It is interesting Peirce is using the example of melody for his third,
synthetic kind of consciousness – and also as a metaphor for other syntheses
like thought, in Robert’s quote.
Here, there is an interesting parallel to the earliest gestalt theorists in
Europe around the same time – Stumpf,
Dear All -
To the question of category-classification of inference types:
In Peirce's mature years, after 1900, he vacillated between two solutions, both
having Abduction as First, but one version taking Induction as Second and
Deduction as Third; the other vice versa.
The 1-Ab, 2-De, 3-In
30 December 2016 at 18:48
To: Frederik Stjernfelt <stj...@hum.aau.dk>
Cc: John Sowa <s...@bestweb.net>, "peirce-l@list.iupui.edu"
<peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Theism and Peircean Cosmology
Luther also favored the princes over the peasa
Dear Peircers -
Luther is an interesting case. He is much too well-regarded.
I just wrote a pamphlet (in Danish) in order to raise a countervoice to the
emerging celebrations of the "Luther Year" of 2017. Luther was anti-reason,
anti-liberty, anti-tolerance, anti-science and founded
Dear John, list -
I perfectly agree there are two quite different question here - the ideal,
conceptual question of the synthesis of e.g. subject and predicate in
propositions - and the actual, empirical question of how brains perform that
synthesis. Both of them are crucially important
ent papers.
Best
F
Fra: John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za<mailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za>>
Dato: torsdag den 21. januar 2016 10.46
Til: Frederik Stjernfelt <stj...@hum.ku.dk<mailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk>>, Robert
Eckert <recke...@mail.naz.edu<mailto:recke...@mail.naz.edu>&
Dear Peircers -
Indeed a deep question.
In Peirce, it is connected to his complicated theory of what constitutes the
unity of propositions ("Dicisigns" - . I addressed this in "Natural
propositions" (2014)).
To Peirce, this question is independent of the issue of the components of
are due to Gary Richmond for
proposing the seminar in the first place.
I think the greatest thanks of all are due to Frederik Stjernfelt — not only
for writing Natural Propositions, and agreeing to the seminar proposal, but for
the superb quality of his posts in all the threads. I think his
den 4. maj 2015 18.45
Til: Peirce-L 1 PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edumailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu
Cc: Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk
Emne: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8567] Re: Natural
List, Frederik:
On May 4, 2015, at 8:46 AM, Howard Pattee wrote:
How do
Dear Howard, iists -
Did I not already answer this? (below)
I do not think Peircean semiotics avoids that question.
I think it avoids the subject-object terminology in order not to import
anthropocentric conceptions from German idealism.
Best
F
Den 04/05/2015 kl. 15.46 skrev Howard Pattee
Dear Franklin, lists -
It is classically described as such in the literature. The formal structure af
abduction (the proposition A explains the occurrence B as a matter of
necessity, therefore A can be chosen as a hypothesis to explain B) does not
explain why A should be chosen over infinitely
Dear Howard, lists -
I certainly do not think Howard's considerations in this sub-thread are
irrelevant to the book. When I have not interfered it is because in this matter
I largely agree with Howard (until now, that is!).
At 09:21 AM 5/1/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
I've got my own book to
necessity is another thing. And this is why math is
not a simple tautology.
Best
F
On Fri, May 1, 2015 at 6:52 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt
stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote:
Dear Franklin, lists,
Many important questions indeed!
I concur with Gary that Frederik's post was a very
Dear Franklin, lists,
Many important questions indeed!
I concur with Gary that Frederik's post was a very informative post,
particularly the last part of it.
Depends upon how you define empiricist. I do not deny that Peirce strongly
emphasized the role of empirical knowledge!
And what
Dear Gary, lists -
You are right about the structure of the book. In some sense, chapters 1-7
conduct one long argument centered around the Dicisign concept, while chapters
8-11 are more like addenda going in different directions, though not entirely
unrelated.
Best
F
Den 01/05/2015 kl.
Dear Joseph, lists -
H …
I think that the answer must be yes. In an event, e.g. the fall of a stone, you
may prescind 1. the qualities (the weight of the stone), 2. the thisness
(this event, involving this particular stone here-and-now) and finally you may
discriminate the regularity 3.
