On 24 Mar 2012, at 21:10, meekerdb wrote:

On 3/24/2012 12:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

> You keep asking who is this "you"

Yes.

>  it is the usual you, as the one you use in your everyday

The word "you" works fine in the usual everyday world,

No, please answer the last part of the message. The everyday world if MWI is true, is a duplicating chamber.

Yes, and I think Bruno's argument is to show that if consciousness is a kind of computation

It is not exactly that, but OK. Comp is really just "yes doctor". A belief in a sort of possible reincarnation. It is better to see it that way, so that we don't need to decide, in the attempt to figure out what matter and consciousness is, between what is Turing computable and what is Turing recoverable through the first person indeterminacies. I currently tend to think that consciousness is not Turing computable, but 100% Turing recoverable. Consciousness is the quintessence of the 1-view.


then diverging computations would produce the same kind of uncertainty that QM does in the MW interpretation. However, that doesn't solve the problem it just makes two problems the same.

Well, assuming both COMP, *and* QM.

So we don't know that yet.

COMP makes the problem more complex, because the SWE itself has to be explained phenomenologically or epistemologically. If both COMP and QM are correct, then UDA proves the existence of a deduction of QM from COMP, that is from the comp TOE of your choice, like the tiny sigma_1 complete fragment of arithmetic.

The advantage of comp is that if you accept the knowledge notion given by Theaetetus then COMP explains both the quanta and the qualia (by the "divine hypostases", the intensional variant of G* minus G). Technically the quanta seem to appear there, and this makes the quanta into first person (plural) notion, which is confirmed by Everett's multiplication of populations of persons, the contagiousness of the linear superposition. At the bottom of what is observable, the linear rules, comp-apparently.

Unfortunately, the arithmetical quantization []<> p is written in Z1*, that is precisely that [] p is Bp & Dp, that <>p is, dually, Bp v Dp, so that []<>p is [](Bp v Dp) = B(Bp v Dp) & D(Bp v Dp), and then to translate some Bell inequality, you need to evaluate formula nesting the quantization ([]<> ([] <> # ...), which makes most quantum logical assertion of that complexity still untractable today, despite the decidability of Z1*).

Bruno


In Everett's MWI there is a problem saying what probabilities mean, which is just the same as the one in the transporter thought experiment(c.f. arXiv:0905.0624v1 by Ardian Kent).

Brent



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