Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS

2012-05-13 Thread Benjamin Udell
to the whole semiotic triad of the representamen, the object (or the significate, or significate object, as Deely calls it), and the interpretant. Best, Ben On 5/13/2012 5:39 AM, Gary Moore wrote: Dear Benjamin Udell, Gary Moore: Although John Harvey’s reply was extremely good and very thought

Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS

2012-05-12 Thread Benjamin Udell
Gary M., list, In the passage that you quote from EP 2: 266, what Peirce says is, [] This scholastic terminology has passed into English speech more than into any other modern tongue, rendering it the most logically exact of any. This has been accomplished at the inconvenience

Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans

2012-05-11 Thread Benjamin Udell
Jon, The way I learned it, (formal) implication is not the /assertion/ but the /validity/ of the (material) conditional, so it's a difference between 1st-order and 2nd-order logic, a difference that Peirce recognized in some form. If the schemata involving p and q are considered to expose

Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans

2012-05-11 Thread Benjamin Udell
Hi, Jim Thanks, but I'm afraid that a lot of this is over my head. Boolean quantifier 'v' ? Is that basically the backward E? A 'unity' class? Is that a class with just one element? Well, be that as it may, since I'm floundering here, still I take it that Frege did not view a judgment as

Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans

2012-05-11 Thread Benjamin Udell
Sorry, corrections in bold: Jon, The way I learned it, (formal) implication is not the /assertion/ but the /validity/ of the (material) conditional, so it's a difference between 1st-order and 2nd-order logic, a difference that Peirce recognized in some form. If the schemata involving p and

Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans

2012-05-11 Thread Benjamin Udell
Hi, Jim, Sorry, I'm not following you here. F and a look like logical constants in the analysis. I don't know how you're using v, and so on. I don't know why there's a question raised about taking the judgment as everything that implies it, or as everything that it implies. Beyond those

Re: [peirce-l] Frege against the Booleans

2012-05-11 Thread Benjamin Udell
Jim, Sorry, I'm just getting more confused. I've actually seen a, b, etc. called constants as opposed to variables such as x, y, etc. Constant individuals and variable individuals, so to speak, anyway in keeping with the way the words constant and variable seem to be used in opposition to

Re: [peirce-l] Beginning to answer On Information Technology

2012-04-08 Thread Benjamin Udell
Ernesto, There are extensive links to online materials on EGs at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Existential_graph#References. Also, Ahti-Veikko J. Pietarinen has just posted some new material including Ten Myths about Existential Graphs at his webpages at http://www.helsinki.fi/~pietarin/. Once

[peirce-l] Technical support

2012-04-07 Thread Benjamin Udell
List, The previous tech support person for peirce-l, Ali Zimmerman, has left her position. From now on, for subscription problems, please contact me and Gary, and if we cannot resolve the problem, we will contact the new tech person who is currently settling into place. A few of you have

[peirce-l] Arisbe to IUPUI and may temporarily appear gone

2012-04-03 Thread Benjamin Udell
List, Arisbe has now been transferred to IUPUI server (but the url remains and will remain http://www.cspeirce.com/) . Now, it takes a while for the changed server location to propagate through the Internet, so it Arisbe may seem to be down when you try to access it. But don't worry, everybody

Re: [peirce-l] The Pragmatic Cosmos

2012-03-29 Thread Benjamin Udell
I said this wrong. Changed below between pairs of asterisks. Sorry! - Best, Ben - Original Message - Jason, list, That's interesting. What aspects of synechism do they reject? a.. Continuity of space and time? Lorentz symmetries seem to make such continuity pretty credible. b..

Re: [peirce-l] C.S. Peirce • A Guess at the Riddle

2012-03-22 Thread Benjamin Udell
Jon, Terry, list, I've seen it suggested in a thread somewhere on the Web that the reason that the position-velocity-acceleration trichotomy is a good one is that that there are universal laws of acceleration and velocity (and position?) but not of the third or higher derivatives. (The third

[peirce-l] Links to more Peirce MS images - GEP

2012-03-21 Thread Benjamin Udell
List, I've added links at http://www.cspeirce.com/digitized.htm to pages leading to Peirce manuscript images Los manuscritos de C. S. Peirce http://www.unav.es/gep/MSCSPeirce.html at Grupo de Estudios Peirceanos. I've translated the Spanish annotations into English. This currently

[peirce-l] Reply versus Reply All

2012-03-20 Thread Benjamin Udell
Steven, list, The need to click on Reply All in order to reply _on list_ to a message is not unique to peirce-l. It avoids a recurrent problem. Under peirce-l's old system, people sometimes accidentally sent to peirce-l personal messages unintended for peirce-l, and in some cases it led to

Re: [peirce-l] Inquiry and Analogy in Aristotle and Peirce

2012-03-18 Thread Benjamin Udell
Jon, list, Let's toss Michael Shapiro's blog a link while we're at it. Language Lore http://www.languagelore.net/. Shapiro persistently brings a pragmatist's perspective to linguistics. I actually ventured into the S.A.A.P. session in honor of Richard Robin on Thursday and met some of the

Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce edition

2012-03-13 Thread Benjamin Udell
=%22Mathematics+is+the+study+of+what+is+true+of+hypothetical+states+of+things%22 - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2012 6:11 PM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce edition Irving

Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce edition

2012-03-12 Thread Benjamin Udell
-theoretical principles), etc. Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Monday, March 12, 2012 1:14 PM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce edition Malgosia, list, Responses interleaved

Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce edition

2012-03-12 Thread Benjamin Udell
for a particular application. (All in all, we won't be able to get rid of the term applied, but in some cases we may be find an alternate term with the same denotation in the given context). Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Khadimir To: Benjamin Udell Cc: PEIRCE-L

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-11 Thread Benjamin Udell
, his thoughts are not yet harvested. Seems unlikely indeed that the Prolegomena-categories are the same Categories that he has been discussing since 1867. Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Cc: Benjamin Udell Sent: Sunday, March

Re: [peirce-l] Categorical Aspects of Abduction, Deduction, Induction

2012-03-09 Thread Benjamin Udell
Gary F., Jon, Gary R. list, I agree, Gary F., all your points are good. Also I did a search on predicament in the CP and usually it turned out to be when he discussed Aristotle's Categories, or Predicaments. I don't think that he means his own categories by Category in the Prolegomena. And the

Re: [peirce-l] Mathematical terminology, was, review of Moore's Peirce edition

2012-03-07 Thread Benjamin Udell
Irving, Do you think that your theoretical - computational distinction and likewise Pratt's creator - consumer distinction between kinds of mathematics could be expressed in terms of Peirce's theorematic - corollarial distinction? That identification seems not without issues but still pretty

Re: [peirce-l] Proemial: On The Origin Of Experience

2012-03-07 Thread Benjamin Udell
of what you say. But when one writes a book blurb, it's best to write it in extra-hard-to-misconstrue ways, as if the reader may be a bit groggy, like I am right now! Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Cc: Benjamin Udell Sent

[peirce-l] Fw: Peirce Society: Program and Business Meeting Agenda

2012-03-05 Thread Benjamin Udell
Forwarded. - Original Message - From: Robert Lane To: The Charles S. Peirce Society Sent: Monday, March 05, 2012 4:58 PM Subject: Peirce Society: Program and Business Meeting Agenda Dear Members and Friends of the Charles S. Peirce Society, Below is the program for our upcoming

Re: [peirce-l] A Question about Metaphysics and Logic

2012-03-04 Thread Benjamin Udell
Jason, Universal is an ambiguous word sometimes used to translate Aristotle's _katholos_ even when Aristotle means merely that which in everyday English is called general, something true of more than one object. Some philosophers say universals and particulars where Peirce (with his better

Re: [peirce-l] A new dissertation on Walker Percy and Charles Peirce

2012-02-26 Thread Benjamin Udell
tradition. On Friday, February 24, 2012, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote: Stephen, Gary, Jon, Ken, list, I don't know whether it supports Stephen Rose's point or not, but Peirce once said that he would embrace Roman Catholicism if it espoused _practical_ infallibility instead

Re: [peirce-l] A new dissertation on Walker Percy and Charles Peirce

2012-02-24 Thread Benjamin Udell
Stephen, Gary, Jon, Ken, list, I don't know whether it supports Stephen Rose's point or not, but Peirce once said that he would embrace Roman Catholicism if it espoused _practical_ infallibility instead of _theoretical_ infallibility. See C. S. Peirce and G. M. Searle: The Hoax of

Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: THE RELEVANCE OF PEIRCEAN SEMIOTIC TO COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUGMENTATION

2011-12-16 Thread Benjamin Udell
Peter, list, Thanks for your response. The augmentationist vision itself in its essence does not seem a conceptually difficult one. In the 1970s I had some amateur notion of it though I knew nothing of practical developments in IA. Without the initial government funding and without the early

Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-12-06 Thread Benjamin Udell
Jim, Irving, John, Peter, list, Thank you for the added comment, Jim. I've been stealing time to try to rummage through online sources but this subject is very abstract for me. I'll just have to remove the problematic sentence pending clarification. Best, Ben - Original Message -

Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-12-04 Thread Benjamin Udell
Irving, list, Thank you for your response, erudite and to the point as always. I agree, it's hard even to imagine a mathematician simultaneously abjuring abstraction and not abjuring mathematics itself. The main kind of abstraction that I've read that mathematicians traditonally abjured in

Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic

2011-12-04 Thread Benjamin Udell
Message - From: Jerry LR Chandler To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Cc: Benjamin Udell Sent: Saturday, December 03, 2011 10:49 PM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] SLOW READ: On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic Gary, Ben, Steven, List: With regard to alternative interpretations

[peirce-l] TITLES OF POSTS

2011-12-03 Thread Benjamin Udell
List, Gary and I have a request to people replying in a slow read: that people please do not change the titles of posts replying _in_ the slow read. The single automatic Re: is good (don't delete it!) but please change nothing else - the letter case, the wording, etc., of the post's title. The

