Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 31 Jul 2011, at 18:24, benjayk wrote:
>> Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>> Arithmetic just happens to be powerful enough to point towards it.
>>>> All other
>>>> universal systems accomplish the same. So to say just number
>>>> relations exist
>>>> and all else is an "epistemological view" on that is a very narrow
>>> Arithmetical truth contains fortranic truth, lispic truth,
>>> combinatoric truth, etc.
>>> It does not contains theological truth, nor physical truth, except in
>>> the 'epistemological' points of view of the creature they have all.
>> How exactly do we know that these epistemological truths are
>> secondary / not
>> ontological? I don't really see how COMP does tell us that, as it
>> could well
>> be that the assumptions COMP makes (including "consciousness
>> exists", in
>> order to say "yes, doctor") are in some sense equivalent to the
>> "epistemological" points of view whose existence we "derive" from the
>> assumptions of COMP. I can't prove this (I don't think it can be
>> but for me it seems like this is the case.
> It is just that we don't need to assume them. It is like the invisible
> horses pulling a car.
True, but consciousness is there without being assumed. The theory cannot
just ignore that.
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