Mary Anne, this amicus brief filed in the 4th Circuit Muslim ban litigation
will suggest many good possibilities:
http://www.robbinsrussell.com/sites/default/files/appellate_pdf/FILED%20CA4%20AMICUS%20BRIEF%20-%20IRAP%20v%20Trump.pdf
You might consider assigning the brief itself.
On Thu, May 11,
I am wondering how far Tom's notion of privilege for sermons (compared with
all other communications by leaders of non-profit groups or entities) can
be carried. Does anyone think that a clergyman, speaking in a sermon, has
a privilege to defame a third party who is not a member of, or in any
tions (in the same way that the Court in effect
> accepted the fact that the Oregon peyote law would prevent the NAC from
> engaging in its sacramental ceremonies).
>
> What I still don't quite understand, in Bob and Chip's argument, is why
> some but not all of the four cl
ver political questions, (2) notions that
> political questions are committed to other branches. And again there, (2)
> becomes a reason for (1). But maybe I should leave well enough alone…
>
>
>
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-bounces@
> lists.ucla.e
t;
> Detroit, MI 48202
>
> l...@wayne.edu
>
> (313) 577-4046 (phone)
>
> Website—http://law.wayne.edu/profile/christopher.lund/
>
> Papers—http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=36340
>
>
>
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:re
Neither Eugene not Steven has made any attempt to state the principle for
which Hosanna-Tabor stands. It certainly does not stand for a broad and
free floating principle of church autonomy, subject to some balancing
test. It does not assert that broad principle, and it explicitly eschews
any
So is it correct to conclude that the struggle over LGBT rights explains
100% of any change in public attitudes -- left and right-- about funding
and regulation of houses of worship? If not, what else explains the change?
The end of the fight between Protestants and Catholics about public funding
rsity of Virginia
> 580 Massie Road
> Charlottesville, VA 22903
> 434-243-8546
> --
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-bounces@lists.
> ucla.edu] on behalf of Ira Lupu [icl...@law.gwu.edu]
> *Sent:* Saturday, April 22, 2017 11:44 AM
&g
;
> Douglas Laycock
> Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law
> University of Virginia
> 580 Massie Road
> Charlottesville, VA 22903
> 434-243-8546
> --
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-bounces@lists.
> ucla.edu] on
ing of secular functions carried
>> out by religious organizations in religious contexts. Now the principles of
>> no discrimination and no funding squarely conflict, and we have to choose
>> between them. And the founding generation did not make that choice.
>>
>>
>&g
I have been struck this week by how almost all of the pro-state discussion
of Trinity Lutheran has focused on the problem of discrimination by state
funded churches (i.e., why should taxpayers fund activities from which some
are invidiously excluded?). It's as if we (academics as well as informed
un...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-bounces@
> lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Ira Lupu
> *Sent:* Wednesday, April 12, 2017 8:19 AM
> *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics <religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>
> *Subject:* Re: State-sanctioned church "police force
Why would a large, predominantly white suburban congregation near
Birmingham need its own police force?
For a related religion clause case, see State v. Celmer,
http://law.justia.com/cases/new-jersey/supreme-court/1979/80-n-j-405-0.html
(invalidating on First A grounds "a statutory scheme which
, not secular) Gorsuch is dismissive. When pro se plaintiff
> Ali objects to being forced to include the name he was convicted under on
> all mail, despite a religiously motivated name change, Gorsuch says he has
> not articulated a substantial burden on a sincere religious exercise
Thanks to Jim Oleske for the kind words. Here is a thought about the
general landscape of inquiry into burdens on religion, and a related
thought about the way Texas has argued in these various matters:
1) The proposition that RFRA's "substantial burden" inquiry includes both a
"secular cost" and
I appreciate Doug's bringing to our attention this material about RFRA and
the Standing Rock litigation. In addition to the question of the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribe's interest in the property under Lake Oahe (the Tribe
argues that this presents an important distinction from Lyng, which
involved
n...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Ira Lupu
> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 22, 2016 4:11 PM
>
>
> *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> *Subject:* Re: Scalia's views of RFRA?