Dear Franklin, lists,
:
Frederik, thank you for sending this off-list exchange to the lists. I think
Tommi explicated more fully my own concerns regarding abduction and the a
priori, and your response is very helpful for understanding your view. I can
hardly believe that you deny Peirce is an
Dear Howard, lists -
Den 28/04/2015 kl. 12.44 skrev Howard Pattee
hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com
At 05:18 AM 4/28/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
[snip]
- Dicisigns - applies to biosemiotics as well. To me, this forms part of a
naturalization of semiotics
Dear Howard, lists,
Den 28/04/2015 kl. 14.47 skrev Howard Pattee
hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com
:
At 07:04 AM 4/28/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
[Howard's] questions about your view:
(1) What parts of nature do you include in naturalization of semiotics?
I am not sure I
of the Matsuno
type?
All the best.
Sung
On Tue, Apr 28, 2015 at 7:04 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt
stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote:
Dear Howard, lists -
Den 28/04/2015 kl. 12.44 skrev Howard Pattee
hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com
At 05:18 AM 4/28/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt
Dear Gary, John, lists -
John wrote:
I think we have converged a lot, and I think the issues are much more clear. My
nagging doubt at this point is that as a naturalist I want to see a continuity
between biosemiotics and cognitive semiotics (if I can call it that).
I agree. This is why I
Dear Gary, lists -
But my argument was not at all to deny firstness. It was just to give the
argument that no category ever appears isolated.
And that there is a hiearchy, paradoxically beginning with Thirdness because it
involves 2 and 1 so that focusing on Firsts involves the prescissive
Dear Tommi, lists
You're right, the correct quote is:
Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect
to a second but regardless of any third (8.328)
Best
F
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
Dear John, Stan -
Thirdnesses in nature are kinds, patterns, laws, generalities - Peirce
sometimes used gravitation as an example.
Best
F
Den 26/04/2015 kl. 15.05 skrev Stanley N Salthe
ssal...@binghamton.edumailto:ssal...@binghamton.edu
:
John -- It would be useful to have an example of
Dear Gary, lists -
But pain involves secondness - it is not imagined pain - you refer to real pain
which implies there's something actually acting in your eye - so it is not the
pure quality, it is quality coupled with the insistence of secondness. Your
blinking eye works in order to get rid of
ps - Peirce's three distinctions are subtypes of partial consideration -
F
Den 26/04/2015 kl. 18.37 skrev John Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za
:
Gary,
I would say it is an abstraction from the perceptual judgment, where
abstraction is understood as Locke’s partial
Dear Gary, lists
In the discussion of this P quote
:
If you object that there can be no immediate consciousness of generality, I
grant that. If you add that one can have no direct experience of the general, I
grant that as well. Generality, Thirdness, pours in upon us in our very
perceptual
though it could have gone to lists.
Lainaus Frederik Stjernfelt stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk:
Dear Tommi, lists -
I have been busy all day and see the discussion has already run several rounds.
But let me try to answer Tommi's question about P's two gates criterion.
The same
Dear John, lists -
A very central comment. Issues of classification are fundamental. And abduction
is the first step in establishing classifications.
One of the things I argue in Natural Propositions is that Peirce's alternative
conception of propositions offers a radical reclassification of
Dear Howard, lists -
Not a bad description -
F
Den 23/04/2015 kl. 15.24 skrev Howard Pattee
hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com:
At 12:57 AM 4/23/2015, Joseph Brenner wrote:
Peirce's 'lumping' of the alleged opposites of induction and abduction is,
rather the recognition that
On Mon, Apr 20, 2015 at 12:22 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt
stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote:
Dear Franklin, lists -
Sorry for having rattled Franklin's empiricist sentiments with references to
the a priori!
Empiricists seem to have an a priori fear of the a priori … but no philosophy
). Or Barry Smith's In Defense of Extreme (Fallibilistic) Apriorism
(http://ontology.buffalo.edu/smith/articles/In-Defense.pdf)
Best
F
Den 21/04/2015 kl. 01.43 skrev Howard Pattee
hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com
:
At 12:22 PM 4/20/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
Sorry for having
Dear Howard, lists -
At 04:16 AM 4/21/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
The distinction between food and poison belongs, I would say, to the a priori
concepts of biology - not of logic.
HP: What is food for a cell is decided by the evolutionary history of the cell
as recorded by its heritable
in the context of defining logic and scientific
inquiry is a very particular normative sense
that is not often grasped by readers today.
See this bit of the canon:
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/04/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-logic-as-semiotic/
Regards,
Jon
On 4/21/2015 4:47 PM, Frederik
Dear Howard, lists -
At 10:20 AM 4/21/2015, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
Howard said: There are no a priori foods as illustrated by the many
extremotrophshttp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extremotroph.
