On 13 Jul 2011, at 01:49, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower behaves differently than a biological plant.Sure. But they have not the same function.They both decorate a vase. How do we know when we build a chip that it's performing the same function that a neuron performs and not just what we think it performs, especially considering that neurology produces qualitative phenomena which cannot be detected at all outside of our personal experience. Maybe the brain is a haunted house built of prehistoric stones under layers of medieval catacombs and the chip is a brand new suburban tract home made to look like a grand old mansion but it's made of drywall and stucco and ghosts aren't interested.Because all known laws of nature, even their approximations, which canstill function at some high level, are Turing emulable.But consciousness isn't observable in nature, outside of our own interiority. Is yellow Turing emulable?
The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will needs the global structure of all computations. If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown physics.
By computers I mean universal machine, and this is a mathematical notion.I don't know, man. I think computers are just gigantic electronic abacuses. They don't feel anything, but you can arrange their beads into patterns which act as a vessel for us to feel, see, know, think, etc.
Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think.And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything physical. It is more an information pattern which can emulate all computable pattern evolution. It has been discovered in math. It exists by virtue of elementary arithmetic. We can implement it in the physical reality, but this shows only that physical reality is at least Turing universal.
That's a bad note! What is the first 5th % that you don't understand?Each sentence is a struggle for me. I could go through each one if you want: "I will first present a non constructive argument showing that the mechanist hypothesis in cognitive science gives enough constraints to decide what a "physical reality" can possibly consist in."
This is the abstract. The paper explains its meaning.
I read that as "I will first present a theoretical argument showing that the hypothesis of consciousness arising from purely mechanical interactions in the brain is sufficient to support a physical reality.
Not to support. To derive. I mean physics is a branch of machine's theology.
Right away I'm not sure what you're talking about. I'm guessing that you mean the mechanics of the brain look like physical reality to us.
I mean physics is not the fundamental branch. You have to study the proof, not to speculate on a theorem.
Which I would have agreed with a couple years ago, but my hypothesis now makes more sense to me, that the exterior mechanism and interior experience are related in a dynamic continuum topology in which they diverge sharply at one end and are indistinguishable in another.
Read just the UDA. The first seven steps gives the picture. Of course, you have to be able to reason with an hypothesis, keeping it all alongin the reasoning.I'm trying, but it's not working. I think each step would have to be condensed into two sentences.No, they are related to arithmetical relations and set of arithmetical relations.Maybe that's the issue. I can't really parse math. I had to take Algebra 2 twice and never took another math class again. If the universe is made of math
The point is that the universe is not made of anything. Neither physical primitive stuff, nor mathematical stuff. You have to study the argument to make sense of this. So you have to accept the comp hypothesis at least for the sake of the argument.
I would have a hard time explaining that. Why is math hard for some people if we are made of math?
Well, I could ask you why physics is hard if we obey to the laws of physics. this is a non sequitur. Also, we are not made of math. math is not a stuffy thing. It is just a collection of true fact about immaterial beings.
Why is math something we don't learn until long after we understand words, colors, facial expressions, etc?
Because we are not supposed to understand how we work. The understanding of facial expression asks for many complex mathematical operations done unconsciously. We learn to use our brain well before even knowing we have a brain.
God create the natural numbers, all the rest is created by the natural numbers.Numbers create things? Why?
Relatively to universal number, number do many things. we know now that their doing escape any complete theories. We know now why numbers have unbounded behavior complexity. It seems to me that you can already intuit this when looking at the Mandelbrot set, where a very simple mathematical operation defines a montruously complex object. See:
My focus is on describing what and who we are in the simplest way. To my mind,what and who we are cannot be described in purely arithmetic relations, unless arithmetic relations automatically obscure their origin and present themselves in all possible universes as color, sound, taste, feeling, etc.Nice picture. This is what happens indeed.You are saying that there is an absolute ontological correlation between numbers and phenomenon, ie all possible spectrums begin with red, all possible periodic tables begin with Hydrogen - the singularity of the proton is immutably translated as the properties of elemental hydrogen in all physical universes?