>
>
>
> There was no compelling interest test
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu <
> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> on behalf of Ira Lupu <
> icl...@law.gwu.edu>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 22, 2016 1:37:05 PM
>
> *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> *Subject:* Re: Scali
here I discuss this in detail,
On Tue, Nov 22, 2016 at 5:02 PM Case, Mary Anne <mac...@law.uchicago.edu>
wrote:
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Ira Lupu
> *Sent:* Tuesday, November 22, 2016 3:37 PM
>
&g
I wonder if Eric Rassbach (and others at The Becket Fund, which has
commendably and energetically pursued RLUIPA cases on behalf of mosques and
Muslim prison inmates) expects such lawsuits, by the DOJ on behalf of those
building a mosque, to continue in the next Administration.
On Tue, Nov 22,
The Scalia opinion in Smith of course did not anticipate a law like RFRA;
instead, he was referencing practice-specific accommodations (like a peyote
prohibition that exempted Native American Church members who used peyote in
sacraments.)
Mary Anne, your comment has an excluded middle -- RFRA, as
>
>Eugene
>
>
>
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-bounces@
> lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Ira Lupu
> *Sent:* Wednesday, October 12, 2016 11:29 AM
> *To:* Mitchell Berman <mitch...@law.upenn.edu>
> *Cc:* David Bernstein <d
Mitch Berman's good question asks in general terms about how much
"solicitude" Fred's claim deserves. But we cannot answer intelligently
unless we know the forum and the grounds advanced for Fred. Is he asking
the state legislature to exempt religious objectors from public
accommodations law?
Thanks very much, Mark, for calling the Hosanna-Tabor article to the
attention of the list. It appears that the links you included from Reva
Siegel's Law and Humanities SSRN journal won't get you to the paper. But
these links will:
http://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications/1224/
Some national attention now --
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/3259421f36124a34be17b68654a7bf4e/no-men-allowed-women-only-pool-hours-draw-complaints-nyc
.
Note the references to Seattle and a Minneapolis suburb, and the ambiguous
position of city wide authorities in NYC (relevant in light of
A few more thoughts:
1. Are there any women participating on this listserv? It seems
remarkable that we have talking about this gender based policy for days and
(unless I missed something, and please forgive me if that is the case) all
the participants are men.
2. The Kiryas Joel problem is
I agree that it's not for the state to arbitrate between Hillel's and
Meir's view about what is embedded in Jewish law with respect to women's
bodies. But I want to go back to Eugene's earlier argument that 3rd party
harms are not relevant to the Establishment Clause problem because the
basketball tournament because they asked
> for an accommodation so they would not have play on the Sabbath.
>
> If their games could be scheduled to avoid playing on the Sabbath at
> minimal cost to others, why shouldn't their religious beliefs be
> accommodated? The fact that there is
on in this kind of a case.
> Alan
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Jun 2, 2016, at 7:49 PM, "Ira Lupu" <icl...@law.gwu.edu
> <javascript:_e(%7B%7D,'cvml','icl...@law.gwu.edu');>> wrote:
>
> Paul is raising, among other questions, an entirely appropriate bas
Paul is raising, among other questions, an entirely appropriate baseline
question -- how do sexually integrated public pools burden anyone's
religious freedom? No one is coerced to use them. The pools are a
constitutionally gratuitous benefit, offered on conventional conditions of
no sex
The EITC is no more a "salary supplement" than Food Stamps. These are
transfers to people based on need, and sometimes triggered by work, or
conditioned on work. They are not given in exchange for work, and the
giver (the U.S.) has no control over the work done or the employee. So
that is no
Equality cannot be the only prism for measuring Religion Clause norms.
Non-establishment does at times mandate different treatment -- favorable to
religion in the context of the ministerial exception, and unfavorable in
the context of public school sponsored speech. A public school may sponsor
a
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/04/making-sense-of-
supplemental-filings-in.html
--
Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood & Eleanor Davis Professor of Law, Emeritus
George Washington University Law School
2000 H St., NW
Washington, DC 20052
(202)994-7053
Co-author (with Professor Robert Tuttle) of "Secular
estimony, actually not that big of a
> deal? What cases have been decided on this basis?
