On 14 Feb 2011, at 18:46, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 2/14/2011 1:00 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 14 Feb 2011, at 07:13, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sun, Feb 13, 2011 at 10:46 AM, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com > wrote:
On 2/13/2011 5:21 AM, 1Z wrote:

On Feb 12, 3:18 am, Brent Meeker<meeke...@dslextreme.com>  wrote:

What do you think the chances are that any random object in
Plato's heaven, or any random Turing machine will support intelligent life?
1 in 10, 1 in 1000, 1 in a billion?


Does that allow us to argue:

1) A universe selected from an uncountably infinite number of
possibilities has measure
2) Our universe exists so it has measure>0
3) Our universe is not selected from uncountably infinite
4) MUH indicates any universe must be selected from uncountable
infinite possibilities (since all
of maths includes the real line, etc)
5) MUH is false.

Hmmm. I think we argue that objects in Plato's heaven and Turing machines are not the right kind of things to support life.

I am very puzzled by this statement. You could help me understand by answering the following questions:

Why couldn't there be an accurate simulation of life on a Turing machine?

How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven distinguish it from a universe that does not?

That is a good argument which convinces many people, who actually ask "what is the MGA for?"

Here I can imagine what 1Z could answer to "How can entities within a universe that exists in Plato's heaven distinguish it from a universe that does not?". He assumes the existence of primary matter or of a primitively real physical universe,

It's equivocation to speak of entities existing in a domain that doesn't exist.

I agree.

If something like arithmetical universe exists, it exists in a very different sense of the word than material objects exist.

Arithmetical universe (model of arithmetic theories) already exist in a different sense than the existence of natural number. For the existence of natural numbers you don't need to postulate sets or 'universes'. In the comp physics, both person and matter exists in a quite different sense than numbers. All the different type of existence can be explained intuitively with the notion of persons views, or technically by the use of the modalities. "ExP(x)" means usually that there exist a number n such that it is the case that P(n), but the existence of matter will be described by a "quantized formula" of the type BD(ExBD(P(n)), or something like that. The intensional difference makes all the difference of the notion of "existence" rather transparent. All existence are build from the number existence, but none are equivalent to number existence which can be taken as the most primitive form of existence.

If there are entities in that universe that are aware of it (whatever that may mean) then they a perforce aware in a different sense.

Not necessarily. If their awareness is emulated by a computation, then such an awareness will not feel any difference if the computation is done by this or that type of reality, but the content of their consciousness, and the stability of the experience may depend on it in the long term. The indeterminacy of their first person experience depends on the set of all continuations available in the maximal "everything" structure. That is why we can test the mechanist hypothesis.

and will, by decision, attribute consciousness, only to the creature made off that primary matter,

No, there is no need to assume primary matter. One need only recognize that there is *this* universe which we are aware of and exist in and it is not the same as some other universe which may or may not exist in some different sense or another.


even if the consciousness relies in the computation implemented in that matter. So 1Z accepts the idea that arithmetical truth is full of zombies, like the "1Z" described in arithmetic through the arithmetical emulation of our galaxy (say). But that moves is made impossible by the MGA. To attach consciousness to matter, you have to introduce something non Turing emulable in that consciousness, or, like Jack Mallah did, attribute a physical activity to a piece of matter having no physical activity at all relevant with the computation.

But the idea of multiple worlds started with Everett whose interpretation of QM implies that there are no pieces of matter with no activity. The universe is defined by a wave function in a Hilbert space and pieces of matter are just certain projections.

OK. I don't see why this change anything in the paragraph you quoted.

But this prevent to say "yes" to the doctor *qua computatio*.

No it doesn't. Whatever the doctor uses to replace neurons in your head is also matter and also part of the universal wave function.


Do you (the reader of the list, not Jason) agree with the 323 principle? If the physical running of a computer entails some consciousness, and if that running does not use the register 323, does the same running of that computer with the "323 register" deleted, run the same consciousness, or not?

I'd say that's an empirical question.

Certainly not. There are no empirical test for consciousness, especially when it is restricted to one particular computation. We know already that the behavior or the report of the experience will not be different.

But in terms of answering the doctor we can say that leaving out register 323 very likely makes it a different computer.

Obviously. But that is the question. The question is: given that the computation c is the same with and without the register 323 (which is not used during c), if consciousness supervenes on c with register 323, does consciousness supervenes on c without register 323?



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to