bt and its
less totalistic but still radical progeny, I agree with Peirce that it's
not the most fruitful thing in philosophy.
Best, Ben
On 5/15/2012 6:30 AM, Gary Moore wrote:
*Subject:* [peirce-l] Title Corrected: ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL
CAUSE TO ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS
[peirce-l]
ally stopped
using the word "representamen" (except in at least one late manuscript
in which he seems to be working anew on a distinction between sign and
representamen). But for Deely and some others, _sign_ refers to the
whole semiotic triad of the representamen, the object (or the
Gary M., list,
In the passage that you quote from EP 2: 266, what Peirce says is,
[] This scholastic terminology has passed into English speech
more than into any other modern tongue, rendering it the most
logically exact of any. This has been accomplished at the
inconvenience th
Jim,
Sorry, I'm just getting more confused. I've actually seen "a", "b", etc.
called "constants" as opposed to "variables" such as "x", "y", etc.
Constant individuals and variable individuals, so to speak, anyway in
keeping with the way the words "constant" and "variable" seem to be used
in o
Hi, Jim,
Sorry, I'm not following you here. "F" and "a" look like logical
constants in the analysis. I don't know how you're using "v", and so
on. I don't know why there's a question raised about taking the
judgment as everything that implies it, or as everything that it
implies. Beyond thos
Sorry, corrections in bold:
Jon,
The way I learned it, (formal) implication is not the /assertion/ but
the /validity/ of the (material) conditional, so it's a difference
between 1st-order and 2nd-order logic, a difference that Peirce
recognized in some form. If the schemata involving "p" and
Hi, Jim
Thanks, but I'm afraid that a lot of this is over my head. Boolean
quantifier 'v' ? Is that basically the backward E? A 'unity' class? Is
that a class with just one element? Well, be that as it may, since I'm
floundering here, still I take it that Frege did not view a judgment as
bas
Jon,
The way I learned it, (formal) implication is not the /assertion/ but
the /validity/ of the (material) conditional, so it's a difference
between 1st-order and 2nd-order logic, a difference that Peirce
recognized in some form. If the schemata involving "p" and "q" are
considered to expose
Jim, Jon, list,
I'm following this with some interest but I know little of Frege or the
history of logic. Peirce readers should note that this question of
priority regarding concept vs. judgment is, in Peirce's terms, also a
question regarding rheme vs. dicisign and, more generally, First vs.
Ernesto,
There are extensive links to online materials on EGs at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_graph#References. Also, Ahti-Veikko J.
Pietarinen has just posted some new material including "Ten Myths about
Existential Graphs" at his webpages at http://www.helsinki.fi/~pietarin/. Once
List,
The previous tech support person for peirce-l, Ali Zimmerman, has left her
position. From now on, for subscription problems, please contact me and Gary,
and if we cannot resolve the problem, we will contact the new tech person who
is currently settling into place. A few of you have notifi
Arisbe is also available at http://cspeirce.iupui.edu if anybody has a critical
need during the transition.
Best regards,
Ben Udell and Gary Richmond
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Tuesday, April 03, 2012 7:26 PM
Subject: [peirce-l
List,
Arisbe has now been transferred to IUPUI server (but the url remains and will
remain http://www.cspeirce.com/) . Now, it takes a while for the changed server
location to propagate through the Internet, so it Arisbe may seem to be down
when you try to access it. But don't worry, everybody
I said this wrong. Changed below between pairs of asterisks. Sorry! - Best, Ben
- Original Message -
Jason, list,
That's interesting. What aspects of synechism do they reject?
a.. Continuity of space and time? Lorentz symmetries seem to make such
continuity pretty credible.
b.. Id
Jon, Terry, list,
I've seen it suggested in a thread somewhere on the Web that the reason that
the position-velocity-acceleration trichotomy is a good one is that that there
are universal laws of acceleration and velocity (and position?) but not of the
third or higher derivatives. (The third de
List,
I've added links at http://www.cspeirce.com/digitized.htm to pages leading to
Peirce manuscript images Los manuscritos de C. S. Peirce
http://www.unav.es/gep/MSCSPeirce.html at Grupo de Estudios Peirceanos. I've
translated the Spanish annotations into English.
