Dear Discussants:
As a lurking observer, I wish to thank everyone who contributed to this
discussion for helping to explain a very difficult concept. I can't say I
understand it all yet, but you have certainly helped a great deal in
increasing understanding.
Thanks to everyone who offered their vi
Jerry R., List:
Thanks for your input, which I think has helped the conversation along.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Fri, Feb 9, 2018 at 7:51 PM, Jer
Edwina, List:
I think that we continue to make real progress in understanding each
other. As I see it, our remaining differences mostly boil down to
Representamen vs. Quasi-mind, and the related issue of whether a Sign can
be external as well as internal.
Peirce frequently appended the prefix "q
Dear Edwina, list,
What I see you doing in your last post is giving reasons for valuing
quiddity for Mind in triadic relation.
What I also see you doing is giving reasons to avoid valuing hecceity in
Quasi-mind contra Mind.
So long as you do the former (valuation for quiddity) and divest y
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Jerry - I don't see that the individual mind is necessarily
referenced as 'quasi-mind.
"A sign is in s conjoint relation to the thing denoted and to the
mind'. 3.360
"But if the triple relation between
Edwina list,
As per your objection,
“I would prefer to somehow imply/read that individual mind/quasi-mind is an
aspect of Mind. I just get 'antsy' about the term 'subset'.”
Here are a few quotes from Peirce that address why individual
mind/quasi-mind is an aspect of Mind (but this concept i
Edwina,
I think what is meant by 'subset' is that your conception of things
contributes to the overall conception of things. But there is also the
possibility that what you contribute are the good and right things and you
are supposed to let go of the things that are not good and/or right.
Anoth
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}Jerry- yes, Peirce was quite specific that one cannot make
individuals judges of truth...and that we function within a
'community'...and I certainly agree with that. I would prefer to
somehow imply/read that individual min
Edwina, list,
Here is a reason for difference between Mind and Quasi-Mind:
*When we come to the great principle of continuity and see how all is fluid
and every point directly partakes the being of every other, it will appear
that individualism and falsity are one and the same. *
*Meantime,
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}Jon -
I still don't see why you call this semiosic action the 'quasi-mind'
rather than the 'mind'. What's the difference between the two?
This 'mind/quasi-mind', in my understanding operates within the
m
Edwina, Jon, list,
Thank you for that nice response.
Now, if the commens is quasi-minds welded together, where is the
representamen that represents the commens? How can we know of it unless
unnoticed nuances of that internal representation are brought to our
attention through some explicit/e
Edwina, List:
Yes, I have; but I will try to do so again, with some additional detail.
What you call the Representamen is basically (though not exactly) what I
see Peirce calling the Quasi-mind, specifically the Quasi-interpreter (CP
4.551 ;1906). Its acquaintance with the system of Signs is "th
Edwina,
I would say, the knowledge brought with the representamen is the immediate object, the common knowledge (which not necessarily includes all existing relevant rules/laws) is part of the dynamical object, and the complete knowledge (including all relevant rules/laws) is the final interpreta
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}Jon, list - You haven't told us where and when the Quasi-Mind
enters the semiosic interaction. And why just the Quasi-Mind? Why not
MIND?
When and how does MIND, which I understand as referring to the
general ha
Gary R., List:
I am currently trying out in my own mind defining the Immediate Object as
the *partial *combination of attributes of the Dynamic Object by which the
Sign *denotes *it. It is partial because (as you said) knowing the DO in
its fullness is an impossibility. It does not *itself *pred
g., objective) is, I take it, being
> explained in terms of the way the distinction is applied in the cases of
> these relatively simpler kinds of things--largely because that is how
> greater clarity can be achieved.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Pr
Edwina, List:
Thanks for the additional explication of your model. I knew that I was
oversimplifying it (again), so this is helpful.
Regards,
Jon S
On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 5:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> Jon, list - there's still quite a bit of disagreement.
>
> You are saying that I say th
Schmidt
Sent: Wednesday, February 7, 2018 3:05:40 PM
To: Helmut Raulien
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen
Discussion
Helmut:
Thanks for clarifying that. It sounds like by "the epistemic cut" you mean
Peirce's distinction
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Jon, list - there's still quite a bit of disagreement.
You are saying that I say that "all Signs [IO-R-II] are internal to
an individual agent. But remember - I don't consider that this
internal triad can exist
Helmut:
Thanks for clarifying that. It sounds like by "the epistemic cut" you mean
Peirce's distinction between "the inner world" and "the outer world."
