On Feb 14, 11:08 pm, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > On 14 February 2011 20:46, John Mikes <[email protected]> wrote: > > > I asked several times: "what are numbers?" without getting a reasonable > > reply. > > Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists. > > That may be, but I would also like to see if we can get things > untwisted. I'm not peddling any theory of my own here, I'm just > trying to do some simple accounting. For example according to some > theory "X doesn't exist" and then somewhere else in the same theory > something supposedly depends on "assuming X". This doesn't add up. > Part of the problem - most of it, perhaps - is > psychological-linguistic. Being dead wrong about some theory of the > mind (fortunately) doesn't stop our minds from functioning. But that > very same fact can blind us to circular reasoning. > > I've tried to argue before that the "causal closure of physics" is a > very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied > consistently. Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied. > The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of > reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what > "exists" is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully > constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition > were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would > perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no "theories" in > such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said > (but by whom?) to underlie them.
No, that wouldn't follow because REDUCTION IS NOT ELIMINATION!!! > Of course this hardly reflects our > experience (how could it?). We do not discover ourselves to be in > some maximally fragmented state (what could it be "like"?) but rather > in some integrated state of an altogether higher order; Do you think reduction means reduction to *disconnected* bits and pieces. > but such > quotidian reality apparently impresses us so little that we are quite > capable of theorising it cheerfully out of existence (e.g. eliminative > materialism). Well, as Groucho Marx once innocently enquired "who you > gonna believe - me or your own eyes?". > > David > > > David, > > > I was laughing all the way from the computer that '7 does not exist'. And > > yes, it does not. > > Do qualia exist without the substrate they serve for as qualia? > > It goes into our deeper thought to identify 'existing' - > > I am willing to go as far as "if our mind handles it, 'it' DOES exist" > > so the quale like; 7(?) [i.e. the monitor for the eggs in your fridge] is > > existing. Not answering the question 'what it is?" - but principally I am > > also against ontology in a worldview of change, where "being" makes only > > sense as "transitionally becoming" and transition substitutes for stagnancy. > > Panta Rhei also boggles my mind, especially when I cut out conventional > > time. > > > I asked several times: "what are numbers?" without getting a reasonable > > reply. > > Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists. > > > On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 2:32 PM, 1Z <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman <[email protected]> wrote: > >> > On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z <[email protected]> wrote: > > >> > > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told > >> > > you 7 doesn't exist. > > >> > Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an > >> > analogous sense? > > >> I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still > >> have a computation running on a physical computer. > > >> > And that consequently any computational > >> > characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing > >> > to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a > >> > formal "game"? > > >> If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to > >> any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a > >> such > > >> > I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but > >> > if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is > >> > real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind? > > >> No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes > >> with nothing to run on are eliminated > > >> > I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm > >> > not clear what is supposed to have any claim to "reality" here, other > >> > than the physical tokens instantiating the "computation". > > >> > David > > >> If you have a physical token running a computation, you have > >> a computation. What is eliminated? > > >> -- > >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > >> "Everything List" group. > >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > >> [email protected]. > >> For more options, visit this group at > >>http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > [email protected]. > > For more options, visit this group at > >http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