Re: [peirce-l] Reply to Steven Ericsson-Zenith Jerry Chandler re Hilbert Peirce

2011-11-27 Thread Benjamin Udell
Irving, Jerry, Steven, list, Irving, thanks for your response, more interesting and informative than what I have to say! Irving wrote, Is there some sort of causality, Aristotelian or otherwise, in [application of] inference rules? Once again, I am at a loss here to comprehend how this

Re: [peirce-l] ³On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for Semiotic²

2011-11-25 Thread Benjamin Udell
Re: [peirce-l] On the Paradigm of Experience Appropriate for SemioticCORRECTION, sorry. - Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Neal Bruss ; PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Friday, November 25, 2011 4:07 PM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] ³On the Paradigm of Experience

Re: [peirce-l] community of inquiry

2011-11-01 Thread Benjamin Udell
John, Michael, list, I'd look harder, but right now I've a nasty cold. I've looked and don't find Peirce speaking in so many words of a community of inquiry, inquirers, research, researchers, investigation, or investigators. It's occurred to me that, given that Peirce (in the Fixation of

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational Communities Segment 3

2011-10-19 Thread Benjamin Udell
to learn more of it. Thanks again, Sally On Oct 15, 2011, at 12:26 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational Communities Segment 3

2011-10-15 Thread Benjamin Udell
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational CoSally, list, I can't resist trying to catch up somewhat, even if I'm slower than ketchup. I think that Joe would have taken your criticisms in your post below quite seriously. You might even have changed his mind, or at least gotten him

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational Communities Segment 1

2011-10-05 Thread Benjamin Udell
Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read : Sciences as Communicational CoDear Sally, list, I've been occupied, and I guess that it's too late for me to catch up with the rest of the slow read, anyway I won't be miffed if nobody replies to this. Here's a cut-down version of the draft that I was working on for

[peirce-l] Slow read: Some Leading Ideas of Peirce's Semiotic

2011-10-01 Thread Benjamin Udell
Forwarded at Nathan Houser's request. Thank you for your persistence, Nathan! - Best, Ben. === Message for Peirce-L The last thing I want to do is intrude on a good ongoing discussion but I guess I'd better take a moment to introduce the October slow read of Joe's early paper

Re: [peirce-l] A change in the slow read schedule, and some Arisbe enhancements

2011-09-13 Thread Benjamin Udell
Thanks, Gary and Irving. For my part I agree that it's best to postpone On Peirce's Conception of the Iconic Sign so that Fernando can do it. I'm sorry that I've been out of loops both on-list and off-list! I plan to get back into the current slow read. We all have our distractions, but I

Re: [peirce-l] A change in the slow read schedule, and some Arisbe enhancements

2011-09-13 Thread Benjamin Udell
P.S., regarding Arisbe website suggestions, you can make them on-list, but if you want to send an Arisbe suggestion off-list, send it to both me and Gary: richmon...@lagcc.cuny.edu gary.richm...@gmail.com bud...@nyc.rr.com Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell

[peirce-l] Note from Gary Richmond

2011-09-09 Thread Benjamin Udell
List, Sorry I've been out of it for the last week or so. Gary Richmond has asked me to send the list a note that, if anyone needs to contact him, they should use his gmail account gary.richm...@gmail.com . Best, Ben

[peirce-l] Jerry Dozoretz

2011-08-21 Thread Benjamin Udell
List, Jerry Dozoretz passed away earlier this month. Condolences to his beloved wife Ann and family. Ann emailed Nathan Houser, Gary Richmond, and me about it today. Denver Post obituary http://www.legacy.com/obituaries/denverpost/obituary.aspx?n=jerry-dozoretzpid=153047257 (August 12-14).

[peirce-l] Fw: Peirce Society: 2011-12 Essay Contest: Call for Submissions

2011-08-19 Thread Benjamin Udell
Forwarded. - Original Message - From: Robert Lane To: The Charles S. Peirce Society Sent: Friday, August 19, 2011 4:55 PM Subject: Peirce Society: 2011-12 Essay Contest: Call for Submissions CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS 2011-12 Charles S. Peirce Society Essay Contest Topic: Any topic on or

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process

2011-08-05 Thread Benjamin Udell
List, Steven, Peter, It may be a little more complicated. Peirce in his cotary propositions said that perceptual judgments amount to compelling abductions, which is very close to saying, compelling explanatory hypotheses. So fallibilism about one's perceptual judgments (at least in retrospect

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Teleology and the Autonomy of the Semiosis Process

2011-08-05 Thread Benjamin Udell
, and I'll be interested in others' responses (presently, I would tend to agree with you that fallibilism re: our perceptual judgments prefigures falsification and that fallibilism can be--I'd say, is--more basic than falsification). Best, Gary Benjamin Udell 8/5/2011 2:53 PM List, Steven, Peter

Re: [peirce-l] Slow Read: Is Peirce a Phenomenologist?

2011-07-21 Thread Benjamin Udell
Category theory, theory of categories, and even categorial theory could be hard to distinguish in some languages. Anyway, we're getting into the territory of distinctions that are semantically nontrivial yet confusingly expressed, such as that between relation algebra and relational algebra,