On 02 Jul 2011, at 21:24, B Soroud wrote:

"A property of consciousness is"

it sounds like you are reifying "consciousness"... consciousness is not a thing in itself, consciousness does not exist in and of itself... it can only be understood within the interdependent and complex framework of sensation, bodies, space.... consciousness of something, in and through something.... inseparable from the system of space, energy, matter and motion... and essential equal to it.... not something seperate and distinct from it that can exist independently of it....

consciousness is not something that exists in itself.... consciousness is always embodied consciousness of life.... in and through life and the complex instrument of form and the mystery of sensation and generation. Consciousness is a phenomena of the "body" and its natural system... and is equal to that "body" and "body system".

it sounds like you guys are reifing consciousness....




It sound more like you are reifing body and system.

Consciousness here and now is accepted by many as the most undoubtable truth, even if unprovable to a pair. Body and system are rather clearly mind constructions to organize experience.

Anyway, my point is logical. If the brain works at some level like a digital machine, then physics emerge from arithmetic (or any universal system (in the Post Church Turing sense).

Computationalism makes the mind body problem into a math problem, sometimes called the "measure problem" in this list.

In the theory of digital machines (theoretical computer science) consciousness appears like a word used by machines to refer to something they want consider as true, even undoubtable, yet incommunicable/unprovable. It has a role, including a role in the origin and stability of the material observable.

I can only refer you to my papers (see my url). My goal is not to argue on the truth, nor even the plausibility that the brain act as a Turing machine, but that IF that is true then Plato's theology is more correct than Aristotle, in a way which is empirically testable. Just to be short and clear. Comp makes theology a science. In all case, even if comp is false, it happens that machines have an interesting theology, where theology is defined as the set of propositions true *about* a machine (as opposed to science, which is what machine can prove).

To oppose theology and science makes both theology and science into a pseudo-theology. Everything I say is just consequences of taking seriously the idea that we might survive with an artificial digital brain. If we get a contradiction (not weirdness) then we refute comp. If we get only weirdness, then we can compare it to the weirdness around you and see if the theory shed some light.

You seem to assume some Aristotelian notion of matter (system, body, energy, ...). Well, that just cannot work unless you postulate a special type of non computationalist theory of mind. That is all my point. I do not pretend this is entirely obvious.

Bruno




On Sat, Jul 2, 2011 at 11:22 AM, Pzomby <htra...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Jul 1, 4:23 am, selva kumar <selvakr1...@gmail.com> wrote:
> Is consciousness causally effective ?
>

In my opinion, yes, if in simple terms, it is logically correct to
state:  A property of consciousness is….the capacity and ability of
individual human consciousness to create intentionally desired
physical and mental effects.

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