FS: Haha! But that is not the argument. The argument that the categories food
and poison
Dear Ben, lists -
Thanks for two mails. The first largely resumes parts of my chapter and indeed
Peirce's basic ideas of theorematicity - although it is not entirely correct
that P saw his distinction as relative to intellect so that which is
corollarial to a grownup will be theorematic to a
Dear Jon, lists,
Sorry again for an answer a bit belated.
Den 17/03/2015 kl. 20.22 skrev John Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za:
Thanks, Frederik. I think that to properly call a view Platonist it must reject
the existence of particulars in favour of universals. Russell
Dear Ben, Franklin, lists,
Den 19/04/2015 kl. 20.05 skrev Benjamin Udell
bud...@nyc.rr.commailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com:
Franklin, lists,
I agree with Jon, thanks for your excellent starting post.
You wrote,
[] Why can't corollarial reasoning, which involves observation and
Dear Franklin, Cathy, Lists -
A small clarification: Peirce's BxD=A idea, I think, should not be taken a
device for the arithmetic calculation of exact information size - it is rather
the proposal of a general law relating Breadth and Depth. His idea comes from
the simple idea that when
Dear Franklin, lists -
Sorry for having rattled Franklin's empiricist sentiments with references to
the a priori!
Empiricists seem to have an a priori fear of the a priori … but no philosophy
of science has, as yet, been able to completely abolish the a priori - even
logical positvism had to
Dear John, lists,
It may not be extreme, but I think that most current realist metaphysicians
(ones who accept universals as real, like myself and David Armstrong, for
example) take a line closer to the Duns Scotus one. The more extreme view seems
to most to be difficult to distinguish from
Dear Jon, lists -
You're right about the economy principle. But it is interesting when it was
first articulated as an explicit doctrine.
Calling Peirce's realism extreme, I was only quoting the man, calling himself
a scholastic realist of a somewhat extreme stripe (5.470)
The extremity lies in
Sorry to have been away from the discussion for a while.
Jon is right that the Pragmatic Maxim is a version of the Razor.
But the ontological Razor was no invention of Ockham and so is not wed to
nominalism in particular.
Already Peirce's realist hero, Duns Scotus, used the Razor two
Dear Ben, lists,
I strongly appreciate the persistent work Ben has been doing in tracing out,
over many postings, the implications of Peirce's problems with the strange
rule. I think Ben is quite correct in locating the ambiguity in the quantifier
some, taken to mean sometimes a certain one,
Dear Stan, lists -
But Stan commits the same mistake of trying to purge one universal by means of
another - this time culture is the new universal assumed to be more real than
evolution … In Stan's argument, cultures are assumed to be real and to
determine minds of different individuals …
Dear Edwina, lists -
The neo-Darwinist conception of evolution works nicely as an example, exactly
because it is so stripped-down.
Even a concept as naked as that refers to real universals - as Edwina writes,
to genes, and natural selection.
F
Den 18/01/2015 kl. 19.30 skrev Edwina Taborsky
Dear Stan, lists -
I am making no claims as to trends etc. - I am making the very simple case that
evolution is a real process.
And I am adding that attempts to make nominalist reconstructions of the concept
evolution do not fail to introduce other universals taken for real, such as, in
Stan's
but Howard, saying this, you assume natural selection to be a real process -
and not just a linguistic convention …
F
Den 17/01/2015 kl. 21.28 skrev Howard Pattee
hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com:
Thank you Ben for a clear answer. I would say, then, that in thinking about
Dear Jeff, lists
You've asked a series of questions.
1. Do list members find Frederik's notion of two kinds of iconicity of
interest and value? If so, what is that value? It isn't clear to me what the
value is of suggesting that Peirce is working with two notions of
Dear Howard, lists,
I think we have covered this ground before, even pretty extensively so.
Peirce was 1) a scientific realist in the standard sense of assuming the
independent existence of objects. 2) Extreme refers to his scholastic realism
- assuming the reality of some universals. His own
Dear Doug, lists,
Thanks for a good summary of Ch. 7.
Here a few comments.
