separation of meanings and 
definitions requires the usage of METALANGUAGES.  For example, ordinary public 
language is necessary for expression of meaning of mathematical symbolic logic. 
 But, from the basic mathematical language, once it grounded in ordinary 
grammar, develops new set of symbols and new meanings for relations among 
mathematical symbols.  Consequently, mathematicians re-define a long index of 
terms that are have different meanings in its technical language. 

 The meaning of mathematical terms is developed from an associative logic that 
is foreign to ordinary language.  From these antecedents, the consequences are 
abundantly clear. The communication between the meta-languages fail. The 
mathematicians have added vast symbolic logical structures to their symbolic 
communication with symbols. In other words, the ordinary historian and 
scientist are not able to grasp the distinctive meanings of mathematical 
information.  

Physical information is restricted to physical units of measure and hence 
constrained to borrowing mathematical symbols and relating to the ordinary 
language as its meta-language.

The perplexity of chemical information theory is such that it is not 
understandable in any one meta-language or any pair of meta-languages.  In 
order for symbolic chemical communication to occur, the language must go far 
beyond such simplistic notions of a primary interaction among forces, such as 
centripetal orbits or even the four basic forces.  

The early metalanguage of chemistry was merely terms within ordinary language, 
such as the names of elements. Or, the common names for oils from various 
sources. Around the turn of the 19 th Century, the metalanguage of chemistry 
started it century-long journey to become a meta-language of mathematics with 
the development of the concepts of atomic weights for each singular elements 
and molecular weight, and molecular formula for each different molecule. 

The critical distinction that separates the meta-language of chemistry from 
other metalanguages is the absolute requirement for specification of the name 
of any object on the basis of it’s distinction from other signs or collections 
of signs. 

Thus, chemical information theory, in terms of metalanguages, requires the 
exact usage of the meta-languages of both physics and mathematics in order to 
define the origin of its symbolic logic, as well as the natural metalanguage of 
ordinary human communication. 

Biological information theory is grounded on chemical information theory, using 
a particular encoding of meaning within dynamical systems, to communicate among 
the 5 essential metalanguages necessary for the practice of the medical arts.  
And, I might add, for human history. 

The failure of luke-warm physics to serve as a foundation for a generalized 
information theory is the lack of terminology that can be used to communicate 
among the symbolic logics used in more advanced modes of human communication.

In summary, in the 21 st Century, the foundation of human symbolic 
communication  requires multiple metalanguages and symbol systems, that is, a 
generalized information theory.  Such a generalized theory  of information must 
necessarily include the symbolic logic of chemistry, which is essential to span 
the  symbolic gaps between the disciplines. 

(For those of you who are familiar with my background, this email illuminates 
some of the reasoning behind the development of the perplex number system and 
perplex systems theory within the associative symbolic logic of graph theory.)

Cheers

Jerry 


> Begin forwarded message:
> 
> From: "Pedro C. Marijuan" 
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Cho 2016 The social life of quarks
> Date: January 18, 2016 at 5:50:40 AM CST
> To: 'fis' 
> 
> Dear Howard and colleagues,
> 
> OK, you can say that quarks communic

Re: [Fis] January Lecture--Information and the Forces of History . Scientific Simplicity.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

Paraphrasing two scientists.

"Nature is pleased with simplicity. And nature is no dummy.”Isaac Newton

"As simple as possible, but not simpler."   A. Einstein

The meaning of Professor Bloom’s essay can be simplified.

This simple essay is an interpretation of history without either human values 
or virtues.

In today’s world, examples of the Bloom thesis are ISIS and a “public” 
organizations such as the NRA.

If brute force is the primary driver of human history, what is a second? or a 
third? and so forth?

What are the feedback and feedforward loops among the first, second, third, … 
usw., that generate humanness (by processing information in terms of values and 
virtues)?   

Cheers

Jerry



> On Jan 3, 2016, at 11:45 PM, howlbl...@aol.com wrote:
> 
>  
> The Force of History--Howard Bloom
>  
> In 1995, I published my first book, The Lucifer Principle: a Scientific 
> Expedition Into the Forces of history.  It sold roughly 140,000 copies 
> worldwide and is still selling.  Some people call it their Bible.  Others say 
> that it was the book that predicted 9/11.  And less than two months ago, on 
> November 13, 2015, some current readers said it was the book that explained 
> ISIS’ attacks on Paris.  Why?  What are the forces of history?  And what do 
> they have to do with information science?
> 
> The Lucifer Principle uses evolutionary biology, group selection, 
> neurobiology, immunology, microbiology, computer science, animal behavior, 
> and anthropology to probe mass passions, the passions that have powered 
> historical movements from the unification of China in 221 BC and the start of 
> the Roman  Empire in 201 BC  to the rise of the Empire of Islam in 634 AD and 
> that empire’s modern manifestations, the Islamic Revolutionary Republic of 
> Iran and ISIS, the Islamic State, a group intent on establishing a global 
> caliphate.  The Lucifer Principle concludes that the passions that swirl, 
> swizzle, and twirl history’s currents are a secular trinity.  What are that 
> trinity’s three components?  The superorganism, the pecking order, and ideas.
> 
> What’s a superorganism?  Your body is an organism. But it’s also a massive 
> social gathering.  It’s composed of a hundred trillion cells.  Each of those 
> cells is capable of living on its own.  Yet your body survives thanks to the 
> existence of a collective identity—a you.  In 1911,[i] 
> 
>  Harvard biologist William Morton Wheeler noticed that ant colonies pull off 
> the same trick.  From 20,000 to 36 million ants work together to create an 
> emergent property, a collective identity, the identity of a community, a 
> society, a colony, or a supercolony.  Wheeler observed how the colony behaved 
> as if it were a single organism.  He called the result a “superorganism.”[ii] 
> 
> Meanwhile in roughly 1900, when he was still a child, Norway’s Thorleif 
> Schjelderup Ebbe got into a strange habit: counting the number of pecks the 
> chickens in his family’s flock landed on each other and who pecked whom.  By 
> the time he was ready to write his PhD dissertation in 1918, Ebbe had close 
> to 20 years of data.  And that data demonstrated something strange.  Chickens 
> in a barnyard are not egalitarian.  They have a strict hierarchy.  At the top 
> is a chicken who gets special privileges.   All others step aside when she 
> goes to the trough.  She is the first to eat.  And she can peck any other 
> chicken in the group.  Then comes chicken number two.  She is the second to 
> eat.  And she can peck anyone in the flock with one notable exception.  She 
> cannot peck the top chicken.  Then comes chicken number three, chicken number 
> four, and so on.  Each one cannot peck the chickens above her on the social 
> ladder.  But each has free rein to peck the chickens below.  Finally, there’s 
> the bottom chicken, a chicken everyone is free to peck but who is free to 
> peck no one.  Ebbe called this a “peck order,” a pecking order, a dominance 
> hierarchy.
> 
> And in 1976, Oxford evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins coined two new 
> terms.[iii] 
> 
>   He observed that biological life, all of it from bacteria to bathing 
> beauties, depends on the evolution  of what Dawkins called “replicators,” 
> molecules that can make copies of themselves. Then Dawkins spotted a newer 
> kind of replicator at work.  The first biological replicators—genes--did 
> their thing in primordial puddles.  The new replicator worked in a puddle of 
> a radically different kind—the puddle of the human mind.  Dawkins observed 
> that we see replicators at work when our mind fixates on a song we hate and 
> plays it over and over again, no matter how vigorously we wish it away. That 
> song is using our mind to make more copies of itself.  But the most important 
> replicators in the soup of the human mind are not pop songs, they’re ideas.  
> Dawkins called these mind-based replicators “memes.”
> 
> Superorganism, the pecking order, and ideas—mem

Re: [Fis] [Fwd: Information And Locality, Addendum's]--Steven

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Steven, Pedro, List:

Steven:  Your posts are a breath of fresh air.  

I have long wondered about how you were associating information theory with 
biophysics and the Peirce philosophic notions of information and symbols.  This 
is now partially clarified.

Numerous, very numerous questions are raised by you posts and Pedro's 
translations into his views of molecular biology.

First, a general comment on the suggested background primer on Kahn which is 
laced with weak metaphors.
I particularly object to the notion (at about minute 2:45 of the first segment) 
that information is the answer to a single question, yes or no.

First objection to the Kahn video is that only an infinitesimal fraction of all 
scientific questions yield a "yes" or "no" answer.

Second objection is that, thus far, no one has constructed a general method for 
coding from the fundamental level of electrical particles to either chemical 
information or biological information.  For QM reasons, this coding problem 
appears to an intractable mathematical problem for any biological theory of 
information emerging from physical principles. 

In these cases, the rich physical behavior of relationships between polar 
opposites, positive and negatively charges apparently requires  the emergence 
of new codes  This is a critical fact that haunts any theoretical attempt to 
invoke Shannon information theory to either chemistry or biology.  

None-the-less, I strongly endorse the intimate linkage between communication 
and information.  This linkage appears necessary for a structural mathematics 
that can be used to exchange meanings.

But, lets ignore that issue for the moment. Let me start with the concepts that 
appears to me to motivate your notion of locality as information.  It is this 
notion that Pedro seeks to translate from a spatial concept, locality, to 
material concepts based on the physics of collections of atomic numbers 
arranged into biological patterns, such as DNA, RNA, and the usual list of 
acronyms that can not be literally (factually) translated into philosophical or 
rhetorical languages.

I am puzzled by the sentence:
It should be clear that the bit alone is local and that any organization of 
>> the bit what-so-ever, be it in the form of a word, a Turing machine tape, in 
>> some form on a disk drive or in a text book is, to some degree, lacking that 
>> locality.

In mathematical terms, what is locality?  
How would express this usage of "locality" in terms of topological spaces 
(another mathematical form of locality) and yet exclude QM theory?

In other words, how does "locality" know where it is at?

In mathematical terms, how is the concept of locality related to message 
content?
For a simple example, what happens to the notion of "locality" when a message 
is compressed 2 fold? 5 fold? 20 fold? Is this concept of locality consistent 
and complete under compression?

An alternative view could be that a bit has meaning only within the context of 
a bit string. In this case, the meaning of the bit string, as a combinatorial 
object, can be assigned a list of rules which change the order of the bit 
string with conservation of the meaning of the string as a whole. 

(As an aside, the preceding suggestion is a rough analogy with the 
"information" content of biological processes such as the flow of information 
from an inducer to a transport protein, as in the Lac operon.) 

On a more constructive avenue, 
> Engineering-wise I believe that a simplified genomics is both possible and 
> ultimately programmable. Enabling us to devise organisms with particular 
> behaviors able to serve our inevitable causes.


is a foundational conjecture seeking to link mathematics, physics, chemistry 
and biology.

First, I would note that molecular biologists, using well-understood chemical 
structural principles, can now
 
> "devise organisms with particular behaviors able to serve our inevitable 
> causes."
so that the second sentence is experimentally used now.

So, it appears that the principle (doctrine) of locality should work if a path 
from the conceptualization of "locality" to chemical structures can be 
constructed?

That is, the paths from quantitative "biophysical" symbolic representations to 
quantitative biochemical symbolic representations (and hence to subjective 
"biosemiotic representations) can be abstractly conceptualized and calculated.

Is this conjecture consistent with your conceptualization of biophysics?

Again, thanks for the highly original and stimulating posts. 

Cheers

Jerry






On Oct 2, 2015, at 3:50 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

> 
> Dear Pedro,
> 
> I greet your response with thanks and a sigh of relief. At least someone is 
> paying attention. :-)
> 
> I understand your concern re. multiple parts and apparent complexity in the 
> full "life-cycle" as you speak of it.  I suspect that there underlie it all a 
> few very simple rules, and this is my premise.  
> 
> Central to this view is th

Re: [Fis] Information and Locality Introduction

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Dear Steven, Pedro and List:

Two excellent posts!

Steven:  I look forward to your ratiocinations and there connectivity with 
symbolic logic. 

It is my view that one of the foundational stumbling blocks to communication 
about syntactical information theory (and its exactness!) is the multi-meanings 
that emerge from the multiple symbol systems used by the natural sciences.

Stan's post is a superb example of how anyone change the semantic meaning of 
words and talk about personal philosophy in context that ignores the 
syntactical meaning of the same word such that the exact sciences are 
generated.  Of course, this personal philosophy remains a private conversation. 

 Steven and Pedro (and I), by way of contrast, are seeking a discussion of 
public information and the exactness of public information theory.  

Cheers

Jerry


Words to live by:

"The union of units unifies the unity of the universe"


 

On Sep 11, 2015, at 7:22 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:

> Dear Steven and FIS colleagues,
> 
> Many thanks for this opening text. What you are proposing about a pretty
> structured discussion looks a good idea, although it will have to
> confront the usually anarchic discussion style of FIS list! Two aspects
> of your initial text have caught my attention (apart from those videos
> you recommend that I will watch along the weekend).
> 
> First about the concerns of a generation earlier (Shannon, Turing...)
> situating information in the intersection between physical science and
> engineering. The towering influence of this line of thought, both with
> positive and negative overtones, cannot be overestimated. Most attempts
> to enlarge informational thought and to extend it to life, economies,
> societies, etc. continue to be but a reformulation of the former ideas
> with little added value. See one of the last creatures: "Why Information
> Grows: The Evolution of Order, from Atoms to Economies" (2015), by Cesar
> Hidalgo (prof. at MIT).
> 
> In my opinion, the extension of those classic ideas to life are very
> fertile from the technological point of view, from the "theory of
> molecular machines" for DNA-RNA-protein matching to genomic-proteomic
> and other omics'  "big data". But all that technobrilliance does not
> open per se new avenues in order to produce innovative thought about the
> information stuff of human societies. Alternatively we may think that
> the accelerated digitalization of our world and the cyborg-symbiosis of
> human information and computer information do not demand much brain
> teasing, as it is a matter that social evolution is superseding by itself.
> 
> The point I have ocasionally raised in this list is whether all the new
> molecular knowledge about life might teach us about a fundamental
> difference in the "way of being in the world" between life and inert
> matter (& mechanism & computation)---or not. In the recent compilation
> by Plamen and colleagues from the former INBIOSA initiative,  I have
> argued about that fundamental difference in the intertwining of
> communication/self-production, how signaling is strictly caught in the
> advancement of a life cycle  (see paper "How the living is in the
> world"). Life is based on an inusitate informational formula unknown in
> inert matter. And the very organization of life provides an original
> starting point to think anew about information --of course, not the only
> one.
> 
> So, to conclude this "tangent", I find quite exciting the discussion we
> are starting now, say from the classical info positions onwards, in
> particularly to be compared in some future with another session (in
> preparation) with similar ambition but starting from say the
> phenomenology of the living. Struggling for a
> convergence/complementarity of outcomes would be a cavalier effort.
> 
> All the best--Pedro
> 
> 
> 
> Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
>> ...The subject is one that has concerned me ever since I completed my PhD in 
>> 1992. I came away from defending my thesis, essentially on large scale 
>> parallel computation, with the strong intuition that I had disclosed much 
>> more concerning the little that we know, than I had offered either a 
>> theoretical or engineering solution. 
>> For the curious, a digital copy of this thesis can be found among the 
>> reports of CRI, MINES ParisTech, formerly ENSMP, 
>> http://www.cri.ensmp.fr/classement/doc/A-232.pdf, it is also available as a 
>> paper copy on Amazon.
>> 
>> Like many that have been involved in microprocessor and instruction 
>> set/language design, using mathematical methods, we share the physical 
>> concerns of a generation earlier, people like John Von Neumann, Alan Turing, 
>> and Claude Shannon. In other words, a close intersection between physical 
>> science and machine engineering.
>> 
>> ...I will then discuss some historical issues in particular referencing 
>> Benjamin Peirce, Albert Einstein and Alan Turing. And finally discuss the 
>> contemporary issues, as I 

[Fis] Economy of Information -The concept underlying the Information Foundation of the Act of F.Flores & L.deMarcos?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Fernando, Luis, List:

This is a further commentary on your paper, focusing on the section labelled:  
Agnumetry, quantifying modernization.

First, your original thinking in this area is clearly expressed and logically 
justified.  Congratulations.

This synthesis of the motivations for human actions with the means to get them 
done is a novel feature that I like very much. The simple comparison of 
artifacts to objective allows enumeration of a form of necessary information 
for the particular act under consideration.  

The postulate of the ratio of relations between human and the count of 
artifacts at different points in time is a clear and concise statement, and, 
within this context, compelling.  

Your paper is a very substantial contribution to cultural information, in my 
view.

In more general terms, I have constructed a mathematical concept of "economy of 
relations" which, I suspect, has similar motivations.  The general notion of an 
"economy of relations" is foundational to Shannon information theory because 
the goal of an exact encoding, transmission and decoding of symbols is to 
preserve the informational content of the message, which is analogous to the 
ratio you describe on page 31.  

It may be helpful to you that in my unpublished work, I first construct a 
"number spine" based on the count of attributes of mathematical objects that 
contain form.   This number spine encode the "count" concept without 
constraining the meaning of the number, which can be assigned on the basis of 
attributes of the number.  In other words, the the informational count can be 
assigned realistic units (of being), as you have done. 

My question to you is:

Can you enumerate a number of examples of agnumery from various cultures and 
time periods.

Please note that I am NOT commenting on various presuppositions and assumptions 
of your paper.  I believe that you will find ways to modify the strong rhetoric 
in such a way that the basic numeric argument is sustained and can be further 
developed.  (At least, I would encourage you to attempt to do this, but it will 
be a daunting rhetorical task.)  

Perhaps other contributors to the list (Raf?) who are highly skilled 
rhetoricians, can be of help?

In summary, an excellent beginning toward quantifying a meaningful theory of 
information content associated with cultural developments.   It is pleasing to 
see the potential for convergence of various approaches to the meaning of 
information.

Cheers

Jerry 








On Jul 24, 2015, at 7:28 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:

> Hola Fernando & Luis,
> 
> Many thanks for your contribution, quite interesting to read. I really second 
> the previous comments from Joseph, Gyuri and Jerry. I also see a few other 
> points:
> --The relationship between entropy and culture taken as order is rather 
> risky. I think there is a misunderstanding of entropy on which I strongly 
> recommend the work of Arieh Ben-Naim (2013, entropy and the second law), 
> quite a lot of fuzzy mysticism has been produced around.  That the artificial 
> work reduces human information to the simple world of a cyborg is dubious 
> (how many informational decisions made by the cavemen versus the urbanite?) 
> The respective emotional rewards of their choices are another matter.
> --About the complexity of human acts everyday activities apparently are 
> "conceptually simple", quite deceptively--they become the most difficult ones 
> to be performed by robots versus the complex but easy industrial operations. 
> These everyday activities look easy because of a previous learning process 
> only. For instance in my trip to Vienna, after arrival I got lost three times 
> while taking the airport bus, the tram, the metro, etc. Terrible experience 
> that forced myself into a lot of informational (wrong) choices and 
> explorations. However next day I was just the master (in spanish "el puto 
> amo"). The tremendous initial complexity had been assimilated and my 
> transportation acts were now very easy. Not including these crucial aspects 
> on the relative complexity, and how it is transformed when navigated by the 
> sophisticated "deep learning" strategies of our nervous system is not OK in 
> my opinion.
> --When computing the informational value of human acts, the number of bit 
> attributed to fingers, hands, limps, body, etc. look rather arbitrary. The 
> same for the law of information conservation as presently formulated. (How do 
> this dovetail with the cyclic nature of human life? There is "information 
> generation" and non-conservation, no?)
> --When analyzing technologies the procedure followed does not look very 
> clear, in particular regarding the invariability of the total level of 
> information value. However, the final two pages on the relationship between 
> informational value and price look quite interesting and in my opinion they 
> are the best  section of the paper.
> Overall the attempt is quite brave and full of suggestio

Re: [Fis] Information Foundation of the Act--F.Flores & L.deMarcos

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

This comment is restricted to the proposed use of mathematical structures in 
context of the social.

The mathematical structure of a tree is restricted by the notion of a cycle. 
A tree is readily converted into a cycle by simply adding a new edge between 
leaves or joints.
The simple logic of a tree is lost by including cyclic relations.

It appears to me that the rhetorical arguments may include inferences requiring 
cycle relations.

What would be the nature of the inferences if the hypotheses allowed for cyclic 
social processes, such as learning on the basis of annual agricultural or 
hunting cycles?

