On Sat, Mar 24, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >Then what the hell IS the point you are making?
> > That comp entails 1-indeterminacy.
Comp entails indeterminacy PERIOD. Give me a example of 2 conscious beings
that are identical by what you call "3-view" but NOT identical by what you
call "1-view", show they deserve different names, do that and I might get a
idea what you're talking about; but don't give me that diaries business, if
the diaries are different a third party can see that just as well as the
individuals who wrote them. Just one clear non mystical example where
objectively 2 things are identical but subjectively they are not, that's
all I ask and I don't think it's a unreasonable request as your proof
depends on there being such a difference.
> I mean that's the pont of the step 3
And that's why I think it's a waste of time to even read step 4, it's built
on a distinction without a difference.
> The point of the whole UDA is to understand that physics is a branch of
> arithmetic/computer science.
As I said before, although I'm not certain I think you could very well be
right about that, but you have not proven it because in your proof you make
a assumption that is not only far from obvious but one that I believe is
downright false, the assumption that 2 identical consciousness are not
identical and thus need different names, like view-1 and view-3.
>> when the diaries diverge the person will too and become 2, both are the
>> original person and neither is each other.
> > Correct. That is part of the explanation of the comp indeterminacy.
I'm glad you agree that the one becomes 2 during the duplicating process,
then obviously you cannot predict a single unique occurrence that those 2
things will experience because no such thing exists to predict, two things
can not be unique. All you're really saying in this 1-indeterminism stuff
is that 2 is not equal to one, you can not put 2 things (like you) into a
one to one correspondence with one thing (like Moscow or like Washington).
All your confusion stems from the fact that you say "I have been
duplicated" but don't really mean it and still assume there is only one
"I". You say Bruno Marchal will feel he is in Washington only and Bruno
Marchal will feel he is in Moscow only but "I" will feel like he is in one
city and one city only, and that would be true if there were only one "I",
but there is not because *YOU* HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.
> There is a sense for the guy in W to say that he has been annihilated in
> Helsinki and reconstituted in W.
Then you get annihilated every time you get on a bus going from point A to
point B. Do you really want to say that?
> See below, you have fail to answer more than four posts.
I've responded to dozens of your posts! What the hell are you talking
about? Last time you said you wrote a wonderful post that I somehow missed
that explained everything. I asked you to resend it. You did not. Now you
tell me there are 4 wonderful posts of yours that I somehow missed that
explained everything. I now ask you to resend the 4. And I've looked below
and I see nothing that clarifies things.
> if you grasp the 1-indeterminacy, you grasp step 3,
I grasped indeterminacy long before I started talking with you, but you
claim that "1-indeterminacy" is different from "3-indeterminacy" and from
physical indeterminacy and from mathematical indeterminacy and your claim
is based on nothing more than the fact that the number 1 is not the same as
the number 2.
> and so tell me what you think about step 4 .
I don't see the point in going to step 4 if step 3 is silly.
> It is enough to interview each copies, they understand automatically what
> we mean by "you".
Fine, "you" have been duplicated so now there are 2 "you", ONE "you" will
say Moscow and ONE "you" will say Washington so "you" will be in Moscow AND
Washington because 1+1 = 2.
> You are the only one having a problem with this.
Great, then I can claim priority in finding the error in your proof, or at
least that particular error; and I've got to tell you, holding a minority
opinion is not a new experience for me.
> It might be phenomenologically identical with other indeterminacy, but it
> has a simpler explanation
It can't explain why you can't know the momentum and position of a particle
with arbitrary precision and it can't explain why the only way to know if a
Turing Machine will stop or not is to watch it and see what it does and the
only thing it does say is that life is like a box of chocolates you never
know what you're going to get, and I already knew that.
John K Clark
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at