F
Den 12/12/2014 kl. 03.57 skrev Douglas Hare
ddh...@mail.harvard.edumailto:ddh...@mail.harvard.edu:
Stjernfelt Seminar: Chapter 7: 7.2-7.3
How should we classify the various different types of diagrams which can
Dear Gary, Doug, lists,
I do think the upshot of taking thinking about thinking and hypostatic
abstraction as human privileges must be that non-human animals are (largely)
incapable of second-order logic, both in the standard sense of quantifying over
predicates, but also in the more
Dear Gary, Douglas, lists,
Thanks to Gary for the reference to the Harvard lecture draft. I went back and
reread that (pretty fantastic btw) piece of prose. Gary's right about P's
waverings (as he calls it) regarding the relation between the categories and
the three argument types, ab-, in-
Dear Michael, lists,
Thank you for a whole essay on markedness - a great essay. I certainly agree
with the importance of Jakobson's ideas about assymmetry relations as central
to language - as well as with his insistence that semantic issues should
receive priority.
It is not completely
Dear Howard, lists,
Sorry for having been away from the discussions for some time. Hope to catch up
a bit in the Christmas week.
HP: Chapter 6 is full of examples of signaling and communication by special
purpose symbols. What is missing is the fact that the existence of all
thesespecial
Dear Gary, lists -
I think this is a very nice combination of Damasio's account and mine between
which I do not see any insurmountable difference - thanks!
Actually, I thought of involving Rosen's notion of anticipation when writing
the chapter - but it was already too long -
Best
F
Den
Dear Mara, Garys, lists -
A good summary.
But I do not think neutral objects are confined to human being Umwelt only. It
is correct that Uexküll sometimes said things in that direction, just as, other
times, he said the opposite.
But we have no reason to assume that mammals or birds, e.g., have
Dear Jeff, Michael, Gary R, Lists,
Peirce's engagement with continuity is a huge issue (see books by Kelly Parker
and Matthew Moore addressing this). One comment - when writing Diagrammatology
(2007) I spent considerable time grappling with this issue for the evident
reason that many diagrams
Howard, great, almost Voltarian oneliner ...
Den 25/11/2014 kl. 14.16 skrev Howard Pattee
hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com:
Natural selection only works after you are dead. Semiosis allows selection
while you are still alive.
-
PEIRCE-L
Dear Stan, lists -
:
F: So Howard's claim about the indecidability of epistemologies does not extend
to his own basic epistemologic assumptions which remain stably realist.
S: I do not recall that Howard has urged the philosophical realist argument.
??? Of course he hasn't. He has urged the
sounds like a great solution! - but meticulously distinguishing what is realist
in science and what is not is different from indecidability …
F
Den 01/12/2014 kl. 21.08 skrev Howard Pattee
hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com
:
By undecidable I was thinking of the typical
Dear Howard, lists -
I am not sure. Much of the yet unresolved discussion of QM have to do with
deciding which ontological commitments come with the Schrödinger equation. As
far as I have understood, there is no scientific agreement about this (unlike
basic knowledge about iron and cakes
Dear Howard, Gary, lists -
It is certainly correct, as Howard says, that Peirce also maintained the
irreducibility of discreteness to continuity and vice versa. In his categories,
2-ness is discrete, 3-ness is continuous. It is also correct that this is far
from trivial. Actually Peirce
Den 06/11/2014 kl. 17.11 skrev Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edumailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu
:
Dear Jeff, lists,
I do not think this P-quote deals with the reduction of individuals to
generalities. It deals with the status of possibilities - it is pertaining to
possibilities he
Dear Gary, lists,
I vaguely recall a picture connecting 1-2-3 - some possibilities (1) seep
through the cracks of existence (2) to become real (3) habits …
I don't recall where it is from …
But whaddabout Jim Hurford and his challenging hypothesis of the visual/dorsal
split realizing
Dear Howard, lists -
I stumbled over a text bite from mid-October which gave me the idea that there
may be some terminological confusion at the root of some of our discussions.
Den 20/10/2014 kl. 18.19 skrev Howard Pattee
hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com:
HP: Exactly. More
F
Den 03/11/2014 kl. 04.40 skrev Clark Goble
cl...@lextek.commailto:cl...@lextek.com
:
On Nov 2, 2014, at 1:24 PM, Frederik Stjernfelt
stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote:
There is a bit terminological confusion here. Peirce's distinction within
Dicisigns was between propositions
Dear Gary, lists -
A good Damasio finding. There are rather different viewpoints in the Cog Sci
communities - some of them, including also the Andy Clark school, refuse
neurocentrism and the idea that cognition arises only with neural tissue.
Best
F
Den 19/10/2014 kl. 15.27 skrev Gary Fuhrman
Dear Howard, Gary, lists,
I think Howard and myself are on the same main line here, even if not in all
details.
