[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose:] I am playing at trying to reject it. ("poss.Bs
poss.~Bs") I have accepted it more often than not.
Now you tell me.
[Jim] I also understand the difference between discussing formal
properties that hold between propositions (modal or non-modal) and forming a
"1st order" proposition out of the discussion of contingent
propositionsand the formal properties. This could be made clearer by
noting the following:
[Jim] "P" is a contingent proposition
[Jim] "P" "-P"are feasible.
[Jim] "" and "feasible" are part of the metalanguage used to
discuss contingent propositions.
[Jim] "feas. P" "feas.-P" are ill-formed.
[Jim] Explanation: "Feasibility" is a 2nd order predicate used to
discuss
It does appear that you understand the difference, though the example could
be misleading. We often do not have distinct words for the object and the sign,
and, even in the case of the word "true" where we can distinguish"true"
(corresponding to the real, to the genuine, etc.) from"real," "genuine,"
etc., nevertheless the word "true" doesdouble duty and we douse the
word "true" about objects in orderto call them genuine, real, authentic,
rather than in order to call them signs corresponding to the real.In the
cases of "possible," "feasible," etc., we're not always going to have enough
words to make the distinction easily. Thus saying that some proposition "Hs" is
feasible could be taken to mean that"Hs" is something which
isfeasible asa proposition. Thusformal logic has functors and
ordinary English has adverbswhich grammatically modify the whole
clause.Some of the functors are too powerful for 1st-order logic, and
whether or not we formalize them as modifying (describing) the proposition or as
altering the attribution of a modification to a substance or re-routing the
denotative force (e.g., to "another than x" or to "inverted order of xyz"), the
basic difference is that, in attributing a modification to a substance, we do
not change which modification or which substance we're discussing. On the other
hand, in "modifying" a modification or its attribution, by negation or
modalizing, etc., we _are_ changing and even reversing what it is that we're
attributing to the substance. In rerouting the denotative force, we're changing
which objects we're characterizing as such--such. I mean, for instance,
"another thing than this stove" is not a kind of this stove, and that "red dog"
is a kind of dog, but "nonred dog" is not a kind of red dog and "non-canine" is
not a kind of canine, "possibly canine" is not a kind of canine, etc. One may
feel more comfortable by thinking in terms of a sign which can be described as
not corresponding to a given obect, or as possibly corresponding to given
object, so that one is dealing with various kinds of the same sign. In the
construction of deductive formalisms, it's often better to avoid the syntactical
complication of formalizing adverbs as functors. But the point in philosophy is
not rephrasability, but instead to understand the result and end of such
procedures, in which the description of signs is a _means_ to
_transformations_ of extension and intension, transformations which
themselves are a means to represent real relationships. The research interest of
smoothing and smoothly "encoding" cognitions into common convenient keys
ormodes guides deductive maths of propositions, predicates, etc.; but does
not guide philosophy, which is more interested in the corresponding "decoding."
Philosophy applies deductive formalisms but is no more merely applied deductive
theory of logic than statistical theory were merely applied probability theory.
_Contra_ many of the linguistic analysis school, philosophy is no more
merely _criticism_ of arguments, argumentswhereof deductive
theory of logic is the _theory_, than statistical theory is merely
_criticism_ of probabilitypropositions whereof probability theory
is the _theory_. There is such a thing as "applied probability theory"
but it is not statistical theory, and a statistical theorist who merely devised
possibly applicable probability formalisms but left the task of statistical
inference to others would be no statistical theorist.
[Jim] This looks strangely similar to where we started in terms of
rephrasing "she is possibly pregnant" as 'it is possible that "she is pregnant"'
or ':she is pregnant" is possible.' But then, 2nd order assertions obey
the theory of NLC cognition except we talk of feasibility, optimality,
possibility and even assertibility. "Assertibility" would be an even
higher-order predicate. Wasn't your initial concern with certain epistemic
predicates that qualify "1st order" predicates?
To the contrary, my initial concern was with the categories {substance,
accident, whetherhood, and object(s)-to-object(s) relations (e.g.
mappings)}.
As I've said, the point is that the mind must be able to treat things in
terms of alternatives to the
[peirce-l] Until later (was Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List)
Jim, list,
This remains interesting, but, generally, this forum is too addictive for
me! I have to get on with practical matters which are, at this point, getting
over my head. So I'm unsubscribing for a few months. Thanks for people's
interest, Gary, Joe, Jim P., Jim W.,Bernard, and any others,
fordiscussing/arguing with me. More generally, keep peirce-l
bustling.
Best, Ben Udell
http://tetrast.blogspot.com/
- Original Message -
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Sent: Wednesday, September 13, 2006 3:50 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New
List
Ben,
You say,
"Saying that the NLC 'theory' of cognition (which seems to me no more a
cognition theory than Peircean truth theory is an inquiry theory even though it
references inquiry) is sufficient except when we talk about possibility,
feasibility, etc., is -- especially if that list includes negation (you don't
say) --to deny that there is an issue of cognizing in terms of
alternatives to the actual and apparent, etc., even though then logical
conceptions of meaning and implication become unattainable. " (END)
It is not asufficient theory. I see it as asking"what are the
most general elements ina process by which the mind forms propositions."
The example is a simple case ofperceptual data. But, it is not a complete
theory of knowledge. In fact, it is more of a chapter in the history of
cognitive psychology. It is a logical description of a psychological
process;some parts of which may be empirically established. (For instance,
Peirce thinks it is questionable what the then current results of empirical
psychology have established with respect to acts of comparison and contrast.)
If the paper is coupled with some theses from the JSP series,
itseems clear to me that a theory of cognition emerges that could be of
interest to psycholinguists and cognitive scientists working in language
formation and even speech-act theory. Does it handle all epistemic interests,
propositional attitudes, modalities? No.
But it is not a special science since the results uncovered are precisely
the most general elements used in any inquiry.It is more nearly what the
1901 Baldwin entry suggests, namely, erkenntnislehre, a doctrine of
elements. Peirce struggled with where to assign this study. Is it a part
of logic or pre-logical? There doesn't seem to bemuch of the normative
concern that later demarcates logic proper. But there is a law-like element that
is presupposed in so far as "one can only discover unity by introducing it."
That transcendental point could easily mark a historical divide between
naturalists such as Quine and "static" modelists such as Chomsky. In some sense,
grammar is the issue, although generalized to the utmost. Both could take the
spirit of the paper and do things, Chomsky in the specialized application to
syntactic structures and transformational grammar, and Quine, in so far as the
theory is empirically testable, as shedding some light on know
Modern epistemology cannot even get off the ground with this NLC paper
unless the enterprise is so naturalized that the theory (historical curiosity or
not) is used to guide research in the relevant special sciences. The specific
perceptual cognition and cognitive assertion under discussion meet none of the
criteria for knowledge in the "classical" picture. The assertion "this stove is
black" need neither be justified, true, or even believed. The paper, at least in
part, is merely explanatory, if only insufficiently, of what is required to even
begin the classical assessment.
You say,
"But the point in philosophy is not rephrasability, but instead to
understand the result and end of such procedures, in which the description of
signs is a _means_ to _transformations_ of extension and
intension, transformations which themselves are a means to represent real
relationships. The research interest of smoothing and smoothly "encoding"
cognitions into common convenient keys ormodes guides deductive maths of
propositions, predicates, etc.; but does not guide philosophy, which is more
interested in the corresponding "decoding." Philosophy applies deductive
formalisms but is no more merely applied deductive theory of logic than
statistical theory were merely applied probability theory." (END)
Well, I agree. It is not for nothing that normative science is
structured the way it is in Peirce's architecture. The purpose of logical
analysis, linguistic analysis, "theory criticism," can't be lost sight of.
Jim W
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Wed, 13 Sep 2006 10:39 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New
List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose:] I am playing at trying to reject it. ("poss.Bs
poss.~Bs") I have accepted it more often than not.
Now you tell me.
[Jim] I also understand the difference between discussing formal
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] Peirce says,
"Very many writers assert that everything is logically possible which
involves no contradiction. Let us call that sort of logical possibility,
essential, or formal, logical possibility. It is not the only logical
possibility; for in this sense, two propositions contradictory of one another
may both be severally possible, although their combination is not possible."
(CP3:527)
Just as I thought, Peirce does not discuss modal propositions in the
passage which you had in mind.
[Jim] Two propositions, "Bs" and "-Bs" may both be possible.
(severally) But, the proposition "pos Bs poss.-Bs" is not possible.
The first two propositions arenot contradictory of one another.
In the context of oppositions, the contradictory of a proposition is the
_negation_ /of that proposition. "Bs" ("This stove is black") and "-Bs"
("This stove is notblack") are contradictory of one another. They can't
both be true and they can't both be false. Thus they fit the form defined in the
logic of oppositions for contradictories.
"Bs" and "-Bs" are both internally consistent but are inconsistent with
each other. That is all that Peirce is implying, nothing more.
You are confusing formal logical properties with logical _expression_ of
modality in just such a way that, ironically,you call impossible the same
modal statement which can be used in order to express the idea that two
propositions are severally possible.
Now, there is nothing that constrains modal expressions to be used in order
solely tocharacterize formal logical relationships such as contrarity,
subcontrarity, implication, etc.However, they _can_ be used in a
context which confines them to that purpose.Taking 'poss.' as the
1st-order _expression_ corresponding to 2nd-orderimputation
ofpossibility or logical internal consistency to a predicate or
proposition,
"poss. Bs poss.-Bs" == "'Bs' and '~Bs' are severally possible." ==
"[Logically,] this stove can be black and this stove can be non-black."
"~ poss.(Bs ~Bs)" == "'Bs' and '~Bs' are incompossible." ==
"[Logically,] it can't be both that this stove is black and that this stove is
not black."
(Note: "this stove", a.k.a. "s", is not, as you called it in an earlier
post, an individual variable, but is instead an individual constant. In
traditional logic, the subject of propositions in the form "Hs" (e.g. "Socrates
is human") is taken as constant across propositions. If "this stove" is not
constant across propositions in a given example, then it is really a variable
and we're no longer talking about an already singled-out stove as in Peirce's
example).
[Jim] The proposition resulting from their combination appears to be
[contradictory].
It does not appear to be contradictory. The components do not imply each
other's negations.
For instance, "poss.Bs" does not imply the negative of "poss.~Bs".
The negation of "poss.~Bs" is "~poss.~Bs".
"~poss.~Bs" is equivalent to "necess.Bs".
Yet "poss.Bs" does not imply "necess.Bs"
Ergo, "poss.Bs" does not imply "~poss.~Bs".
Ergo, "poss.Bs" is consistent with "poss.~Bs".
QED.
[Jim] They are not Aristotelian (sub) contraries dealing with
"some" objects.
I said nothing about some specifically Aristotelian kind of subcontraries
that deal only with "some" objects, "all" objects, etc.
The oppositional relationships of subcontrarity, contrarity, contradiction,
etc., are certainly not confined to pertaining to quantificational propositions
about some objects, all objects, etc. The Square of Opposition shows some
oppositional relationships arising between quantificational propositions;
however, one does not need quantificational forms at all in order to define such
oppositional relationships -- indeed, a complete system of such binary formal
logical relationships. The forms or schemata of propositional logic are all
that's needed.
[Jim] The so called "failure of contradiction" deals usually with
general object indefiniteness in the case of the existential quantifier. That is
not what is going on here. Vagueness is just as much the result of considering
the two propositions severally.
In the context of logical oppositions, contradiction is the validity of
exclusive alternation, and contradictories are defined as two propositions which
can't both be true and can't both be false. Subcontrarity is positive
alternation's validity conjoined with negative alternation's nonvalidity, and
subcontraries are defined as two propositions which can both be true and can't
both be false.
(Formal) equivalence.Validity of the biconditional.
Can't be the 1st one true
the 2nd one false.Can't be the 1st one false
the 2nd one true.
p. p.
T. T.
F. F.
--
(Formal) strict forward
implication*.Validity
of the forward conditional and nonvalidity of the reverse
conditional.
Can't be the 1st one true
the 2nd one false.Can be the 1st
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim, [Jim Willgoose] (I responded to your later message first.) I agree with a lot here.The idea that there are objective possibilities that are true, regardless of our knowledge, has beenarguably the central issue in discussions of philosophical realism for 2500 years. The idea of objective indeterminacy is a part of that. Consider that a proposition which reflects an objectively indeterminate state of affairs is not bivalent. (I assume that a God would know that it is not bivalent. S/he would be omniscient.) In the concrete world, the most obvious case of objective indeterminacy is that of quantum mechanics. For point A there will be some point B regarding which the info doesn't exist at point A as regards the determination of point B. Yet that info will exist eventually. Or, if in accordance with the "superdeterminism" interpretation of quantum mechanics, there is superluminal determinism, then the relevant info can't be available to subluminal entities at point A. I can't say whether it is fair to deny that such info _actually_ exists at all until at least point B. This gets into a more general question about _actuality_, which Peirce defined as reactiveness. Putting aside superluminal determination, there is to note that it takes light 10,000 years to cross the visible Milky Way. Does the Milky Way _actually_ exist as an _actual_ coherent whole with respect to a duration briefer than 10,000 years? Should one double the duration in order to allow for two-way interaction? Well, expressed in light-units, the width of the Milky Way and the time which light takes to cross its width are the same. (The only other kinematics time-version of length of which I'm aware is L/v, the amount of time that an object takes to pass its length through a given point at rest, a quantity which is obviously highly variable like velocity and which approaches infinity as velocity approaches zero). This question, with which I've played (nothing more) occasionally for decades, is of particular interest in regard to whether the current claim, that our Big Bang universe is spatially infinite, amounts to a claim that it is _actually_ infinite in spatial extent. Maybe it doesn't amount to such a claim. Decades ago a physics student, a roommate of mine, told me "existence travels at the speed of light." Still more generally, the inevitable imprecision and errors of measurements guarantees some imprecision and errors in our knowledge. Since therefore even the final interpretant would involve leaving room for such error, and since the real depends on the final interpretant, therefore the real itself must be subject, in some sense, to imprecision and "errors" or nonconformity to laws -- at least laws that we can formulate. Peirce wrote in "The Architecture of Theories" (CP6.7-34), "...within another century our grandchildren will surely know whether the three angles of a triangle[in actual space] are greater or less than 180 degrees,-- that they are _exactly_ that amount is what nobodyever can be justified in concluding." Also B. Roy Frieden http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/B._Roy_Frieden is of interest in regard to inevitable error's and imprecision'sconsequences for "reality itself." John Collier has said at peirce-l that an information channel can't convey infinite information. Infinite information is what would be needed for infinite precision, I think, unless there were some sort of "perfect analog" measuring device and some mental "perfect analog" way to cognize the results, some sort of continuum which potentially could actualize any of its potential points. (I'm averse to actual infinities but, if I remember correctly, Peirce is not averse to actual infinities.) But the moment that info must be translated or encoded or decoded into an incommensurate form (e.g. continuous into discrete), then imprecision must become involved. Now, this is the part where I have special trouble developing a clear idea. Inthe foregoing sense, it _seems_ that we are not alone in necessary imprecision -- the world's parts seem subject to necessary imprecision, and chance is mathematically founded in the world. However, the world doesn't "know" that it is sometimes trying to "translate" between incommensurate forms, rather we are trying to use one form incommensurate with another in order to learn about the other. That sounds less vague than it should in order to reflect what I'm trying to think about. Anyway, still more generally, there is the question of insoluble mathematical problems, including many that have been proven insoluble. Peirce somewhere says that even these would prove amenable to inductive and abductive approaches. Well, there is a blur of issues here. Penrose talks hypothetically of "oracles" which can solve problems which require infinities of computation, a higher degree of oracle for each higher aleph, or something like that. How would we verify that something were
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] Well, I guess the passage doesn't discuss modal
propositions if you disallow rephrasing "this stove is possibly black" with 'It
is possible that "this stove is black."' There is certainly a logic of
possibility at work.Why aren' t these modal propositions?It is just
that the possibility operator is outside of the proposition. I took it that
Peirce is saying that "this stove is black" and this "stove is not black" are
formally possible. What would a "logical _expression_ of modality" be? The
operator is a unary connective much like negation. ('it is not the case
that "this stove is black."')
Peirce makes some assertions themselves modal in character about some
non-modal propositions. This can be translated into modal propositions or
assertions but it is not the same thing as discussing modal propositions. To say
that "Bs" "~Bs" are incompossible is to say "~poss.(Bs ~Bs)" and
isn't to say "~(poss.Bs poss.~Bs)" or "~poss.(poss.Bs
poss.~Bs)". Peirce was not implying either "~(poss.Bs poss.~Bs)" or
"~poss.(poss.Bs poss.~Bs)" in any way, shape, or form.He was
implying that "Bs" "~Bs" are severally possible, "distributively"
possible, each in its turn possible -- "poss.Bs poss.~Bs" -- but not
compossible, not collectively possible -- "~poss.(Bs ~Bs).
[Jim] You say,
"~ poss.(Bs ~Bs)" == "'Bs' and '~Bs' are incompossible." ==
"[Logically,] it can't be both that this stove is black and that this stove is
not black." (END)
[Jim]I like this alot and have read it this way too.(at
times) My mistake with respect to mixing contrary and contradiction up. It is
easy to get in the habit. What is the other sort of possibility Peirce
refers to? I have always looked for the supposed vague
possibility.Maybe this is not the right passage from
Peirce.Yet, If weacceptthe proposition"poss. Bs
poss.-Bs", then the point of the passage might be that besides formal
possibility, there is vague possibility.In the othermode of
possibility, contradiction is inapplicable. Thus, the proposition
"poss. Bs poss.-Bs" is not a contradiction.But I reject
this for the example "this stove is possibly black and this stove is possibly
not black."
[Jim] I thinkI know my problem. In thecontext where
"this stove" is a definite, actual individual and I assert this stove is
black, every state of affairs is restricted to this stove and blackness. Thus,
necessarily this stove is black and what does not occur is impossible or vice
versa. This is an extreme form of actualism.But, I can make some
sense of the claim that -poss.( poss.Bs poss-Bs) The confusion and irony,
however, doesn't lie with the possibility operator or where possibility appears
in an ordinary proposition. It is all modal logic.
What's happening is that you're simply refusing to accept definitions of
modal logic going back to Aristotle such that "necessary to do X" = "impossible
not to do X" and "possible to do X" = "unnecessary not to do X" and "necessary
to do X" implies but is unimplied by "possible to do X" and so forth. Instead,
for you"poss." = "necess." =straightforward affirmation,and
"~poss." = "~necess." = straightforward negation.The sense that you're
making of " -poss.( poss.Bs poss-Bs)" is your interpreting it as being
practically no different from "~(Bs ~Bs)." Yet 2nd-order logic itself
offers a model for ideas of possibility and necessity in the ideas of
consistency and validity, and furthermore allows for the distinction between
contingently true and necessarily true -- which is a distinction which you don't
accept.
Even when it is a premiss that the stove is black, it does not become
formally true, in furtherinference,that the stove is black.
*_That is the difference between a premiss and an
assumption._* It's been said that a true proposition implies all
true propositions and that a false proposition implies all propositions -- but
that "implies"refers to_material_ implication, nowadays
oftener called"theconditional" and not to _formal_
implication.It's true that I'm writing this post, but that doesn't
formally imply that I'm in my apartment, though that's true too.But it
_is_ true that either I'm not writing this post or I'm in my apartment
or both. "~p v q" == "p--q" -- material implication. Meanwhile, we do assume
the rules of formal implication. So, if the premiss is that the stove is black,
such that the schema is "Bs," then the schema is consistent and nonvalid --
possible and non-necessary. Hence, logically it is possible but non-necessary
that the stove is black, even when it is true that the stove is black. The
possibility and nonnecessity are "relative" to the choice of rules whereby we
attribute possibility and necessity.
If you don't have a problem with that, then why should you have a problem
with attributing necessity and possibility to things in virtue of more
complicated and empirically anchored "formalisms" and norms and patterns and
laws
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim, [Jim Willgoose] The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and furthermore,not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might be. So, we might try to rephrase some expressions if they do not fit the theory. It appears here that "possibility" reflects a state of ignorance with respect to the predicate.How far can the theory be extended and still work? The abstracted quality "pregnancy" can be identified. But can "possible pregnancy" be identified? I think your response would be "so much the worse for the theory." As you said previously, it is not rich enough. As for the matter of my particular interpretation of "possibility" being nowhere near shouting distance of ordinary Engish, that may be a virtue. Consider that adefinite, actual stove cannot have contrary predicates. So, there is only one individual under consideration regardless of our ignorance of the predicate. The statements cannot both be true and in that sense they are inconsistent with each other. In any case, do you think some of your examples can be handled by Peirce's theory of cognition? A possible pregnancy could be idenitified as being in respect of signs positive but inconclusive about pregnancy. In the given case, there would need to be an understood threshhold, even if only a vague one, for what the mind counts as representing a significant degree of possibility, as in practical affairs wherein one signifies that one is momentarily departing from just such a practical understood norm by saying something like, "well, it's _theoretically_ possible but...," etc. I don't know to what extent modal logics have dealt with these issues or instead leave them to the user along with the standard advice to be consistent across the given case. Note that any problem with the idea of a possible pregnancy is also part of a problem with a flat-out modal proposition such as "Possibly there is a pregnant woman" or any propostion of the form "Possibly[Ex(GxHx)]. In any non-empty universe, certain Ex, there is something. So it's a question of the possibility of HxGx. If one goes even simpler, "Possibly[ExHx], then in any non-empty universe the same question about a "possibly H" will be raised. Theories of probability and statistics are among the ways of dealing with possibility more variegatedly. There's alsofuzzy logic, or at least a fuzzified modal logic (I presume),in order to deal with ways to formalize the informality and vagueness involved with talking about things like "maybe pregnant," "oh just possibly pregnant," etc. I don't see why you consider "possibly black" and "possibly non-black" contrary. They seem forall the world to be _subcontrary_ -- it seems that of a given subject they can both be true butthey can't both be false."Necessarily black" and "necessarily non-black" -- those seem contrary, since it seems that of a given subject they can both be false but can't both be true. Boldface: *3 any-pair-wise contraries*, collectively exhausting the options (usually one would say "exhausting the possibilities" but the word "possible" itself appears in the table, so, in order to avoid confusion) Italics: _3 any-pair-wise subcontaries_, whose negatives collectively exhaust the options. ~ ~ ~ _necessary or impossible_ ~ ~ ~ *necessary* ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ *impossible* ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ | ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _possible_ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _unnecessary_ (=possible non-) ~ ~ *possible and unnecessary* ~ ~ _necessary or impossible_ *necessary* *impossible* X possible orimpossible _possible_ _unnecessary_ *possible unnecessary* Boldface:*4 any-pair-wise contraries*, collectively exhausting the options. Italics:_4 any-pair-wise subcontaries_, whose negatives collectively exhaust the options. Table pattern in familiar case (Boolean quantification). I iff A *IA* *OE* F _AvE_ A E *AE* _IvO_ I O *IO* T _IvA_ _OvE_ I iff O not contingent *necessarily true* *necessarily false* X _not contingently true_ necessarily true or contingently false false *contingently false* _not contingently false_ true necessarily false or contingently true *contingently true* true or false _possibly true_ _possibly false_ contingent Rearranged a little, but table has same overall oppositional properties: necessarily true or contingently false *necessarily true *contingently false* X _not contingently true_ not contingent false *necessarily false* _possibly true_ true contingent *contingently true* true or false _not contingently false_ _possibly false_ necessarily false or contingently true
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim, I should add, upon re-reading your comments, that the idea of possibility that I've been discussing has pretty much been in terms of ignorance, but it seems to me that the terms don't need to be essentially in terms of ignorance. If one is talking about a future event, then the reason for one's ignorance of the outcome may be the uncertainty and vagueness of current things themselves as determinants of the future -- the uncertainty is not just "in one's head," nor even just "necessarily in one's head, by the nature of intelligence." I think that Peirce agrees that not all uncertainty is merely epistemic, since he holds that chance is real. For my own part, I consider standard 1st-order logic as a low-resolution, "low-pixelage"picture of the real for this reason among others. The idea that a true proposition (zero-place predicate) about concrete things is true of all concrete things everywhere and everywhen seems -- somehow -- at odds with the idea that the relevant information is not everywhere and everywhen, if indeed chance is real (for my part, I think it's real). That is to say that our concrete Big-Bang universe differs in some logically deep way from a 1st-order logical universe of discourse -- well, who could be shocked! shocked! by that, but what I mean is, that the idea of a flat-out in-or-out membership in a universe of discourse seemsa crudebeginning for understanding what sort of universe of "discourse" and information it is that we actually live in. It's not that I've forgotten that, in a 1st-order logical universe, there can be true contingent propositions which don't imply each other -- I get that, but chance and uncertainty seem (to me) deeper and more complicated in the concrete world, for some reason. Best, Ben Udell http://tetrast.blogspot.com - Original Message - Jim, [Jim Willgoose] The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and furthermore,not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might be. So, we might try to rephrase some expressions if they do not fit the theory. It appears here that "possibility" reflects a state of ignorance with respect to the predicate.How far can the theory be extended and still work? The abstracted quality "pregnancy" can be identified. But can "possible pregnancy" be identified? I think your response would be "so much the worse for the theory." As you said previously, it is not rich enough. As for the matter of my particular interpretation of "possibility" being nowhere near shouting distance of ordinary Engish, that may be a virtue. Consider that adefinite, actual stove cannot have contrary predicates. So, there is only one individual under consideration regardless of our ignorance of the predicate. The statements cannot both be true and in that sense they are inconsistent with each other. In any case, do you think some of your examples can be handled by Peirce's theory of cognition? A possible pregnancy could be idenitified as being in respect of signs positive but inconclusive about pregnancy. In the given case, there would need to be an understood threshhold, even if only a vague one, for what the mind counts as representing a significant degree of possibility, as in practical affairs wherein one signifies that one is momentarily departing from just such a practical understood norm by saying something like, "well, it's _theoretically_ possible but...," etc. I don't know to what extent modal logics have dealt with these issues or instead leave them to the user along with the standard advice to be consistent across the given case. Note that any problem with the idea of a possible pregnancy is also part of a problem with a flat-out modal proposition such as "Possibly there is a pregnant woman" or any propostion of the form "Possibly[Ex(GxHx)]. In any non-empty universe, certain Ex, there is something. So it's a question of the possibility of HxGx. If one goes even simpler, "Possibly[ExHx], then in any non-empty universe the same question about a "possibly H" will be raised. Theories of probability and statistics are among the ways of dealing with possibility more variegatedly. There's alsofuzzy logic, or at least a fuzzified modal logic (I presume),in order to deal with ways to formalize the informality and vagueness involved with talking about things like "maybe pregnant," "oh just possibly pregnant," etc. I don't see why you consider "possibly black" and "possibly non-black" contrary. They seem forall the world to be _subcontrary_ -- it seems that of a given subject they can both be true butthey can't both be false."Necessarily black" and "necessarily non-black" -- those seem contrary, since it seems that of a given subject they can both be false but can't both be true. Boldface: *3 any-pair-wise
[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] There is a difference between treating possibility
epistemically or treating it ontologically. "Possibly black' and
"possibly non-black" are (sub) contraries, indeterminate with respect to a state
of information. But since we are considering "this stove," and not allowing
multiple reference for "this," we know that both statements cannot be true for a
definite individual. Particular propositions, for Peirce,obey both the
laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle. ( 1st order
Form: (poss. Bs poss -Bs )Notice thatI do not
use the quantifier "E" since "this stove" denotesa definite
individual. ("s" is an individual variable and "B" is a predicate letter.)
These two propositions are not "compossible, although they are severally
possible." (Peirce's language) However, 2nd order
Formcreates a problem. EF(Fs -Fs) Which property? Here "F"
is an indefinite predicate variable.Should not all substitutions for "F"
be identical regardless of whether we can identify the property?Maybe not.
Peirce said in the gamma graphs that for ordinary purposes, "qualities may be
treated as individuals." Ifthere is no definite property, then the
proposition is vague rather than false. Identity is critical even for possible
states of information.
Maybe there's a necessary difference at a simple logical level between
epistemic and ontological treatments of possibility, but such difference isn't
evident to me.
You don't provide a reference or a quote, but presumably Peirce is
referring to the components of "(Bs ~Bs)" as non-compossible and as
severally (separately) possible, but is _not_ referring to a form like
"(poss. Bs poss. -Bs)"at all. It would be strange, I think, if
he did. Yet Peirce's technical conception of propositions and predicates and
their treatment differs enough from the contemporary, that, well, who knows? So
I ask for a quote from him. Somehow you seem to be thinking that "poss.Bs" is
the negative of "poss.~Bs".
The same issues are involved withthe "(Fs ~Fs)"in "EF(Fs
~Fs)."
I don't know what your assumptions are about the 1st-order syntactical
status of "poss.", but it's as if you're treating "poss." in "poss. Bs" as a
predicate, whereas one needs to treat it asa functor (like the negative
sign) and to treat the resultant "poss. Bs" as function of "Bs" rather than as
"Bs" itself with some added predicated description "possible."This is the
same as one treats "~Bs"as a function of "Bs" rather than as "Bs" with
some added predicated description "negative."The appropriate 2nd-order
counterpart is not "EF(Fs ~Fs)" but "EF(poss.Fs poss.~Fs). But I'm
just guessing at your assumption. However it does seem that, however you're
treating "poss.", it's not as a functor like "not".
Best,
Ben Udell,
http://tetrast.blogspot.com/
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[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim,
[Jim Willgoose] You say,
"The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly,
probably, optimally, if only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or
proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can
apprehend whether the stove is, isn't, may be, might be,
is 57%-probably, is if--only-if-it's-Thursday,would feasibly
be, would most simply be,is, oddly enough, etc., etc., etc.,
black. " (end)
[Jim] I would say as I previously did that most of these can be handled
by treating the subject as a proposition. Otherwise, youpredicate
"possible blackness" of this stove rather than the proposition "this stove
is black." This might not be so bad if only identification didn't break down.
"this stove" is definite but "this is a possible black thing" suffers.
I don't see what's wrong with it. In real life we do in fact talk about
possibilities involving actual things. You can break it into two interlocked
propositions if you wish, oneaffirming the actual existence of the stove
and the other affirming a possibility about it. Just make sure that their
subjects are somehow equated. And I don't see what's wrong with making the
possibility sentence into a one-place predicate "Ex(x={this
stove} x[possibly(Eyy{y is black}
y=x)])" which can be rephrased to "This stove is possibly black." Of
course, one is more likely to say something like, "This stove is possibly
malfunctioning a bit."
"This stove is possibly black" and "this stove is possibly not-black" are
not inconsistent in any logic whose treatment of the word "possibly" is within
shouting distance of ordinary English usage. In fact their conjunction makes for
at least one sense of the word "contingent," as in _it is a
*contingent* question whether the stove is black or
non-black._ Usually "possibly..." and "possibly not..." are taken in a
sense parallel to that of "consistent" and "non-valid." Any truth-functional
sentence is either (a) valid or (b) inconsistent or (c) both consistent and
non-valid.
[Jim] I might even go so far as to say that "this stove is possibly
black" fails to assert anything and thus fails the test of
cognition.
Tell that to the man who's just been told, in regard to his wife, "She is
possibly pregnant," and, in regard to his finances, "You are possibly bankrupt,"
and so on -- all definitely existent things around which possibilities
range.
[Jim] It also runs up potentially against contradiction since
"this"refers to a definite, individualobject and the two
propositions "this stove is possibly black" and "this stove is possibly not
black" are inconsistent.
It potentially runs up against contradictions? I think you'll need to spell
them out.They may be the fault of an inadequate logical formalism since
obviously we deal with such things every day. And, again, "possibly black" and
"possibly not black" are consistent, not inconsistent, unless one's formalism
constrains one to signify something quite deviative from normal English usage of
words like "possibly."
[Jim] But 'It is possible that "this stove is black"' seems to work
better. What is the deal about supposing the identity of the predicate and then
assessing the modality of the proposition? Peirce gives the example of "it
rains" in the gamma graphs. He doesn't consider possible rain but whether the
proposition "it rains" is possibly true (false)
If your possibilitative propositions are incapable of transformation into
one-or-more-place predicates, then they seem strangely limited. Anyway, I've
gone on at some length about deductive formalisms, philosophical inquiry, and
the difference betweenfinding a convenientand smooth way to "encode"
or represent something for a given general kind of guiding research interest,
and a specifically philosophical exploration of the conceptions involved in
those things represented. I certainly haven't exhausted the subject, but I leave
it to you to respond by argument to the arguments which I've already started in
http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1377(my
second September 6, 2006 post to peirce-l).