Cheers

Jerry

 

On Jul 22, 2015, at 7:33 AM, Pedro C. Marijuan wrote:

> 
> The informational foundation of the act
> Fernando Flores
> Lund University
> fernando.flo...@kultur.lu.se
> 
> Luis de-Marcos
> University of Alcalá
> luis.demar...@uah.es
> 
> See the whole text at: http://fis.sciforum.net/resources/
> 
> Our introducing paper (35 pages) presents a theory that quantifies the 
> informational value of human acts. We argue that living is functioning 
> against entropy and following Erwin Schrödinger we call this tendency 
> “negentropy”. Negentropy is for us the reason behind “order” in social and 
> cultural life. Further, we understand “order” as the condition that the world 
> reaches when the informational value of a series of acts is low. Acting is 
> presented as a set of decisions and choices that create order and this is the 
> key concept of our understanding of the variation from simplicity to 
> complexity in human acts. The most important aim of our theory is to measure 
> non-economic acts trying to understand and explain their importance for 
> society and culture. In their turn such a theory will be also important to 
> understand the similarities and differences between non-economic and economic 
> acts. 
> We follow the classical concept according to which informational value is 
> proportional to the unlikelihood of an act. To capture the richness of the 
> unlikelihood of human acts we use the frequency theory of probability 
> developed by Ludwig von Mises and Karl Popper. Frequency theory of 
> probability allows us to describe a variety of acts from the must most “free” 
> to the least “free” with respect to precedent acts. In short, we characterize 
> human acts in terms of their degree of freedom trying to set up a scale of 
> the information and predictability carried out in human decisions. A taxonomy 
> of acts is also presented, categorizing acts as destructive, mechanical, 
> ludic or vital, according to their degree of freedom (complexity). A 
> formulation to estimate the informational value in individual and collective 
> acts follows. The final part of the paper presents and discuss the 
> consequences of our theory. We argue that artifacts embed information and 
> that modernization can be understood as a one-way process to embed acts of 
> high levels of complexity in simple devices. However, our theory assumes that 
> the total amount of information in the social and cultural world is constant 
> and that Modernity only enables us to redistribute our informational 
> potential. We also advocate for the development of a new science named 
> “agnumetry”, the science that quantify Modernity, measuring the obsolescence 
> of an environment (from agnumy the Greek word for “break”). 
> In our study of human acts we found that acting can also be classified as 
> productive, consumptive and as acts of exchange or economical. The 
> informational value of acts can be the expression of any or all of these 
> acting forms. We outline the relation between the informational value of 
> production and the informational value of consumption (which we call 
> “operative information”), and conclude that these acts define the 
> non-economic value. Sometimes, and depending on the social level of 
> informational value, the acts of exchange emerge defining the informational 
> value of an item at the market, an informational value that assumes the shape 
> of “price” justifying the use of money.
> 
> -- 
> -
> Pedro C. Marijuán
> Grupo de Bioinformación / Bioinformation Group
> Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud
> Centro de Investigación Biomédica de Aragón (CIBA)
> Avda. San Juan Bosco, 13, planta X
> 50009 Zaragoza, Spain
> Tfno. +34 976 71 3526 (& 6818)
> pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> http://sites.google.com/site/pedrocmarijuan/
> -
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis

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Re: [Fis] FIS newcomer

[Jerry LR Chandler]

nna) 
> that “By means of the reformation, all scientific and philosophical domains 
> are facing an integrative trend of paradigm reform, which I name as 
> “informationalization of science”, (The quotation is from one of his 
> presentation slides).
> 
>  
> 
> As you can see, my assertions are very close to what Prof. Kun Wu claims, but 
> far from what you (and other mainstream FIS contributors) obey and adhere to.
> 
>  
> 
> I am a newcomer to FIS and I do not intend to preach in the others’ temple. 
> But Prof. Kun Wu is one of the founding fathers of the Philosophy of 
> Information. Therefore, it would be wise for you to be in an agreement with 
> his postulates.
> 
>  
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Emanuel Diamant.
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
> Sent: Monday, June 15, 2015 8:42 PM
> To: Emanuel Diamant
> Subject: Re: [Fis] FIS newcomer
> 
>  
> 
> Dear Emanuel:
> 
>  
> 
> Thanks for posting your views on Research Gate.
> 
>  
> 
> Interesting perspective, but...  the essence of biology / biological 
> computation are empirical observations that are highly irregular in nature. 
> One must separate the concepts of structures from functions in the languages 
> of chemistry and biology.
> 
>  
> 
> You may wish to look at the concepts of languages from your perspectives.
> 
>  
> 
> Several of my online available papers will provide more substance for these 
> comments.
> 
>  
> 
> Cheers
> 
>  
> 
> jerry
> 
>  
> 
>  
> 
> On Jun 15, 2015, at 11:29 AM, Emanuel Diamant wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Dear FISlists,
> 
>  
> 
> I am a newcomer to the FIS discussion table. The debate that is going on in 
> your list-exchange is very interesting to me, but frankly, for the most of 
> the time, I only guess about what you are talking – my vocabulary and my 
> notions of Information are quite different from yours. Nevertheless, I would 
> like to add my voice to the ongoing discourse – I would like to direct you to 
> my page on the Research Gate 
> (https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Emanuel_Diamant)  to see my uploads 
> from the last IS4IS Vienna Conference. Maybe you will find them interesting.
> 
>  
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Emanuel Diamant.
> 
>  
> 
> ___
> Fis mailing list
> Fis@listas.unizar.es
> http://listas.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
> 
>  
> 
> 
> 
> ___
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[Fis] Information Does Not Equal Communication

[Jerry LR Chandler]

URL Source:
http://www.medpagetoday.com/PatientCenteredMedicalHome/PatientCenteredMedicalHome/48574?isalert=1&uun=g322500d2619R5316671u&utm_source=breaking-news&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=breaking-news&xid=NL_breakingnews_2014-11-13

FISer's:

There are many ways to approach the nebulous concept of information.
These include mathematics, physics, mechanicals, symbolic relations, grammar, 
etc.

Pragmatism is seldom given the priority it deserves.

This article give's an example of the how information is used, perhaps in 
life-death decision making.

What is the relation between Information and the bottom line?  (Or, in this 
case, the entelechy of the last line!)

Cheers

Jerry



Information Does Not Equal Communication
Published: Nov 13, 2014


By Fred N. Pelzman, MD

Information is everything, communication is the key.
Recently, we were contacted by the medical director of a subspecialist fellow's 
practice at one of our affiliated hospitals.
She wanted to discuss ways to improve communication between our practices, and 
expressed considerable frustration about the information received in 
consultation requests from the providers in our practice sending patients their 
way.
She noted that they had "read-only" access to our electronic health record 
(through an information-sharing agreement between our hospitals) and said that 
they were able to see the consult order in the system (which has a section for 
clinical comments), as well as read the provider's notes to glean information 
about why the patient was being sent to see them.
Apparently the fellows at her practice were frustrated about the lack of 
clarity in the consultation requests, not being able to extract from all of 
this what the clinical question being asked of the subspecialist was.
We had a long discussion about how important this was and how her fellows spent 
enormous amounts of time reading through the chart to find out what the 
patient's complaints were, what their past medical history was, what 
interventions had been tried for the specific complaint, and what specifically 
the provider sending the patient to them was asking their assistance with.
This is perfectly reasonable; there is a real expectation that when you refer 
to someone that you clearly delineate your question to them, to make it easier 
for them to help you care for your patient.
This is an art form, being able to wisely use your consultants, to know how to 
engage them to help you improve the condition of your patients. For our interns 
and residents this is part of the learning process, and in looking back at 
their consultation requests we found the quality and clarity of the consult 
question at times lacking, at times nonexistent.
This is an education deficit, a gap in what we are teaching them, but we hope 
to help them learn this process as they continue to grow as clinicians.
As we talked over this problem, we came up with a plan for ways to continue to 
educate our providers on the best way to communicate with consultants and ask 
them an appropriate clinical question, to help make their lives easier as they 
see our patients in their practice.
I then mentioned to the medical director that, in the nearly 20 years that I've 
been at this practice and we have been sending patients to them, there has been 
no mechanism in place for them to communicate back to us. We send patients to 
them, and they disappear into the black box of the hospital down the street.
No letters, no e-mails, no phone calls.
Patients return, and we ask them what the specialist did, what they tested them 
for, what they told them to do, what they gave them to try. The response is 
usually "they did some tests, they gave me some medicine, but I can't really 
recall the details."
Their hospital still has no outpatient electronic health record, so the 
fellow's notes are typed as simple word-processing documents, printed, and 
saved to a paper chart.
They are complaining that they have read-only access to our electronic health 
record, but read-only access is better than no access. Never a thought about 
sending your consultation note back to the requesting provider.
Seems like an obvious deficit, something missing from the consultation process, 
which would really allow us to take better care of our patients.
We talked about different ways to improve this problem, and over the course of 
the next half hour we jury-rigged a process whereby their practice 
administrator would remind the fellows to print a copy of their notes for bulk 
faxing to our practice once a week.
Someone at our end would go through those faxes, identify the referring 
provider, and transport the paper to their mailboxes, ultimately to allow them 
to be reviewed and then scanned into our electronic health record.
Not very technologically savvy, and likely to quickly be forgotten as the busy 
fellows go about their days.
Pretty damn clunky, if you ask me.
This is, of course, a temporary fix, albeit an ugly one; the

Re: [Fis] FIS 2015, Workshop on Combinatorics of Genetics, Fundamentals

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

Their exist many forms of formal logics. 

One of the several concepts important to logic is an ancient concept:

If antecedents, then consequences.

In recent decades, the concept of para-consistent logic has emerged.
It has found many applications, particularly in the cybernetics of control 
systems.

Para-consistent logics are tolerant of apparent or so-called "inconsistencies" 
among several premisses.

Para-consistent logics are worth studying as they motivate consequences from 
antecedents.  One key author is Graham Priest.

One of the principle questions that para-consistent logics raise is "How does 
one compose premisses?"  not necessary dependent on the geometric metrics rules 
of a  line.

Cheers

Jerry



 
On Oct 20, 2014, at 6:44 AM, Karl Javorszky wrote:

> Workshop on the Combinatorics of Genetics, Fundamentals
> 
>  
> In order to prepare for a fruitful, satisfying and rewarding workshop in 
> Vienna, let me offer to potential participants the following main innovations 
> in the field of formal logic and arithmetic:
> 
> 
> 
> 1)  Consolidating contradictions:
> 
> The idea of contradicting logical statements is traditionally alien to the 
> system of thoughts that is mathematics. Therefore, no methodology has evolved 
> of appeasing, soothing, compromise-building among equally valid logical 
> statements that contradict each other. In this regard, mathematical logic is 
> far less advanced than diplomacy, psychology, commercial claims regulation or 
> military science, in which fields the existence of conflicts is a given. The 
> workshop centers around the methodology of fulfilling contradicting logical 
> requirements that co- exist.
> 
> 
> 
> 2)  Concept of Order
> 
> We show that the pointed opposition between readings of a set once as a 
> sequenced one and once as a commutative one is similar to the discussion, 
> whether a Table of the Rorschach test depicts a still-life under water or 
> rather fireworks in Paris. The incompatibility between sequenced and 
> commutative (contemporaneous) is provided by our sensory apparatus: in fact, 
> a set is readable both as a sequenced collection and as a collection of 
> commutative symbols. We abstract from the two sentences “Set A is in a 
> sequential order” and “Set A is a commutatively ordered one” into the 
> sentence “Set A is in order”.
> 
> The workshop introduces the idea and the technique of sequential enumeration 
> (aka “sorting”) of elements of a set, calling the result “order”, and shows 
> that different sorting orders may bring forth contradicting assignments of 
> places to one and the same element, resp. contradicting assignments of 
> elements to one and the same place.
> 
> 
> 
> 3)  The duration of the transient state
> 
> We put forward the motion, that it is reasonable to assume that a set is 
> normally in a state of permanent change – as opposed to the traditional view, 
> wherein a set, once well defined, stays put and idle, remaining such as 
> defined. The idea is that there are always alternatives to whichever order 
> one looks into a set, therefore it is reasonable to assume that the set is in 
> a state of permanent adjustment.
> 
> We look in great detail into the mechanics of transition between Order αβ and 
> Order γδ, and show that the number of tics until the transition is achieved 
> is only in the rarest of cases uniform, therefore partial transformations and 
> half-baked results are the ordre du jour.
> 
> 
> 
> 4)  Standard transitions and spatial structures
> 
> The rare cases where a translation from Order αβ into Order γδ happens in 
> lock-step are quite well suited to serve as units of dis-allocation, being of 
> uniform properties with respect to a numeric quality which could well be 
> called an extent for “mass”.
> 
> These cases allow assembling two 3-dimensional spatial structures with 
> well-defined axes. The twice 3 axes can even be merged into one, consolidated 
> space with 3 common axes, the price of the consolidation being that every 
> 1-dimensional statement has in this case 4 variants. The findings allow 
> supporting Minkowski’s ideas and also some contemplation about 3 
> sub-statements consisting of 1-of-4 variants, as used by Nature while 
> registering genetic information in a purely sequenced fashion.
> 
> 
> 
> 5)  Size optimization and asynchronicity questions
> 
> The set is the same, whether we read it consecutively or transversally. The 
> readings differ. We show that the functions of logical relations’ density per 
> unit resp. unit fragment size per logical relation are intertwined, making a 
> change between the representations of order as unit and as logical relation a 
> matter of accounting artistry. (“If I want more matter, I say that I see 66 
> commutative units; if I want more information, I say that I see 11 sequences 
> of 6 units.”)
> 
> The phlogiston (or divine will) fueling the mechanism appears to be the 
> synchronicity o

Re: [Fis] Re to Pridi: infinite bandwith and finite information content CS Peirce and Chemical Nomenclature

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Pridi, Krassimir,  List:

(In order to place this comment in context, and for reference, I have copied 
Krassimir's "definition" of information below. My comments follow the excellent 
post of Pridi.)

> In physical world there exist only reflections but not information. 
> 
> Information “ i " is the quadruple: 
> i = (s, r, e, I) 
> where 
> s is a source entity, which is reflected in r 
> r is the entity in which reflection of s exists 
> e is an evidence for the subject I which proofs for him and only for him that 
> the reflection in r reflects just s , i.e. the evidence proofs for the 
> subject what the reflection reflects . 
> I is information subject who has possibility to make decisions in accordance 
> with some goals – human, animal, bacteria, artificial intelligent system, 
> etc. 
> 
> In other words, information is a reflection, but not every reflection is 
> information – only reflections for which the quadruple above exist are 
> assumed as information by the corresponded subjects. 
> 
> For different I , information may be different because of subjects’ finite 
> memory and reflection possibilities. 
> Because of this, a physical event with an infinite bandwidth may have finite 
> information content (for concrete information subject) . 
On Jul 23, 2014, at 6:45 AM, Pridi Siregar wrote:

> Dear Krassimir,
> 
> Thank you for your explanation. It does give me a better understanding of how 
> information (beyond Shannon) can be formalized! However, a closer look at the 
> formalism and its semantic does raise new questions:
> 
> From the definition you have given, it appears that information cannot be 
> viewed in any absolute sense but as internal representations of "external 
> patterns" whose meaning depends on the subject capturing/interpreting/storing 
> the said patterns. In this framework then, it seems that "information" cannot 
> be conceptualized without reference to the both "something out there" and the 
> "internal structures" of the receptor/cognitive system. 
> 
> In other words the concept of "information" lies within some "subjective" 
> (albeit rational) realm. I'm sure that I'm stating the obvious for most of 
> FIS members but a question arised upon reading your formalism: How can we 
> really quantify meaningful (semantic) information beyond Shannon (that 
> disregards semantics) and his purely statistical framework? Or beyond 
> Boltzmann's entropy/Information based on micro-macro states ratios?
> 
> When we formalize i = (s, r, e, I) there is  a "meta-level" formalisation 
> that is only apparent since even (s,r) reflect our own (human) subjective 
> world-view. We could actually write (I1(s), I1(r), e, I2) where I1 and I2 are 
> two distinct cognitive systems and both of which lie at the OBJECT level of 
> the formalizing agent which is NEITHER I1 or I2. All "objective" measures 
> (entropy, negentropy,...) are actually totally dependant of I1 and I2 and can 
> never be considered as "absolute". 
> 
> 
> This leads me to a second question (sorry for the lengthy message): there are 
> some researchers that posit that "information" may be more fundamental than 
> the fundamental physical (mass, time, space, amps). This appears (and perhaps 
> only appears) to be at the opposite end of the above-mentioned view. Indeed, 
> in this framework some kind of "universal" or "absolute" notions must be 
> accepted as true.
> 
> One apparent way out would be to demonstrate that information somehow 
> logically entails the fundemantal physical entities while accepting that we 
> are still within a human-centered  world view. And thus no "absolute truth" 
> (whatever this means) is really gained. "Only" a richer more complete 
> (subjective but coherent) world-view .
> 
> Am I making anys sense? Any thoughts?
> 
> Best
> 
> Pridi 
> 

Pridi's comment concur with many of my views wrt the concept of information. 

Krassimir's assertion of a quadruple of symbols is rather close to the 
philosophy of C S Peirce (hereafter "CSP") in one context.

S as symbol represents an external source of signal, that which is independent 
of the individual mind and being.  This is analogous to CSP's term "sinsign".

R is a thing itself.  That is, R generates S.

E as evidence is a vague term which infers an observer (2nd Order Cybernetics?) 
that both receives and evaluates the signal (S) from the thing (R).  CSP 
categorizes evidence as icon, index or symbol with respect to the entity of 
observation.

I  as Krassimirian information is a personal judgment about the evidence.  
(Correspondence with CSP's notion of "argument" is conceivable.) 

Krassimir's assertion that: 
> For different I , information may be different because of subjects’ finite 
> memory and reflection possibilities. 
> Because of this, a physical event with an infinite bandwidth may have finite 
> information content (for concrete information subject) . 

 
moves these 'definitions' of individual symbols into the subjectiv

Re: [Fis] Re to Pridi: infinite bandwith and finite information content - Information content of Atomic Numbers

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Krassimir:

(I have posted Krassimir's response below, since it may not have been 
distributed to the list.)

My question was not a metaphysical question about materiality, my body and 
other such philosophical question of import.

Rather, it is direct question about the sufficiency of the rhetoric of the 
proposal to define a theory of information.

The response saids:
"Atom has no number in the reality, it has one in any information quadruple."

The physical, material concept of order is the empirical ground for 
enumerations of physical chemistry.

The concept of "atomic number" is central to elemental quantum mechanics as 
well as atomic table of elements as well as molecular biology and of course, 
the practice of medicine itself.

To assert that "Atom has no number in the reality"  is a denial of physical 
reality, is it not?

By logical extension,
 if "Atom has no number in the reality", then the material world has no reality.
And:
If the material world has no reality,  the proposed definition of "information" 
is self-contradictory.

This suggests to me that the proposed definition may need to altered to avoid 
the implication of self-contradiction.

Cheers

Jerry






Dear Jery,
 
Thank you for interesting remark.
 
Physical world means all material reality.
A special case of it are living creatures.
 
Your example is good for discussion – somewhere the Rutherford/Moseley 
experiments had been reflected to be further analyzed, i.e. we have information 
quadruple including scientists who assign atomic numbers. Atom has no number in 
the reality, it has one in any information quadruple. Of course, here we have 
very long chain of reflections and corresponded quadruples.
 
Ideal entities are reflections (information) in our brain and are so material 
as we are. This is long story about information models ... including your 
example ...
 
