On 2/14/2011 1:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 14 Feb 2011, at 07:13, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meeker<[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
What do you think the chances are that any
random object in
Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine
will support intelligent life?
1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?
Zero.
Does that allow us to argue:
1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
possibilities has measure
0
2) Our universe exists so it has measure>0
3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
possibilities
4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
infinite possibilities (since all
of maths includes the real line, etc)
5) MUH is false.
Hmmm. I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing
machines are not the right kind of things to support life.
I am very puzzled by this statement. You could help me understand by
answering the following questions:
Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing machine?
How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven
distinguish it from a universe that does not?
That is a good argument which convinces many people, who actually ask
"what is the MGA for?"
Here I can imagine what 1Z could answer to "How can entities within a
universe that exists in Plato's heaven distinguish it from a universe
that does not?".
He assumes the existence of primary matter or of a primitively real
physical universe,
It's equivocation to speak of entities existing in a domain that doesn't
exist. If something like arithmetical universe exists, it exists in a
very different sense of the word than material objects exist. If there
are entities in that universe that are aware of it (whatever that may
mean) then they a perforce aware in a different sense.
and will, by decision, attribute consciousness, only to the creature
made off that primary matter,
No, there is no need to assume primary matter. One need only recognize
that there is *this* universe which we are aware of and exist in and it
is not the same as some other universe which may or may not exist in
some different sense or another.
even if the consciousness relies in the computation implemented in
that matter. So 1Z accepts the idea that arithmetical truth is full of
zombies, like the "1Z" described in arithmetic through the
arithmetical emulation of our galaxy (say).
But that moves is made impossible by the MGA. To attach consciousness
to matter, you have to introduce something non Turing emulable in that
consciousness, or, like Jack Mallah did, attribute a physical activity
to a piece of matter having no physical activity at all relevant with
the computation.
But the idea of multiple worlds started with Everett whose
interpretation of QM implies that there are no pieces of matter with no
activity. The universe is defined by a wave function in a Hilbert space
and pieces of matter are just certain projections.
But this prevent to say "yes" to the doctor *qua computatio*.
No it doesn't. Whatever the doctor uses to replace neurons in your head
is also matter and also part of the universal wave function.
Do you (the reader of the list, not Jason) agree with the 323
principle? If the physical running of a computer entails some
consciousness, and if that running does not use the register 323, does
the same running of that computer with the "323 register" deleted, run
the same consciousness, or not?
I'd say that's an empirical question. But in terms of answering the
doctor we can say that leaving out register 323 very likely makes it a
different computer.
Brent
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
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