Ben Udell
http://tetrast.blogspot.com/
---
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[peirce-l] Re: The roots of speech-act theory in the New List
Jim, list, [Jim Wilgoose] It is a little difficult to assess matters since I have been focusing on the NLC and you are looking more broadly at the corpus. You say you do it differently. Nevertheless,I will try to locate a problem area. [Jim] You say, [Ben] The disparity of Peirce's approaches to (1) attribution and accident and (2) identity/distinction and substances (substantial things), is a serious flaw, and his approach to attribution and accident is better than his other approach. [Jim] In what way is there a flaw? In the NLC, a "pure species of abstraction" plays anecessary role in cognition. Peirce's theory (in many ways a continuation of Aristotelian and Medieval psychology) commits to this abstraction, without which assertions are inexplicable. Peirce says it is discriminated and treated independently. In other words, the question is not whether blackness is in the stove essentially or accidentally but only what is required for assertion or the "applicability of the predicate to the subject." Are you using the term "accident"in the classical metaphysical sense or are you reflecting on the passage where Peirce says that "intermediate conceptions may be termed accidents" or neither? I'm using "accident" in pretty much the sense in which I find it in Peirce. Peirce seldom mentions the conception of accident; basically, Peirce says the three categories 1stness, 2ndness, and 3rdness, can be termed "accidents" and thereafter we don't hear much about "substance-accident" issues.I'm not strong enough on Aristotlean or Scholastic philosophy to be able to say whether Peirce was departing from any tradition in flatly calling qualities "accidents." Of course, his definition of "quality" is not quite Aristotle's. Anyway, the question is not about the essentialness or accidentalness of the blackness's being in the stove. Thequestion is about _whether_ the blackness is or isn't in the stove. It's not even about the ground per se or about that word "in." The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly, probably, optimally, if only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can apprehend whether the stove is, isn't, may be, might be, is 57%-probably, is if--only-if-it's-Thursday,would feasibly be, would most simply be,is, oddly enough, etc., etc., etc., black. A mind which cannot conceive, or can only weakly conceive,of alternatives to the actuality with which it is presented, is no longer a mind, oris a weak or weakened mind. In people, it bespeaks brain damage. _Meaning and implicationare in terms of such alternatives._ For instance, consider "'(p--q)'=='((~p)vq)'=='~(p~q)'" and, indeed, consider it both in its propositional-logic aspect and in its 2nd-order aspect. In Scholastic terms, I'm using "whetherhood" and "attribution-relation" in a sense similar to that ascribed to Avicenna's conception of _anitas_ which is a Latin translation of an Arabic term.The Latin word_anitas_ was coined by the translator from the common Latin _an_ which means "whether" and is used in the formation of indirect questions like "You know whether she is here." (It's quite English-like; neither "whether" nor_an_ is an adaptation of a conditional-formative "if"-word; _an_ also has a prefixive sense of "either" as in "ancipital" = either-headed in the sense of a two-edged sword (having two opposite edges or angles), and is also related to "ambi-") However I see a lot more in "whetherhood" than the Scholastics seem to have seen. They were basically thinking of that which is represented by that whichin logic is traditionally called "logical quality" (positive, negative). I don't see any of this as pertaining directly to whether the sentence is assertoric, acknowledgemental, deliberative, imperative, inquisitive, declarative, etc. What Peirce says about attribution is, so far as I know, in terms of the predication of predicates of subjects, which is the interpretant's task. I'm not aware that Peirce in some passage actually says that this refers to the copula uniting substance with accident. So I've been left with the impression that, for Peirce, attribution is a representational relationand, in particular, aninterpretive relation. So what we actually get is this: 1. quality | 3. representation (includes attribution; imputation is a kind of attribution) 2. reaction/resistance (includes identifications/distinctions and the identicals/distincts) You might ask, aren't the "identical/distincts" substances or hypostatic abstractions? But Peirce goes so quiet in such regards about substance that it was only recently through Joe's finding and transcribing Peirce's partial rewriting of the NLC in MS 403 (1893), "The Categories", (see http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/ms403/ms403.pdf or both http://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu/msg01183.html(Ransdell
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Bill, list, Peirce does disgtinguish between direct and immediate. See Joe's post from Feb. 15, 2006, which I reproduce below. It's not very clear to me at the mmoment what Peirce means by without the aid of any subsidiary instruments or operation. -- which is part of how he means direct. I know at least that when I say direct I mean such as can be mediated, and I've thought that Peirce meant direct in that sense too. So by direct I guess I mean something like -- if mediated, then such as not to create impediments, buffers, etc., and such as instead to transmit brute or unencoded, untranslated determination of the relevant kind by the shortest distance. (I.e., insofar as the mediation means an encoding, it's not the relevant kind of determination anyway). Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wednesday, February 15, 2006 8:36 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: immediate/mediate, direct/indirect - CORRECTION I did a check against an aging photocopy of the MS of the quote from Peirce in my recent message, and found some errors of transcription, and also a typo of punctuation that needed correction as well. I also include in this correction an indication of the words which are underlined in the original (using flanking underscores). I show one illegible word as a set of six question marks enclosed in brackets because the illegible word appears to have six letters, maybe seven. Here is the passage again, corrected (though not infallibly): A _primal_ is that which is _something_ that is _in itself_ regardless of anything else. A _Potential_ is anything which is in some respect determined but whose being is not definite. A _Feeling_ is a state of determination of consciousness which apparently might in its own nature (neglecting our experience of [??] etc.) continue for some time unchanged and that has no reference of [NOTE: should be to] anything else. I call a state of consciousness _immediate_ which does not refer to anything not present in that very state. I use the terms _immediate_ and _direct_, not according to their etymologies but so that to say that A is _immediate_ to B means that it is present in B. _Direct_, as I use it means without the aid of any subsidiary instruments or operation. -- MS 339.493; c. 1904-05 Logic Notebook Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: Bill Bailey [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Sunday, September 03, 2006 2:40 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor Jim, List: I cannot accept the notions direct acquaintance or direct experience if those terms mean unmediated, or generally assume a human sensory system that is isomorphic with the universe as it exists independently of any observer. Electro-chemical events in the system must follow their own system rules. That is not to say human sensory experience is not veridical. It obviously is, or we would have perished. But isomorphism is no more necessary to veridicality than it is to the analogical relationships between mathematical formulae and the physical world. The most direct experience we have, and it seems to me Peirce supports this contention, is a strong affective state. For the baby, it's a hunger pang, a physical hurt, or more happily, being fed or swaddled. What is felt is all there is; stimulus and response are essentially unitive. It takes awhile for a child to learn to mediate between that systemic relevance and the identity that is commonly called objective. Developmental psychologists have commented upon the beginnings of perception in relevance. For example: an urban infant commonly sleeps through all sorts of traffic noises--sirens, crashes, horns, etc., but wakes up when mother enters the room. And relevance continues to direct us in our adult, everyday lives where things and events have the identies and meanings of their personal relevances--what we use them to do and how we feel about them. The wonderfully bright and sensitive colleague who stopped by our office to chat yesterday is inconsiderate and intrinsically irritating today with his endless yammering while we are trying to meet a paper deadline. There is some physiological evidence that meaning precedes perception--i.e., that the relevance of a sensory response is responded to in the brain's cortex before differentiation of the stimulus identity. Contrary to experience, we've been brought up and educated to believe we perceive and identify the object and then have responses--which, if it were so, would have promptly ended evolution for any species so afflicted. You couldn't dodge the predator's charge until after you'd named the predator, the attack and what to do. For most of our lives, the subject-object relationship analysis only enters when things go wrong, when the ride breaks down and we have to
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Sorry, I forgot to compensate for an MS Outlook Express problem which involves URLs not getting copied properly. Now taken care of. Charles, list, [Charles] With this post which exhausts all I am incluned to say in this context, I too will probably "go quiet." [Charles] On Sat, 26 Aug 2006 18:58:50 -0400 "Benjamin Udell"writes: [Ben] Charles, list, I guess it's hard for me to let any remarks about my ideas go by without response, but I still am inclined, as I've put it, to "go quiet." Charles wrote, [Charles] [I would say that Bens Recognition is included in (not outside) the Interpretant as an element of the Interpreters contribution to its determination.] [Ben] The recognition or recognizant, in thecore narrow sense,is _defined_ as object-experience (of the acquaintance kind) formed collaterally to sign and interpretant in respect of the object; the recognizant is defined as something which, Peirce (usually) says, is not gotten from the sign and isoutside the interpretant. So you're simply contradicting the definition. [Charles] I have said nothing that I see as contrary to what Peirce says about the role of collateral experience in sign processes. In the situation where you saw smoke and went looking for a fire, seeing smoke functioned as a sign that you took as representing something other than smoke at at least two levels, a general and a singular. Before you found and actually saw the fire, you interpreted seeing smoke (the sign itself, a sinsign, distinguishable from its objects and interpretants) according to a general rule (a legisign), something like, Wherever there is smoke there is fire. and according to a singularization of the rule something like, With the smoke I presently see there is presently a fire. As Peirce points out, smoke would be uninterpretable as a sign of fire apart from your prior acquaintance with fire (and smoke also for that matter), but seeing smoke prompting you to look for fire and a particular fire was mediated by rules with which you were also already acquainted and apart from which you would not have known to look for fire. I agree that a singular instance of seeing smoke and interpreting seeing smoke as a sign of fire occurs by means of collateral experience that would include recognizing smoke as smoke and not a cloud of steam or dust, fire as fire, etc. in which the interpretant of seeing smoke in its capacity as a singular sign played no partoutside, as you say, the interpretant. But the collateral experience would also include having learned to act and acting as if a rule is true apart from which smoke, insofar as it is suited to function as a sign, could not be interpreted as a sign. What I have been trying to say is that acts of interpretation which include recognition are semiosical, and that recognizing is an interpretant or included in interpretants of a sign or signs that are collateral to the interpretant of any particular sign. (Assuming that you intend no practical difference made by differences between "recognizing" and "recognition" etc.) -- Insofar as "recognizing" in the current discussion is defined as "forming an experience as collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object," you're saying that an experience formed as collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object isan interpretant of that object. That's just a contradiction, both internally and to Peirce. It is notan interpretant in Peirce's view,which is that acquaintancewith the object is not part of the interpretant about that object. From C.S. Peirce, Transcribed from Letter to Lady Welby Dec 23, 1908 (in _Semiotics and Significs: Correspondence Between Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Lady Welby_, ed. Charles Hardwick, Indiana U. Press, 1977, p.83) http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/interpretant.html also at http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005_02_01_peircematters_archive.html . Quote: Its Interpretant is all that the Sign conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral experience. End quote. Note that Peirce does _not_ say that _collateral_ acquaintance with its Object must be gained by collateral experience. Peirce is not stating such a truism. Instead he says that acquaintance, any acquaintance at all, must be gained by collateral experience. There is good reason for Peirce to hold that view, since experience of the sign of an object is not experience of that object, which in turn is because the sign is (usually) not the object, and part of the whole point of signs is to lead the mind to places where, in the relevant regard,experience and observation have not gone yet but could conceivably go. This is as true as ever even when the experienced object is a sign experienced in its signhood or an interpretant sign experienced in its interpretancy. It is not cl
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Joe, list, Joe, I don't know why it seems to you like I'm suddenly releasing a "tirade of verbal dazzle." The prose there looks pretty mundane to me and I certainly didn't mean it intimidate you. Generally when I write such prose I'm just trying to present links in arguments, keep from being confusing, and keep the internal cross-references clear. I try (not always successfully) to avoid trying to write "dazzling" prose because often enough when I've looked at it months later it seems a bit stilted and labored. My editing consists most of all in replacing pronouns with nouns and phrases, even though it leads to repetition, because it worked very well for Fritjof Capra in his _The Tao of Physics_, and he pushed that sort of writing about as far as it can reasonably go, to excellent effect. As for showing that there's no subtle weird complex way that one could reduce verification to the triad, I don't know why you were expecting such in my response to Jim. I've said earlier that I was working on something,and that it would take maybe a week. Then you soon posted to me on other stuff in regard to verification, and that led to the current discussion, so I don't know where you think that I'd have found the time towork onthe no-reduction argument. And when I said that I've practical matters also to attend to, I wasn't just making it up. Now, I didn't see any reason to rush the kind of argument which you asked me to make, since it would be the first time that I'd made such an argument on peirce-l. And I see it as dealing with more challenges than you see it as dealing with, for I don't seem able, even after all this time, to get you to _focus_ on analyzing the verificatory act, for instance, of checking on what a person says is happening at some house. You refer to such an act but you don't look at it. Somebody tells me there's a fire at a house, I form an interpretation that there's a fire at that house, I run over and look at it, and looka there, it's on fire! Feel the heat! Look atthe fire trucks! Cross to the other side of the street in order to get past it. Verification, involving experience of the object(s). Now, if that experience merely represented the house to me, the smoke, its source, etc., then it wouldn't be acquainting me with the house as the house has become. Doubts about this lead to the interesting question of _what are signs for, anyway_? Meanwhile, if the house really is on fire, then subsequent events and behaviors will corroborate the verification. Once, from around 16 blocks away, I saw billowing smoke rising from the vicinity of my building. I rushed up to the elevated train station but couldn't get a clearer view. Finally I ran most of the way to my building, where I observed that the smoke was coming from a block diagonally away -- the Woolworth's store was aflame and my building was quite safe and sound. Ihadn't sat around interpreting a.k.a. construing, instead I had actively arrangedto have aspecial experience of the objects themselves, an experience logically determined in its references and significances both prior and going forward, by the interpretation that my building was afire; and the experience determined semiosis going forward as well, and was corroborated in my interactions with fellow witnesses and by subsequent events, including the gutting and rebuilding the store. - Wasthe experiencethe object in question? - No. - Was it the sign? - No. - Was it the interpretant? - No. - Was it determined logically by them? - Yes. - Was it, then,another interpretant of the prior interpretants and their object? - No, because it was not an interpretant of the object, instead it further acquainted me with the object. Now, if you don't see a problem for triadicism there, then I'd say that you've set the bar exceedingly high for seeing a problem. And if you reply that you don't find that sequence of questions and answers convincing of anything, even of the plausible appearance of a problem, without pointing to just where the logic breaks down, then I'll conclude that you've merely skimmed it, and haven't reasoned your way through it at all. Yes, generally I point out thatsign and interpretantdon't give experienceof theobject and that verification involves experience of the object. There's a cogent general argument right there. But if you see no problem for semiotics in the question of signs and experience, no problem that can't be "taken care of" later, some time, when somebody gets around to it, meanwhile let somebody prove beyond this doubt, then that doubt, then another doubt, that there's some sort of problem there that needs to be addressed,well, then, you'll never feel a burden of need to deal with it. Generally I''m okay with this, because it leads to my exploring interesting questions. In response to my points about collateral experience, some asked, among other things -- "but how does that make
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Gary, Charles, Joe, Jim, Jacob, list, [Ben] Object and signs are roles. They are logical roles, and their distinction is a logical distinction [Gary] As I see it, it's not that simple because of the dynamical object, the fact of inter-communication as well as internal inference, etc. I didn't say that logic doesn't go deep, much less that it's something with which we merely decorate the world. It's about attaining the truth, and is a way for one to arrange for oneself to be determined by truth, so it must have something to do with the world, be of it and not just on it. This also goes to the question of what it means for reality to depend on the final interpretant. I guess I'd say that I think that the distinction between object and sign ismore basicand general than idioscopic distinctions, in that sense in which cenoscopy is more basic and generalthan idioscopy.I don't thinkthat, as roles,they arestrictly arbitrary or entirely subject to conscious deliberate whim, and that also seems to involve my thinking of them also as statuses, though I'm not sure what that adds to the idea of their not being quite arbitrary; for the time being,the status element's contributionisjust a sense that I have. And special phenomena do seem to vary in their capacity to serve as signs -- e.g., we've generally regarded it as a question whether biological phenomana _embody_ semioses and, in connection with that,to what extent they can be considered to embody interpretants. I've even said that mechanical systems, or at least some of them, from a certain perspective,could be considered to embody only objects. Whether that is or isn't the case, it shows thatI do think that logical distinctions end up rooting themselves in some sense into the concrete, idioscopic world. I think that they do so in such ways, for instance,as to help motivate, justify, and reward the conception of a quasi-mind. However, I think that theassignment or "belongingness"of such roles to things is a relationship in the mind or quasi-mind for which things are signs and objects, and to the extent that that mind or quasi-mind is particularized from out of set of possibilities, likewise the object-sign relations get particularized. The capacity of many given things to serve both as objects and as signs is part of why it is that we have such freedom to focus on them in either way and to let our further semiosis about them be governed by general logical considerations. But where the freedom seems so great that the logic seems "decorative" -- no, I don't go along with that, though I can see how I may seem to when I emphasize that the sign-object distinction is a logical one rather than a physical, material, biological, or psychological one. Peirce emphasizes the importance of distinguishing logical conceptions from psychological conceptions, and something like that spirit is what I had in mind. [Gary] Charles may mean something somewhat different from what I'm taking his two semiosical triads to be referring to (I hope he'll comment further on them at some point), but I'll show how I see the two through an example diagramming them in relationship to each other. [Btw, I would recommend an analysis Charles posted 12/1/05--his "as if" post--in which he considers certain Peircean passages which brought him to his inner/outer notion] This is admittedly only a very preliminary analysis and I may see things differently as I consider the two triads further (I may be conflating some of the inner and outer aspects, or not connecting them properly--it appears, not surprisingly, to be a very complex relationship indeed) [Gary] -- outer semiosical triad: The sign in this case is a particular line spoken in a particular production of Shakespeare's Much Ado About Nothing by a particular actor at one outdoor performance in a New York City park. | The audience members hearing it spoken are these (selected) interpreters: (a) a young acting student who is studying the given role, (b) an 8 y.o. child attending her first live play, (c) a Spanish speaking man without much English language skills dragged to it by his girlfriend. (d) the director of the play The dynamical object is whatever meaning/emotion Shakespeare, the actor, the director mean to convey/express in that line, through its delivery, etc. -- [Gary] However this sign as reflected in semiotic processes of the various audience members are naturally very different semioses ( a, b, c and d) at the moment of their each hearing and "following the meaning" of the line: [Gary] -- inner semiosical triad [read 1/2/3]: 1. The sign is pretty much whatever the line spoken is heard as (given educational backgrounds, language skills, the coughing of someone next to one interpreter, a thought of the need to pay a bill at just that moment) and what each takes it to mean, possibly accompanying thoughts, etc. 1/2/3 | 3. The interpretant
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Jim, Charles, Gary, Joe, Jacob, list, (Let me note parenthetically that, in my previous post, I used the word "mind" in a number of places where I probably should have used the word "intelligence," given the far-reaching sense which the word "mind" can take on ina Peircean context.) Jim below says things pretty near to that which I'm saying in terms of the distinction between object and sign, andit seems that the "bad regression" stuff that I've said about his previous stuff no longer applies. Object and signs are roles. They are logical roles, and their distinction is a logical distinction, not a metaphysical or physical or material or biological or psychological distinction, though it takes on complex psychological relevance insofar as a psyche will be an inference process and willnot onlydevelop structures which manifest the distinction, but will also tend consciously to employ the distinction and even thematize it and make a topic (a semiotic object) out of it (like right now). However, my argument has been that, when one pays sufficient attention to the relationships involved, one sees that a verification is _not_ a representation, in those relationships in which it is a verification, -- just as an object is not a sign in those relationships in which it is an object. Even when a thing-in-its-signhood is the object, the subject matter, then it is _in that respect_ the object and not a sign, though it wouldn't be the object if it were not a sign (and indeed every object is a sign in some set of relationships). These logical distinctions don't wash away so easily. Meaning is formed into the interpretant. Validity, soundness, etc., are formed into the recognition. Meaning is conveyed and developed through "chains" and structures of interpretants. Validity, soundness, legitimacy, is conveyed and developed through "chains" and structures of recognitions. One even has some slack in "making" the distinction between interpretant and verification -- it's a slack which one needs in order to learn about the distinction so as to incorporate those learnings into oneself as a semiosic sytem and so as to employ the distinction in a non-reckless but also non-complacent manner. (For everything -- (a) boldness, (b) confident behavior, (c) caution, (d) resignation -- there is a season -- (a) bravery, (b) duely confident behavior, (c) prudence, (d) "realism" -- an out-of-season -- (a) rashness, (b) complacency, (c) cowardice, (d) defeatism.) In a sense the distinction (interpretant vs. verification) which I'm discussing is an aspect of the ancient one traceable between meaning, value, good, end (telos), actualization, affectivity and factuality, validity, soundness, true, entelechy, reality, establishment, cognition. To make it four-way: 1. object ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. interpretant 2. sign ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. recognition, verification 1. strength, dynamism ~ ~ ~3. vibrancy, value, good 2. suitability, richness ~ ~ ~4. firmness, soundness, truth etc. 1. will character ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. affectivity sensibility 2. ability competence ~ ~ 4. cognition intelligence 1. agency ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. act, actualization 2. bearer ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. borne, supported 1. beginning, leading, arche ~ ~ 3. end, telos, culmination 2. middle, means ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. check, entelechy 1. multi-objective optimization process ~ ~ 3. cybernetic process 2. stochastic process ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. inference process 1. forces ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3. life 2. matter ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4. intelligent life Best, Ben http://tetrast.blogspot.com/ - Original Message - From: Jim Piat To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Sunday, August 20, 2006 1:54 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor Charles Rudder wrote: That is, there is an immediate--non-mediated and, hence, cognitively autonomous relation between cognizing subjects and objects consisting of phenomena and/or things in themselves who are in some sense able to "see" or "recognize" objects and relations between and among objects as they are independent of how they are represented by signs and their interpretants. On this account of cognition, signs and systems of signs are "instrumental" auxiliaries to cognition and their semiosical instrumentality is subject to being and is consciously or unconsciously continuously being extrasemiosically evaluated, validated, or "verified" by cognizing subjects; a process which Peirce, who makes cognition and cognitive growth an exclusively semiosical process, ignores. Dear Charles, Folks Here's my take -- That one has some sort of non-representational "knowledge" of objects against which one can compare or verify one's representational or semiotic knowledge does seem to be a popular view of the issue of how reality is accessed or known. But I think this is a view Peirce rejected in the New List. However this is not to say that there is no
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Charles, Joe, Gary, Jim, Jacob, list, [Charles] Following up on Joe's saying: [Joe] "If I am understanding you correctly you are saying that all semeiosis is at least incipiently self-reflexive or self-reflective or in other words self-controlled AND that the adequate philosophical description of it will REQUIRE appeal to a fourth factor (which is somehow of the essence of verification) in addition to the appeal to the presence of a sign, of an object, and of an interpretant, allowing of course for the possibility of there being more than one of any or all of these, as is no doubt essential for anything of the nature of a process. The appeal to the additional kind of factor would presumably have to be an appeal to something of the nature of a quadratic relational character. To be sure, any given semeiosis might involve the fourth factor only in a triply degenerate form, just as the third factor might be degenerate in a double degree in some cases, which is to say that the fourth factor might go unnoticed in a single semeiosis, just as thirdness might go unnoticed in a single semeiosis." Note for anybody reading at http://www.mail-archive.com/peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu/maillist.html : I find that a few recent posts from me and Joe didn't get posted at mail-archive.com. They can be found here: http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1311(post from me August 19, 2006) http://article.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/1312(post from Joe Ransdell August 19, 2006) [Charles] and your saying: [Ben] "Generally, I'd respond that that which Peirce overlooks in connection with verification is [Ben] -- that verification is an experiential recognition of an interpretant and its sign as truly corresponding to their object, and that verification (in the core sense) involves direct observation of the object in the light (being tested) of the interpretant and the sign. "In the light (being tested)" means that the verification is a recognition formed _as_ collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object. Experience, familiarity, acquaintance with the object are, by Peirce's own account, outside the interpretant, the sign, the system of signs. [Ben] -- and that, therefore, the recognition is not sign, interpretant, or their object in those relationships in which it is the recognition of them; yet, in being formed as collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object, it is logically determined by them and by the object as represented by them; it is further determined by the object separately by observation of the object itself; and by the logical relationships in which object, sign, and interpretant are observed to stand. Dependently onthe recognitional outcome, semiosis will go very differently; it logically determines semiosis going forward. So, how will you diagram it? You can't mark it as object itself, nor as sign of the object, nor as interpretant of the sign or of the object. What label, what semiotic role, will you put at the common terminus of the lines of relationship leading to it, all of them logically determinational, from the sign, the object, and the interpretant? [Charles] I am still trying to find out if I have any grasp at all of what you think the (Interpretant -- Sign -- Object) relation omits. [Charles] Suppose I am given a photograph to use as a means of finding aperson whomI have never seen. As far as I can see there would be nothing "tested" in my looking for the person unlessI fail to find the person, in which case, assuming that the person was present, I might wonder if the photograph is recent, if the person has gained or lost weight, grown or shaved a beard, etc. That is, I might question what I sometimes fall the "fidelity" of a sign or how precisely the Immediate or Semiosical Object of thesign represents its Dynamical Object--in this illustration how closely the features of the photographic image resemble the features of the person photographed. Having failed in an attempt to _use_ a sign, I might and actually have questionedits _usefulness_ as a sign. Inference may be deliberate, conscious, controlled (and that's reasoning or ratiocination) or nondeliberate, unconscious, uncontrolled. The question of whether inference or testing or such things take place, is not the question of whether one is conscious of inferring or testing or such things and of learning thereby, but rather of whether intentionally or unintentionally, indeed consciously or unconsciously, one so infers or tests such that, intentionally or unintentionally, and consciously or unconsciously, one learns. It is quite natural to look back on experiences and realize that they involved trials whereof one was unaware or only confusedly aware at the time. The point is whether one incorporates and practices one's learnings from them, whether or not one is aware of having done so. Not every system is of _such a nature
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Charles, Joe, Gary, Jim, Jacob, list, The occasion here is that Charles wrote, "I am still trying to find out if I have any grasp at all of what you think the (Interpretant -- Sign -- Object) relation omits." The idea that one can't even grasp what I'm saying leads me to make one last try. What do I think the relation omits? I thinkthat the (Interpretant -- Sign -- Object) relation omits recognition, verification, establishment. I mean "recognition," "verification," "estabishment," and the like, in a pretty commonsense way. I'm trying to think of how to get the tetradic idea across. First, I'd point out that the difference between interpretation and verification can be taken in a common-sense way with which we are all familiar. That common-sense way is at the basis of how I mean it. But I've pointed that out in the past. I've even brought the plot of _Hamlet_ (because peirce-l is classy :-)) into the discussion. Now, there's a weak sense of the word "understanding" where one says "well, it's my _understanding_ that Jack is going to come" -- one is saying that one doesn't _know_ whether Jack is actually going to come -- one hasn't _verified_ it, even to oneself -- one means that, instead, it's _merely one's interpretation_. I think that we're all familiar with these ways of talking and thinking. I talk and think that way, and my impression is that most people talk and think that way. Those ways of talking and thinking are quite in keeping withobject-experience's being outside the interpretant. An interpretation isa construal. An unestablished, unsubstantiated interpretation is a _mere_ construal in the strongest sense of the word "mere." (In a similar way, one should think of a sign which is unsubstantiated in whatever respect as a _mere_ sign, a _mere_ representation, in that respect.) One should not let the _word_ "interpretant" evoke anything stronger in sucha case, but, instead, one should stick with the common notion of interpretation. Even a biological mutation, considered as an interpretant, should be considered as a construal and as a random experiment which "experience" or actual reality will test. Research and thought had thousands of years to show that one can make much progress by merely making representations and construals about other researchers' representations and contruals and by, at best, verifying representations and construals _about_ representations and construals -- doing so via books about other books and by researchers' going back and checking the originals and considering the ideas presented there. This sort of thing in the end makes little progress when the subject matter is not thought itself but instead, say, physics or biology. One needs to verify by experiences of the subject matter. The logical process must revisit the object, somehow, some way. Second, I'd point to the analogy between decoding and interpretation, an analogy which has been referred to and alluded to often enough, e.g., in David Lodge's "Tout décodage est un nouvel encodage." I'd point to the extended analogy, and ask, why does triadic semiotics have no analogue for the recipient? source ~~~ object encoding ~~ sign decoding ~~ interpretant recipient ~~ ? Is it merely that in early scenarios the decoding was usually mechanical and the recipient a human? Why does a recipient notice redundancies and inconsistencies which a decoder does not notice? What is the difference in function between a decoding and a "recipience"? Why, at the fourth stage, does the analogy suddenly break down between information theory and triadic semiotics? Does one of them have the wrong scenario? Which one? Is it normal or is it a warning alarm, when a tenable analogy just suddenly goes bad? If the interpretant is analogous both to decoding and to recipient, what functions analogous to theirs does it combine? Should a semiotic philosopher be concerned about such questions? Especially a Peircean one accustomed to tracing extensive analogies and correlations, a philosopher who believes in doing that sort of thing? But I've pointed this all out in the past. Third, I'd point out the following logical stream of thought: Peirce says that to represent an object is not to provide experience or acquaintance with the object. There are good reasons to agree with Peirce about this, which I've discussed in the past. It is rooted in the fact that, except in the limit case of their identity, the sign is not the object but only, merely, almost the object. However, in being almost the object, it does convey information about the object; however, acquaintance with the object can't be gained from the sign. Now, when one forms an acquaintance or experience with an object, what does that give to one, that a sign, indeed, acquaintance with a sign, does not give to one? Why is object acquaintance or object experience involved with confirming something about an object? The core of
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Charles, Joe, Gary, Jim, list, Currently, I'm focused on answering Joe's recentest post to me, particularly in regard to the question of how to argue that some very complicated complexus of objects, signs, and interpretants will not amount to a verification. My focus there has as much to do with trying to restrain my prolixity as anything else! Still, I'd like to attempt at least a brief response here. A point which I'll be making in my response to Joe, and which may be pertinent here,is that the "reflexivity" involved in semiosis is not just that of feedback's adjusting of behavior but instead that of learning's effect on the semiotic system's very design -- solidifying it or undermining it or renovating it or augmenting it or redesigning it or etc. Generally, I'd respond that that which Peirce overlooks in connection with verification is -- that verification is an experiential recognition of an interpretant and its sign as truly corresponding to their object, and that verification (in the core sense) involves direct observation of the object in the light (being tested) of the interpretant and the sign. "In the light (being tested)" means that the verification is a recognition formed _as_ collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object. Experience, familiarity, acquaintance with the object are, by Peirce's own account, outside the interpretant, the sign, the system of signs. -- and that, therefore, the recognition is not sign, interpretant, or their object in those relationships in which it is the recognition of them; yet, in being formed as collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object, it is logically determined by them and by the object as represented by them; it is further determined by the object separately by observation of the object itself; and by the logical relationships in which object, sign, and interpretant are observed to stand. Dependently onthe recognitionaloutcome, semiosis will go very differently; it logically determines semiosis going forward. So, how will you diagram it? You can't mark it as object itself, nor as sign of the object, nor as interpretant of the sign or of the object. What label, what semiotic role,will you putat the common terminus of the lines of relationship leading to it, all of them logically determinational,from the sign, the object, and the interpretant? If, as verification, it is logically determined by object, sign, and interpretant, and is neither the object itself, or sign or interpretant of the object, then *_what_* is it in its logically determinational relationship to object, sign and interpretant? My answer is that verification is just that, verification, a fourth semiotic element on a part with object, sign, and interpretant. The content of your summary seems at first glance generally correct, except that I would not call it so much a summary as a placement of Peirce's discussion of transuasion into an appropriatefurther Peircean context. Previously on peirce-l, I think it was over a year ago, I addressed the issue of induction and verification in a general way: http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2005-January/002066.html [peirce-l] Re: [Arisbe] Re: Critique Of Short -- Section 4 --DiscussionBenjamin Udell Sun Jan 2 23:55:43 CST 2005 66~ [Joe:] The purpose of the collateral knowledge is not to "confirm the meaning" but to identify the object independently of its identification in the sign.The latter, not the former, was Peirce's purpose, but it amounts to the same thing, takes on importance since there would be no other way to confirm the meaning. For instance, the experimentation which conveys collateral acquaintance with the object to the experimenter's mind is, by that very stroke, not an interpretant or sign.in the relevant relations. It's an induction which concludes not in an interpretant but in a recognition -- some degree of recognition -- though it certainly will also conclude in an interpretant to the extent that the interpretant goes beyond the recognition represents the object in respects in which collateral experience has not been furnished. The progression continues. But at some point I will address how this works when the collateral experience is conveyed only weakly how it is that we are satisfied with that which we call evidence when the evidence is not the object itself freshly observed.~99 (The way in which I eventually addressed the issue was in terms (a) of a general evidentiary power of signs in virtue of their deserving recognition on the basis of experience, and in particular of a kind of sign, classificationally seated alongside index, icon, symbol, a sign _defined_ in terms of the recognition which it would deserve and which I call the "proxy" and (b) a certain slack and experimentability which the mind has in understanding and practicing the difference between an interpretant and a recognition/verification,
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Jacob, Joe, Gary, Jim, list, [Jacob] Theres been a lot of debate on this issue of verification, and it almost sounds like patience is being tried. If I could just give my input about one remark from the last posting; I hope it helps some. [Jacob] Ben wrote: I dont know how Peirce and others have missed the distinct and irreducible logical role of verification. I keep an eye open regarding that question, thats about all. I dont have some hidden opinion on the question. [Jacob] Prof. Ransdall (or do you prefer Joe?) replied: I dont think Peirce overlooked anything like that, Ben. It is just that verification is not a distinctive formal element in inquiry in the way you think it is, and Peirces approach to logic as theory of inquiry doesnt mislead him into thinking that one has to give a formal account of such a thing. [Jacob] I want to agree with Joe; its hard for me to see Peirce overlooking that bit, for several reasons. But the question of why verification isnt a formal element in inquiry needs some unpacking. [Jacob] The discussion sounds like everyones talking about isolated instances. All the examples given to illustrate testing here are particular, individual cases where one person observes something, draws a conclusion, and checks to see if hes right. Thats not the only way to view the development of thought. [Jacob] Take Joes common-sense example: You tell me that you observed something on the way over to my house to see me, e.g. a large fire at a certain location, and I think you must have made a mistake since the edifice in question is reputed to be fire-proof. So I mosey over there myself to check it out and, sure enough, the fire is still going on at the place you said. Claim verified. Of course, some third person hearing about this might think we are both mistaken or in collusion to lie about it, and having some financial interest in the matter, might not count my report as a verification of your claim. So he or she might mosey over and find that we were both confused about the location and there was no fire at the place claimed. Claim disverified. But then some fourth person . . .Well, you get the idea. So what is the big deal about verification? (This is pretty much what Jim Piat was saying, too, perhaps.) [Jacob] I dont think anyone finds this sort of thing unusual; the difficulty with this illustration is in *how* it bolsters the case Joe is making. [Jacob] It also seems to me theres some confusion about what were arguing about. The role of verification in *inquiry* or *thought*? At the level of individuals or in general? Let me try to illustrate what I mean. [Jacob] When checking your work, you might discover that youd made an error (often the case with me), or even that you initially had the right answer but somehow messed up (not often the case with me). This occurs at the individual level. But animals reason too, though they dont verify. And thats telling. (This was Bens point when quoting Lewes on Aristotle: science is science because of proof, testing, verification.) Animals don't deliberately verify. Even most human verification is not carried out with a specifically verificative purpose. To the extent that animals learn and are capable of unlearning, they do test, verify, disverify, etc. I throw a stick for a dog to fetch, we go through it a couple of times. Then I make the motion but don't release the stick. The dog runs, can't find the stick, walks half-way back, and I show the stick to the dog. Soon enough the dog realizes that just because I make that rapid throwing motion doesn't mean I throw the stick. The dog waits till it sees the stick flying through the air, at least until it thinks that I've stopped pretending about throwing the stick. [Jacob] At the general level it doesnt seem to be the case. I cannot think of any time in the history of physical sciences when the scientific community at large said anything like, Copernicus goofed Ptolemy was right after all! and *reverted* to the original way of doing things. It just doesnt happen. When a development occurs in knowledge, its pretty much forward-moving. The same goes for other fields of inquiry. Actually Copernicus brought about a reversion to the heliocentric view of Aristarchus, who arrived at it in apparently a reasonably scientific manner. (The view also appears in some of the ancient Vedas.) Yet there is a forward motion. A new theory is supposed to explain that which the old theory explained, and then some. The decrease of massive overturnings of previous scientific views pertains to research's becoming really good at verification, in those fields where research has done so. Freud held sway for quite a time, but many now say it's all junk; others say that his concepts of transference, denial, projection, etc., are solid additions to psychological theory, even if one rejects other aspects of his theory. Some theories in research
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Joe, Gary, Jim, list, [Joe] Ben Says: [Ben] I don't know how Peirce and others have missed the distinct and irreducible logical role of verification. I keep an eye open regarding that question, that's about all. I don't have some hidden opinion on the question. Tom Short argued that there is a problem with answering how it is that semiosis learns to distinguish sense from nonsense, and Tom argued that Peirce saw this problem. I wasn't convinced that Peirce saw the problem, and I think that it's the verification problem; I can't help thinking that if Peirce had seen it, he would have addressed it more aggressively. [Joe] REPLY: [Joe] I don't think Peirce overlooked anything like that, Ben. It is just that verification is not a distinctive formal element in inquiry in the way you think it is, and Peirce's approach to logic as theory of inquiry doesn't mislead him into thinking that one has to give a formal account of such a thing. Oh, well, one can of course explain about how publication works, and how people are expected to respond to the making of research claims to do what one can describe as "verifying" them. That would involve discussing such things as attempts to replicate experimental results, which can no doubt get complicated in detail owing to the fact that it would only rarely involve exact duplication of experimental procedures and observations of results, the far more usual case being the setting up of related but distinguishable lines of experimentation whose results would have rather obvious implications for the results claimed in the research report being verified or disverified, depending on how it turns out. I don't think there would be anything very interesting in getting into that sort of detail, though. One might make similar remarks on abductive inference, which is belief-laden and context-sensitive and would require getting into lots of details and variation case by case. Note that the kind of hypotheses which inferential statistics characteristically produces are "statistical hypotheses" rather than explanatory ones, and it is not as if statisticians never had an interest in the subject; a few years ago one statistician wrote here at peirce-l about being interested in general approaches to the production of the content of hypotheses which go beyond the usual statistical kind. Statistics deals with phenomena in general and, though often applied in idioscopy, is not itself about any special class of phenomena. Yet one does, in at least some philosophy,attemptand pursue general characterizations_of_ abductive inferenceand this is becauseabductive inference is a logical process of a general kindand is therefore part of philosophy's subject matter.Verification is also a logical process of a general kind. The question is, is it some kind of interpretation, representation, or objectification, or combination thereof? Or is it something else? Now there are two more questions here: Did Peirce think that verification was important and determinational in inquiry? (Yes). Did Peirce think that verification is a distinctive formal element in semiosis? (No.) Your discussion of an emphasis on verification as reflecting a pathology of skepticism, a search for infallible truth, etc., goes too far in de-valorizing verification, certainly to the extent that you may be ascribing such a view to Peirce. From the Collected Papers of C.S. Peirce Vol. I, I. General Historical Orientation, 1. Lessons from the History of Philosophy, Section 3. The Spirit of Scholasticism, Paragraph 34, http://www.textlog.de/4220.html 66~~~ 34. Mr. George Henry Lewes in his work on Aristotle(1) seems to me to have come pretty near to stating the true cause of the success of modern science when he has said that it was *_verification_*. I should express it in this way: modern students of science have been successful because they have spent their lives not in their libraries and museums but in their laboratories and in the field; and while in their laboratories and in the field they have been not gazing on nature with a vacant eye, that is, in passive perception unassisted by thought, but have been *_observing_* -- that is, perceiving by the aid of analysis -- and testing suggestions of theories. The cause of their success has been that the motive which has carried them to the laboratory and the field has been a craving to know how things really were, and an interest in finding out whether or not general propositions actually held good-- which has overbalanced all prejudice, all vanity, and all passion. Now it is plainly not an essential part of this method in general that the tests were made by the observation of natural objects. For the immense progress which modern mathematics has made is also to be explained by the same intense interest in testing general propositions by particular cases -- only the tests were applied by means of particular demonstrations.
