On Sun, Jul 17, 2011 at 10:38 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> > > The interior of the >> singularity is the interior of the cosmos with all of the spacetime >> vacuumed out of it. Spacetime is what exteriorizes the big bang >> (meaning it's more of a Big Break, where the void of space rushes >> inward. There is no exterior to the big bang since it prefigures >> timespace, therefore it can only be conceived of accurately from the >> interior perspective. explicates matter as volume and the void of time >> explicates 'energy' (the experience of matter) as sequence-memory. The >> Singularity then is always happening and never happening, since it is >> outside timespace, the hub of the wheel of Runtime/UD. >> > > The UD is a mathematical being. It is an open question if the apparent > physical universe run a UD, without stopping. > One has run, in my office, for one week. Such a program is demanding in > memory, to say the least. > > Bruno, Is the source of this program available? I am curious how many lines of (Fortran?) code is was. Thanks, Jason > > > > >> I get what you are saying about Mickey Mouse as far as an Inception/ >> Matrix/Maya sense of value-weighted coherence within a semiotic frame >> of reference, although I think there is something good there that you >> are over looking. Something about the density of the simulated >> universe which, by definition, can only be realized in comparison to >> the experience of a denser, more discrete version of the simulation. >> It's qualia of density/mass but there's something unique - it's the >> qualia that pretends not to be qualia. I'm not seduced by the promise >> of the Higgs or Einsteinian curved space (a brilliantly useful >> metaphor, but the opposite of what is literally true) >> > > You talk like if you knew the truth. Are you a sort of guru of what? > > > > > - more at a >> concept of Cumulative Entanglement, where the sensotimotive relation >> of processes separated by space is warped such that scale and density >> is respected. Motive power is inversely proportionate to the >> difference in the scale of the two densities, so that it's not gravity >> exerting a field of force holding you to the ground, it's the >> magnitude of the Earth, (and the momentum of it's rotation and >> revolution? or no? Not an astrophysicist, haha) which weakens your >> motive power to escape becoming part of it. >> > > ? > > > >> So yes, I am certainly willing to entertain comp as far as the cosmos >> not being a concrete stuff >> > > I am agnostic about comp. > I just show that comp makes Aristotle's theology wrong. With comp, there > is no basic primitive universe that you can relate to consciousness, but the > physical reality appearance is explained by a self limitation property of > universal machine (again a mathematical, arithmetical notion). > > > > > > but rather principles having an experience >> of concreteness (by pretending they are the opposite end of what they >> essentially are - ie chasing their tail, thus becoming existential and >> completing the sensorimotive circuit of the singularity to become the >> opposite of the singularity: not just everything and anything, but >> finite, coherent things which come and go into existence, as well is >> less coherent non-things that are literally felt out of insistence). >> > > ? > > > > I >> don't want to limit comp to numbers though. I see that numbers have an >> interior topology as well. That's qualia, and that's what numerology >> tries to tap into. You're right, it is poetry, but that is the >> interior of the cosmos. It insists. One has a personality. It's the >> first, the only, the new, the solitary, etc. It's bold yet timid (it's >> only frame of reference is 0 and 2). Two is a whole emergent identity, >> coupling, relation, cooperation, equality, inequality, etc. So any >> definition of comp to me would have to include the qualitative >> interiority of numbers, the potential feelings, figurative, >> metaphorical evocations which tie in the echo of the future by >> subtracting from the singularity interior. Poetry pulls it down from >> 'heaven'. >> >> Happy day-after-the-full moon Bruno. My head is banging on too many >> cylinders right now but I look forward to continuing this soon. We >> should trade tips on how to lower the control rods into our own >> psychic fission pile and turn off the machine. >> > > > It is very hard to make sense of what you are saying. > From my work you can take deduce that you need special non Turing emulable > components in some primitive matter (nor even quantum emulable). > > With comp, on the contrary, we need , more exactly: we can only use, > addition and multiplication of natural numbers. The mind will correspond to > whatever a universal machine can talk about when introspecting (well defined > by Gödel like technics), and matter appearances are retrieved from limiting > attribute of such a mind. I do not propose any new theory. I show that all > this is unavoidable once we postulate some (rather weak) version of > mechanism. Basically, all this made Plato like theology more coherent with > the facts and with that comp theory than the materialism/naturalism of > Aristotle. > > Have a happy day too. If you have some intuition, you have to understand > that it can be an hard task, actually the real task of the scientist, to > convey it. > > Bruno > > > > >> >> >> On Jul 15, 5:15 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> >>> On 15 Jul 2011, at 00:42, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>> >>> The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will >>>>> needs the global structure of all computations. >>>>> If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown >>>>> physics. >>>>> >>>> >>> I don't consider it an unknown physics, just a physics that doesn't >>>> disqualify 1p phenomena. >>>> >>> >>> So either you naturalize the quale, which can't work (it is a base on >>> a category error), or you introduce an identity thesis, which is ad >>> hoc, and logically incompatible with the comp. assumption. >>> >>> I don't get why yellow is any less stable >>>> than a number. >>>> >>> >>> Yellow, or any qualia. This is a consequence of the UDA. Are you >>> willing to imagine that comp *might* be true for studying its >>> consequence? >>> >>> >>> >>> Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think. >>>>> And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything >>>>> physical. >>>>> >>>> >>> I get what you're saying, but you could put a drug in your brain that >>>> affects your thinking, and your thinking can be affected by chemistry >>>> in your brain that you cannot control with your thoughts. In my >>>> sensorimotive electromagnetism schema, everything physical has an >>>> experiential aspect and vice versa. >>>> >>> >>> That's a form of pantheism, which does not explain what is matter, nor >>> mind. >>> >>> Bruno: >>>> It is more an information pattern which can emulate all >>>> computable pattern evolution. It has been discovered in math. It >>>> exists by virtue of elementary arithmetic. We can implement it in >>>> the >>>> physical reality, but this shows only that physical reality is at >>>> least Turing universal. >>>> >>> >>> CW: It sounds like what you're suggesting is that numbers exist >>>> independently of physical matter, whereas I would say that numbers >>>> insist through the experiences within physical matter. >>>> >>> >>> I find natural to suppose that 17 is prime independently of universes >>> and human beings. I need it if only to grasp actual theories of matter >>> which presuppose them logically. I don't need to know what numbers >>> are. I need only some agreement on some axioms, like "for all natural >>> numbers x we have that s(x) is different from 0", etc. Then I can >>> explain the appearances of matter and mind from the relations >>> inherited by only addition and multiplication. It is amazing (for non >>> logician) but if comp is true, we don't need more than elementary >>> arithmetic. We don't need to postulate a physical universe, nor >>> consciousness. >>> >>> >>> >>> The point is that the universe is not made of anything. Neither >>>>> physical primitive stuff, nor mathematical stuff. You have to study >>>>> the argument to make sense of this. So you have to accept the comp >>>>> hypothesis at least for the sake of the argument. >>>>> >>>> >>> Hmm. If the universe isn't made of anything than your point isn't made >>>> of anything either. I don't get it. >>>> >>> >>> The game of bridge is not made of quarks and electron. No mathematical >>> object is made of something. My point is a reasoning, you have to >>> cjeck his validity. It is non sense to assume a logical point has to >>> be made of something. You are confusing software and hardware (and >>> with comp, the difference is relative, and eventually hardware does >>> not exist: it is "in the head of the universal machines": that is >>> enough to derive physics (which becomes a first person plural measure >>> on possible computational histories). >>> >>> >>> >>> Also, we are not made of math. math is not a stuffy thing. It is just >>>>> a collection of true fact about immaterial beings. >>>>> >>>> >>> Have you read any numerology? >>>> >>> >>> Numerology is poetry. Can be very cute, but should not be taken too >>> much seriously. Are you saying that you disagree with the fact that >>> math is about immaterial relation between non material beings. Could >>> you give me an explanation that 34 is less than 36 by using a physics >>> which does not presuppose implicitly the numbers. >>> >>> >>> >>> Relatively to universal number, number do many things. we know now >>>>> that their doing escape any complete theories. We know now why >>>>> numbers >>>>> have unbounded behavior complexity. It seems to me that you can >>>>> already intuit this when looking at the Mandelbrot set, where a very >>>>> simple mathematical operation defines a montruously complex object. >>>>> >>>> >>> The complexity is in the eye of the perceiver. Your human visual sense >>>> is what unites the Mandelbrot set into a fractal pattern. There is no >>>> independent 'pattern' there unless what you are made of can relate to >>>> it as a coherent whole rather than a million unrelated pixels as your >>>> video card sees it, or maybe as a nondescript moving blur as a gopher >>>> might see it. >>>> >>> >>> OK, but I don't take "human" as primitive. I explain "human" by >>> (special) universal machine (a purely mathematical notion whose >>> existence is a consequence of addition and multiplication). That >>> explain matter, too. Indeed, that makes physics completely derivable >>> (not derived!) from arithmetic. So we can test the comp. hyp. by >>> comparing the comp physics, and empiric data. >>> >>> >>> >>> I cannot be satisfied with this, because it put what I want to >>>>> explain >>>>> (mind and matter) in the starting premises. >>>>> Then I show that comp leads to a precise (and mathematical) >>>>> reformulation of the mind-body problem. >>>>> >>>> >>> Are you more interested in satisfying your premise, >>>> >>> >>> By definition of premise, I am not. >>> >>> or discovering a >>>> true model of the cosmos? >>>> >>> >>> That makes no sense. We can only propose a theory, and refute it, or >>> doubt it forever. >>> >>> >>> >>> You're not saying that Mickey Mouse has mass and velocity though, >>>>>> right? I don't get it. >>>>>> >>>>> >>> It