This currently includes
Steven, list,
The need to click on "Reply All" in order to reply _on list_ to a message is
not unique to peirce-l. It avoids a recurrent problem. Under peirce-l's old
system, people sometimes accidentally sent to peirce-l personal messages
unintended for peirce-l, and in some cases it led to
List,
I've added links to Tom's and Jason's blogs at
http://www.cspeirce.com/individs.htm
Cathy, thanks for the kind words. I know Gary R. has done some hard work but
your words make me wonder whether I've worked harder than I've realized, since
I've thought of myself as doing quite a bit of c
Jon, list,
Let's toss Michael Shapiro's blog a link while we're at it.
Language Lore http://www.languagelore.net/. Shapiro persistently brings a
pragmatist's perspective to linguistics.
I actually ventured into the S.A.A.P. session in honor of Richard Robin on
Thursday and met some of the peop
RCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Saturday, March 17, 2012 12:29 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] a question
Would it not be fair to say that the conscious experience of the immediate
present must always be at least a second? That is the view I hold.
Jason H.
On Sat, Mar 17, 2012 at 11:24 AM, Benjamin
olves Secondness, and that is the
breaking of one moment by another, though each moment, taken apart, simply has
its quality, its Firstness.
Bet, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Friday, March 16, 2012 7:10 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce
- Original Message -
From: Claudio Guerri
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU ; Benjamin Udell ; Gary Richmond
Sent: Friday, March 16, 2012 7:26 PM
Subject: Fwd: Re: [peirce-l] a question
Apparently this mail has not reached the List
because I have used
omic implicatures,
then it would defeat itself as undecidable and incomplete.
I have nor Peirce text at hand, yet I find it difficult to conceive Peircean
time as abstract iconic diagrams of Firstness represented in abstract Thirdness
symbolisms, unless they were to be bound somehow by indexic
Jon, list,
The 1903 Lowell lectures on "Some Topics of Logic bearing on Questions now
Vexed".are a different series than the 1903 Harvard lectures on Pragmatism.
Here's what I once put together. I hope to heck I got the CP pages right for
the Lowell Lectures. I include a link to the Robin Catal
List,
Arisbe's host has informed us to expect brief downtimes at the Arisbe site on
Saturday, March 17th. See below. - Best, Ben
In response to Microsoft's latest security patch releases; we will be
patching Windows servers on Saturday, March 17th. The standard patching will
be performed be
I would propose to consider
'possibility' as a very much better option to explain Firstness...
Best
Claudio
Benjamin Udell said the following on 14/03/2012 04:55 p.m.:
Diane, list
Peirce generally associated the categories with modalities more readily than
with times:
Diane, list
Peirce generally associated the categories with modalities more readily than
with times:
Firstness possibility, the may-be the vague quality.
Secondness actuality the determinate/singular fact
Thirdness (conditional) necessity/destiny, the would-be the general law
&lpg=RA1-PA193&dq=%22Mathematics+is+the+study+of+what+is+true+of+hypothetical+states+of+things%22
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 6:11 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of M
s
>> fictional.
> Quite so; but philosophers tend to have a powerful sense of entitlement.
the other, in Gauss's famous letter November 1, 1844 to astronomer Heinrich
Schumacher regarding Kant's philosophy of mathematics, that:
"you see the same sort of [mathematical in
nces/arts. And of course, sometimes theoretical or 'pure' math is developed
specifically for a particular application. (All in all, we won't be able to get
rid of the term "applied," but in some cases we may be find an alternate term
with the same denotation in the given
maths of optimization (linear and nonlinear programming), probability theory,
the maths of information (with laws of information corresponding to
group-theoretical principles), etc.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Monday, March 12,
Malgosia, list,
Responses interleaved.
- Original Message -
From: malgosia askanas
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Monday, March 12, 2012 12:31 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce
edition
>>[BU] Yes, the theorematic-vs.-corollaria
Irving, Gary, Malgosia, list,
Yes, the theorematic-vs.-corollarial distinction does not appear in the Peirce
quote to depend on whether the premisses - _up until some lemma_ - already
warrant presumption.
BUT, but, but, the theorematic deduction does involve the introdution of that
lemma, and
ce but not combination, those which involve
combination."