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Gary, Joe, Jim, list, (continued,3rd part) [Gary] Again, you maintain that the "logically determinational role" of "such recognition" cannot be denied and yet I can't even find it! For me it is less a matter of its being denied than my not even missing it (clearly you've fixed your own ideas in this matter quite differently). Your arguments around the interpretant seem absolutely convincing to you, but I have not been able to fully comprehend your argument regarding the logical necessity of this fourth "intuition" of the object as a proxy for the it. Perhaps this originates in my not being able to find it unmediated in my experience (as phenomenologist, as semeiotician, as ordinary "muser" etc.) But you say you cannot see how it is possible to argue logically for anything except a categorial schema which includes this putatively necessary fourth element that is so obvious to you, but a mystery to me. You're mixing the proxy up with the recognition and misattributing to me the view that experience is unmediated. You seem to have forgotten the difference between "direct" and "unmediated." The logically determinational role is that of (dis-)confirmatory experience. I look and see that person X is wearing a hat as I expected. I see X wearing the hat as I expected. Now, it's confirmatory in regard to my interpretive expectation based on signs, confirmatory in logical virtue of what the contents of the sign, interpretant, and object-as-represented were and inlogical virtue of what the object now shows itself to be and indeed what the object, sign, and interpretant now all show themselves to be. It is indeed confirmatory of a massive amount of prior semiosis without which I couldn't make enough sense of what I was seeing in order to think or say "looka there, he's wearing a hat!" In that sense, the experience is indeed logically mediated and logically determined. There was even a logically determined need for such a confirmation. My further stream of interpretation and verification will be decisively determined logically by the fact that I have confirmed that X is indeed wearing a hat just as I expected on the basis of earlier signs and interpretants. The confirmation touches not only on the question of whether X is wearing a hat and the ramifications regarding X, but also on the validity and soundness of the whole semiosis leading up to the confirmation, ultimately on the whole mind as aninference process. In sum: If the experience is formed *_as_* collateral to sign interpretant in respect of the obect, then object, sign, and interpretant logically determine it in its collaterality. And it in turn logically determines semiosis going forward. It really should be setting off one's philosophical alarm bells if one finds oneself denying that experience, recognition, verification, have a logically determinational role. I don't understand how anybody could argue that a claim does not logically determine the character of its verification (in the sense that, e.g., a claim that a horse is on the hill determines a verificationconsisting in looking for a horse on the hill) or that the claim's verification does not logically determine further inference involving the claim (e.g., a horse was confirmed to be on the hill, and it's good news that a horse is nearby, and it's also good news that the semiosis leading up to the verification was faring quite well, and Joey the horse-spotter was right again, and so forth, and all those items factor determinatively into semiosis going forward, a semiosis which would go _very differently_ if it had been dis-confirmed that a horse was on the hill). I don't understand how anybody could argue such, but I'm willing to examine such an argument if one is offered. So, the semiosis can't be diagrammed in its logical determination without lines representing relationships of experience to object. You could draw little dots in the line to show that the experiential relationship is, from another viewpoint, interpretively mediated. But that doesn't stop the line from being an experience line, any more than breaking a representation line into atoms and their motions turns the representation line into a mere mechanics or matter line. If you insist on showing the experience line as a mere interpretation line, then you have no way to display experience of the object such that the experience is "outside" the interpretant and sign of the object. That's part of why nobody has sat down and drawn a diagram showing how recognition or verificationis merely interpretation. Another seemingly open door gets closed when an intended signhood turns out to be the mind's experience's serving as a sign of some other object than the object of which it is the mind's experience. Of course one experiences things as being signs of still more things. Now, the following seems simple to me: __The object does not, of itself, convey experience or even
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Joe, Gary, Jim, list,
I forgot that I had wanted to make a remark on the Pragmatic Maxim in the
present connection.
[Joe] I forgot to say something about the supposed problem of
distinguishing sense from nonsense. That's what the pragmatic maxim is all
about, isn't it?
The Pragmatic Maxim is all about distinguishing sense from nonsense, given
a healthy inquirial setting. By itself, it is about the clarification of
conceptions. It is not about actually checking them, which also is important in
order _soundly_ to distinguish sense from nonsense. I think that,
as a practical matter, the result of semiotics' more or less stopping at the
stage of clarification, is that degenerate forms of pragmatism, feeling the
importance of practical, actual verification and consequences,have
emphasized actual outcomes ("cash value") at the expense of the conception of
the interpretant, an expense exacted throughpersistent misreadings of the
Pragmatic Maxim as meaning that the meaning of an idea isin its
actualobserved consequences "period, full stop."
Yetthe Pragmatic Maximprovides a basis for saying that _the
interpretant is addressed to the recognizant_. The interpretant, the
clarification, is in terms of conceivable experience having conceivable
practical bearing. It is a narrowing down of the universe represented by the
sign -- it picks out some ramifications of value or interest under the standards
of the interpreter. As an appeal to possible relevant experience, _it
is an appeal to possible recognizants_. As experiences, the
recognizants are not merely"specialized" down from the sign's represented
universe; instead they are downright singularized, insofar as experience is
singular. For instance,a prediction based on a hypothesis is a
potential recognizant, or a step in the formation of an actual recognizant. It
tends to be a prediction which is, itself, crucial-testable, and whose
confirmation lends support to the hypothesis, while its disconfirmation
disconfirms the hypothesis. The less crucial-testable a prediction is, the more
it is like a hypothesis itself if it is testable at all.
Best, Ben Udell http://tetrast.blogspot.com/
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The composite photograph metaphor
Gary, Joe, Jim, list, (continued, 2rd part) [Gary] It does seem most likely and natural that there are a number of corrections and additions to be made in regard to Peirce's theories. For example, Ben points to the need for contemporary research fields to find their places within Peirce's classification of the sciences. But first folk have got to see the power of such an approach to classification, a matter which Kelly Parker admirably discusses at length in relation to continuity/triadicity in one of the early chapters of his book (the revisions that Ben has suggested to Peirce's classification seem to me idiosyncratic; and certainly any such revision of the classification ought not be one person's "take" on the matter anyhow). That last remark sets up a strawman. To the contrary of course I'm not suggesting that people ought to embrace my revision even when they disagree with it and when I'm the only one in favor of it. Any revision of the classification ought not to be decided by a poll of whether one person supports it or dozens of people support it, etc. If, nevertheless, numbers are worth mentioning when I'm in the minority of one, let's remember that -- in numbers of supporters among philosophers -- Peirceanism itself comes in far behind linguistic analysis phenomenological/existential philosophy. Now, if we want to rephrase "minority of one" into "thinks he's right and whole rest of the world is wrong," that's merely self-inflammatory rhetoric, especially when the whole philosophical world is far from agreement among its constituents about the subject in question. Now, I don't see why _more_ folks have tofirst see the power of an approach to classification. What is needed is for the people most interested in the subject to actually attempt it -- just _do_ it, engage the issues, and get productive inquiry rolling. The commencing to appear of some sort of interesting questions and first fruitful results along the way will be the strongest persuader that the approachcouldbe more generallyfruitful and that the subject is even worth pursuing at all. Birger Hjørland http://www.db.dk/bh/home_uk.htmhas written http://www.db.dk/bh/Core%20Concepts%20in%20LIS/articles%20a-z/classification_of_the_sciences.htm"There is not today (2005), to my knowledge, any organized research program about the classification of the sciences in any discipline or in any country. As Miksa (1998) writes, the interest for this question largely died in the beginning of the 20th century." And the would-be classifier is up against a lot more than that. It seems that not a few researchers believe that classification of research is an unredeemablebane. Of course, I do think that the reason that Peirceans haven't attempted incorporations of contemporary fields into the Peircean classification, is that it's rather difficult. For instance, statistics seems to belong in cenoscopy, but it doesn't seem to belong within philosophy in any traditional sense. And what of information theory and its various areas? The problems involved are philosophical problems -- I think that they're to be solved philosophically. I doubt that stirring interest in people from various fields will do much to help various research fields "find their places" in the Peircean classification when those most familiar with the classification can't figure out how to place such well establishedand much written-about fieldsas probability theory, statistical theory, information theory, etc. within it. Of course I'm not against trying to stir other people's interest. But I think that it's just delaying the grappling with the philosophical problems. Regarding idiosyncrasy. You think my classification is idiosyncratic. I think that a side-by-side comparison of my classification with Peirce's would show that mine is not idiosyncratic and is actually more regular and systematic. With each of four major families of research, I associate a category -- Peirce doesn't do that at all -- a referential scope or 'quantity'-- Peirce doesn't do that -- and a typical inferential mode of conclusion -- Peirce does that only for mathematics. Crossing the families are inter-family bands of 'friendly cousins' based ultimately on such general and systematizable conceptions as those of relationshipsof 'one-to-one,' 'many-to-one,' 'one-to-many,' and 'many-to-many'. What those abtract and colorless characterizations amount to or correlate with, I try to sketchalong the first columnat the relevant rows.Meanwhile the attempt totrace outimplicit Peircean inter-family and inter-subfamily bands or patterns leads to that which Joe Ransdell has called the appearance of "derangement" in Peircean classification. Now, one can certainly believe that my classification is wrong, andsome years ago I put it through enough changes that the possibility of revising it again is quite real to me, and, one way or another, itcertainly is a work in
[peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate
Bill, Jim, list, [Bill] I pretty well agree with the following two paragraphs [by Jim, much further down now -- Ben]. I'd like to make some friendly amendments, however. I don't think one sign carries more evidential weight than another, but then I'm not clear on what you mean because I don't understand how abstraction is related nor what your conception of it is in the sentences below. Do you mean a visual experience of a the tree is more particularized in terms of data than the visual or auditory experience of the word tree? To say one of those is more or less abstract than the other seems strange to me. [Bill] What I miss in your post, and in Ben's response, is a fuller recognition of *usage* in sign function. You get to it at the end of first paragraph below, in connection with abstraction, but you need to put it to use at a more basic level. [Bill] I agree that all we know (or know that we know) is mediated by signs, including trees. We never apprehend the existential object we call tree. For my part, I'd need some more examples of what you mean by usage in sign function. I think you may be setting the bar too high for what constitutes apprehension of an existential object. If we never can apprehend an existent object, then we never can apprehend any existent signs of it, either. We apprehend an existent object as something which tends to withhold much of itself from us, some of it actual but hidden beneath surfaces, some of it hidden in potency. Some things which are not parts of the object can still be signs about the object. Creating or destroying those things does not, per se, augment or diminish the object. So they are not parts of the object. Some things which _are_ parts or samples of the object, can also be signs about the object. Whether the aspect or face of it which is patent to us is the object perspectivally viewed or is a sign about the object, is a matter of whether we are asking about the greater object a question on the basis of the patent aspect as a sign about it. In respect of such question, the patent aspect is a sign. Semiotic object, sign, etc., are roles in logic and inquiry, roles assigned in terms of inquirial relationships arising in the study of the given subject matter. [Bill] We have only instances of signs of treeness, which are not emitted by trees, but which we learn to use as signs. Our information processing system rather favors abstraction. The apprehension of a concrete object means 'intending' it as unabstracted, and means not intending some abstraction of it. It does not mean actually possessing all that information; it doesn't mean being able to make the tree's constituents all dance like puppets. It means possessing the relevant information for the given purpose, and it means that the object figures large enough to be counted as an object and as a significant source of semiotic determination. Apprehension is a bit vague of a word, or I would risk more on the question of actual contact with the object. You take the object as it comes to you -- nature's abstraction is not your abstraction. Abstraction decay are everywhere -- with matter and thermodynamics, everything is imperfectly represented in a sense. An object's parts are imperfectly represented to one another. How can it even be an object? If we flatly equate info-decrease, abstraction in every possible sense, and representation, then we will have let deep and fecund parallels become a wash of self-defeating skepticism, swirling down logical drains of infinite regressions, leading to...gee, I wish I could think of a way to continue this senetence. Anyway, now, if we want to generalize this beyond the concrete, it is still a question of forming a recognition of the thing, as it is, for what it is, in its establishedness and in its questions. The inverse of abstraction is to educe or produce information such that, in a sense, one has increased information, added it in. It may have been there implicitly, but it appears as novel. Life invests its world with variegated valuations, and these valuations are based in reality, yet depend on life for their meaning or being anything at all. Anyway, this inverse of abstraction corresponds to such processes as calculation, coding, extrapolation, curve-fitting, and image reconstruction, and to insight, understanding, and interpretation, the generation of the content of inference, if not the recognition, the actual inference to a conclusional judgment on the basis of confirmatory or corroboratory particulars. Abstraction usually means taking some info from an object and, in that sense, reducing the information, and forming a separate representation of the object, one intended not as interpretive of some other representation but rather as a representation taken straight from life, a representation meant to occasion interpretation rather than to complete it -- although semiosis could be
[peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate
of verification. I am not saying that I see your view in his exactly but rather that I seem to see some similarity with your view in his explication of it as being required in order to account for the universal as concrete rather than merely an abstraction. (Peirce does talk somewhere of concrete reasonableness as being a fourthness while denying at the same time that this introduces something not formally resolvable in terms of the other three factors. That is, I seem to recall this, but I can find nothing in my notes that says where that passage is. Does anyone else recall this, I wonder, or have I merely hallucinated it?) Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Friday, July 28, 2006 4:10 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate
Jim, list, [Ben] That signs and interpretations convey meaning, not experience or acquaintance with their objects, is not only Peirce's view but also the common idea of most people. For instance, most people might agree that expertise can sometimes be gained from books about their subject, but they will disagree that experience with the books' subjects can be gained from books. There is good reason for this. [Ben] The expertise consists of conveyable information from books. The experience involves dealing with and learning about the objects of experience in situations with actual consequences. Even in math, when you stop to think about it, you notice a big difference between reading about math problems and working those math problems yourself. [Jim] Dear Ben, [Jim] Thanks for another helpful and interesting post! [Jim] You seem to be saying that we can have two types of aquaintance with objects. Either we can experience objects directly without the mediation of signs or we can experience the meaning of objects (but not the entirety of the objects themselves) through signs. Before continuing I want to make sure I'm understanding you on this point. Does your notions of direct aqauintance with objects (unmediated by signs or the process of representation) provide one with knowledge of the objects meaning? Yes and no. No: Direct and unmediated don't mean the same thing. There's lots of sub-logical or sub-semiotic stuff going on. I don't mean illogical, instead I mean, not inference-processing. We perceive directly, but there's lots of mediation by things -- dynamic, material, biological -- which we don't perceive. Likewise in conscious experience there are contributions by unconscious inference processes. If we order by principles of knowledge, principles of how (on what basis, in what light) we know thing, then experience comes first. When we analyze experience, we start breaking it down into elements whereby we explain what we do experience. We can break experience down into, for instance, dynamic processes (in which I've said in the past that we should look for the involvement of 'inverse' or multi-objective optimization), material stochastic processes, and vegetable-level information processes. In idioscopy, if we order by explanatory principles then we will put physics first, as usual. If we order by knowledge principles, we will put inference processes first (in idiosocopy this means the sciences of intelligent life). The maths are typically ordered in the order of knowledge rather than an order of being -- ordered on principles of how (on what basis, in what light) we know things, and structures of order and deductive theory of logic are usually considered more basic and foundational. This is the opposite of the situation in idioscopy. Anyway, recognition, interpretation, representation, and objectification are elements in a logical a.k.a. semiotic process. If we order by explanatory principles aka the traditional order of being, which corresponds to the order of semiotic determination, then we explain by the object. Yet there is more than objects in semiosis, and there is more than forces and motion in the concrete world. Yes: One can experience things (1) as semiotic objects and (2) as signs and (3) as interpretants and (4) as recognitions. So make that four kinds of experience instead of two. I don't really think of it as resulting in four _kinds_ of experience, though. One can experience things as being, respectively, (1) sources of semiotic determination, (2) conveyers/facilitators/encodings of semiotic determination, (3) clarifiers/decodings of semiotic determination, and (4) establishers/recipients of semiotic determination. It can be noted here that, when Peirce says that by collateral experience he does not refer to experience with the sign system itself, he is not saying that there is no such thing as experience with the sign system itself. The most thorough confirmatory experience will be experience not exclusively of the object but also of the signs interpretants representing it, and indeed one checks that which was the immediate object as well. One checks one's assumptions, premisses, everything that one can. If one could not experience things as serving in all the various elementary semiotic roles, then it would severely limit semiosis's reflexivity, self-accessibility, self-testing power, its capacity to develop higher-order and meta structures (semiosis about semiosis itself, etc.). I regard higher-order structures as the rule, not the exception, in semiosis. E.g., I regard sciences and maths as disciplines of knowing in or on what light or basis one knows things; affective arts as disciplines of understanding in what effects one feels things; political, military, and power affairs as arenas of deciding (or its getting decided) who or what gets to decide things; etc., etc. So one can focus on a sign and treat
[peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate
Joe, list, I thought I was so concise that it was okay to pull the topic in my favorite direction, since it seemed brief. But I have to make some additions and corrections. Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wednesday, July 26, 2006 9:01 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate Joe, list, Thank you! Those quotes are both apropos and interesting in other ways. Excessively brief samples: Peirce: The point of contact is the living mind which is affected in a similar way by real things and by their signs. And this is the only possible point of contact. The mind alone recognizes sign and interpretant as corresponding to the real. Yet that mind's recognition of the signs' corresponding to the object is not the mind's sign for the object yet is the mind's _something_ regarding the object, something involving experience of the object. Maybe it's just that, experience, and experience is something outside semiosis, technically non-semiotic in that sense, and supporting semiosis by external pressure? (No, I don't think that, in case anybody is wondering :-)) and Peirce: 1. Truth belongs to signs, particularly, and to thoughts as signs. Truth is the agreement of a meaning with a reality. 2. The meaning -- to lekton -- is the respect in which signs which translate each other are conceived to agree. It is something independent of how the thing signified really is and depends only on what is conveyed to whoever interprets the sign rightly. Thirdness is reference to an interpretant. The interpretant is the sign's meaning. The meaning is the respect in which signs which translate each other are conceived to agree, and is independent of how the thing signified really is. ADDITION: Peirce wrote in 1870 of the meaning's independence from how the thing signified really is. I didn't look closely enough at that yesterday and I mistook the direction of the independence. He seems to have meant not the real's independence of yours and my opinion, but rather a determination of the interpretant by the sign but not by the real object. If that's what he meant, then obviously he later changed his mind, and discussed the object as determining the sign interpretant but as doing so in possibly a misleading way. However, one way or another, the interpretant, the meaning, is not the selfsame thing as the truth, the recognition-worthiness, or the recognition. (End of addition). BUT -- truth is the agreement of a meaning with a reality and _belongs to signs_. So signs have truth, soundness, legitimacy -- and it's not an non-semiotic issue; and it's not their meaning, value, etc., per se. It's a further relationship of meaning, a relationship to the real. Is truth a sign's being in 'real relation' to the object? Can an index -- when defined as a sign defined in particular cases by a real relation with its object -- be defined as sign defined in particular cases by its truth, its legitimacy, its deserving of recognition as true? This does seem a consequence of Peirce's view. CORRECTION: Actually, even when the index's definition includes not singularity but only real relatedness to its object, it is also specified that the index is in real relation with a singular, reactive/resistant object. No sign is defined as being in real relation with its object irrespectively of the object's category; it's as if a sign can be in real relation only with a singular. (End of correction) I've said in other posts why I don't think that this works for the index as usually conceived -- the index's representation of some other object is just as mistakable as an icon's representation of another object. ADDITION CORRECTION: To say that a sign is defined by its truth or legitimacy, is to say that it is a sign whose function is to establish or confirm or corroborate something. Also, a sign's being interpreted or even defined as verificatory (in whatever sense) doesn't prove that the sign _is_ verificatory, and a sign's being verified as verificatory may also be mistaken. The reason that an index is not nicely definable by its truth (or its truth about a singular) is not some supposedly implied infallibility, but instead that its pointing function is quite distinguishable from a verificatory function. Every sign has some sort of verificatory status, just as every sign has meaning, but to be defined as pointing is not the same thing as to be defined as verificatory. Nevertheless, it is useful to look at the idea, that the index must point to its object successfully, the idea the object must exist, or behave as the index indicates it to behave, in order for the index to be an index, as opposed to the idea that the index's supposed object must be supposedly existent, singular, reactive/resistant or behaving in a particular way. (End of addition correction
[peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate
Joe, list, Thank you for your response, Joe. Comments interspersed below. - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2006 1:29 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate [Joe] Ben says: I thought I was so concise that it was okay to pull the topic in my favorite direction, since it seemed brief. But I have to make some additions and corrections. [Joe] Ben, I hadn't read your latest message in responding to your earlier message as I do below, and am not sure whether your subsequent comments bear on what I say or not but will just go ahead and post them anyway. (I should add that the MS from which the quote you are commenting on is drawn was not completely quoted by me and what was omitted is perhaps pertinent to it, given the direction you went from it. I will perhaps post the whole thing separately in a later message.) [Joe] Ben says: ===QUOTE BEN Peirce: The point of contact is the living mind which is affected in a similar way by real things and by their signs. And this is the only possible point of contact. The mind alone recognizes sign and interpretant as corresponding to the real. Yet that mind's recognition of the signs' corresponding to the object is not the mind's sign for the object yet is the mind's _something_ regarding the object, something involving experience of the object. Maybe it's just that, experience, and experience is something outside semiosis, technically non-semiotic in that sense, and supporting semiosis by external pressure? (No, I don't think that, in case anybody is wondering :-)) ==END QUOTE=== [Joe] REPLY: [Joe] I wonder if in talking about correspondence, you are looking for something that just isn't to be found, Ben, namely, a statement of verification of a certain cognitive claim that is something other than a mere repetition of the same claim because it claims that the claim corresponds to the way the object actually is. (I say this in view of your opinion that confirmation or verification is a logically distinct factor that Peirce fails to take due account of as a logically distinct fourth factor in his category theory.) [Joe] Let us suppose that some person, P1, makes a certain knowledge claim, C1, about a certain object, O, namely, that O is F. And let us suppose that a second person, P2, makes a claim, C2, about that claim, saying, yes, O really is as P1 claims it is, namely, F. (In other words, he makes what may seem to be a verifying claim.) And suppose that P2's claim differs from P1's claim not as regards any difference in evidential basis for saying that O is F but only because C2 is about the relationship between claim C1 and O and their observed correspondence, whereas C1 is just about O. (In other words, P1 is merely saying that O is F whereas P2 is saying not only that O is F but also that P1 is saying that O is F and is therefore speaking the truth.) Supposing that the two persons are equivalent as regards their generally recognized status as people who try to speak the truth. [Joe] Question: Is P2's claim that P1 is speaking the truth a verification of P1's claim? Not in any strong sense. Instead it is assertion, a sign, claiming a verification. The moment we move the conception of verification to such a plane, we get away from what verification is about. Now, the assertion may be, for P2, a part, an outward growth of that verification, helping solidify and store it in his memory (years later P2 forgets the incident but sees his notation of his verification and, based on good experience -- i.e., pre-verified by past good experience -- with his own past notations about verifications, he counts the notation itself as verification). Whether it's a verification to anybody else depends on the evidentiary value which, based on experience, they assign to P2's assertions. In talking about verification, it is important to specify, for what mind. You're speaking of it as if it were a kind of universal act of verification, or an act of verification to mind of God or to the mind of the semiotician studying the scenario. The semiotician may take a stand as to whether C C2 are correct or not, or may treat the scenario as an example where the semiotician does not know whether they're true. Especially in the latter case the question arises of whether P2 took the proper measures in order to make a reasonably good (though not infallible) verification of C. Verificatory ( disconfirmatory) methods can be distinguished from interpretive methods. This doesn't mean that verification is merely a method. There is considerable singularness about verification, even in mathematics -- in diagrammatic observation. In constructing a model of it, we lose sight sometimes of the fact that we're talking about a relation of a model to a
[peirce-l] Re: MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate
Joe, list, The transcription of Peirce's re-write of the On a New List of Categories is exciting and valuable. For one thing, at last now we know what happened to the categories of Being and Substance. They're still there; he just no longer calls them categories. I've been kind of distracted lately (my neighborhood was one of those blacked out in Queens), but have electricity again and am following your posts with interest. Gary emailed me today and says that the conference in Denmark went quite well. Lots of positive support for trikonic with a number of particulars regarding that. And I don't think Gary will mind my quoting the following: 66~ High points included Nicola Guarino's invited talk..., Sowa's on Peirce's Contributions to the 21st Century, and perhaps especially perhaps the preeminent Danish Peirce scholar there, Frederik Stjernfelt's talk on Two Iconicity Notions in Peirce's Diagrammatology. Amongst the other papers the most note-worthy was Rudolf Wille's on the notion of replacing the notion of ontology in AI with semantology. Wille and I had some great conversations--he really is a fine scholar and an authentic Peircean. Correia's and Reinhard Poschel's strict mathematical proof of the reduction thesis was also a high point. John Old wants to use trikonic in relation to work he's doing with the on-line Roget's Thesaurus, and of course Simon is keeping me busy already, sending papers, etc. while the fire is still hot. ~99 Anyway, onward. Joe wrote, But why, as in the passage newly transcribed here, is this being ascribed to the sign in general rather than to the symbol in particular? I will return to that and other relevant considerations in another message. I had the impression that Peirce says somewhere that _every_ sign is a surrogate for its object, but I can't find it. It might be useful for somebody to do a search on the CD-ROM edition for the word surrogate. In ordinary English, one could say that insofar as a sign stands for its object in some respect, it is a surrogate for its object in that respect. A symbol serves as a surrogate not only for its object but for some unpresented quality or reaction or representational relation which is imputed to that object. Every sign has an effect on its interpretant, or has an effect which is the sign's interpretant. That's to say, that the sign (triadically with the object) determines the interpretant. The interpreter doesn't just make the interpretant up. But not every sign is defined by a habit-based effect on the interpretant. Either (1) the imputation involves a kind of effect, achieved through habit, where, through neither reactional connection (or, more generally, 'real relation') nor resemblance, the sign conjures up a kind of idea of a reaction or a resemblance, or of a representational relation which at some level involves reactiononal connections (or, more generally, 'real relations') and resemblances. or (2) the imputation is understood in another manner, one consistent at least with ordinary English, where, in addition to (1) above, also the interpretant imputes an index's reaction (or real relation) to the object, or an icon's quality to an object. It's a kind of word shortage, not enough words for the desired distinctions, or not enough words which actually evoke the desired distinctions in our minds. A month or two ago I spoke of the word evocant as something like a synonym for symbol, but in fact indices and icons evoke their objects too; Peirce says in one the quotes which you supply, that a sign calls up its object. If icon, index, and symbol all evoke their object, and if one can speak of 'imputation' of qualities and reactions actually presented as well as symbolized (though perhaps Peirce has supplied some such term as attribution for such presentmental cases), then the key difference remains that the symbol, not the index or icon, is _defined_ by its effect on the interpretant, which is to say, defined _by the effected imputation_ of a quality, reaction, or representational relation. It's also to say that the symbol is defined by its (non-reaction, non-quality) reference to an interpretant (more precisely: a given kind of symbol is defined by defining in terms of kind of effect on the interpretant) icon - defined by its quality, its reference to a ground. | symbol - defined by its (non-reaction, non-quality) reference to an interpretant. index - defined by its reaction (or real relation), its reference to an object. Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Tuesday, July 25, 2006 8:00 PM Subject: [peirce-l] MS 399.663f On the sign as surrogate What follows below is a transcription of a passage from Peirce's Logic Notebook, dated Nov. 1, 1909. (The ISP numbers of the two copy pages are MS 339.663 and 664, but 664 precedes 663 in the order of
[peirce-l] Re: The Guerri graph about some sign relations.
Jim, list, You got me thinking this time! Your comment below raises another related thought: I agree about nummbers as othernesses. Other is not unlike an ordinal form of the phrase more. What I meant to suggest in my earlier remarks was that other was akin to the notion of quantity as expressed in cardinal numbers and that the notion of sequence or order as expressed in ordinal numbers was perhaps more akin to the notion of thirdness, mediation, continuity and time. Otherness I associate with secondness which I was trying to suggest might be associated with the notion of quantity. These notions are far from clear in my mind but I think their interdependence (if in fact they are interdependent) may in part be explicated by Peirce's categories (as also be the source of some the disagreement as to whether or when a sign is a first or a third). Semiotic elements -- interpretant, semiotic object , sign -- are thirds. Each involves reference to an interpretant. That makes each a third. But, relative to each other, they are third, second, first, respectively. There is a thorny problem there, but it is not a problem of whether Peirce thought that they were third, second, first, respectively. The only people who disagree are people who don't even make clear whether they think (A) that Peirce _did not hold_ that they are third, second, first relatively to one another, or (B) that Peirce _wrongly held_ that they are third, second, first relatively to one another. They should clarify their view (e.g., by saying Peirce thought so and was wrong!; or Peirce didn't think so, Peirce never thought so!; or Wow, I just can't figure out what Peirce thought, he's so gnarly!; etc.) and defend it. Furthermore they might consider arguing in terms of the thorniest problem involved. The thorniest problem is the contrariness of semiotic determination with regard to the definitions of the categories. In Trichotomic: First is the beginning, that which is fresh, original, spontaneous, free. Second is that which is determined, terminated, ended, correlative, object, necessitated, reacting. Third is the medium, becoming, developing, bringing about. If the sign is a first relatively to its object and to its interpretant, then why is the sign semiotically determined by the semiotic object, instead of vice versa? Or why isn't the semiotic object the first? And the sign the second? One might say something like: A semiotic object, _as_ an object, has a phenomenological secondness, while the sign, which is in one sense or another, the available 'appearance,' has a kind of phenomenological firstness. But in terms of semiotic (a.k.a. logical) determination, the semiotic object is first and the sign is second. The phenomenological first is semiotically second, and the phenomenological second is semiotically first. I don't say that, but one has to say _something_, no? One of Gary Richmond's motivations for his vectors is in order to deal with that problem. So he says that the vector of semiotic determination is 2, 1, 3. And he's found bases for various vectors in Peirce's work. Involution, evolution, etc. Gary went where the fire is burning. There are some Peircean philosophers whom I much admire, but Gary is the only one of whom I'm aware who has tried to do something about the basic theoretical architecture. Not only that, he's keeping it as Peircean as possible. Some people may dismiss Gary's vectors, and as we know I take a whole other view of the matter, but for those who hold with Peirce's threes, the question is: If not Gary's vectors, then what? Are folks just going to let the semiotic triad lie there in disarray with the categories? Just get used to it? That problem won't just go away and probably is one of the things holding pragmaticism back. We can blame to our hearts' content the bottleneck-fondness of philosophers of the phenomenological epoche and the analytic linguistic turn, and there is indeed something wrong when philosophy's two biggest schools treat one bottleneck or the other as the port of entry to a bottle called philosophy, but I refuse to believe that philosophers are mostly lost seminarians. The pragmaticist conceptions of the semiotic triad and the categories are out of correlation. System-builders are out of fashion in philosophy, yet an encompassing and _consistent_ structure has broad appeal for good reason. Peirce would want his bones to live, not just be antiques polished preserved. Well, that's just my opinion, and Gary is in Denmark and too busy to caution me on my venting, and of course I want people to have an uncomfortable awareness of problems in Peirce because I've that whole other view of the matter. Taking up your remarks on quantity, What I meant to suggest in my earlier remarks was that other was akin to the notion of quantity as expressed in cardinal numbers and that the notion of sequence or order as expressed in
[peirce-l] Re: The Guerri graph about some sign relations.
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!Wilfred, My changing an other to another was merely a morphological correction. It's merely a rule in English. I'm not sure why it's a rule. Maybe it's because of the pronunciation. The n' in an is felt to be part of the other. For instance, sometimes people, especially children, will say a whole 'nother thing instead of a whole other thing. Best, Ben Udell Dear list, Since I will use some graph Claudio Guerri made for here on the list some while back (i asked him and he very kindly agreed), I asked Benjamin to restyle the graph of Claudio a bit. I again met the kindness of some great people here, and got some restyled version of Claudio’s graph from Benjamin in my mailbox just now. The graph is great now, although I sensed some difference between “ an other” and “another”. Which I guess there is, and I think I understand and explain this correct in my answer to Ben. I just post this answer here on the list since I think it might be interesting to the other list reviewers. Benjamin just stated “ another sign” instead of “an other sign” like it was mentioned and stated by Claudio in the original graph made by Claudio. Which is actually great to me, since for me this made me think about difference and got me more insight again into the graph and also semiotics. Kind regards, Wilfred -- Benjamin, Thank you a lot! Only small thing is that in the graph of Guerri there is mentioned “an other sign” instead of “another sign”. Although I kind of sense some difference between an other and another, I do not know whether there is ( I am too less into linguistics to judge that). But, actually, I think this is not that important in this context, should there be some small difference in meaning. Although I wonder an other might more stress that there is NOT a triadic relation between an other sign and the “a sign” and “a third sign”. Or there is. Depending on which aspect of the sign is meant. What I mean, is that an other sign might stress not on the tradic relation referred to while another does (in that sense, another instead of an other will be better if the relation is stressed, but an other sign would be better to stress the anothernesses (other kinds of triadic relations in signs). I do not know whether you understand what I am typing here, but for myself this kind of reasoning gave me some much clearer and better insights again ;-). In fact I have some additional explanations and insight to add to Claudio’s excellent graph. And it proves that graphs are indeed very useful for insight. Especially if you also “see” words as graphs (also the ones of CS) and take notion of anothernesses by means of some abduction processes. By the way, I will post this reply to your mail on the Peirce-L list. It may sound vague and I will just keep it that way for now ( have to add some insights to my dissertation first and show it after I promoted then J). But, it has to do a lot with insight in semiotics and Peirce a think. And a lot more. Kind regards, Wilfred --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: The Guerri graph about some sign relations.