I think Howard's generalization of language goes too far because that seems
to require an elaborated system to exist as a prerequisite to even the very
first occurrences of signs
Dear Jon, lists -
I do not think that jumping out of the pan of psychologism into the pyre of
biologism is doing logic, pragmatisim, or semiotics much good.
So watch out for that ...
Ha! - point taken!
But I do not see the interest in tracing the development of semiotic and logic
capabilities
Dear Jerry, lists -
There is a bit terminological confusion here. Peirce's distinction within
Dicisigns was between propositions and quasi-propositions, the latter being
those Dicisigns which are not symbols. (One confusion comes from the fact that
Peirce often uses Dicisign and proposition
Dear Jeff, Gary, lists
Den 24/10/2014 kl. 00.10 skrev Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edumailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu:
Gary R., Lists,
Here is a minor point. You say: But Frederik is arguing in his book that the
other two, the Dicent Indexical Legisign and the Dicent Indexical
Dear Tyler, Gary, lists
I have nothing against a taxonomic approach, as Tyler calls it. We should
certainly develop means to distinguish the simple E.Coli cognition of sugar
from the richness of human propositions - my argument is just that these
taxonomic means are not to be found in Peirce's
Dear Stan, lists,
That is a beautiful picture, and certainly a good candidate for an important
type of conceptual development. But I am not convinced it is the only type.
There could also developments beginning with a pretty precise but narrow
conception … I think different development patterns
Dear Garys, lists,
There is certainly no disparaging in Peirce's claim that icons and indices are
degenerate as compared to symbols. The concept comes from mathematics, conic
sections in particular, where figures like hyperbolas and ellipses are
considered non-degenerate while figures like
Dear Gary, lists,
I think Gun country counts as a Dicisign - it makes a pretty straightforward
claim which could be translated into the linguistic utterance like The US is a
gunlike country. Of course, as in many artworks, the dicisign character is
deliberately weakened in order to leave some
Dear Jerry, lists -
I think you are right chemistry played a central role in Peirce's dicisign
conception. He saw both the predicate part and the subject parts as atoms with
valencies which fit each other when forming the molecule of the dicisign. He
even compared the two with halogens and
Dear Ben, lists -
Good summary. I discuss some early arguments by Peirce pertaining to these
distinctions in a later ch. of NP.
Best
F
Den 05/10/2014 kl. 16.19 skrev Benjamin Udell
bud...@nyc.rr.commailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com
:
Gary F., Tom, lists,
A predicate's denotation can be narrowed (and
Dear Howard, lists,
Very good - what should be added is just that bits are symbols in another sense
than Peirce's sense of symbol.
Maybe we can compare it to the old vocabulary of structural linguistics - words
are made up of units which may be signs (in-flat-ion), but each of these are
made up
thanks, that is a helpful overview!
F
Den 11/10/2014 kl. 21.46 skrev Gary Richmond
gary.richm...@gmail.commailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com
:
Frederik, lists,
So glad to learn that your health is improved, Frederik. It's terrific having
you active again in the seminar.
Here's a little chart
Dear Jeff, Gary, lists -
Sorry for being absent from the discussion - I fell ill during traveling in
Germany but am now back on the horse.
Jeff, it is certainly an interesting and important idea to compare Peirce's
mature doctrine of the Dicisign from the years after the turn of the century
Dear Clark, lists -
Mathematics certainly deals in propositions according to P.
P's general philosophy of math claims that math is about forms of relations,
and that those abstract objects are addressed by the help of diagrams.
Existing, particular, physical diagram tokens permit the access to
Dear Clark, lists,
Den 25/09/2014 kl. 19.22 skrev Clark Goble
cl...@lextek.commailto:cl...@lextek.com:
On Sep 25, 2014, at 8:50 AM, Frederik Stjernfelt
stj...@hum.ku.dkmailto:stj...@hum.ku.dk wrote:
This isn’t to say Heidegger and Peirce are the same. Just that I think the move
towards
Dear Cathy, lists
Good point
F
Den 29/09/2014 kl. 02.37 skrev Catherine Legg
cl...@waikato.ac.nzmailto:cl...@waikato.ac.nz:
Dear All,
Yes, just to reiterate what has also been said by Jeff D in his post in this
thread – the key criterion for thought, and intelligent thought, is not
Dear Jon, lists
Peirce use the concept degenerate in his sign theory in analogy to the
geometric sense of the term.. Referring to conic sections, certain sections are
generic (hyperbolas, ellipses) while other sections are degenerate because
corresponding to non-generic cases where one or more
Dear Clark, lists -
But aren't formal and material causes just re-baptized in physics as constants
(of laws), as types of forces or particles, or as boundary conditions?