"Predicaments" are predicates of predicates for Peirce, Aristotle's
"Categories."
With respect,
Steven
--
Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Institute for Advanced Science & Engineering
http://iase.info
e
not yet harvested." Seems unlikely indeed that the Prolegomena-categories are
the same Categories that he has been discussing since 1867.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: "Steven Ericsson-Zenith"
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Cc: Benjamin Udell
Sent: Sunday, March
Gary F., Jon, Gary R. list,
I agree, Gary F., all your points are good. Also I did a search on
"predicament" in the CP and usually it turned out to be when he discussed
Aristotle's "Categories, or Predicaments." I don't think that he means his own
categories by "Category" in the "Prolegomena."
o attend to what you actually say and not just to vague impressions
of what you say. But when one writes a book blurb, it's best to write it in
extra-hard-to-misconstrue ways, as if the reader may be a bit groggy, like I am
right now!
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Steven Ericsson
Jon, list,
The passage by Peirce that you quoted below has nagged at me for some time. On
your mywikibiz page to which you linked, as regards that passage, you said "The
first thing to extract from this passage is the fact that Peirce's Categories,
or 'Predicaments', are predicates of predicat
Irving,
Do you think that your "theoretical - computational" distinction and likewise
Pratt's "creator - consumer" distinction between kinds of mathematics could be
expressed in terms of Peirce's "theorematic - corollarial" distinction? That
identification seems not without issues but still pre
Steven,
In regard to your post that started this thread, first two suggestions about
word choice:
"it is the logicians that concerned themselves"
- change to -
"it is the logicians who concerned themselves"
"it is a surprise to many that use logic everyday in their education"
- change to -
Forwarded.
- Original Message -
From: "Robert Lane"
To: The Charles S. Peirce Society
Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 4:58 PM
Subject: Peirce Society: Program and Business Meeting Agenda
Dear Members and Friends of the Charles S. Peirce Society,
Below is the program for our upcoming m
Jason,
"Universal" is an ambiguous word sometimes used to translate Aristotle's
_katholos_ even when Aristotle means merely that which in everyday English is
called "general," something true of more than one object.
Some philosophers say "universals" and "particulars" where Peirce (with his
b
ubsisted entirely in a historical
conformation of the individual to a teaching tradition.
On Friday, February 24, 2012, Benjamin Udell wrote:
> Stephen, Gary, Jon, Ken, list,
>
> I don't know whether it supports Stephen Rose's point or not, but Peirce once
> said th
Stephen, Gary, Jon, Ken, list,
I don't know whether it supports Stephen Rose's point or not, but Peirce once
said that he would embrace Roman Catholicism if it espoused _practical_
infallibility instead of _theoretical_ infallibility. See "C. S. Peirce and G.
M. Searle: The Hoax of Infallibilis
List,
I was converting from PDF (dated 2006) into HTML Joe's transcription of
Peirce's "The Categories" from 1893 (MS 403), which Joe interleaved with "On a
New List of Categories" from 1867.
When I thought I was done, I thought I should take a look at the MS-Word
document version that Joe h
Irving, list,
That certainly gets us thinking. This would, I take it, be a list of articles
with links even when the articles are not free online. For the "librarians" to
be able to edit directly, it would need to be done at a place like Google Sites
(as a so-called "social media" or "Web 2.0
Cathy, list,
It's good to have you back. Very gratifying Call for Papers! Not only would
Joe feel honored, he'd feel the fondness for him in the call's "faithful" use
of his favorite font at Arisbe, bolded black Trebuchet MS. You can usually tell
when you're at Arisbe.
I posted the Call for
Jon, Gary F., list,
Now see what you've done, Gary. You've awakened the punster in Jon!
Anyway I quite agree with Jon's subtext that there's no way that Peirce used
the word "fermentation" in innocence of the Dionysian implications.
'Fermentation of ideas' as name of the third method doesn't se
Jon, list,
I hope I don't seem pedantic, but this post is about Peirce's methods of
inquiry in "The Fixation of Belief." (I know next to nothing about professional
or academic journals, so I've little to say about them.)
Jon wrote,
Charles S. Peirce, who pursued the ways of inquiry more dogg
Jacob, list,
I hope somebody knows. That info will be useful to me too the next time I
replace my computer. Probably many will like to know the answer to your
question!