Jim, I don't think that in fact you _would_ say "an...other serving" in order to mean "another kind of serving." I think that you're drawing right now on the sense of "other" in a sentence like "He was different, other" -- which is an unusual use of "other" but isclear enough to sustain its sense but only in such a sentence where it is clearly used as a predicate rather than as a adjectival or substantive pronoun.It's a use of"other" to mean that which "otherish" would mean if "otherish" existed. I think it really is a matter of diction and of making Claudio's graphicshow good English. One is supposed to write "another," not "an other," and, again, I think that this is because of pronunciation. We don't pronounce it "an-other," instead we pronounce it "a-nother." It gets split only if there's an intervening word like "whole" as in "a whole other issue." Because of the standard pronunciation "a-nother" the result is that in spoken English people say "a whole nother..." instead of "a whole other" The only time that one properly splits them without an intervening word is when one indicates vocal stress of "other" by itself apart from "an" along with the syllabification "an-other" -- as in "an other thing." But again, people actually say "another" or "a nother". One might call the spelling "another" a holding action against a redivision of the written word into "a nother." I agree about numbers as othernesses. "Other" isnot unlikean ordinal form of the phrase "more". Best, Ben - Original Message - From: "Jim Piat" [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Friday, July 14, 2006 2:28 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The Guerri graph about some sign relations. Dear Ben, Wilfred-- Since much of this discussion has focused on the issue of nominal (categorical) and ordinal (sequential) distinctions, it occurs to me to mention that "an other" and "another" can (I think) be sometimes used to emphasize this distinction."Another" is sometimes used to emphasizes a reference to something that is a second, further or additional something; whereas, "an other" is sometimes used to place more emphasis upon the distinctiveness between two somethings. For example if I wanted a second helping of food I might ask for "another" helping, where as if I wanted a different type of food I might ask for "an other" serving or entree.I may be wrong about the above and mention it not to dispute anyone's anyone's intepretation of these _expression_, but merely suggest that the question at the heart of this discussion is indeed a deep one and not merely question of diction. In what sense Peirce's categories represent nominal verses ordinal modes of being remains unclear to me. Perhaps his categories hold the key to riddle of quality verses quantity as well oridinal vs cardinal numbers.I guess my point is that for me this discussion of what mode of being are signs has been very helpful to me. Not for any definitive conclusion that have been reached but for the issues that have been raised. For example, I'm just now wondering if there is some value in considering the parallels between Firtness and quality, Secondness and quantity, and Thirdness and sequence --- self, an other, another.Otherness in itself may be adequate to account for quantity in as much as the notion of "and" seem implicit in the notion of "otherness" as for example a self "and" and an other self constitutes otherness. So that quantitity is implicit in other-others. Likewise time as Peirce oft cited examplar of Thirdness par excellence carries within it the notion of sequence or order among others.Just wondering.Cheers,Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Jim, list,
I'm not sure at this point what more limited conclusion it is that we're
talking about!
Generally speaking, I don't have a view on any logical valence numbers's
being sufficient or necessary for all higher-valence relations. But I'm a bit
doubtful that Peirce's trichotomism triadism are an artefact of his not
considering hyperspaces.
The only case of which I know where a "minimum adicity" makes really clear,
really simple sense to me is that of Feynman diagrams of which it's said that
the "minimum possible event" involves two triadic vertices. I'm able to make
sense of it because it's specified that to be such an "event," an interaction
has to be capable of showing the conservation of quantities.The
corresponding idea in semiosis might not be that of some sort of conservation,
however. I would consider that some sort of evolution must be showable. The
interpretant is merely a development, a hopeful monster, a construal. Triadic
semiosis has no way to learn and keep learning to distinguish sense from
nonsense. Real evolution involves not merely development of construals, but
their testing against the reality which they supposedly represent.
As to tetrads, I just say that, in whatever sense an
interpretant-sign-object relationship can't be reduced to some strictly dyadic
sign-object relationship, so, likewise, in that sense, a
recognition-interpretant-sign-object relationship can't be reduced to a strictly
triadic interpretant-sign-object relationship. Since a collaterally based
recognition is logically determined by its correlates and logically determines
semiosis going forward, it is a semiotic element. Since it is as experience of
the object, that it is a collaterally based recognition, it is neither sign of
the object nor interpretant of the object. If it were the object itself, then
neither sign nor interpretant would be needed. It is indistinct from the
interpretant only when the sign is indistinct from the object; in which case all
four are indistinct from one another. (The interpretant's elucidation of 'fresh'
info about the object implies a distinction or divergence between sign
object.) We are sufficiently code-unbound to be able to test our signs,
interpretants, and systems and "codes" of interpretation. This involves
collateral experience. No degree of elucidation, interpretation, or construal,
is a substitute for (dis-)confirmation, whereby wetake over the task of
biological evolution andlessen our risk of being removed from the gene
pool as penalty for a bad interpretant.
As regards 4-chotomies, some significant ones are transparently logical and
are not subject to any useful kind of trichotomization that I can see. Other
4-chotomies are more or less established, e.g., the special-relativistic light
cone, which is a ubiquitous physical instance of a general structure which one
might revise to a 5-chotomy or even a 6-chotomy; a trichotomization would be the
division into past, present, future, but this is crude for some purposes,
including the understanding of communication. Information theory has its
division into source, encoding, decoding, and recipient, often compared with
that of semiotics up to the stage of "interpretant = decoding." However the
comparison fails at the fourth stage (the recipient) and thereby renders quite
suspect the comparison as a whole. The collaterally based recognition
("recognizant"), however,is what correlates to the info-theoretic
recipient. (Note: Information theory also places channels between the stages,
especially between encoding decoding.)
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Jim Piat
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Sent: Tuesday, July 04, 2006 12:37 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign -
help!
Ben wrote:
A 3-D object can be so rotated in 4-D space as to turn it
opposite-handed. I remember an episode of the original _Outer Limits_
about it -- some man ended up with two right hands :-).
My response:
Thanks, Ben. I'm not surprised to hear from
you on this issue four-most importance. But so quickly -LOL. Well
if you are right (and I imagine you are) it seems to me that this would shed
some doubt on the universality of Peirce's claim regarding the nature of
triads being sufficient to account for all higher order relations. Still
I think the result holds for three dimensional space (especially with respect
to the issue of sterio-isomers requiring in principle only three groups to
establish their handedness. Would you agree with this latter more
limited conclusion? I recall a similar discussion on list years back
when the question of whehter Peirces conclucions regarding the sufficiency of
triads was merely an artifact of the the fact that we lived in three
dimensional space and someone said that the issue had been addressed by some
mathematicians and apparently "those" mathematicians felt Peirce was
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Claudio, Patrick, list,
That object for which truth stands doesn't sound fully like Peirce. But
Peirce did say that truth is of a predicate, proposition, assertion, etc. ; a
true predicate corresponds to its object. Inquiry seeks to arrive at true signs
about the real.
66~~~ ('A Sketch of Logical Critics', EP 2.457-458, 1911) ~~~
To say that a thing is _Real_ is merely to say that such predicates as are
true of it, or some of them, are true of it regardless of whatever any actual
person or persons might think concerning that truth. Unconditionality in that
single respect constitutes what we call Reality.[---] I call truth the
predestinate opinion, by which I ought to have meant that which _would_
ultimately prevail if investigation were carried sufficiently far in that
particular direction.
~~99
Lots of Peirce quotes on truth and reality are at
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html
Lo is an old-fashioned word, now generally obsolete, used to attract
attention or express wonder or surprise, and now used with at least some
quaintness of effect. It now seems oftenest encountered in the phrase Lo and
behold. The Online Etymology Dictionary says
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=losearchmode=none that lo is from
Old English _la_, exclamation of surprise, grief, or joy, influenced in M.E. by
_lo!_, short for _lok_ look! imperative of _loken_ to look.
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: Claudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 10:25 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Patrick, List,
Patrick wrote the 28 June:
I like to start out from Peirce's definition of the real as that object for
which truth stands
I could not find this definition in the CP... could you tell from where you got
it?
I found this one, closely related:
CP 1.339 [...] Finally, the interpretant is nothing but another representation
to which the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its
interpretant again. Lo, another infinite series.
(I imagine that Lo is So)
Thanks
Claudio
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Interesting remarks, including but not limited to those by Peirce. Maybe I should add that I find it difficult to believe that anyone has actually been able to read all of the way through Calvino's practical joke of a book! It's also difficult to believe that anyone eats all the way through a rich, multi-layered Italian pastry. And yet, we do (usually). Kidding aside, I have literally no idea why Joe says it's difficult to believe that anybody could read all the way through it. Too much coherence? Too much mix of coherence and incoherence? Now, it's fun to try to work a certain amount of seeming incoherence into one's writing. Conversations, for instance, don't have to be written as give take where speakers understand or even address each other's previous remarks in any direct way. It's a literary technique, or challenge, which one sees here and there. _Teitlebaum's Window_ by Wallace Markfield has some of it. Some of the conversations in _Mulligan Stew_ by Gilbert Sorrentino. In real life, of course, that kind of talk is often motivated by evasiveness. One year at a Thanksgiving dinner, a relative asked a question about another relative, a question which those of us in the know didn't want to answer. So I answered that the reason why the relative in question had gone to California (we're in NYC), was in order to buy some shoes. There followed about an hour's worth of purposely non-responsive conversation by all the relatives, both those in the know and those not in the know (conversation which really confused some of the non-family guests), which was really jokes, puns, whatever we could muster. But the point wasn't incoherence, but, instead, unusual coherences intensified and brought into relief against the lack of some usual kinds of coherence. Years ago I read a newspaper column doing this, by Pete Hamill of all people, and it was really pretty funny. Also don't miss _t zero_ with The Origin of Birds. Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thursday, June 29, 2006 11:13 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! Michael said: [MD:] Haven't had the pleasure of Calvino's Cosmicomics, [but] I like the antidotal sound of it [cure for hyper-seriousness]. The asymptotic/singularities of beginnings and endings in continuous processes challenge all systems that allow for them, and do make for pretzelian thought-processes. But I note that the final chapter of David Deutsch's very creative The Fabric of Reality: The Science of Parallel Universes and Its Implications is titled The Ends of the Universe, which posits an asymptotic end of the universe(s) [actually, a sort of coming together of all the infinite parallel quantum universes a la Wheeler and co], which in part prompted the parallel question on the denouement in Peirce's cosmology. But, you're right, Joe: I think I'll retreat to Calvino. I never really recovered from trying to conceptualize the cosmological stew that preceded the sporting emergence of Firstness. RESPONSE: [JR:] Well, I'm not sure what the moral of it is supposed to be, Michael. I put all that down rather impulsively, not thinking much about what might justify it or what it might imply. In retrospect I think that what I was doing was trying to re-express what I thought Peirce was expressing in the following passage from the MS called Answers to Questions Concerning my Belief in God which Harshorne and Weiss published in the Collected Papers, Vol. 6: ==QUOTE PEIRCE 508. Do you believe Him to be omniscient? Yes, in a vague sense. Of course, God's knowledge is something so utterly unlike our own that it is more like willing than knowing. I do not see why we may not assume that He refrains from knowing much. For this thought is creative. But perhaps the wisest way is to say that we do not know how God's thought is performed and that [it] is simply vain to attempt it. We cannot so much as frame any notion of what the phrase the performance of God's mind means. Not the faintest! The question is gabble. 509. Do you believe Him to be Omnipotent? Undoubtedly He is so, vaguely speaking; but there are many questions that might be put of no profit except to the student of logic. Some of the scholastic commentaries consider them. Leibnitz thought that this was the best of all possible worlds. That seems to imply some limitation upon Omnipotence. Unless the others were created too, it would seem that, all things considered, this universe was the only possible one. Perhaps others do exist. But we only wildly gabble about such things. ==END QUOTE= [JR:] But wildly gabbling doesn't necessarily mean utterly senseless, as I was exaggeratedly construing it, but might only mean that what we are saying or thinking becomes seriously and irremediably
[peirce-l] Re: Syntax and grammar of the signs
Robert, list, Robert's "The Syntax of a Class of Signs" (scroll down to see) is interesting. Robert might helpfully clarify a few things. 1. Robert's conclusion is "We can define the syntax of a classe of signs as the part of the lattice of the ten classes of signs situated below this class. Then, the complete lattice appears as the grammar of signs." At least at first glance, given that the foregoing discussion was about the syntaxes of classes of signs, shouldn'tthe conclusion be "... Then the complete lattice appears as the *syntax* of signs" [emphasis added] ? I don't know how Peirce defined "grammar." In looking around the Web, the definitions oftenest mention grammar as involving morphology and syntax. It's not clear to me that the lattice accommodates all such distinctions as those involving kinds of hypoicons (images, diagrams, metaphors), etc. If the lattice doesn't accommodate their distinctions, then Robert might want to call that "morphology" and thus confine the lattice to syntax. I'm improvising here, though, so I don't know what I'll think about it tomorrow. Meanwhile, The Century Dictionary gives for "grammar" http://www.leoyan.com/century-dictionary.com/03/index03.djvu?djvuoptspage=819: 66~~ 1. A systematic account of the usages of a language, as regards especially the parts of speech it distinguishes, the forms and uses of infiected words, and the combinations of words into sentences; hence, also, a similar account of a group of languages, or of all languages or language in general, so far as these admit a common treatment. The formerly current classification of the subjects of grammar as fivefold, namely, _orthography_, _orthoëpy_, _etymology_, _syntax_, and _prosody_, is heterogeneous and obsolescent. The first and last do not belong really to grmnmar, though often for convenience included in the text-books of grammar; _orthoëpy_ is properly phonology or phonetics, an account of the system of sounds used by a language and of their combinations; and _etymology_ is improperly used for an account of the parts of speech mid their inflections. See these words. Abbreviated _gram._ [examples] 2. Grammatical statements viewed as the rules of a language to which speakers or writers must conform; propriety of linguistic usage; accepted or correct mode of speech or writing. [examples] 3. A treatise on grammar. Hence--4. An account of the elements of any branch of knowledge, prepared for teaching or learning; an outline or sketch of the principles of a subject: as, a grammar of geography; a grammar of art.--5. The formal principles of any science; a system of rules to be observed in the putting together of any kind of elements. [examples] Comparative grammar, grammatical treatment of a number of languages, compariug their phenomena in order to derive knowledge of their relations and history or to deduce general principles of language. ~~99 2. The thought that, by Robert's standard, the syntax of arguments is the same thing as "the grammar [or syntax] of signs," got me to thinking about the qualisign at the other extreme. The qualisign would just be by itself. Can that be right? This may be a question of phrasing. The qualisign has, in Robert's sense, minimal syntax proper to it, but the qualisign is involved in the syntax of all other signs. So, one might distinguish between, for instance, the syntax of the involvent dicisign and the syntax of the involute dicisign. 3. Is Robert saying that the lattice contains all the distinct information needed to generate the essentials of a paragraph like the one which he quotes from Peirce? Are all such conceptions as those of the replica adequately implied? Now, I don't know whether he would be going too far with such claims. But I'm wondering whether that's basically what Robert is claiming. Incidentally, I recreated the graphic imagesas monochrome bitmaps, which Marty is free to use without attribution if he wants them. I recreated them because I assumed that the originals were the cause ofhis rtf (rich text file)'s being so large (around 850KB). But then I found that, in fact, his graphic imagesare quite low-KB -- jpgs ranging from 3KB to 11KB. However, the rtf stored them in a way that made the file very large. I guess that's what rtfs do. Replacement with the monochrome bitmaps reduced the rtf filesize from around 850KB to around 72KB. The monochrome bitmaps themselves are 0.842KB, 2.21KB, 3.38KB. Best, Ben Udell THE SYNTAX OF A CLASS OF SIGNS [Robert Marty]. http://www.univ-perp.fr/see/rch/lts/marty/lattices/Lattice-CP.rtf[Marty also directs attention to http://www.univ-perp.fr/see/rch/lts/marty/lattices/Lattice-CP.rtf] On two occasions in the texts on the ten classes of signs 2-254 to 2-263 Peirce talk of the syntax of a class : First in 2-257 concerning the Dicent Sinsign [ 2® 2® 2 ] he write : "Such a Sign must involve an Iconic Sinsign [ 2® 1® 1 ] to embody the
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc, list It is unfortunate that Peirce used the terms 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' in the place of ordinals when he used the same vocabulary for the categories. In the texts that you chose the terms do not refer to categories, they simply refer to 3 things presented in a given order, as in the English language, when you say: first I will make some coffee, secondly I will get some bread and thirdly I'll eat breakfast. No. Wrong. Referring to a First and a Second and a Third is _not_ normal English and certainly not normal written English. It distinctively coheres, rather glaringly to anybody fluent in English, with the specific sense lent to that set of forms by Peirce. Peirce's manner of using those ordinal words is so distinctly un-English that one sees whole discussions about Peirce which avoid quoting him saying such things, because it sounds strange in English. One cannot deduce from that that making coffee is firstness, getting some bread is secondness and that eating breakfast in thirdness If the sign was a First as you commented on CP 2-274 according to the cenopythagorean category Firstness, how would you explain that the sign taken in itself can be a quality (a First), an existent (a Second) or of the nature of a law (a Third)? It can be a First, a Second, etc., in various ways and respects. This is elementary stuff in Peirce. At this point, I honestly think that you are grasping at straws. I'm sorry, but it's over. Best, Ben Udell --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker! 66~~ *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.* ~~99 Normal English? With capitalization of the ordinals, no less? In English we would say a given thing, a second thing, etc. English is characterized by intransigent normalcy. So Peirce is going to use some capitalized ordinals without explicit referents, as if he were talking about Firsts, Seconds, Thirds in the usual Peirce way, in order to say simply something, another thing, and a third thing? Peirce is complicated but he is not sadistic toward the reader. The Sign's correlate, when no further specification is provided, is the Object. On a New List of Categories: Secondness is reference to a correlate. The Object is the Correlate is the Second. On a New List of Categories: Thirdness is reference to an interpretant. The Interpretant is the Third. Argh, Ben, on three glasses of wine - Original Message - From: Jim Piat [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:12 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list-- For what its worth, it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms first, second and third in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as Jean-Marc suggests merely a way of indicating the three elements involved when (A) Something --a sign, (B) stands for Something -an object, (C) to something -- an interpretant. I think it is mistaken to suppose a sign (as a function) is a example of a Peircean Firstness. A sign (as I understand the matter) is pre-eminently an example of Pericean Thirdness. OTOH is also seems to me (as Ben and others are suggesting) that Peirce's trichotomies of signs are in some fundamental way related to his categories and less arbitrary than it seems to me that Jean-Marc is suggesting. But I make both of the above comments mainly from the standpoint of an interested bystander who is both enjoying and learning from this interesting discussion which I hope will continue. That said, I am somewhat puzzled by what Peirce means when he refers to a sinsign as not actually functioning as a sign and yet having the characteristics of a sign. The only tentative explanation I can come up with is that for Peirce all that we conceive or experience (and thus all we can or do speak of ) are signs. So to speak of a quality is necessarily not to speak of a qaulity iself (because by defintions qualities are in or as themselves non existant) but to speak of the sign of a quality. IOWs a sinsign is something that stands for a quality that stands for something to something. And since this is more or less open forum I'd like to comment on a special interest of mine and that is the logic of disagreements but I will do that in a separate post. Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc, list, I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty obvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 classes depends on the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the trichotomies are ordered (or orderable) in a Peircean categorial way, specifically: the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. If one incorporates this ordering of the trichotomies into the ordering of the classes, then one ends with a complete ordering of the classes. One can also so prioritize as to arrive simply at the partially ordered lattice. This is at least partly a matter of whether one prioritizes the Peircean category of the trichotomy (the ordinality of the parameter) or the Peircean category of the term IN the trichotomy (the ordinality of the parametric value). How does one decide? Well, one looks at it both ways, both ways have their illuminative aspects, so one ends up finally not choosing one way dispensing permanently with the other way. So there seems to be some optionality in how one orders these things. Jean-Marc, however, seems to believe that the ordering question is quite determinate, and leads inevitably to the partial ordering. He does this by dismissing without analyzing the certainly very categorial appearance of the ordering of the trichotomies. Certainly Peirce was quite conscious of this categorial structure of the trichotomies, since his 10-ad of trichotomies is obviously an attempt to extend that structure. Where most Peirceans seem to regard this matter as settled and fairly simple, Jean-Marc differs, which is his right. But I don't see in any of this thread where Jean-Marc addresses what certainly appears to be a Peircean categorial orderability of the trichotomies. Instead he has merely asserted that they are like categories of male/female and old/young, and he has not actually pursued a comparison of his example with the Peircean trichotomies in order to argue for his counter-intuitive assertion. So I think that we're still awaiting an argument. If this argument is supposed to be in Robert Marty's book, then perhaps Jean-Marc can summarize it. If Jean-Marc is unprepared to do that, perhaps Robert can do it. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Jean-Marc Orliaguet [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 9:15 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) gnusystems wrote: I'd like to second what Joe says here, [[ but my own interest in the classification system is not with what can be learned from it by manipulating graphical models of it but with understanding what use it might have when it comes to understanding how to apply it in the analysis and understanding of distinctively philosophical problems such as have formed the staple of philosophical concern from the time of the Greeks on. I wonder if anyone knows of any attempts to do that. ]] Specifically, i'm wondering what this classification of signs can contribute to the old but still vexed problem of characterizing the cognitive gap between humans and other animals. One has to put gap in quotation marks because no one seriously doubts the continuity of the evolutionary process which has produced human cognition (though some see more leaps in the process than others do). There has been some empirical progress on this problem recently -- in fact i'm now reviewing a recent book on exactly that, for the Journal of Consciousness Studies -- but interpreting the data remains a problem of philosophical concern; and the same goes for the cognitive development process of individual humans. The origin-of-language problem is one aspect of this. In this light, Joe's (or any) ordinal numbering of Peirce's tenfold classification looks much like a developmental sequence. Part of the resemblance is that if we look at the two ends of the sequence, there's no question about which is which. Adult humans are capable of handling arguments, while human infants and adult monkeys are not; and i would presume that qualisigns are implicit in sentience itself. But ordering the steps or stages in between is much more problematic, both logically and empirically. [...] precisely, there isn't a linear sequence connecting qualitative knowledge and symbolic knowledge. This is what the lattice structure tells you. There are several paths instead of a linear sequence between 1 and 10. this is described in Marty's book - in the chapter about the correlation between the lattice and knowledge, epistemology, etc. There is also a comparison with Piaget's different stages of intellectual development. see the original article in: S¨miotique de l'¨pist¨mologie SEMIOSIS 10 (1978), Agis Verlag, Baden Baden,
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc, list, Let me add that, while I don't think that you will succeed in presenting the argument for which I think I've shown the need, my characterization of your assertions as being not yet an argument is not itself a mere rhetorical move. A few years ago, I said that you had not presented a strong enough argument as to why the term triad should be restricted to the threesome of tri-valently referring to one another and themselves, while trichotomy should be restricted to three-fold divisions of terms not related by references _to_ one another. If I recall correctly, I said I leaned toward the terminological distinction but that I wasn't convinced that it should be a hard and fast rule. You then presented to another peirce-lister a very strong argument, via substituting one of these words for the other in a passage by Peirce, showing that the passage then deteriorated into nonsense. That convinced me both of the distinction's value and of Peirce's own recognition of its value (though, if I recall correctly, I said nothing at the time because you seemed gratuitously passionate against your interlocutor), and since then I've adhered (or tried to adhere) to the distinction. In fact I think that acceptance of this terminological distinction has become pretty common, if not universal, on peirce-l. Basically, you won. I would still argue that each triad is also a trichotomy, but for most practical purposes of discussion, it's simpler to speak simply of triads versus trichotomies, and I once even suggested the term triastic to serve instead of 'trichotomy' as the genus where of 'trichotomy' (in the narrower sense) and 'triad' would be the species, but nobody seemed to like that word (I think it's a good candidate for the three word in the series monistic, dualistic). Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 11:36 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Jean-Marc, list, I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty obvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 classes depends on the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the trichotomies are ordered (or orderable) in a Peircean categorial way, specifically: the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. If one incorporates this ordering of the trichotomies into the ordering of the classes, then one ends with a complete ordering of the classes. One can also so prioritize as to arrive simply at the partially ordered lattice. This is at least partly a matter of whether one prioritizes the Peircean category of the trichotomy (the ordinality of the parameter) or the Peircean category of the term IN the trichotomy (the ordinality of the parametric value). How does one decide? Well, one looks at it both ways, both ways have their illuminative aspects, so one ends up finally not choosing one way dispensing permanently with the other way. So there seems to be some optionality in how one orders these things. Jean-Marc, however, seems to believe that the ordering question is quite determinate, and leads inevitably to the partial ordering. He does this by dismissing without analyzing the certainly very categorial appearance of the ordering of the trichotomies. Certainly Peirce was quite conscious of this categorial structure of the trichotomies, since his 10-ad of trichotomies is obviously an attempt to extend that structure. Where most Peirceans seem to regard this matter as settled and fairly simple, Jean-Marc differs, which is his right. But I don't see in any of this thread where Jean-Marc addresses what certainly appears to be a Peircean categorial orderability of the trichotomies. Instead he has merely asserted that they are like categories of male/female and old/young, and he has not actually pursued a comparison of his example with the Peircean trichotomies in order to argue for his counter-intuitive assertion. So I think that we're still awaiting an argument. If this argument is supposed to be in Robert Marty's book, then perhaps Jean-Marc can summarize it. If Jean-Marc is unprepared to do that, perhaps Robert can do it. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Jean-Marc Orliaguet [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 9:15 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) gnusystems wrote: I'd like to second what Joe says here, [[ but my own interest in the classification system is not with what can be learned from it by manipulating graphical models of it but with understanding what use it might have when it comes to understanding how to apply
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Joe, list, I would add a heuristic value to the mnemonic value which Joe discusses. The diagrams can bring patterns to light which we might otherwise miss. I think that Gary will want to address this, but I'll resist the opportunity to steal his thunder. More generally, I think that Joe is asking a very fair where's the beef? kind of question, a generalized form of the question which I think Jerry Chandler asked only too narrowly, why are these terms important to understanding human communication, to which I responded in part that their applicability would be much broader and include application in metaphysics. Where's the beef? It's not a question of whether the classes lack the beef of illuminative applicability, rather more a question of how much actual productive work has been done. One could point out that one obvious move to bring such work into relief, would be simply to point out where actual work in rhetoric, the rhetoric of politics, and in metaphysics, may be considered to be using the legisigns qualisign, sinsign, legisign and the rest, though in other vocabularies. That was partly what I was tending to do in my response to Jerry Chandler. After all, is not the classification of signs part of an organon, a toolbox? But pragmaticism is not merely a toolbox of tools neutral inert till somebody exploits them, one way as good as another; it's not just the hotel or valet or whatever for various research fields. There is to exploit the dynamic of sign-classificational relations, with an eye to sign classes' 'form-generative' _content_. I think that Joe is getting at something like that. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 12:23 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) The numbers can be ignored altogether as far as I am concerned, or one could use, say, the Greek alphabet instead of numbers or just leave the numbers off. All that is important for me is the class names and the understanding that it is presuppositiional from the top down, which could be shown by using down-pointing arrows for connective lines. The use I would have for the figure doesn't require that it have the properties required to transform it in the various ways graph theory requires. For my purposes its use is primarily as a mnemonic for remembering what presupposes what. so that if, in the process of analyzing a bit of discourse, say, one has identified something as being of this class or that one knows ipso facto that a sign of this or that other class is either presupposed by it or presupposes it, directly or indirectly.. I imagine the use of it to be that of being able to figure out what is going on in or going wrong with some actual bit of persuasive argumentation, in a very broad sense of argumentation in which even a work of visual art or a piece of music might be thought of as being constructed argumentatively, supposing one can make good on the prospect of being able to understand artworks\as arguments, coherent or incoherent. The application of this sort of thing to infrahuman life would be via the collapse of genuine into degenerate forms (in the special sense of degeneracy Peirce uses), the elimination of levels of reflection, and whatever other modifications are necessary to account for higher developments of life. This view of its use could conceivably be at odds with Peirce's own aims in devising graphical representations of the classes, which might require that the graphs have the properties you require of them because his aim was to be able to learn some things simply from manipulating the graphs in various ways. But it seems to me that something gets lost there. Perhaps something of great philosophical interest will result from the use of graph theory, but focus on what that might yield could be at the expense of what is lost by conforming to its constraints where there is no need to do so since all one needs is a graphical representation for mnemonic and other intuitional purposes. I am not at present aware of what may in fact have been accomplished philosophically with the use of graph theory, but I can imagine it being of interest for a great many other purposes which, for all I know, may be far more important than the philosophical ones. Moreover, I am not saying that what has been done has no philosophical interest but only that I am not myself aware of any such results from it -- and I lay no claim to being well informed about it, which I am not.. I \am just saying that what interests me does not seem to require anything more than I indicate above. Anyway, one thing that occurs to me when I note that Peirce's trek through the presuppositional order in 2.254 through 2.263 begins with quality and ends with the argument is that it seems comparable to
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc, I spoke of the three trichotomies, not the five or six or ten. If you don't address what's said, why do you bother sending posts to a place like peirce-l? If you do not address this structure, specifically, the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. then I think that you lose this argument by sheer default. Best, Ben UDell. - Original Message - From: Jean-Marc Orliaguet [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 1:48 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Benjamin Udell wrote: Jean-Marc, list, I don't even agree in the end with Peirce's classification but it's pretty obvious that whether one partially or totally orders the 10 classes depends on the criteria. And it's pretty obvious that the trichotomies are ordered (or orderable) in a Peircean categorial way, specifically: the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. If one incorporates this ordering of the trichotomies into the ordering of the classes, then one ends with a complete ordering of the classes. One can also so prioritize as to arrive simply at the partially ordered lattice. This is at least partly a matter of whether one prioritizes the Peircean category of the trichotomy (the ordinality of the parameter) or the Peircean category of the term IN the trichotomy (the ordinality of the parametric value). How does one decide? Well, one looks at it both ways, both ways have their illuminative aspects, so one ends up finally not choosing one way dispensing permanently with the other way. So there seems to be some optionality in how one orders these things. Jean-Marc, however, seems to believe that the ordering question is quite determinate, and leads inevitably to the partial ordering. He does this by dismissing without analyzing the certainly very categorial appearance of the ordering of the trichotomies. Certainly Peirce was quite conscious of this categorial structure of the trichotomies, since his 10-ad of trichotomies is obviously an attempt to extend that structure. Where most Peirceans seem to regard this matter as settled and fairly simple, Jean-Marc differs, which is his right. But I don't see in any of this thread where Jean-Marc addresses what certainly appears to be a Peircean categorial orderability of the trichotomies. Instead he has merely asserted that they are like categories of male/female and old/young, and he has not actually pursued a comparison of his example with the Peircean trichotomies in order to argue for his counter-intuitive assertion. So I think that we're still awaiting an argument. If this argument is supposed to be in Robert Marty's book, then perhaps Jean-Marc can summarize it. If Jean-Marc is unprepared to do that, perhaps Robert can do it. Best, Ben Udell Which Peirceans are you thinking of? I'll tell you about the Peirceans, concerning the ordering of the trichotomies. First Peirce, among the Peirceans, gives over the years five different orderings of the trichotomies. Beginning with the triad (S, S-Od, S-If), then continuing with the 6 trichotomies (1904 and 1908) in different orders and the finally with the ten trichotomies (letter to Lady Welby 1908 and 8-344) yet again in different orders - This is summarized on page 231 of Marty's book. None of the orderings are the same, by the way. This is for Peirce's account. Then two other authors Lieb (1977) and Kawama (1976) listed in the same table propose a different ordering of the 10 trichotomies. Marty also mentions on the same page that Jappy proposed a non-linear ordering of the trichotomies. Then Marty claimed that some of the trichotomies are redundant. (this is summarized in a mail dated 2006/06/16 sent to peirce-l which you most likely overlooked.) which would not yield to 66 classes of signs but only 28. Bernard Morand however claims that there is no redundancy and that each trichotomy is independent. is this what you call settled and fairly simple? I think you have a very simplified understanding of these issues. Best /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc, You've evaded the question again. So, we can take your default as your tacit admission that you don't grasp even the appearance of the categorial correlations with the three trichotomies. I suppose that this tacit admission of yours is better than nothing, but it is really quite an astonishing admission for you to have made. It's not particularly illuminating of the philosophical topic when the interlocutor simply abandons the field, but I'll take the win. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Jean-Marc Orliaguet [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2006 2:19 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Benjamin Udell wrote: Jean-Marc, I spoke of the three trichotomies, not the five or six or ten. If you don't address what's said, why do you bother sending posts to a place like peirce-l? If you do not address this structure, specifically, the 1st trichotomy pertains to the sign's own category, the 2nd to the category in which the sign refers to its object, and the 3rd to the category in which the sign entails its interpretant. then I think that you lose this argument by sheer default. Best, Ben UDell. the same three trichotomies that you mention also appear also in the 6 and the 10 trichotomies in a different order. you obviously don't understand what you are writing about. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Jean-Marc: In reading Joe's response to you, I am reminded that you still haven't taken a stand on the three main trichotomies and their categorial correlations. If you do in fact understand the correlations, you may feel that it destroys your argument to admit that you understand them. But then it comes to the same thing. Then I caught this remark of yours: Then Marty claimed that some of the trichotomies are redundant. (this is summarized in a mail dated 2006/06/16 sent to peirce-l which you most likely overlooked.) which would not yield to 66 classes of signs but only 28. Far from overlooking it, I responded to it, and am still awaiting Robert's reply. I append it directly below. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Friday, June 16, 2006 12:28 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: redundancies of trichotomies Robert, list, Bernard Morand mention in a message my assertion claimed in my book "L'alg¨bre des signes" according to many trichotomies among the 10 trichotomies are redundant. Here are my arguments, exposed on the case of the trichotomie number IV concerning "the relation of the sign to the dynamic objet" : By the trichotomy number I ( The sign itself, the mode of apprehension of the sign itself" ) we know the categorial membership of the sign ( 1, 2 or 3 ); by the trichotomy number III (the Mode of Being of the dynamical object)... Number III being abstractive/concretive/collective. ...by the trichotomy number III (the Mode of Being of the dynamical object) we know the categorial membership of the dynamic object (1,2 or 3). In view that the dynamical object determine the sign we have the following possibilities : If the Mode of apprehension of the sign is 3, the Mode of Being of the Dynamical object is 3 and their relation is categorically determined by the pair (3,3). The sign is a symbol. If the Mode of apprehension of the sign is 2, the Mode of Being of the Dynamical object is 3 or 2 and their relation is categorically determined by the pair (3,2) or by the pair (2,2). In both cases the sign is an index. (respectively legisign or sinsign) Trichotomy I, the Mode of apprehension, consists of 1. qualisign, 2. sinsign, and 3. legisign. If the Mode of apprehension is 2, then the sign is a sinsign. So the pair (3,2) is a collective sinsign and the pair (2,2) is a concretive sinsign. Yet you then say that (3,2) and (2,2) are, "respectively, legisign or sinsign." Also, the collective sinsign seems to be excluded by Peirce's "ususal" rules of sign-parametric combination. One of us seems to have gone wrong here. Your discussion is formulated rather abstractly, so I may well be the one who'se gone wrong. But would you clarify this? It seems like you meant to write some permutation of this. E.g., "If the Mode of Being of the Dynamical Object is 3, the Mode of apprehension of the sign is 3 or 2, and their relation is categorically determined by the pair (3,2) or by the pair (2,2). In both cases the sign is an index (respectively legisign or sinsign)." In that case (3,2) would be a (2) concretive (3) legisign and (2,2) would be a (2) concretive ([CORRECTED] 2) sinsign, and it would be allowed by the rules of sign-parametric combination, and would cohere with saying that the sign is respectively legisign or sinsign. But Peirce's parametric combination rules would seem to allow the concretive sinsign to be iconic rather than indexical. So, if you meant to refer to a concretive legisign and a concretive sinsign, then what rule of combining sign-parametric values are you using and on what basis do you rule out the apparently allowed iconic concretive sinsign? I'm not saying that it shouldn't be ruled out. But that's the step that renders Trichotomy IV redundant. The 10-ad of trichotomies which we're discussing is far from "canonical." But still, whatare your ideasthese regards? This is of interest to the question of whether you keep the arrangement whereby all symbols are copulant and none of them designative or descriptive. If the Mode of apprehension of the sign is 1, the Mode of Being of the Dynamical object is 3 or 2 or 1 and their relation is categorically determined by the pair (3,1) or by the pair (2,1)or by the pair (1,1). In the three cases the sign is an icon ( respectively legisign or sinsign or qualisign). I have the analogous question here as I asked above. (You start out saying that the sign is a qualisign, and (3,1) seems to be a collective qualisign, and (2,1) seems to be a concretive qualisign, and (1,1) seems to be an abstractive qualisign. (3,1) (2,1) seem excluded by the usual rules of sign-parametric combination, and then you say that the sign a qualisign or a sinsign or a legisign. Etc.) Best, Ben Udell Whatever the case the trichotomie n¨ IV is enterely determined by the tric
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help!