Indeed, Edwina's model (as I understand it now) is that all Signs (IO-R-II)
are *internal to an individual agent*--although it need not be a hum
Jon, List,
I took the epistemic cut for the boundary of one´s mind (is that correct?), and taking it into account means to have to mention which parts of a sign are internal and which are external to it, as Edwina did. A representamen then is internal to a certain person´s mind. If you do not tak
Helmut, List:
I am not sure exactly what you mean in this context by "the epistemic cut,"
and hence which model (Edwina's or mine) you see as taking it into account
vs. ignoring it. Could you please clarify?
Thanks,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosoph
Edwina, Jon, List,
I guess there are two models, which are different, but either of them may justifiedly be chosen: One model is taking the epistemic cut in regard, and the other is ignoring it. When Peirce writes: "If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions
Edwina, List:
Understood, thanks again.
Jon S.
On Wed, Feb 7, 2018 at 10:30 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
>
> Jon - you only partly get my view...but..I acknowledge that you are
> getting most of it!
>
> I consider that the Dynamic Interpretant from Person A - since it is
> articulated, has a For
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Jon - you only partly get my view...but..I acknowledge that you are
getting most of it!
I consider that the Dynamic Interpretant from Person A - since it is
articulated, has a Form; which is to say, it is now in
Edwina, List:
Thank you for confirming and elaborating on that. I knew that I was
oversimplifying, but it is helping me get a much better handle on how you
are using the terminology, which (needless to say) has been a major
obstacle for me. I also recognize that the process is not as "linear" as
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}Jon - yes/no/ but. ...I think one has to be careful. It isn't as
reductionist as it might sound from the words...
The external Dynamic Interpretant of Person A, is his interpretation
of an external Dynamic Object.
Edwina, List:
ET: The whole triad, which carries within it the general/common
information of the Representamen as expressed within the Dynamic
Interpretant will then act as a Dynamic Object from Person A to Person B.
This is what I was seeking to confirm--in your view, the (external) Dynamic
In
Jerry R., List:
My question was prompted by the fact that Edwina's definition of the
Representamen requires it always to be *internal *to an agent; i.e., in her
view, there is no such thing as an *external *Representamen.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Ama
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Jon - there isn't any 'gap'. There isn't any free-standing Sign that
zips between two people, carrying all information in his postal bag.
The whole triad, which carries within it the general/common
information o
Jon, list,
You said:
In your *semiotic *terminology, *what* bridges the external gap between the
internal Representamen of the utterer and the internal Representamen of the
receiver?
mind if I try?
the external representamen of the commens?
Best,
J
On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 8:57 PM, Jon Alan Sch
Edwina, List:
Hmm, no, that is not what I mean. The "medium of communication" that I
have in mind is whatever conveys an *idea *or *form *from one agent to
another--certainly not mere air waves or screen pixels or light
reflections. In your *semiotic *terminology, what bridges the external gap
b
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}Jon - I don't quite understand the point of your question.
When you are speaking of 'something external to convey the content
from one person to another personthat is the medium of
communication. That is not
Edwina, List:
Let me try asking my question in a slightly different way. If I am
understanding you correctly, the [IO-R-II] triad is strictly *internal *to
each individual agent. It seems to me that for communication to occur
between two *different *agents, something *external *is required to co
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}Jon - the triad is: O-R-I.
Therefore, all semiosic interaction between agents takes place
within this triad. That means:
DO[IO-R-II] DI
The DO and DI are external. The Relations within th
Edwina, List:
Seeking even greater clarity--given your view that the Representamen is
always *internal *to an agent, do you also hold that all *external
*communication
*between *agents takes place by means of Dynamic Objects, rather than by
means of Representamens?
Thanks again,
Jon S.
On Tue,
Neal, List:
Agreed. As I recently stated in the thread on "Collateral Experience and
Habits of Interpretation," the word "determines" in this context carries in
my mind the connotation of constraining or narrowing, rather than
dictating; i.e., *reducing *the range of possibilities, but not (by
it
"
Cc: "tabor...@primus.ca" , Jon Alan Schmidt
, "peirce-l@list.iupui.edu"
Subject: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Representamen Discussion
Edwina, Jon,
I think you are both right: When we talk about the word "vase" we have seen
written, this written w
Jon, list,
Then I suppose I would do well to remember that.