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: jacob longshore
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Friday, January 27, 2012
Duly forwarded. - Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Robert Lane
To: The Charles S. Peirce Society
Sent: Thursday, December 29, 2011 4:54 PM
Subject: Peirce Society: Final CFP: 2011-12 Peirce Society Essay Contest
FINAL CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS
2011-12 Charles S. Peirce Society Essay Con
James, Peter, Jon, list,
James wrote,
I think it was McLuhan who wrote that technologies are amputations (as in
your examples below). They "cut off" the capacities that they augment.
The one that concerns me is the general degradation of interpretive skills in
a digital environment. That
the reversal of the language of
the concluding thought).
Also, if anyone could easily recover that earlier discussion (Ben?), that too
would be most helpful. Thanks in advance!
Best,
Gary
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City Univer
Terry, Jon,
Peirce said it at least twice.
Peirce (1869), "Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic: Further Consequences
of Four Incapacities", JSP v. II, n. 4, pp. 193-208. Reprinted (CP 5.318–357),
(W 2:242–272), (EP 1:56–82).
http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/writings/v2/w2/w2_23/v2_23.htm, nea
Peter, list,
Thanks for your response.
The augmentationist vision itself in its essence does not seem a conceptually
difficult one. In the 1970s I had some amateur notion of it though I knew
nothing of practical developments in IA. Without the initial government funding
and without the early
Peter, list,
This slow read is quiet enough that I might as well send some minor comments
that might provide a little to chew on, I don't know. But before those, let me
first of all thank you for leading the slow read and for your heart-warming
reminiscences of Joe.
The second computer revolut
Gary F., Jerry,
When I first saw the phrase "special sciences" in Peirce, I was already
acquainted with it in Neo-Thomistic writing, I think it was Maurice de Wulf
ascribing the idea to medieval Schoolmen, but maybe also I read it in Gilson.
In de Wulf's version - if I remember correctly - even
Jim, list,
Yes, I was just reading an article that said that Van Heijenoort said that
Frege's logic has just one universe of discourse, whereas others allowed
variations. Frege as "unic-universalist" (my word) rather than merely
universalist.
Van Heijenoort lists two further consequences of t
Jim, Irving, John, Peter, list,
Thank you for the added comment, Jim. I've been stealing time to try to rummage
through online sources but this subject is very abstract for me. I'll just have
to remove the problematic sentence pending clarification.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
Fro
t; suggests something thrown upon the thinker (or whatever person) and
not so hidden noumenally. Peirce soon enough rejected the idea of the
unknowable thing-in-itself.
One also sees that Peirce there defines 'Thing', 'Representation', and 'Form'
pretty much as he la
lly conceived,
always more or less departing from the reality -- that deduction applies.
Best,
Gary R.
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
E202-O
718 482-5700
*** *** *** ***
>>> Benjamin Udell 12/02/11 4:31 PM
Irving, list,
Thank you for your response, erudite and to the point as always.
I agree, it's hard even to imagine a mathematician simultaneously abjuring
abstraction and not abjuring mathematics itself. The main kind of abstraction
that I've read that mathematicians traditonally abjured in earl
List,
Gary and I have a request to people replying in a slow read: that people please
do not change the titles of posts replying _in_ the slow read. The single
automatic "Re:" is good (don't delete it!) but please change nothing else - the
letter case, the wording, etc., of the post's title. Th
experience” of a sort, even in the realm of abstractions (or fictions) --
which is also part of Joe's point -- it seems to me that “mathematization” of
logic would necessarily move it even further from actual experience than it
already is. To make that move in the name of “r
Gary, Steven,
Steven's discussion of his own view of ethics is a little less clearcut than
Gary seems to see it as. On one hand Steven says "In my own terms I refer to
"natural ethics" as the consideration of natural and inevitable behaviors and
the means by which effective outcomes may be achi
trichotomy*] since matter and collections of
particles so lend themselves to statistical treatment and stochastic processes.
Corrected also below. - Best Ben
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2011 3:09 PM
Subject: Re
Irving, Jerry, Steven, list,
Irving, thanks for your response, more interesting and informative than what I
have to say!