Friendly regards
Krassimir




On Jul 21, 2014, at 12:33 PM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:

> List, Karassimir:
> 
> I found your definition of information to be a bit confusing because the 
> language is a bit ambiguous to me.
> 
> While the definitions of the quadruple "make sense" from a rhetorical sense, 
> one notion that is missing is the concept of what is the meaning of the  
> central reference term:  "physical world".
> 
> For example, please show how for your definition information works for the 
> electrical nature of the carbon atom as defined by the Rutherford/Moseley 
> experiments, which form the base of the atomic numbers. (Carbon has the 
> physical world definition of "6".)  How would this information be symbolized?
> 
> In other words, how does the concept of "quantity" enter into your definition?
> 
> Cheers
> 
> Jerry
> 
> 
> 
> 
> On Jul 21, 2014, at 4:40 AM, Krassimir Markov wrote:
> 
>> Dear Pridi,
>>  
>> An accordance with my understanding:
>>  
>> In physical world there exist only reflections but not information.
>>  
>> Information “i" is the quadruple:
>> i = (s, r, e, I)
>> where
>> s is a source entity, which is reflected in r
>> r is the entity in which reflection of s exists
>> e is an evidence for the subject I which proofs for him and only for him 
>> that the reflection in r reflects just s, i.e. the evidence  proofs for the 
>> subject what the reflection reflects.
>> I is information subject who has possibility to make decisions in accordance 
>> with some goals – human, animal, bacteria, artificial intelligent system, 
>> etc.
>>  
>> In other words, information is a reflection, but not every reflection is 
>> information – only reflections for which the quadruple above exist are 
>> assumed as information by the corresponded subjects.
>>  
>> For different I, information may be different because of subjects’ finite 
>> memory and reflection possibilities.
>> Because of this, a physical event with an infinite bandwidth may have finite 
>> information content (for concrete information subject).
>>  
>> Friendly regards
>> Krassimir
>>  
>>  
>>  
>>  
>>  
>> -Original Message-
>> From: Pridi Siregar
>> Sent: Monday, July 21, 2014 10:35 AM
>> To: Jerry LR Chandler
>> Cc: Foundations of Information Science of Information Science Information 
>> Information Science
>> Subject: Re: [Fis] FIS in Varna. Analogue Computation
>>  
>> I was thinking about particles with mass...:-)
>>  
>> If anyone has an idea concerning my question thanks for the reply. I'm 
>> totally ignorant concerning deep thoughts on the nature of information.
>>  
>> Pridi
>>  
>&

Re: [Fis] Re to Pridi: infinite bandwith and finite information content

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Karassimir:

I found your definition of information to be a bit confusing because the 
language is a bit ambiguous to me.

While the definitions of the quadruple "make sense" from a rhetorical sense, 
one notion that is missing is the concept of what is the meaning of the  
central reference term:  "physical world".

For example, please show how for your definition information works for the 
electrical nature of the carbon atom as defined by the Rutherford/Moseley 
experiments, which form the base of the atomic numbers. (Carbon has the 
physical world definition of "6".)  How would this information be symbolized?

In other words, how does the concept of "quantity" enter into your definition?

Cheers

Jerry




On Jul 21, 2014, at 4:40 AM, Krassimir Markov wrote:

> Dear Pridi,
>  
> An accordance with my understanding:
>  
> In physical world there exist only reflections but not information.
>  
> Information “i" is the quadruple:
> i = (s, r, e, I)
> where
> s is a source entity, which is reflected in r
> r is the entity in which reflection of s exists
> e is an evidence for the subject I which proofs for him and only for him that 
> the reflection in r reflects just s, i.e. the evidence proofs for the subject 
> what the reflection reflects.
> I is information subject who has possibility to make decisions in accordance 
> with some goals – human, animal, bacteria, artificial intelligent system, etc.
>  
> In other words, information is a reflection, but not every reflection is 
> information – only reflections for which the quadruple above exist are 
> assumed as information by the corresponded subjects.
>  
> For different I, information may be different because of subjects’ finite 
> memory and reflection possibilities.
> Because of this, a physical event with an infinite bandwidth may have finite 
> information content (for concrete information subject).
>  
> Friendly regards
> Krassimir
>  
>  
>  
>  
>  
> -Original Message-
> From: Pridi Siregar
> Sent: Monday, July 21, 2014 10:35 AM
> To: Jerry LR Chandler
> Cc: Foundations of Information Science of Information Science Information 
> Information Science
> Subject: Re: [Fis] FIS in Varna. Analogue Computation
>  
> I was thinking about particles with mass...:-)
>  
> If anyone has an idea concerning my question thanks for the reply. I'm 
> totally ignorant concerning deep thoughts on the nature of information.
>  
> Pridi
>  
>  
>  
>  
>  
> - Mail original -
> De: "Jerry LR Chandler" 
> À: "Foundations of Information Science of Information Science Information 
> Information Science" 
> Cc: "John Collier" , "Pridi Siregar" 
> 
> Envoyé: Dimanche 20 Juillet 2014 05:12:53
> Objet: Re: [Fis] FIS in Varna. Analogue Computation
>  
> Pridi:
>  
> Are you mixing apples with citrus fruits?
>  
> Pure elastic collision are pre-suppose mass particles.
> Electrical particles in this context do what?
>  
> Cheers
>  
> Jerry
>  
>  
>  
> On Jul 18, 2014, at 3:21 AM, Pridi Siregar wrote:
>  
> > Dear John and all,
> >
> > The limiting case of the particle collision (pure elastic collision) can be 
> > represented by a dirac impulse whose spectral content ranges over all the 
> > frequencies. I have a question: What does it mean to have a physical event 
> > with an infinite bandwith while its information content is finite ?
> >
> > Best
> >
> >
> > Pridi
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > - Mail original -
> > De: "John Collier" 
> > À: fis@listas.unizar.es, "Pedro C. Marijuan" 
> > Envoyé: Mardi 15 Juillet 2014 07:19:50
> > Objet: Re: [Fis] FIS in Varna. Analogue Computation
> >
> > Dear fis members,
> >
> > I don't think that granularity per se is a
> > necessary basis for the application of
> > information theory to analog channels. In some
> > cases it might be, and I agree that studying the
> > relations between analog (continuous) and digital
> > (discrete) processes is likely to be both
> > interesting and productive. However the bandwidth
> > of an analog channel typically can be defined
> > even if there is no discreteness, for example if
> > the information bearing process consists of waves
> > so that the information bearing capacity is
> > limited by the wavelength. Virtually all physical
> > processes are cyclical in some way and thus have
> > a limited bandwidth. A countercase would be a
> > collision between particles that carries momentum
> > from one to

Re: [Fis] FIS in Varna. Analogue Computation

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Pridi:

Are you mixing apples with citrus fruits?

Pure elastic collision are pre-suppose mass particles.
Electrical particles in this context do what?

Cheers

Jerry



On Jul 18, 2014, at 3:21 AM, Pridi Siregar wrote:

> Dear John and all,
> 
> The limiting case of the particle collision (pure elastic collision) can be 
> represented by a dirac impulse whose spectral content ranges over all the 
> frequencies. I have a question: What does it mean to have a physical event 
> with an infinite bandwith while its information content is finite ?
> 
> Best
> 
> 
> Pridi
> 
> 
> 
> 
> - Mail original -
> De: "John Collier" 
> À: fis@listas.unizar.es, "Pedro C. Marijuan" 
> Envoyé: Mardi 15 Juillet 2014 07:19:50
> Objet: Re: [Fis] FIS in Varna. Analogue Computation
> 
> Dear fis members,
> 
> I don't think that granularity per se is a 
> necessary basis for the application of 
> information theory to analog channels. In some 
> cases it might be, and I agree that studying the 
> relations between analog (continuous) and digital 
> (discrete) processes is likely to be both 
> interesting and productive. However the bandwidth 
> of an analog channel typically can be defined 
> even if there is no discreteness, for example if 
> the information bearing process consists of waves 
> so that the information bearing capacity is 
> limited by the wavelength. Virtually all physical 
> processes are cyclical in some way and thus have 
> a limited bandwidth. A countercase would be a 
> collision between particles that carries momentum 
> from one to another. I can't think offhand right 
> now (I just woke up), but I suspect that even in 
> such cases there is a finite amount of 
> information transferred. In any case, Shannon 
> discussed the bandwidth of continuous process channels. It is worth looking 
> at.
> 
> John
> 
> At 10:28 PM 2014-07-14, Srinandan Dasmahapatra wrote:
>> I think I agree with Joseph Brenner 
>> here.  Analogue computing is linked to real 
>> processes, while living beings find ways of 
>> transducing information out of dynamical states. 
>> The graininess that information theories rely on 
>> to define measures may be directly linked 
>> to  physical limits in the information carriers 
>> (such as photons) or they might be limitations 
>> of the processing organism, extracting the 
>> sufficient "difference that makes a difference". 
>> And yes, there's often a too hasty rush to view 
>> analogue computing through pixellated perspectives.
>> 
>> I'm not sure if this is well known to members of 
>> this list, but Bill Bialek's biophysics text is 
>> a profound reflection of the interplay between 
>> the analogue and the digital, with selection 
>> pressure forcing the sufficiency of the grainy 
>> "difference that makes a difference" towards a 
>> necessity for organisms, and hence pushing 
>> sensory systems close to the physical limits of information transfer.
>> Cheers,
>> Sri
>> 
>> 
>>  Original message 
>> From: Joseph Brenner
>> Date:14/07/2014 18:12 (GMT+00:00)
>> To: Pridi Siregar ,"Pedro C. Marijuan"
>> Cc: fis@listas.unizar.es
>> Subject: Re: [Fis] FIS in Varna. Analogue Computation
>> 
>> Dear Colleagues,
>> 
>> My first reaction to this suggested project is that the logic and philosophy
>> of information (where I am more comfortable) would have little to
>> contribute. However, analogue computation is an area in which insights from
>> some complex theories of information might be useful. Analogue computation
>> has always appeared to me, perhaps incorrectly, as being closer to real
>> processes and therefore in principle better able to model their fuzzy,
>> qualitative aspects. But in some of the articles I've seen, the authors seem
>> almost apologetic at not being able to claim the 'power' of the digital
>> computer . . .
>> 
>> Best wishes,
>> 
>> Joseph
>> 
>> 
>> - Original Message -
>> From: "Pridi Siregar" 
>> To: "Pedro C. Marijuan" 
>> Cc: 
>> Sent: Monday, July 14, 2014 4:35 PM
>> Subject: Re: [Fis] FIS in Varna
>> 
>> 
>>> Thanks for the news Pedro. Sounds really exciting! As you might recall I'm
>>> interested in applications and I would be very keen on having a
>>> brainstorming session that would include pure researchers and
>>> application-oriented guys like me to explore technology transfer
>>> opportunities. I don't know if this could be part of some (possible)
>>> future agenda but I'm sure that business people may find it more than
>>> worthwile to attend such meetings! I'm sure Plamen would be interested
>>> too.
>>> 
>>> best!
>>> 
>>> Pridi
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> - Mail original -
>>> De: "Pedro C. Marijuan" 
>>> À: fis@listas.unizar.es
>>> Envoyé: Vendredi 11 Juillet 2014 14:41:42
>>> Objet: [Fis] FIS in Varna
>>> 
>>> Dear FISers,
>>> 
>>> The fis summer conference in Varna just took place 5-6 July --our 20
>>> years of activities were celebrated too, FIS 20th. Rather unfortunately
>>> not many people attended: half dozen from

Re: [Fis] [PEIRCE-L] Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Steven:

Has your lecture been posted?

Cheers

Jerry



On Jan 7, 2014, at 6:43 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

> 
> Dear List,
> 
> My lecture on the 15th involves an uncommon subject (for me), God. What role 
> does God play in the construction of computing machinery and why is the 
> subject of my talk at all relevant today?
> 
> Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)
> His life, contributions to logic, and the "American Enlightenment."
> http://www.stanford.edu/class/ee380/
> 
> The lecture will be recorded, I'll let you know when it is available.
> 
> Regards,
> Steven
> 
> --
> Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
> Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
> http://iase.info
> 
> 
> 
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirc...@list.iupui.edu 
> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
> 
> 
> 
> 

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[Fis] Nomino-realism and the encoding and decoding of communications

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Joseph, Kassimir,  Bob U:

(This is a continuation of my inquiry into role of universals in biological 
communication.)

Joseph:
After reflecting on the roots of your system of "Logic of Reality"  as grounded 
in potentiality and actuality I remain as puzzled as ever. These two terms are 
widely used in philosophy and physics.  Indeed, historically, it appears these 
terms are translations from the Greek terms of Aristotle.

So, why am I puzzled?  Because I do not find a path from these terms to the 
terminology used by logicians.  While logic itself is an utter disaster (in the 
scientific sense of a unitary discipline) , one point that most authors agree 
upon is a logical statement allows one to draw a conclusion.  By extension, I 
expect a system of logic would allow a systematic method for drawing 
conclusions.  Do you find this to be an unreasonable expectation?

What am I missing?

Kassimir:

I suspect you are mis-reading the message that I seek to communicate.
You write:
>> Information interaction is exchanging of information models.


In other words, you and I do not share a common "information model".
By citing Shannon, you suggest that the information model of Shannon is 
sufficient for (mechanical?) communication.
But what is the notion of universality that you are pre-supposing?  Is it 
merely Euclidian mathematics?

My assertion is that one needs a nomino-realistic notion of "information model" 
in order to encode biological communication.  That is, the names are not 
arbitrary abstractions but necessarily must be constructed from parts.  The 
logic for this assertion are physical principles - physical atomism and the 
associated mathematics of physical conservation principles.  In other words, 
the arbitrary assignment of mathematical variables (names) will not generate a 
logic of biological communication.  

This conclusion is reached as a semiotic necessity - that is, the semiosis 
intrinsic to a mutual shared "information model" that operates between 
mathematics and physical atomism does NOT exist. 

 The antecedent model (information model) does not generate the consequent 
model and hence no conclusions can be drawn.  To make this point sharper, the 
physics community in general rejected the notion of physical atoms prior to the 
experimental and theoretical work between 1900 - 1930 (Rutherford, Bohr, 
Schodinger,...)

I note substantial parallelism between your views and those of my colleague, 
Bob Ulanowicz, in the limited sense that engineering mathematics plays a 
critical role in the structures of your arguments.

The concept of "nomino-realism" demands a richer mathematics, far richer than 
the typical engineering mathematics. 

The terms of this mathematics must be sufficiently rich to allow logicians to 
construct names from the properties of the terms. That necessity is the basis 
of the limitation of the classical mathematical views of universals, such as 
variables and such mathematical structures as "categories". 

At the simple level of natural language communication, a speaker/listener of 
Russian and a speaker/listener of Chinese (pre-supposing that both are 
mono-linguistic) can not communicate because the encoding and decoding 
processes are not mutual.  This is a simple metaphor for the abstract concepts 
that I seek to communicate in the more general representation of mathematical 
symbols.  When are they nominal?  When are they realistic?  And when must they 
be both nominal and realistic?  Biological communication requires BOTH! 


Cheers 

Jerry

Headwater House



On Dec 5, 2013, at 11:08 PM, fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es wrote:

> 
>   1. Nomino-realism and the encoding and decoding of
>  communications (Jerry LR Chandler)
> 
> From: Jerry LR Chandler 
> Subject: [Fis] Nomino-realism and the encoding and decoding of communications
> Date: December 5, 2013 11:08:23 PM CST
> To: fis@listas.unizar.es, pcmarijuan.i...@aragon.es
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Pedro, FISers:
> 
> Congratulations on a big step forward for FIS!
> 
> I am delighted to see this major philosophical step (from the term 
> 'information' to the term 'communication' for Pedro as the leader of FIS.
> 
> The progressive step
> FROM the philosophy of information as a form of physics / number 
> TO the recognition of communication as the basis purpose of "information"
>  is warmly welcomed here at the Headwater House.
> 
> In my view, a new direction has been established for  FIS and I heartily 
> welcome it!
> 
> The next step for FIS is,  in my opinion, to explore the relative.
> In other words, what are the nature of the relatives in communication?
> 
> In this regard, I disagree strongly with Kassimir assertion that :
>> Communication is a process of exchanging of "signals, messages" with 
>&g

[Fis] Nomino-realism and the encoding and decoding of communications

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Pedro, FISers:

Congratulations on a big step forward for FIS!

I am delighted to see this major philosophical step (from the term 
'information' to the term 'communication' for Pedro as the leader of FIS.

The progressive step
FROM the philosophy of information as a form of physics / number 
TO the recognition of communication as the basis purpose of "information"
 is warmly welcomed here at the Headwater House.

In my view, a new direction has been established for  FIS and I heartily 
welcome it!

The next step for FIS is,  in my opinion, to explore the relative.
In other words, what are the nature of the relatives in communication?

In this regard, I disagree strongly with Kassimir assertion that :
> Communication is a process of exchanging of "signals, messages" with 
> different degree of complexity (Shannon).
> Information interaction is exchanging of information models. It is specific 
> only for intelligent agents but not for low levels of live mater (bio 
> molecules, cells, organs).

My rejection of Kassimir's assertion is at a foundational level with respect to 
communication and the role of encoding/decoding in communication.  I interpret 
Kassimir's paragraph as a excluding "genetic systems" from the category of 
"intelligent agents".

Living systems come into existence and persevere on the basis of information 
exchanges/information models. I assert this as a biological fact.

Simple reason for my assertions: The codes for mechanical "information models" 
are generated by living systems.

 In temporal logical terms, the generator must proceed the generated.  Human 
intelligence generates the mechanical "intelligent agents" used for engineering 
purposes. What is the basis of the conjecture that "intelligent agents" are 
anything other than products of human intelligence?

The encoding and decoding processes that are necessary for communication as a 
process are both representations expressible in terms of physical atomism. The 
distinction is the generative nature of the encoding and decoding processes 
viewed as either nomino-realism or as merely mechanical philosophy of Newtonian 
physics.

 (The term nomino-realism, is used as a philosophical category that describes 
the emergence of names.  I coined this logical term out of necessity. The 
philosophy of nominalism, as a separate concept is insufficient to generate 
biological codes (such as the genetic code.) The philosophy of realism, taken 
as a separate concept, is insufficient to generate biological codes (such as 
the genetic code.) Both philosophical concepts, taken in conjunction as 
indicated by the hyphen that binds the two terms, are necessary to provide the 
logic necessary to express the concept of a code.  The word "code" in this 
concept refers to reference symbols, rather similar to Shannon's notion of a 
code.)

Grammatically, nomino-realism expresses the concept comparable to Leibnetz's? 
notion that the object contains the subject. (My memory is that this was 
Leibnetz's view, but I do not have the immediate citation at hand.  Perhaps 
someone can either verify this point or correct it.)

In terms of John Collier's defense of "its from bits", I would argue that 
physical atomism is the ultimate source of both biological and mechanical codes 
necessary to generate communication between two independent but relative 
systems. 

Cheers

Jerry

(BTW, these conclusion come deductively from my on-going work on the logic of 
number as manifest in physical atomism.) 






On Dec 5, 2013, at 7:46 AM, fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es wrote:

> Send fis mailing list submissions to
>   fis@listas.unizar.es
> 
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>   https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>   fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es
> 
> You can reach the person managing the list at
>   fis-ow...@listas.unizar.es
> 
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of fis digest..."
> Today's Topics:
> 
>   1. The Interaction Man (Krassimir Markov)
>   2. Stanford seminar "On The Origin Of Experience"
>  (Steven Ericsson-Zenith)
>   3. Re: The Interaction Man ( Xiaohong Wang??? )
> 
> From: "Krassimir Markov" 
> Subject: [Fis] The Interaction Man
> Date: December 4, 2013 4:38:53 PM CST
> To: "Pedro C. Marijuan" , 
> Reply-To: Krassimir Markov 
> 
> 
> Dear Pedro and FIS Colleagues,
> This discussion is full with interesting ideas.
> What I want to add is that I distinguish the concepts "communication" and 
> "information interaction" which reflect similar phenomena but at different 
> levels of live hierarchy.
> Communication is a process of exchanging of "signals, messages" with 
> different degree of complexity (Shannon).
> Information interaction is exchanging of information models. It is specific 
> only for intelligent agents but not for low levels of live mater (bio 
> molecules, c

Re: [Fis] fis Digest, Vol 577, Issue 10

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Pedro, List:

You write:
>  ...a reference to the tension between the empirical and the abstract in FIS. 
> I quite agree, it is one of the essential tensions in any healthy scientific 
> development (whenever it is possible to maintain it).

Tensions?
Tensions between the empirical and the abstract?

From my reading of the posts of various contributors over the past 3-5 years, I 
heartily disagree with this view of the current situation on this FIS list 
serve.

Shannon's information theory was published about 65 years ago.
It has become the logical foundation of a huge industry employing millions of 
workers, globally.

