On 3/22/2012 4:47 PM, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/22/2012 1:31 PM, John Clark wrote:On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be<mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>> wrote:## Advertising

>> This illustrates the problem I have with your ideas, it's not your mathematics it's the assumption you make right at the start which is the foundation for everything else. > Which assumption?Your assumption that if a identical copy of you is made everythingmay seen identical to a third party but to itself, to the copy andthe original, they would somehow have different viewpoints even ifeverything they saw was the same and they remained identical. I thinkthat is just plain wrong. Lately you seem to be equivocating somewhaton this point and everybody has a right to change their mind, but ifyou do then you'll have to rewrite your proof from page 1 becausethat assumption was important.> Those admit precise and simple definition, related to the duplication and multiplication thought experience. First person = content of a diary bring in the duplication devices.OK, but the original and the copy will both write in their diaries "Iwalked into the duplicating chamber, the machine was turned on and acopy of me appeared right in front of me face to face", the copy andthe original agree on what occurred, so according to you the firstperson perspective, the one that both you and I believe is mostimportant, is identical; so there is only one perspective, oneconsciousness.I don't think Bruno disagreed with this. I know I didn't. The oneconsciousness only becomes two when there is something different - inthe perception of the outside (Washington vs Moscow) or some randominternal change. Your thought experiment shows that comp implies thatpersons bodies can be duplicated without duplicating theirconsciousness (at least for a moment or two). But as I said I don'tsee that this invalidates Bruno's argument which I take to be thatquantum uncertainty can be modeled by uncertainty in personal identity.

Hi Brent,

`Could you offer some sketch of how quantum uncertainty can be`

`modeled by uncertainty in personal identity? The uncertainty of QM`

`follows from the mathematical properties of canonical conjugates`

`(roughly, there exists a Fourier transformation between them) and the`

`general non-commutativity of observables (roughly, as they have complex`

`number valued amplitudes). Quantum uncertainty is not "just randomness"`

`or stochasticity, the evolution of QM systems is the template of a`

`deterministic process. It is just that it is impossible to recover the`

`information required to make a local prediction that makes it seem`

`"classically random" (aka decoherence). I think that we are taking the`

`"branching tree" analogy used by many to explain the many worlds`

`interpretation way too literally here... We should disabuse ourselves of`

`that concept.`

`The uncertainty generated by the copy and paste operations of`

`computation follows from the fissioning of the first person sense of`

`self, so it is indeed generates a "branching tree graph" IFF we ignore`

`cul-de-sacs and other delete operations, cycles and non-monotic`

`relations. Additionally, we assume that conservation laws, which would`

`be "no new rules or data" restrictions for computations. Where is the`

`bridge connecting these concepts? What about the fact that intercourse`

`between humans create "babies", which would be entirely new minds? How`

`do they fix into these scheme?`

Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.