On Feb 4, 12:45 pm, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > On 4 February 2011 12:34, 1Z <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> What I think I'm still missing is the precise significance of "has to" > >> in the above. > > > If platonism/AR is false, there has to be a real physical world, > > because there is then no mathematical world for the appearance of > > a real world to emerge from > > Yes, obviously. But I'm querying why Bruno says that this world "has > to" be different from what comp predicts, given that comp itself can > only be true absent such difference. It seems self-contradictory to > me. > > David >
Yes. Comp+Plato predicts a certain amount of weirdness, but there is no contrasting reason to expect "real" physics to be weirdness free...in fact, if physics cohered exactly with human intuitions, that would be suspiciously idealistic and somewhat contradictory to physical realism. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