The principle abstraction of information theory can be roughly stated.  If one 
encoded information (numbers, letters, images, mathematics, physics, chemistry, 
biology, medicine, art, music, literature, feeling, emotions, etc.) into a 
binary code, then the encoded information can be electronically encoded and 
transmitted (transferred) to other electronic devices and decoded by other 
machines or individuals. This dependency, in turn, relies upon Boolean Algebra 
and associated mathematics. It now appears that the overwhelming majority of 
contributors to list serve find this externalist's view of information to be in 
complete harmony with the empirical and the abstract.   

Where is the tension?
Do you not believe in the validity of Boolean algebra?
Do you not believe in the validity of encoding processes? 
Do you not believe in the validity of transmission processes/error correction 
codes?

The overwhelming majority of contributors find this externalist's view of 
information to be acceptable, and seek to make it more acceptable by tweaking 
the "word-smithing" a bit in order to become congruent with their personal 
philosophy.  At least that is my view of the current status. 

Why do I write this message, perhaps a bit on the side of harshness?

Quite simple. 
The current foundation of information sciences does not meet the needs of 
chemistry, biology or medicine. A second foundation must be built to express 
the role of information in communications within living systems. For example, 
central to the tree of life are the informative  feed-forwards processes that 
transmit genetic information into individual anatomies and logical processes, 
life itself. Of particular theoretical interest, from the perspective of FIS, 
are the feed-forward processes that start with the messages encoded in a 
fertilized egg and generate, through a sequence of biochemical process, the 
mind.

Perhaps one or more of the externalists can determine whether the genesis of 
mind, a process common to almost all human descendants, is Turing Computable or 
not?  

Cheers

Jerry 

Research Professor
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Studies
GMU



On Nov 7, 2013, at 11:00 AM, fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es wrote:

> Send fis mailing list submissions to
>   fis@listas.unizar.es
> 
> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
>   https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
> or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to
>   fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es
> 
> You can reach the person managing the list at
>   fis-ow...@listas.unizar.es
> 
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of fis digest..."
> Today's Topics:
> 
>   1. Re: FIS News (Pedro C. Marijuan)
> 
> From: "Pedro C. Marijuan" 
> Subject: Re: [Fis] FIS News
> Date: November 7, 2013 7:11:48 AM CST
> To: 
> 
> 
> Dear Karl and FIS colleagues,
> 
> Many thanks for the comprehensive response. You have made a reference to the 
> tension between the empirical and the abstract in FIS. I quite agree, it is 
> one of the essential tensions in any healthy scientific development (whenever 
> it is possible to maintain it). My tongue-in-cheek complain was precisely 
> addressed to the usual abscence of such tension in our discussions, or say, 
> the insufficient presence of the empirical. For instance, in the current 
> exchange I was mentioning the ecological-sociological views of Jared Diamond, 
> as one of the most vocal authors on the "collapse" of historical societies, 
> even pretty complex ones.  His views on the structural traits involving the 
> complexification of the daily interactions could be quite interesting to 
> discuss along the present theme.
> 
> Nowadays there also a number of network science studies on person-to-person 
> interactions, often along cell-phone technologies. Other more general 
> approaches look for the influence of new technologies in human relationships 
> (in Xian an excellent presentation on "friendship" from an Aristotelian 
> background in the i-society was made by Michael Patrick). Another interesting 
> angle concerns the studies on "smart cities" , how individual life stories 
> are carried out among energy-material flows  coupled with information flows 
> of a new nature.  The contemporary acceleration of "artificial in

Re: [Fis] fis Digest, Vol 571, Issue 17 Role of First Principles in Information theory

[Jerry LR Chandler]

anical 
representations BEFORE the Turing computations can even be considered. The 
difficulty of making this logical encoding is addressed by C S Peirce in his 
"trichotomy".

I gave a paper on "Third Order Cybernetics" at the Vienna conference last year. 
I will send you a copy of the slides which will illustrate some of the 
theoretical and practical problems intrinsic to the mechanical vs biological 
view of nature if they are of any interest to you.

Best wishes in your journey.

Cheers

Jerry 






 May 27, 2013, at 11:00 AM, fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es wrote:

> Today's Topics:
> 
>   1. Re: Collier's Metaphysics (Jerry LR Chandler)
>   2. Re: Collier's Metaphysics (John Collier)
>   3. Re: Collier's Metaphysics (Bruno Marchal)
>   
> From: Jerry LR Chandler 
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Collier's Metaphysics
> Date: May 26, 2013 10:27:07 PM CDT
> To: John Collier 
> Cc: John Collier , "fis@listas.unizar.es" 
> 
> 
> 
> From: John Collier 
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Collier's Metaphysics
> Date: May 27, 2013 1:08:54 AM CDT
> To: "fis@listas.unizar.es" 
> 
> 
> Another vapid criticism with no argument. Give me an idea, Jerry, give me an 
> idea. You obviously think I don't have it, so it would be rude of you to just 
> say this sort of thing and refrain. List some things that are involved with 
> metaphysics that I have missed.
> 
> Otherwise I will have to assume that you cannot do this.
> 
> John
> 
> At 05:27 AM 2013/05/27, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
> 
>> On May 26, 2013, at 10:46 AM, John Collier wrote:
>> 
>>> I don't have much idea.
>> 
>> 
>> I concur.
>> 
>> Jerry
> 
> 
> --
> Professor John Collier colli...@ukzn.ac.za
> Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa
> T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292   F: +27 (31) 260 3031
> Http://web.ncf.ca/collier
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> From: Bruno Marchal 
> Subject: Re: [Fis] Collier's Metaphysics
> Date: May 27, 2013 3:41:00 AM CDT
> To: fis Science 
> 
> 
> 
> On 27 May 2013, at 08:08, John Collier wrote:
> 
>> Another vapid criticism with no argument. Give me an idea, Jerry,
>> give me an idea. You obviously think I don't have it, so it would be
>> rude of you to just say this sort of thing and refrain. List some
>> things that are involved with metaphysics that I have missed.
>> 
>> Otherwise I will have to assume that you cannot do this.
> 
> 
> Indeed, there is nothing metaphysical about this. It is a theorem in applied 
> science (the step 8 of the Universal Dovetailer Argument has to use a bit of 
> Occam razor). If we are machine, the physical reality is a statistical 
> appearance, resulting from information selection among multiple computations 
> which can be proved to be emulated (not just described) in arithmetic. This 
> can already be used to explain some weird aspect of nature (the quantum).
> 
> Some people tend to dismiss this without studying the (mind-body) problem. 
> This is a quasi tradition since Aristotle, but it is not science.
> 
> With Mechanism, we can attribute a subject to some object, but we cannot 
> attribute one object to one subject, only an infinity of objects.  We can 
> already confirm that aspect when looking close to any piece of matter.
> 
> The self-multiplication of machines, explains the origin of information, from 
> the machines (or relative numbers) points of view. Elementary computer 
> science shows the very rich structure that the universal machine are forced 
> to put on that information.
> 
> This makes also the mechanist or computationalist hypothesis testable (and 
> already partially tested).
> 
> Bruno
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> 
>> John
>> 
>> At 05:27 AM 2013/05/27, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
>> 
>>> On May 26, 2013, at 10:46 AM, John Collier wrote:
>>> 
>>>> I don't have much idea.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> I concur.
>>> 
>>> Jerry
>> 
>> 
>> --
>> Professor John Collier 
>> colli...@ukzn.ac.za
>> Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa
>> T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292   F: +27 (31) 260 3031
>> Http://web.ncf.ca/collier
>> 
>> ___
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>> https://webmail.unizar.es/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/fis
> 
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
> 
> 
> 

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Re: [Fis] Collier's Metaphysics

[Jerry LR Chandler]

On May 26, 2013, at 10:46 AM, John Collier wrote:

> I don't have much idea.


I concur.

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Re: [Fis] Collier's Metaphysics

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John:
On May 26, 2013, at 10:26 AM, John Collier wrote:

>> Your notion of metaphysics appears to so extremely narrowly restricted that 
>> you can exempt your own highly metaphysical writings from your definition of 
>> metaphysics.  In fact, the traditional usage of the term "metaphysics" is 
>> not narrowly restricted.
> 
> Metaphysics has to do with two things, ontology and necessity

Your response amply demonstrates my point.

Cheers

Jerry




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[Fis] Collier's Metaphysics

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John:

I have followed your writings for many years - perhaps more than two decades 
now.  

Frankly, from the perspective of a hardcore realist, I find much of your 
written work to be highly metaphysical in nature, including the sentences which 
I cited in the post of May 17, 2013.

Your notion of metaphysics appears to so extremely narrowly restricted that you 
can exempt your own highly metaphysical writings from your definition of 
metaphysics.  In fact, the traditional usage of the term "metaphysics" is not 
narrowly restricted.

On numerous occasions, you assert your views as a MIT trained physicist. Yet in 
this immediate exchange, the responsibility for the assertions are attributed 
to others. Puzzling.  

Have you every given any serious metaphysical thought to the scientific meaning 
of the phrase "it from bit"?  

Perhaps the dichotomy of your perspectives is amply illustrated by the title of 
your book:

"Every Thing Must Go"

This title itself is a simple logical assertion. It expresses logical necessity.

If this assertion is true, what would remain?

Life?
Matter?
Mentation?
John Collier?
MIT style physics?
Mathematics?
Philosophy of science?
Metaphysics?
Nothing?

This title alone expresses a deep and profound metaphysical perspective. 

At heart, I am a simple man, in love with nature, logic and mathematics. From 
my perspective, your voluminous metaphysical writings tend to be contrary to my 
experience of nature, logic and mathematics. 

"It from bit"?  Really?

My question of May 17, 2013 remains open:

> How would a rational realist distinguish this metaphysical perspective from 
> witchcraft or magic?


Cheers

Jerry 



On May 23, 2013, at 2:45 AM, John Collier wrote:

> Jerry, I don’t think I have a metaphysical position on information. I was 
> classifying the way that active scientists use the concept (or concepts). I 
> really don’t know what you are talking about. If you want to know the 
> empirical basis for the uses of information I suggest you read the original 
> authors I refer to.  I use the concept as it has been introduced by others. 
> Some concept I don’t find useful, so I ignore them, but all of the use of 
> information I have made over the years has been in the context of its use in 
> scientific theories. So I really don’t see what your concern about 
> metaphysics is. I don’t think the issue is very important, if there is one. 
> We detect information, we interpret it, we process it, we hypothesize it and 
> its properties in order to explain our observations. It doesn’t seem much 
> different from energy that way, at least to me. I am not even really clear as 
> to what having a metaphysical position on information would be. I suppose 
> that there are several: it is a “stuff”, it is an illusion, it is constructed 
> by us, and so on. I don’t really see much advantage in pursuing these issues, 
> and they have been applied in the past to energy without any gain in 
> understanding.
>  
> The part you pasted you can find the basis of in work by David Layzer as the 
> earliest. Negative entropy was introduced by Schroedinger in the context of 
> explaining how living systems reproduce and maintain themselves, and related 
> explicitly to information in by Leon Brillouin in his studies of measurement. 
> Wheeler introduced the it-from-bit view, and it has been used to study black 
> holes and to explain why they don’t destroy order in the universe (See Leon 
> Smolin, Three Roads to Quantum Gravity). Scientific sources relating 
> information, order and entropy are too numerous to list, but they have been 
> sued to explain how order and disorder can increase together in the universe. 
> I don’t see anything especially metaphysical in any of this work.
>  
> In general, as in the book I participated in, Every Thing Must Go, I prefer a 
> minimalist metaphyiscs that only commits to the kinds of things that are 
> required by our best science. I am not prepared to say to a scientist, “You 
> can’t use that concept; it violates my metaphysical preconceptions.” I don’t 
> really have metaphysical preconceptions except that I believe that there are 
> things in the world that we didn’t make or construct, and that we can have 
> fallible knowledge of them using fallible methodology, and that our best 
> guide to what there is is scientific investigation (pretty much like Peirce, 
> or more recently Sellars, or my sometime coauther C.A. Hooker, or the other 
> authors on the book I just mentioned).
>  
> And that is why I didn’t understand what you were asking when you asked about 
> metaphysics, especially given your quoted section.
>  
> John
>  
>  
> From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
> Sent: Wednesday, May 22, 2013 11:10 PM
> To: fis@listas.uni

Re: [Fis] fis Digest, Vol 571, Issue 5

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John:

> Which does "this" refer to, Jerry? 

My response was to the section of your post that I pasted / cited in my post.

Your further assertion that: 

>  Since the scientists involved are among the top in the respective fields, I 
> take that what they are doing with information concepts is reasonable. I 
> can't judge that as I am not a specialist in their fields.

is really astounding to me!

As you are well aware, numerous philosophies and metaphysical concepts of 
information exist in the published literature.
Given your extensive list of publications in the information sciences over 
several decades, I find your stance with respect to your judgments to be 
remarkable.

Finally, I do not feel that I have a quarrel with anyone.
 
As a natural scientist, I merely asked a provocative question about your 
metaphysical position.
I use the term "metaphysical" as I do not find a relationship with either 
mathematics or the sciences of information as I understand them.  

Does the tone of these posts suggest that you would like to change your 
position?

Cheers

Jerry




On May 22, 2013, at 3:26 PM, John Collier wrote:

> Which does "this" refer to, Jerry? My paper is about scientists who use 
> information concepts to explain things and make predictions. And then I 
> organized them into a nested hierarchy. Since the scientists involved are 
> among the top in the respective fields, I take that what they are doing with 
> information concepts is reasonable. I can't judge that as I am not a 
> specialist in their fields. If you are, then any quarrel you have is with 
> them, not me. I assume, prima facie, that scientists know what they are 
> doing. I have found Smolin, who uses the it-from-bit view to explain 
> conservation of information around a black hole, very approachable.
> 
> John
> 
> At 05:42 PM 2013/05/17, Jerry LR Chandler wrote:
>> John: 
>> 
>> On May 17, 2013, at 5:26 AM, fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es wrote:
>> 
>>> The vacuum background is random, and hence contains no information in the 
>>> negentropy sense (see my "kinds" at Kinds of Information in Scientific Use. 
>>> 2011. cognition, communication, co-operation. Vol 9, No 2 ). However "it 
>>> from bit" information appears and disappears. It can be magnified in 
>>> principle, but I know of no detected cases.
>> 
>> How would a rational realist distinguish this metaphysical perspective from 
>> witchcraft or magic?
>> 
>> Cheers
>> 
>> Jerry
> 

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Re: [Fis] fis Digest, Vol 571, Issue 5

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John:

On May 17, 2013, at 5:26 AM, fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es wrote:

> The vacuum background is random, and hence contains no information in the 
> negentropy sense (see my "kinds" at Kinds of Information in Scientific Use. 
> 2011. cognition, communication, co-operation. Vol 9, No 2 ). However "it from 
> bit" information appears and disappears. It can be magnified in principle, 
> but I know of no detected cases.

How would a rational realist distinguish this metaphysical perspective from 
witchcraft or magic?

Cheers

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Re: [Fis] fis Digest, Vol 564, Issue 7

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Stan:

On Oct 22, 2012, at 12:00 PM, fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es wrote:

> I think it of some interest that I have previously ( 2006  On Aristotle’s 
> conception of causality.  General Systems Bulletin 35: 11.) proposed that the 
> Aristotelian 'formal cause' determines both 'what happens' and 'how it 
> happens', and that the combination of this with material cause ('what it 
> happens to') delivers 'where' it happens.
> 

What a curious view of Aristotelian causality!

You completely reject the traditional metaphor of the purpose associated with 
building a house?

Formal causes are almost always interpreted in terms of symbolic 
representations - symbolic logic, symbolic equations, symbolic plans - images 
of human imagination /consciousness.

So you see yourself, as within your consciousness, as the source of 'what 
happens' and 'how it happens'!   :-)  ;-)

Philosophy!

Cheers

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[Fis] Aspects of the Logical Philosophy of Information (was: Physical information is WHAT? A Puzzle.)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

the molecular number ladder, mental activity. 

With respect to your reference to a computational hypothesis, which (whose?) 
are you referring to? Does your usage of the term "computational hypothesis" 
require mathematical closure on an exact calculation? In other words, do you 
get an exact answer... or another bit of philosophy?

I do not understand what is unclear about the difference between 
electro-mechanical and electro-chemical systems. I do not think my usage of 
these terms is in any unusual.


Finally, given the silence of many strong proponents of "physical information", 
I am beginning to wonder if the concept of "physical information" is another 
philosophical red herring, a sort of metaphysical wish to find a correspondence 
between a popular mechanical method of calculation and the efficient causality 
of motion of matter in space.  Form must remain at the root of information.


Cheers

Jerry 



On Jun 7, 2012, at 1:14 PM, Joseph Brenner wrote:

> Dear Jerry,
> 
> I am afraid I have forgotten exactly what it was I said that caused you to 
> embark on this line of reasoning. Be that as it may, there is one part of it 
> that I wish to distance myself from.
> 
> You wrote: "As atomic numbers, these two numbers represent all of the 
> physical information contained in the respective atoms."
> 
> I respectfully disagree. A number is one (abstract) thing and an atom is 
> another (non-abstract) thing. I consider this form of analysis, which you 
> have used also in your "Perplex Number" discussion, as eliminative. What is 
> eliminated is, exactly, the energetic physical properties, actual and 
> potential, which is the most important part of the physical information that 
> is characteristic of an atomic or molecular structure. It is this that 
> determines the angles between atoms.
> 
> That numbers, from whatever source, can be combined in various ways is clear. 
> To call this 'physical information', fundamental to information theory in 
> chemistry and physics, that provides any /new/ facts or insights into what, 
> say, cyclooctene is and/or can become seems inappropriate to me.
> 
> (By the way, there are several additional linear, non-cyclic, assymmetrical 
> "56" structures, with methyl groups and double and triple bonds that you can 
> write that correspond to the formula C8H8.)
> 
> Best regards,
> 
> Joseph
> 
> 
> - Original Message - From: "Jerry LR Chandler" 
> 
> To: 
> Sent: Thursday, June 07, 2012 5:11 PM
> Subject: [Fis] Physical information is WHAT? A Puzzle.
> 
> 
> 
> FISers:
> 
> The following example concerning the fundamental theory of information in 
> chemistry and physics puzzled me. Logical analyses of this puzzle from 
> longtime participants would be welcomed.
> 
> Consider any pair of atomic numbers. (Recall that the concepts of atomic 
> numbers were established by physical measurements (Rutherford, Moseley, 
> (1911)).  Because the conundrum is a question of meaning, I will select the 
> two numbers 1 and 6. As atomic numbers, these two numbers represent all of 
> the physical information contained in the respective atoms.  The QM equations 
> for these two numbers (e.g., hydrogen and carbon) are well studied. And, the 
> respective geometries of the orbitals are well studied.
> 
> Next consider exact 8 pairs of these two numbers, 16 integers in all. (Could 
> we write a string:
> 6,1,6,1,6,1,6,1,6,1,6,1,6,1,6,1) that would represent the 16 physical sets of 
> information.)
> The sum of these atomic numbers is 56  (= 8 x7)
> 
> First question: How much physical information is in the number 56?
> 
> Let us call the sum of the atomic numbers the molecular number.
> Two separate and distinct chemical molecules can be composed from the this 
> partition of the molecular number of 56 into 8 separate but physically 
> identical pairs of atomic numbers.
> 
> One molecular number 56 is called "cubane". The geometry of cubane is that of 
> a cube, with each corner of the cube having the number 6 and each of the 
> number "1"s projecting outside the cube as one node of a tetrahedron.  (Do 
> Not conflate this geometry of a physical tetrahedron with the tetrahedron of 
> a categorical representation of commutativity.)
> 
> A second molecular number 56 is called cyclo-octene  (or, more exactly, 
> 1,3,5,7, tetra-dehydro-cyclo-octene.  The geometry of cyclo-octene  is that 
> of an octagon with each angle of the octagon having the number 6 and each of 
> the number "1"s projecting outside the octagon.
> 
> Note that both chemical representations of molecular number 56 are symmetric 
> graphs composed from the same multi-sets of a

[Fis] Physical information is WHAT? A Puzzle.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

FISers:

The following example concerning the fundamental theory of information in 
chemistry and physics puzzled me. Logical analyses of this puzzle from longtime 
participants would be welcomed.  

Consider any pair of atomic numbers. (Recall that the concepts of atomic 
numbers were established by physical measurements (Rutherford, Moseley, 
(1911)).  Because the conundrum is a question of meaning, I will select the two 
numbers 1 and 6. As atomic numbers, these two numbers represent all of the 
physical information contained in the respective atoms.  The QM equations for 
these two numbers (e.g., hydrogen and carbon) are well studied. And, the 
respective geometries of the orbitals are well studied.