Not necessarily. The structure of the proton might be more geographical (contingent) than physical (same for all observers). It is better to understand the reasoning by yourself than to speculate ad infinitum of what I could say. The exact frontier between geography and physics remains to be determined (in the comp theory). In the non comp theory, the question cannot even be addressed.
It is in between. Because physics is not the projection of the human mind, but the projection of all universal (machine (number)) mind.I can go along with that, although I would not limit the universal interior order to machine, number, or mind, but rather a more all- encompassing phenomenology like 'sense' or 'pattern'.
I cannot be satisfied with this, because it put what I want to explain (mind and matter) in the starting premises. Then I show that comp leads to a precise (and mathematical) reformulation of the mind-body problem.
By definition, mental phenomena are exempt from physical constraints, such as gravity, thermodynamics, etc.They are not; even in Platonia.You're not saying that Mickey Mouse has mass and velocity though, right? I don't get it.
It depends on the context. Mickey Mouse is a fiction. as such it has a mass, relatively to its fictive world. That world is not complex enough to attribute meaning to physical attribute, nor mental one, so that your question does not make much sense.
The complex problem is how pain are possible, and yes, I think that computer science has interesting things to say here.Like what?
Like obeying to the las of qualia, where qualia are defined by what the machine can know immediately, yet cannot prove that they know that. It is a part of "machine's theology".
There might be a bit of a language barrier.. I'm just not sure what you mean towards the end. Why does the universal machine pretend not to be a machine?
Because the machine's first person experience is related to the notion of truth, which is a highly non computable notion. Computationalism confronts all machines with a lot of non computable elements. Theoretical computer science is mainly the study of the non computable reality (of numbers).
Craig On Jul 12, 3:58 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 11 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Craig Weinberg wrote:On Jul 12, 3:58 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 11 Jul 2011, at 23:57, Craig Weinberg wrote:I'm having trouble understanding what you're saying.Computer chips don't behave in the same way though.That is just a question of choice of level of description. Unless youbelieve in substantial infinite souls.Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower behaves differently than a biological plant.Sure. But they have not the same function.A computer chip behaves differently than a neuron.Not necessarily. It might, if well programmed enough, do the same thing, and then it is a question of interfacing different sort of hardware, to replace the neuron, by the chips.Why assume that a computer chip can feel what a living cell can feel?Because all known laws of nature, even their approximations, which can still function at some high level, are Turing emulable. In the case ofbiology, there is strong evidence that nature has already bet on the functional substitution, because it happens all the time at the biomolecular level. Even the quantum level is Turing emulable, but no more in real time, and you need a quantum chips. But few believes the brain can be a quantum computer, and it would change nothing in our argumentation.Your computer can't become an ammoniaholic or commit suicide.Why?I'm talking about your actual computer that you are reading this on.Are you asking me why it can't commit suicide or spontaneously developa hankering for ammonia?Because, it is a baby, and its universality is exploited by the sellers, or the nerds. And we don't allow it any form of introspection, except some disk verification. So it has no reason, and no real means, to think about suicide. He has still no life, except that (weird) form of blank consciousness I begin to suspect. My computer is not a good example,when talking about computers in general. By computers I mean universalmachine, and this is a mathematical notion.A physical computer seems to be a mathematical computer implemented ina well, another probable universal being in some neighborhood. With comp, they are numerous. With QM, too.The other side is well explained in the comp theory.I'm giving it a good try reading your SANE2004 pdf but I think I'm hovering at around 4% comprehension.That's a bad note! What is the first 5th % that you don't understand?If you want me to be able to consider your hypothesis I think that you will have to radically simplify it's insights to concrete examples which are not dependent upon references to anyone else's work, logical/mathematical/or philosophical notation, teleportation, or Turing anything.Read just the UDA. The first seven steps gives the picture. Of