On 31 Jul 2011, at 18:24, benjayk wrote:
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Arithmetic just happens to be powerful enough to point towards it.
All other
universal systems accomplish the same. So to say just number
relations exist
and all else is an "epistemological view" on that is a very narrow
interpretation.
Arithmetical truth contains fortranic truth, lispic truth,
combinatoric truth, etc.
It does not contains theological truth, nor physical truth, except in
the 'epistemological' points of view of the creature they have all.
How exactly do we know that these epistemological truths are
secondary / not
ontological? I don't really see how COMP does tell us that, as it
could well
be that the assumptions COMP makes (including "consciousness
exists", in
order to say "yes, doctor") are in some sense equivalent to the
"epistemological" points of view whose existence we "derive" from the
assumptions of COMP. I can't prove this (I don't think it can be
proven),
but for me it seems like this is the case.
It is just that we don't need to assume them. It is like the invisible
horses pulling a car. You can reify the epistemological truth in some
ontology, but there is no need to do that, and it makes the MB problem
more difficult. In science, you can never proof that a theory is
wrong, by changing ad-hocly the way you interpret the data. The
epistemological view are secondary because they are recovered by the
way machine looks at the arithmetical reality. The simplest ontology
are the numbers, and the internal view, including the physical, are
given by the arithmetical modalities, like Bp and Bp & Dp, or the less
arithmetical one, like Bp & p, Bp & Dp & p, etc. At least in the toy
theology based on the Theaetetus definition of knowledge (justified
opinion which happens to be God's opinion (I mean which happens to be
true)).
Bruno
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