Next consider exact 8 pairs of these two numbers, 16 integers in all.  (Could 
we write a string:
6,1,6,1,6,1,6,1,6,1,6,1,6,1,6,1) that would represent the 16 physical sets of 
information.)
The sum of these atomic numbers is 56  (= 8 x7)

First question: How much physical information is in the number 56?

Let us call the sum of the atomic numbers the molecular number.
Two separate and distinct chemical molecules can be composed from the this 
partition of the molecular number of 56 into 8 separate but physically 
identical pairs of atomic numbers.

One molecular number 56 is called "cubane". The geometry of cubane is that of a 
cube, with each corner of the cube having the number 6 and each of the number 
"1"s projecting outside the cube as one node of a tetrahedron.  (Do Not 
conflate this geometry of a physical tetrahedron with the tetrahedron of a 
categorical representation of commutativity.)

A second molecular number 56 is called cyclo-octene  (or, more exactly, 
1,3,5,7, tetra-dehydro-cyclo-octene.  The geometry of cyclo-octene  is that of 
an octagon with each angle of the octagon having the number 6 and each of the 
number "1"s projecting outside the octagon.

Note that both chemical representations of molecular number 56 are symmetric 
graphs composed from the same multi-sets of atomic numbers.

Questions: Is the physical information content of molecular number 56 the same 
in cubane and cyclo-octene?

How much information is the molecular number?

What is the physical basis for calculating the information content of molecular 
number 56?

When would the amount of information represented in this molecular number be 
the same?

What is necessary and what is sufficient to calculate meaningful physical 
information?

Have fun! 

(Thanks to Joseph Brenner for calling this line of reasoning to my attention!)

Cheers

Jerry 




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Re: [Fis] Good (clear) article on information and physics

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John, List.
-
> but offhand it seems to me to depedn on a sort of idealism that I do not 
> accept.


"It does not. It does rely on Church thesis, which relies on arithmetical 
realism, that is the idea that elementary arithmetical truth are NOT a creation 
of the mind, which is a form of anti-idealism."
---

I am utterly confused by this post.

It seems to intermingle mathematics, logic, philosophy and personal beliefs 
without any apparent connection to the history of the subjects or science.


I have not any idea what "elementary arithmetics truths" means.  Do you wish to 
include or exclude logs? Either way, are you including or excluding arithmetic 
and/or geometric progressions from "arithmetic realism"?
Could you be specific and point out the exact relations between "truths" as 
used in this context and your philosophy of physics?  Or the nature of physics?

"a creation of the mind"  ??  What does this possibly mean in this context? In 
particular, do you wish to imply or infer or illate that the human mind before 
the social creation of arithmetic symbol systems was somehow "non-creative"??  
VERY CONFUSING from a historical perspective.

"a form of anti-idealism"??? Perhaps you mean something to do with 
representation or symbolization of your beliefs?  Why introduce "form" as a 
concept related to a personal view of "anti-idealism"   Makes no sense to me.  
Does your view reject the polar opposites  / electricity of Schelling?

Finally, I would note that Dalton's Law of ratio of small whole numbers, an 
established physical principle based on the atomic numbers and fundamental to 
quantum chemistry, contradicts the essence of your post as I understand it.

Frankly, I can not find any immediate coherence between this article and either 
electro-mechanical or electro-chemical principles that are essential to 
physical and chemical information theory.

Cheers

Jerry





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[Fis] Chemo-informatics as the source of morphogenesis - both practical and logical.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Loet, Joe:

This email responds to several questions raised in response to my long post of 
Oct. 16, 2011.

 Loet asks:
1. What is the equivalent in chemo-informatics of a bit of information? Can
this be operationalized as a formula like Shannon's H?
2. Can one compute with this formula in fields other than chemistry? For
example, in economics; without using metaphors? ("As if")
JLRC: 
1. There is no equivalence between a bit of information and the science of 
chemistry. Chemical information must be encoded into a number just as any other 
semantic message. 
If their were such an equivalence, there would be no need for the clear, 
separate and distinct natural symbol system developed from signs from natural 
things and Dalton's rule that material things can be categorized as ratio of 
small whole numbers of weights and volumes.

Chemistry can be thought of as a semiotic science. 
C.S.Peirce stated it well when he insisted (rejecting Kant) that the following 
role of symbols is necessary for formal logic:

"Thing - Representation - Form."
or, more precisely:
"Thing - Representation - Iconic form"

In other words, the formal logic of chemistry depends on the sort of 
representation selected. This formal logic is an encoding of impressions on the 
mind into a coherent symbol system that constructs iconic representations of 
particular things. 
. 
In Shannon information, the concept of encoding any message is used to assert 
that every thing can be encoded (represented in Peircian rhetoric) into a 
number AS a string of bits, a string of 0,1's, a string of true-false 
propositions. (Note the ambiguity of meaning of encoding as a representation!) 
The purpose of Shannon's logic was to communicate any message within a 
generalized inductive argument about communication. The purpose of Dalton's was 
to communicate a particular graph form that was particular to a specific form. 

The following are a list of propositions that underlie the communication of 
chemical information. 

1. The chemical concept of an atomic number is a rhetoric phrase.
2. The adjective "atomic" modifies the noun "number".  
3. Consequently, the concept of a chemical number is not the same as the 
concept of a artificial number.
4. The adjective "atomic" has a particular meaning that modifies the the LOGIC 
of operations on the noun. 
5. The concepts of an atomic number and of an artificial number both are exact 
representations of concepts. 

6. The representations of number in both cases are positions in a list. 
7. The adjective "atomic" as used to represent chemical things, corresponds 
exactly with the count of the positive charge on the nucleus and the count of 
the negative charges of the electrons.
8.  These two counts are identical.  ((Schelling's "polar opposites" 
neutralizing one another.) 
9. These two counts correspond with a specific thing with specific physical 
properties.
10. These two counts correspond to the rhetorical name of each chemical element.

11. These two counts form TWO SORTS of nodes in a mathematical graph.
12.One sort of node represents each electron as a unit.
13. The other sort of node represents the integer count of the nucleus.
14. These two sorts of nodes can be represented as a graph.
15. This graph is terms a labeled bipartite graph because it has two sorts of 
nodes that can not be substituted for one another.

16. All logical operations in the chemical sciences are based on the atomic 
numbers.
17. The simple logical operations are logical conjunctions of two or more atoms 
to form a particular molecule.
18. The conjunctive operation of creating a molecule from two atoms is a 
copulative verb, not a predicative verb.
19. The logic of this conjunctive operation creates a new identity, a new 
graphic object (a new icon in the sense of Peirce)
20. The conjunctive operation of two atomic numbers is an additive relation 
with respect to the properties of both number and weight (or mass), giving rise 
to the logical terms, molecular formula and the molecular weight.

21, The conjunctive operations on atomic numbers are formal operations that are 
extensive to all the sciences that study things with specific identities and 
properties.  
22. The atomic numbers are the source of all molecular biological descriptions 
of life - genetic, development, anatomy, much of physiology, toxicology, 
pharmacology, clinical medicine.
23,.The atomic numbers are not applicable to artificial numbers such as 
irrational numbers, imaginary numbers, transcendental numbers, surrealistic 
numbers, the various efforts that attempts to represent infinity or the 
continuum. 
24. A series of relationships can be used to transliterate the atomic numbers 
into artificial numbers - these are the Rosetta relationships. Such 
transliterations change the formal logical relations between the symbols from 
the copulative logic of the chemical sciences to the predicative logic of 
physical sciences.
25. The communication of chemical 

[Fis] Chemo-informatics as the source of morphogenesis - both practical and logical.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

FIS, Loet, Joe:

This message is a response to Loet's notion that morphogenesis is a red-herring.

Before my specific comments, I would like to acknowledge Michel for his 
excellent introduction to the conceptualization of chemo-informatics as a 
branch of information theory and engineering of chemical systems. The 
motivation for the work of developing chemo-informatics come from various 
sources, but, generally speaking, they are tied to the concept of DESIGN - 
another term for morphogenesis.  

Practical chemistry searches for ways to get a job done by finding ways to use 
chemical knowledge to solve a problem.  Often, this means testing a range of 
different chemicals to see if the desired effects are obtained. In the early 
history of chemistry, various natural sources of different sorts of matter were 
empirically tested. Following the theoretical developments in the late 18th and 
early 19th century, mathematical chemistry slowly developed from the concepts 
introduced by John Dalton that all chemical structures were ratios of small 
whole numbers composed from different chemical elements.  Given the large 
number of different sorts of chemical elements and the unbounded number of 
combinatorial possibilities, the chemical community gradually developed a 
system of mathematics which captured the essential features of the information 
content of chemical structures.  The mathematical system is simple enough to be 
taught in high school but the combinatorial 'explosion' of structures and 
properties is so vast that a sub-discipline of 'chemo-informatics' was 
developed just to study the interrelations between subsets of chemical 
structures and subsets of chemical properties.

 Chemo-informatics developed a separate form of information as Michel has 
summarized. The form (ie, the morphology) of chemical information is iconic. 
The atomic numbers, as icons, are combined to form chemical structures, the 
basic mathematical objects of chemo-informatics. Chemo-informatics developed a 
separate form of logic. The logic of chemo-informatics has both regular 
components, such as those associated with mass (strictly additive) and 
irregular components, such as those associated with electrical parity of iconic 
representations of atomic numbers. For the electrical associations, a separate 
method of relational addition was developed as a theory of valence (from 
empirical observations). The later theory is closely akin to and the precursor 
of mathematical category theory. The iconic representation of atomic numbers is 
calculated in terms of graphs. Chemo-informatics can be thought of as the 
logical precursor of both category theory and graph theory. Charles S. Peirce, 
1839-1914, laid the foundations for modern logic, based on both chemistry (his 
term - existential graphs as forms of logic) and Scholastic logic. 

Today, the practice of chemistry is a practice of mathematics, a practice of 
relational calculations on numbers.  Organic chemical analysis and chemical 
synthesis, including all molecular biological structures, are based on proof 
theory. The notion of "proof of structure" in an exact notion that establishes 
an exact graphical relationship between Dalton's 'ratio of small whole numbers' 
and the iconic forms of chemical structures. Chemo-informatics is closely 
associated with bio-informatics. A substantial portion of bioinformatics 
consists of counting possible chemical forms or closely related forms that 
differ in sequences. Bio-informatics can be thought of as "engineering" 
extension of the potential for simple combinatorics (graphs) of atomic numbers 
to generate sequences of subgraphs. Again, the "combinatorial explosion" rears 
it head. Each potential sequence has its own unique form.  The morphogenesis of 
spatial forms of matter is studied by the several methodologies, such as x-ray 
diffraction patterns.  

One example with which I have had several years of experience with is the 
development of a drug for epilepsy.  On average, between 1,000 and 10,000 
different unique structures were examined for each drug that eventually made it 
to market.  Chemo-informatics and biological assays and clinical trials were 
all critical components of the process. All three sorts of empirical studies 
were necessary to identify a useful medicine. The morphological form of the 
isomers are critical components of matching of 'drug' to  a 'receptor'. 

I bring this example to the discussion to illustrate the application of 
chemo-informatics as a practical way of sending messages to the human body. 
Such messages, contained within a mathematically-defined iconic form, are 
intimately interrelated to bio-informatics, the expression of forms of genetic 
information. 

Thus, Loet, I can not concur with your following assertions.
> 
> It seems to me that the issue of "morphology" and its evolution is a red 
> herring in a discussion about information theory. A shape (e.g., a network) 
> can be describe

[Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate

[Jerry LR Chandler]

A series of responses to recent posts of James, Gavin, Steven, Stan, Pedro, 
zyx, Joe, and koichiro. 
FIS response March 14, 2011

v547. ? Gavin:

writes:

"Modern chemistry fell out of alchemy."

As far as I am aware, modern chemistry developed its own semantics, grammar and 
logical symbol system virtually independent of alchemy. The authors were 
Priestly, Lavoisier, Dalton, Volta, Bezerlious, and others, mainly in the late 
17 th and early 18 th Century. The ostensive and demonstrative basis of alchemy 
was re-interpreted in terms of the properties of invisible and indivisible 
gases. From these origins, the alchemical ostensions were re-symbolized to 
become mathematical extensions of identity, volume, weight of.. , and other 
properties. These observations became the basis of the "ideal gas laws" and 
later, thermodynamics and eventually, quantum mechanics.

Gavin continues:
"Language still doesn’t have a good definition (or even what it may be). And we 
build our entire knowledge system on it."

I disagree.
The knowledge systems of science are based on observations and the 
correspondence relations between measurements and mathematical calculations. 
I recently published a long discussion of these relations under the title of 
"Algebraic Biology" in Roberto Poli's journal, Axiomathes.

Gavin continues: 
Language has only three types of logic
Declarative statements (like the one below) be either True or False
Imperative statements (commands) can be structure or process.
Interrogative Statements (questions), can be yes or no, and True or false
 
To me, this assertion is simply false. 
Numerous logics are studied.
Particularly interesting is the recent development of 'para-consistent" logics. 
For the past decade, I have been constructing a logic for the chemical sciences 
and medicine, closely related to some of the ideas of C S Peirce and category 
theory. It is called synductive logic and is classified as an inductive logic 
operating on labelled bipartite graphs. The grammar of this logic is an 
abstraction from the calculus of chemistry and electricity.

Gavin continues:
Is Mathematical Category Theory and Topoi Logic together the foundation of all 
Reality?
 
My simplistic view of mathematics is that reality is vastly more perplex than 
anything to do with mathematics.
The great beauty and power of mathematics emerges from those rare cases where 
the mathematical symbol systems can be shown to be in correspondence with 
nature.


v. 547.5 by James Hannam:

First, let us clear up a deep mis-understanding.
My usage of the term calculus is in the traditional sense of "to calculate". 
That is, exact logic that is reproducible by others. Newtonian calculations are 
a sub-set of the more general term. The term comes from Latin, meaning a small 
pebble, referring to the use of an abacus.

Jim, you write:

"So, while I can clearly see you disagree with me, I am afraid that I do not 
really follow why."

I provided you with a short summary of the basic ideas of modern science - 
roughly thirty concepts that were developed in Aristotle's writings roughly 
2300 years ago.  The extension of each of these concepts from Aristotle to 
today is a study of the history of a critical term of modern science.

It is the sort of study of the history of science that I wish you had done 
before you boldly asserted your "contentious postulate."

If you elect to undertake such a multi-year study, then you may find that 
modern science, much like modern mathematics, is a tightly interwoven network 
of both semantic and syntactical terms, glued together with mathematics and 
arcane beliefs about nature. The level of coherence within this network of 
terms is robust. 

v547.6  Joe Brenner writes:

"It would be most interesting if synergies were to appear. For example, how 
might the logic of situations be related to the dynamic logic of processes of 
Logic in Reality, etc.?"


Joe, your messages remain outside the scope of my comprehension.
May I request that you give the list three or four concrete scientific examples 
of your "Logic of Reality"?
In particular, is your usage of the term "reality" either ostensive or 
demonstrable? 
I am of the persuasion that "A rose by any other name is a rose"
or, in this case, phenomenology by any other name is phenomenology.   :-) :-) 
:-) 

v547.7 Stan

Your conceptualization of the concept of properties as a way of knowing appears 
to be grossly deficient with respect to the chemical sciences. Metaphorically 
consistent with category theory, the chemical way of knowing emerges from the 
commutativity of the grammar of chemistry as derived from Dalton's "ratio of 
small whole numbers." 

The critical notion is the the commutativity among the nominative case, the 
properties as "universals" and the arrangement of parts of the whole. This 
commutativity creates a mathematical and logical intimacy among ostension, 
extension and intention. (While this a triadic argument, it differs 
sub

[Fis] Hannam's Contentious Postulate, vol. 547, issue 1

[Jerry LR Chandler]

(Pedro: Please Post to FIS)



James Hannam, Stan, Pedro, List:

 

Thank you for taking the time to express your point of view.  For several years 
now, I have been studying the origins of molecular biology, seeking a coherent 
explanation for the meaning for its predictive powers and the methods which 
lead to scientific predictions. I certainly do not speak for the metaphysics of 
the physical information theorists, who, perhaps, may be more persuaded by your 
style than I.

 

Your assertion that:

“I sense some scepticism about my contentions that ancient science could never 
have developed into what we call modern science. “

is simply illogical and necessarily false.

 

Why do I confront your logic?

The simple facts are that the basic ideas of Aristotle remain the foundations 
of Western science.  The developments from Aristotle to the present day can be 
traced step-by-step.

By the basic ideas of Aristotle, I mean five specific notions that Aristotle 
wrote of:

Rules of thought [identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle]
Categories [substance, quality, quantity, relation, time, place, situation, 
condition, action and passion]
Causality [formal, material efficient, telos]
Logic of premises (sorites, pathways of statements from antecedents to 
consequences, graph theory, theory of categories]
hierarchy  [individual, species, genera, alone with ostension to greater levels]
During the intervening 23 Centuries, our notions of all these terms have 
changed substantially. Our very notion of language itself, as well as our 
notion of symbol systems, especially mathematics and chemistry has greatly 
improved our ability to be specific. Nevertheless, modern science developed 
directly from these few simple concepts, particularly of the concept of 
identity. The scientific terms of Aristotle continue to serve the sciences well 
and continue to be discussed routinely in both the theory and in practice of 
modern science.

 

If Western science did not develop from these Aristotelian concepts, what 
concepts did modern science develop from?

 

Your focus on motion, as an example, is, in my opinion, ill-advised for your 
thesis. The philosophy of physics continues to churn, century after century, it 
remains unsettled today. Personally, I smile a wide grin whenever a physicist 
announces once again that the foundations of physics must be revised. As one of 
my friends loves to say, physics is the only metaphysics we (“modern science”) 
have. The other sciences, intimately associated with the logic of calculus, 
thrive on the correspondence between observations and predictions.

 

Is it possible, James, that your training has embedded your thinking so deeply 
in the logic of language that the historical role of the logic of calculus in 
the development of science is submerged in your writings?

 

 

Stan:

Two ideas are at issue:

The first is your most recent post on the role of the term, “properties.”
“There ARE NO "properties of things" unmediated by biology and culture.” The 
concept of properties is, of course, the bedrock of predicate logic and the 
grammar of physics. If you deny the existence of properties in your ontology, 
your metaphysics becomes much clearer.

 

 

Secondly, the notion of the term, “ostensive””.  What is it?
The Latin roots suggests the meaning

 “stretch out to view”,

 that is, demonstrable. In particular, are you using this term as if it is 
unrelated to the concept extension that merely stretches a concept out?  

 

Pedro:

 

Your defense of the fertility of Western intellectual history of periods 
between Aquinas and Newton are important in understanding how our world views 
of today are rooted in the deep sense of community that developed during that 
historic timeframe.

 

 I would add that the idea of a “University”, which developed more or less “ad 
hoc” from the Paris model, as place to transmit, reflect and create values 
should be acknowledged. 

 

The separation of the triverum from the quadriverum was a profound step in the 
history of thought as it separated the role of language (rhetoric, grammar and 
logic) from the logic of the calculus. James Hannam, as I noted above, appears 
to devalue this separation.  It is important to keep in mind that the ancient 
Summerians (3 rd millenium BC) concept of informational symbols completely 
lacked this ability to separate concepts in this manner.

 

I believe that this separation was critical to the development of our view of 
mind (the Modistae of the 1300’s), the development of signs (John of Poinsot) 
and most especially the continual development of explication via the technics 
of disputation. I might also add that the conceptualization of 
“Syncategorimaticism” by Peter of Spain became the foundation for extending 
mathematical logic in the 19th Century (by C S Peirce).   Of course, this is a 
further example of the role of Aristotle’s notion of “relational” categories.

 

Cheers to All

 

Jerry

 

 

[Fis] Foundational Views of Shannon Information Theory

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List:

My responses to recent posts by Karl, Stan, Joe, Loet, Gavin, John, and Bob by 
the number of the digest that I rec’d. I seek to address several basic issues. 

 

First, I would repeat my assertion from my post of Jan. 20, 2010, along with 
Karl’s denial and my comments about his denials:

 

JLRC: The unspoken premise of many discussants appears to me to be a view of 
information theory as a  universal glue, a universal predicate, a universal 
code.