Jerry, Gary, list, A number of recent posts have addressed the topics of: On Jun 19, 2006, at 1:05 AM, Peirce Discussion Forum digest wrote: Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign I am seeking help in understanding the importance of these terms to individual scholars. The definitions are reasonably clear, at least to me. At issue is the question of why are these terms important to understanding human communication. To Peirce, logical process = representational process, and is not a specifically human or intelligent-life phenomenon, a chapter in the books of psychology, sociology, history, even if these books covered reasoning creatures other than homo sapiens which is the only clear example of which we know (SETI hasn't found ET, at least not yet). Instead, to Peirce, humans are a special logical phenomenon -- he might assent to a current phrase like logic processors though not in the computer sense (deductive, with strict algorithms, etc.). For my part, I would say that logicality is general like statisticality or (in the information-theoretic sense) information. So these terms (signsign, legisign, qualisign) are important in understanding the logical possibilities which human communication tends to actualize. IMHO the importance is not so very different from the importance of aerodynamics to the evolution and anatomy of winged insects, pterosaurs, birds, bats, flying organisms generally. But I think that a more exact analogy would be the relationship of probability, statistics, and, as a general mathematical statistical subject, stochastic processes, to matter. In the Peircean system, terms like qualisign/sinsign/legisign are also important, or regarded as destined to be important, in understanding the possibilities realized in metaphysics -- questions of ontology, questions of God, freedom, immortality, and (philosophical) questions of space, time, matter, etc. This is implicit in Peirce's classification of logic as a field which does not presuppose metaphysics but which is presupposed by metaphyiscs. The appending of three unusual prefixes to the concept of a sign is clearly a creative use of language. The apparent (mechanical) objective is to form three new categories as derivatives of the parent word, sign. Could one imagine other prefixes to the word sign? Peirce imagined quite a few other prefixes to the word sign. But presumably you mean such as to make a semantic distinction, not merely a morphological improvement. Could one imagine more than three other prefixes? Your question would be helpfully clarified if you stated it directly instead of morphologically. Obviously one can imagine, so to speak, many more classes of signs, and Peirce certainly did. Can one imagine a classification into a 4-chotomy of signs? Of course one can, but, for better or worse, it would be unPeircean. Triadism is built deeply into Peirce's semiotic. How is this context important in distinguishing among paths of usages? It's a way of distinguishing between specific occurrences of signs, the appearances of signs, and the general meaning or habitual 'conventional' interpretation of a sign. (The symbol's interpretant, in being an inferential outcome, usually goes beyond such conventional significations.) For many practical and theoretical purposes, English horse and Spanish _caballo_ are the same legisign. Horse and _caballo_ won't be regarded as the same qualisign (except by those for whom all human words are indistinguishably the same qualisign). Horse and _caballo_ won't be regarded as ever being the same sinsign (except by those for whom pretty much all human occurrences are one single undecomposable occurrence). What other terms might be substituted for these terms? Peirce himself offered, at various times, at least three sets of words for the same trichotomy of logical terms: Tone, token, type. Qualisign, sinsign, legisign. Potisign, actisign, famisign. One might call them: a quality-as-a-sign, a singular-as-a-sign, and a general-as-a-sign. He at least mentioned other words as candidates as well. Do these terms impact the concept of a grammar? It depends on the grammar. If this were some other forum, your conception of grammar might be implicitly understood and accepted. Here, in a philosophical forum which happens to be a crossroads of many specialties and traditions, you need to define it and state the context and tradition from which you are drawing your sense of the word, in order to make yourself widely understood. Is this ad hoc extension of the concept of sign desirable for mathematics? How does it contribute to the mathematical usages of signs? You specified neither the hoc nor the basal concept of which you characterize Peirce's terms as an extension. I guess everybody likes to think of his or her concept as the genus and of the other forms of the concept as the specializations. But you haven't said what your concept is,
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
of the CP, written many years ago when I was working with this material with some intensity, that I thought Hartshorne and Weiss were making some sort of mistake in their account of what Peirce is saying. I have not yet attempted to find out why I thought this is so, but I will try to do that now to see if there is anything in that..Joe Ransdell- Original Message - From: "Benjamin Udell" [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 1:45 PMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)Looking at all three triangles, I get to feeling that it's unlikely that Pierce, having included no numbers in one triangle, would then in the other two triangles throw numbers in like afterthoughts and, in both triangles, change them, and begin and finish the numbers so that they looked a bit scattered and visually sloppy -- when he has written the sign class names with some care. Especially the MS540-17 triangle.I had noticed in the smaller graphic image of MS540-17 that the lettering looked careful, with serifs -- I thought it might even be medieval style. But in fact it was the bolding which Peirce did, which gave a medieval lookto some of the lettering when seen in the smaller, less-easy-to-read graphic image . I keep wanting to crack a joke here about Peirce being "not a profligate bolder" but showing here that "he was clearly not inexperienced at it ."Anyway, great work, Joe! Thanks for these images of Peirce's own writing.Best, Ben- Original Message - From: "Benjamin Udell" [EMAIL PROTECTED]To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" peirce-l@lyris.ttu.eduSent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 2:01 PMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)Image came through beautifully!Look carefully at the MS799.2 triangle of boxes and you can that the numbers are change from an earlier set of numbers. I originally thought that the little earlier numeral "8" was an extra numeral "3"CURRENT:1 ~ 5 ~ 8 ~ 10~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 9~~ 3 ~ 7~~~ 4EARLIER:1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4~ 5 ~ 6 ~ 7~~ 8 ~ 9~~~ 10Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Gary, Joe, list, I downloaded the chapter from Merkle's dissertation last night and it downloaded quite quickly compared to the daytime when the Internet is busier. What graphics! Very little in the way of my shadings, very much in the way of exactness and complexity. If somebody asked me to do a graphic with,for instance,over 700 relational lines in the right places, I'd promise nothing! Amazing stuff. And he brings together and compares quite a variety of arrangements of Peircean sign classes and related conceptions by various scholars. If the logical and mathematical structure across Peirce's signs interests you, hie thee to Merkle's chapter http://www.dainf.cefetpr.br/~merkle/thesis/CH4.pdf. I saved my copy to disk, that way I don't cause him (or his server) bandwidth charges by downloading it from his server any time I want to see it. Best, Ben Udell So far I've looked mainly at the graphics. - Original Message - From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Sunday, June 18, 2006 6:01 PMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Ben, Joe, list, I would highly recommend for those interested in further exploring the themes of this discussion--and, yes, thanks very much to Joe, Ben and others for providing such a wealth of valuable information, diagrams, etc.--the fourth chapter of Luis Merkle's dissertation to which he recently posted a URL: http://www.dainf.cefetpr.br/~merkle/thesis/CH4.pdfespecially Sect. 4.4 (p 233 to the end of the section) and most especially his Figure 4.5 The 10 valid arrangements that satisfy the prescision constraint [the discussion discusses the connection between prescision and categoriality] which shows clearly how Peirce arrived at the numbering of the triangular diagram under consideration, Figure 4.7 Ternary tree of the 10 valid arrangements among the 27 explicating Figure 4.6 Peirce's arborescent diagram of the ten categories of triadic signs (which he used at Harvard in 1903 to illustrate and defend his classification of signs into 10 categories), as well as Peirce's triangular diagram, here Figure 4.8 Peirce's diagram depicting the affinities among the ten categories (with a very helpful insert labeled "Horizontal and vertical adjacency," and perhaps most especially Merkle's Figure 4.9 Collapse of the 10 valid arrangements into a triangular diagram. Merkle adds this gloss to this figure: By imagining the tree as enclosed in a parallelepiped, it is possible to collapse the existing planes into a single one. The result is a triangle with ten elements. Peirce used triangular diagrams to describe the affinities between categories. The collapse above enables an understanding of Peirce's diagrams in the light of ternary trees. I spent quite a bit of time with Merkle's thesis a while back when he first posted it (or parts of it) to the list, but was too involved in other projects at the time to get much into--if at all--on the list. Merkle's work seems to me to put a clear light on many of the points under consideration in this thread. However, one caveat: the file is huge and may take some considerable time to download. Although Merkle's primary interest seems to be informatics, Sect. 4.4 concentrates on sign relations in Peirce. Gary Benjamin Udell wrote: Joe, list, It will be interesting to find out what you thought was wrong about what the editors were saying. Again, thank you for your efforts in this! --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: representing the ten classes of signs (corrected)
Joe, Vinicius, Robert, list, My initial reaction was that Peirce had added the numbers but then I came generally to the same conclusions as Joe. It sure would be nice to have a color copy. I tend to think that at least the line-boxes themselves were drawn by Peirce (the chart _is_ on graph paper). Anyway, the editors wrote "all red ink except as noted." So if the line between the centeral and bottom boxes is in red ink, it's probably Peirce's line, right? Otherwise perhaps the editors' line. I was looking closely at Box 10, and wondering whether Peirce had written "Symbolic" and the editors put an arrowhead (to indicate brown ink) or whether he had written "Symbolical" with the "cal" a bit squished. But looking at the whole classification, the words marked as being in brown ink are generally the ones which Peircenoted were superfluous for identifying the classes.So I think that that probably _is_ an editor's arrowhead next to "Symbolic".Brown-for-superfluous would also explainthe variations between "symbolic"and "symbol" as well as the choice of the noun form "argument." Just got Joe's latest post to peirce-l. Looking forward to the further images! - Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 8:54 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: representing the ten classes of signs (corrected) Vinicius, Robert, and list: I take it that you have received in the previous message the image of the original MS version of the boxed triangle, in MS 799.02 (i.e. the second page in the MS 799 folder). Notice the following: 1. There are no Roman numerals, so that is clearly an editorial artifact (Hartshorne and Weiss). 2. The numerals "1" through "10" appear instead, but seem clearly to have been added after the image was drawnand the names of the sign classes were entered, raising the question of whether they are due to Peirce or to some later editors. (More on this below) 3. The numerals associated with the boxes differ in one respect from the Roman numerals that were editorially added in the CP version, namely, in respect to the boxes at the middle and the bottom of the pyramid 4. The names assigned to the boxes also differ in that same respect. Thus both the boxes and the numerals associated with them have been, in effect, interchanged in the transition from the original drawing to the version in the CP. 5. Someone has indicated with the line with an arrowhead at both ends that an interchange should be made, i.e. it seems very likelythat this is the meaning of that line. 5. This interchangemakes the numbering on the original page the same, in effect, as the numbering by the Roman numerals in the CP version. Hence it is possible that, although there are no Roman numerals on the original, the ones on the CP version could be based on the numbering used on the original and very probably are, and therefore possible that the Roman numerals are justified as well in the sense that they reflect the original numbering. But that is true only if we suppose that the numerals on the original were put there by Peirce. But since they were put there after the drawing was otherwise completed, it is also possible that they were put there by the editors, too, in which case the Roman numerals are only an editorial artifact. as we first conjectured. 6. This also supposes, though, that the line with the arrowheads at both ends that is presumably used to indicate the need to interchange the boxes is also an editorial artifact. But what if that line was put there by Peirce? In that case, the Roman numerals would be justified as an ordering device after all even if due entirely to editors, supposing that Peirce intended to number them at all. 7. But did he intend to number them at all? 8. And who is responsible for the idea of the interchange? Peirce himself or his editors? There may be some clue to that in the editorial comments to be found in the CP which are attached to paragraphs 2.235n and 2.243n. 9. For what it is worth, I have not yet worked with those comments in the CP, but I do notice that in my copy of the CP I made a note to myself many years ago adjacent to the beginning ofthe note2.235n,when I was studying this material closely at that time, that says: "This is not what Peirce is saying above", meaning that I did not at that time think that what the editors were interpretingPeirce as saying in 2.235 was in fact correct. Ino longer recall why Isaid this, but I seemed to have spotted something I took to be wrong in the editorial understanding at that time. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: robert marty To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 1:50 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: representing the ten classes of signs (corrected) "Peirce never put the roman numbers on his original MS." ! I am very happy reading this
[peirce-l] Re: representing the ten classes of signs (corrected)
You're welcome, Joe. Before you go, do you have a clearer view of the words written in the third set of boxes? Here's what it looked to me like it was saying: Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 10:25 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: representing the ten classes of signs (corrected) That's all for the moment from me. There arre other MS pages that might throu some light on things but it will take me some time to browse through the MS material, which is from several different file folders, to see what is truly worth adding as grist for the present discussion. P.S.:And thanks to Ben for the earlierhelp -- off-list as well as on --with the graphics and for the recent provision of the color version of the triangle of boxes. Joe Ransdell --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: representing the ten classes of signs (corrected)
I think I'm hungry too. Meanwhile, here's more. It would be nice if somebody at Harvard could take a quick look and say whether the numbers in the first set were in red ink and whether generally any editorial marks were ever in red ink. - Ben. - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 11:23 AMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: representing the ten classes of signs (corrected) Damn, it looks like the images all shrank somehow. Hang in there and I will send all three again in the right size.It will take me a while since I have to stop for breakfast first! Joe - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 9:38 AMSubject: [peirce-l] Re: representing the ten classes of signs (corrected) You're welcome, Joe. Before you go, do you have a clearer view of the words written in the third set of boxes? Here's what it looked to me like it was saying: Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 10:25 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: representing the ten classes of signs (corrected) That's all for the moment from me. There arre other MS pages that might throu some light on things but it will take me some time to browse through the MS material, which is from several different file folders, to see what is truly worth adding as grist for the present discussion. P.S.:And thanks to Ben for the earlierhelp -- off-list as well as on --with the graphics and for the recent provision of the color version of the triangle of boxes. Joe Ransdell --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Image came through beautifully! Look carefully at the MS799.2 triangle of boxes and you can that the numbers are change from an earlier set of numbers. I originally thought that the little earlier numeral 8 was an extra numeral 3 CURRENT: 1 ~ 5 ~ 8 ~ 10 ~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 9 ~~ 3 ~ 7 ~~~ 4 EARLIER: 1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4 ~ 5 ~ 6 ~ 7 ~~ 8 ~ 9 ~~~ 10 Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Looking at all three triangles, I get to feeling that it's unlikely that Pierce, having included no numbers in one triangle, would then in the other two triangles throw numbers in like afterthoughts and, in both triangles, change them, and begin and finish the numbers so that they looked a bit scattered and visually sloppy -- when he has written the sign class names with some care. Especially the MS540-17 triangle. I had noticed in the smaller graphic image of MS540-17 that the lettering looked careful, with serifs -- I thought it might even be medieval style. But in fact it was the bolding which Peirce did, which gave a medieval lookto some of the lettering when seen in the smaller, less-easy-to-read graphic image . I keep wanting to crack a joke here about Peirce being not a profligate bolder but showing here that he was clearly not inexperienced at it . Anyway, great work, Joe! Thanks for these images of Peirce's own writing. Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Saturday, June 17, 2006 2:01 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Image came through beautifully! Look carefully at the MS799.2 triangle of boxes and you can that the numbers are change from an earlier set of numbers. I originally thought that the little earlier numeral 8 was an extra numeral 3 CURRENT: 1 ~ 5 ~ 8 ~ 10 ~ 2 ~ 6 ~ 9 ~~ 3 ~ 7 ~~~ 4 EARLIER: 1 ~ 2 ~ 3 ~ 4 ~ 5 ~ 6 ~ 7 ~~ 8 ~ 9 ~~~ 10 Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign
Wilfred wrote, "List, "I did not know the Digital Peirce online site before. " I should just send this to every new peirce-lister. Additions corrections welcome. I've checked these links, they're all live, though some of the URLs seem to be the result of recent changes. - Ben Udell - Arisbe: The Peirce Gateway: http://members.door.net/arisbe/ (Joseph Ransdell) - Peirce-Related Papers On-Line http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/bycsp.htm - Papers by C.S. Peirce [Online] http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/aboutcsp.htm - Special Resources http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/rsources/rsources.htm - Syllabus - Classification of Sciences 1.180-202 G-1903-2b (1903) http://www.princeton.edu/~batke/peirce/cl_o_sci_03.htm - Classification of the Sciences http://www.textlog.de/4257.html - Digital Encyclopedia of C. S. Peirce http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/ - Dictionary of Peirce's Terminology http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html (Mats Bergman Sami Paavola) - The Peirce Helsinki Commens http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/index.html - Peirce Edition Project http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce (Nathan Houser, Andre DeTienne, Indiana University Purdue University at Indianapolis, USA) - UQAM satellite of the Peirce edition Project http://www.pep.uqam.ca/index_en.pep (François Latraverse David Lachance, working on the preparation of the Century Dictionary material for W7) - The Century Dictionary online http://www.global-language.com/century/ - The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce http://www.nlx.com/titles/titlpeir.htm - Charles Sanders Peirce: Published Works I http://www.nlx.com/titles/titlppw1.htm - The Writings of Charles S. Peirce -- A Chronological Edition (Forthcoming) http://www.nlx.com/titles/titlcspc.htm - [in FAQ] What is the relation between the various Peirce titles? http://www.nlx.com/pstm/pstmfaq.htm#peirce - Conceptual Graphs http://conceptualgraphs.org/ (John Sowa, IBM, Fritz Lehmann, USA, et al.) - CeneP (Centro de Estudos Peirceanos) http://www.pucsp.br/pos/cos/cepe/ (M. Lúcia Santaella-Braga, Pontificia Universidade Católica de São Paulo (PUC-SP), Brasil) - John Josephson, Ohio State, USA (LAIR: Logic of Abduction) http://www.cse.ohio-state.edu/~jj/ - Grupo de Estudios Peirceanos http://www.unav.es/gep/ (Jaime Nubiola, University of Navarra, Spain) - The Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society http://www.peircesociety.org/transactions.html - Institute for the Study of Pragmaticism http://www.pragmaticism.net/ - Wyttynys.net (_His Glassy Essence_) http://www.wyttynys.net/ (Kenneth Lane Ketner) - Computer Semiotics: Peircean Semiotics and Digital Representation http://www.ckk.chalmers.se/people/jmo/semiotics/ - Institut de Recherche en Sémiotique, Communication, et Éducation (L'I.R.S.C.E) http://www.univ-perp.fr/lsh/rch/semiotics/irsce/irsce.html (Gérard Deledalle, Joëlle Réthoré, Université de Perpignan, France) - International Research Group on Abductive Inference at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main http://www.rz.uni-frankfurt.de/~wirth (Uwe Wirth, Alexander Roesler; Frankfurt, Germany) - Research Group on Semiotic Epistemology and Mathematics Education, Institut für Didaktik der Mathematik http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/idm/semiotik/semiotik-e.html Michael Hoffman, Michael Otte, Universität Bielefeld, Germany) - Nijmegen C.S.Peirce Study Center http://www.kun.nl/fil-beta/peirce-en.html (Guy DeBrock, Director; Menno Hulswit, Coordinator: University of Nijmegen, Netherlands) This Webpage seems to have disappeared, and the Wayback Machine (http://www.archive.org) says that access to archived versions has been blocked. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign
ign, Qualisign So why would the word “red” be a symbol??? To me it is also not. I would regard the word “red” more as being a qualisign, which then would also fit the last sentence below. To me the word “red” can not be a sinsign since it is not an actual existing thing or event. And to me a quality (like red) can also not be a legisign. But I might be wrong. Of course. Wilfred Van: Benjamin Udell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Verzonden: dinsdag 13 juni 2006 9:51 Aan: Peirce Discussion Forum Onderwerp: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign . If the same rules hold for these 10 trichotomies as for the three, then it would appear, for instance, that all symbols are copulants. Copulants "neither describe nor denote their Objects, but merely express… logical relations"; for example "If--then--"; "--causes--." That seems like it just must be wrong. Then a symbol like the word "red" couldn't be a symbol, instead, since it's descriptive, it can be a legisign, a sinsign, or a qualisign, but in any case it has to be a descriptive abstractive iconic hypothetical sympathetic suggestive gratific rhematic assurance of instinct. That just can't be right. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign
Joe, Bernard, Wilfred, list, _Magno cum grano salis_ it is, then. The content of the 10-chotomy on which I got my paws is very suggestive, beginning with the sign's own phenomenological category and ending with a trichotomy of _assurances_ of instinct, experience, and form, i.e., as at an inquiry's end. I look forward to comparing the 10-chotomies of -- (clears throat) -- semio-parametric trichotomies. Wilfred, for my part I don't happen to know why Peirce put some relationships and not others into that 10-chotomy. With Peirce, sometimes things not immediately explained do have explanations. For all I know, Peirce himself was dissatisfied with that 10-chotomy for the pattern of inclusions exclusions which you mention. As Joe said, Peirce didn't bring this aspect of his work into a satisfactory form. The reason that Peirce wanted to put his definitions into structural, diagrammatic relations is the same reason that scientists like to do that with physical quantities. It unifies understanding, turns it into a sensitive web, and makes far-separated things into both supports and checks/balances to each other. The unification of conceptions of mathematical empirical understanding in his accounts of the observations and manipulation of diagrams has not yet been plumbed, so far as I can tell. The structuring-together of definitions strengthens the constraints for consistency, pattern, and logical dependence, and provides constraints for making clarity out of things which seemed hopelessly confused. However, it's a rare thing to combine a talent for that with a talent for giving structural names and habitations to the deep elements patterns of human life experience. Peirce comes before some sort of weird great divide in philosophy, when those who aspired to logical structure tended to try to reduce and explain away the deeper things, while those whose inclination was opposite thereto seemed to become strangely estranged from the scientific worldview. Anyway, whatever ultimate entelechy might be reached would be something beyond our imagining -- if a diagram, then a diagram beyond our imagining, and I much doubt that Peirce thought that he could imagine in any detail what it would be like. It's an ideal-limit idea, something that might be infinitely far off. C.S. Peirce often said that adequate research will discover anything, but he never said that ultiimate truth was within his grasp (i.e., that adequate earthly funding of C.S. Peirce would lead to ultimate truth :-). Now Peirce did think that _some_ of his structures of ideas had reached their final form -- he wasn't infallibilistically sure of it, but he felt reasonably sure -- but as to the 10-chotomies of semio-parametric trichotomies, he'd certainly agree that they're not at endstate and he'd like very much for discussion and research to go on and on. Peirce was not the kind to think that the patent office would need to be closed in the foreseeable future. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Tuesday, June 13, 2006 5:55 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign Dear list, I would like to state First of all that I regard the ongoing discussion about sinsign, legisign and qualisign here on the list as being very interesting. But, I also have my remarks. Some of them might be worthwhile to reconsider. Or not. It might also just be I am just not wise enough to respond the way I do. First remark is just some remark about the first diagram here below. With the I to X at the left. There is stated at IV The relation to the sign to the dynamic object. What I do not understand is why there is stated nowhere the relation of the sign to the immediate object? Then there is VII the relation of the sign to the dynamic interpretant. Again, why nowhere the relation of the sign to the immediate interpretant? Then X..why not more triadic relations Another remark I have, is that somehow Charles Sander Peirce disappoints me if he really aimed at putting his definitions in a diagram and if he thought that would ever lead to some all-inclusive and complete diagram with perfect entelechy. Or, connected with that, that he would think that all thoughts SHOULD be diagrammatic. This has to do with the Dutch saying de weg is het doel. Maybe. Or maybe not. My dissappointment is still not much if i am correct on this one since his definitions are great and also this diagrammatic reflections are. But still, I am wondering. Last remark I have is that Charles Sander Peirce still was a human being like all of us. Not some god that never made any mistakes. So whether some diagram being his endstate or not is not so important. More important is that the discussions will be going on and on and on. Because, eventually, about ALL social theories and insights will be wrong. Or, should I say, just less optimal for new contexts and social
[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign
Thank you, Bernard!-Ben Qualisign Sinsign Legisign Icon Index Symbol Rheme Dicisign Argument qualisigns iconic rhematic / sinsigns \ iconic rhematic indexical rhematic dicentic /legisigns \ iconic rhematic indexical rhematic dicentic /symbolic \ rhematic dicentic argumental --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Entelechy
Cassiano wrote, It's been a long while I don't write, but the subject interests me.I run the risk of repeating everything that was said here about entelechy, but a look up at the form of the word seems appropriate: entelechy in ancient greek is a form of saying (as literally as I can see) en telos echein, that is, something like "to have the end [aim?] in", "the obtaining of the end" (since the verb "echein" has a wide semantic range).In this sense, it is possible to think of it as a process rather than the final result of the process itself - if we think in analogy to the ultimate interpretant, it's perfectly fit: although the interpretant is called "ultimate", it's nonetheless still an interpretant, sign-process in sum. Now, the substantive "entelechia" seems to indicate exactly this, as I can see, in Aristotle: a process of attaining the end (telos), which should not as I see be defined as a definite outcome, final and not capable of being fowarded furthermore - because the idea of telos carries the notion of possible aim to be reached - the final cause is of the nature of a general desire, in Peirce's interpretation (which seems a very plausible way to read Aristotle's theory of the four causes - the formal cause being in the end the same as the final cause, the material cause the same as the efficient cause). So, entelechy would be a process of causation, the finalization of the process of attainment a telos, or of fulfillment of the end, if I can say this in English. So, it continues to be a process, as I tend to read it; not the same as before, but still a process.I hope I'm understandable in this poor English of mine, and I also hope I'm not completely out of the discussion. All the best to all,Cassiano(from the Center for Studies on Pragmatism, Catholic University of São Paulo (PUC), Brasil).I tend to see an entelechy assomething which is stable but not merely exhausted, but instead "in working order" to do more. In its stability, it'snot just a form but a structure, andit can serve as a foundation and basis for more, as for instance we say that knowledge is a basis anda grounding. So it's a settledness yet it contributes to a process, helps ground it more securely, sometimes precisely in order for the process not just to repeat but to evolve (through learning). It supports us, is our human supportedness by reality. So I tend to see entelechy as the confirmation, the solidification, of that action or culmination which is an end or is supposed to be an end -- but which may or may not hold up. If it holds up, stands stably, then it is, in that sense, confirmed. It's the difference between coming to an end, and being ended, being settled, settled ina constructive sense, ready for more. In a broader sense, I regard intelligent experience, formed as collateral to sign interpretant in respect of the object, as the entelechy of semiosis as such. And they all keep on going, and cannot culminate except as "energy" or solidify except as basis -- energy and basis, for _more_ of themselves.Charles Olson once said that Edward Dahlberg pounded it into his head as a poet that "every perception leads DIRECTLY and IMMEDIATELY to another perception." Culmination entelechy. It's also the difference between the Thomistic "necessaries for the beautiful" -- "claritas" (which Joyce well translated as "radiance," as of a culmination, a bloom, the bright colors of flowers, the shiny colors of fish, etc.,)and "integritas sive perfectio" (which Joyce sonorously translated as "wholeness" but misunderstood as simple unity as provided by a bounding line drawn around an object. Aquinas instead meant structural integrity, as of something not "diminuta" (dashed to pieces or destructively violated) and thereby "turpia" (base, disgusting, "gross"). Diminuta http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3D%2314023 turpia http://lysy2.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/words.exe?turpis But in my emphasis on entelechy as something cognitive and even epistemic, as confirmation, confirmed value, etc., (as opposed to a telos or teleiosis asmore affective, aculmination, a value), I part with Aristotle, Aquinas, Peirce, and everybody but myself. I also think of entelechy as a causal principle like telos, in a sense like the formal cause, but deepened, just as a vital telos is something deeper than mere thermodynamic decay. With entelechy, there is dependence, often complex dependence,on sign and evidentiary conditions. E.g., knowledge expectations are causes in markets. This is not "instead" of telic influence, nor does it leave teleology behind -- but it does take things to a new level, a level of ongoing evolution (mental, social), which distinguishes a human from, say, a vegetable organism which, in its way, is quite telically governed, but certainly does not evolve in its own lifetime. So those are just my opinions. Joe Ransdell sent
[peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science
be inferred in regard to any state of things from any
circumstance: as, the significance of a metaphor, of a chance remark, of a
look, of behavior.
2. Importance; more strictly, importance as significative of something
interesting, but also, frequently, importance as affecting considerable
interests: as, the great significance of many small things.
3. The character of being significant; force of meaning; distinct
signification; expressiveness. =Syn. Significance, Signification, Meaning.
Meaning is the most general; it may apply to persons, but not the other words:
as, what was his meaning? Signification is closer than significance;
significance is especially the quality of signifying something, while
signification is generally that which is signified: as, he attached a great
deal of significance to this fact; what is the signification of D. C. L.? [NOTE
BY JR: i.e. what does D.C.L. abbreviate?]
SIGNIFICATION
1. The act of signifying or making known; expression or indication of meaning
in any manner. [Rare.]
2. A fact as signified; an established or intended meaning; the import of
anything by which thought is or may be communicated; connotation, or logical
comprehension; implication; sense: as, the signification of a word or a
gesture; the significations of mathematical and other conventional signs. [NOTE
BY JR: Here he again cites a philosophical example: Words in their primary . .
. signification stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses
them. Locke, Human Understanding, III. ii. 2.]
3. Significance; occult meaning; a fact as inferable from a phenomenon of which
it is said to be the signification.
4. Importance; consequence; significant import. Halliwell. [Obsolete or prov.
Eng.]
5. In French-Canadian law, the act of giving notice; notification.
- Original Message -
From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Saturday, June 03, 2006 9:37 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and
science
Joe, Gary R., Mats, list
Once again I've tripped up over the difference between signification
significance. In addition to tripping up often simply because of trying to
think through ideas of comprehension, denotation, etc., in regard to qualities,
representational relations, etc., I have located one case in The New Elements
where Peirce used the word signification to mean meaning (what's formed
into the interpretant) instead of comprehension (a ground as referenced), and
it probably worked its way into my mind in past readings.. every sign is
intended to determine a sign of the same object with the same signification or
meaning. Any sign, B, which a sign, A, is fitted so to determine, without
violation of its, A's, purpose, that is, in accordance with the 'Truth,' even
though it, B, denotes but a part of the objects of the sign, A, and signifies
but a part of its, A's, characters, I call an _interpretant_ of A. ('New
Elements', EP 2:304, 1904?)
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/interpretant.html
Anyway, if one can, unlike me, keep straight the more usual terminology
(ground, comprehension, connotation, signification versus interpretant,
meaning, significance), Mats' assertion that mental icons are _the_ carriers of
connotative meaning in communication makes a lot more sense.
As an icon refers to a ground (the ground of the quality which the icon
presents), it could be said to have comprehension a.k.a. connotation, at least
by some of Peirce's characterizations (unless those characterizations involved
implicit and unstated qualifications limiting comprehension to being a property
of symbols). And as the function of an asserted icon is to evoke a mental icon,
the mental icons can be said to be -- well, here, I still part with Mats -- not
the carriers but the decodings, or just say it plain, the interpretants, of
connotative meaning in communication. As decodings, interpretants, they are
also encodings, signs, carriers; it's a difference of emphasis, yet an
important one, I think, relating to the fact, in which Joe Ransdell has been
particularly interested in the past, that a symbol is supposed to lead to a
mental icon, and that a particular semiosis or inquiry process finds an ending
(but not a resting -- there I part with Peirce) in an icon, not a symbol. A
symbol is also a carrier of comprehensional meaning such that it doensn't seem
clear or obvious that mental icons are _the_ principal carriers of
comprehensional meaning in communication.
Also, this does leave open the question of representational relations like
not and if only if etc. Are they defined by qualities/grounds, whether a
sign's own or as will be evoked in the interpretant? That is to say, by
representational relations cast as qualities (just as qualities can be
hypostatized, cast as objects denotable designable)? I really don't think so.
Terms like
[peirce-l] Re: LSE Conference abstracts on representation in art and science
Gary, Jim, list, [Gary] I've been wanting to address some of the issues of this post of Ben's but, feeling under the weather, I can't yet tackle it with any certainty that I'll contribute to clarifying any of these. I did come across an interesting passage today which, however, might shed some light--or at least stimulate additional thinking--about one consideration. Ben writes: [Ben] If comprehension is always comprehension of a quality, and denotation always denotation of an object, then there's no corresponding mode of standing for a representational relation, yet terms such as not and and do not stand for logical relations cast or disguised as either objects or qualities. [Gary] But I think that even such terms as not and and do represent simple diagram-like signs in the sense in which which Peirce writes that all reasoning is diagrammatic and that even a noun can be seen as like a simple diagram. I do think that they represent representational relations. They just don't represent them as objects or as qualities. Diagrams are constructible to represent more manipulably that which not probably and etc. represent. [Gary quoting Pierce] [S]omething of the nature of a diagram, be it only an imaginary skeleton proposition, or even a mere noun with the ideas of its application and signification is needed in all necessary reasoning. Indeed one may say that something of this kind is needed in all reasoning whatsoever, although in induction it is the real experiences that serves as diagram. (from MS 459, The Lowell Lectures, in Stuhr, ed., Classical American Philosophy, p 50) [Gary] One can certainly agree with Peirce that 'diagram' so used is employed in a wider sense than usual. He continues: [Gary quoting Pierce] A Diagram in my sense, is in the first place a Token, or singular Object used as a Sign; it is essential that it should be capable of being perceived and observed. It is, however, what is called a General sign, that is, it denotes a general Object. [MS 293] [Gary] Not and and and other logical functors, to use your term, seen as diagrammatic and iconic in this sense need not be cast or disguised as either objects of qualities as you perhaps suggested Mats was doing. They simply are iconic representations (in the sense just analyzed) of the form of logical relations, pure relational symbols to be used in reasoning. They certainly cannot--as tokens--be meaningfully divorced from any actual reasoning. Not and and seen as iconic are cast as qualities or as qualia (qua = objects referenced by their qualities). I'm not talking about divorcing them from actual reasoning or logical relations of any kind. [Ben] . . .a symbol is supposed to lead to a mental icon, and that a particular semiosis or inquiry process finds an ending (but not a resting -- there I part with Peirce) in an icon, not a symbol. A symbol is also a carrier of comprehensional meaning such that it doensn't seem clear or obvious that mental icons are _the_ principal carriers of comprehensional meaning in communication. [Gary] Ben, I'm interested in how you part with Peirce--I don't quite get your meaning re: a resting.. This is the same thing that I've discussed in the past. But I made it a bit murky by talking about an inquiry process culminating in an icon rather than, as I should have said, in an interpretant which involves both icon and index. I was thinking, an interpretant icon (along with an attached index). So there I'm agreeing that symbols should lead to icons (with indices attached.) And then I'm at the question of whether inquiry ever comes to rest with an interpretant. An interpretant is a construal, a tentative ending. Inquiry never comes to reasonable rest, doubt never comes to be reasonably quelled, with a mere construal no matter how elucidatory. It comes to rest with evidence, corroboration, confirmation. Intelligent experience is not dyadic but tetradic, formed as collateral to sign interpretant in respect of the object, and is the entelechy of semiosis as such. Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Graphics in posts
Joe, I'm unsure what the _intended_ function of the DIV tag is supposed to be, other than dividing the document. Basically, I think of it as being like the paragraph tag P without the extra linespace which the P tag adds after a paragraph. When one converts an html email to plaintext, the Ps extra linespace is lost, and paragraphs which had looked separate end up looking like one paragraph. Text formatted with DIV tags tends to behave better when undergoing changes. Also, DIV is block-level element like P and this means certain things when you add STYLE formattting to the tag. The designed behavior of the P tag was not a bad idea, and was in line with the basic ideas involved in html -- the P tag is in order to tell the user's program what ARE the paragraphs of TEXT. But programs were designed which somtimes mess the appearance up when the text mode is changed (changed by converting from html to plaintext, or in making a reply, or in copying and pasting into plaintext, etc.). The BR tag corresponds to the MS Word line break which you get by pressing SHIFT ENTER. My experience is that these BR's sometimes get lost in conversion. I've seen it especially in responses to my emails in past years. So I developed a habit of avoiding them unless I knew that I wouldn't really mind if they got omitted at some point. If you see text in a response in which, in the course of every one or two lines, two words run together, then it may well be because the program didn't save the BR tags in converting the text from one mode to another. Some of these email programs do all kinds of wierd things, like add I should take the opportunity to note that the 20s equality signs which the Lyris server adds to the html source are seen only at the Lyris archives, and not in the posts actually distributed (at least not in the ones which I receive). Best, Ben What is the functional difference between using the DIV and the BR tag, Ben? You say that it makes some sort of difference in email but I don't understand what you mean. Joe - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Monday, May 29, 2006 3:41 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Graphics in posts List, I've been considering Richard Hake's complaints about html, graphics, etc., in messages. Believe it or not, I have some sympathy for his views (otherwise I wouldn't clean up my html markup or strive to make images be as low-KB as I can with my amateur means). This sympathy developed and hardened in the course of work experience some years ago at a corporation whose internal branding requirements during the middle part of my time there were dreamt up by some PC-semiliterate folks quite separately from awareness about kilobytes, server capacity, and mass-pho'py stickiness. I've also noticed that the Lyris server adds some sort of coding, with a lot of 20s equality signs, which makes my html messages harder to read in the message source as some people try to do. So I'm willling to take a few ameliorative steps. I am very glad that Joe maintains a policy of allowing html images etc., but, since I've seemed to be the most frequent user of the graphic capabilities, I'm willing to send a plaintext version to those who prefer it, with links to the graphics which I'll put at some free image-hosting service like imageshack.us or Flickr. I do not believe that listers generally should be required to do this, but again, I'm currently the lister making the most frequent use of graphic capabilities and I happen to find it easy to take the described measures. I'll use html only when I'm including tables or other graphics. So when you see html from me, you'll know that you can just delete it because I'm sending you a plaintext version if--if--if you've let me know (off-list) that that's what you prefer. Those who already simply delete any message at all from me don't need to change their behavior at all, of course, and they, too, have at least some of my sympathy! Actually, I don't expect to hear from anybody about this, but I could be wrong, so I thought that I should at least offer. It is already the case that my html posts to peirce-l can be converted to plaintext without loss of info as to italicization, etc., and I generally arrange it so that the paragraphs are separated into email divisions (with the DIV tags) rather than using the simple breaks (with the BR tags) which some modes (I forget which) of plaintext conversion lose. I do recommend that any respondents delete whatever is unneeded in the response, including my graphics if they're irrelevant. I don't know how every email program works, but in the Microsoft ones, you can convert to plaintext by clicking on Format, Plain Text. MS Outlook Express automatically deletes images in the textbody in conversion to plain text; some other email programs seem to allow incorporation of images
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Jim, list, Oops, erratum: I wrote: "Darned if I know what it'd mean for a particle to go at lightspeed -- tau zero -- in a circle and thus coincide with itself indefinitely many times all at once.)." I was thinking of the particle's "own" viewpoint. (Technically, it doesn't even have one -- a lightspeed particle has no rest frame of reference. One does speak of "tau zero" even though maybe technically one should say that rest mass and proper time are "meaningless" rather than "zero" for lightspeed particles. "Tau" (sometimes spelt out informally in Roman characters instead of expressed by the Greek letter; I just discovered that gmane doesn't keep the Symbol font formatting, and I can't use the Unicode character without causing problems) is a system's proper time, its time in its own rest frame.) In any case, the circling lightspeed particle would not coincide with itself indefinitely many times or even once. At Dtau=0, it's still traveling at the quite non-zero and positive Dd/Dt = 1, even though, if by a miracle it were sentient, then it would experience no passage of time (that's why photons and the like don't age -- there's no such thing as "old" light -- the Doppler shift is something else -- lightspeed particles are pristine, agelessly young, the angelic ambassadors of morning, etc.) Sorry about that! -- Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Trikonicb.ppt Slide 18
Jerry,
Jerry,
I missed this question in my response to your post to Gary R. and me:
[Jerry] Can you explain your understanding / usage of the concept of
grammar?
