>> Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower behaves
>> differently than a biological plant.

>Sure. But they have not the same function.

They both decorate a vase. How do we know when we build a chip that
it's performing the same function that a neuron performs and not just
what we think it performs, especially considering that neurology
produces qualitative phenomena which cannot be detected at all outside
of our personal experience. Maybe the brain is a haunted house built
of prehistoric stones under layers of medieval catacombs and the chip
is a brand new suburban tract home made to look like a grand old
mansion but it's made of drywall and stucco and ghosts aren't
interested.

>Because all known laws of nature, even their approximations, which can
>still function at some high level, are Turing emulable.

But consciousness isn't observable in nature, outside of our own
interiority. Is yellow Turing emulable?

>By computers I mean universal
>machine, and this is a mathematical notion.

I don't know, man. I think computers are just gigantic electronic
abacuses. They don't feel anything, but you can arrange their beads
into patterns which act as a vessel for us to feel, see, know, think,
etc.

>That's a bad note! What is the first 5th % that you don't understand?

Each sentence is a struggle for me. I could go through each one if you
want:

 "I will first present a non constructive argument showing that the
mechanist
hypothesis in cognitive science gives enough constraints to decide
what a "physical reality"
can possibly consist in."

 I read that as "I will first present a theoretical argument showing
that the hypothesis of consciousness arising from purely mechanical
interactions in the brain is sufficient to support a physical reality.
Right away I'm not sure what you're talking about. I'm guessing that
you mean the mechanics of the brain look like physical reality to us.
Which I would have agreed with a couple years ago, but my hypothesis
now makes more sense to me, that the exterior mechanism and interior
experience are related in a dynamic continuum topology in which they
diverge sharply at one end and are indistinguishable in another.

>Read just the UDA. The first seven steps gives the picture. Of course,
>you have to be able to reason with an hypothesis, keeping it all along
>in the reasoning.

I'm trying, but it's not working. I think each step would have to be
condensed into two sentences.

>No, they are related to arithmetical relations and set of arithmetical 
>relations.
Maybe that's the issue. I can't really parse math. I had to take
Algebra 2 twice and never took another math class again. If the
universe is made of math I would have a hard time explaining that. Why
is math hard for some people if we are made of math? Why is math
something we don't learn until long after we understand words, colors,
facial expressions, etc?

>God create the natural numbers, all the rest is created by the natural numbers.
Numbers create things? Why?

>> My focus is on describing what and who we are in the simplest way. To my 
>> mind,
>> what and who we are cannot be described in purely arithmetic
>> relations, unless arithmetic relations automatically obscure their
>> origin and present themselves in all possible universes as color,
>> sound, taste, feeling, etc.

>Nice picture. This is what happens indeed.

You are saying that there is an absolute ontological correlation
between numbers and phenomenon, ie all possible spectrums begin with
red, all possible periodic tables begin with Hydrogen - the
singularity of the proton is immutably translated as the properties of
elemental hydrogen in all physical universes?

>It is in between. Because physics is not the projection of the human
>mind, but the projection of all universal (machine (number)) mind.
I can go along with that, although I would not limit the universal
interior order to machine, number, or mind, but rather a more all-
encompassing phenomenology like 'sense' or 'pattern'.

>>By definition, mental phenomena are
>> exempt from physical constraints, such as gravity, thermodynamics,
>> etc.

>They are not; even in Platonia.

You're not saying that Mickey Mouse has mass and velocity though,
right? I don't get it.

>The complex problem is how pain are possible, and yes, I think that
>computer science has interesting things to say here.

Like what?

There might be a bit of a language barrier.. I'm just not sure what
you mean towards the end. Why does the universal machine pretend not
to be a machine?