>
> Eric
>
> On Mar 22, 2016, at 9:05 AM, Ira Lupu <icl...@law.gwu.edu> wrote:
>
> Bob Tuttle and I have written a book ("Secular Government, Religious
> People") that central
Fax)
> gbay...@adflegal.org
> ADFlegal.org
> Not Licensed in DC
> Practice Limited to Federal Court
>
> *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
> religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Ira Lupu
> *Sent:* Tuesday, March 22, 2016 10:25 AM
> *To:* Law &am
Eric Kniffin writes that ". . . whether there is a substantial burden on a
sincere religious belief is something courts can determine by looking at
the force of the government’s compulsion." That's correct, but it's only
half the story. Look at Yoder (on which RFRA declares it is modeled), in
Try the spending power. But why would Congress want to do this, rather
than leave it to each state? And if Congress did, why not include a
provision that would specify that the law does not apply to exemptions that
would cause significant harm to third parties?
On Monday, February 22, 2016,
Steve Jamar is absolutely right, and the Texas Supreme Court is quite
wrong. Cheers uttered, and banners carried, by cheerleaders during a
public high school football game are school sponsored speech. Does anyone
on the list think the First Amendment would bar the school from ordering
One more thought -- I am really hoping that somewhere in the great state of
Texas there are a few brave and impish cheerleaders who will bring banners
to the next game that read "Good without God -- beat Austin HS!" Under
this Texas Supreme Court ruling, school officials would just be begging for
constitutionally repulsive to me, and it's very sad if fear
chases away all the potential plaintiffs.
On Sat, Jan 30, 2016 at 12:15 PM, Ira Lupu <icl...@law.gwu.edu> wrote:
> Steve Jamar is absolutely right, and the Texas Supreme Court is quite
> wrong. Cheers uttered, and ban
An equal treatment theory also does not fit the "ministerial exception"
constitutionally mandated in Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church v. EEOC. I wonder
if Eugene, and others who question the Trinity Lutheran Church outcome, think
that unanimous decision is incorrect.
Sent from my iPhone
> On
Neither Eugene's or Alan's questions invite quick or easy answers, but
here's a start:
1. Eugene's examples all involve health and safety. None can be diverted
to religious use; all make religious use, and all other uses of the
property, healthier or safer. Compare Mitchell v. Helms -- in-kind
efore be equally free to say that “play in the joints” lets it deny
> all those safety grants (otherwise generally available to all other
> institutions) to religious institutions?
>
> Eugene
>
> Chip writes:
>
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> [m
According to the 8th Circuit opinion,
http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/trinity-op-below.pdf,
the Missouri Constitution (Article I, Section 7) specifically provides that
“no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or
indirectly, in aid of any church, section
--a holding that the EC
> does not categorically prohibit direct funding to churches--would be fairly
> momentous, no? (even if we've all been expecting it since SOC left the
> Court)
>
> On Fri, Jan 15, 2016 at 8:32 PM, Ira Lupu <icl...@law.gwu.edu> wrote:
>
&g
>> wrote:
>>
>>> I missed Chip's great post before I asked my question.
>>>
>>> I agree completely with what Chip says here. It seems like a clear
>>> violation of EC limitations on National power. The clearest command of the
>>> EC forbids denom
gt;>> who are not part of the American political community, could one colorably
>>> argue that the denominational-discrimiantion rule -- as currently
>>> understood by the Court -- does not apply?
>>>
>>> - Jim
>>>
>>> On Wed, Dec 9, 2015 at 12:21 PM, Rick Duncan <nebraskalawp...@yahoo.
hoo.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> I missed Chip's great post before I asked my question.
>>>>
>>>> I agree completely with what Chip says here. It seems like a clear
>>>> violation of EC limitations on National power. The clearest comma
There has been much discussion in the press and on blog posts re: the
constitutionality of of Trump's proposal to bar (non-citizen?) Muslims from
entering the U.S. Several commentators have suggested the "plenary power"
doctrine, governing Congressional power over immigration, would insulate
such
Kara Loewentheil also collects these sources (RFRA's and state
constitutional provisions so construed) is her "The Satanic Temple, Scott
Walker . . . " piece here: http://harvardlpr.com/2015/04/14/1762/
On Sat, Dec 5, 2015 at 1:02 PM, Douglas Laycock
wrote:
> I collect
disagree."