Gary is using "grammar" in Peirce's sense, in order to refer to the
discipline and field of study of the various kinds of signs, their
classifications into various triads 10-ads, etc.
Basically, Peirce divided logic,with disciplinal orderingin
this manner: that which supplies principles THENthat whichappeals to
the principles supplied,as follows
1. Speculative Grammar: including the semeiotic triad: (sign,
object, interpretant) kinds of signs (icon, index, symbol; qualisign,
sinsign, legisign; etc.).
THEN
2. Critic: the modes of inference (abduction, induction, deduction),
their various validities degrees of force.
THEN
3. Methodeutic: methods for truth's investigation, exposition,
application), the Pragmatic Maxim.
Sometimes Peirce titled methodeutic "rhetoric."
Peirce places logic (aka semeiotics) as one of the three normative sciences
in philosophy. Much of that which many currently call "logic" is, for Peirce,
"mathematics of logic."
1. Phenomenology/Phaneroscopy -- including study of the three
categories (firstness, secondness, thirdness). the Reduction Thesis.
THEN
2. Normative Sciences -- Esthetics (ideals, the admirable), Ethics
(right wrong), Logic (Semeiotics)
THEN
3. Metaphysics -- General Metaphysics aka Ontology, Psychical /
Religious Metaphysics (God, freedom, immortality), Physical Metaphysics (real
nature of time, space, laws of nature, matter)
And he places philosophy between math and the special sciences. Mathematics
of logic is placed first among the mathematical fields.
1. Mathematics -- study of hypotheticals, and drawing necessary
conclusions
THEN
2. Cenoscopy (a.k.a. Philosophy) study of positive phenomena in
general without need of special experiences/experiments, phenomena such as
anybody at any moment will find before his/her notice http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/cenoscopy.html
THEN
3. Idioscopy (a.k.a. Special Sciences) -- study of positive
phenomena in their various classes and resorting to special
experiences/experiments.
I append quotes from Peirce at the Commens Dictionary of Peirce's
Terms (Edited by Mats Bergman Sami Paavola) http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html
Entries under "grammar, speculative," "grammar, universal,"
"grammar, formal," "grammar, general."
Best, Ben
"... I extend logic to embrace all the necessary principles of semeiotic,
and I recognize a logic of icons, and a logic of indices, as well as a logic of
symbols; and in this last I recognize three divisions: Stecheotic (or
stoicheiology), which I formerly called Speculative
Grammar; Critic, which I formerly called Logic; and
Methodeutic, which I formerly called Speculative Rhetoric."
('Phaneroscopy', CP 4.9, c. 1906)
"... a speculative rhetoric, the science of the essential conditions
under which a sign may determine an interpretant sign of itself and of whatever
it signifies, or may, as a sign, bring about a physical result. [---]In the
Roman schools, grammar, logic, and rhetoric were felt to be akin and to make up
a rounded whole called the trivium. This feeling was just; for the three essential branches of semeiotics, of
which the first, called speculative
grammar by Duns Scotus, studies the ways in which an object can be a
sign; the second, the leading part of logic, best termed speculative
critic, studies the ways in which a sign can be related to the object
independent of it that it represents; while the third is the speculative
rhetoric just mentioned." ('Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific
Writing', EP 2:326-327, 1904)
"All thought being performed by means of signs, logic may be regarded as the science of the
general laws of signs. It has three branches: (1) Speculative Grammar, or the general theory
of the nature and meanings of signs, whether they be icons, indices, or
symbols; (2) Critic, which classifies arguments and determines the
validity and degree of force of each kind; (3) Methodeutic, which studies
the methods that ought to be pursued in the investigation, in the exposition,
and in the application of truth. Each division depends on that which precedes
it." ('A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:260, 1903)
"Logic, which began historically,
and in each individual still begins, with the wish to distinguish good and bad
reasonings, develops into a general theory of signs. Its three departments are
the physiological, or Speculative
Grammar; its classificatory part, judging particularly what
reasoning is good and what bad, or Logical Critic; and finally,
Methodeutic, or the principles of the production of valuable courses of
research and exposition." ('A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP
2:272, 1903)
"Logic is the science of the
general necessary laws of Signs and especially of Symbols. As
[peirce-l] Re: peirce-l digest: May 11, 2006
Jerry, Gary Richmond's view doesn't technically contradict Gary F.'s statements, since Gary F.'s statements were qualified by the possibility of somebody's producing evidence, though Gary F. obviously seemed doubtful about the idea of the chemical connection. I felt kind of doubtful too, though I myself have been aware of people's calling Peirce's theory about monads, dyads, triads, a valency theory. Actually I wish I'd asked Gary Richmond about it when he included the valency theory language in a presentation which he wrote which I produced for him in PowerPoint http://members.door.net/arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/pr-main.htm#richmond . At the time, I just kind of assumed vaguely...well, I don't know what I was thinking. I was thinking about how I was making the presentation look kind of spacy and the closing theme from the old Fireball XL5 TV show was much in my mind. I'm so deep sometimes. Anyway, if Gary R. says that Peirce made the chemistry connection explicit in some passages in his writings, then I'd assume that Peirce did so. Of course, those would be some interesting passages to read! Unfortunately, Gary R. has been very busy lately. But I'll ask him later because I'm curious to read them too. I've been kind of busy myself, or I'd have responded sooner. I started off writing a reply to Jim Piat and it got so long that I may never send it. The Reduction Thesis is: All relations of more than three elements are reducible to triadic relations, but triadic relations are not reducible to dyadic and monadic relations. Best, Ben Udell [Ben] Off-list, Gary Richmond, who's quite busy, sent me this: 66~~ Chemistry expresses itself in Peirce's valency theory (the term is not his but Ken Ketner's who hasn't been given enough credit yet for his work in this area, something you hinted hadn't been developed in Pierce, etc.). In any event, see the reduction thesis at work in organic chemistry here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Organic_nomenclature Trichotomy, the reduction thesis, the development of EGs, etc. all come from Peirce's knowledge of and work in chemistry. In some writings he makes this explicit. ~~99 [Jerry] This is a curious paragraph. It is too terse for me to understand it. The first sentence is ambiguous to me. In particular, what is the reference for the term, reduction thesis in this context? Chemical names are assigned on the basis of a constructive thesis, as study of the indicated web address will indicate. This post apparently contradicts Gary F.'s views. Can someone untangle the intended communication? Cheers Jerry --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Dear Jim, list, One thing is that I wouldn't underrate the importance of the conception of resistance/reaction -- I wouldn't replace it with location. Location has a lot to do with resistance and reaction! Space, shortest distances, straight lines, least action, fields, -- there's quite a set of interrelated ideas there, for my part I wish I knew how to untangle them, but there they are. In talking about the meaning of the object, it's hard not to take the object as a sign. Seed as sign of the tree to come. But if the idea of a tree is the interpretant, and the seed is the sign, what is the semiotic object? As far as I can tell, the semiotic object needs to be some already given thing taken as topic. In some cases, maybe it's hard to be more specific about the semiotic obect than simply to say, well, the world, existence, is the semiotic object, or maybe the world's future, if that future is taken for granted as being at least going to happen, as vague as that future may currently be. If the future tree is taken for granted, and we're looking at the seed for info about what kind of tree, then the tree in its vague, unclassified aspect, would seem to be the semiotic object. But there's no getting at those things without taking into account not only location and properties, but also the ifs, ands, and buts, and novelty, and probabilities, and feasibilities and optima -- all that stuff pertaining to whetherhoods, modalities, alternatives, etc., which matter in referring to a thing, and which aren't really properties or locations. Yet sometimes these iffy things seem to semi-congeal to a kind of property or modification of a thing, I think particularly of its value, the difference that it would make, for a living thing. In what state a thing would be proven as to its value or otherwise -- the legitimacy or legitimation of a thing as being whatever it's supposed to be. And as a symbol can symbolize value (connotatively/comprehensionally, I suppose) and whetherhoods (logical relation, alteration of comprehension), it can even symbolize legitimacy, accreditation, status, as yet another kind of modification, even if it does not in fact confer legitimacy; and it can also symbolize shifts of denotation, a thing's or various things' mapping to another thing or things, and these mappings are also not really locations or properties of the thing. I admit this is getting murky. I just have to call it a night! Anyway, thanks for your further thoughts. Best as always, Ben - Original Message - From: Jim Piat [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Saturday, May 06, 2006 10:28 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? Dear Ben, Folks-- I'm just back from a walk and thought a bit more about what we are discussing. I'd like to try to clear up a couple of things I presently poorly. First, I said whew in response to one of your comments. I meant something more like Wow! Objects are refered to in terms of either their properties or their locations. Locations seems to mean -- geographically and historically, up through the point of identifying which things they are. Also in terms of whether and with or despite what ifs, ands, or buts, what novelty, what probability, what feasibility optima, they did/do/will/would have their identities modifications. Also rankings, convertibility, quantity, arrangement, etc., as what relatively or correlatively to other objects Alone, neither definition adequately conveys the meaning of an object. In the case of location what is missing is an account of an object's qualities and what they connote. Obviously knowing that we are refering to an object that is located at such and such a place tells us very little about the meaning of that object unless we have collateral experience with the object itself. On the other hand the meaning or consequences of an object does depend in part on its context or location. A police officer located in a squad car seen from your rear view mirror as you are speeding down the highway means something quite different than that same officer located a the local dunkin donuts having coffee. Symbols are objects that perform a very special function. They represent other objects. For one object to represent another the lst object called a sign must accomplish two distinct functions. First the sign must indicate which or what object it is representing. As discussed above, two aspects of the object being represented must be refered to or indicated. First the location of the object being represented must be indicated. Second the properties or qualites of the object being represented must be identified. The usual way of indicating the location of an object is by somehow calling attention to this location. This can be done in a number of ways but the common element they all share is directing our senses to the
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Jim, list, Ben wrote: (Beginning with a quote from my earlier remarks) [Jim] One can indicate the location of an object (or at least to its center of gravity). An object which perfoms this function is called an index. One can not readily point to the quality or form an object because form is not a matter of the object's location but of how the object is organized in space and time. [Ben] To the contrary, I think that one can and does point out a form, run one's finger around it, and point out qualities, shine lights on them, and so forth. One can point things out in music while the music is playing. Spatial form is especially subject to being traced out. And the presentation of an icon requires pointing out the icon itself. It was greenish-blue -- like this thing here. [Jim] Well, here we differ. I maintain that it is extremely important to keep in mind the conceptual distinction between Peircean firstness (quality or form) and secondness (reaction or inertia). I further believe that all those aspects of an object which we refer to as its qualities are a manifestation of the object's form which in turn I believe is equivalent to the object's organization in space and time. In turn I contend that an object's inertia mass or resistance to movement is in effect a matter of its location in space and time. The idea of a thing's relative spatiotemporal location's giving it its inertial and gravitational properties was proposed by Mach in physics but has not won general acceptance. [Jim] I think this analogy works both figuratively and literally. But apart from whether one accepts this physical analogy there remains a concpetual distinction between form and location which I think you have conflated in your example above. In your example of pointing out an objects form musically or spatially what you have illustrated in not form per se but the location of an object whose form you wish to highlight. One locates an object that has form but form itself can not be pointed to as having a specific location because form is a matter of organziation not merely location. This sounds like you're talking not about pointing out a form, pointing out its various parts, but about pointing out the _idea_ of form, or pointing out an idealized abstracted form in the sense of its not having a singular location. Now if somebody doesn't get that I'm pointing at the quality rather than the thing, then it may be a challenge to get the idea across, and other blue things may be helpful. If I want to point out the form as a separable idea, then icons are a good way to go too. But I may be concerned to point the form out but not as either an individual thing or as a qualitative appearance. Now, whether the setting is in a specific concrete place or in a vague somewhere or a general anywhere, once you're there, the form consists in the relationality among the locations, to which you can point and, more importantly, which point to one another, and the form is the very balance holding among those mutual pointings-at. From among hundreds of stars you point out seven bright ones to somebody, and have thereby pointed out the constellation which they make, and they point at one another in such a way as to make it easier for the observer to pick them out. Insofar as the form consists in mutual pointings, it shouldn't be considered a quality like blue. The main difference between a structure of force and movement, and an unbalanced force or movement, is just that -- balance imbalance. Force and momentum are *distance* quantities (in a sense that mass, energy, and power are not), and are alliances of magnitude with *direction*, and, when various forces or motions are opposite to one another, and to the extent that they're collectively balanced, they make a structure, with aspects positional, kinetic, static, dyanamic. A structure is essentially an arrangement of forces or motions which are balanced, stably or unstably, such that any unbalanced portion of the force or motion is attributed to the force or motion of the observed system as a whole with respect to an observer at rest. Differently moving observers will therefore divide external motion (potential actual) from internal motion (potential or actual) differently! So as different as they are by being internal and external, inside and outside, these things are the same thing in complementary modes, each is the other inside out. The form may be abstracted unto diagramhood, where the parts are denoting each other. That's beyond concerns with quality of appearance or with location with respect to the observer. [Jim] Form refers to the relative location of parts of whole not to the overall location of the whole itself. Conversely location is not a matter of form because location can have a unique center of gravity or focus which can be pointed to or denoted. Note that Peirce treats indexicality in terms
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Gary F, list, [Gary] I've been following this thread with great interest -- following in the sense that it's always a step or two ahead of me! But i'd like to insert something with reference to Ben's question about words like not, probably, if, etc. [Gary] I don't think it is helpful to consider such words as signs; rather they constitute part of a sign's internal structure, the sign proper being a statement, sentence, or proposition -- or minimally, what Peirce calls a term. In linguistics, words like if are sometimes called structure words as opposed to content words, a distinction that is sharper than it may appear at first glance. Structure words, such as conjunctions, appear in closed classes with a relatively small membership. In English, for instance, there are probably less than a hundred prepositions (even counting those no longer in current use), and the addition of a new preposition to the language is extremely rare, compared to the frequency with which we add new nouns, verbs and adjectives (those being open classes). The structure words sound like that which Jon Awbrey once quoted Peirce calling pure symbols -- and, or, of. The paucity of structure words, especially those of the syntactical kind which I've been discussing, is quite understandable. In one or another old file marked Don't Look! (please look) some of us have sets of invented syntactical words and if you have that, then you know how difficult it is actually to use them, even privately. Playing with the skeletal system of ordinary language is uncomfortable. Some languages like German don't even regularly form distinct adverbs. We're likelier to invent exactly defined syntactical written symbols (like the arrow) than words, and otherwise we make do with abstractions. Signs are built into complex signs and it wouldn't be helpful to have a level of internal structure where semiotics must dispense with its usual conceptions in order to reach. As the more complex signs are built, those internal structural links are expanded; they don't stay out of sight. Representational relations are internal, in a way; or if representational relations are an external character or effect of a sign, then the qualities (which they alternate, attribute, impute, etc.) are internal characters, internal resources of a sign, which sounds good, since now it sounds like I'm describing symbol and icon, respectively, in a reasonably recognizable way. One way or another, each is the other turned inside out, like probability and statistics, or like linear energy and rest mass. The more habitually we divide them, the more we make it take a person with crazy hair to reunite them. Now, Peirce has already included representational (logical) relations as a fundamental category. And he has a class of signs -- symbols -- which represent by reference to representational relations embodied as an interpretant. Symbols are amazingly versatile and can represent abundant objects and qualities. I don't see why we can't regard them as sometimes directly representing representational relations as well, rather than treating representational relations as some sort of virtual particles to be barely glimpsed in the midst of other goings-on. I've been discussing the not, if, etc., as pretty straightforward generalized ways of altering (not merely modifying) comprehension and discussing the symbol as pretty much telling the interpretant to negate, probabilize, logically condition, etc., a given predicate or proposition. The symbol does so as representing, and determined by, its object. And I think that Jim got it right with what I called his treating not as an elliptical not Once we apply not to blue, we have a comprehension and denotation for the new predicate not blue. But we don't have a way to describe the representational contribution of the not itself. Now, I'm not against looking at classes and all that, but I'd like the description to be true to the experience that I have when I simply say the word not. I'm not sure how to see this as some sort of 2nd-order comprehension or denotation, and I think of it as a kind of transcomprehensioning, which sounds 2nd-orderish or 2nd-intentional, but not remains a 1st-order term indispensable at any level (or you could make do with not both...and... but in the end it's the same thing). [Gary] Another relevant distinction from linguistics is between semantics and syntax. If we want to study what (or how) how closed-class words mean, then we have to focus mainly on syntax, or the structure of utterances as determined not by objects denoted or qualities signified but by the structure of the language itself. That's another reason to regard signs for representational relations as symbols. The symbol is a sign defined by its effect on the interpretant in virtue only of an established rule or habit (e.g., that of an animal species or a human culture) (a rule or habit of
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Gary F., list An addendum [Gary] Another relevant distinction from linguistics is between semantics and syntax. If we want to study what (or how) how closed-class words mean, then we have to focus mainly on syntax, or the structure of utterances as determined not by objects denoted or qualities signified but by the structure of the language itself. [Ben] That's another reason to regard signs for representational relations as symbols. The symbol is a sign defined by its effect on the interpretant in virtue only of an established rule or habit (e.g., that of an animal species or a human culture) (a rule or habit of treating an icon as an icon or an index as an index doesn't count toward making it a symbol). So when the symbol's purpose is contribute a representational relation, then the circle just gets drawn somewhat smaller. Now these sound like the pure symbols that were a source of much argument here a while back. I don't think that a mind, or anything which could be called a sub-mind (in a dialogical sense), could get by (though some algebraists supposedly don't do so badly) purely on symbols, let alone, purely on pure symbols. I would like to add that, insofar as semiotics is not confined to the study of ordinary language, it is more open to taking into account linguistic structure influences coming from the nature of logical and mathematical challenges and how these challenges are met. Aerodynamic challenges influence the evolution of flying animals; information-theoretic problems influence biological phenomena. Issues of inference and reason, logical structures, influence rational beings in their evolution personal, societal, maybe biological. When the objects denoted are representational relations, these determine signs and interpretants in the resulting semiosis. The conception of semiotic object is obviously correlated with the conceptions of substance, subject, resistance/reaction, etc., but that correlation is not an equation, and there is no obvious reason for a representational relation _not_ to serve as a semiotic object, even though it's not a tangible resistance or whatever. When one's language and thought have representational relations as semiotic objects, one's language and thought open themselves to being determined by them toward one's understanding and knowing about representational relations. This is an influence by something more than culture, even if it is through culture, an influence by something more than culture to the extent that representational relations are not idiosyncratic, arbitrary human or cultural phenomena or inventions. Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Joe, list, I had a thought about an topic from February 2006. - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Friday, February 10, 2006 9:32 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? [Ben] Yet attributions, ascriptions, copulations, distributions, etc., etc., of predicates to subjects, or of accidents to substances, or of qualities to reactions, all have a certain similarity and parallelism. Then when we associate connotation in one way with firstness, quality, iconicity and, in another way, with thirdness, meaning/implication/entailment, we get confused. Or at least I get confused. [Joe] That is exactly the confusion that I was trying to express, Ben. I've come to think that the mistake here is to associate connotation generally with firstness, quality, iconicity on account possibly mainly of the prominence of the case of a descriptive predicate term, the case which has been the focus of the connotation x denotation = information discussions. If the connotation is, as Peirce says elsewhere, the meaning or significance which gets formed into the interpretant, then we should recognize -- as equally valid modes of connotation along with the connoting of a quality -- symbolic designation of an object, and the symbolizing of a representational relation. In a way, the real odd man out is _denotation._ Not that the conception of denotation isn't valid. sign icon -- resembling, portraying | interpretant - | symbol - | evoking, connoting object -- index - pointing at, pointing to The main difference between Peirce's account of connotation the everyday logical account, is that he at least sometimes equates connotation with significance, significance presumably including implication, while the everyday account, I think, tends to equate connotation with meaning in the sense of _acceptation_ (and perhaps with a meaning arising in an obvious way through a compounding of acceptations). For what it's worth, it also seems to me that, if an evocation/connotation distinction is to be made, it might be better made between that which is evoked information and that which is evoked (soever informatively) as subject matter or as a given. Under this account, icons and indices would generally not _connote_, though they easily _evoke_. Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Joe, Gary, list, Gary's very busy right now but he sent me some interesting Peirce quotes on connotation, reminding me that this was not his favored word for intension or depth. It appears that the original meaning of "connote" was actually less far from the present-day literary meaning (and also from "evoke") than from the present-day philosophical meaning. I do seem to remember Peirce's equating connotation with significance at some point, but, if he did so, thenprobably it was a concession to some audience, and probably was accompanied by note as to its not really being the right word. In one interesting passage Peirce characterizes four aspects of signification (1) the indispensable signification -- the essentials, amounting to the definition or acceptation (2) the banal signification -- further data but not newsworthy or informative but instead redundant to the given interpreter (3) the informational signification --which IS news to the given interpreter (4) the complete signification -- all valid predicates of the term My putative two-way distinction made using the words "evoke" and "connote" didn't do justice to that. My "connote" would go with the indispensable signification and my "evoke" with the informational signification, but the banal signification seems falls between the cracks that I left. Well, I'll have to do some more serious terminological exploration if I want to pursue choosing verbs for these various aspects of signifying. Anyway, while I'm at it, I've made a few syntatically stylistically desperately needed corrections, between astrisks in blue, to my own previous post, after Gary's quotes from Peirce. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: "Gary Richmond" [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: "Benjamin Udell" [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Wednesday, May 03, 2006 5:52 PM Subject: SIGNIFICATION AND APPLICATION "In a nutshell" Peirce: CP 2.317 Fn P1 p 182 Cross-Ref:†† †P1 Mill's term connote is not very accurate. Connote properly means to denote along with in a secondary way. Thus "killer" connotes a living thing killed. When the scholastics said that an adjective connoted, they meant it connoted the abstraction named by the corresponding abstract noun. But the ordinary use of an adjective involves no reference to any abstraction. The word signify has been the regular technical term since the twelfth century, when John of Salisbury (Metalogicus, II, xx) spoke of "quod fere in omnium ore celebre est, aliud scilicet esse quod appellativa (i.e., adjectives) significant, et aliud esse quod nominant. Nominantur singularia (i.e., existent individual things and facts), sed universalia (i.e., Firstnesses) significantur." See my paper of Nov. 13, 1867 [next chapter], to which I might now [1902] add a multitude of instances in support of what is here said concerning connote and signify. Peirce: CP 2.431 Cross-Ref:†† SIGNIFICATION AND APPLICATION †1 431. These are substitute terms for what are called by Mill and others connotation and denotation; for (1) the previously well-established use of connote was somewhat warped by Mill and his followers, and (2) these words may be applied to the corresponding properties of propositions as well as terms. The application of a term is the collection of objects which it refers to; of a proposition it is the instances of its holding good. The signification of a term is all the qualities which are indicated by it; of a proposition it is all its different implications. Peirce: CP 2.432 Cross-Ref:†† 432. Great confusion has arisen in logic from failing to distinguish between the different sorts of signification, or connotation, of a term: thus to the question, Are proper names connotative? "contradictory answers are given by ordinarily clear thinkers as being obviously correct," for the reason that they have not the same thing in mind under the term connotation. It is necessary to distinguish between; (1) the indispensable signification; (2) the banal signification; (3) the informational signification; and (4) the complete signification. (1) is so much as is contained in whatever may be fixed upon as the definition of the term--all those elements of the meaning in the absence of any one of which the name would not be applied; (2) is what "goes without saying," what is known to every one, and (3) is what there is occasion to give utterance to: these, of course, vary with the different individuals to whom the proposition is given out--that oxygen is exhilarating is informational to the student of chemistry, and banal to the teacher of chemistry (but false to those who are familiar with the latest results of the science); (4) consists of all the valid predicates of the term in question. When I say, "The one I saw yesterday was John Peter," the indispensable signi
[peirce-l] Re: Fw: What is Category Theory?