Best
F
Den 22/09/2014 kl. 15.59 skrev Clark Goble
cl...@lextek.commailto:cl...@lextek.com
:
On Sep 21, 2014, at 9:13
Dear E, G, lists
I also have no idea as to how Peirce would pronounce it.
I chose dee-see- for these reasons:
The C I pronounce as S for the reasons Edwina quotes - in the traditional
pronunciation of Latin words, C is generally S before front wovels like I
The I I pronounce as EE because that
Dear John, lists,
I think you're right - Peirce saw thought as an argument chain whose resting
points were propositions.
Best
F
Den 22/09/2014 kl. 18.46 skrev John Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za
:
At 01:41 PM 2014-09-13, Frederik wrote:
Dear Sung, lists -
To take thought
Dear John, lists
OK, that clarifies things.
Best
f
Den 23/09/2014 kl. 11.35 skrev John Collier
colli...@ukzn.ac.zamailto:colli...@ukzn.ac.za
:
At 10:50 PM 2014-09-21, Frederik wrote:
Dear Stan, lists,
The problem here is a bit as when Collier thought all the world was in the
head - for where
Edwina, lists,
In the ten-sign list of the Syllabus, the Dicent Symbolic Legisign is but one
of three types of Dicisigns. So you can not identify the two. I discuss the
other two, Dicent Indexical Sinsign and Dicent Indexical Sinsign, in the
chapter.
Best
F
Den 24/09/2014 kl. 15.16 skrev
Dear Clark, lists,
Den 24/09/2014 kl. 22.17 skrev Clark Goble
cl...@lextek.commailto:cl...@lextek.com
:
On Sep 24, 2014, at 1:16 PM, Gary Richmond
gary.richm...@gmail.commailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com wrote:
In any event, I'm finding section 4. of New Elements of especial interest and
want
Dear C, B, lists -
Scares me as well - is this really so widespread among philosophy students? Why
don't they study sociology instead, then?
And why should we be culturally sensitive at all? We have only reached to
where we are now by being INsensitive to a lot of cultural ideas - including
Dear Gary, lists -
This is correct. This is also why not every phase of thought needs
consciousness - even if Peirce was very insistent on thought being
self-controlled. But he also realized self-control come in many degrees, not
all of them necessarily conscious - even if consciousness
Dear Howard, lists -
Den 22/09/2014 kl. 02.47 skrev Howard Pattee
hpat...@roadrunner.commailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com
:
But Howard, this is a different position than the one you presented in the
earlier quote just some lines before. There, each foundation of math was
legitimized by specific
Dear Jeff K, lists -
I merely reproduced P's argument for his hierarchy of sciences from memory
because it came up in the list discussion - it is not something playing a
prominent role in the argument of my book (apart from the issue of
(anti-)psychologism).
Best
F
Den 22/09/2014 kl. 06.50
Dear Jon, Tom, lists
Well spoken Jon, I think this also covers my position.
The pre-semiotic world is full of connections, causal, morphological, formal,
which may be taken, in the semiotic processes of biology, as a basis for signs.
Best
F
Den 19/09/2014 kl. 20.10 skrev Jon Awbrey
Dear Koichiro, lists
At 9:54 PM 09/19/2014, Frederik wrote:
In intellectual history I think the idea that cyclic, self-sustaining processes
may play a special role in biology goes at least back to Kant (in the latter
half of the 3rd Critique).
Philosophically, it could be okay. In practice,
great!
F
Den 20/09/2014 kl. 05.01 skrev Jon Awbrey
jawb...@att.netmailto:jawb...@att.net
:
A nominalist in name only would be a nominal nominalist.
But a real nominalist would be a contradiction in terms.
Checkmate ...
Jon
-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply
Dear Jon, Howard, lists,
As far as I can make out, there are important relation between Hertz' basic
ideas and Peirce's.
To Peirce, the relation of similarity connecting a diagram to its real-world
object is not necessarily easy to grasp - on the contrary, in many cases it
requires protracted
Dear Jon, lists,
I think Jon has an important point here.
Too many people confuse the idea that diagrams are iconic, on the one hand,
with the idea that iconic signs should be immediately interpretable, on the
other.
It is the latter which is false. Most if not all diagrams require symbolic
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