In a message dated 11/12/2011 3:29:16 PM Eastern Standard Time, marc...@ulb.ac.be writes:
Let me try, assuming mechanism. Would you agree that in the case you are cut and pasted in two different places, the resulting individuals share a common memory-past? From this we can make sense of "sharing a consciousness", and may be understand that personal identity is relative. Would the original, before the duplication, die in case one of the copy will die? I can understand that sharing consciousness can be felt as a meaningless notion, in case consciousness is defined by the first person experiences including memories, but thought experiments can be imagined to defend the idea that we might survive amnesia (as it is commonly believed), in which case the 'consciousness" we share might be the consciousness of the least common part to ... all Löbian machines, or even all universal machines? We never really know who we are, it seems to me, and that ignorance makes me open to the idea that "sharing consciousness" might make some sense. Bruno Well-said, Dr. Marchal. However many thousands of people 'share' experiences at, say a football game, even though it is a vastly, different experience for each individual. I would say that a fraction of the shared experience is identical, for many, as it would be when many thousands view a ball being kicked into the goal? If somehow, quantum teleportation is demonstrated to be something that human brains occasionally are capable of, then that would prove my point, but I cannot and will not make a claim for this today. If you agree, at some level that Tipler's Omega Point is at all valid, then all the MWI versions of Dr. Marchal, would converge at the nexus of the singularity, and we'd have a collective being, sharing multitudes, of experiences, from what was once, the same identical person. I cannot imagine what such a person would be like, except the psychological, phrase 'multiple personality disorder! This would be for everyone, of course, not just for you. Mitch -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
