On 22 Mar 2012, at 21:31, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Mar 21, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> This illustrates the problem I have with your ideas, it's not
your mathematics it's the assumption you make right at the start
which is the foundation for everything else.
> Which assumption?
Your assumption that if a identical copy of you is made everything
may seen identical to a third party but to itself, to the copy and
the original, they would somehow have different viewpoints even if
everything they saw was the same and they remained identical.
I don't make that assumption.
I think that is just plain wrong.
Like Brent told you, I agree with you.
Lately you seem to be equivocating somewhat on this point and
everybody has a right to change their mind, but if you do then
you'll have to rewrite your proof from page 1 because that
assumption was important.
I never made that assumption. It is in your imagination. You really
look like you want to see something invalid in the reasoning, and then
you imagine assertion which does not exist (or show me where).
> Those admit precise and simple definition, related to the
duplication and multiplication thought experience.
First person = content of a diary bring in the duplication devices.
OK, but the original and the copy will both write in their diaries
"I walked into the duplicating chamber, the machine was turned on
and a copy of me appeared right in front of me face to face",
You are still avoiding the WM duplication. You cannot invalidate an
argument by changing the premise.
the copy and the original agree on what occurred, so according to
you the first person perspective, the one that both you and I
believe is most important, is identical; so there is only one
perspective, one consciousness.
Sure. This does not invalidate the point I am making. It does not
address the point at all.
> Third person = content of a diary of an external observers.
OK, but the third person observer will write in his diary "the
original walked into the duplicating chamber, the machine was turned
on and a copy of him appeared right in front of him face to face",
the third person agrees on what happened with the first person, he
agrees with both the copy and the original.
Please come back to the reasoning.
> First person plural = content of the diaries of a collection of
person duplicated together.
I don't see the point of this one because according to you (and me
too) if the viewpoint is identical then the consciousness of all of
them is identical, so the word "plural" serves no purpose and just
Come back to the reasoning.
>>but you can't give a scrap of evidence that such differences
>Just look at the content of the diaries.
I did, if they say the same thing then their consciousness is
identical from their viewpoint and my viewpoint and your viewpoint
and the Easter Bunny's viewpoint and ANY viewpoint; and if the
diaries are different then they are different people from ANY
Come back to the reasoning. In the thought experiment I am using, the
content of the diaries are equal up to some pages, and then they
diverge. The experiencer tries to predict which branch they will live.
> It contains statements like "I predict that I will feel to be in W
or in M, I am in M, so I win", pr "I predict that I will see Flying
circus, but I see nothing recognizable, so I fail", etc.
If the purpose of all this "predict" stuff is to find a clear
continuous path that establishes what is meant by "I"
You come back again on this !?!
No, the point is not to establish what is meant by "I". David, Quentin
and others (including myself) have already explain this to you.
You continue to avoid the points. Follow the reasoning and you will
see the purpose.
then it's like pushing on a string, you're doing it backwards,
you've got to do it from the present to the past not from the
present to the future. Looking back the Washington man remembers
being the Helsinki man so they both are part of the same I, and the
Moscow man remembers being the Helsinki man so they both are part of
the same I, but the Moscow man does not remember being the
Washington man so they are not part of the same I.
Which is part of the explanation of the first person indeterminacy.
> If the guy annihilated die, then he would say that P(M) = P(W) =
1/2, and there would be no 1-indeterminacy.
Of course here I made a typo mistake (which you missed). Read P(W) =
P(M) = 0, in case the guy dies. But as we both agree on comp, the guy
does not die in that process.
First of all you seem to make a distinction between dying and being
annihilated that I do not understand, and second, if either of those
things had happened to you you wouldn't be making any predictions,
you wouldn't be saying anything at all.
Like Brent said, the difference is between annihilation and no
reconstitution (= dying), and annihilation + reconstitution (=
teleportation, or duplication, etc.).
Please, answer my post of the 19 mars, instead of attributing me
assertion which are not in my posts, nor in the publications.
You seem to avoid systematically the fact that the indeterminacy
concerns duplication followed by a differentiation. That's the point
of using W and M.
You act like some people in Brussels and paris, who keep criticizing a
thesis which I have never written. I know why they do that, but in
your case it is more mysterious. Are you under influence?
Things are rather simple. You pretend that there is no 1-
indeterminacy. Then you have to explain to us how you predict the
movie that you will remember having seen when the movie-multiplication
experience is completed.
The problem is that you are also unclear on this, and you seem to
accept that 1-indeterminacy in some post, and then just dismiss it as
trivial. In that case that's OK because trivial or not, you get it,
and so we can go to the step 4.
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