On Feb 14, 11:08 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
> On 14 February 2011 20:46, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > I asked several times: "what are numbers?" without getting a reasonable
> > reply.
> > Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.
>
> That may be, but I would also like to see if we can get things
> untwisted.  I'm not peddling any theory of my own here, I'm just
> trying to do some simple accounting.  For example according to some
> theory "X doesn't exist" and then somewhere else in the same theory
> something supposedly depends on "assuming X".  This doesn't add up.
> Part of the problem - most of it, perhaps - is
> psychological-linguistic.  Being dead wrong about some theory of the
> mind (fortunately) doesn't stop our minds from functioning.  But that
> very same fact can blind us to circular reasoning.
>
> I've tried to argue before that the "causal closure of physics" is a
> very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
> consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
> The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
> reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
> "exists" is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
> constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
> were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
> perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no "theories" in
> such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
> (but by whom?) to underlie them.

No, that wouldn't follow because REDUCTION IS NOT ELIMINATION!!!

>  Of course this hardly reflects our
> experience (how could it?).  We do not discover ourselves to be in
> some maximally fragmented state (what could it be "like"?) but rather
> in some integrated state of an altogether higher order;

Do you think reduction means reduction to *disconnected* bits and
pieces.

> but such
> quotidian reality apparently impresses us so little that we are quite
> capable of theorising it cheerfully out of existence (e.g. eliminative
> materialism).  Well, as Groucho Marx once innocently enquired "who you
> gonna believe - me or your own eyes?".
>
> David
>
> > David,
>
> > I was laughing all the way from the computer that '7 does not exist'. And
> > yes, it does not.
> > Do qualia exist without the substrate they serve for as qualia?
> > It goes into our deeper thought to identify 'existing' -
> > I am willing to go as far as "if our mind handles it, 'it' DOES exist"
> > so the quale like; 7(?) [i.e. the monitor for the eggs in your fridge] is
> > existing. Not answering the question 'what it is?" - but principally I am
> > also against ontology in a worldview of change, where "being" makes only
> > sense as "transitionally becoming" and transition substitutes for stagnancy.
> > Panta Rhei also boggles my mind, especially when I cut out conventional
> > time.
>
> > I asked several times: "what are numbers?" without getting a reasonable
> > reply.
> > Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.
>
> > On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 2:32 PM, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> >> On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
> >> > On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
> >> > > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
> >> > > you 7 doesn't exist.
>
> >> > Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
> >> > analogous sense?
>
> >> I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
> >> have a computation running on a physical computer.
>
> >> >  And that consequently any computational
> >> > characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
> >> > to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
> >> > formal "game"?
>
> >> If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
> >> any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
> >> such
>
> >> >  I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
> >> > if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
> >> > real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?
>
> >> No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
> >> with nothing to run on are eliminated
>
> >> > I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
> >> > not clear what is supposed to have any claim to "reality" here, other
> >> > than the physical tokens instantiating the "computation".
>
> >> > David
>
> >> If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
> >> a computation. What is eliminated?
>
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