On 7/3/2011 8:56 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 2:35 AM, selva kumar <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 12:59 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On Fri, Jul 1, 2011 at 6:23 AM, selva kumar
<[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
Is consciousness causally effective ?
If it is not causally effective, then you must explain what
caused the word "consciousness" to enter our lexicon and what
caused the field of pihlosophy of mind, and all the various
books on the subject of consciousness. The dirty secret of
epiphenominalism (the theory that consciousness is casually
inert) is that if it were a true theory, the theory of
epiphenominalism would be entirely private and unsharable.
The fact that a theory was generated and shared to explain
consciousness proves consciousness has effects. Even the fact
that we are discussing it now in this thread can be taken as
evidence of its causal effects.
Jason
Then by your definition..Consciousness is our ability to think ?
No, my point is that if you are thinking about consciousness, then
what else could it have been but consciousness that caused you to
think about it?
That would be the material cause in Aristotles sense. But material
causes don't form causal chains.
Brent
If consciousness had no effects, then we would not think about it,
talk about it, or write e-mails about it.
Jason
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