course, you have to be able to reason with an hypothesis, keeping it all alongin the reasoning.As near as I can tell, it seems like you are looking at the hows and whys of sensation - how physics and sensation are both logical relationsNo, they are related to arithmetical relations and set of arithmeticalrelations.rather than noumenal existential artifacts and why it might be necessary. I can't really tell what your answer is though.God create the natural numbers, all the rest is created by the naturalnumbers. Created or subselected by their ancestors in long computational histories. Comp leads to a many-world interpretation of arithmetic.My focusis on describing what and who we are in the simplest way. To my mind,what and who we are cannot be described in purely arithmetic relations, unless arithmetic relations automatically obscure their origin and present themselves in all possible universes as color, sound, taste, feeling, etc.Nice picture. This is what happens indeed.No problem. That would mean that the substitution level is low. Itdoes no change the conclusion: the physical world is a projection ofthe mind, and the mind is an inside view of arithmetic (or comp isfalse, that is, at all level and you need substantial souls). But wedon't even find a substance for explaining matter, so that seems a regression to me. Anyway, it is inconsistent with the comp assumption.When you say that the physical world is a projection of the mind, do you mean that in the sense that it might be possible to stop bulletsdirectly with our thoughts or in the sense of physicality only seemingphysical because our mind is programmed to read it as such?It is in between. Because physics is not the projection of the humanmind, but the projection of all universal (machine (number)) mind. So,we can' change the laws of physics by the power of the mind, but wecan develop degrees of independence. That is why we can fly, and go tothe moon.I would agree that physicality arises only from the body's own physical composition and our mind's apprehension of the body's awareness of itself in relation to it's world, but I wouldn't say that physical matter is a mental phenomenon. By definition, mental phenomena are exempt from physical constraints, such as gravity, thermodynamics, etc.They are not; even in Platonia. You have to grasp at least up to the step^seven to see what I mean. I am not trying to propose a solution. I just show that materialism and mechanism are not comptaible, andthen than mechanism propose a path toward the solution, which consistsin a sort of dialog with a universal (Löbian) machine.I don't know about the mind being an inside view of arithmetic. I would say that arithmetic is only one category of sense and see noreason to privilege it above aesthetic sense or anthropomorphic sense.It is simple and Turing universal. I could chose any first orderlogical specification of a universal system instead of arithmetic, butarithmetic is much well known.Sense is the elemental level to me. Pattern and pattern detection. Counting is just another pattern. Not all patterns can be reduced to something that can be counted.The notion of universal machine provides just that. It is not trivial.This is what the mathematician have discovered in the 1920-30. I can explain you that this is possible, although there is a BIG price;which is that universal can crash, and no one can really predict it ingeneral.Some things have to be named. Still others cannot be named or numbered.Yes. Theoretical computer science is full or result with that shape.But computer science explains why and how such feelings occur.Computer science explains why pain exists?In the case of pain, the why is easy. It provides motivation in the game of life (to eat or to be eaten). The complex problem is how pain are possible, and yes, I think that computer science has interesting things to say here.If you get the six or seven first steps, it is an easy exercise to show that matter cannot be cloned. Ask if you have any difficulty.Unfortunately I can't really get any of the steps.I think it is a problem of motivation, or prejudice (like nothing can make me doubt on the primaty cahracter of physics, or something). Try again, or ask question, at any step. Or never mind. Despite you don't seem to have a theory, UDA shows that you are correct in rejecting comp, for saving primitive matter. Knowing that might helpyou to begin your theory of mind-matter. It already says that you willneed some infinities. BrunoOn Jul 11, 4:26 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:On 11 Jul 2011, at 04:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:d. What is it thatexplains non-cloning of matter? comp? Give me some details and I'lltry to understand.If you get the six or seven first steps, it is an easy exercise to show that matter cannot be cloned. Ask if you have any difficulty.--You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .
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