Irving wrote,
Is there some sort of causality, Aristotelian or otherwise, in [application
of] inference rules? Once again, I am at a loss here to comprehend how this
issu
Re: [peirce-l] "On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for
Semiotic"CORRECTION, sorry. - Best, Ben
- Original Message -----
From: Benjamin Udell
To: Neal Bruss ; PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Friday, November 25, 2011 4:07 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] ³On the Paradigm of
n covered at least some of this
issue (along with much else) in "Peirce's Theory of Semiotics"
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/peirce-semiotics in the Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. When I first read it some years ago, I was so shocked by some of
what I found there about
Forwarded to peirce-l, partly as a test. Post intended for peirce-l from
Claudio Guerri. - Best, Ben
Mensaje original
Asunto: Re: [peirce-l] “On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for
Semiotic”
Fecha: Wed, 23 Nov 2011 17:35:58 -0300
De: Claudio Guer
Aye, and let's recall Peirce's definition of "normal"
"...the 'normal' is not the average (or any other kind of mean) of what
actually occurs, but of what _would_, in the long run, occur under certain
circumstances." - c. 1909 MS, _Collected Papers_ v. 6, paragraph 327.
Best, Ben
- Origin
Forwarded. - Ben
- Original Message -
From: Robert Lane
To: The Charles S. Peirce Society
Sent: Thursday, November 03, 2011 12:48 PM
Subject: Fwd: John J. Fitzgerald (1928-2011)
Dear Members of the Charles S. Peirce Society,
I am forwarding a message from André De Tienne containing the
Duly forwarded, from Robert Lane of the Charles S. Peirce Society
http://www.peircesociety.org/. - Ben
- Original Message -
From: Robert Lane
To: The Charles S. Peirce Society
Sent: Tuesday, November 01, 2011 11:43 AM
Subject: Peirce Society: 2011-12 Essay Contest: 2nd Call for Submis
John, Michael, list,
I'd look harder, but right now I've a nasty cold. I've looked and don't find
Peirce speaking in so many words of a community of inquiry, inquirers,
research, researchers, investigation, or investigators.
It's occurred to me that, given that Peirce (in the "Fixation of Beli
List,
I want to add to Arisbe a guide to pronunciation of names that one encounters
in studying Peirce, and I need your help!
There are just too many names that I'm unsure how to pronounce, and though
probably most you know more of the pronunciations than I do, I'd bet that each
of us is stum
, at least as he knew it, as actually or potentially abused for
political ends, than to sociology at its ideal best.
Finally, thanks for the reference to Feynman's work. His perspective does seem
akin to a cultural anthropological one. I am not familiar with it, but hope to
learn more of it.
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational CoSally, list,
I can't resist trying to catch up somewhat, even if I'm slower than ketchup.
I think that Joe would have taken your criticisms in your post below quite
seriously. You might even have changed his mind, or at least gotten him
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : "Sciences as Communicational CoDear Sally, list,
I've been occupied, and I guess that it's too late for me to catch up with the
rest of the slow read, anyway I won't be miffed if nobody replies to this.
Here's a cut-down version of the draft that I was working on for S
Forwarded at Nathan Houser's request. Thank you for your persistence, Nathan! -
Best, Ben.
===
Message for Peirce-L
The last thing I want to do is intrude on a good ongoing discussion but I guess
I'd better take a moment to introduce the October slow read of Joe's early
paper o
orized copy" that has the defect of
missing the figures.
Regards and thanks again,
Jon
Benjamin Udell wrote:
> P.S., regarding Arisbe website suggestions, you can make them on-list, but if
> you want to send an Arisbe suggestion off-list, send it to both me and Gary:
>
>
P.S., regarding Arisbe website suggestions, you can make them on-list, but if
you want to send an Arisbe suggestion off-list, send it to both me and Gary:
richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu
gary.richm...@gmail.com
bud...@nyc.rr.com
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To
Thanks, Gary and Irving.
For my part I agree that it's best to postpone "On Peirce's Conception of the
Iconic Sign" so that Fernando can do it.
I'm sorry that I've been out of loops both on-list and off-list! I plan to get
back into the current slow read. We all have our distractions, but I s
List,
Sorry I've been out of it for the last week or so.