Joe, list, The popular discussions of category theory on the Internet haven't helped me very much. Apparently the basic explanational problem is that it's based on higher math, so it's just hard to explain. I once asked a singularity theorist, okay, it's about categories, so what are the results? The results? Yes, what _are_ the most basic categories? Well, it's not that kind of theory. I'm unsure whether he was correct about that. One piece of info which I eventually sought and could not find until I asked John Sowa, was this: Is an antiderivative (a.k.a. indefinite integral) a morphism? In general, is a relation which maps one value of x to more than one value of y, a morphism? The answer is, _no_. The answer is also _no_ for a many-to-many relation such as x^2 + y^2 = 1. A morphism is one-to-one, e.g., f(x) = x+2, or many-to-one, e.g., f(x) = x^4. Best, Ben Udell - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Friday, April 28, 2006 12:49 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Fw: What is Category Theory? Does anybody know anything about category theory in math, which is what the book in the forwarded message below is about. What is it? Does it actually have any philosophical interest? Is it relevant to Peirce? Joe Ransdell --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce and Prigogine
List, Just wanted to note that I'm having second thoughts about the idea that decay is not an end! But I'll keep it at least somewhat short because Jerry LR Chandler's post looks interesting. (I read some things at http://www.hyle.org/ (philosophy of chemistry) a few years ago, including something on chemical symbols. If anybody thinks that the subject lacks philosophical interest, that's one place to find some, though he probably knows of others.) Now, I said that decay might be considered a kind of material end, a telic aspect of the material cause, but that it's not really a final cause. I lost sight of the fact material cause should not be considered synonymous with physical matter. *Correlations, NOT equations*: momenta forces - efficient cause -- forces, dynamics, mechanics (rest) mass, internal power - material cause -- physical matter, chemistry energy, power final cause - life internally balanced momenta forces -- formal cause --- intelligent life Now, I see little reason that the sun's radiating of energy should not be considered an end, an effect which goes toward making the sun what it is, never mind whether it serves any living thing or not, and be the sun's radiative end soever resource-like and means-like from a biggest-picture viewpoint. Physically material non-living systems tend to have characteristic effects which are ways of decaying. The kinds of ends for which an organism is specialized organized goes very much farther than that, it is true. Usually when we think of the final cause, we often think of an organism's nature's elaborate dependences on functions homeostatic, exploitive, reproductive. This sort of thing does go well beyond the sun's radiating. And, likewise, the kinds of final states and entelechies into which on the basis of which an intelligence builds evolves seem to go very much farther than physical non-living or even vegetable-level biological structures. Yet one would hardly deny that merely physical-material and merely biological things partake of those settled, final states that we call structures. So why deny that the sun has a characteristic effect? It's that we tend to think of the final cause in a biocentric way. So, the end stands out like a sore thumb from among efficient, matter, form all considered merely physically -- the end seems higher than they. If we just said actional cause or something like that, instead of end, it wouldn't seem automatically higher. We don't tend to think of the formal cause in a biocentric, much less an intelligence-centric way. Yet sometimes some of us do think of form in that way. Although I've said that Peirce didn't see semiosis embodied in the nonhuman physical world, he did at least once say that _mind_ is at work in the growth of crystals and in the work of bees (I assume he meant the honeycombs -- the language of bees wasn't understood back then). He even says ...at any time, however, an element of pure chance survives and will remain until the world becomes an absolutely perfect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which Mind is at last crystallized in the infinitely distant future (CP: 6.33). (Incidentally, note that Peirce says infinitely distant future.) If we think of the causes in a human way, we think of (1) decisions efforts, (2) means resources, (3) ends, aims, (4) solidifications, confirmations (epistemic or ontic), etc. A structure can be a living, intelligent record, an evolvable stability of tensions releasable and renovatable in agency. The sore thumb issue pretty much fades. Likewise the sore thumb issue fades if one considers the causes as associated with successive levels -- (1) forces (2) matter (3) function (4) knowledge. Of course, it's hard to consider knowledge as a cause by itself, without function, and there's no reason to regard it that way, any more than one would consider function without matter or dynamics. But to bring into relief what knowledge brings to the causal table, just consider the roles of knowledge expectations in a market. However, I'd also note (going in the other direction), that the study of dyanamic mechanical systems seems to uncover a level at which decay doesn't occur (e.g., a pure quantum system), and where the ends would instead be, I suppose, various ways of conserving quantities in interactions. 1. mechanics, forces (variational principles ( inverse-varational processes?)) -- conservation (efficient causes emphasized, sensitive dependence on initial conditions) 2. thermodynamics, matter (stochastic processes) -- decay (material causes emphasized, averaging-out or steadying dependence on intermediate-stage conditions) 3. life (information processes) -- growth (final causes emphasized, corrective perfective dependence on resultant conditions) 4. evolution intelligent life (inference processes) -- growth decay, recycling
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce and Prigogine
Gary, Actually, you weren't taking too much for granted, at least not with most of the listers, only with ignorant me. I think most listers have either read Prigogine or read discussions about him. I have a book of his somewhere but haven't read it. [Gary] However i still don't find anything in Peirce resembling current notions of self-organizing processes, nonequilibrium thermodynamics, or dissipative structures. It is hard to find discussions by Peirce about energy. Perhaps it's because he regarded energy as idioscopic, a topic for the special sciences, special experiences experiments. Now, Peirce did regard Archimedean mechanics as sufficiently general to be a part of cenoscopy (a.k.a. philosophy), a part very close to idioscopy (a.k.a. the special sciences) yet, nonetheless, cenosopic. I've tried to argue in the past that the special-relativistic conception of energy other kinetic and kinematic quantities can be rooted in sufficiently general considerations (at least apart from its arbitrary aspects, e.g.,lightspeed's size in conventional units and its size in relation to other fundamental physical quantities) to make energy, etc., worth a Peircean philosopher's while. I'm not entirely satisfied with my arguments since they seem like maybe they rely too much on science-historical hindsight and also since, in the end, intelligences like ours can't really phenomenologize to the concepts but instead must imagine (as Einstein indeed did) that one were capable at any moment of having experience and observation of relativistic accelerations just as we do of the kinds of motion in Archimedean mechanics -- accelerations and speed differences which, for merely technical reasons, we never personally and directly experience or observe at all. Since confining philosophy within this kind of merely technical limitation would make philosophy quite variable in its boundaries dependently on the nature and physical abilities of the beings pursuing it, I tend to be willing to rely on artifices of the imagination, along with the explicit qualification that that's what I'm doing. So there remains to improve the argument that special relativity has sufficient roots in mathematical and general considerations about experience in general, to warrant general philosophy's use of conceptions of energy and other such quantities. For that purpose, a key postulate to look at in relativity is that of the existence constancy of the signal speed limit (its constancy consisting of (a) its universality across all events and (b) its invariance across all inertial frames); the postulate of it as such a natural yardstick helps lead to a common system of measurement of space and time (miles light-miles; light-years years, etc.) and thence to the unification of space time, and therefore of the kinematic quantities, and also of the kinetic quantities. The very consideration of such a unification is philosophically attractive, and the very idea of a signal speed limit seems a possibility of sufficiently general character as to have been worth at least philosophical attention well before Einstein, but it seems that nobody thought of it. And, obviously it would not have taken hold among physicists, or at least would have taken much longer to draw their serious attention, if observations had not in fact been coming into conflict with Newtonian physics. If it is true that Peircean philosophy resists dealing with conceptions of energy because of the idioscopicity of Newtonian physics, then the doorway for Peircean philosophy for really coming to grips with conceptions of energy and, for instance, dissipative structures is through relativity. Special relativity, at least. (As little as I actually know about special relativity, I know even less about general relativity, so I just have to keep mum on that subect). And it's not as if relativistic questions were so relevant to questions about dissipative structures! You wrote to Victoria: [Gary] Yes; and here i think your final state is equivalent to Peirce's entelechy, which is not the final cause of creation but the *object* of it, the final cause itself being a symbol, according to the penultimate paragraph of New Elements (EP2, 324): [[[ A chaos of reactions utterly without any approach to law is absolutely nothing; and therefore pure nothing was such a chaos. Then pure indeterminacy having developed determinate possibilities, creation consisted in mediating between the lawless reactions and the general possibilities by the influx of a symbol. This symbol was the purpose of creation. Its object was the entelechy of being which is the ultimate representation. ]]] This is a difficult passage in Peirce. I don't know, but I would not take for granted that this is an ultimate version of his picture of final causes and entelechies in general, If it is, then for Peirce any final cause is a symbol for a representation entelechic
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce and Prigogine
Bill, Thank you. Talking about cause effect does seem a bit of an art and when I think about it too much, I tend to feel like I'm on thin ice. With other factors held the same, when one wiggles something x, and something y behaves in some corresponding manner and otherwise does not, then we say that what we do to x causes what y does. This is so general that it is applicable to laws. Somebody asks -- why did the asteroid curve its path as it neared Earth? Well _there_ -- another responds -- the law of gravity comes into play. With other factors held equal, the gravity law's coming or not coming into play, determines whether the asteroid's path curves or not. At least in some representation in the mind. So there the law of gravity, taken as something that could have been different _at least as far as a person knew_, seems to that person like a cause, a why. But once the law of gravity is taken as established and one is not in any particular doubt as to whether it comes into play or not, then the law seems merely descriptive, telling you how, telling you what is made to be, telling you what is necessary, but not why. Instead we ask, why does gravity happen? Why does space curve? What, that could have been different at least as far as we know, makes those things or happenings? (And that phrase that could have been different at least as far as we know involves vagueness across the ontic the epistemic.) I'm not actually so pleased with the idea of the cause-effect conception's dissolving into a relativity to viewpoint, but I take some comfort in the fact that relativity theory is itself somewhat less relativistic then some suppose. (There's the signal speed limit which is a constant, and there's the center of gravity, in terms of which, for instance, it does make sense to say that the Solar System's center is in the Sun.). I think some solid ground as to causes and effects can be reached by distinguishing epistemic vagueness from ontic variability. In other words, if exclusively the wife's nagging regularly leads to the husband's withdrawal, then there's cause and effect appearing within a given context. If the husband's withdrawal actually precedes the nagging, then it is false that exclusively the wife's nagging leads to the husband's withdrawal. The conceptions involved seem actually pretty good as long as we don't treat their articulate application as being automatically confirmatory enough to preclude the need for further observation of a represented situation. (I.e., don't believe everything you read!). This is why I sometimes think it's just as well that English is spelt so irregularly and deceptively. Perhaps it breeds a healthy distrust and ambivalence toward the written word in the young who strive for years to master it. :-). Seriously, though, I find the questions dizzying, so tied up are they with those which you point out, questions of context, time-slice, and indeed questions of what is in question and what isn't in question -- all these epistemic issues -- yet epistemic issues which somehow also reflect reality in their structure. Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Bill Bailey [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2006 4:41 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Peirce and Prigogine Ben, I liked your post. In any analysis of process, cause-effect relationships are created by our puctuations--which in turn inevitably result from our local (space and time) interests. Time slices can be so misleading. Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson (Pragmatics of Human Communication) wrote of such punctuation in analysis of communication. The wife nags and the husband withdraws. Ah! Cause and effect. However, had we sliced the transaction a bit earlier, we'd have seen the husband's withdrawn attitudes toward the wife precede the nagging. So how do we locate cause and effect in a system? In some some applications, such as communication systems, it is better to talk about the hows rather than the whats of the system. It's about the same as describing the increase of body temperature as the normal response of the body to invading bacteria rather than saying bacterial infections cause a fever. Unless the nature of the system is understood, all sorts of false causes may lurk behind the conventional cause-effect assignments. Ben wrote, in part: Now, the Peircean idea is that the laws followed by agents are the ends, and are defining and general -- as if a particular end were some sort of oxymoron. I think it simply hamstrings analysis, if one rigidly conflates the four causes with distinctions between individual general rather than drawing, at best, parallelisms founded in some underlying relationship, and, as always, I wonder what possible basis or justification there could be for appealing, in basic issues, to a distinction between individual general without also taking into account
[peirce-l] Re: Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from Peircean elements topic)
France, list [Frances] My position is to generally agree with Peirce and pragmatism, to include the trichotomic structure of the phenomenal categories. One metaphysical thorn for me however is whether all the things in the world as posited by Peirce are indeed phenomenal, or rather if there is a nomenal and epiphenomenal aspect of the world that brackets the phenomenal aspect of the world. If this trident of the menal world were so, then the phenomenal aspect would be a dyadic dichotomy. Now, if there were things in the nomenal and epiphenomenal aspects, such as ephemeral spirits like gods and ghosts and angels or supereal aliens like unicorns and androids, then the only way they can be sensed and so be real is analogously as phenomena and then by way of existent objects that act as representational signs. Phenomenally, the referred objects of existent signs can be abstract possibles, or concrete actuals, or discrete necessary agreeables in the collective sense. This however need not have anything to do with things that may not be existent or even phenomenal at all. There is another twist here for me in that the dyadic phenomenal world of phanerons and representamens might be held in a Peircean way as synechastically continuent and semiosically existent. Now, if there are continuent things in the phenomenal world, such as mere fleeting essences, then the only way these can be sensed and so be real is analogously as existents and then by way of objects or representamens that act as signs. Under such a scheme and to be categorically consistent, phenomenal continuents would be things as attributed essences, while phenomenal existents would be objects as manifested synechastic substances and then objects as exemplified semiotic presences. This speculative scheme implies to me that there are continuent and existent representamens that are not signs, and even existent objects that are not signs. In the phenomenal world, there are seemingly for Peirce continuent synechastic representamens that are not signs and there are existent semiosic representamens that are signs. No. Peirce said that there might be representamens that are not signs, but he was anything but sure of it. Furthermore the representamen would involve semiosis without a mind's involvement. The sign, on the other hand, is considered to be involved in semiosis only in virtue of the involvement of a mind (or quasimind). Thus the nonliving material world is full of things which count as signs in virtue of the fact that minds or quasiminds do or could interpret them, though the nonliving material world does not embody semioses. So those are signs without semiosis except as continued in observant minds (or quasiminds). It is the _representamen_, not the sign, which has semiosis without a mind and it was only a conjecture by Peirce on the basis of which he allowed of a distinction between sign and representamen which he eventually abandoned. [Frances] The world is thus perfused with representamens,... Not for Peirce under the sign-representamen distinction, under which the world is perfused with signs and only conjecturably has any non-sign representamens at all -- that the world would, furthermore be perfused with non-sign representamens is much farther-reaching conjecture, one which you're certainly allowed to make, but it is not Peirce's. [Frances] ...but the world for mind is only virtually and analogously perfused with representamens that are signs. Phenomena and representamens that are not signs cannot be directly sensed or known by mind to be real, but rather they must first be sensed and represented and interpreted with signs. What is unsensed and unknown is not noumena or factuality or existence, but rather is the reality of those entities. It is not yet fully clear to me if these suggestions are supported by an interpretation of Peircean philosophy. They don't really seem compatible with Peircean philosophy since, if by nomena you mean noumena, these are ruled out in Peircean phillosophy. Peirce holds that that, which is hidden, often enough doesn't stay hidden and instead reaches out and touches us, indeed strikes us, and that pertains to Peircean Secondness. [Frances] On the term continuent as used by me, it is derived from the ideas continuendo and continuando. Continuents are things that precede existents as objects in the evolving world of phenomenal phanerents or phanerons or phanerisms. They may become embedded or embodied within existents as attributed qualitative essences, but only if evolution takes them that far. They are a constituent state of phenomena. As an act of continuity engaged in by a continuum, the contin[u]ent is a global continuendo that may also be specified as a particular continuando. All continuents are the result of a disposed habit in law on the part of phenomenons or phenomena to continue with
[peirce-l] Re: Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from Peircean elements topic)
Frances, list, It's a bit hard to respond to this because, though it's okay for you to disagree with Peirce, you do so in ways that are vague to me; I don't really see clearly the viewpoint which you hold, so it's hard for me to address it. For instance, you say things like "...which signs then stand analogously for other things that may not be objects or signs, such as essences or unicorns or angels." Peirce is willing to treat, as objects and signs, such things as essences, unicorns (as objects signs in a fictional world), and angels (whether angels would be treated as fiction, fact, or indeterminate, would depend on the semiotician, but still they would be signs semiotic objects). You've clarified your use of the word "synechastic" somewhat, though not enough, and you still haven't defined "continuent," which is a hard one to figure out, especially with its anti-etymological "-ent" ending (the form would normally be "continuant"; I'm not saying that one shouldalways use correct Latin participle forms, but please define and explain "continuent."). Things ofthese kinds make people worry that we're being subjected to a Sokal test of some kind http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/. You wrote, "These guesses of mine about the topical issues at hand may possibly go to avoiding the logical or semiotical contradictions that your theory of the recognizant seems fearful." I don't know how to address them as _*possibly*_ going to avoiding the logical or semiotical contradictions which I've tried to spotlight. They seem to start from the assumption, that triadicity trichotomicality must be preserved, ergo how, possibly, might the recognizant aka agnoscent (the collaterally based experiential recognition of sign interpretant in respect of the object) be accommodated in the triadistic or trichotomistic framework? I don't know how to respond to them except to say that, if the agnoscent is logically determined or determining but is not logically determined or determining in the role of object, sign, and interpretant, then it is a fourth semiotic element, and that won't be changed by anyshifting of the agnoscent into some other division of logic; rather it will be "changed," or the idea of it will be defeated, by defeating the idea that semiotic triadic sufficiency means that anything which is logically determinational is logically determinational in the role of object, sign, or interpretant, and/or by defeating the idea that the agnoscent is logically determinational and/or by defeating the idea that the agnoscentis neither interpretant nor sign nor semiotic object in the relations in which it is the agnoscent, and/or by defeating some ideadecisively involved with those ideas. I'm not sure how to respond to a counterargument that neither grants, nor argues against, the idea that _triadic sufficiency means that anything which is logically determinational is logically determinational in the role of object, sign, or interpretant_, and which neither grants, nor argues against, the idea that_the agnoscent is logically determinational_ and which neither grants, nor argues against, the idea that _the agnoscent is neither interpretant nor sign norsemiotic object in the relations in which it is the agnoscent_. But let's say that you just aren't ready to grapple so directly with what I've said. I'm often not ready to grapple directly with ideas with which I disagree.Why don't Ijust go along and see what turns up? I have, indeed, tried. But it is hard for me to follow your reasoning when the framework which you propose, though itis triadistic/trichotomistic (I once suggested the word "triastic" for that, but nobody seemed to like it),is nevertheless not quite Peircean and instead departs from the Peircean in ways that I have trouble understanding, ways that would be helpfully defined with some bold plain strokes isolating the key differences from Peirce. Okay, but I'll try, and we'll see whether I succeeded in not misunderstanding you. In particular, you keep talking about "non-semiosic representamens." Yet Peirce introduced a provisional distinction between sign representamen exactly in order to account for a case (the hypothetical example of a sunflower turning as producing another sunflower turning) where at least some elementary _semiosis_ takes place without the involvement of an actual mind. The world, said Peirce, is perfused with signs, and the everyday material world has endless signs, but the everyday world is not perfused with _embodied processes of semiosis_, and its signs are signs in virtue of one's mind's being so constituted and arranged as to be addressed by those signs. But what if a sunflower...? asked Peirce, and he gave a hypothetical example of a sunflower turning which produces another sunflower turning, and this is an example of a semiosis, an actuallyembodied process of semiosis,without the involvement of an actual mind. So,
[peirce-l] Re: evolving universe
Hi, Il-Young, Thank you for the clarification. Now I understand, too, what you mean about an effort for which science is ill equipped, an effort more philosophical, and an infinite regress in thirdness, i.e., the scientific enterprise as studying itself. This seems to happen in any field of research into reason reason's crackups, and the fields themselves have sometimes been called disciplinally ill-equipped, dysfunctional, and, at any rate, cracked up into schools. Maybe it's the nature of the problems, something to do with the reflexivity, the researcher as part of the subject matter, inferential ratiocinative processes. My guess is that the psychological social studies have it worst, studies of rational beasts by rational beasts, with philosophy coming in a close second with its indeterminately or multiply answerable questions and problems inverse to those of deductive theory of logic. Deductive theories of logic, and of ordered structures math-induction applicability, seem divided into schools at least in terms of infinities, the intuitionist minority, etc., though I haven't heard of these researches being characterized as disciplinally dysfunctional in the way that happens to the more obviously reflexive researches such as philosophy the social psychological studies. *** Peirce means what he says about mind and matter. He holds that matter is congealed mind, effete mind -- effete meaning spent, played out, exhausted, all birthed-out. According to Peirce, physical laws are habits into which mind has settled rigidified. At the same time, people, and the scientific enterprise, embody a process of growing thirdness amid the decay. Peirce held that God is real and that it's a fetich to persist on the question of whether God is actual. (See A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God, where he discusses his three-way being-actuality-reality distinction.) Actual is that which reacts or resists, as in an experiment. Real is that which is independently of what you or I or any finite community of minds (scientific or otherwise) thinks of it, but is also that which would be reached by research sooner or later and which would necessarily be reached by research prolonged indefinitely. Laws habits can be quite real without being concrete reactive objects. 1. The possible, -- being (in the broadest sense) | 3. The (conditionally) necessary (would have to approx. = should), -- the real 2. The actual, the reactive/resistant, -- the existent Best, Ben Il-Young wrote, Hello Ben, By ...the mapping (or the mediator) between models and their corresponding natural phenomena cannot just dissolve into the model itself. I simply meant that the notion that somehow labour of science would yield a convergence to a set of laws that are True Laws in the sense that they are unmediated, singular, and completely stable (i.e., self-evident) seems to me implausible. Now, given Gene's response, I'm beginning to think I may have misread Peirce. Admittedly my reading of Peircean literature is limited as I was unaware of Peirce's statement quoted by Gene that all matter is really mind. By Thirdness (as applied to laws of nature) what I thought he had in mind is something akin to (albeit in no way identical to) what Chomsky called a kind of chance convergence between aspects of the world and properties of the human mind/brain. But, this calls for a clairfication of what Peirce meant by all matter is really mind and if my memory serves me correctly I remember Peirce making a distinction between reality and existence. I may be wrong here but this leads me to believe that what he had in mind is not a deference to mind as a source explanation (which is sort of what I gathered from Gene's response) nor an advocacy of nominalism. Given the limited knowledge of Peirce's writing, I still tend towards interpreting his Thirdness (as applied to evolution of laws of nature) as a description of scientific enterprise itself and not that mind sits at the top of The Chain of Being. I should also clarify what I said in my previous post. I didn't mean to say it is of no value to consider evolution of laws of nature as a potential source of formal inquiry by the scientific community. I hope I didn't give that impression. - Original Message - From: il-young son [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thursday, March 23, 2006 5:10 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: evolving universe On 3/23/06, Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Il-Young Son, list, Il-Young Son wrote, I am not sure how many, if many, when pressed, would object to the notion that there are fundamental limits to models and that the mapping (or the mediator) between models and their corresponding natural phenomena cannot just dissolve into the model itself. As succinctly put by Korzybski, map is not the territory. There are notable exceptions of course
[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Jim, Wilfred, list, Sorry about my use of the word 'the' as an index or subindex. This was simply a slip. Arguably the word 'the' can serve as an index or subindex when supported by context, but I really didn't mean to get into such questions! I've replaced it below with 'Ben." Note: it's an index or subindex in singling me out, or singling some other Ben out. It's not a legisign in virtue of such ambiguity. - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Sunday, March 19, 2006 1:32 PM Subject: [Norton AntiSpam] [peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals Hi, Jim, One of your paragraphs was cut off, which I've indicated in bold red. Also two of mine were, and I've restored mine in gray between pairs of insert "^^" symbols. [Jim] Thanks for the response. What's in a name? I don't think that the sign's relation to itself is critical. The fact that the sign "Ben" has three letters or that it appears black colored on my screen x number of times does not make for a decision regarding its status as an index or a subindice. Actually it does make a difference _when one distinguishes subindex from index_. That which can occur more than once, "x number of times,"is the subindex. That which occurs once only once is the index. An instance of "Ben" on a material page is one occurrence and is an index, at least in the sense that it occurs once only once. That which canoccur once or moreon the page is the subindex (as qualisign andas legisign). That decides whether we're discussing an index or a subindex. That which can occur in a limited variety of appearances, such thatacross that variety there is sufficient unity thatone can reasonably treat them as variations of the samequalitiative appearance,is the qualisign. That decides whether we're talking about a subindexical qualisign or some other kind of index/subindex. That which can occur in an unlimited variety of appearances is the legisign. That decides whether we're talking about a subindexical legisign or some other kind of index/subindex. The difference between a subindexical qualisign and a subindexical legisign seems just as large as the difference between either of them and the indexical sinsign. The subindex the index are definitively constradistinguished from each other in terms of exactly the "sign's relation to itself",i.e. (in this context)the phaneroscopic category of the sign itself (is it a reaction, a quality, or a representational relation?), and the subindex is really a negatively defined class of "pointer" (where "pointer"= "index-or-subindex") -- it's that pointer which is not an index, and it comes in two kinds, the subindexical qualisign the subindexical legisign, which are just as distinct from each other as each of them is from the index (aka indexical sinsign). We're simply talking about the three-way difference between sinsign, qualisign, legisign, applied to "pointers." The pointing sinsign stands out for us because it pertains to the singular, the reactive, etc., in two respects -- it'snot a"mixed" kind of sign in the way that the other two are. The electronic screen complicates this. Is the word"Ben" -- in an electronic document being viewed-- the same occurrence after each exit from and re-opening of the document? Aftereach edit save? Even from moment to moment? It's not so much a metaphysical question per se, as a question of a need for sign-classificational univocality, a question which plays itself out in various applications. [Jim] The two relevant passages from the Commens Dictionary are the 1904 Lady Welby quote which suggests that a proper name is an index and the 1903 Syllabus quote which suggests that proper names are subindices. The first mentions that a proper name is a legisign and that there is a real relation to an object. This means that if either of the relates are destroyed, changed, lost or whatever, the relation is destroyed. Thus, if you allow that "Abraham Lincoln," "Jesus Christ," or "Charles Peirce" pick out plural individuals, the real relation is maintained, providing anyone of the individuals kept its name and the name always refers to eac [Here Jim's text breaks off] If a name like "Abraham" _actually_ picks out plural individuals for a reader or listener, then the context has failed to supply precision and the index or subindex is too vague to serve its function -- we have a confusionand ambiguity among real relations. A name like "The Beatles" picks out plural individuals, but is supposed to do that, picking them out collectively or distributively. Again, it's important to treat Peirce's introduction of the subindex as a development in his thought -- rather than, say, as a fluctuation over which we can average. Best, Be
[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Jim, list,
You sound like you've gotten it partly right.
Sometimes Peirce characterizes the index as something that can be general
or singular (individual). But sometimes instead he says that an index has to be
singular (individual).Once, hedefines as thesubindex that
which is a sign through some real connection with the object. I've taken this to
be in contradistinction to the indexas being necessarily singular. And
you're right, I _inferred_ that a subindex is always non-singular. It
hadn't occurred to me that Peirce might have meant that the index is a mode of
subindex. It hadn't occurred to me that Peirce's subindex might simply be a
"pointer" in whatever scope, singular or general or whatever.
However, looking overPeirce's definition yet again--
1903 ('A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:274) he says of
subindices / hyposemes (click on "subindex" in the sidebar at the Commens
Dictionary) http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html:
66~~~_Subindices_ or _hyposemes_ are signs
which are rendered such principally by an actual connection with their objects.
Thus a proper name, [a] personal demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the
letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing to a real connection
with its object but none of these is an Index, since it is not an individual.
~~~99
-- it does now strike me as logically possible that he meant that the
subindex can be either singular or general and that, whena subindex
issingular, said subindex is an index.
Well, I just tried the Century Dictionary, and in the Supplement there
is:
http://www.leoyan.com/century-dictionary.com/12/index12.djvu?djvuoptspage=537
66~~~
subindex (sub'in-deks''), n. A
specifying figure or letter following and slightly below a figure, letter, or
symbol: as the 0 in x0.
~~~99
The word "subindex" already existed. SoPeirce wasthinking first
of all of labels in a math diagram. That thought of a letter attached to a
diagram was my basic picture of the subindex and that's why I thought of it as
nonsingular. But clearly Peirce didn't come out and say so, so who really knows.
Well, since evidently Peirce seldom actually used the word, the main thing is
the variation in his definition of that other word, "index." Sometimes he holds
that an index must be individual, in which case we find ourselves looking for a
term for indexlike general signs, and there's that word "subindex" looking
really handy. Sometimesinstead Peirce holds thatan indexcan be
individual or general and suddenly we don't need a word like "subindex" any
more.
As far as I can tell, Peirce wavered between the two views. I doubt that it
was strictly a verbal, terminological question with him, but I'm not sure what
he saw at stake in it.
But, in any case,why wouldn't you think that the index or the
subindex involve a "real relation"? Why, in the case of a (sub)indexical
qualisign,wouldn't there be reality ina habit of using a certain set
of sound to direct the attention of one or more among a set of minds to certain
individual? Why, in the case of a (sub)indexical legisign, wouldn't there be
reality in habits of using whatever set of sounds(or other
appearances)to direct the attentionwhatever set of minds to a
certain individual?
Best, Ben
- Original Message -
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Sent: Sunday, March 19, 2006 8:33 PM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Thanks Ben,
The individual equals the singular. OK.I wanted an individual to be,
as you say, "atomic." But it is not. I thought if it was, then there was a
better chance of meeting the criteria for a real relation. I had originally
thought that it would be interesting to see if one could legislate or entrench a
name such that it refers to *one and only one object.* I think this is the
distinction you use between "ordinary" and "atomic." (two senses of
singular)OK. I had not thought to draw the inference that if a
subindex is not an individual, then it is general or that if it is general, it
can be both general and singular. Is that right?Do I have it right
now?
Jim W
---
Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Joe, Jim,
Joe wrote,
Jim:
Subindex is not a Peircean term, is it? What is it and why should Peirce
be concerned to distinguish an index from it?
Joe Ransdell
I recently posted about the index and the subindex. Friday, February 10, 2006
2:51 PM, Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Reproduced just below. - Best, Ben
66~~~
Joe, list,
Your response sends me back to the Kaina Stoicheia, in search of Peirce's
search for unexpressed thought. I'll have to ponder that till I can think of
something to say about a connection among difficulties with the idea of
connotation, the use of real where usually actual would be used, and
unexpressed thought.
One of the first things that I notice again, in looking around the Kaina
Stoicheia, is that, even if one replaces real with actual, existent in
Peirce's statement that In the first place, a sign is not a real thing. It is
of such a nature as to exist in _replicas_. , it still makes one wonder
whether he is wavering on, say, the idea that an index is an actual existent.
Well, going over Peirce quotes, I see that I have generally been thinking in
terms of a simplified Peirce. I didn't realize that there was a period of
time when he was wavering on whether an index was necessarily a sinsign, and I
don't think that I'll bother my head about it so much as I was doing. I mean,
it's significant that Peirce didn't always view indices as actual, existent,
even in his later years, but I shouldn't have been shocked. The remainder of
this post consists in things which I found in looking into this.
The Commens Dictionary http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/dictionary.html
puts a question mark by the 1904 in its collection of definitions of indices.
One has to wonder whether it was mostly written at least a little earlier,
1903. In looking through the Commens definitions of index, one notices that
Peirce more than once, and indeed in 1909, speaks of the real connection
between index object, and does not define the index in terms of its being an
individual second until 1903. Of course, there is always there is to point to
a persistence, a reality, of the reactional connection between index object.
As for the index's being, itself, an individual reaction or resistance, that's
another story.
In 1885 ('On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of
Notation', W 5:162-3) he speaks of a letter attached to a geometrical diagram
as an index, likewise he speaks of subscript numbers which in algebra
distinguish one value from another without saying what those values are. But
in 1903 ('A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:274) he says of
subindices / hyposemes (click on subindex in the sidebar at the Commens
Dictionary):
66~~~
_Subindices_ or _hyposemes_ are signs which are rendered such principally by an
actual connection with their objects. Thus a proper name, [a] personal
demonstrative, or relative pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes
what it does owing to a real connection with its object but none of these is an
Index, since it is not an individual.
~~~99
The earliest reference to sinsigns or tokens that I find at the Commens
dictionary is from the 1903 'A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:291:
66~~~
A _Sinsign_ (where the syllable _sin_ is taken as meaning being only once, as
in _single_, _simple_, Latin _semel_, etc.) is an actual existent thing or
event which is a sign. It can only be so through its qualities; so that it
involves a qualisign, or rather, several qualisigns. But these qualisigns are
of a peculiar kind and only form a sign through being actually embodied.
~~~99
It's as if, until 1903, Peirce thought of indices as general in their own
character and as indicating through existent replicas, then wavered. In the
1903 'A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic' EP 2:274 he defined the subindex
in contradistinction to the index; the index is a sinsign, the subindex (e.g.,
a proper name) is a legisign. Yet later, From A Letter to Lady Welby, SS 33,
1904, proper names are again called indices:
66~~~
I define an Index as a sign determined by its dynamic object by virtue of
being in a real relation to it. Such is a Proper Name (a legisign); such is the
occurrence of a symptom of a disease (the symptom itself is a legisign, a
general type of a definite character. The occurrence in a particular case is a
sinsign).
~~~99
In the 1906 'Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism', CP 4.531, it sounds
like the index as such is a sinsign:
66~~~
... secondly, by being really and in its individual existence connected with
the individual object, when I call the sign an _Index_
~~~99
Later, in 'A Sketch of Logical Critics', EP 2:460-461 (Commens Dict: 1909; EP
Vol. II: 1911), a need for the index itself to be individual, i.e., to be a
sinsign, is unmentioned, though of course maybe he would
[peirce-l] Re: on continuity and amazing mazes
Thomas, list, Peirce's version of the proof for Cantor's theorem can be mapped in a quite straightforward way to the structure of the New List of 1867. At the same time the proof of Cantor's theorem can be extended by continued diagonalization (which latter, by the way, Peirce discovered not later than 1867 and under a different name and in a much more general form than afterwards discovered and used by Georg Cantor, Kurt Goedel and Alan Turing) to a derivation of the system of Existential Graphs, which can thus be seen, as Peirce himself said, to be expressive of the properties of the continuum and fulfills the criteria Peirce gave for true continuity, namely Kanticity and Aristotelicity. I could probably show in strict terms what the above means, but this does not seem to me to make any sense in an email forum, since it involves a lot of logic and mathematics and is by no means impossible, but difficult to express in words. Anyway, I've written it down and so maybe one day... . One of the main difficulties is perhaps generally, that it is impossible to understand Peirce from a set theoretical point of view (even if this be only used as a language and however implicitly) and it seems to me equally and definitely impossible to understand Peirce's continuum in terms of any form of nonstandard analysis. This sounds perhaps complicated, but it is in fact simple and only difficult to understand, as it seems. Anyway, this is the end of the road for me, since I surprisingly found what I have been looking for over long years and Peirce, according to my understanding, is not so much about a body of knowledge, but what he found out is meant to be used and that's the only meaning it has. So I leave it at this point and shall now do something completely different. I hope that you do pass your notes to another mathematician rather than just letting the issue vanish! If true, your ideas could be incredibly valuable. Let me finish with two concluding remarks: What regards a fourth category, this means for me to simply go into the wrong direction. A reduction to two categories might be progress, but Kant already tried that, as is well known, and he failed. Its meaning for you of simply to go in the wrong direction is even more simply an unconfirmed interpretant, and in a sense makes my point for me. For my part, I will trust to truth, and not my preconceived notions of good dependent on hidden presumption of what is true, as to what will constitute progress, since evaluations of what is good or bad among ideas are pending what is true or false apart from what you or I think of them. Certainly there are four-folds for which it would create rather than remove complications to reduce to three, such as the Square of Opposition, various related logical structures, the structure of source-encoding-decoding-recipient, the light cone's four zones of causal determination, and sets of relations many-to-many, one-to-many, many-to-one, one-to-one. Certainly, saying that such--such would be good or bad not only fails to say anything about whether it would be true, but it also makes a rhetorical presumption that it would be false. Presumably one means that it would be the wrong direction not in spite of its being true but rather on account of its being false. One's meaning does not, however, prove anything at all. And, to be sure, if reality is what it is apart from what you and I think of it, then it would be presuming a great deal, to say that four-folds, if true, would be the wrong direction. Secondly, Douglas Adams once described how flying works: You throw yourself at the ground, and miss it completely. This seems to me to apply beautifully to induction in particular and signs in general, too;-) Bye, Thomas. P.S. I might be completely wrong of course. In that case, never mind! Best of luck, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from Peircean elements topic)
Frances, Gary, Steven, Joe, Theresa, list, I've taken a while to respond to this, partly because I've been busy, and partly because I wished, despite my difficulty in understanding it, to be responsive to it. I admit I've simplified my task by only briefly skimming all the posts that have followed it while I busied myself in other matters or slept, obliviously, to the excitement around here! [Francis] Recognizants you define as the experiences in mind of objects acting as signs. If the experiential recognition however is itself not acting as a sign or as part of a sign situation, then it is for the signer only collateral to semiosis. This hence implies that not all phenomenal things that exist in the world are signs or objects of signs, or perhaps even prone to teleonomic designs and assigns. That's not quite how I _define_ recognizants, though it could be pieced together out of things that I've said. I've said that the recognizant is an experience. And I've said (most recently, to Jim Piat) that only something which is an object in its own right can also serve as a sign. I don't know what you mean by signer -- I would take a signer to be a sign-maker and to be pretty much the same thing as a sign. If I make a sign, assert or represent, that _p_ is the case, then not only am I making a sign that _p_ is the case, but also, in a sense, I become a sign that _p_ is the case. If the experience is only collateral to semiosis, then indeed there is something quite outside semiosis, something that one would have expected to be quite involved in determining being determined by semiosis. Since experience testing would be collateral to semiosis, all telical designs would be subject subordinate to the harsh trial error of biological-style blind evolution. [Francis] If the pragmatist thrust on the matter is correctly understood by me, the experience for Peirce when it is deemed within semiosis is itself held by him to be a sign, and therefore an objective logical construct. Just exactly what kind of sign it is remains unclear for me. It may go to informative grammatic effects, or evaluative critical worths, or rhetorical evocative responses; and all in the Morrisean pragmatic manner, if it can be put that way. Yes, Peirce's view would be that experience participating as an element in semiosis would have to participate as an object, a sign or an interpretant. The only way to do that is to view the experience non-phenomenologically, view it in its indeterminateness, which means from the viewpoint from which it is not confirmatory, the viewpoint of some mind or quasimind other (or _qua_ other) than the one performing the semiosis in question. That seems inconvenient like a geocentric system's epicycles, and less effective, too. It elides the issue of confirmation as being not interpretation and as being nevertheless logically determinational. [Francis] ... On the other hand, the experience may be partly preparatory to semiosis, and thus often collateral to signs. Actually Peirce give examples of collateral experience coming subsequently to the signs to which it is collateral. Collateral experience must be had, one way or another and, if one does not already have it, and can't dig it up from memories, then one needs to go forth and acquire it. [Francis] All things that are felt to continue evolving in the world and that are given uncontrolled to sense after all are phenomenal representamen that exist as objects, but not necessarily objects that act as signs. This may be the condition for experiencing and recognizing objects, whether the objects and recognizants are signs or not. Besides differentiating these states or kinds of objects, there must also be a differentia maintained between representamens and signs, because there are phenomenal representamens that are continuent but not existent, and thus that are not objects or signs, nor interpretants. I'm not sure what you mean here. If there are representamens that aren't signs, I'd think that for each such representamen there would be something x serving as that representamen, such that x would also be an object, even if only a continuent object rather than an existent, reactive object. I don't know what you mean by continuent. [Francis] You stated earlier that by recognizant is meant some experiential recognition, formed as collateral to the sign and its interpretant in respect of its object. This means that where a normal human signer senses the object, they then recognize that object as being as they interpreted some sign to represent that object. The experiential recognizant therefore would strictly not be in semiosis nor be a sign. I wouldn't use the word senses there but, otherwise, that part is right. And the experiential recognizant would strictly (according to Peircean semiotics) not be in semiosis nor be a sign. That's the problem, because, in the
[peirce-l] Collateral observation (quotes)