KJ: The assertion is outspoken, explicit and apodictically declaratory: 
information theory IS a universal glue, a universal predicate, a universal code

 

Karl: Out-spoken?

JLRC:  Yes, I spoke-out.  :-)

Karl: Explicit? 

JLRC: Yes. Rosen argues that biology requires a separate symbol system, that is 
outside of mathematical category theory. My explicit response to the category 
theory approach to information theory is contained in three recent papers – 
Axiomathes, Discrete Applied Math, and a chapter in a book by Vrobel and Otto 
Rossler. If desired, I will forward copies of these papers to list members.

Karl: apodictically declaratory: 

JLRC: Yes!  By design.   ;-) 

JLRC:  Perhaps you have not considered the reasons why Shannon information 
lacks universality. So, Precisely what is it that you are denying about the 
appearances of information theory?  

·  That category theory is applicable to biology?

·  By inference, that set theory / predicate logic is sufficient to 
describe optical isomers?

·  That the simple “yes/No” choice essential to Shannon information is a 
universal code for human knowledge?  (The notion of a binary encoding of all 
information is denied by Dalton’s premise – the ostensive source of chemical 
codes.)

·  Or, is it that you believe that addition is a universal operation of 
mathematics?

JLRC: Your numerous posts on your decade-long mediations on the nature of 
arithmetic remain unpersuasive. The consistency of group theory and ring theory 
provide an adequate explanation for all iterative arithmetic operations. Your 
persistence is admirable, your intelligence is substantial, your logic 
questionable and your conclusions lack extension. 

 

Stan (545:10) Re: [Fis] Ostension and the Chemical / Molecular Biological 
Science,   …It is this translation from material observations into logical 
form, in particular into fully explicit, crisp logical form that I am 
questioning.  Yes, it can lead to short term triumphs, via engineering,…

 

JLRC: Hu, I think you miss the point. The abstract symbol systems of 
Dalton, Lavoisier, and Coulomb underly the foundations of thermodynamics as 
well as the Shannon theory of information as well as our concept of such 
abstractions as “energy” and “entropy.” These symbol systems are now firmly 
embedded in the logic of scientific communications. Perhaps you wish to infer 
that concept of ostension is not useful in the natural sciences?  Or, is it 
that in your world view, “utility” is a bad word? 

BTW, Lavoisier / Daltonian logical forms are not fully explicit in the usual 
sense of mathematics. They are closer to codes with an exact syntax.

Joe (245:11) …”that existence and energy are primitive and numbers something 
derived.”

JLRC: Are you putting the cart before the horse? As a consequence of the 
international system of units, number takes priority over all other scientific 
and economic proper names. Number is the antecedent to expressing quantity of 
most any sort.

JLRC: Are you attempting to substitute semantics for syntax in your view of 
information theory? In your view of symbolic logic?  In your view of the 
concept of order?

JLRC: The order of the atomic numbers of the chemical elements stands in 
one:one correspondence with the any list of objects, with the listing of 
elements of a group, in a listing of the roots of a polynomial, in a listing of 
a vector, in a listing of the nodes of a graphs, and so forth. The existence of 
a listing is essential to the basic attributes of a message. It is essential to 
communication.

 

Joe (245:11) …and under what conditions one should seek to maximize (because 
valuable) heterogeneity as opposed to homogeneity.

 

JLRC: What fundamental classes of informational variables can be used to 
express heterogeneity?  Homogeneity? How do such classes relate to Rosen’s 
postulates of separate and distinct symbol systems? Or, Aristotelian causal 
structures?  Or, Descarte’s “clear and distinct” ideas

 

Gavin (245:12) …one of the qualitative foundations of information theory is 
word frequency of English from Zipfs law.

 

JLRC: Minor technical point.  Perhaps you mean the frequency of usage of 
different alphabet symbols in a linguistic message?

 

Stan (245:12) … Put otherwise, does anyone know of data about natural things 
that would not deliver a power law?

 

JLRC: Power laws are the exception, not the rule in the natural sciences. For 
example, catalysis, the source of nearly all of biological catal

[Fis] test

[Jerry LR Chandler]

test
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[Fis] fis Digest, Vol 543, Issue 19 (John Collier) and footnote to fluctuon discussion (Stanley N Salthe)

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John, Stan, Loet, Krassimir, List:

This message responses to posts of both Stan and John, which are, strangely 
enough, philosophically, intimately related.

First, Thank You, Stan, for your illuminating post which clarifies your 
personal philosophy. 
(The paper you comment on can be found online under the same title.)  

> Note that the levels are found to be orders of magnitude different in size.  
> No change in any single unit at any level can have an effect at the next 
> upper level


With all due respect to you and to Terrence Sejnowski, the overwhelming weight 
of evidence from molecular genetics and human genetics denies your conclusion. 
The evidence denying your conclusion is very simple.

Since the 1960s, molecular biology has been based on a quantitative premise 
that a single base change in a DNA molecule may cause a change in the 
inheritance of the organism and a change in the health state of the organism. 
This is the background premise supporting the sequencing of the human genome 
and the gradual switch to "personalized medicine."  We all human beings by 
virtual of our common inheritance, our diversity emerges from the  individual 
sequences we inherit from our parents. Our DNA is one source of our individual 
reflexivity.  A single base change is certainly a "single unit".

Stan, you conclusion that " No change in any single unit at any level can have 
an effect at the next upper level" is simply factually false since the 
overwhelming body of DNA sequence data supports the opposite conclusion. After 
nearly two decades of attempting to understand your self-constructed 
narratives, I think I understand the philosophical reasons why you are engaged 
in this line of discourse but I will leave that for you to clarify however you 
wish.  

John, your response to the semiotic issues rather surprised me as you are 
regular contributor to the Peirce list serve. 

The symbol systems used by physics to communicate are derived from mathematics. 
 Physics lacks a symbol system of its own making. As such, the concept of 
reflexivity, X = X, is one of the triad of terms used to create the notion of 
an equivalence relation.  Now, Shannon information depends on this concept of 
reflexivity to provide the exact mechanisms of encoding and decoding codes by 
the sender and receiver.  These must be 'platonic' mathematical relations 
without any physical meaning or content. Otherwise, Shannon information would 
not a faithful method of communication between different systems. The notion of 
probability enters into Shannon information not in the message itself, but 
rather in the capacity to detect errors in the transmission.


Strangely, it appears that Stan and John have stumbled on the same 
philosophical concept of reflexivity, a concept which lies at the heart of 
human  individuality and human communication.  The scientific facts support the 
conclusion that the reflexivity of a human being is an emergent property of 
life, not mathe-magic or philo-magic.

Cheers

Jerry, forever the realist.
 







On Nov 20, 2010, at 12:00 PM, fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es wrote:

> Send fis mailing list submissions to
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> Today's Topics:
> 
>   1. footnote to fluctuon discussion (Stanley N Salthe)
> 
> From: Stanley N Salthe 
> Date: November 20, 2010 9:18:18 AM EST
> To: fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: [Fis] footnote to fluctuon discussion
> 
> 
> Folks -- This cut is Figure 1 from
> 
> Sejnowsky, T., 2006.  The computational self.  Annals of the New York Academy 
> of Sciences 1001: 262-271.
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Note that the levels are found to be orders of magnitude different in size.  
> No change in any single unit at any level can have an effect at the next 
> upper level
> 
> 
> STAN
> 
> 
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Re: [Fis] fis Digest, Vol 543, Issue 19

[Jerry LR Chandler]

John, List:

A simple semiotic flaw exists in this paper.

So, I am not buying into the hypothesis or the conclusions.
Reality is far more perplex than mere technical terms.

Given the situation, who else can find the logical flaw?

Cheers

Jerry 



On Nov 17, 2010, at 12:00 PM, fis-requ...@listas.unizar.es wrote:

> Send fis mailing list submissions to
>   fis@listas.unizar.es
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> To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit
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> 
> When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific
> than "Re: Contents of fis digest..."
> Today's Topics:
> 
>   1. Demonic device converts information to energy (John Collier)
>   2.  strings, vacua, structures (karl javorszky)
> 
> From: "John Collier"
> Date: November 16, 2010 11:37:33 PM EST
> To: fis@listas.unizar.es
> Subject: [Fis] Demonic device converts information to energy
> 
> 
> http://www.nature.com/news/2010/101114/full/news.2010.606.html?WT.ec_id=NEWS-20101116
> 
> Not really surprising, but an interesting demonstration.
> 
> John
> 
> --
> Professor John Collier, Acting HoS  and Acting Deputy HoS
>   colli...@ukzn.ac.za
> Philosophy and Ethics, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban 4041 South Africa
> T: +27 (31) 260 3248 / 260 2292   F: +27 (31) 260 3031
> http://collier.ukzn.ac.za/
> 
> 
> 

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[Fis] Asymmetry and Information: A Modest Proposal

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Stan, Pedro, John C, Loet, Joseph and Rafael:

Your comments are sufficiently stimulating to make another attempt at  
moving the FIS agenda forward. It seems as if we have been going  
around in circles for decades. From my perspective of biochemistry  
and genetics, I attribute the greater part of this extended "sine  
wave function" to mis-understandings about the meanings of words and  
word patterns as they relate to mathematics / formal models.

I will attempt to comment on the responses one by one.

Rafeal:

I really do not understand the intent of your comment.

If you read my post, it was intentionally phrased in terms of  the  
Grammar of information.
Now, given your expertise in ancient and modern languages, you are  
well aware that formal models are fundamentally different from  
grammar.  Only under special situations when great care is taken can  
one translate the usual grammar of communication to a formal model.   
The Shannonesque information is expressed as a particular formal  
language. How many other grammars or formal models of information  
exist or could be constructed for the purposes of communication?   
Polyvalent information implies that other formal models of  
information exist. Do you object to this interpretation on the basis  
of grammar?


Joe:

Yes, I was well aware of the Swiftian satire that concerns you.  That  
is your interpretation, but it is not the intended interpretation.

I am more than a little surprised by your objection to alternative  
formalisms. Your formalism is a formalism is it not?

The number of possible formalisms is large, so, if we can find a  
semantics that is useful for get ourselves out of this decade long  
"sine function" of circular miss-communication entangled with  
different disciplinary perpectives, I would consider that a step  
forward.


Pedro:

You write:
"As far as I see the problem, rather than a "gold standard" for the term
information, an enlargement of context is required."

I am using the term "gold standard" as it is used in the  
pharmaceutical industry. As the best of the class. It meets  
completely your  requirement for an "enlargement of the context".  A  
standard does not imply that it is the only member of the class.

You suggest to speak of "informational entities".
This moves the concept of information to merely being an attribute  
(adjective) of an entity.
This is completely remote from the formalism of Shannon or any other  
formalism.
"Entities" could mean matter, mass, substances, monads, etc.
I have no objection to "concrete" forms of information, it is the  
precision or exactness of any such communication between two  
communicators that is the stumbling block for FIS

When you have completed your "Ten Basic Principles" I may comment on  
them.  At this point in time, the concepts you include are  
semantically based, and with huge overlapping domains so you have a  
significant challenge in front of you.

Your comment on the partition function was surprising; at least my  
recall is that it is a very fast growing function - more like a  
factorial function, but I could be wrong on this point. I think there  
is a closed form for the partition function that is both long and  
complicated.


John, Stan:

It seems to me that the term "physical entity" when used in the sense  
of "interiority" as in the phrase "information in" is outside the  
bounds of science and mathematics. Can this term be used so that it  
has measurable content, not merely metaphysical connotations?   
Perhaps I could be persuaded otherwise, but Shannon information  
appears to define the minimum for the notion of "information in" as a  
binary choice. What other approach is being suggested such that the  
option of choice is respected among Cantorial dust symbols?


Loet:

I also have great respect for the virtues of Weiner / Shannon  
information concept as a formal system.
I agree that the Shannon formality is free of reference, thereby  
gains it great value and becomes the gold standard, at least for now.  
But, each particular discipline has a referential language and many  
symbol systems are in use, each constructed by humans for use in  
human communication. I think we agree that the human capacity to  
symbolize situations is polyvalent and polysemic.

You write:

>
Perhaps, I should not use the word information because this has two  
meanings:
uncertainty and meaningful information ("a difference which makes a
difference"). The latter is system-specific while the former is not  
necessarily. I
am particularly interested in this because models generate alternative
possibilities and therefore redundancies. Are redundancies also  
physical or
> biological? I don't think so.

The term information is used in more than the two meanings that you  
reference. But you are expressing the principle reasoning for  
suggesting the polyvalency of information and the necessity of  
formalisms that capture "the differences that make a differ

[Fis] Asymetry and Information: A modest proposal

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, Pedro, Bob:

A modestt proposal

Without a "gold standard" for the term "information" we keep going  
around in circles.

I would suggest that at least three distinct meanings of the term  
"information" are in current usage, probably more.

For convenience, let us take the Shannon view of information as it is  
exact in definition and application, it is purely an arbitrary term  
in this sense, as are all mathematical terms.  The symbols acquire  
meaning from the cultural context rather than emerging from  
biosemiotic origins.

Shannonesque information (if I can create such an adjective) is  
design to serve as the message bearer between two machines. But this  
is not an ordinary message bearer.  As a message bearer, Shannonesque  
information can include a rudimentary form of redundancy, an elegant  
form of symbolic repetition that allows machines to correct errors  
that the message bearer may acquire on it's journey from machine A to  
machine B. This design feature is constructed into the artificial  
encoding that creates the message.  From the antecedent redundancy of  
the code, the message bearer acquires a property that goes beyond the  
semantics of mathematical symbols when viewed from the perspective of  
enabling communication between machine A and machine B.  This  
consequence is not a property of all message bearers.

In general, "raw" physical information lacks the Shannonesque message  
bearer quality because physical events are unique.

In general, chemical information lacks the Shannonesque message  
bearer quality because chemical structures are unique.

In general, biosemiotic information, composed from chemical  
information, has the message bearing quality of Shannonesque  
information.

In general, cultural information, composed from biosemiotic  
information, has the message bearing quality of Shannonesque  
information.

At the most primitive levels of description, both biosemiotic and  
cultural information have a modicum of error correction capacity,  
metaphorical comparable to machine to machine communication.

So, where does this Peircian categorification of the kinds or sorts  
of information lead?

I suggest that Stan's usage of the term "valency" of information may  
be a useful name for the values of information in the respective  
systems that is being referred to. The polyvalency of biosemiotic and  
cultural information is already well-established in practice.

The concept of polyvalent information provides a reasonable term to  
describe the exactness of the reproduction of biological structures,  
of genetic inheritance.

The conundrums over the questions of symmetry and asymmetry remain  
open for description in logical terms of the valency of the  
symbolization of information used for communication.  For example,  
can practical communication be achieved with an infinitely  
polyvalent  "chunk" of information? Or, is this merely a useful  
metaphor? How does the Barwise metaphor of categorical information  
fit into the concept of polyvalency? Can one actually encode  
information into infinite groups or is this merely a mathematical  
metaphor?

Numerous other questions can be raised from the logical proposition  
that communication implicitly connects via valencies.

Happy Thanksgiving to one and all.

Cheers

Jerry

Research Professor
Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study







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Re: [Fis] Neuroscience of Art:Insights & Leads

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Joseph:

Your post was studied for some time. I would suggest that, from my  
perspective, that you are developing a internal language that orders  
your feelings in a manner that is satisficing to personal your  
needs.  But, I find it difficult to translate your expressions into  
the usual usages that allow me to understand your expressions.  What  
is it, really, that you are seeking to signify?


In particular, your style suggests that the notion of sign, signals  
and semiosis at the base of natural and human communication is  
purposefully excluded from your discourse.  The information content  
of messages comes to us in these forms. And, we give our sensual  
experiences to others in these forms.  Is this merely my imagination  
or do you intentionally exclude the profound separation that guides  
an artist from the sensory impressions to the sensual expressions?


The phrase:

"be directed inversely to the logic of ethics, inversely to any  
rational or irrational process, that is, inversely to processes that  
lead toward the absolute identity or diversity of non-contradiction."



reads to me as an abuse of the everyday usage of the notion of both  
inverse and and identity.


Can you give meaningful definitions of how you are using the terms  
"identity" and "inverse" in this context?


(Neither of these terms cohere to logic as it is typically expressed  
although both are common in mathematics.)



Perhaps the critical phrase in your thinking is:

"dynamic electrostatic equilibrium".

Is it your intention to communicate that mental dialectics in the  
parliament of the mind must engineer the absolute stoppage of time?


In my simple notion of a Greek-ish world, the pleasures of art should  
parallel the pleasures of good friends, good food, good wine and a  
good lover!   ;-)


Cheers

Jerry


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Re: [Fis] Neuroscience of art

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Prof. Grohn, List:

I am curious about what you are seeking to communicate when you write:

"I am afraid that list can't be validated as a set  "laws". Laws  
should be independent of each other."


What is the rational for your feelings about law (singular) vs laws  
(plural)?


Is it necessary that laws be independent?  Or merely desirable?
If it is merely desirable, what feelings should I trust in order to  
seek my desires?


Some conductors assert that they have the capacity to serially "play"  
a major piece in their minds.  Is this in any way related to the  
desire for laws to independent of one another?



Cheers

Jerry





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[Fis] test

[Jerry LR Chandler]

test


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[Fis] Test - Post

[Jerry LR Chandler]

test  jlrc
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[Fis] FIS test

[Jerry LR Chandler]

I have received several responses from the test.

Unfortunately, I failed to receive the request to test!

Jerry
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[Fis] The Goals and Worlds

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Ted:

Do you have the immediate reference for this source?

"Kauffman is famously on record as believing that the preferred space
is algebraic. He goes further in stating that it is the ONLY space,
all others illusory, or less fundamental."

(from FIS post of 10/5/27 - this was an excellent post!)

In January, you asked how my work relates to predicate logic.  Well,  
I have a partial answer to your question, but it is a long road,  
going back into medieval logic.


Beyond that, how goes your world?



Cheers

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[Fis] Re: info & meaning

[Jerry LR Chandler]

To the FIS List:

I mean to say a bit about meaning and information.

The context I wish to start with is natural language, that is, the  
meaning of everyday language as used in a novel, a play, between two  
lovers at the breakfast table, in a political convention, during a  
financial transaction or in a chemical lecture.


The choice of meaning under such circumstances is open to  
interpretation by those present, the speaker and the listener(s).


How do listeners attach meaning to the spoken words?
How does a listener learn to attach meaning to spoken words?
When does the listener develop the capacity to learn to attach  
meaning to the spoken words?
Is the listener's capacity to attach meaning to the spoken words a  
stationary capacity, for all time and place?

Why does the listener attach meaning to the spoken words?
What language is used by the speaker and are the words of that  
language known to the listener?


In light of the answers to such questions, one ought to consider the  
issue of polysemy  (poly = many, semy = signs) in attaching meaning  
to spoken words or symbols.


Consider the Porpthryian decision tree and apply it to the possible  
meanings of each word in a sentence composed of twenty words.   
Consider the possibility that each word of the sentence is restricted  
to only three meanings.  Then, 3,486,784,401 possible combinations of  
meanings are possibly created by the sentence, that is, 3 multiplied  
by itself twenty times.


Does such a sentence have _a_ meaning?

What is the _information_ content of such a sentence?

Under what circumstances can the speaker's meaning or the writer's  
meaning be _exact_?


Is _meaning_ a momentary impulse with potential for settling into a  
local minimum in the biochemical dynamic?


After decoding and interpretation of the organic codes, the meaning  
of my message about meaning and information may have meaning to you.


