On 24 Mar 2012, at 21:10, meekerdb wrote:
On 3/24/2012 12:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> You keep asking who is this "you"
Yes.
> it is the usual you, as the one you use in your everyday
The word "you" works fine in the usual everyday world,
No, please answer the last part of the message. The everyday world
if MWI is true, is a duplicating chamber.
Yes, and I think Bruno's argument is to show that if consciousness
is a kind of computation
It is not exactly that, but OK. Comp is really just "yes doctor". A
belief in a sort of possible reincarnation. It is better to see it
that way, so that we don't need to decide, in the attempt to figure
out what matter and consciousness is, between what is Turing
computable and what is Turing recoverable through the first person
indeterminacies. I currently tend to think that consciousness is not
Turing computable, but 100% Turing recoverable. Consciousness is the
quintessence of the 1-view.
then diverging computations would produce the same kind of
uncertainty that QM does in the MW interpretation. However, that
doesn't solve the problem it just makes two problems the same.
Well, assuming both COMP, *and* QM.
So we don't know that yet.
COMP makes the problem more complex, because the SWE itself has to be
explained phenomenologically or epistemologically. If both COMP and QM
are correct, then UDA proves the existence of a deduction of QM from
COMP, that is from the comp TOE of your choice, like the tiny sigma_1
complete fragment of arithmetic.
The advantage of comp is that if you accept the knowledge notion given
by Theaetetus then COMP explains both the quanta and the qualia (by
the "divine hypostases", the intensional variant of G* minus G).
Technically the quanta seem to appear there, and this makes the quanta
into first person (plural) notion, which is confirmed by Everett's
multiplication of populations of persons, the contagiousness of the
linear superposition. At the bottom of what is observable, the linear
rules, comp-apparently.
Unfortunately, the arithmetical quantization []<> p is written in Z1*,
that is precisely that [] p is Bp & Dp, that <>p is, dually, Bp v Dp,
so that []<>p is [](Bp v Dp) = B(Bp v Dp) & D(Bp v Dp), and then to
translate some Bell inequality, you need to evaluate formula nesting
the quantization ([]<> ([] <> # ...), which makes most quantum logical
assertion of that complexity still untractable today, despite the
decidability of Z1*).
Bruno
In Everett's MWI there is a problem saying what probabilities mean,
which is just the same as the one in the transporter thought
experiment(c.f. arXiv:0905.0624v1 by Ardian Kent).
Brent
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