> https://campaignforamericanprinciples.com/first-amendment-defense-act/
>
> Family Research Council on FADAs (which it calls GNDAs): "Like the First
> Amendment Defense Act at the federal level, states need to pass legislation
> now to protect individuals and entit
As I understand it, many state legislatures meet only in the first few
months of the year, and have not been in session since the Obergefell
decision. I have heard from several reliable sources that Georgia
legislators will re-introduce a RFRA in January 2016. In spring 2015, it
appeared that
Is this any different than creating chapels or worship/reflection spaces on
a state university campus, in a county hospital, or on a military base?
What holds these examples (including the airport) together is the desire to
accommodate the worship needs of patrons/participants who have no ready
I wonder if any County official or member of the public (one of the new
licensees) has asked for a formal opinion of the Kentucky AG re: the
validity of the licenses issued under these circumstances:
http://ag.ky.gov/civil/opinions/Pages/default.aspx
Such an opinion (which may take a while to
he ground have overtaken all of this.
> Still worth thinking about to figure out how better to deal with similar
> events in the future. For responsive points, see comments below in
> brackets. The gist is that if “Davis to Mason” is constitutional, then
> “Davis to Mason with authorizati
us grounds. In County C, the clerk
> opposes marriages by previously divorced individuals on religious grounds.
> Does our commitment to reasonable religious accommodations require us to
> accept a system in which same-sex couples living in County A have to have
> their marriage licenses authorized
Correction to my message from a few minutes ago -- it was Michael Masinter
(not Marty Lederman) who invoked, on a related thread on this list, the
quotation "l'etat c'est moi" in reference to Kim Davis.
On Mon, Sep 14, 2015 at 10:09 AM, Ira Lupu <icl...@law.gwu.edu> wrote:
&
I think Jim Oleske's analysis is spot on, and completely of a piece with
Doug Laycock's point, offered early in this discussion, that Rowan County
cannot assert a religious identity. Accommodations can be made for Davis
personally, but not for the County. The 6th Circuit might wisely put an end
When you study or teach family law, you quickly realize that the validity
of a marriage is never adjudicated at the time a license is issued, or when
the ceremony is taking place. The validity of a marriage will only be
questioned some time later, in a matter of divorce, inheritance, or some
A few questions, and forgive me if they have been asked and answered on
this or related threads on this listserv:
1) Why did Ms. Davis stop issuing all marriage licenses? God did not tell
her that issuing licenses for different-sex couples was sinful or wrong.
Was this full closure on advice of
We're discussing the nonprofits, but, as Nelson pointed out, these regs
accommodate some objecting for-profits, including Hobby Lobby itself. I
know we have Becket Fund lawyers on the list, and I do not expect them to
disclose information about their clients' plans. But I have been wondering
I believe (and I may be mistaken on this) that Utah considered but did not
enact this kind of perform marriages for all or for none rule for public
officials with this kind of authority. I think Utah wound up with a right
of selective opt-out for these officials.
The North Carolina rule (all or
:43 PM, Ira Lupu icl...@law.gwu.edu wrote:
I'm not at all convinced that the current law includes any categorical bar
on aid to houses of worship. What SCOTUS decision (on its facts) ever
involves direct grants to houses of worship, for use in worship functions?
In any event, Trinity Church
I'm not at all convinced that the current law includes any categorical bar
on aid to houses of worship. What SCOTUS decision (on its facts) ever
involves direct grants to houses of worship, for use in worship functions?
In any event, Trinity Church applied for this grant in connection with its
Posner's opinion in FFRF v. McCallum ignores SOC's Mitchell opinion on the
question of whether indirect (beneficiary choice) aid must pass through
the hands of a beneficiary (as a voucher would). He argues that such a
requirement is unnecessary. But McCallum is an indirect aid case, and so
does
On May 7, there was a lengthy discussion on this list of the issues Howard
raises, under the subject line, By the power vested in me . . . ? The
discussion did not include the Establishment Clause question, on which my
view is that a general nondiscrimination rule for solemnizers, while
Several points:
1. DC (and, I expect, most states) does not license clergy or anyone
else to confer marital status. The DC Code authorizes civil celebrants
(many categories) to solemnize a marriage.
http://dccode.org/simple/sections/46-406.html
2. Jim, thanks for the plug to the work that Bob
commitments.