Gary Richmond has asked me to send the list a note that, if anyone needs to
contact him, they should use his gmail account gary.richm...@gmail.com .
Best, Ben
Cassiano, George,
I've done a search through the Collected Papers, the Writings, Contributions to
'the Nation', and the Comprehensive Bibliography, and found no references to
Hölderlin, Holderlin, or Hoelderlin. All instances of "Zeichen" were in titles
of secondary works listed in the Comprehe
ethods of inquiry" in "The Fixation of Belief."
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Thursday, September 01, 2011 2:13 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Lay question about speculative grammar
Hi, Kevin,
Thanks for joining a
Hi, Kevin,
Thanks for joining and posting.
Have you read Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/eds.htm by Joseph
Ransdell? It's a good introduction to his speculative grammar.
Here are some more links in case you missed one.
a.. Marty, Ro
List,
Jerry Dozoretz passed away earlier this month. Condolences to his beloved wife
Ann and family. Ann emailed Nathan Houser, Gary Richmond, and me about it today.
Denver Post obituary
http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/denverpost/obituary.aspx?n=jerry-dozoretz&pid=153047257
(August 12-14).
Forwarded.
- Original Message -
From: Robert Lane
To: The Charles S. Peirce Society
Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 4:55 PM
Subject: Peirce Society: 2011-12 Essay Contest: Call for Submissions
CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS
2011-12 Charles S. Peirce Society Essay Contest
Topic: Any topic on or re
ater view. In the whole
of his "Science and Immortality" piece of 1887 he is as skeptical as he is
later. Only on a superficial reading could one conclude otherwise. What he
alludes to I believe is his belief in a necessary universal basis of mind and
the "spiritual consciousness
the survival
> of the individual consciousness or ‘soul’ is quite irrelevant.
>
> Gary F.
>
> } Every man is tasked to make his life, even in its details, worthy of the
> contemplation of his most elevated and critical hour. [Thoreau] {
>
> www.gnusystems.ca/gnoxic.htm }{ ho
and this consciousness is the same as
judges not only so-called "eternal truths" but also transient truths,
analogies, jokes, and any other kind of sentence. Why should consciousness of
a so-called "eternal truth" be more "spiritual" than consciousness of a
so-calle
Best, Ben
- Original Message -----
From: Benjamin Udell
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Sunday, August 07, 2011 5:09 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis
Process"
Dear Gene, list,
You're quite right! I forgot about that. Occasional
perception is just harder for me to think about. - Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Sunday, August 07, 2011 5:40 PM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: "Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis
Process"
Peter, li
osis
Process"
Hmm - the second passage instances statements with mixed quantifiers; as for
the cotary proposition in CP 5.181, I am not sure what to make of it without
seeing a concrete example.
Peter
From: C S Peirce discussion list [PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] on behalf of
Benjamin Udell
What about: "A word may be in several
places at once, six six, because its essence is spiritual; and I believe that a
man is no whit inferior to the word in this respect." (Peirce. 7.591, W 1:498,
1866)
Gene
From: C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.E
s would work or not seems to me
independent of whether our observations are fallible or infallible. But
fallibilism about perceptual judgements does of course imply the fallibility of
science - it rules out any conclusive proof of scientific hypotheses.
I hope this makes sense.
Peter
Fr
will ever
be able to observe or single out, then I'd say that you're banking on some
generals' being discoverable and independent of any actual person's or group's
opinion - i.e., some generals' being real, in Peirce's sense.
Best, Ben
- Original Mess
gular" and individual." He meant
the stubborn _this_, not the _uniquely such_, even when many an actual
individual is unique in important or essential characters.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Jerry LR Chandler
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Cc: Benjamin Udell
Sen
be interested in others' responses
(presently, I would tend to agree with you that fallibilism re: our perceptual
judgments prefigures falsification and that fallibilism can be--I'd say,
is--more basic than falsification).
Best,
Gary
>>> Benjamin Udell 8/5/2011 2:53 PM >
I knew it (consensus) was too good to be true! But I think you make at least
two important points here, Ben, and I'll be interested in others' responses
(presently, I would tend to agree with you that fallibilism re: our perceptual
judgments prefigures falsification and that
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