Jim, I don't know what could be wrong. It works fine on my MS Internet Explorer Mozilla. Ah, the heck with it! Here they are. - Best, Ben Collateral observation (quotes) Update: Thomas L. Short points to “a long and important section of MS318, first published by Helmut Pape in Nous 1990 and now found in EP2:404-9, that adds much to our understanding of what collateral observation is and how it works and what purpose it serves,” in a post from Tom forwarded to the peirce-l electronic forum by its manager-moderator Joseph Ransdell on Friday, February 25, 2005. Six pages is a bit much to excerpt here, but The Essential Peirce, Volume 2, is in print. End of update. Back in April 2003, Joseph Ransdell most helpfully compiled the following quotations from C.S. Peirce on the subject of collateral observation, collateral experience, etc., and sent them out to his peirce-l electronic forum. I find myself posting them to peirce-l every six months or so. It’s easier to blog them once and for all to the Internet, and such is the occasion for my setting this blog up. Included are some comments by Joe from the peirce-l post in which he sent the quotes. I have regularized the quotes’ labeling for convenience of use of this blog and, in particular, so that every quote’s permalink can target its quote’s label. (The permalink for the entire “Collateral Observations (Quotes)” post is http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005/02/collateral-observation-quotes.html ). Within the quotes, even though italic formatting itself appears, I have retained the underlines girding italicized words in case somebody copies a quote into a plaintext environment where the italic formatting would be lost. [Joseph Ransdell wrote:] The result of a string search through the CP and some notes. These passages are not arranged by me in any special order other than that order in which they came to my attention in collating them. At this time I would not know how to order them effectively, so I leave them unordered other than by an arbitrary numbering for reference purposes. “CP” abbreviates “Collected Papers of Charles S. Peirce, 8 volumes.” [1] Peirce: CP 6.318 (c. 1909) permalink: http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005_02_01_peircematters_archive.html#CP_6.318318. . . . An existential relation or relationship is distinguished from others by two marks. In the first place, its different subjects all belong to one universe; which distinguishes it very strikingly from such relations as that which subsists between a thing and its qualities, and that which subsists between portions of matter and the form into which they are built; as for example between the cells of a living body and the whole body, and often times between the different singulars of a plural and the plural itself. In the second place, an existential relation or relationship differs from some other relations and relationships in a respect which may be described in two ways, according as we employ collective or distributive forms of _expression_ and thought. Speaking collectively, the one logical universe, to which all the correlates of an existential relationship belong, is ultimately composed of units, or subjects, none of which is in any sense separable into parts that are members of the same universe. For example, no relation between different lapses of time -- say, between the age of Agamemnon and that of Homer -- can be an existential relation, if we conceive every lapse of time to be made up of lapses of time, so that there are no indivisible units of time. To state the same thing distributively, every correlate of an existential relation is a single object which may be indefinite, or may be distributed; that is, may be chosen from a class by the interpreter of the assertion of which the relation or relationship is the predicate, or may be designated by a proper name, but in itself, though in some guise or under some mask, it can always be perceived, yet never can it be unmistakably identified by any sign whatever, without collateral observation. Far less can it be defined. It is existent, in that its being does not consist in any qualities, but in its effects -- in its actually acting and being acted on, so long as this action and suffering endures. Those who experience its effects perceive and know it in that action; and just that constitutes its very being. It is not in perceiving its qualities that they know it, but in hefting its insistency then and there, which Duns called its haecceitas -- or, if he didn’t, it was this that he was groping after. However, let me not lapse further into metaphysics just now. [2] Peirce: CP 6.338 (c. 1909) permalink: http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005_02_01_peircematters_archive.html#CP_6.338338. All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your deeper self for his assent. Consequently, all thinking is conducted in signs that are mainly of the same
[peirce-l] Re: Peircean elements
Jim, list, Jim wrote: Ben,I have a question. What is the relation between cognition and recognition? It seems that 3a and 3b respond to two different questions, namely, what is a correct logical description of the structure of cognition and how is that structure *validated* for any given peice of information. No wonder that 3a and 3b appear incompatible. To represent an answer graphically would appear to require extended sides, more vertices, new objects and interpretants since what determines a sign to an interpretant does not explain how or why it does so. I do not know if I am even getting warm here but I guess that the interpretant might become a sign which has new objects and interpretants that do the explaining. How the extended apparatus can show its reference to the original structure of cognition without ad hoc marks eludes me.Jim W Your question is not very clear to me and seems a bit connect-the-dots, but I'll give it a try. However, I'm seldom so long-winded as when I'm trying to respond to questions which I've grasped somewhat vaguely. Fortunately, quite a bit of this post is phrased not very formally. 3a 3b are not addressing very separate questions of the logical description of a semiosis and its validation. The validation or confimation of a semiosis's logical structure isa question in, of, for that semiosis. A logical description which excludes questions of confirmation would be incomplete. 66~ 3: a. **If the recognition is logically determined by the object, sign, and interpretant, then Peircean semiotics says that such recognition is determinedAS their object or AS their sign or AS their interpretant,** narrowed down to a choice between sign or interpretant except in such regard as may arise in virtue of the dynamoid object's depending on the final interpretant (which I tend to take as a case of mutual determination and some sort of logical equivalence). b. **Buta mind'sexperiential recognition, -- logically determined by object, sign, interpretant, -- of said object, sign, interpretant as truly and validly one another's triadic correlates, -- is _not_that mind'ssign or interpretant of them as being truly and validly one another's triadic correlates, since it is and conveys _experience_ of them as being truly and validly one another's triadic correlates.** **a. b. are in strict logical incompatibility.** They can't both be true. Something cannot both be and not be a sign or interpretant in the same respect extent. A choice must be made. I won't belabor the point, but it is crucial that this be clearly seen, else what follows will be pointless.~99 Now maybe your question arises because I phrased b. as if the mind were talking to itself in a semiotician's vocabulary and were trying to do the kind of abstract theoretical validation which a semiotician might do. But, I don't mean that the mind is doing semiotics except in the mind's doing it in an amateur, practical way as it usually does. That phraseology of "triadic correlates" which I use just seemed briefer and less tangled.But I'll rephrase it here: A mind's experiential recognition -- logically determined by object, sign, interpretant, -- of said object, sign, interpretant as truly validlyone another's object, sign, interpretant, -- is _not_ that mind's sign or interpretant of them as being truly one another's object, sign, interpretant, since it is and conveys _experience_ of them as being truly and validly one another's object, sign, interpretant. Nevertheless, you raise a more serious issue, one that goes to the heart of the difference between information logic, and between vegetables intelligent beasts. The question of how a cognition is validated or confirmed,is a question for cognition, in cognition, by cognition. Science did not emerge, like Venus on the half-shell, out of seeming parentlessness foam. It is not only semioticians, but also everyday people, who find themselves wondering about their interpretations of signs, and seek confirmation where they do not already have it. In everyday experience, probably most interpretation occurs nearly simultaneously as the recalling of experience which confirms the interpretation. And, in everyday experience, there is a continual bringing to bear of interpretations as expectations about the experience, and the experience is formed as an ongoing testing, though the testing isn't usually THE purpose or end of all that activity, rather it's like checking that ends have in fact been achieved continue to be achieved. The experience itself is semiotically enriched -- how? How else? -- than by being formed as collateral to signs interpretants in respect of objects. Now, people's standards of confirmation, evidence, rigor, etc., may vary and are certainly not typically the result of professional scientific training, and some will take the word of some book or newspaper as absolute proof,
[peirce-l] Re: Peircean elements
Claudio, list, It's fine with me if you or others modify my graphics for the purposes of discussion, and you seem good at the graphics. The discussion has advanced considerably beyond the point which you seem to have reached. You seem to have isolated a few of my remarks and addressed them without reading the rest. Thus you end up saying things like you find "nothing" in my text about _why_ there should be a fourth element. It really is not plausible to address my explanations by claiming that I did not offer any, claiming it so casually as to raise the question of whether you read more than a few sentences of that post. I in fact did so and have done so in many other posts. You also fail to distinguish between the categories themselves, the semiotic elements, and, apparently, Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes. About a year after I joined peirce-l, Joe justifiably dinged me for not offering arguments for my claims -- I was mainly offering patterns of ideas and asking people to ponder them and grasp resonances, grasp them as that which might be called a philosophical-conceptual version of curve-fitting. So, since then, I have worked to develop arguments, and sought to capture articulate various inferential moves which I was making but had regarded as somehow "too technical" to be worth stating. And so I can understand how the interpretant seems to have the valuable cognitive content and how an inference to a judgment,an inference to a recognition, can seem somehow "extra" and its thematization can seem "not reallyneeded" because what such inference adds is mainly soundness, it adds the status of that which can reasonably be called knowledge,rather than still-further understanding.The interpretant appraises; the recognition merely legitimates. But in fact it is by such inference and its articulate counterpart, the argument that concludes in an acknowledgement, that a discipline like philosophy gets anywhere. I mean, it's nice and I really do like it when people respond to my posts, but I ask them to follow the argument closely enough to respond to it. Also, my arguments relate in important ways to Peirce's discussions of collateral experience, many of which are at http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005/02/collateral-observation-quotes.html Now I think I can show, that collaterally based recognition's being a semiotic element follows from the Peircean conception of semiotic (a.k.a. logical) determination. I will try to make it as deductive as I can, so it is important for the reader to consider whether s/he grants the premisses and regards the conclusions as following deductively or at least cogently. Points 1 - 3 have, I think, the most deductive structure, I can't deduce all possible counterarguments, however, so from 4 (with its A-K) onward we're in especially inductive territory. I will send Points 1-4 today. Some peope may have additions to make for Point 4, so I'll hold off on going beyond Point 4for a week or two. Thebasic ideais that everything logicallydeterminate or determinative is logically determinate or determinative _as_ a semiotic element, (e.g.,_as_ semiotic object or _as_ sign or _as_ interpretant). Thus, if the collaterally based recognition is logically determinate or determinative in its role _as_ collaterally based recognition,then it must be a semiotic element. 1. **Semiosis is logical process, the process OF logic,and everythinglogically determinative or determinate in the course of semiosis is so _in some logical role_.** 2. **The idea of the sufficiency of the triad, the idea of the diagrammability of relationships of logical determination interms of the three elements or elemental roles in thetriad,is this, the idea that everything that is logically determinative or determinate,is so,in the role of either object, sign, or interpretant.** If somebody diagrams semiotic, logically determinational relations, one would expect at any given juncture or 'vertex' to find a label of the kind one sees, "S"(or "R")for "sign"(or "representamen")or "O" for "object,"or "I" for "interpretant." One could accept some complication, where a given thing is a semiotic object in one set of relations and is a sign in another set of relations (it might be easier to label the arrows than the vertices), or where a given thing is a sign in one set of relations, but simply uninvolved in another set. All the same, one would not expect to find a case where, despite an assumption of triadic sufficiency, something is put intologically determinational relations as _decidedly definitely_ neither sign nor semiotic object nor interpretant. It would, I believe, be regarded as conflicting with theidea of triadic sufficiency. **A bit more precisely, the idea of triadic sufficiency is that everything, that is logically determinative or determinate to whatever given extent in whatever given respect,is logically determinative or determinate
[peirce-l] Re: Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from Peircean elements topic)
Frances, In Peirce's discussions of collateral experience, notice how he repeatedly says that the sign, the interpretant, the sign system, do not convey experience of the object. Instead, they convey meaning about the object. http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005/02/collateral-observation-quotes.html There are ten quotations from Peirce about it there. In all but one of those quotes, he is quite clear about the role of collateral experience. It tells you the denotations of the objects. One needs such experience because sign interpretant themselves do not convey experience of the objects which they denote. I think that experience is needed also to learn and verify connotations, meanings, any sign power. The reason for all of that, is that the map is not the land, the portrait is not the person, and so on. One's experience of the sign is not one's experience of the object. I mean this in the most plain and obvious way. A big point of a sign is to convey information from beyond given present limits of experience. Some argue that one's experience of the object is simply a sign or interpretant which one has about the object, as if one's experience of the object were no more than a drawing or a text about the object. Thus they agree not with Peirce but with Steven Hawking and the positivists, that there are only models, pictures, of reality, one never has reality itself. Since Peirce usually does decisively distinguish experience from sign or interpretant, their argument is first of all with Peirce. Experience is fallible not always reliable, but that does not mean that experience is really one of those things -- i.e., signs interpretants -- which conveys information but not experience about the object. Now: by recognizant I mean experiential recognition, formed as collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object. I mean where you look at the object and recognize it as being as you interpreted some sign to represent it. Now, go back again to the idea that sign and interpretant do not convey experience of the sign, the idea that familiarity-dependent understanding of the sign has outside the interpretant. How can the recognizant be, in the same relations regards, both the mind's experience of the object and the mind's sign or interpretant of the object? Something cannot both be, and not be, a sign or interpretant in the same respect extent. A choice must be made. I said that, though I wouldn't belabor the point, it was crucial. If somebody does not see the contradiction to which I am pointing, then that is where I wish to concentrate. If you don't see the contradiction, what do you see? Does it have the appearance of a contradiction? Why do you think that it isn't a contradiction? Or do you agree that it is a contradiction? If you agree, then how can you say that the recongnizant is a sign? Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Frances Kelly [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wednesday, March 08, 2006 7:05 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from Peircean elements topic) Frances to Ben and Claudio and others: Forgive the interjection, but here are some interpretations of mine on Peircean ideas that may be related to your present concerns in signs and my current interests in designs. Let me state my speculations and invite corrections to them. The initial grammatic division of semiosis, or the fundamental structure of signs as information they bear, does rightly consist of: (1) representamens; and (2) referred objects; and (3) interpretants. This grammatic division however is only the first of three divisions, where interpretants in fact go on to permeate the other two divisions, which divisions are roughly critics and rhetorics. The recognizant as a sign force therefore may be merely a further development of an interpretant supersign beyond the information it is sensed to bear, and perhaps mainly within the rhetoric division. The recognizant thus would be part of a tridential and trichotomic system of signs, and should then not be held as the basis of some extended tetradic model of signs. If further quasi categories are to be found or deemed beyond the trichotomic phenomenal categories of terness, in the familiar plan of firstness and secondness and thirdness, then they might be of nomenal zeroness as an empty class holder in waiting, or even perhaps of epiphenomenal enthness to include fourthness and beyond. This however takes mind into some extra semiotic arena of the celestreal or ethereal or supereal world, which is not phenomenal or existential or experiential, nor logically categorical for that matter. States of thingness beyond phenomenal terness are after all senseless and illogical, because they are absolutely of nothingness or vaguely of anythingness and everythingness, which when outside the existence and experience of tridential phenomena makes
[peirce-l] Re: Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from Peircean elements topic)
Second correction! I must be tired. Sorry. I've gone over it extra carefully this time. - Ben. Sorry, one-word correction, but it's needed. It's indicated in the text. - Ben - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Thursday, March 09, 2006 1:05 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from Peircean elements topic) Frances, In Peirce's discussions of collateral experience, notice how he repeatedly says that the sign, the interpretant, the sign system, do not convey experience of the object. Instead, they convey meaning about the object. http://peircematters.blogspot.com/2005/02/collateral-observation-quotes.html There are ten quotations from Peirce about it there. In all but one of those quotes, he is quite clear about the role of collateral experience. It tells you the denotations of the objects. One needs such experience because sign interpretant themselves do not convey experience of the objects which they denote. I think that experience is needed also to learn and verify connotations, meanings, any sign power. The reason for all of that, is that the map is not the land, the portrait is not the person, and so on. One's experience of the sign is not one's experience of the object. I mean this in the most plain and obvious way. A big point of a sign is to convey information from beyond given present limits of experience. Some argue that one's experience of the object is simply a sign or interpretant which one has about the object, as if one's experience of the object were no more than a drawing or a text about the object. Thus they agree not with Peirce but with Steven Hawking and the positivists, that there are only models, pictures, of reality, one never has reality itself. Since Peirce usually does decisively distinguish experience from sign or interpretant, their argument is first of all with Peirce. Experience is fallible not always reliable, but that does not mean that experience is really one of those things -- i.e., signs interpretants -- which conveys information but not experience about the object. Now: by recognizant I mean experiential recognition, formed as collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object. I mean where you look at the object and recognize it as being as you interpreted some sign to represent it. Now, go back again to the idea that sign and interpretant do not convey experience of the object [object, not sign], the idea that familiarity-dependent understanding of the sign is [is, not has] outside the interpretant. How can the recognizant be, in the same relations regards, both the mind's experience of the object and the mind's sign or interpretant of the object? Something cannot both be, and not be, a sign or interpretant in the same respect extent. A choice must be made. I said that, though I wouldn't belabor the point, it was crucial. If somebody does not see the contradiction to which I am pointing, then that is where I wish to concentrate. If you don't see the contradiction, what do you see? Does it have the appearance of a contradiction? Why do you think that it isn't a contradiction? Or do you agree that it is a contradiction? If you agree, then how can you say that the recognizant is a sign? Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Frances Kelly [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wednesday, March 08, 2006 7:05 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from Peircean elements topic) Frances to Ben and Claudio and others: Forgive the interjection, but here are some interpretations of mine on Peircean ideas that may be related to your present concerns in signs and my current interests in designs. Let me state my speculations and invite corrections to them. The initial grammatic division of semiosis, or the fundamental structure of signs as information they bear, does rightly consist of: (1) representamens; and (2) referred objects; and (3) interpretants. This grammatic division however is only the first of three divisions, where interpretants in fact go on to permeate the other two divisions, which divisions are roughly critics and rhetorics. The recognizant as a sign force therefore may be merely a further development of an interpretant supersign beyond the information it is sensed to bear, and perhaps mainly within the rhetoric division. The recognizant thus would be part of a tridential and trichotomic system of signs, and should then not be held as the basis of some extended tetradic model of signs. If further quasi categories are to be found or deemed beyond the trichotomic phenomenal categories of terness, in the familiar plan of firstness and secondness and thirdness, then they might be of nomenal zeroness as an empty class holder in waiting, or even perhaps of epiphenomenal enthness to include
[peirce-l] Re: Peircean elements
Hi, Thomas, Some of what you say is quite suggestive. I hope somebody here at peirce-l understands it better than I do. I'm hardly acquainted with the EGs. I had a notion that they're basically a visual form of 1st-order logic. I had no idea that Peirce's exploding-point cuts and his maths of continuity would have much to do with them. I wish I understood the ramifications of exploding points. Well, I suppose it might mean that it's not quite true that anything that you can do in Non-Standard analysis, you can do in Standard analysis, but I don't know whether that would be what's at issue. I used to know a singularity theorist (topological analysis) who might have shed some light, but he went and got married etc. Anyway, I guess the use of visual diagrams does invite such thinking in a way that algebraic expressions don't. I am aware in a very vague way of the idea of a forceful interruption of the continuum, because I read Peirce talking about it somewhere. And I'm vaguely aware of some sort of resonance that this has with the idea of doing mathematics at all and with the idea that the world as we know it, with its discrete-like things, results from such interruption(s), somehow. (Resonance with the idea of doing mathematics at all, would be because otherwise the mathematicals would be some sort of infinity of all possible relations combinations; some folks think that Tegmark is wrong to regard the ensemble's Level IV as the mathematics level because they think it's all possible bitstrings, undifferentiated uninteresting, so I get an image of a mathematician as somebody who sticks a finger up into the math cloud and stirs up differentiated swirls). So the reflection principle is where you build a tower like that of Babel to touch the sky, and the reflection principle zaps your tower but instead of talking babble, you end up with a nice transfinite number, because you planned it this way all along. And the reflection principle is like another way of making a cut? I'm probably getting mixed up. I'm probably mixed up about transitivity, I don't know anything about generalized transitivity. By icon I don't know whether you're thinking of something that has an approximate, outward, or statistical resemblance to something, or instead whether you're thinking of a mathematical diagram. How the reflection principle drives the existential graphs would be an interesting subject! But if the subject upsets you, then make it wait for you. If you're hoping that you're wrong about that which you're finding, you may have good reason to hope and, in any case, it can be a good idea for various reasons not to give up hope of being wrong or fear of being wrong. Peirce himself probably had any number of extraordinary intellectual adventures, and one notes that he carefully cultivated fallibilism. His writing is also what one might call phlegmatic -- I don't mean that in a bad way. But it's dry careful, sometime ironic. I keep thinking of him as some sort of navigator who's unruffled and careful even as the boat sails along the coast, on windy day, past reefs, etc., and he's aware of and monitoring lots of things which the passengers can't even see, and on top of everything else he's doing, he's taking measurements to see whether the north magnetic pole has shifted at all. The writer Edward Dahlberg, comparing Peirce very favorably against the other Pragmatists, said that Peirce's words are isolated and austere, and have a dry Nantucket vision about them. Peirce experienced considerable ups downs, and his steady, scholarly attitude probably helped steady him amid his adventures. Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Thomas Riese [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Sunday, March 05, 2006 6:12 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Peircean elements Dear Thomas, As regards the structure of the Peirce Continuum, perhaps you've seen this, where Peirce says that all Cantor's alephs are multitudes and that true continua are greater and are not multitudes. I wish I knew whether, by using the plural continua, he means that there is a hierarchy beyond the alephs, too, or whether he just means so many 'pieces' of true continuum, in which case I guess he means something like upper-case Omega, absolute infinity. I've seen it said that the hyperreal continuum is already non-metric, that the surreals are more numerous and their continuum is non-metric too, i.e., topology could be about them in the way that Peirce seems to be thinking of topical geometry as being about a true continuum. Anyway, I wish there were a popular account for folks like me, indeed a chart, a table (I'm a big one for tables!), that explains how these various continua infinities are related: The infinity of functions, the infinity of functionals, the hyperreals, the surreals. Anyway, here's the Peirce quote, in case you're not already familiar
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Gary, Jim, Joe, Thomas, list, Erratum. In fact I should probably have cut the kinematic quantities out since there's room to explain what the heck I'm thinking about with them, but, since I mentioned them, I should at least get them right. Change of observer's time should appear where I put "1" (unity). Change of the observed's own time is "Dt" often called "change of tau." I should also have added "(with lightspeed c held equal to 1)." ARX. (Arche.) Saturation, struggle, instability, mobility, forcefulnessDd = =TLO. (Telos as teleiosis.) Illumination, culmination, vigor, immoderation, energeticism. Dt-Dt =|X|= MES.(Meson.) Incubation, mediation, moderation,patience (like processual steadiness). Dt = = NTL. (Entelecheia.) Verification, establishment, stability, firmness (like structural integrity) Dt-Dd Sorry about that! Best, Ben --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Joe, list, [Joe] Ben, you say: [Ben] I don't pose a tetradic reduction thesis applicable to all relations. I just say that there's a fourth semiotic term that isn't any of the classic three. A sign stands for an object to an interpretant on the basis of a recognition. I think that an increasingly good reason to suppose that recognition can't be reduced to interpretant, sign, and object, is that nobody has done so in any kind of straightforward way. [Joe] REPLY: [Joe] Has anybody tried? Well, yes, Gary Bernard tried, and both of them put some effort into it. Martin Lefebvre also gave it a shot or two. I pondered their efforts for quite some time. It's what I was talking about when I said in my previous post: 66~~~ - It's been said that recognition collateral experience are a generalized context, but that context is not what I meant by recognition nor what Peirce meant by collateral experience. I've meant, for instance, your seeing somebody wear a hat just as you expected. Or like somebody talking about a bird and your checking their comments against your experiences of particular birds. - It's been said that recognition experience are mediated or made of signs interpretants. Those involve shifts of the semiotic frame of reference, which is a legitimate analytic move, but not a legitimate reductive move. - It's been said that the evolution of a triad -- somehow -- conveys experience without the members of the triad doing so. If there's a relationship among object, sign, interpretant, a relationship which conveys experience of the object, then that relationship IS experience of the object and is not reducible to object, sign, interpretant -- and we're back at talking about the familiar subject of phenomenology vs. physiological analysis of vision. ~~~99 The first counterargument above was Gary's, and I agreed that there is a large context of experience collateral in many ways to many things, and it's an interesting and, I find, illuminating line of thought, because there IS a common solidary experiential context, the solid intertanglement of the anchorages of one's many recognitions, one which I've come to think is illuminating in regard to assertions. However it's just not what I was talking about in discussing recognitive experience formed as collateral to the sign interpretant in respect of the object -- such experience is formed in terms of its references to the other semiotic elements, and is quite distinguishable from the generalized context. If I was supposed to be checking whether some water boiled in a pot when I was instead checking whether somebody wore a certain hat as I expected, I will hear a lot about the specific referential differences between those collaterally based recognitions from whomever I promised that I would keep an eye on the pot of water. Gary has also made a more advance form of the argument, in which he said that man is sign, the whole universe is a sign, why does one need confirmation? My answer was twofold, one, that by that kind of reasoning, (1) one doesn't even need an interpretant, since one is already the sign, the universe is already the sign, and (2) that most signs and interpretants aren't like that anyway, and that they should not be regarded as false partial versions of the big sign which is oneself or the grand sign which is the universe. We have to deal with signs interpretants as they commonly are. There was actually more argument related in various ways to this, more of it is coming back to me as I write this, but let me move on. The second counterargument has been made in one form or another by you, Gary, Martin Lefebvre, and others. I addressed it in the passage above and continually throughout the post. My past discussions of phenomonological versus physiological-analytic viewpoints have been addresssed in part to it. The third counterargument was developed by Gary Bernard in three-way interchange with me. That which I said in the quoted passage above was actually a brief form of a new response by me on it. My other response was that this object-experience-generating relationship should be tracked down in order to test whether it indeed is reducible to object, sign, or interpretant. The triad's integrity, conceived-of as object-experience formed as collateral to sign interpretant in respect of the object, is the conception of a semiotic fourth without calling it that. Now, if sign interpretant did not, as such, convey experience, yet some aspect or relation among them did so, perhaps over time, then we would say that they DO convey experience of the object, in virtue of that very aspect or relation. And if they conveyed object-experience but only after sufficient time and evolution, then, too, we would say that they DO convey experience of the object, just not instantaneously or as quickly as one might like. Peirce says not merely that signs don't convey experience of
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
material world, from which it filters order and is an INTERPRETANT to us. 4. The intelligent living system is time-nonsymmetric but INDIVIDUALLY pointed variously in both directions thermodynamically -- as living thing, it filters for order -- as intelligent, it is a sink, retaining sign-rich disorder as recorded -- I don't know how it pulls double-direction trick off -- anyway it is a RECOGNITION which we are. The sign defined by its relationship to recogition is a proxy. ERGO: As sign, man is most of all a proxy. At intelligent life's best, only indefinitely approached, intelligent life is a genuine, legitimate proxy acting deciding on behalf of the ideal, in being determined _by_ the ideal. Intelligent life shouldn't let it go to his/her head, though. Hard it is to be good; harder still to confirm solidify it by entelechy = by staying good = continual renovation and occasional rearchitecting (entelechy is not necessarily a freeze) amid changing evolvable conditions. Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Benjamin Udell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2006 11:15 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? Jim, list, Jim Piat wrote: [Joe Ransdell] Good point, Gary. Still another way of thinking about it might be to suppose that the emphasis is supposed to fall on thing rather than sign: no sign is a real THING rather than no sign is a REAL thing; but that doesn't sound very plausible to me. I like your solution better. Joe Ransdell [Jim] While we're raising questions about the distinctions among such notions as the real, the existent and the true (their relationships to the categories etc) Are you disagreeing with Peirce here? It's okay to disagree with him, I do too, but I'm wondering whether that's what you're doing. Here's Peirce's view: 1. The possible | 3. The (conditionally) necessary (would have to approx. = should), the real 2. The actual, the reactive, the existent Truth in Peirce's use of the word is the property of a true proposition, its property of corresponding to fact, though it could also correspond to a law regarded as a fact. I'll give this a try. Keeping in mind that these are correlations, not equations: 1. Term (seme, etc.) - (univocality?) -- (case in the sense of question, issue, matter, _res_?) --- possibility. | 3. Argument -- validity -- law --- (conditional) necessity. 2. Proposition - truth -- fact --- actuality. [Jim] -- I'd like to throw in a related question: Does existence as a mode of being ever occur outside of representation or thirdness (as a mode of being). Or is existence (and objects conceived of as merely existing -- ie something less than signs) something that always swims in the contiuum of representation. My take has been that existent objects are always also embodied signs, but that embodied interpretants aren't so common. I'd have to dig. I seem to remember Peirce talking about genuine phenomenal thirdness as not being everywhere -- but I also remember thinking that he was talking in terms of the interpretant, and not of just any signs -- i.e., it was the thing about embodied interpretants again. Peirce doesn't use the phrase embodied interpretant, as I recall. Gary used it I picked it up from him. Now, Peirce says that an index doesn't necessarily resemble its object at all, and that it indicates its object whether we notice or not -- the relationship with its object is one of actual resistance or reaction (when the index a sinsign; otherwise, the relationship of its replica with the object). If I think of such reactions, I think vaguely of forces, variational principles, etc. And I think of effects which quantitatively and qualitatively differ a lot from their causes. In the case of icons, Peirce is more likely to think in terms of mathematical diagrams. He thinks that mathematical structures and patterns are real, and are real thirdness (I think). However, I don't know what Peirce thinks about iconicity in statistical patterns and processes in material nature -- I don't mean in the sense of statistical patterns making pictures of physical objects, if that ever happens. I mean in the sense that there are statistical processes whereby random fluctuations and differences cancel out to a common middle or average, and a stage of a process can be predictably similar to a current stage depending on how recent or soon-to-arrive it is at the time of the given curren stage. There are other kinds of widespread similarities -- typical percentages of various substances in widely dispersed material, so on. Now insofar as we're talking about embodied iconicity, it's not just about resemblances, but about resemblances arising among things reactively or resistantially related -- in other words, a lot of things with family kinships, things made of the same kinds of stuff often from common
[peirce-l] Re: Introduction
Joe, list, Thank you for your recollections of Morgenbesser. He sounds so New York Jewish! To B.F. Skinner, Let me see if I understand your thesis. You think we shouldn't anthropomorphize people? Yes, I've come to think that the NYT claim sounds ridiculous (I didn't know what to think back when I first read it all those years ago). The worst that Morgenbesser may have done was crystallize some people's feelings about Austin. More Morgenbesser stories, Remembering Sidney Morgenbesser: http://daily.nysun.com/Repository/getmailfiles.asp?Style=OliveXLib:ArticleToMailType=text/htmlPath=NYS/2004/08/03ID=Ar01400 Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sidney_Morgenbesser From Leon Wieselier in TNR: And now Sidney Morgenbesser, whom I loved. And not, I hasten to declare, chiefly for his jokes. They are properly famous, but their fame was burdensome to Sidney. He wanted to be remembered for more, this hilarious man consecrated to things much higher than hilarity. Full article available only to paid TNR subscribers: https://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?i=20040816s=diarist081604 More from the Wieselier article at: http://64.233.179.104/search?q=cache:qUwwWkaF1F4J:scott3362.blogspot.com/2005/07/mind-of-mensch-don-quixotic-bliss-was.html+%22They+are+properly+famous,+but+their+fame+was+burdensome+to+Sidney%22hl=enct=clnkcd=3 Correction to common (not only the NYT) story about unfair unjust from commenter at _Crooked Timber_, http://crookedtimber.org/2004/08/03/sidney-morgenbesser The New York times repeats a misquotation from Sydney Morgenbesser: He was once asked if it was unfair that the police hit him on the head during the riot. It was unfair but not unjust, he pronounced. Why? It's unfair to be hit over the head, but it was not unjust since they hit everybody else over the head. He actually said the opposite: It was unjust but not unfair. It was unjust for them to hit me over the head, but it was not unfair since they hit everybody else over the head. The Times version doesn't make sense. Sydney had been thinking about Rawls' development of the idea that Justice is Fairness and this was one of the ways in which he saw a clear difference. Posted by Gilbert Harman · August 5th, 2004 at 3:32 pm Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Peirce Discussion Forum peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Sunday, February 12, 2006 1:50 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Introduction Ben: I was in grad school at Columbia while Sidney Morgenbesser was there and the anecdote about his refutation of J. L. Austin's claim (Yeah, yeah) is wholly believable. He published very little and what he published was not especially important, but he was the greatest asset that department had and that story captures him to perfection. He was the most combative and abrasive philosopher I've ever met but also the liveliest, and had an extraordinary knack for deflating anything pretentious but empty. Peirce somewhere characterized Chauncey Wright as the boxing master for the members of the Metaphysical Club, and I immediately think of Morgenbesser whenever I read that passage and also when I encounter one of Peirce's remarks about the superior intelligence of the street-wise New Yorker in comparison with the well-protected genteel intelligence of the Cambridge academicians. The idea (in the article you mention) that Morgenbesser's retort either did or could hurt the first philosopher's reputation and career is ridiculous, by the way. Joe Ransdell --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Introduction
Darrel, Tori, Gary, I knew it! I shoulda, woulda, coulda posted my surmise that it was from nothing.com. By the way, did you check out something.com? There's been something there, though the server seems to be down right now. Best, Ben Udell Tori, Being an optimist by nature, I typed www.nothing.com into my web browser. In a rare stroke of Internet Luck I was presented with a Pierce quote and a link to http://www.peirce.org/ and happened upon this forum. Another stroke of luck I must say. Darrel --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
Joe, Gary, Thanks, Gary, for letting me know that I'm not out to lunch on this one. I think that you're right, that the same distinction appears, just with different words, and when Peirce gets down to the business of defining, he's persistently clear which words mean what. Joe, you'll certainly stimulate curiosity regarding your questions regarding existence reality. I actually thought that you were satisfied with Peirce's account of signs in works of fiction, etc. Why shouldn't they have their own reality? It's semiotically representational but it's not pure artistic whim if it's any good. Like what Sorrentino said -- a patch of color here, one there, a third, and suddenly the painting has the painter trapped -- artistically trapped, really-artistically trapped. In asking actual or real things to serve as signs one may tap into their actualities or realities as things in such a way as to commit to their actual or real processes wherever they may lead -- one rides them but gives them their head, steering here, trying to direct or channel there -- as, for instance, going where an analogy may lead, unexpectedly, into falsehood, truth, irony, mere cleverness, whatever. If these things are already multidimensional in their universes of discourse, their behavior as objects and as signs, etc., etc., well, that's arich instrument that one is playing. Thirdness of predication? Where does Peirce associate quality with thirdness predication (in contradistinction to firstness a predicate)? I took it like so: 1. Description (quality) | 3. Copulation (representation) 2. Designation (reaction) The description (or 'descriptor') is predicated of the designatee, the subject. The 'copulation,' which a relatedidea tothat of 'predication,'may come with some pretty complex logical qualifications or conditions, probability qualifications or conditions, etc., in which other implicit subjects predicates may be vaguely involved intermixed -- it doesn't have to be purely "and," "or," "not." If a law is not just a common character shared by a collection's members, then it presumably involves, is like a "fabric" of, such conditions and dependences. I don't know that Peirce takes "copulation" to all that extent, though I wonder why he would give it such a prominent place otherwise. (I of course always take it to all that extent, but that's me.) Best, Ben - Original Message - From: Joseph Ransdell To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2006 3:14 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? I don't know whether Peirce is terminologically loose or not when it comes to "real" as distinct from "existent" but there is something that is still puzzling to me in that distinction, much in the same puzzling way "quality" shows upsometimes as firstness but sometimes as if it has the thirdness of predication. In the case of reality, there is the further complication, too, of the fact that he recognizes a reality of sorts in the "internal" world, too. As it happens, I am just now readying a paper for Arisbe by Jerry Dozoretz, which was in Peirce Studies I, which you may or may not be acquainted with called "The Internally Real, the Fictitious, and the Indubitable", in which the idea of internal realityis carefully worked out.It will probably be tomorrow before I manage to get that up, but you'll probably want to read that before concluding anything about the real and the existent. Joe Ransdell - Original Message - From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Thursday, February 09, 2006 12:52 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about? Ben All, Ben, thanks for continuing to make relevant Century Dictionary material readily available for ease of list discussion. For a moment, however, I'd like to consider not "fact" vs "event" but your question concerning "reality" vs "actuality". You first quoted Peirce then commented::: 66 No sign, however, is a real thing. It has no real being, but only being represented. [] I might more easily persuade readers to think that affirmation was an index, since an index is, perhaps, a real thing. Its replica, at any rate, is in real reaction with its object, and it forces a reference to that object upon the mind. 99 66 For reality is compulsive. But the compulsiveness is absolutely _hic et nunc_. It is for an instant and it is gone. Let it be no more and it is absolutely nothing. The reality only exists as an element of the regularity. And the regularity is the symbol. Reality, therefore, can only be regarded as the limit of the endless series of symbols. 99 [BU] I thought that reality was marked by pattern habit and by conditional necessity, the character of that which would have to be. The
[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: entelechy (CORRECTED)
Joe, list, I think you've got it right -- the cognitive content rather than either the act of interpretation or the activity of interpretation. This distinction may get slippery, though, insofar as obect - sign - interpretant are agent - patient - act! Well, let's burn that bridge when we come to it. You may also be right that, whatever the optimal distinction, Peirce wanted to put a reminder that distinctions of possibly somewhat various kinds will be waiting to be made. The cognitive content rather than either the act or the activity of interpretation -- The final interpretant is not approached at some universal rate or class of rates that invariably puts it off indefinitely into the future -- but may instead be reached (though the interpreter won't know for sure) already. What stretches invariably into the indefinite future is the _maximum_ time that it would take to reach the final interpretant -- that's an extremum, such that inquiry prolonged long enough is destined to reach the final interpretant no later than indefinitely far into the future. It sounds unencouraging until we remember that the point of this is to bring research and truth into mutual definitional relation and that, as a brief about research prospects, it is considerably less pessimistic than the view which flatly forbids access to things in themselves. An infinitely precise truth could be approached, as a limit, only over infinite time but, as Peirce said, we can confess inaccuracy and one-sidedness and call it a night. Eventually Peirce did refer to an infinite community of investigators rather than merely an indefinitely prolonged investigation. And it might actually mean something, too, to say that a given truth would take a higher order than lower-case omega successive finite non-infinitesimal periods of time -- that would be to say that the chances of our reaching it sooner were vanishingly small. This seems actually the case with undecidable mathematical questions, though Peirce somewhere talks about resorting to non-deductive inference in such cases. That may seem a stretch with some mathematical questions, but with questions like the consistency of sufficiently rich mathematical systems, it seems that some sort of inductive generalization is in fact how mathematicians come to such a strong belief in many of those systems' consistency, especially the ones proven to be consistent-if-arithmetic-is-consistent. I've argued on another list that such beliefs are probably best not regarded as faith unless we want to talk about statistics-based faith as well. Seems to me to water down the word faith. But then what do I know, I'm not a mathematician. It comes back to me that I also said to Tom, that the point of calling it an interpretant is that it is another sign -- interpretant is short for interpretant sign. Interpretant sounds like a thing, as sign does, rather than like an activity or an act. The thing / product idea (as opposed to act/activity ideas) is hovering in there, but the sign idea cuts through (I think) to the point, the point of cognitive content. It occurs to me that the same ideas apply to the difference between representation and representamen. The sign is the representation but not the activity of representation or the act of representation or the holding or maintaining of representation, etc. Peirce must have really liked the word sign because he didn't need to make one of those coinages out of it. Now, looking at the Commens Dictionary, I find a remarks by Peirce about representation/representamen which is somewhat analogous -- close enough -- to your favored distinction between interpretation and interpretant. He speaks not of an act or activity of representing but of a character of representing. http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/representamen.html 66~~~ A representation is that character of a thing by virtue of which, for the production of a certain mental effect, it may stand in place of another thing. The thing having this character I term a _representamen_, the mental effect, or thought, its interpretant, the thing for which it stands, its _object_. (A Fragment, CP 1.564, c. 1899) ~~~99 66~~~ ... I confine the word _representation_ to the operation of a sign or its _relation to the object _for_ the interpreter of the representation. The concrete subject that represents I call a _sign_ or a _representamen_. (Lowell Lectures, CP 1.540, 1903) ~~~99 If a thing has character of representation, it is a representamen. By analogy, If a thing has the character of interpretation, it is an interpretant. So if I interpret, I'm interpreter and interpretant, indistinguishably, no? Distinguishably. I also represent, make claims, etc., and one can say in a vague way that I'm a sign that [fill in a belief of mine here] but usually we narrow it down to signs that I make and intepretants that I form. In some cases
