On 15 February 2011 00:42, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:

>> I've tried to argue before that the "causal closure of physics" is a
>> very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
>> consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
>> The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
>> reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
>> "exists" is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
>> constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
>> were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
>> perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no "theories" in
>> such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
>> (but by whom?) to underlie them.
>
> No, that wouldn't follow because REDUCTION IS NOT ELIMINATION!!!

Yes, so you keep saying, or in this case, shouting ;-)  And of course
I agree with you.  To claim that reality consisted solely of
"disconnected events" would of course be nonsensical.  Any such
proposition leads directly to a reductio ad absurdum; observation
informs us that reality is manifestly integrated at multiple levels.
But this is the point: all such observation is a posteriori; it isn't
a priori deducible from the theory of a fundamental substrate of
micro-physical entities and their relations.  Moreover, such a theory
does not, a priori, legitimise or require the postulation of complex
higher-order entities in order to account for the state of affairs at
its own level.  But this state of affairs, ex hypothesi, exhausts what
is real.  Therefore if we properly reduce - or restrict - our account
to this level, and hence eliminate any appeal to higher-level concepts
or states, nothing real should be left out.  But this does not accord
with observation. Consequently, higher-level states must also be, in
some ineliminable sense "real", or to put it another way, both
differentiation and integration must play a role in an adequate
account of reality.

Remember I'm just doing accounting, not peddling solutions.  My point,
on this accounting, is that the elusive HP and its zombie spawn seem
to be the consequence of an incomplete tally of what is "real", and
that this in turn is consequent on intuiting the "completeness" of
micro-physical theory in the wrong spirit.

David

>
>
> On Feb 14, 11:08 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
>> On 14 February 2011 20:46, John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> > I asked several times: "what are numbers?" without getting a reasonable
>> > reply.
>> > Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.
>>
>> That may be, but I would also like to see if we can get things
>> untwisted.  I'm not peddling any theory of my own here, I'm just
>> trying to do some simple accounting.  For example according to some
>> theory "X doesn't exist" and then somewhere else in the same theory
>> something supposedly depends on "assuming X".  This doesn't add up.
>> Part of the problem - most of it, perhaps - is
>> psychological-linguistic.  Being dead wrong about some theory of the
>> mind (fortunately) doesn't stop our minds from functioning.  But that
>> very same fact can blind us to circular reasoning.
>>
>> I've tried to argue before that the "causal closure of physics" is a
>> very strong claim that is also very restrictive if applied
>> consistently.  Trouble is, in my view, it very rarely is so applied.
>> The Hard Problem, and the corresponding zombie intuition, is a sort of
>> reductio of the strongest version of this claim - i.e. that what
>> "exists" is reducible to a micro-physical substrate that is fully
>> constitutive of all phenomena of whatever type. If this proposition
>> were ever to be taken at face value, then further theorising would
>> perforce just stop right there; indeed there can be no "theories" in
>> such a scenario, just the sub-atomic events that might have been said
>> (but by whom?) to underlie them.
>
> No, that wouldn't follow because REDUCTION IS NOT ELIMINATION!!!
>
>>  Of course this hardly reflects our
>> experience (how could it?).  We do not discover ourselves to be in
>> some maximally fragmented state (what could it be "like"?) but rather
>> in some integrated state of an altogether higher order;
>
> Do you think reduction means reduction to *disconnected* bits and
> pieces.
>
>> but such
>> quotidian reality apparently impresses us so little that we are quite
>> capable of theorising it cheerfully out of existence (e.g. eliminative
>> materialism).  Well, as Groucho Marx once innocently enquired "who you
>> gonna believe - me or your own eyes?".
>>
>> David
>>
>> > David,
>>
>> > I was laughing all the way from the computer that '7 does not exist'. And
>> > yes, it does not.
>> > Do qualia exist without the substrate they serve for as qualia?
>> > It goes into our deeper thought to identify 'existing' -
>> > I am willing to go as far as "if our mind handles it, 'it' DOES exist"
>> > so the quale like; 7(?) [i.e. the monitor for the eggs in your fridge] is
>> > existing. Not answering the question 'what it is?" - but principally I am
>> > also against ontology in a worldview of change, where "being" makes only
>> > sense as "transitionally becoming" and transition substitutes for 
>> > stagnancy.
>> > Panta Rhei also boggles my mind, especially when I cut out conventional
>> > time.
>>
>> > I asked several times: "what are numbers?" without getting a reasonable
>> > reply.
>> > Sometimes I really like 1Z's twists.
>>
>> > On Mon, Feb 14, 2011 at 2:32 PM, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>
>> >> On Feb 14, 6:21 pm, David Nyman <da...@davidnyman.com> wrote:
>> >> > On 14 February 2011 12:35, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>>
>> >> > > Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
>> >> > > you 7 doesn't exist.
>>
>> >> > Wouldn't this then imply that computation also doesn't exist, in an
>> >> > analogous sense?
>>
>> >> I can still have seven eggs in my fridge, and I can still
>> >> have a computation running on a physical computer.
>>
>> >> >  And that consequently any computational
>> >> > characterisation of the mental is in itself a mere fiction, reducing
>> >> > to whatever physical behaviour is picked out under the rules of a
>> >> > formal "game"?
>>
>> >> If computation is multiply realisable, it never reduces to
>> >> any particular physical behaviour, even if it always instantiated a
>> >> such
>>
>> >> >  I recall that you aren't committed to CTM per se, but
>> >> > if what you say about mathematics is true, and only the physical is
>> >> > real, wouldn't it follow a priori that CTM just eliminates the mind?
>>
>> >> No. Every running programme is physical. Only programmes
>> >> with nothing to run on are eliminated
>>
>> >> > I know you've said before that reduction isn't elimination, but I'm
>> >> > not clear what is supposed to have any claim to "reality" here, other
>> >> > than the physical tokens instantiating the "computation".
>>
>> >> > David
>>
>> >> If you have a physical token running a computation, you have
>> >> a computation. What is eliminated?
>>
>> >> --
>> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> >> "Everything List" group.
>> >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> >> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> >> For more options, visit this group at
>> >>http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>>
>> > --
>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> > "Everything List" group.
>> > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
>> > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> > For more options, visit this group at
>> >http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
> --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
> "Everything List" group.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
> everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> For more options, visit this group at 
> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
>
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to