The possibility of third-party harms seems to draw the two issues
together, not separate them.
Jeremy
On May 7, 2015, at 3:25 PM, Ira Lupu icl...@law.gwu.edu wrote:
Several points:
1. DC (and, I expect, most states) does not license clergy or anyone
else to confer
Last night, Michael Worley wrote, some colleges forbid same-sex dating.
This made me genuinely curious. These rules can't possibly forbid two
men, or two women, from going to dinner and a movie; or forming a close
bond of trust and friendship; or even expressing affection in the form of a
hug.
or advocates interracial
marriage will be expelled.
3. Students who date outside of their own race will be expelled.
4. Students who espouse, promote, or encourage others to violate the
University's dating rules and regulations will be expelled.
On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 8:58 AM, Ira Lupu icl
The Methodist pavilion story that Luke invokes is constantly being
under-described, in a misleading way. For a more complete account, you
might want to look at pp. 279-80 of this:
scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1055context=njlsp
On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 6:18 PM,
Is there information about Gordon College more recent than this:
http://www.worldmag.com/2015/03/review_board_gordon_college_accreditation_not_at_risk
The IRS is already under tremendous political pressure over treatment of
political advocacy groups. The idea that it will choose now to go after
. And if the issue did arise, and the SG consulted with
IRS, I'd be shocked if the IRS was willing to lock itself in with respect
to what it might do 15-20 years from now, in cases with facts that are hard
to foresee.
On Wed, Apr 29, 2015 at 10:08 PM, Ira Lupu icl...@law.gwu.edu wrote:
Verrilli
Thanks very much for posting this, Will. One of the big questions lurking
here involves the extent to which the reasoning in the DOJ's Office of
Legal Counsel memo (World Vision), cited in note 2 of the letter from USCCB
(and others) to which you linked, applies to treatment of social service
of Law
*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Ira Lupu
*Sent:* Sunday, April 05, 2015 1:58 PM
*To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics
*Subject:* Re: Eugene's Blog Post on Liberals and Exemption Rights
Mark:
O'Brien
I accept Mark's apology.
His point about RFRA critics overstating the potential downside is
precisely met by commenting about how RFRA's friends tend to understate the
potential harmful effects, which include encouraging discrimination as much
as actually legalizing it.. We all know that it is
Charlottesville, VA 22903
434-243-8546
*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [
mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Ira Lupu
*Sent:* Sunday, April 05, 2015 10:51 AM
*To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics
*Subject:* Re: Eugene's
of
discretion given to officials who would police the photographer's use of
her First Amendment rights.
Mark
Mark S. Scarberry
Pepperdine University School of Law
Sent from my iPad
On Apr 1, 2015, at 6:03 PM, Ira Lupu icl...@law.gwu.edu wrote:
No, I don't think that's OK. But that's a real
understanding the dignitary
injury argument as anything other than a position that people should not
have to hear certain viewpoints with which they disagree, even if goods and
services are otherwise being provided.
Will
Will Esser
Charlotte, North Carolina
From: Ira Lupu icl
That is not an adequate fix. What if an employer in Indianapolis, relying
on RFRA, refuses to provide spousal benefits for a same sex spouse? What
if a vendor in Indianapolis refuses on religious grounds to serve a Muslim
or an atheist?
If the state legislature wants to assure everyone that the
I think the compelled speech issues, re: communicative work like
photography, are interesting and sometimes difficult. I address those in an
article I will post later this month. All I want to say now is that
religious motivation is irrelevant to the compelled speech argument. (See
W Va Bd of
Mark S. Scarberry
Professor of Law
Pepperdine Univ. School of Law
*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Ira Lupu
*Sent:* Wednesday, April 01, 2015 4:22 PM
*To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics
*Subject
that the emperor isn’t really a god?
Mark
Mark S. Scarberry
Professor of Law
Pepperdine Univ. School of Law
*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Ira Lupu
*Sent:* Wednesday, April 01, 2015 5:32 PM
*To:* Law Religion
instead
simply discarded the Lee language wholesale by saying RFRA went further
than the pre-Smith law.
- Jim
On Wed, Apr 1, 2015 at 12:09 PM, Ira Lupu icl...@law.gwu.edu wrote:
I do not think most liberals oppose exemptions for businesses per se --
imagine a law that compelled a butcher
Alan asks very good questions. I think the answer about civil rights
carve-outs has to start with 1) justifications and 2) political costs.