Best,
J
On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 3:24 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote:
> Jerry R., List:
>
> That quote is from c. 1896 (R 1345). In Peirce's later and more extensive
> writings about semiosis, he consistently limited the term "Representame
Jerry R., List:
That quote is from c. 1896 (R 1345). In Peirce's later and more extensive
writings about semiosis, he consistently limited the term "Representamen"
to the first Correlate--what he here called "the substance of the
representation, or the *Vehicle* of the *Meaning*," such as "the ma
Edwina, List:
I identify the word "vase" as a Representamen only in the first analysis,
not the second, in which it is instead treated as a Dynamic Object; and I
believe that we (more or less) agree on all of the other Correlates *except*
(obviously) the Representamen.
Thanks,
Jon S.
On Tue, Fe
Jon, list,
You said:
On the contrary--those would be ten different Interpretants of the same
Representamen. :-)
I am sure you are right since you are now looking at the cartoon and not
*vase*.
A *Representamen* can be considered from *three formal points of view*,
namely, first, as the
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}Jon - the sticking point is the Representamen. But please note - YOU
have informed us that the word 'vase' is a Representamen!
The Representamen is, to me, the internal process of mediation that
transforms the inp
Jerry R., List:
On the contrary--those would be ten different Interpretants of the same
Representamen. :-)
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Tue, Feb 6, 2
Dear list,
Here are 10 different representamens for *vase*.
Hth,
Jerry R
On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 2:38 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
wrote:
> Edwina, List:
>
> I see considerable value in reaching agreement on exactly where we
> disagree. :-)
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 2:22 PM, E
Edwina, List:
I see considerable value in reaching agreement on exactly where we
disagree. :-)
Thanks,
Jon S.
On Tue, Feb 6, 2018 at 2:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> Jon - yes, that's correct. To me, the Representamen is internal to an
> agent. It has the function of mediating between the ex
Edwina, List:
In the thread on "Collateral Experience and Habits of Interpretation," we
completely agreed on the second analysis of the bird example, with the
notable exception of how to define the Representamen. I honestly believe
that the same is true of the second analysis of the "vase" exampl
Edwina, List:
Again, I do not expect to convince you; I am only doing exactly what you
have said in the past that I should do, which is to note our disagreement
and then make the case for my own view.
Where do you see me "equating the Representamen with the Interpretant"?
Regards,
Jon S.
On Tu
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}Jon - yes, that's correct. To me, the Representamen is internal to
an agent. It has the function of mediating between the external set
of sensate data of the Dynamic Object...which is received by this
Agent as the Immediat
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}Jon - no, we don't agree on your first or second analysis. I totally
and completely disagree with your view of the Repesentamen and indeed,
of the semiosic process.
I think we should stop. Wait and see if others a
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Jon - stop. You haven't convinced me. I repeat; when I saw the
written word - that word was a Dynamic Object. It then 'moved' into
my Mind as an IO, where my knowledge base [Representamen] came up
with several Interpret
Helmut, List:
I wholeheartedly agree with you that different analyses will assign the
same element to different Correlates. I tried to make that point with the
bird example--the loud sound initially serves as a Representamen that
stands for the falling of the tree, and then as a Dynamic Object fo
Edwina, List:
JAS: Initially the bare word "vase" stood for my previous discussion with
Gary R. to your interpreting mind.
ET: The first time - my Interpretant of it was that it referred to your
discussion with Gary R.
I read these two statements as saying exactly the same thing--the word
"vase
Edwina, Jon,
I think you are both right: When we talk about the word "vase" we have seen written, this written word is the dynamic object. When somebody just reads the word "vase", the word is a representamen.
In the first case, during the talk, there is a semiotic chain in which interpretants b
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}Jon - NO. NO.
It may have been a Representamen according to YOUR analysis. But it
was, right from the start, to me - a Dynamic Object.
The first time - my Interpretant of it was that it referred to your
Edwina, List:
*Initially *the bare word "vase" stood *for *my previous discussion with
Gary R. *to *your interpreting mind. Hence it was indeed a Representamen
according to my analysis, but with a different Dynamic Object than I
anticipated. It was only in your *subsequent *analysis that you cla
Helmut - no, Peirce's term was not 'medium' which simply means a
carrying-agent. His term was mediation.
"A Representamen mediates between its Interpretant and its Object"
2.311
Edwina
On Tue 06/02/18 1:37 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Edwina, List,
Edwina, List,
now I have read the entries in the Commens dictionary about "representamen" and "sign" (in some places Peirce says, that a sign is a special kind of representamen, the one that creates an interpretant in a human mind, in another place he says that both are synonyms). You wrote:
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}Jon - I had no recognition of the word as associated with a
container for flowers. I associated it with your discussion with
Gary R.
Then - when you specifically asked the question: Is it a
Representamen - I then
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