Cheers

Jerry







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[Fis] Re: The communication of meaning in anticipatory systems

[Jerry LR Chandler]

From: Jerry LR Chandler 
<<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[EMAIL PROTECTED]>

Date: September 5, 2007 10:52:53 AM EDT
To: <mailto:fis@listas.unizar.es>fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: Re: The communication of meaning in anticipatory systems


Dear Loet:

From: "Loet Leydesdorff" <<mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]>[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
<http://www.leydesdorff.net/casys07/index.htm>The Communication of Meaning 
in Anticipatory Systems:
<http://www.leydesdorff.net/casys07/index.htm>A Simulation Study of the 
Dynamics of Intentionality in Social Systems
Vice-Presidential Address at the 8th Int. Conference of Computing 
Anticipatory Systems (CASYS07),
Liège, Belgium, 6-11 August 2007 
<<http://www.leydesdorff.net/casys07/casys07.pdf>pdf-version>


Abstract
Psychological and social systems provide us with a natural domain for the 
study of anticipations because these systems are based on and operate in 
terms of intentionality. Psychological systems can be expected to contain a 
model of themselves and their environments; social systems can be strongly 
anticipatory and therefore co-construct their environments, for example, in 
techno-economic (co-)evolutions. Using Dubois’s hyper-incursive and 
incursive formulations of the logistic equation, these two types of systems 
and their couplings can be simulated. In addition to their structural 
coupling, psychological and social systems are also coupled by providing 
meaning reflexively to each other’s meaning-processing. Luhmann’s 
distinctions among (1) interactions between intentions at the micro-level, 
(2) organization at the meso-level, and (3) self-organization of the fluxes 
of meaningful communication at the global level can be modeled and 
simulated using three hyper-incursive equations. The global level of 
self-organizing interactions among fluxes of communication is retained at 
the meso-level of organization. In a knowledge-based economy, these two 
levels of anticipatory structuration can be expected to propel each other 
at the supra-individual level.





Thank you for posting your curious abstract.
Your innovative thinking raises several questions which lead to substantial 
doubt about the conclusions.


Let's start with just one of your many assertions.

Psychological systems can be expected to contain a model of themselves and 
their environments;


Now, I will be so bold as to claim that I am a "psychological system", 
(just for the purposes of discussion, of course! :-)  )


I do not expect to find any "model" of myself within my psychological 
system.  Models, as I understand the term is used in scientific jargon, are 
based on communicable codes, not merely cues.


It appears to me that your assertion is merely a linguistic ploy designed 
to create an illusion about how you would prefer to communicate about "mind".


If, indeed, I have such a "model", perhaps the first step in a persuasive 
argument would be to tell me in which of my many symbol systems it is 
recorded and then give me some clues on how to retrieve the parts of 
interest to me now.;-)


It appears to me that you are elevating mathematical reasoning to the level 
of a spiritual or religious source of truth. I fear that I am to much of an 
empiricist to believe that your semiotics is essential to 
intentionality.  Deeper drives appear to me to be necessary to create 
organization.


Cheers

Jerry





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[Fis] Re: fis Digest, Vol 501, Issue 5

[Jerry LR Chandler]

To: Igor / Ted / Stan

First, Igor.

I found your perspective here to be 180 degrees off from mine!

On Feb 5, 2007, at 6:01 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


Reply to Steven and Ted

By "genetic constraints" I assume you simply mean that we have   
certain capacities and are not omnipotent. Is not conflict and war  
an  indicator of our individual failure to manage social  
complexity? Or  would you argue that war is social complexity  
management?


I was referring to the hypothesis that we have the propensity to  
function in relatively small groups bind by strong cultural bonds.



From my perspective, enriched by chemical relations,

genetic system serve as fundamentally creative activities.

Genetic networks are not an amalgam of soft concepts, rather a  
genetic network is a discrete interdependent network of chemical  
relations.
The enumeration of the creative  genetic network is complete for some  
organisms, some species.


In Aristotelian logical terms, the position of the species is between  
the individual "point" and the "genus".
It is the chemical capacity to create species that I find to be  
absent from your narrative.


Thus, I would re-phrase your  hypothesis generating sentence:

From:
I was referring to the hypothesis that we have the propensity to  
function in relatively small groups bind by strong cultural bonds.


To:

"I was referring to the hypothesis that genetic networks have the  
creative capacity to function in very large associations that are  
linked together by very weak bonds."


Ted's comment seems to be based on a some recent innovations in the  
mathematics of hierarchies.  The issue of how we select the meaning  
for our symbols of representations of the world can be a very  
complicated one.  The profound limitations that linear and quasi -  
linear mathematics places on the symbolic carrying capacity of signs  
may be relevant to Ted's statement.  But, I am not certain of the  
origins of his views.


Stan's comment deserves to be attended to.

"The many
complexities facing us as society can be parsed as follows, using a
specification hierarcy:
{physical constraints (material/chemical constraints {biological
constraints {sociocultural constraints."

As I search for the substance in this comment, I  focus on what might  
be the potentially misleading usage of the term "parsed."   Nor, do I  
understand why brackets, signifiers of separations, are used in this  
context.
I have no idea what it would mean to "parse" a "material / chemical  
constraint" in this context.


Indeed, chemical logic functions in exactly the opposite direction.

The creative relations grow with the complexity of the system.  Is  
this not what we mean by evolution?


On a personal note to Stan: We have been discussing similar concepts  
since the inception of WESS more than 20 years ago and it does not  
appear that we are converging!  :-)  :-)  :-)Unless you choose to  
embrace the creative capacities of chemical logic, I fear your mind  
is doomed to the purgatory of unending chaotic cycles, searching for  
a few elusive or perhaps imaginary "fixed points."  ;-)  :-):- 
( !!!



Cheers

Jerry



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Re: [Fis] genetics: the most outstanding problem, (un)SOLVED?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Richard:

As I read your post, you seem to be involved with an internal debate  
with yourself.


It appears to me that a starting point for your post is a  
philosophical perspective about your personal relationship with  
nature and I have responded in that vain.


Your post suggests that you do not give serious consideration to the  
natural logic of associative relations but that is merely an  
intuitive conjecture on my part.


A few comments are interlaced; my comments may or may not be relevant  
to what you had in mind.



On Nov 12, 2006, at 5:45 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:


Jerry,

You wrote:

Biological information emerges as flows of changes of chemical  
relations - metabolic dynamics.


By what principle does this emergent property you describe adopt a  
specifically digital language to manage those analogously chemical  
affairs of biological systems?  To recognize such an emergent  
property I would have to agree to a few brave assumptions.  One  
would be that biological systems, comprising hierarchical atoms and  
molecules, are just naturally capable of writing their own  
operational programs.  That's a reach for me, because nothing is  
explained.  Even though I am aware that organisms do exactly that,  
there are no principles I know of to support it.  HOW they do it  
(not WHY they do it) is the key issue for me.  How do analogs write  
their own digital scripts?  One again, the only other time in  
natural history that I know of this sort of thing happening was  
when human analogs wrote their own digitally symbolic language  
about 10,000 years ago.




Living systems are natural.  Conceptual words such as analog and  
digital are artifacts of human cultural history.  Written symbol  
systems need grammars so that we can communicate with one another.   
Closure over symbol systems and "colonies" of statements are  
necessary and or essential for logical expressions in written symbol  
systems.  Your paragraph appears to me to conflate many concepts in  
such a way as to exclude nature from herself!




As Stan has said:


Of course, the origin of the genetic system is arguably the most
outstanding problem facing natural science.


 And you go on to say:

Thus, if one wishes to develop a compelling argument about  
chemical numbers and structures and genetic information,  one  
should start with relational algebras that keep track of changes  
of relations... A living system is a society of associative  
relations among atomic numbers.


If an emergent property truly emerges in nature I think it ought to  
do so on first principles.


I have no idea why nature "ought" to follow your principles.  Nature  
is what nature does.  So what?

"First principles" is a theological concept, is it not?

Still, to argue that "biological information emerges as flows of  
changes..." interests me. Seems a little like a DC electrical system 
—something new for me to worry about.  But how did those upstart  
crystalline micelles, containing numerical/chemical relations,  
learn algebra well enough to enable the emergence of a genetic  
code?  How did such a uniquely non-analogous language for  
communicating pure digital information in biological systems come  
into existence?


Your philosophy of mathematics appears to be based in I have no idea  
what.
If you expect chemical atoms and molecules to follow your vision of  
algebra, you may be severely disappointed.
The order of the list of the chemical elements apparently proceeded  
the man's expression of order by several billion years. From my  
perspective, you are putting the cart before the horse.



Maybe this emergent property cannot be explained in hierarchical  
terms applying to a single universe.  Maybe the emergent property  
Jerry speaks of is evidence of another universe, a coincidental  
one, where digits rule and analogs are the exception. Yes, it's a  
wild idea.  But I don't think there is enough hierarchy in this  
pedestrian universe of ours to get us the principles we need to  
explain what biological life actually is and where it came from.




If one wishes multiple universes, one first has to cope with the  
intrinsic mis-use of the usual definition of the noun "universe".   
Personally, I would only resort to such an argument if it was the  
only possibility and even then I would not use it!   :-)



Cheers

Jerry


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[Fis] what is life, logically?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Karl:

I will respond to both your new title to the thread and to your  
philosophy of mathematics.


When you ask the question, "what is life, logically?"  what is the  
nature of the question that you wish to address?  Given your history  
of posts, I am almost certain that I do not understand what you are  
asking.


The principle issue that separates our views is not the nature of  
life or information, it is the nature of scientific logic and a  
philosophy of mathematics.


The concept of "logic" dates back to pre-Aristotelian days and it is  
no clearer today, in my opinion, than when Aristotle defined his  
views of causality and categories.  (The small book, "Logic, A short  
introduction" by Graham Preist, OU Press, is to be recommended.)   
Model theory and various sorts of set theory are often promoted by  
promoters.  Yet, no one has succeeded in applying set theory to  
chemical theory and phenomena.  The oft stated claim that "quantum  
theory" covers all of chemistry lacks supporting evidence. It really  
refers to calculating properties of molecules AFTER one is given the  
exact enumerations of structural organization in space.


  If anyone would like to demonstrate that quantum theory covers  
chemistry, the place to start is to show how quantum theory applies  
to a simple enzymatic reaction.  For example, give an exact  
calculation of the transfer of electrons from ethyl alcohol to NAD  
via the enzyme alcohol dehydrogenase, starting from physical  
principles.  Chemists have developed exact methods to give an  
accounting of the particles and their positions for this reaction.  
The simple fact of the matter is that physical quantum theory is  
derived from the chemical table of elements and chemical relations  
and not vice versa.  The list of chemical elements is an abstraction  
about invisible particles with electrical properties and relations  
among them.  Chemical quantum mechanics simply places the objects in  
motion.  (Physical quantum mechanics is awash in the mathematical  
approximations that attempt to use 1 or 2 or 3 or 4 different  
mathematical definitions of force into a logically consistent  
framework.  Which notion of force should I believe in?  Have you a  
favorite definition of force?   If one makes a sufficient number of  
approximations, one can eventually fit empirical data - this is  
remote from the exactness of chemical calculations!)


More generally, I believe that the nature of logic itself is  
intertwined with the the semiotics of the symbol systems.  Logical  
methods are not general.  We have many classes or types of logic.   
These logics are intimately intertwined with the grammar of the  
particular symbol system that is being used.  The grammar of addition  
is hardly the grammar of our emotions, is it?  The grammar of music  
is hardly the grammar verbal expression. The grammar of chemistry is  
highly context dependent. a modal grammar that is closer to Aristotle  
than to quantum mechanics and its inability to correspond directly  
with human sensory perceptions.  Can anyone point out how the axioms  
of set theory or group theory express the grammar of genetic systems?


I point I am seeking to make is that the oft expressed notion that  
certain logical statements are "true for all time and place" is a  
statement that can not be placed directly in correspondence with  
empirical observations in the many, many many areas of biology and  
medicine.


So, when you ask, "what is the life, logically?", I think you will  
get many answers and that these answers are more apt to reflect on  
the individual philosophy of mathematics and science and little to do  
with the question.


For me, a rough answer that is little more than a tautology is " Life  
is a chemical system that co-operates with an ecosis to reproduce  
systems similar to itself. "


Enough venting of my views!  A few comments are interlaced into to  
your response below.


On Nov 14, 2006, at 6:00 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

From: "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> (by way  
of Pedro Marijuan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>)

Date: November 13, 2006 7:21:08 AM EST
To: fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: [FIS] what is life, logically?


Dear  Fis,

Both Stan and Jerry raise points about whether the fact of having  
figured out
how genetic information, in its abstracted and formalised version,  
can be
transferred between the living organism and its dna, does or will  
generally

improve a chemist's lot.
Both interjections address important questions.
Stan says:
>   SS: What I meant is no compelling model of an 'RNA First  
world'

> as a model of the origin of life.  That is, life begins with
> spontaneously synthesized catalytic RNA molecules.  My point is a
> materialist one, not a logical one.


I concur with Stan and add that the problem is the nature of  
catalysis, not a particular structure.

Jerry says:
> Chemical information is grounded in the list of chemical elements  
an

[Fis] genetics: the most outstanding problem, (un)SOLVED?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

(To the List: I am re-posting my message to Karl because the original message was not distributed in it's totality; the arguments were truncated.  Cheers  Jerry ) Karl:I fear that I must once again disagree with your strong conclusions about the relations between mathematics and genetics.  I would urge you to attempt to find exact correspondence relations between empirical evidence and your views of models based on numbers.See my comments below.Subject: [Fis] genetics: the most outstanding problem, SOLVEDDear Stan,In your last posting, you said:    SS:  Of course, the origin of the genetic system is arguably the mostoutstanding problem facing natural science.  It seems that, other than the(to me) unconvincing RNA World idea, there is no compelling model of it.The model that the RNA (together with the DNA) is a sequence and that thegenetic mechanism copies the information from a sequence (the dna/rna) intoa nonsequenced assembly (the living organism) and from there (by means ofthe ovaries and the testes) back into a sequence is a quite compellingmodel.The term "information" has been shown in this chatroom to mean the cuts thatsegregate, separate and distinguish summands;The term "sequence" has been defined by Peano;The term "nonsequenced /=commutative/assembly" is indeed hairy, as thereexists no definition for multidimensional partitions, although this is whatit means;The term "copies" means a filter restriction on a set of entries into adatabase (a restricted, in optimal case, bijective map between twoenumerations).I certainly will not support this view of the relationships among numbers, genetics and information.I find your post to be outside the scope of the standard theories of biochemistry and genetics.Chemical information is grounded in the list of chemical elements and the relations among them.The terms "DNA" and "RNA" etc, are chemical names of specific relationally rich bio-molecules.The information content of chemical molecules must be expressed in terms of atomic numbers and relations among the electrical particles (graphs).Biological information emerges as flows of changes of chemical relations - metabolic dynamics. In general, chemical structures / information does support transitive relations among the atomic numbers organized into graphs.  Thus, if one wishes to develop a compelling argument about chemical numbers and structures and genetic information,  one should start with relational algebras that keep track of changes of relations.  Bijective maps are not a suitable basis for describing change of chemical relations and hence the flow on biological information.Finally, if one wishes to describe a mathematics of biological information, the suitable starting point is the fact that a single position in a DNA sequence can control the fate of the entire organism.  A living system is a society of associative relations among atomic numbers. CheersJerry___
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[Fis] genetics: the most outstanding problem, (un)SOLVED?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Karl:I fear that I must once again disagree with your strong conclusions about the relations between mathematics and genetics.  I would urge you to attempt to find exact correspondence relations between empirical evidence and your views of models based on numbers.From: "Karl Javorszky" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: November 7, 2006 10:04:13 AM EST To: "'Stanley N. Salthe \(by way of Pedro Marijuan<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>\)'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,  Subject: [Fis] genetics: the most outstanding problem, SOLVED   Dear Stan,  In your last posting, you said:     SS:  Of course, the origin of the genetic system is arguably the most outstanding problem facing natural science.  It seems that, other than the (to me) unconvincing RNA World idea, there is no compelling model of it.  The model that the RNA (together with the DNA) is a sequence and that the genetic mechanism copies the information from a sequence (the dna/rna) into a nonsequenced assembly (the living organism) and from there (by means of the ovaries and the testes) back into a sequence is a quite compelling model.  The term "information" has been shown in this chatroom to mean the cuts that segregate, separate and distinguish summands; The term "sequence" has been defined by Peano; The term "nonsequenced /=commutative/assembly" is indeed hairy, as there exists no definition for multidimensional partitions, although this is what it means; The term "copies" means a filter restriction on a set of entries into a database (a restricted, in optimal case, bijective map between two enumerations).  I certainly will not support this view of the relationships among numbers, genetics and information.I find your post to be outside the scope of the standard theories of biochemistry and genetics.Chemical information is grounded in the list of chemical elements and the relations among them.The terms "DNA" and "RNA" etc, are chemical names of specific relationally rich bio-molecules.The information content of chemical molecules must be expressed in terms of atomic numbers and relations among the electrical particles (graphs).Biological information emerges as flows of changes of chemical relations - metabolic dynamics. In general, chemical structures / information does support transitive relations among the atomic numbers organized into graphs.  Thus, if one wishes to develop a compelling argument about chemical numbers and structures and genetic information,  one should start with relational algebras that keep track of changes of relations.  Bijective maps are not a suitable basis for describing change of chemical relations and hence the flow on biological information.Finally, if one wishes to describe a mathematics of biological information, the suitable starting point is the fact that a single position in a DNA sequence can control the fate of the entire organism.  A living system is a society of associative relations among atomic numbers. CheersJerry___
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[Fis] Call for Papers 14th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Call for Papers   14th Workshop on Logic, Language, Information and Computation (WoLLIC'2007)    Rio de Janeiro, Brazil    July 2-5, 2007  WoLLIC is an annual international forum on inter-disciplinary research  involving formal logic, computing and programming theory, and natural  language and reasoning.  Each meeting includes invited talks and tutorials  as well as contributed papers.  The Fourteenth WoLLIC will be held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from  July 2 to July 5, 2007, and sponsored by the Association for Symbolic Logic  (ASL), the Interest Group in Pure and Applied Logics (IGPL),  the European Association for Logic, Language and Information  (FoLLI), the European Association for Theoretical Computer Science (EATCS),  the Sociedade Brasileira de Computacao (SBC), and the Sociedade  Brasileira de Logica (SBL). PAPER SUBMISSION  Contributions are invited on all pertinent subjects, with particular  interest in cross-disciplinary topics.  Typical but not exclusive  areas of interest are: foundations of computing and programming;  novel computation models and paradigms; broad notions of proof and belief;  formal methods in software and hardware development; logical approach to  natural language and reasoning; logics of programs, actions and resources;  foundational aspects of information organization, search, flow, sharing,  and protection.  Proposed contributions should be in English, and consist of a scholarly  exposition accessible to the non-specialist, including motivation,  background, and comparison with related works.  They must not exceed 10 pages (in font 10 or higher), with up to  5 additional pages for references and technical appendices.  The paper's main results must not be published or submitted  for publication in refereed venues, including journals and other  scientific meetings.  It is expected that each accepted paper be presented at the meeting by  one of its authors.  Papers must be submitted electronically at  www.cin.ufpe.br/~wollic/wollic2007/instructions.html  A title and single-paragraph abstract should be submitted by  February 23, and the full paper by March 2 (firm date).  Notifications are expected by April 13, and final papers for  the proceedings will be due by April 27 (firm date). PROCEEDINGS  Proceedings, including both invited and contributed papers,  will be published in advance of the meeting.  Publication venue TBA. INVITED SPEAKERS: TBA STUDENT GRANTS  ASL sponsorship of WoLLIC'2007 will permit ASL student members to  apply for a modest travel grant (deadline: April 1, 2007).  See www.aslonline.org/studenttravelawards.html for details. IMPORTANT DATES  February 23, 2007: Paper title and abstract deadline  March 2, 2007: Full paper deadline (firm)  April 12, 2007: Author notification  April 26, 2007: Final version deadline (firm) PROGRAM COMMITTEE  Samson Abramsky (U Oxford)  Michael Benedikt (Bell Labs)  Lars Birkedal (ITU Copenhagen)  Andreas Blass (U Michigan)  Thierry Coquand (Chalmers U, Goteborg)  Jan van Eijck (CWI, Amsterdam)  Marcelo Finger (U Sao Paulo)  Rob Goldblatt (Victoria U, Wellington)  Yuri Gurevich (Microsoft Redmond)  Hermann Haeusler (PUC Rio)  Masami Hagiya (Tokyo U)  Joseph Halpern (Cornell U)  John Harrison (Intel UK)  Wilfrid Hodges (U London/QM)  Phokion Kolaitis (IBM Almaden Research Center)  Marta Kwiatkowska (U Birmingham)  Daniel Leivant (Indiana U) (Chair)  Maurizio Lenzerini (U Rome)  Jean-Yves Marion (LORIA Nancy)  Dale Miller (Polytechnique Paris)  John Mitchell (Stanford U)  Lawrence Moss (Indiana U)  Peter O'Hearn (U London/QM)  Prakash Panangaden (McGill, Montreal)  Christine Paulin-Mohring (Paris-Sud, Orsay)  Alexander Razborov (Steklov, Moscow)  Helmut Schwichtenberg (Munich U)  Jouko Vaananen (U Helsinki) ORGANISING COMMITTEE  Marcelo da Silva Correa (U Fed Fluminense)  Renata P. de Freitas (U Fed Fluminense)  Ana Teresa Martins (U Fed Ceara')  Anjolina de Oliveira (U Fed Pernambuco)  Ruy de Queiroz (U Fed Pernambuco, co-chair)  Petrucio Viana (U Fed Fluminense, co-chair) WEB PAGE  www.cin.ufpe.br/~wollic/wollic2007 ___
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[Fis] Physical Objects; Gold standard for Information