Once upon a time, the political costs of RFRA's were very low; they were
abstract and obscure to most voters. It was Hobby Lobby, coupled with the
rise of
One very important question I have never seen discussed is the relationship
between a state RFRA (say, Texas or Indiana) and a local
anti-discrimination ordinance (say, San Antonio or Indianapolis) that
covers public accommodations and protects the LGBT population. This is a
common configuration;
Most states have a co-religionist hiring exemption for organizations with
religious purposes, akin to section 702 of Title VII. A few have narrower
co-religionist exemptions, limited to jobs with religious duties of some kind.
From my reading of Utah law when this story arose last week (I
Many stories on-line about the new proposal, e.g.,
http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/mormon-church-backs-utah-anti-discrimination-bill/
Does anyone have a link to the text of the Bill?
Thanks in advance.
Chip
--
Ira C. Lupu
F. Elwood Eleanor Davis Professor of Law, Emeritus
George
] *On Behalf Of *Ira Lupu
*Sent:* Wednesday, March 04, 2015 4:15 PM
*To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics
*Subject:* Utah Bill re: LGBT discrimination, with religious exemptions
Many stories on-line about the new proposal, e.g.,
http://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/mormon-church
://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=342235
Blogs:
Prawfsblawg http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
Mirror of Justice http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/
Twitter: @RickGarnett https://twitter.com/RickGarnett
On Tue, Feb 17, 2015 at 12:51 PM, Ira Lupu icl...@law.gwu.edu wrote
-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Ira Lupu
*Sent:* Wednesday, February 18, 2015 6:12 PM
*To:* Law Religion issues for Law Academics
*Subject:* Re: Jim Oleske's new review of book by Robert George
Dear Rick:
Yes, I think you are just echoing Mark and Eugene when you emphasize
my tune about whether we should provide conduct exemptions from
general, neutral laws that burden religious activity. Professor Ira Lupu,
whom Oleske thanks in a note for helping with the review, circulated a link
to it, touting it as “rigorously argued.” But a review cannot be rigorously
argued
Look at the Nevada law of public accommodations,
https://www.leg.state.nv.us/NRS/NRS-651.html#NRS651Sec060. It is focused
on places open to the general public, not on particular kinds of work. It
covers any bar or restaurant, or any establishment that includes a bar or
restaurant. And it
The idea that state legislators, faced with home schooling questions, are
reflecting on the best reading of Pierce, Yoder, or the Constitution (and
which parts of that would they be reading?) strikes me as spectacularly
fanciful. If they cared about what legal research disclosed (rather than
what
I've gotten a little bit lost re: whether we are discussing the right to
home school or the right to not have your children vaccinated against
contagious disease. But I must add that the legislative support, now quite
widespread, for home schooling is not limited to or focused on those who
home
I did very similar research for a piece I wrote in the B.U. L. Rev. in
1987, and found exactly the same thing -- courts very much resisted
extending Yoder into a general right to home school. They distinguished
Yoder based on age of the children and character of the relevant religious
community
if I have been wrong in
thinking that there is no political appetite in the current climate for
bipartisan state RFRAs targeted at the type of noncontroversial exemptions
discussed during the debates over the original RFRA.
- Jim
On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 6:13 PM, Ira Lupu icl...@law.gwu.edu
The Georgia General Assembly is considering RFRA-type legislation. The
proposed Bill is here:
http://www.legis.ga.gov/Legislation/en-US/display/20152016/HB/29.
A group of legal scholars, including myself and others who post on this
list, have written a letter to Georgia political leaders,
, and if the bill passes, it would seem to be a major development in the
debate over state RFRAs (and a development that I, quite frankly, would not
have anticipated in the current political environment).
- Jim
On Fri, Jan 23, 2015 at 3:03 PM, Ira Lupu icl...@law.gwu.edu wrote:
The Georgia General
I want to call the list's attention to Jim Oleske's rigorously argued, just
published review of Robert George, Conscience and Its Enemies: Confronting
the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism (2013).
The web link is here,
http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/01/the-born-again-champion-of-conscience/,
and the
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