depends on the context. Mickey Mouse is a fiction. as such it >>>>> has a >>>>> mass, relatively to its fictive world. That world is not complex >>>>> enough to attribute meaning to physical attribute, nor mental one, so >>>>> that your question does not make much sense. >>>>> >>>> >>> How does Mickey Mouse have mass? >>>> >>> >>> Walt Disney attributes him a mass, in the sense that Mickey Mouse >>> obeys to the laws that it does not fly, and can take objects. he has a >>> mass in that fictive world. Like hero have houses and friends. I talk >>> "in" the fictive worlds. >>> >>> Whoever is drawing the cartoon can >>>> make the universe he is in be whatever they want. >>>> >>> >>> Not really. The cartoon will not be published if the physical laws are >>> too much fictive. That would be too easy for the super hero, and the >>> story line would get boring. Humans real fictions obeys to Earth real >>> economy, and to human psychology, etc. >>> >>> It doesn't have to >>>> have pseudophysical laws like gravity. He can just teleport around a >>>> Mandelbrot set. >>>> >>> >>> But it usually does not. Even if it does, it is a fictionist nonsense >>> to compare Mickey Mouse and prime numbers. The existence, even >>> fictive, of Mickey mouse needs a long computational history. The prime >>> numbers needs very short history. It is plausible that the actual >>> (Walt Disney) Mickey Mouse stories even needs the physical world, and >>> with comp, this one arise from long histories (number computations). >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> On Jul 13, 5:43 am, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>>> On 13 Jul 2011, at 01:49, Craig Weinberg wrote: >>>>> >>>> >>> Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower >>>>>>>> behaves >>>>>>>> differently than a biological plant. >>>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>> Sure. But they have not the same function. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>> They both decorate a vase. How do we know when we build a chip that >>>>>> it's performing the same function that a neuron performs and not >>>>>> just >>>>>> what we think it performs, especially considering that neurology >>>>>> produces qualitative phenomena which cannot be detected at all >>>>>> outside >>>>>> of our personal experience. Maybe the brain is a haunted house built >>>>>> of prehistoric stones under layers of medieval catacombs and the >>>>>> chip >>>>>> is a brand new suburban tract home made to look like a grand old >>>>>> mansion but it's made of drywall and stucco and ghosts aren't >>>>>> interested. >>>>>> >>>>> >>> Because all known laws of nature, even their approximations, which >>>>>>> can >>>>>>> still function at some high level, are Turing emulable. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>> But consciousness isn't observable in nature, outside of our own >>>>>> interiority. Is yellow Turing emulable? >>>>>> >>>>> >>> The experience of seeing yellow might be, although its stability will >>>>> needs the global structure of all computations. >>>>> If you believe the contrary, you need to speculate on an unknown >>>>> physics. >>>>> >>>> >>> By computers I mean universal >>>>>>> machine, and this is a mathematical notion. >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>> I don't know, man. I think computers are just gigantic electronic >>>>>> abacuses. They don't feel anything, but you can arrange their beads >>>>>> into patterns which act as a vessel for us to feel, see, know, >>>>>> think, >>>>>> etc. >>>>>> >>>>> >>> Neither computer nor brain can think. Persons think. >>>>> And a computer has nothing to do with electronic, or anything >>>>> physical. It is more an information pattern which can emulate all >>>>> computable pattern evolution. It has been discovered in math. It >>>>> exists by virtue of elementary arithmetic. We can implement it in the >>>>> physical reality, but this shows only that physical reality is at >>>>> least Turing universal. >>>>> >>>> >>> That's a bad note! What is the first 5th % that you don't >>>>>>> understand? >>>>>>> >>>>>> >>> Each sentence is a struggle for me. I could go through each one if >>>>>> you >>>>>> want: >>>>>> >>>>> >>> "I will first present a non constructive argument showing that the >>>>>> mechanist >>>>>> hypothesis in cognitive science gives enough constraints to decide >>>>>> what a "physical reality" >>>>>> can possibly consist in." >>>>>> >>>>> >>> This is the abstract. The paper explains its meaning. >>>>> >>>> >>> I read that as "I will first present a theoretical argument showing >>>>>> that the hypothesis of consciousness arising from purely mechanical >>>>>> interactions in the brain is sufficient to support a physical >>>>>> reality. >>>>>> >>>>> >>> Not to support. To derive. I mean physics is a branch of machine's >>>>> theology. >>>>> >>>> >>> Right away I'm not sure what you're talking about. I'm guessing that >>>>>> >>>>> >>> ... >>> >>> read more » >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to >> everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> >> . >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%[email protected]> >> . >> For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >> . >> >> > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~**marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/> > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<[email protected]> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscribe@ > **googlegroups.com <everything-list%[email protected]>. > For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** > group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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