Craig
On Jul 12, 3:58 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 11 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Jul 12, 3:58 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 11 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> > I'm having trouble understanding what you're saying.
>
> >>> Computer chips don't behave in the same way though.
>
> >> That is just a question of choice of level of description. Unless you
> >> believe in substantial infinite souls.
>
> > Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower behaves
> > differently than a biological plant.
>
> Sure. But they have not the same function.
>
> > A computer chip behaves
> > differently than a neuron.
>
> Not necessarily. It might, if well programmed enough, do the same  
> thing, and then it is a question of interfacing different sort of  
> hardware, to replace the neuron, by the chips.
>
> > Why assume that a computer chip can feel
> > what a living cell can feel?
>
> Because all known laws of nature, even their approximations, which can  
> still function at some high level, are Turing emulable. In the case of  
> biology, there is strong evidence that nature has already bet on the  
> functional substitution, because it happens all the time at the  
> biomolecular level.
> Even the quantum level is Turing emulable, but no more in real time,  
> and you need a quantum chips. But few believes the brain can be a  
> quantum computer, and it would change nothing in our argumentation.
>
>
>
> >>> Your computer
> >>> can't become an ammoniaholic or commit suicide.
>
> >> Why?
>
> > I'm talking about your actual computer that you are reading this on.
> > Are you asking me why it can't commit suicide or spontaneously develop
> > a hankering for ammonia?
>
> Because, it is a baby, and its universality is exploited by the  
> sellers, or the nerds.
> And we don't allow it any form of introspection, except some disk  
> verification. So it has no reason, and no real means, to think about  
> suicide. He has still no life, except that (weird) form of blank  
> consciousness I begin to suspect. My computer is not a good example,  
> when talking about computers in general. By computers I mean universal  
> machine, and this is a mathematical notion.
>
> A physical computer seems to be a mathematical computer implemented in  
> a well, another probable universal being in some neighborhood. With  
> comp, they are numerous. With QM, too.
>
>
>
> >> The other side is well explained in the comp theory.
>
> > I'm giving it a good try reading your SANE2004 pdf but I think I'm
> > hovering at around 4% comprehension.
>
> That's a bad note! What is the first 5th % that you don't understand?
>
> > If you want me to be able to
> > consider your hypothesis I think that you will have to radically
> > simplify it's insights to concrete examples which are not dependent
> > upon references to anyone else's work, logical/mathematical/or
> > philosophical notation, teleportation, or Turing anything.
>
> Read just the UDA. The first seven steps gives the picture. Of course,  
> you have to be able to reason with an hypothesis, keeping it all along  
> in the reasoning.
>
>
>
> > As near as I can tell, it seems like you are looking at the hows and
> > whys of sensation - how physics and sensation are both logical
> > relations
>
> No, they are related to arithmetical relations and set of arithmetical  
> relations.
>
> > rather than noumenal existential artifacts and why it might
> > be necessary. I can't really tell what your answer is though.
>
> God create the natural numbers, all the rest is created by the natural  
> numbers. Created or subselected by their ancestors in long  
> computational histories.
> Comp leads to a many-world interpretation of arithmetic.
>
> > My focus
> > is on describing what and who we are in the simplest way. To my mind,
> > what and who we are cannot be described in purely arithmetic
> > relations, unless arithmetic relations automatically obscure their
> > origin and present themselves in all possible universes as color,
> > sound, taste, feeling, etc.
>
> Nice picture. This is what happens indeed.
>
>
>
> >> No problem. That would mean that the substitution level is low. It
> >> does no change the conclusion: the physical world is a projection of
> >> the mind, and the mind is an inside view of arithmetic (or comp is
> >> false, that is, at all level and you need substantial souls). But we
> >> don't even find a substance for explaining matter, so that seems a
> >> regression to me. Anyway, it is inconsistent with the comp  
> >> assumption.
>
> > When you say that the physical world is a projection of the mind, do
> > you mean that in the sense that it might be possible to stop bullets
> > directly with our thoughts or in the sense of physicality only seeming
> > physical because our mind is programmed to read it as such?
>
> It is in between. Because physics is not the projection of the human  
> mind, but the projection of all universal (machine (number)) mind. So,  
> we can' change the laws of physics by the power of the mind, but we  
> can develop degrees of independence. That is why we can fly, and go to  
> the moon.
>
> > I would
> > agree that physicality arises only from the body's own physical
> > composition and our mind's apprehension of the body's awareness of
> > itself in relation to it's world, but I wouldn't say that physical
> > matter is a mental phenomenon. By definition, mental phenomena are
> > exempt from physical constraints, such as gravity, thermodynamics,
> > etc.
>
> They are not; even in Platonia. You have to grasp at least up to the  
> step^seven to see what I mean. I am not trying to propose a solution.  
> I just show that materialism and mechanism are not comptaible, and  
> then than mechanism propose a path toward the solution, which consists  
> in a sort of dialog with a universal (Löbian) machine.
>
>
>
> > I don't know about the mind being an inside view of arithmetic. I
> > would say that arithmetic is only one category of sense and see no
> > reason to privilege it above aesthetic sense or anthropomorphic sense.
>
> It is simple and Turing universal. I could chose any first order  
> logical specification of a universal system instead of arithmetic, but  
> arithmetic is much well known.
>
> > Sense is the elemental level to me. Pattern and pattern detection.
> > Counting is just another pattern. Not all patterns can be reduced to
> > something that can be counted.
>
> The notion of universal machine provides just that. It is not trivial.  
> This is what the mathematician have discovered in the 1920-30. I can  
> explain you that this is possible, although there is a BIG price;  
> which is that universal can crash, and no one can really predict it in  
> general.
>
> > Some things have to be named. Still
> > others cannot be named or numbered.
>
> Yes. Theoretical computer science is full or result with that shape.
>
>
>
> >> But computer science explains why and how such feelings occur.
>
> > Computer science explains why pain exists?
>
> In the case of pain, the why is easy. It provides motivation in the  
> game of life (to eat or to be eaten).
>
> The complex problem is how pain are possible, and yes, I think that  
> computer science has interesting things to say here.
>
>
>
> >> If you get the six or seven first steps, it is an easy exercise to
> >> show that matter cannot be cloned. Ask if you have any difficulty.
>
> > Unfortunately I can't really get any of the steps.
>
> I think it is a problem of motivation, or prejudice (like nothing can  
> make me doubt on the primaty cahracter of physics, or something).
>
> Try again, or ask question, at any step. Or never mind. Despite you  
> don't seem to have a theory, UDA shows that you are correct in  
> rejecting comp, for saving primitive matter. Knowing that might help  
> you to begin your theory of mind-matter. It already says that you will  
> need some infinities.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> > On Jul 11, 4:26 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 11 Jul 2011, at 04:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:d. What is it that
> >>> explains non-cloning of matter? comp? Give me some details and I'll
> >>> try to understand.
>
> >> Read  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract
> >> ...
>
> >> If you get the six or seven first steps, it is an easy exercise to
> >> show that matter cannot be cloned. Ask if you have any difficulty.
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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