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Dear Michael and List:I am departing on an extended trip and will not be able to continue this conversation.  A few hurried comments are inserted in your post.On Jul 31, 2006, at 6:00 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: 1. Physical Objects (Michael Devereux)From: Michael Devereux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: July 31, 2006 1:55:35 AM EDT To: FIS Mailing List  Subject: [Fis] Physical Objects   Dear Jerry, John H., and colleagues,  I’m convinced that the traditional, long-established argument for the existence of physical, material (chemical) objects, clearly distinguished from our purely mental concepts, remains the valid one. So am I. I concur.But, I am also convinced that the LOGIC of the chemical sciences is radically different from the logic of the physical sciences.  Have you ever considered this possibility?We make no progress if conflate the one logical structure for another.  For example, the atomic numbers are indivisible.  The physical concept of mass is a divisible variable.  What foundational issue is at stake on the distinction between divisible and indivisible?No sensible person would willingly step in front of a speeding automobile, because it might be a very painful experience. Physical objects have effects on our senses - we can feel them. (Or see, hear, smell, or taste them. We smell and taste chemical objects.  Molecules.Chemical theory provides direct evidence for relationships between smell and molecular structure.  The concepts of mass, position, force, etc are not "smelled" or "tasted"; these are amorphous continuous variables, not discrete chemical structures.And, we observe them in experiments.) Obviously, that’s not the case with a mathematical concept like five, or, for instance, numerical equality. No one has ever been hurt wrangling an integer. So, I do not believe that physical objects are all that exists. And, physical scientists, as distinct from pure mathematicians, say, do invariably rely on tangible, controlled, reproducible experiments to establish the scientific validity of our descriptions of the material world. Many mathematicians are deeply involved in designing experiments to valid theories.  The issue is the logical structure, the conceptual structure, the sources of structure, the origin of properties, the beginning of the foundations of matter as it relates to logical sentences that correspond EXACTLY with reality.The physicist, and nobel laureate, Sheldon Glashow, has ardently emphasized that string theory, while popularly promulgated, and intriguing, is not established science until it is experimentally confirmed. I’ve heard proposals for string experiments which would require machines operating at very high energies. We may recall that the quark theory was only confirmed after construction of the high energy Stanford linear accelerator. Other machines have reproduced those experiments, and reconfirmed that description of nature. I don’t believe I’ve yet heard an accepted, precise description of information. Still, I’m sure that, as Landauer taught us, all information is transported and stored in material objects. I also understand that it was Szilard, (Zeitschrift fur Physik, 53, 1929, p. 840, english translation in Maxwell’s Demon: Entropy, Information, Computing, Princeton U. Press, 1992, p. 124.) who introduced, and exampled in a thermodynamic engine of gas molecules, the information bit.If one ignores the issues of encoding and decoding information, one has wide choices of narratives to describe information.  Is a "bit" of information merely using the term "sign" as information or is part of communication between a sender and a receiver?If one insists that information is transmitted as an encoding and uncoded or recoded after the transmission, one has to work a bit harder.  It appears to me that Landauer prefers to use the notion of "sign" as information.   Information, as I understand it, is stored via the particular physical arrangement of the four basic protein molecules of DNA.Well, I am not certain how to understand this perspective.  I presume that this is a categorical error but I am not certain. I take it that information transmission is an “event”, as John H., Stanley, and Rafael suggest, in agreement with at least one definition physicists use for that term. We name certain energy exchanges. as, for example, the annihilation of an electron and positron to create two electromagnetic photons, an annihilation-creation event, appropriately described by a quantum mechanical operator. H.  Well, perhaps we do not use the term "event" in the same sense.  My usage is an event is without the concept of duration.  A process includes intrinsically the concept of duration. And, I’ve argued that information is carried in the configuration of physical objects, which also determines the energy of that physical system. Thus, information transfer would also transmit energy, a physical event. I don’t find any implication, however, that the concept

[Fis] Physical Information

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Dear Michael:Your post is surprising close to my own view, but we are using the words differently.(I should note that I was in a playful mood when I used the term "trinitarian physics".  The triad of "space time energy"  is so often abused in the philosophy of science literature that a use of a metaphor with religious doctrine seemed appropriate.)With regard to the term "physical objects", what does it mean to you?If all things are "physical objects", then certainly this "Schoolman" philosophy imputes that all concrete information is physical. very simple deduction; no need for discussion.  I presuppose that this is your usage.  But, as you write in your post, this view of "physical objects" is no longer accepted.  String theory, as I understand it,  is merely mathematics, untestable by experiment.  I would be delighted if someone could point me to experiments designed to test string theory.If all things are chemical objects, then all concrete information is chemical.  But, as you write in the example in your post, a chemical object, is the SOURCE of study of physical objects.  And, as you are well aware, the logic of chemical structures is based on the atomic numbers.  These atomic numbers are the natural origins of the mathematical number systems from which physical thought is derived.  This is what I mean by foundational.I provide explicit comments within your post.  On Jul 25, 2006, at 6:01 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:From: Michael Devereux <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: July 24, 2006 10:36:41 PM EDT To: FIS Mailing List  Subject: [Fis] Physical information.   Dear Colleagues,  I understand Landauer’s insight not as an analysis of the logical structure of information, nor of its ubiquitous utility throughout human endeavors, but rather as a more precise description of the mechanisms for storage and transmission of information. What are you seeking to express?If the concept of information is an independent concept, a foundational concept, a concept from which other concepts are derived, then why drag in notions of storage and transmission?  I suggest your sentence suggests a tacit recognition that of the system science perspective of communication of encoded information, otherwise, the precise description of information lacks meaning, does it not? According to Landauer, and I think he was right about this, information is exclusively stored in the configuration of physical objects,.and transmitted only by material entities. So, for example, the energy configuration of a simple bi-level atom would contain a single bit of information, represented by zero, say, in its ground configuration, and by one in its excited level. Of course the physical configuration of the atom’s nucleus, made up of protons and neutrons, must also contain additional information, ignored in this instance. And we know that protons and neutrons are themselves composed of quarks, whose physical configuration must also contain more information. And, as far as we know, those quarks may be constituted by some structure of strings, with even more information, and so on.I concur with the possibility of mathematical projections from "strings".  But, by using this argument you are in effect agreeing with my position.  That modern physics (not 19 th Century physics) is effectively applied mathematics. In order to compose your narrative, it is necessary to re-define the concept of a bit  from the context of a message and a communication between a sender and a receiver.  In place of a bit as a unit of communication, the narrative moves into abstractions of abstractions, in other words, mathematics.  In doing so, the context of the term "bit" as a unit of encoded communication between sender and receiver disappears; the meaning is lost and the ability to decipher the message is lost.  I also understand Landauer to tell us that information is transmitted from one thing to another only by physical objects, all of which are composed of energetic quanta. As, for instance, sending information on a telegraph line by a series of electrical impulses, each of which contains many electrons. I know of no reason to suppose that the information any person holds and exploits, even about mathematics, is not stored and transmitted physically, as Landauer has said.I respond with a simple question:Is the information content of DNA a physical form of information?If so, can you construct a narrative that reveals how this information is encoded from physical principles? Jerry wrote that “mathematics is often deemed as abstraction, (so) mathematical information is often deemed as abstract.” But, it is the brain cells and synaptic connections, their chemical and electrical configuration and signal processing, which alone permits us to employ mathematics. H, a curious view.Does this mean that the sperm and egg of our parents contain mathematics?Or, is mathematics one of several abstract symbol systems emerging from human cultural activities and huma

Re: [Fis] Physical Information

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Dear Rafeal:Your response to Stan (see below) caught my eye, since, on first blush, it appears to be remote from modern physics and the "physics talk" of the (space time energy) trinity.  This trinity is, of course, merely a reification of modern mathematical symbolism.  And this modern mathematical symbolism is merely an explication of the concepts of continuity, grounded in the quasi mystic world view of Russian - German mathematician G. Cantor. (Cantor's views of logic were expounded on by Husserl and Heidigger, as you are well aware.) A major difficulty facing the (space time energy) trinity is the trinitarian nature of space itself.  The pairings (left/right), (front/ back), (up/down) and the x,y,z co-ordinates of analytical geometry give 9  (= 3 + 6) of the putative 11 - dimensions of string theory (Calabi-Yau spaces).  (This fact is of critical importance in understanding the following text.)How is it possible to discretize information from this foundation?  That is, relate or illate with unique symbols?Your position appears to me to be a radical simplification of human communication.  The simplistic dichotomy you write of presupposes a "symbolic world"  as if somehow the distinctionthere *is* the *material* world but we *live* also in a *symbolic* world. It seems to me that (to put it in a simplified way) we argue with two theories of information, one which is related to the *material world* (physical information) and the other which is founded in the *symbolic world*.is of substantial fundamental importance.  It is not. ( If my memory serves me correctly, your text is analogous to the position of Augustine with respect to the doctrine of signs,  or, perhaps a view of CS Peirce.  Or did you have another view in mine?)Human communicators have created numerous symbol systems, notations for alphabets, numbers, music, dance, etc.  A fundamental challenge is to relate the grammars of the various symbol systems that we use for daily communication.  This challenge is simplified by one critical fact.One symbol system is antecedent to all of the others.That is, the chemical symbol system is the source of our material world.And the emergence of life is the emergence of symbol systems that express meaning relationships within the material world.  For example, the encoding and decoding of information into macromolecules is historically meaningful and preserved over time.  Thus, the chemical symbol system is antecedent to the biological symbol system.And the emergence of man is the emergence of the capacity to create symbol systems pendent on macromolecules.And the emergence of cultures is the capacity to transmit and translate among symbol systems.The process philosophy of emergence, the history of nature, it seems to me, does not support your argument of :two theories of information,rather, we have an antecedent theory of information in chemical symbolism, from which the alphabetic symbolism emerged with a radically different grammar. From the alphabetic symbolism, a mathematical symbolism emerged, with a strange grammar that restricts itself to the imperative mood.From the mathematical symbolism, the trinitarian concept of physical information was imagined, not as a discrete process, but rather as a Platonic form.  And, eventually, the eidetic picture of strings emerging from imaginary numbers of space as expressed in the opening paragraph of this message.Rather than "two theories of information", process history provides us with a flow of internal and external relationships among symbol systems, such as string theory.The grammar of chemical symbolism, is, however, already a spatial grammar.  (We call them "isomers".)The grammar of chemical symbolism is a numeric grammar that is "pendent" on our experience; it is a grammar with remarkable clarity and distinctiveness.  The grammars of all other symbol systems are derivative from the grammar of the chemical symbol system.  To me, the illation you propose is unpersuasive from either a philosophical or material perspective because it omits the sense of history of information and communication.To place this into Aristotelian perspective, the Porphyrean tree you propose is at the level of the individual.  The same argument can be re-stated, but phrased in alternative symbol systems: Aristotelian logic is much richer when viewed from the antecedent symbolism of chemistry than from the derivative symbolism of alphabetic predications.Or, in yet another view of the same argument, the aim of science is to create explications of genera, dichotomies are merely the first of the pairings that can mark the distinction. Thank you for a stimulating post. Thanks also to John H. for his innovative parsing of the concept of 'information" - philosophic polysemy at its finest!CheersJerry On Jul 23, 2006, at 6:00 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: From: "Rafael Capurro" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: July 22, 2006 3:25:33 PM EDT To: , "Stanley N. Salthe" <[EMAIL PROTECTE

[Fis] A "Gold Standard" for the Conceptualization of Abstract Information?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Dear Michael, JohnH, Pedro, John C and List:The recent posts activated several long-simmering views on the issue of quantum theory and information as an exact science.  I will attempt to specify the issues that are of concern to the chemical, biological and medical sciences.1. Grammar.It appears to me that the conflation of grammatical concepts with mathematical concepts lie at the root of J. Barwise's notion of information. The argument is as follows:A.  I argue that the concept of a mathematical function is intrinsically a causal  connection between the domain and the codomain (range).  B. The necessity for a matching of points (intervals) of every object in the domain to a specific point (range) in the codomain is deemed to be indistinguishable from a causal relationship. C.  Further, one can argue that the specification of the particular function is a specification of particular  information.  D. By extension, the mathematical formalism of information theory requires the  composition of multiple functions in order to transmit information from the sender and to the receiver.E. By necessity, the grammar of mathematical functions used to transmit information is imperative.F. Shannon's view of information TRANSFER allows for the one function to be statistical in nature (noise) and thereby introduces the notions of contingency into the engineering of the system. G. The pseudo statistical nature of quantum theory is intrinsically (functionally) different from the usual mathematics of statistical distributions.  (For example, in addition to the special functional forms of QM,  how does one untangle the dynamics of mathematical quantum  "knots" using statistics?)H. I can not draw a general conclusion that the logic of quantum information is computable.  Can anyone else draw such a general conclusion?  In other words, is quantum information / computation a rare phenomena restricted to certain highly specific circumstances?G. In other words, is it possible that the logic of quantum mechanics is not grammatically imperative?2. Material causalityIt appears to me that the Landauer's argument is merely "physics talk" that is a self filling prophecy.The quote of Michel:In his words, "Information is not a disembodied abstract entity; it is always tied to a physical representation. It is represented by engraving on a stone tablet, a spin, a charge, a hole in a punched card, a mark on paper, or some other equivalent. This ties the handling of information to all the possibilities and restrictions of our real physical world, its laws of physics, and its storehouse of available parts." (Physics Letters A 217, 1996, p. 188.)But what is physical thought?  Most would agree that physical thought is intimately intertwined, interwoven and interlaced with mathematics.  Some might say that physics is merely applied mathematics, that it lacks any self standing domain.  Consequently, as mathematics is often deemed as abstraction, mathematical information is often deemed as abstract.  It appears to me that physicists often seek to treat matter itself as  a disembodied abstract entity;so what lies at the roots of Landauer's position other than a very weakly justified negation of the term "information" as a concept that lacks a definitive definition.Landauer's claim:it is always tied to a physical representation.is not to be taken seriously, unless one starts with the premise that only the physical representation can exist.Then, of course, the claim becomes a tautology.In fact, we do not have exact physical representations of most of chemistry, biology and medicine and I am skeptical that the theories of (space time energy) have the power to capture the essential nature of matter as it exhibits itself in chemistry, biology and medicine.Landauer's assertion that:This ties the handling of information to all the possibilities and restrictions of our real physical world, its laws of physics, and its storehouse of available parts." (Physics Letters A 217, 1996, p. 188.)is also not to be taken seriously from a mathematical perspective.For example, the relatively "simple" problem (from a complexity perspective) of counting the number of chemical isomers remains unapproachable from a physical perspective.  Why? Perhaps, because the language of physics is grounded in concepts of the point, the line and the plane.  The isomer problem is a spatial problem that appears to be beyond the scope of the mechanics of dimensionality theory.  Consequently, the  Landauer claim of "all the possibilities" is not correct, it is not justified, and it is simply without a scientific or mathematical basis.  3. Philosophic plasticityFrom my perspective, man is intrinsically part of nature and has emerged from nature.  Human communication, an integral aspect of being human, uses many different symbol systems to express the richness of our individual natures, not merely mathematical symbols. In particular I note that chemical symbols are antecedent to artificial mat

[Fis] Re: Encoding and Decoding as Essential to Quantum Information Theory?

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Dear Andrei:On May 21, 2006, at 6:00 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I remark that if one defines information through entropy than if fact information theory is reduced to probability theory. If one removes an essential components, one removes the essence of the subject.Intrinsic to any meaningful notion of "information theory"is the necessity for encoding and decoding processes.The fact that mathematics can be used to facilitate transmission is secondary to the encoding and decoding processes created for the express purpose of communicating..Shannon labeled his work A (The) Theory of Communication.Thus, the question for me becomes, how do we encode the source of the encoding processes into quantum mechanics?And, how do we decode the source of the decoding processes into quantum mechanics?CheersJerry  ___
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[Fis] The Identity of Ethics

[Jerry LR Chandler]

(Pedro:  Please post this for me; I have a new email
address.)

Dear Pedro and Rafael:
I am deeply puzzled by the content of your two messages.
Could both of you expand your positions substantially?  The threads
of your 
reasonings are not clear to me.
Are both of you proposing a constructivist mode for the genesis of
ethics?
Pedro, what is your intent is using the term "viable" in
conjunction with the 
term "ethics"?
Rafael, do you reject the concept that a code of ethics is possible, code
here 
being used in the sense of a logical code that allows decisions among
symbol 
systems?
Rafael, are you proposing that the genesis of ethical behavior is
associated 
with natural principles or that it is fully independent of cultural 
constraints?
Or, perhaps you have a line of reasoning that does not require an
encoding of 
ethics into symbols?
On further reflection, perhaps the encoding / decoding schema of
messaging is 
not important to your views of the genesis of ethical behaviors during

childhood and enculturations?
Cheers 
 Jerry

   1. social opacity (Pedro Marijuan)
   2. Re: social opacity (Rafael Capurro)
From: Pedro Marijuan
<

[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
Date: April 7, 2006 8:53:44 AM EDT
To:


fis@listas.unizar.es
Subject: [Fis] social opacity

Dear FIS colleagues,
I have the impression that a serious attempt to establish informational

foundations for ethics is not viable, at the time being. Although we can

produce discourses about different threads involved ---traditional
philosophic, 
evolutionary, postmodern, politico-economic, technologic, theoretical
science, 
etc.-- finally we have to deal with real people living their own lives,
and 
this "vitalism" does not accept reduction within any
disciplinary grid. In 
ethics, like in the arts, we can make provisional constructs and keep
them 
afloat as long as they are useful.
However, "morals", taking them in the sense of basic-guidelines
coming out from 
our human nature, appear as very permanent bodies, susceptible of being
put 
into codes, which traditionally have been elaborated by religions. This
means 
that religions are highly relevant for the debate of ethics:  they
handle the 
transcendent aspect of our lives.
In my opinion, the info foundations of ethics imply a similar problem to

establishing the concepts of meaning, value, and fitness at the cellular
realm 
---and in the recent discussion we couldn't. It is a pity that Maturana
and 
Varela's autopoietic views have not been updated, as I think that the
stumbling 
block that presumably we confront  ("social
opacity")  implies revisiting some 
of their tenets.
best regards
Pedro



From: "Rafael Capurro"
<

[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
Date: April 7, 2006 12:58:31 PM EDT
To:
<

fis@listas.unizar.es
>, "Pedro Marijuan"
<

[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
Subject: Re: [Fis] social opacity

Dear Pedro and all,
ethics as a scientific discipline is viable at all times. It has been so
for 
thousands of years in our tradition. I see no reason why we should/could
stop 
reflecting on morals. This would mean a re-action that would block (or
intend 
to block) the process of giving ourselves reasons for our actions. The

foundation of ethics is itself not the same as the foundations of morals,
if we 
compare ethics with physics (and morals with nature) then the foundations
of 
ethics corresponds to the foundations of physics (which is not a physical
but a 
philosophical matter).
Regarding Maturana and Varela: As you probably know, Varela published a
very 
remarkable book on ethics "Un know-how per l'etica"  (Roma
1992) in which he 
describes how morality (!) is "enacted" in bodily reactions,
i.e. as bodily 
"know how".
This is similar to what Aristotle says about "habits"
("hexis"). Varela's book 
is a reflection on morality, i.e. it is a book on ethics but ethics is
not 
itself a foundation of moral action (at
least not directly). The question of the sources (or "forces")
for moral action
is a deep and very controversial (ethical) question not only in Western
thought 
(think about the difference between Rousseau and Hobbes concerning human

nature).
kind regards
Rafael

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